In Benin, the selection criteria for senior positions in the intelligence services are not made public in detail. The decree creating the intelligence services does not indicate anything about the criteria for selection for management positions [1]. Generally, it is men trusted by the President of the Republic who are appointed to this position [2].

There is no evidence of opportunity for intervention by third parties that may result in selection bias or undue influence in the selection of candidates. However, there is no known and specific selection process to appoint senior officials within the intelligence services [1]. This depends on the will and discretion of the President of the Republic who prefers to appoint people close to him at this strategical positions. In this case, impartiality may be an issue because of the political links to the ruling party or personal links to the president of the Republic [2].

Leadership positions in the intelligence services are mainly occupied by the defence and security forces [1]. A morality investigation shall be carried out by the competent services of the national police and there is no hiring panel that can call witnesses and demand information [2]. A morality investigation is a regulated investigation conducted to verify the behavior and background of a candidate for recruitment. In Benin, the legal framework for recruiting personnel in the intelligence services is not well detailed. But it should be noted that intelligence activities and the recruitment of associated personnel generally fall under the jurisdiction of defense and national security institutions. For sensitive and highly responsible positions, it is up to the President of the Republic to choose this staff. To this end, since the personnel of the intelligence service are within the ranks of the defense and security forces, they are in fact subject to this control as soon as they enter the field. But it is possible that specific control measures can be taken for intelligence positions, although these are not necessarily made public. This check aims to verify the integrity, good repute and loyalty of candidates before their integration into the intelligence services.

The appointment of senior officials in the national intelligence service is left to the discretion of the President of the Republic. Moreover, even the appointment decrees are never officially published. The criteria put forward for the appointment of these officials are generally loyalty to the course of action laid down by the CNDD-FDD. The people who are appointed to these positions are officers who were early fighters for the CNDD-FDD, who had started university studies in the early 90s but were unable to complete them because of the civil war. [1][2][3]

The appointment to high responsibilities at the level of the national intelligence service can indeedbe considered as a gift from the executive, particularly the President of the Republic. [1] [2]

The research found that there is no form of independent investigation into the people who are appointed to high-level positions within the national intelligence service [1] [2].In other words, these kinds of appointments are the personal choice of the President of the Republic.

The appointments within the intelligence services are governed by the discretionary power of the Head of State, Head of the Armed Forces. There are no known objective criteria known. It appears that senior positions within the intelligence services are subject to objective selection criteria. However, it seems that President Paul Biya, based on the profiles of the officials he has appointed to the top levels of these services, places particular emphasis on two criteria: discretion and reserve.[1][2]. There is no jury for the recruiting heads of the intelligence services, which makes the selection process even less transparent. Article 8, paragraph 2 of the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon stipulates that the President of the Republic is the head of the Armed Forces and can appoint anyone to these positions. Article 8[3] of the Constitution states that he is responsible for the internal and external security of the Republic. Paragraph 9 of the same article further states he appoints individuals to civil and military posts within the State.[3] From the above, the executive holds pre-eminence and exclusivity in the selection of senior intelligence officers, rendering the process opaque. The prerogatives of the Head of State reflect his discretionary power in appointment matters. The Martinez Zogo case has highlighted the deficiencies in the moral oversight of recruitment practices within the Cameroon intelligence services.[4]

It is the President of the Republic or his close collaborators who examine the profiles of all the candidates for senior positions in the intelligence services. As a strategic tool, intelligence is a service whose aim is to protect the national interests of the State. It seeks information to enable the State to ensure an independent and sovereign international life. In Cameroon, intelligence emanateis from, or is guided by, a policy of the Head of State whose strategic objectives are the defence of the State and its institutions.[1] In practice, in this country, intelligence services seem to serve more the President than the country [2]. The heads of the intelligence services are chosen and appointed by the President. The legal basis for these appointments is Article 8[3] of the Constitution, which states that the President is responsible for the internal and external security of the Republic. This article states in paragraph 9 that the President appoints to civil and military posts in the State.

There is no known verification process in Cameroon, and most appointments for these positions are solely at the discretion of the Presidency of the Republic.[1][2]

There is no evidence of objective selection criteria guiding the appointment of senior intelligence service officials. The process remains unknown. For example, the selection of intelligence service chiefs is a matter reserved for the president. The fight against terrorism has also strengthened the discretionary nature of the appointment of senior intelligence service officials. [1] [2]

The assessment found no specific information on this issue. The selection of intelligence service heads is discretionary. Counter-terrorism has reinforced the discretionary nature of the appointment of senior intelligence officials. The intelligence services have been reformed. The National Intelligence Coordinator (CNR) is attached to the Presidency and headed by a civilian administrator. [1]

The process remains opaque, as it is left to the discretion of the authorities responsible for appointments. National security and sometimes state security considerations reinforce this opacity. Information about the process itself and the profiles of candidates remains inaccessible to the general public and limited to government bodies such as the Ministries of Defence and the Interior, the Presidency and senior defence and security officials [1] [2].

The filling of Senior positions within the securities and intelligence services in Ghana is guided by the Securities and intelligence Agencies Act 2020 (Act 1030). (1) In all cases, appointment is by the President in accordance with Article 195 of the 1992 Constitution. This provision does not submit to any objective criteria as appointment is at the mercy of the President. (2)

The process of filling senior positions within the securities and intelligence services in Ghana, as described, can be subject to selection bias as it does not require the President of the Republic to adhere to specific, transparent, and objective criteria for appointments. Under Article 212 clauses (1) and (2) of the 1992 Constitution, the President appoints service chiefs in consultation with the Council of State and grants commissions to officers of the armed forces (1). Senior leadership positions in the intelligence community — including the Director-General of the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) — are also presidential appointments, made under the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) (2). Neither the Constitution nor the Act prescribes detailed, publicly available selection criteria for these roles, and the appointment process is not subject to open competition. This gives the President significant discretion in determining who fills these positions.

For example, a report by The Herald (2025) described the career progression of former Chief of Defence Staff as unusually rapid compared to some of his more senior colleagues (3). Citing unnamed sources, the paper suggested his promotions were linked by some observers to his perceived role in the electoral success of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government. These claims have not been confirmed by official investigations, and the government has not publicly acknowledged any irregularity in the appointments (3).
Moreover, security analysts have questioned the timing of senior military promotions, arguing that advancement should align with institutional needs and operational priorities. (4) While there is no directly documented case of political influence in recent NIB leadership appointments, the evidence suggests that, in both the armed forces and intelligence services, senior roles may be perceived by observers as subject to subjective factors. Without clear guidelines or merit-based qualifications, the President’s choices may be driven by subjective factors such as loyalty, political affiliation, or personal relationships, rather than the competence or qualifications of the candidates. (5) (6) (7)

The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 also states that an intelligence agency “shall have control over the selection, training and induction of a person into the agency,” and that other staff may be appointed by the President under article 195. This is an internal HR control, not an external vetting mechanism for senior appointments. (1) Act 1030 creates a Complaints Tribunal (appointed via the Chief Justice) that can call witnesses and request documents—but this is for handling complaints about agency conduct, not for pre-appointment vetting of nominees.
The Constitution establishes an Armed Forces Council to advise the President on appointments and promotions within the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF). While service regulations govern promotions, there is no public evidence of an external, independent vetting panel with the authority to call witnesses or demand information for senior intelligence positions (2). Furthermore, the Ministry of National Security must submit annual reports to Parliament under Act 1030 (incl. audited accounts). These are oversight/reporting duties; they do not constitute candidate vetting (1).
Any vetting that occurs appears to be internal and justified on the grounds that senior intelligence posts are considered highly sensitive and critical to national security (3)(4)(5). However, the processes are not codified in public law or subject to independent scrutiny.

There is an objective selection criteria for appointing the Director-General of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), but it is unclear if it is consistently applied. The President appoints the Director-General with the approval of the National Assembly, as stipulated in Article 242 of the Constitution, which establishes the National Intelligence Service, and Section 7(1) of the National Intelligence Service Act, 2012. Parliament has 14 days to consider the nominee’s suitability and either approve or reject the nomination [1]. Also, objective criteria under Section 8 of the National Intelligence Service Act (2012) outlines that a candidate must be a Kenyan citizen; hold a degree from a recognised university; have at least 15 years of experience in intelligence or national security; have served in a senior management role in NIS or public service for at least 10 years. Disqualifications include holding political office or having done so within the previous 5 years, dual citizenship, a criminal conviction for over six months without an option for fine, prior removal from office for misconduct.

Section 8 of the National Intelligence Service Act, 2012, outlines the criteria and requirements for the Director-General, including adherence to Chapter 6 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Chapter 6 emphasises integrity, accountability, and ethical conduct for public officers to uphold the rule of law and ensure effective democratic institutions [2].

However, while the recent nomination of the Director-General faced opposition in court and memorandums challenging his compliance with Chapter 6, the DG was ultimately appointed [3]. The approval of the NIS Director-General was nearly unanimous, with only one dissenting vote from MP Raphael Wanjala of Budalangi [4]. A court later dismissed the case challenging the DG’s appointment, stating that no objections had been raised to remove him while he served as the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) [5].

The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and the Red Card Campaign issued a press statement regarding the nomination, objecting to the DG’s appointment due to allegations of a compromised track record and failure to fulfill constitutional obligations during his tenure as DPP. Civil society organisations (CSOs) raised concerns about his impartiality and commitment to fighting corruption, citing a pattern of withdrawing approximately eight cases within just eight months of the new administration taking office [6]. During the Finance Bill protests, the Deputy President also issued a press statement where he allegedly criticised the DG, stating: “We have a dysfunctional National Intelligence Service that has exposed the President, the government, and the people of Kenya” [7].

There are sufficient checks and balances to ensure there is no opportunity for intervention by third parties that may result in selection bias or undue influence in the selection of candidates. For instance, there is a parliamentary vetting, including public hearings and an approval vote. The Public Appointments (Parliamentary Approval) Act (2011) authorises public submission of petitions, allowing civil society or concerned individuals to raise objections prior to approval.
While the president makes the appointment of the DG NIS, the power to reject or approve rests with parliament. The public have up to 14 days to present memos on nominees which are considered by the appointing committee. Where the public are not satisfied, they are allowed to seek legal redress. Section 8 of the National Intelligence Service Act provides for the qualifications of the Director-General of the National Intelligence Service in Kenya as follows: a citizen of Kenya; holds a degree from a university recognised in Kenya; has the knowledge and at least fifteen-years experience in intelligence or national security; has served in a senior management position in the National Intelligence Service or public service for at least ten years; and meets the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution (on leadership and integrity) [1].
At the backend of the protests in June 2024, the Deputy President alleged that the Director General of the NIS failed to provide intelligence about the protests. The Deputy President then issued a statement demanding the resignation of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) Director General to make way for a ‘more competent Director General’ [2]. The Cabinet Secretary of Defence made a rebuttal stating the Director General had a distinguished career, he rose from the ranks to becoming Deputy Director before leaving to become Director Public Prosecutions and later DG NIS [4].
No credible evidence has emerged suggesting political interference in this process. On the contrary, public resistance to nominations (e.g. KHRC challenge) was considered but ultimately dismissed by the committee and Assembly based on procedural and merit review [5].

Section 7(1) of the National Intelligence Service Act 2012 provides for a Director General to be appointed by the President with the approval of the National Assembly [1]. Parliament has 14 days after receiving the nominee’s name to consider their suitability and either approve or reject the nominee [2]. In parliament, the nominee is subject to a vetting process which includes raising questions and issues submitted from the public. Parliament evaluates the submissions and vetting outcomes and considers the candidate’s suitability. The vetting process is televised and accessible to the public [3].

The Act establishing National Security Agency states that the Director General and his deputy shall be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation required for the appointments to take effect.
However, beyond specifying the appointing authority and confirmation process, the Act does not provide objective, publicly available criteria such as professional qualifications, years of experience, or integrity vetting.[1]
While Senate confirmation hearings provide a degree of procedural scrutiny,[2] they are primarily political in tone and do not necessarily involve systematic investigation into candidates’ professional suitability or prior conduct [3][4].

The Act establishing the National Security Agency (NSA) stipulates that the Director General and Deputy are appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation. While this framework appears to provide checks through legislative oversight, in practice appointments remain largely political. Senate confirmation hearings are typically conducted as formalities rather than rigorous assessments of competence or prior conduct, with proceedings often focused on affirming political loyalty rather than scrutinising suitability.[1]

There is a likelihood that presidential appointment of officials in the security sector could be biased. Evidence suggests that appointments to senior positions in the intelligence sector are strongly influenced by political affiliation, loyalty to the President, and ethnic or patronage considerations, rather than objective selection criteria.[2] Public discourse also reflects concerns over tribal and religious biases in government appointments, with civil society organisations urging leaders to move away from such practices.[3]
Overall, while legal provisions mandate Senate confirmation, in practice appointments to senior intelligence posts are shaped more by political loyalty than by transparent, merit-based criteria.

The Act establishing National Security Agency outlines that the Director General and his deputy shall be presidential appointees. This makes the selection criteria clear in terms of the appointing authority. However, much of these positions when nominated are subjected to senate confirmation hearing, implying that these positions could be political.[1][2][3]
Regarding vetting procedures, there is no publicly available evidence of systematic background checks, clearance procedures, or professional vetting standards being applied to candidates for senior positions within the NSA. Calls from experts and civil society have highlighted the need for formal vetting mechanisms. For instance, a Liberian security expert in January 2024 recommended that top defence and police officers undergo thorough vetting before appointment.[4] However, there is no indication that these recommendations have been institutionalised.

Several criteria exist for the selection of seniors positions in the intelligence services. These include criteria based on values such as honesty, integrity, patriotism and competence. [1] [3] Thus, any soldier called upon to occupy an important position must be the subject of an internal investigation. [2] However, the criteria and procedures are not public.

Despite the existence of selection criteria, the appointment to high-level positions in the intelligence services is always linked to political considerations. So in 2022, for example, General Roger Rafanomezantsoa, ​​former Minister of Public Security, was appointed Director General of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS). This choice was motivated by the desire of the Head of State to better manage the presidential election which will be held a few months later [1]. Previously, the CIS was headed by General Dominique who is also the brother-in-law of the Prime Minister [2]. Those who therefore occupy the most important position in matters of intelligence are always a person trusted by the Head of State [2]. And this does not fail to have an impact on its impartiality.

Investigations are being carried out for appointment to high-level positions in the intelligence services [1]. However, although appointments to senior government positions must always meet the criteria of “competence, integrity, rigor, and firmness in the management of public affairs, it is rather the political criteria which seem to take precedence and above all proximity to the regime which holds the State. [2] [3]

The selection criteria for high-level posts in the intelligence services are at the discretion of the President of the Republic (President of the Transition). There are no pre-established criteria, and the head of general intelligence is a trusted confidant of the President of the Republic.[1][2]

According to the founding decree, in particular article 9, the National State Security Agency is placed under the direct authority of the President of the Republic, and the Director General and his deputy are appointed by decree of the President of the Republic.[1]The discretionary aspect can play a role at all levels in terms of appointments to management positions.[2]

The appointment and promotion processes for intelligence officials are unclear and constitute another potential catalyst for illicit processes. Such appointments appear to have been generally determined by political considerations, often at the expense of probity and efficiency. There is no public information about any vetting processes for the appointment of senior intelligence officials.[1][2]

In Mozambique, Intelligence Sector issues are competitive and protected by the State Secrets Law [1]. The Intelligence Policy is not public, and the recruitment model is objective in law: internal verification processes and principles based on confidentiality of procedures, freedom of candidate freedom ((i.e., the legal guarantee that candidates may apply without discrimination or undue restriction), objectivity in selection criteria, and other relevant principles [3]. Paragraphs A, B and C, No. 1, Article 5 of Decree No. 18/2013, of May 3, which sanctions the Regulation of the Statute of Members of the State Intelligence and Security Service (approved by Law No. 13/2012, of February 8) present the criteria for recruitment as well as selection and internal verification of Intelligence Services personnel [4]. However, in practice, the process is unclear, subjective and based on trust and some level of patriotism [2]. The level of trust or perceptions of the level of patriotism and verification [2, 3] are the dominant criteria for the recruitment of officers and appointment of leaders in the Intelligence Sector in Mozambique, since the early post-National Independence period in 1975.

Traditionally, senior positions in the Intelligence Services depend more on the trust of the executive than on the technical competence and knowledge of the Intelligence Sector. Trust of the executive involves the level of political militancy in the party in power, relationships of affinity and proximity through the period of training or area of work, recommendation from a political or war veteran, and even ethnic relationships of place of birth, language and ethnic group [1]. According to Article 5 of Decree No. 18/2013, of May 3, which approves the Regulation of the Statute of Members of the State Intelligence and Security Service, “the candidate who has been cumulatively approved in the following phases may be appointed as a member of the Intelligence Service: recruitment; basic military selection; objectivity in selection criteria and other relevant principles” [2]. The objectivity involves mainly the use of merit-based criteria such as educational qualifications, relevant professional training, results from aptitude or physical fitness tests, and compliance with background vetting requirements [2]. However, the weight given to these criteria is limited in senior appointments, where political trust and loyalty remain decisive.

The recruitment and appointment follow the Verification element, but the process does not require a public competition and observes the principles of confidentiality of procedures, freedom of candidate freedom ((i.e., the legal guarantee that candidates may apply without discrimination or undue restriction), objectivity in selection criteria and other relevant principles [1]. The verification consists of the “process of collecting and analysing information about members and candidates for entry based on known facts using specific procedures, methods and means” [2]. The elements of the vetting process can be compromised if matters related to political affinity, trust and patriotism, are used to the detriment of the objective procedural aspects established by legislation [3].

Recruitment information for senior intelligence posts cannot be sourced. It is also worth noting that the intelligence services information is covert and therefore not easily subject to oversight [1][2]

There is not enough evidence available on the recruitment of senior intelligence posts to score this indicator. [1] [2]

There is not enough evidence available on the recruitment of senior intelligence posts to score this indicator. [1] [2]

Recruitment and promotion in Nigeria’s public service are in principle guided by the Federal character principle. Federal Character Commission (FCC) has the responsibility of implementing this principle in Nigeria [1]. The principle, which has been enshrined in Nigeria’s Constitution since 1979, was borne out of the need to ensure evenness in spreading government appointments to promote inclusion, representation, a sense of belonging and balance in the polity. The underlying philosophy of the principle is providing equality of access in public service representation to curb dominance by one or a few sections, including in the defence and security sector [2]. Public service institutions are expected to adhere to its provision, but in addition to compliance to objective selection criteria. Within the nation’s intelligence institutions, it is unclear if the federal character principle and objective selection criteria are applied given several allegations of favouritism and politicisation of the recruitment, promotion and posting of officers [3,4].

Although the National Assembly has a residual power to vet and confirm appointments, this does not constitute effective checks and balances on the exercise of the executive power to appoint [1]. Senior positions in the military, security and intelligence services are primarily influenced by the executive. A Premium Times analysis found 12 out of 21 heads of national security agencies hail from the South-West and North-West, aligning with President Tinubu’s home region—a distribution that critics say reflects nepotism and political allegiance rather than institutional checks and balances [2].

More recently, allegations of favouritism are rife as President Bola Tinubu favoured his associates from his native South-west and parts of North-west and North-east [3]. A critic noted that “President Bola Tinubu’s appointment is nepotistic and now has earned the status of nepotism pro max 15” [4]. Transparency advocates argue that confirmation hearings are often brief lacking detailed interrogation of candidates’ credentials, and instead echo political patronage patterns [4][3]. While this doesn’t necessarily prove illegal nepotism, it demonstrates that executive dominance over appointments undermines the institutional purpose of vetting

Security vetting in Nigeria is formally conducted by agencies such as the State Security Service (SSS) and the Department of State Services (DSS), intended to evaluate the suitability of senior regional and defence personnel [1]. However, high-profile setbacks have highlighted systemic defects in the process.

In 2020, the Peoples Gazette exposed the SSS recruitment scandal, revealing that hundreds of personnel slots were allocated to individuals from the Director-General’s regional base—ignoring standard vetting criteria. Leaders across Nigeria’s South and Middle Belt strongly criticized the process as discriminatory and politically driven, effectively bypassing merit-based vetting protocol [2]. Politicians have taken over the decision of who becomes a security operative in the country. Given such external influence by politicians, the outcome of a vetting exercise is sometimes disregarded by decision makers in the government [3][4].
These cases illustrate that, despite legal frameworks, vetting recommendations are often overridden when appointments serve political interests, compromising the integrity of selection processes and undermining public confidence in intelligence institutions.

Senior officers in intelligence services are selected based on criteria such as integrity, ethics and professionalism. [1] The culture of military professionalism that has developed in Senegal is the result of a deliberate and long-term effort to instil the values of service, meritocracy and respect for democratic values. [2] In general, appointments within the Senegalese army, including the intelligence services, are made according to specific procedures that take into account rank, seniority, skills and operational needs. Appointments may be promotions, transfers or assignments to specific positions. Decisions are made by the military hierarchy, usually the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, after consultation with the Superior Defence Council. However, these criteria can be very relative and depend on the assessment of the line manager who is responsible for appointing the person. [1]

The Senegalese executive has not sought to interfere in the internal workings of the army, whether it be promotions, advancement or the appointment of officers. [1] Possibility of political affiliations playing a role in the selection still exist but evidence suggests that it is relatively low and that there is a high level of impartiality in the selection process. [2]

Before a person is appointed to a certain position of responsibility, there is a morality check on the various candidates, and this also applies to the military. [1] The suitability of candidates for certain positions including intelligence services, is assessed in great depth, but this is done internally and not by external bodies. Depending on the type of position, candidates may be interviewed. A character investigation is also carried out in certain cases. A character investigation or morality check is an inquiry conducted to verify a person’s integrity and behaviour, often in the context of administrative or professional procedures. It aims to ensure that the person is trustworthy and suitable for certain roles or activities.[2] Most of the time, the hiring panel doesn’t bother to call witnesses and ask for information about the person.

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The Intelligence Services Regulations set out requirements for the recruitment and selection of intelligence operatives including high-level principles for appointments. [1] It is, however, unclear whether these criteria are applied in practice particularly in a context where intelligence services have been highly politicised. The most senior position within the State Security Agency has been vacant for a significant period since 2018 and the last Director-General resigned after less than two years in office. [2]

In terms of the Intelligence Services Act, the Director-Generals of intelligence services are appointed by the President and generally, are politically aligned with the President. [1] The head of the State Security Agency during the period of state capture was a close ally of former President Jacob Zuma and based on the findings of the State Capture Commission, supported the President in fighting factional party politics. [2] Although the period of state capture falls outside the assessment period, the selection remains an unfettered prerogative of the President as per the Intelligence Service Act, which has not changed.

The Intelligence Services Regulations establishes processes for vetting and the provision of security clearances. [1] In practice, the system is highly dysfunctional with senior officials at times operating without security clearances, non-compliance with the vetting process, and a significant backlog of cases and insufficient staffing to perform background checks. [2]

The National Security Service is established under Article 160 of the South Sudan Constitution. This section goes ahead to stipulate how high-ranking officials of the service are to be recruited [1]. Article 160 (2a) of the Transitional Constitution clearly states that while the two Directors General of the NSS – the Internal Security Bureau (ISB) and the General Intelligence Bureau (GIB) – shall be appointed by the President, they would first need to be endorsed by the Minister of National Security [1]. However, the application of this law has been questioned as the selection of the senior positions within the NSS has been based on Presidential Orders. For instance, the appointment of the first director generals of NSS and ISB. [2] [3] Nonetheless, under Chapter II of the R-ARCSS on the unification of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF), the parties to the R-ARCSS agreed on the unification of the top echelon of the NUF, including NSS, based on agreed criteria, which involve qualifications, experience, and other factors to ensure a competent and balanced leadership.

While the constitution [1] is clear about how senior officials of the intelligence service are to be appointed in South Sudan, there are some limitations that could hinder unbiased selection. The selection of senior intelligence officers in South Sudan is heavily influenced by ethnic loyalty, political allegiance, and personal ties to the president, rather than professional merit or institutional competence. This bias consolidates power within a narrow elite—particularly from the president’s ethnic group—undermining national cohesion and fostering impunity within the security sector[3]. One such prominent example is the appointment of the heads of ISB and GIB on Independence Day by the President, when even ministers had not been appointed yet. [2] Such actions inevitably raise concerns over the commitment by the executive to remain unbiased.

There is no evidence that top officials of the National Security Services were subjected to vetting before being appointed. There was no evidence on local and regional media [1] regarding such vetting. The researcher contact at the transitional National Legislative Assembly [2] was also not aware of vetting processes for such officials. In addition, as explained in section 22B the earliest appointments of top National Security Services were not done according to the law, there is no public information showing that subsequent appointments have been subjected to a vetting process [3]. However, under the unification of forces, the vetting of the officers was based on individual parties to the R-ARCSS internal processes and the list submitted to the President as the appointing authority. [4]

The question of whether senior positions within Uganda’s intelligence services are filled based on objective selection criteria, and whether appointees undergo thorough suitability and prior conduct investigations, reveals a tension between stated policy and practical application. While objective selection criteria may exist on paper, their consistent and impartial application remains unclear. This ambiguity raises concerns about the integrity and professionalism of the intelligence services.[1][2]
Senior positions in Uganda’s intelligence services, such as the Director of the Internal Security Organisation (ISO) or the External Security Organisation (ESO), are often appointed by the president.[3] This appointment process can be heavily influenced by political loyalty and patronage rather than by merit-based or objective criteria. In recent years, it has been observed that some individuals appointed to high-level intelligence positions in Uganda have had close ties to the ruling government or the president himself. For example, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni has appointed his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, as head of the military. General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is widely perceived to be his father’s successor as the President of Uganda [4].

According to the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) Act, there are clear provisions for promotions in the army [1]. The UPDF Act and related statutes set out promotion/selection criteria for UPDF officers (length of service, training, confidential reports on character/performance, exams, etc.). The UPDF Act defines clear promotion criteria and structures that include senior intelligence roles like Chief of Military Intelligence. [1]
However, appointments at the highest echelons (e.g., heads of intelligence formations) remain heavily influenced by the President or High Command and are not based solely on objective or independent vetting mechanisms [2]. There have been allegations of nepotism which have seen some personnel stagnate in ranks yet have served for long in the force, while others have been promoted rapidly, and yet they are considered newcomers. [3]

Section 55 of the UPDF Act 2005 provides the considerations for the promotion of an officer or a militant, where the Board shall consider the following:
a) the establishment of the Defence Forces;
b) his or her length of service, and where applicable, age;
c) training or courses or both, attended;
d) appointment;
e) results of such standard promotions examinations, practical and written, to be attended after such periods after successful completion of the requisite courses, as shall be prescribed by the Defence Forces Council;
f) confidential reports by his or her commanding officer or head of department regarding – i) character; ii) discipline; and iii) performance;
g) for professionals and quasi-professionals, qualifications and experience; and;
h) such other conditions as the Defence Forces Council may prescribe [1].
However, these processes are not followed by the appointing authorities and the vetting process is generally not subjected to any external party [2]. There is little evidence that senior intelligence appointments undergo independent, external vetting (public confirmation/hearings, parliamentary vetting) or investigations on questionable conduct before appointment. Appointment largely remains an executive prerogative [3][4]

While the constitution states that the president appoints the Director General of the Intelligence organisation for a renewable five years [1], it is not clear as to how they are appointed. The selection criteria and appointing senior personnel into the senior positions of the intelligence, is not clear [2,3]. The selection and appointment of senior intelligence officers remains a subjective process based on loyalty and political party affiliation -ZANU-PF [4].

The selection process for senior positions in the intelligence is often not transparent, as those appointed have links with the ruling party, ZANU-PF and the president [1]. There is no clear criteria in selecting these individuals. Some findings suggest that the president would only appoint candidates that will serve their political interests. [2] Moreover, the marks of nepotism can be seen even at the highest levels of the intelligence agency. The President has previously confirmed that the Head of the Zimbabwean CIO boss is his uncle, who he appointed. Similarly, President Mnangagwa confirmed that he is related to CIO Director General Isaac Moyo at the funeral of the latter’s daughter. [3].

The whole process of appointing individuals in senior intelligence positions is unclear [1]. There is internal vetting, but the main challenge is that there is no clarity on how the vetting process is conducted, what the objective selection criteria is and whether it is employed appropriately, and the offices and officers involved; suggesting minimal or no credible investigation [2].