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Q60.

Are potential defence purchases made public?

60a. Policies

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60b. Notice of planned purchases

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The long-term plan on the development of the Armed Forces (LTPDAF) provides the priorities for the defence purchases between 2016-2025 for all the services and branches of the Armed Forces. The purchases are planned to be conducted in three-year phases: 2016-2018, 2019-2021, and 2022-2525 [1]. The annual directives issued by the minister of defence provide information on the on-going status of the purchases [2, 3, 4].

The MoD website provides some information on completed purchases, but no information is provided on budget. Some of the planned procurements appear in the annual procurement plans of the MoD and the armed services [1]. Some financial information on the yearly planned purchases is provided by the minister of defence during discussions on the proposed annual budget in the parliament [2, 3, 4, 5].

No information could be found on planning for potential purchases. There is also no evidence that a strategic defence review or a white paper exists, at least not publicly, for example on the website of the Defence Ministry (1) or in the military magazine (2). In public, Vice-Defence Minister Salah has broadly addressed this issue and stated that it had to be ensured that the armed forces were optimally equipped and armed (3). He did not say anything more specific about potential defence purchases. As has also been noted by the country’s last assessment (4), and answered in previous questions, sensitive information on defence issues including procurement is subject to secrecy.

No information could be found on forward purchase plans of the Ministry of Defence, either on their website or their monthly magazine (1), (2). In an article, the military noted that its modernization and development process is proceeding according to carefully considered and detailed planning (3), but no further information was provided. As has also been noted by the country’s last assessor and expanded upon in previous answers, sensitive information on defence procurement is subject to secrecy.

The government has not produced a published white paper, though one has been written, it is not published yet. National Development Plans (the last for 2018-2022) contain strategic objectives for defence and security, though no financial information is provided. Defence purchases are not made public, in detail, in advance before being approved by the president (1), (2).

While arms and military logistics procurement is exempted from the 2016 Public Procurement Law, presidential approvals for other defence procurement contracts need to be published in the official gazette. Additionally, the state budget law published every year on the Ministry of Finance website, requires the president to submit contracts above the value of 26 million USD (as for Jan. 2018) to audit court pre-review (2).

For instance, the purchase of six helicopters from Augusta Westland SA in 2014, approved by the president in 2015 (by presidential dispatch 83/15 of October 13, published in the official gazette), went through an audit court review (being one of the few public court records regarding defence purchases). Nevertheless, recent media reports allege that eventually different, cheaper models were delivered than the helicopters stipulated in the contract, raising suspicions that the then chief of the President’s Security Bureau exerted his influence to misappropriate the price difference (1), (3), (4) (5).

However, confirmation on the purchase and delivery of 18 Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets (all second-hand and refurbished), a deal initiated in 2013, embedded in a broader cooperation agreement with Russia, was mainly provided by Russian sources. No detail of the contracts was made public and there is no record of a contract pre-review by the audit court (6).

Decree 1729/2007 establishes a “National Defence Planning Cycle.” [1] First, the President and the Ministry of Defence order the Chiefs of Staff to issue a Strategic Military Plan. This Plan includes short, medium, and long term plans for the Armed Forces. The Short Term Plan “determines the form in which military power will be employed with the existing stock of military capability.” This Short Term Plan (1-3 years) is used to develop the annual preliminary budget of each branch of the military. The Medium Term Plan (4-20 years) “directs available efforts to achieving the necessary capabilities … to secure the comprehensive fulfillment of the Strategic Military Objectives.” Through it the Chiefs of Staff must produce a Military Capacity Draft that establishes the desirable level of capacities to satisfy the Armed Forces’ missions, as set out in the Short Term Plan. This later becomes the Military Capabilities Plan, which will include the planning for specific investments. The Long Term Plan (over 20 years) defines the strategic vision of the military. These plans are not exclusively focused on procurement. Purchase decisions are mostly covered in the Short and Medium Term plans. The Long Term Plan is conceived more in terms of research to adapt to changes in the strategic outlook or techology, so that the Armed Forces can adapt, transform, or renew themselves accordingly. None of these plans are accessible online publicly, so there is no way of knowing if they are comprehensive.

On the websites of COMPR.AR [1] and CONTRAT.AR [2] there is no information regarding acquisition plans that go beyond a year. Likewise, with the exception of the DPDN, remaining procurement planning documents deriving from the Decree on the National Defence Planning Cycle are not easily accessible to the public. [3] [4]

The Law on Procurement in a detailed manner outlines the planning and financial sources for the procurement. Clause 3 of Article 15 outlines the planning and possible changes in the preliminary listing of procurement [1]. Potential defence purchases are planned for each fiscal year and included in the yearly budget. The plans are available through the www.amersp.am web portal. The plans are made yearly, there is no other public indication that longer planning occurs (though, there might be internal planning that is not made public).
Decree N 526- Ն, provides a very detailed procedure of procurement. Among very specific provisions, there is a planning form compulsory for all government agencies [2]. There is no comprehensive list of defence procurement available to the public. This is partially justified by the N9-Ն Order by the minister of defence [3], that in a detailed manner prescribes the extensive institutional list of confidential information based in the Law on State and Official Secrecy [4]. There is a Strategic Defence Review, though no full information on purchases exists [5]. The review was the basis for development of long-term classified defense development plans and programs for 2016-2024 (Armed Forces’ Development Plan (2018-2024), State Plan for Arms and Military Equipment Development). [6]. Moreover, Midterm Expenditure Framework (MTEF) includes also planning of purchases for each state body in the 3-year perspective. However, in this document the procurement plans are very vague and superficial, and hardly can be qualified as comprehensive and detailed plans in the sense of this sub-indicator. More or less detailed procurement plans are contained only in the annual state budgets. [7].

All the regular defence purchases are available through the www.armeps.am portal with detailed descriptions on purchase items and financial information. Military procurement; however, is not as public as the regular purchases.The long-term development plans of the RA Armed Forces contain a state secret and are not subject to publication. Order N 9-Ն [1] by the minister of defence on extensive confidentiality of military procurement limit the opportunity to obtain information on military acquisitions. The lists available through the web portal are only available for one year. There are no procurement plans for a longer period than a year.

The 2016 Defence White Paper [1] and complementary Integrated Investment Plan (IIP) [2] contain advanced long-term planning of defence procurement; however, the IIP has been heavily criticised for being superficial and has not been properly updated since the beginning of 2016. At its launch in February 2016, the IIP said it focused “on the first ten years of investment, with broad guidance on the second decade to FY 2035–36 where feasible, to allow for longer-term investment portfolio planning” [2, p9]. In practice, this means little detail on estimated schedules, budgets, and planning is available beyond FY 2025-26, which is as of September 2019 just 5 years away. The IIP claimed that, by bringing together different investment programs into one document “for the first time”, it would “provide the framework for a more coherent and efficient approach to managing the development of future Defence capability [2, p9]. Despite this promise, the comprehensiveness of the IIP was sharply criticised, with analysts saying “…despite its many colourful charts and self-congratulatory ‘for the first time’ claim, the level of disclosure in the IIP is below that of DCP [Defence Capability Plan] published from 2001–2012, and even compares poorly with the public ‘Pink Books’ and ‘Green Books’ of the 1990s. As a result, the 2016 IIP represents the lowest point in defence capability planning transparency in a quarter-century” [3]. Additionally, despite assurances that “an online version [of the IIP] will be periodically updated to reflect changes in the program” [2, p11], the online resources that have come up are short on detail and often riddled with inaccuracies [4, 5]. Promised comprehensive reporting has been repeatedly delayed [5].

Detailed notice of planned purchases publicly occurs up to one year in advance through the AusTender website, though the level of comprehensiveness is low and it’s not clear how complete the planned procurement list is. The Department of Defence releases and continually updates an Annual Procurement Plan (APP) [1], which gives detail on the type of procurement, when the approach to market is planned, the location, relevant contacts within defence [2], and occasionally expected completion dates and a brief description of the work to be done [3]. The APP includes projects planned roughly up to a year in advance. Experts say the list is not complete, likely not including many projects, though the precise proportion of planned projects included vs excluded on the list is difficult to tell [4]. Some purchases, such as those of Foreign Military Sales materiel from the United States, are only publicly revealed – through US Government disclosure, rather than Australian Department of Defence disclosure – ex-post [5].

According to experts (1, 2, 3), Azerbaijan does not have a strategic procurement program in the military field and, therefore, the procurement policy is spontaneously conducted. The public cannot access documents and regularly updated information on all aspects of the defence policy or security strategy. For example, the text of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) (4) and the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO are not publicly available. White Paper has not been accepted. The Military Doctrine (5), the National Security Concept (6) and The Maritime Security Strategy (7) do not cover the procurement steps. Thus, the government does not have any plans covering procurement for about 5-10 years.

The government’s plans for planned purchases are not publicly available. There is no information about potential tenders available. In a number of cases, general information is given on whether Azerbaijan will receive weapons from various countries (1).

According to sources, there is no white paper or strategic paper on strategic purchases. Forward planning is usually less than a year in advance for strategic purchases as a result of (mostly external) political influence [1, 2]. In some cases, there are strategic purchases (such as from USA), which is announced as a deal before hand, but with no details. In that case it is not forward planing rather a politically influenced decision. There is no evidence that strategic procurements from the US have a plan attached as they are decided through the King’s office, and not based on an assessment of needs. Following a search of the website of the parliament, MoD, Ministry of Finance, the government and other media sources and verified by interviewees, there is no more information on this topic.

Based on internet research and from interviews, no information on forward planning for strategic purchases is made public. Sometimes, foreign news outlets announce the procurement of weapons, but these are not available publicly in an official format [1, 2]. Following a search of the website of the Parliament, the MoD, the Ministry of Finance, the government and other media sources, and then verified by interviewees, there is no more information on this topic.

In 2012, Bangladesh began a military modernisation programme entitled Forces Goal 2030, with the aim of transforming its defence forces into a three-dimensional force. This modernisation plan was endorsed by the Prime Minister [1]. In addition to the regular defence budget, an undisclosed amount was earmarked for necessary purchases under this plan [2].

The full details of Forces Goal 2030 have not been officially disclosed, however, the Prime Minister, who is also the Minister of Defence, recently spoke publicly about Forces Goal 2030, hinting that Bangladesh will build its own fighter jets [1]. Elaborate unofficial details are available on military information websites [2] and on a defence journal website [3]. The Ministry of Defence’s 2019 annual report also provided a list of military hardware and equipment purchased [4]. On May 18, 2021, the DGDP issued a tender for the foreign purchase of 90 ‘Reliving of rocket 240 mm’ for the MiG-29, requisitioned by the Bangladesh Air Force. It was not possible to confirm whether this purchase is part of Forces Goal 2030 or when it will be delivered [5].

Forward planning is included in the Strategic Vision of the Minister of Defence [1]. This document is drawn up each legislature. It elaborates on the five year plan of forward procurement planning. The document generally also includes pointers to more long-term acquisitions. After drafting, it is approved by the government and transposed into a law [2]. The current Strategic Vision was drafted in 2015 and extends to 2030 – a 15 year period. The new Strategic Vision has been drafted but is awaiting acceptance by the government.

The Strategic Vision provides detailed information on capability procurement [1]. It includes detailed data on capability type, investment cost and envisaged timing. Moreover, the procurement procedures require the announcement of planned defence purchases through the official channels, as stipulated by the laws on public procurement [2, 3].

Debates on Defence by oversight agencies and civil society are relatively low in Belgium, mainly due to a lack of interest. However, the necessity of defence purchases is debated. The key players are the Commission of Defence, the Royal Higher Institute of Defence and the expert committees which draft a report on the risk envorinment and the recommendations for Defence’s Strategic Vision [4, 5, 6, 7].

Through Defence Review and Development and Modernization Project of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH), a document containing a ten-year plan for potential purchases has been produced. The documents outline further activities in the defence sector aimed at building modern, well-equipped, trained and affordable armed forces that will be interoperable with NATO forces [3].
This document has been prepared and approved by the BiH Presidency for the period 2017 – 2027. More precisely: At its 31st regular session held on 24 November 2016, the presidency adopted:
– Decision adopting the documents “Defence Review” and “Plan of development and modernisation of the Armed Forces of BiH”
– Decision on the size, structure and locations of the Armed Forces of BiH, which will enter into force on the date of the activation of NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP)
At its 51st extraordinary session held on 1 February 2017, the BiH Presidency adopted:
– Implementation plan for the document “Defence Review”
– Action Plan for implementation of the “2017-2027 Plan of development and modernisation of the Armed Forces of BiH [1].”
The listed documents are not publicly available and it makes it harder to evaluate all the provided information. It is of consequence to note that the aforementioned documents contain information whose disclosure to unauthorised users could pose a threat to the defence system of BiH. Under the Law on Protection of Secret Data (“Official Gazette of BiH”, Nos. 54/05 and 12/09), this information is considered secret and as such cannot be distributed to unauthorised users.
As part of the implementation of the Action Plan for implementation of the “2017-2027 Plan of development and modernisation of the Armed Forces of BiH”, AFBiH has started developing projects aimed at modernisation of AFBiH. Projects are in the design phase, and the planning of procurement of goods, services and works needed for these projects depends on the approved funds [2].
Media reported that the content of the two documents includes: the reduction of a number of military personnel; the modernization of the command and control system; the procurement of helicopters, combat armoured vehicles on wheels, transport motor vehicles [4].

The government publishes the plans for defence purchases in detail for one year [1]. Before launching procurement procedures, the MoD publishes the public procurement plan on its website for all types of procedures described in the Public Procurement Law (PPL) [2]. The law stipulates that all procurements with a value over 50,000BAM (+/-25000EUR) for goods and services, and 80,000 BAM (+/-40000 EUR) for works, must be included in the procurement plan [3]. The MoD can easily change the procurement plan, in 2018 there were three amendments to the procurement plan [4].

Potential defence purchases that are not sensitive are made public [1]. However, the projections of the potential procurements are usually for 12-24 months and not for periods longer than that. There are reports or statements of future purchases but these are not documented officially. For example, in 2017, BDF started receiving second hand Land Rover 110 Defenders from a British company Witham (Specialist Vehicles) Ltd. Although at the time it was claimed that BDF procured the vehicles to the tune of P161.9 million, sources within the army have revealed that the vehicles were donated by the British army [2]. Although this procurement was known within the BDF circles, it was not published as a demonstration of forwarding planning, despite it discussed for a long time.

As explained in 60A, notices of purchases are published on the PPADB website [1,2]. However, the government occasionally publishes the plans for defence purchases in detail two years in advance. The 2-year notice is not prescribed in terms of the law.[1] Depending on the nature of the procurement, 1-2 year notices may be given and published on the PPADB website as noted above. For example, the BDF 2019-2021 Procurement Plan provides details on the procurement project name, budget allocation, tender dates, procurement timeline, and bidding process.[3,4] The information is fairly comprehensive.

Brazil has a general plan of what will be developed (which involves acquisitions) in its three strategic defence documents: the Defence National Strategy (END – Estratégia Nacional de Defesa) the Defence National Policy (PND – Política Nacional de Defesa) [1] and the White Paper [2]. The strategic projects [3] are publicized and require planning for potential purchases that are more than ten years in advance. These projects, available publicly, mention the potential defence purchase necessary. The “Escritório de Projetos do Exército Brasileiro” (Office for Projects of the Brazilian Army), list the requirements for each of the main strategic projects of the Force, such as Sisfron, Guarani (this project is scheduled to be completed in 20 years), Cyber defence, Proteger, etc; it is the same with Navy and Air Force. Those are potential purchase for the next 10 to 15 years [4]. There is also defence acquisition planning, the Plano de Articulação e Equipamento de Defesa (PAED), but there are not many details about it on official websites [5]. There is a document that elaborates the PAED’s history, stating that it was the result of a study group created within the Ministry of Defence in 2011, envisioning a projection of defence acquisitions for the next 20 years. The study group established a necessary connection between the plan and the national defence strategy documents (cited in Q60A) [6]. However, when the assessor asked to have access to the document through an FOIA request, the Ministry of Defence asserted that the document is still being developed, and the study group will only release the document at the end of 2022 [7].

The PAED is not available, as it is still being worked on [1], therefore it is not possible to know the plans regarding defence acquisitions.The purchase of the Gripen aircraft lasted 15 years [2, 3]. They were not reported on in a timely manner; instead, the process took longer than imagined. As explained, plans are public, but not extensively so.

In 2017, the MoD got the National Assembly to pass a law, the new law is known as the Law of Military Programming, for the implementation of a 2018-2022 Strategic Reform Plan (1). According to a member of the Defence and Security Committee, 725 billion CFA francs will be allocated every year for the implementation of the plan (2). However, there is no breakdown of that amount, nor the activities included in the amount (2). Usually, the military of Burkina Faso does not initiate planning of purchases or defence procurements or contracting as a whole. According to Article 6 of Law No. 039, some defence items are labelled secret and are therefore not made public (3).

The 2017 Law of Military Programming provides some information on forward purchase plans by indicating the amount to be allocated every year, as well as a timeframe (five years). According to Diallo, the passing of this law will allow the government to provide the military with comprehensive resources to effectively fulfil its mission (1). However, it is regrettable that the law does not provide any details on the items that will be purchased. The law does not provide much information on how the military will use the money or on their intended procurement and contracting processes (2), (3).

Due to the lack of transparency surrounding defence and security procurement [1], potential defence purchases are not made public. There is no evidence of forward planning for potential purchases, or of any strategic defence review or white paper.

Information on military procurement usually only filters through supplying organisations and media outlets when purchases have been made [1]. There is no information available in the existing literature that was made public while defence purchases were being planned. Military donations made to the government of Cameroon are however aired on state media outlets [2]. The rise of the Boko Haram sect has increased this trend as the government of Cameroon receives more and more military support in the form of training, logistics and weaponry [3].

Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy’, developed in 2017 after extensive public consultation, lays out planned defence funding projections for 20 years with more detailed breakdowns for each year from 2017-2021 and accounting for spending as a proportion of GDP through to 2025. [1] Additionally, the broad anticipatory needs/requirements from the various branches of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are laid out in policy documents and publications from the Department of National Defence (DND) that outline key strategic needs for the maintenance of military capabilities. [2]

The Government Contracts Regulations, Section 7 notes that: “A contracting authority shall solicit bids by (a) giving public notice, in a manner consistent with generally accepted trade practices, of a call for bids respecting a proposed contract; or (b) inviting bids on a proposed contract from suppliers on the suppliers’ list.” [1] The specifics of many defence purchases (over CAD10,000) are listed on the Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) website. [2] The list includes the date, location, description, and total amount of the contract awarded, as well as links to further information about the procurement. Through the Request for Proposal(s) (RFP) process, the requirements needed for potential projects are laid out for firms bidding on government contracts. In the case of open bidding for contracts, government websites list those firms that are interested in supplying the tenders. [3] At later stages of development, those companies/firms that have been identified as meeting the initial criteria (for each procurement initiative) to bid for the contract are highlighted specifically. [3] Potential defence purchases that are made available to the public are listed as Notice of Proposed Procurement (NPP) on the BuyandSell website. NPPs relating to the Department of National Defence (DND), are listed in a drop-down menu. [4] RFPs that are DND related, also in a drop-down menu, are often found to be less than a year ahead of the purchasing plan (that is, publication date to date closing). [5]

In conformity with the 2006 Law of Fiscal Responsibility [1], the last edition of the Book of Defence [2] defined a system of investment in defence based on the development of strategic capacities. However, the Ministry of Defence (MDN) has not yet published a strategic plan for potential acquisitions in the sector. In 2018, the Capability Based Planning Process was updated and was established as a testing mode for four years [3]. However, it was not possible to find documents relating to this.

The MDN does not publish plans for defence purchases in advance or with sufficient detail. Particular institutions in the defence sector may publish their purchasing plan for the year on the public bidding website bidding, Chile Compras [1]. In 2019, the navy purchasing plan was equivalent to 102,182 USD, and the air force a plan for 31,525 USD.

Forward planning exists but is not transparent. The CMC Equipment Procurement Regulations (2002, 装备采购条例) [1] stipulate a three-year procurement cycle with detailed timeframes and deadlines (Article 16). The public can find out about China’s strategic doctrine and priorities through White Papers, which are regularly published by the MoD, articles in the state and army press, and military parades. However, the information contained is limited. For instance, the latest White Paper only mentions that: “Type 15 tanks, type 052D destroyers, J-20 fighters, and DF-26 intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles have been commissioned.” [2] Also, the public is informed about a defence purchase only when it is near completion or already operational. [3,4,5] The plap.cn and www.weain.mil.cn. procurement websites contain information about planned purchases but only when these plans have reached the tender stage.

In the few instances when the MoD has announced its plans for purchases in White Papers or official statements, there has been no clear timeframe involved and usually new weapons are announced either after they are operational or at the late stages of their development/purchase. Overall, there is no commitment to announcing potential purchases and there is extensive secrecy in the military modernisation efforts, especially in planning stages. [1]

Potential defence acquisitions are planned on an annual basis through a procurement plan. Article 74 of Law 1474 of 2011 provides that all state entities must issue their Plan of Action, including their procurement plan, on 31 January of each year. [1] This format is standardised and contains items such as: the UNSPSC code; a description; estimated start date of selection process; estimated date of submission of offers; estimated duration of the contract; mode of selection; estimated value at current value; future terms; status of request for future validity; recruitment unit; location; name of the person responsible; and data of the person responsbile, including telephone and email. This Plan is also required to take into account the mission and vision of the entities and the strategy perspective of each of the forces and the Ministry of Defense. [2, 3]

The Ministry of Defence and affiliated entities publish their procurement plans annually. According to the Transparency Act 1712 of 2014, [1] this is a part of the mandatory minimum information required by Law regarding services, procedures, and operation of the entities. The format of the Plan is standardised and contains descriptive information related to the UNSPSC code; description; estimated start date of selection process; estimated date of submission of offers; estimated duration of the contract; mode of selection; estimated current value; future terms; status of request for future validity; recruitment unit; location; name of the person responsible; and data of the individual in charge including telephone number and email. In addition, SECOP I [2] allows public entities, including the defence sector, to publish in detail the public calls for purchases of goods and services required by the sector. These publications are made covering a certain period of time, complying with contractual requirements. [3] The annual procurement plans can be found on the websites of the Ministry of Defence, [4] the National Army, [5] the Colombian National Navy, [6] the Air Force, [7] and the National Police. [8] Documents cover one year, reporting in detail the requirements stipulated in the regulations Decree 1510 of 2013, [3] Decree 1082 of 2015, [9] and Law 1474 of 2011. [10] These plans serve as a tool to facilitate, identify, record, programme, and disclose the needs of goods, works, and services to potential suppliers. [11, 12] There is no evidence, however, of a strategic 5-year plan, nor can it be said that all the elements proposed in the purchasing plan are published, due to the existence of reserved expenses. That said, the information that is published is in line with the regulations.

The adoption of the five-year Military Planning Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire, LPM) 2016-2020 serves as a general roadmap for potential purchases through 2020. The LPM 2016-2020 has allocated a total of 2.254 billion FCFA (about USD 745 million per year) to the different military budgets through 2020. The reason for the increase in expenditure, according to the MoD, is the need to reequip the armed forces, to strengthen border controls (especially in the unstable western and northern regions) and to fight against terrorism from jihadists. The LPM 2016-2020 was approved by the National Assembly Security and Defence Committee (Commission de Sécurité et Défense, CDS) on January 4, 2016. It has been presented by the MoD as a reform bill that lays down the main policy guidelines related to defence and security, including personnel management, equipment and operations of the armed forces, Gendarmerie Nationale and National Police. The LPM seeks to reduce the number of soldiers to save on personnel expenditure and to degrade the capacity of former rebel leaders to destabilize the country (1), (2), (3), (4).

The annual draft Budget Law shows highly aggregated figures for potential defence expenditure. For example, the draft Budget Law for 2018, published in October 2017, provided the planned expenditure across broad functions. Table 5 (p. 17) shows the key spending elements affecting defence as follows: Defence and security: 516.8 billion FCFA, of which 252.8 billion FCFA was projected for Army Services (services des armées), 174.3 billion FCFA allocated to the police forces and 79.3 billion FCFA to the Gendarmerie Nationale (5). The draft Budget Law for 2018 also indicates the level of projected expenditure for fuel destined to the armed forces (13.8 billion FCFA), operational costs at the Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS) (10 billion FCFA) and a global figure of 617.9 billion FCFA across other functions (5). Forward planning for potential purchases extends less than 5 years in advance) under both the LPM and the annual drat Budget Law provide highly aggregate expenditure figures for 2016-2020, but no evidence of any strategic defence review.

Highly aggregate figures have been published by Ivorian media about the planned defence investments in equipment and infrastructure, based on the LPM 2016-2020. The information is lacking in detail and incomplete. In a February 2017 article, Le Point Afrique stated that the LPM 2016-2020 was the vehicle chosen by the authorities in Côte d’Ivoire to modernize the armed forces with EUR 1.2 billion in planned purchases for the 5 years (1).

In a June 2016 report by the Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP), Georges Berghezan stated that the Ivorian Government had committed 2.254 billion FCFA (about USD 745 million per year) on military expenditure to modernize the armed forces, as per LPM 2016-2020. The report also noted that the LPM 2016-2020 did not include planned purchases for internal security, which are the subject of a different law (2). In a February 2017 article in Global Voices, the reporter characterizes the LPM 2016-2020 as a Marshall Plan and the first Military Planning Act in the country’s history. In this article, the aggregate figure of 2 trillion FCFA (EUR 3.8 billion) was said to be budgeted through 2020 for planned purchases of equipment. The article also stated that 90% of the budget allocated to the armed forces at that time covered personnel costs and not equipment. The Minister of Defence Alain-Pierre Donwahi described the need to invert the pyramid so that more money would be channelled to equipment and infrastructure (3). There is inconsistency in the aggregate figures for the LPM 2016-2020.

The document “Outline of Planned Larger Material Acquistiions and Material Service Tasks” (“Oversigt over planlagt større materielinvesteringer og materieldriftsopgaver”), published annually by DALO, provides a comprehensive picture of planned procurements and material service tasks [1]. The document is divided into three investment timeframes: short term (5 years), medium term (6-10 years) and long term (11-15 years). Note that the plan is tentative and dynamic. Larger forthcoming procurements are written into the Defence Agreement (which is a political agreement reached in parliament) [2].

Actual tenders are made public on the state website udbud.dk [1]. Larger planned purchases are announced in the Defence Agreement, which usually covers a period of five years [2]. The Finance Act also contains information on ongoing and planned purchases in forthcoming years [3]. Further, the DALO website contains information on incoming material, but in these cases the purchase is already made and thus not part of the forward purchase planning [4]. As mentioned in Q60A, the document “Outline of Planned Larger Material Acquistions and Material Service Tasks” (“Oversigt over planlagt større materielinvesteringer og materieldriftsopgaver”), published yearly by DALO, provides a comprehensive picture of the forward planning of defence purchases in the short term (five years), medium term (six-ten years) and long term (11-15 years), however the document is not binding [5]. The state requires the public authorities to make a plan of coming purchases available at udbud.dk. For defence procurement, the “Outline of Planned Larger Material Acquistions and Material Service Tasks” is made available to satisfy that demand [6]. Together, these documents provide a comprehensive picture of the planned purchases.

It is difficult to determine whether there is a strategic defence review or white paper that includes forward planning for potential defence purchases. Interviewee 2 says he had never heard of such a document, but he knows there is a degree of forward planning for potential purchases that is needs and capability driven, especially for smaller arms and equipment (1). He thinks that some of the more major purchases are sometimes improvised and is driven by political, rather than need or capability, considerations. There seems to be an agreement among many experts that the purchase of the Rafale military aircraft and Mistral air carriers is an example of unplanned political contracts (2), (3), (4).

There are several legal provisions the allow and even encourage the secrecy of defence purchases. Examples are the Public Authorities Contracts’ Law which allows the MOD and MMP to make procurement processes closed, limited or by direct order with no bidding process. As regards to arms procurement, it is not subject to any form of monitoring by the MOF or the CAA as per Law 204 (1957) (1). Moreover, Law no. 14 (1967) prohibits the publishing or broadcasting of any information or news about the Armed Forces and its formations, movement, armaments and personnel, and everything related to the military and strategic aspects except after obtaining written approval from the director of the military intelligence department (2). Therefore, when some information makes it to the public domain, it usually comes from foreign sources (e.g. the selling country) or is the information that the MOD chooses to disclose to the media without obligation (3).

The Ministry of Defence establishes the Estonian National Defence Development Plan for ten years ahead. It is partly [1] made public on the Ministry’s website in different formats: in a .pdf document and as an info-graph in Estonian and in English. [2] The ten-year plan that describes planned strategic courses is reviewed and updated every four years, listing more concrete procurement plans. The current National Defence Development Plan covers the period between 2017 to 2026. It gives an overview of how the Estonian Defence Forces are being developed. It sets out a detailed overview of purchases: it lists specific vehicles and systems planned to be made use of. It also talks about investments in infrastructure, science and knowledge. The document does not make it clear to whom and in which conditions the whole document is made available. [3]

In addition to the National Defence Development Plan for 2017 – 2026, the Ministry of Defence together with the Defence Forces developed a four-year National Defence Action Plan that is reviewed every year. [1] The shorter-term action plan is more detailed compared to the development plan, for example, and it lists priorities and planned purchases more concretely. [2,3] It also explains the budget – for example, how much will be spent on ammunition, how much on infrastructure and what exactly will be built or repaired. Overall the document is brief, but it gives the reader an overview of the priority areas in the defence sector. However, there are not many details included. For example, no exceptions are described, nor are the duration of procurements. [4]

Information about major defence purchases is made public in advance e.g. in the Government Defence Report (published approx. every fifth year) and through its parliamentary acceptance process. [1] The Government Defence Report is a long-term strategy paper and thus anticipates developments in the security environment beyond the five-year period. However, the information publicly provided well in advance is not as detailed as score 4 would require – likely because, for example, there is a need to maintan flexibility throughout the procurement and because the details may be secret. Shorter period procurement plans (4 and 8 years) are rather detailed, but in longer term projects the sheer number of decision points may require the aforementioned flexibility. Any company in a relevant field has the opportunity to enquire about future procurements in its field and a range of potential suppliers are contacted in the initial requests for information phase of the procurement process (publicly, so that others can also participate). [2]

The Act on Public Procurement and User Agreements, chapter 10, regulates procurement which does not cross the EU thresholds, but exceeds the national thresholds (100 000 euros for goods and services, 500 000 euros for construction projects) [1]. Act on Public Procurement and User Agreements, chapter 6, section 28: The procurement unit must publish a tender notice (entailing the necessary information for making an offer) on all acquisitions that exceed the EU threshold (400 000 euros in goods and services, 5 million euros in construction projects) and is carried out through competitive bidding, restricted bidding or consultation procedure. It also must publish a post-tender notice about the end result within 48 days of singing the acquisition contract. It must also publish a notice on additional acquisition that cross the EU threshold and suspension of the acquisition process (including its justification). If it desires to utilise a shortened timeframe, it must also issue a pre-notice of planned purchases.

The contracting unit may also publish a notice on direct procurement. Chapter 6, section 29 states: In competitive bidding, restricted bidding and consultation process, the notice must be published so that the bidders have min. 37 days for stating that they will be bidding in the process. In restricted bidding, the timeframe for submitting an offer is min. 40 days; in competitive bidding and consultative process reasonable. Chapter 6, sections 30-32 then regulate the shortening and lengthening of the timeframes. Decree on Public Defence and Security Procurement, chapter 2, specifies the announcement process in procurement exceeding the EU threshold; accroding to section 5, the contracting unit must asap after the beginning of a FY publish pre-notice about the planned procurement (within the next 12 months) of purchases which estimated overall value is above 750 000 euros (goods and services) and construction projects which estimated overall value is above 5 million euros. [2] The Ministry of Defence provides advance information about future acquisitions e.g. in its press release on the next FY’s defence budget draft [3], which is based on the strategic development of defence capabilities and, thus, also provides information on mid-term plans. Hilma-system (for public procurement) entails notices on future acquisitions also in the defence sector, information requests, calls for tenders, amendments to and cancellations of bidding processes, re-opened bidding processes and, finally, acquisition decisions. [4] Decree on Public Defence and Security Procurement, chapter 2, section 4, specifies the use of Hilma-portal as the announcement channel [2]. Logistics department of the Defence Forces is in charge of defence material purchases – it also is in charge of the Defence Forces’ partnership programme and contracts. According to its press release, part of defence procurement has been carried out in the Hanki-system since 2017, which is an electronic portal for carrying out the bidding process, and information about future tenders is available through it as well [5,6].

The latest white paper on defence and national security was issued in 2013. [1] It is the fourth white paper published since the beginning of the Fifth Republic in 1958. The first one was issued in 1972, the second in 1994, and the third dated back to 2008. It defines the global defence and security strategy for the country and makes broad reference to the various equipment requirements that are necessary to implement the strategy, between 2013 and 2025, for the land forces, navy, air force and special forces [2]. The white paper is the strategic foundation on which the LPM (military programming law) is based. LPMs are presented every 6 years, with the latest one presented in 2018 for the period 2019-2025. [3] It contains a highly detailed breakdown of upcoming defence purchases that are deemed necassary to implement the strategy set out in the white paper. The LPM goes into more depth than the White Paper for the period 2019-2025 providing a clear list of procurement requirements and breaking down the number of units for each piece of equipment annually over the period in question [4].

Notice of planned acquisitions is not precise and clear enough for oversight agencies and civil society to debate the necessity of the proposed purchases (e.g. the average procurement duration, justification of exceptions, and specific overview records by type of bidding procedure). Acquisitions are more detailed in the yearly Finance Law Bill (PLF). [1] For instance, it states that 19,5 billion Euros are to be invested in new equipment in 2019: the PLF gives numbers, types of equipment, budget amounts, both for deliveries and for upcoming orders in the year to come [1, pages 51-57]. The LPM (military programming law) aims to give extensive information about the plans for defence purchases for the coming 6 years. [2] For instance, it announced “the acquisition of two light surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, three strategic reconnaissance aircraft (CUGEs) and the control of a light surveillance and reconnaissance vessel, as well as the commissioning of CERES space systems (Capacity of Listening and Spatial Electromagnetic Intelligence) and MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Recognition and Observation).” [2, page 31 of the LPM] Another example: “As far as equipment is concerned, these forces will have 4th generation equipment by 2030, including 200 battle tanks, 300 medium armored vehicles, 3,479 armored modular and combat vehicles, 147 reconnaissance and attack helicopters, 115 manoeuvring helicopters, 109 155mm guns, 13 unit rocket launcher systems, 7,020 tactical and logistics mobility vehicles, and about 30 tactical UAVs. By 2025, half of the SCORPION median segment will have been delivered.” [2, page 36 of the LPM] Again, on page 46 of the LPM, details of equipment acquisitions planned until 2025 are given.

However, it is important to note that most of the figures and amounts given are for deals that have already been sealed. Figures tend to account for deliveries that are expected, rather than future procurement plans. The LPM doesn’t lay out the detailed needs of the army to give prospective suppliers information so that they can file bids, but rather to disclose the general orientation.

The Government publishes comprehensive forward planning for potential purchases, which extends 10-15 years in advance, e.g. through a strategic defence review, in particular a white paper. In 2016, the ‘White Paper: Strategic Review and Way Ahead’ was published. The ‘White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr’ is the key German policy document on security policy. It is a strategic review of the current state and future course of German security policy. The potential defence purchases and plans are very specific, detailed, comprehensive and actionable [1] and forward planning is addressed for at least the next four years [2,3], but is also adapted earlier if necessary.

This document is therefore the principal guideline for the security policy decisions and measures of this country. It establishes a framework in terms of concepts and content and provides starting points for strengthening the government-wide approach and developing further ministerial strategies. The White Paper defines Germany’s ambition to play an active and substantial role in security policy. It reflects the country’s identity and understanding of security policy. On the basis of Germany’s values, national interests and an analysis of the security environment, it defines the country’s strategic priorities and translates them into key areas of engagement for German security policy. The most recent White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr was published in 2006. The White Paper lays the foundations for Germany to take synchronised and comprehensive action in the field of security policy. It provides a framework for the use of all security policy mechanisms available to the nation.

The White Paper will lay the foundation for one of these mechanisms in particular, namely the Bundeswehr, to meet the challenges of the future [2] (see also [4]). Furthermore, in line with EU Directive 2009/81/EC, Germany publishes tenders for the procurement of defence materials in the European public procurement journal ‘Tenders Electronic Daily’ (TED). The TED also includes the contracts awarded for the tender processes, while additional information regarding procurement can be found in the Ministry of Defence budget [5].

The German government publishes the plans for defence purchases in detail for at least the next four years [1]. The adequate and timely information (e.g. elements of the defence equipment plan, itemised budget proposals) is sufficient to enable prospective suppliers to prepare and seek further information, and enough for oversight agencies and civil society to debate the necessity of the proposed purchases (e.g. the average procurement duration, justifications of exceptions and specific overview records by type of bidding procedure) [2,3].

There are several sources available (see also Q60A): in line with EU Directive 2009/81/EC, Germany publishes tenders for the procurement of defence materials in the European public procurement journal ‘Tenders Electronic Daily’, which includes the contracts awarded for the tender processes, while additional information regarding procurement can be found in the Ministry of Defence budget [4].

Invitations to tender for potential procurements are published online at the national [5] and EU levels through the ‘Tenders Electronic Daily’ (TED). The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support also provides online information about selected procurement projects and, in some specific cases, special webpages are created with additional information [6]. The magazine ‘Griephan’ also offers some information about current procurement projects [7]. However, a proper summarised overview of all defence purchases is not available [8].

According to Section 21 of the Public Procurement Act, the MOD shall submit its procurement plan to its tender committee no later than one month from the end of the financial year for approval (1). Additionally, the MOD shall submit an update of the procurement plan to the Tender Committee after approval of the budget and at quarterly intervals. However, these procurement plans have never been made publicly available by the MOD or the Tender Committee. Furthermore, despite the fact that defence spending is forecasted to rise by 2.56 per cent, eventually, reaching USD 213.8 million in 2021, the MOD doesn’t have a defence review or white paper where forward planning for purchases is published (2).

There is hardly any forward planning for potential purchases that goes beyond 5 years. There is no strategic defence review or white paper. However, OPTRALOG – Operations, Training and Logistics, primarily designed by the military, look at some security projections and make plans for preparations (3), (4), (5).

There is no information made publicly available by the MOD or the GAF on planned purchases (1), (2), (3).

In Greece, there is rarely forward planning for potential purchases extending more than five years in advance. Moreover, there is no strategic defence review, although a white paper on defence was published in 2014 and updated in 2015. As a result, there is not enough transparency regarding Greek defence policy and its goals. All the same, the ministry occasionally leaks information to the media regarding major changes and weapons purchases [1, 2]. The relevant legislation stipulating the length of procurement cycles is no longer implemented [3].

There are no current and applicable planning documents for procurement.The five-year Single Medium Term Development and Modernisation Programmes were cancelled due to the 2009-2019 economic crisis [1, 2]. The programmes were also hit by major scandals. As a result, there is little information about planned purchases. Greece has not procured any major weapon systems in the last five years. Having said that, Greece participates in various joint defence technology development programmes with allied countries for which there is considerable forward planning [3].

The government published no forward planning for potential purchases. According to the interviewees conducted, no such long-term document exists at all. There is no strategic defence review of the white paper either. The Zrínyi 2026 program [1] is the most consistent paper; however, that has no exact timeline and comprehensive needs assessment [2].

Only sporadic information is available on the planned purchases, and it is far from comprehensive [1]. The information published often lacks details, including deadlines and accurate budget allocations. Notice only available for open procurements that represent only minor defence procurements [2]. The annual purchase plan is also subject to many modifications throughout the year [2].

The process of defence acquisition in India is based on the fifteen years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), five years Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and an Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP) from each of the services [1][2]. As India does not have a National Defence Strategy, defence procurement can be reactionary [3].

Some information is publicly available in the Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) which gives an overview of equipment to be inducted up to the late 2020s, so it’s 10 to 15 years in advance [4][5]. Non-sensitive defence tenders are published on the government’s Defence eProcurement Portal [6]. The Indian Army regularly publishes tenders and RFIs on its website [7].

Notice of planned purchases is subjective and depends on the specific defence purchase. High-profile defence purchases are made public by the media, prior to their actual completion [1][2].

As alluded to above, the MoD’s TPCR gives a comprehensive overview of equipment to be inducted up to the late 2020s across nineteen categories, 10 to 15 years in advance [3].

The direction of long-term TNI defence equipment needs is indicated through a ‘minimum capability’-based needs plan that must be fulfilled, namely the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) 2009-2024 [1], which is structured into three five-year strategic plans (Rencana Strategis/Renstra), namely MEF Renstra Phase I (2009-2014), Phase II (2015-2019) and Phase III (2020-2024). The development of the MEF is expected to provide a real picture of the development of the integrated military branches’ (Trimatra) power, especially with regard to defence equipment. Furthermore, the MEF is implemented in stages, through four MEF development strategies: rematerialisation, revitalisation, relocation and procurement, to improve the mobility and capability of the Indonesian Army, Navy and Air Force. At the end of each strategic plan and towards the next MEF phase, MEF alignment policies are carried out to coordinate planning, decision-making mechanisms, maintenance and repair (life cycle cost) and budget effectiveness in the next strategic plan [2]. Through these MEF alignment policies, the annual allocation plan for arms procurement is stated in the next strategic plan, as well as the plan for arms procurement/rematerialisation/revitalisation/relocation of TNI Headquarters and the three service branches of the TNI.

The purchasing plan is established for five years and includes extensive information on product types and specifications, accompanied by a financial strategy in the Ministry of National Development Planning’s (Bappenas) Strategic Plan. The TNI Shopping List is published in the MEF Alignment Document. The term ‘TNI Shopping List’ is not used in the defence equipment needs plan in the Five-Year Strategic Plan for Ministry of Defence and the TNI, but it is commonly used in the field of procurement, as evidenced in official Ministry of Defence publications [1]. This ‘Shopping List’ generally includes the types and quantities of defence equipment. However, because the budgeting process (APBN) is carried out on an annual basis, at the beginning of each year, the Ministry of Defence and the TNI prepare arms procurement plans for the fiscal year, along with the required budget values [2]. This proposal is then jointly reviewed by the Ministry of Defence, the Bappenas and the Ministry of Finance, to be submitted to the DPR for approval and ratification in the annual Government Work Plan (RKP) and APBN. Therefore, the annual Shopping List and procurement value from the Ministry of Defence and the TNI are only published annually after the APBN is officially announced [4]. In other words, since the requirements budget plan is carried out on an annual basis, the arms procurement proposal can only be established every year.

There may be some forward planning for defence purchases [1], but purchases tend to be driven by a supplier’s willingness to provide items [2], given that Iran is under an arms embargo. Timelines are often wrong or not provided. There is no strategic defence review or white paper.

Some information is given on purchase plans, but it is lacks so much detail so it can be considered incomplete [1, 2].

Needs are not outlined beneath a comprehensive strategy. Iraq’s parliamentary and defence committee discuss its advisory and capacity to support defence purchases in round table discussions with interior and defence high-ranking figures (1), (2). Emphasis is placed on the need to diversify purchases and ensuring fairly allocations, as well as pressing security concerns – the most recent of which have been the attacks on PMF Shuhada base (3). Forward planning may happen based on the available evidence of frequent meetings — but is kept out of public sight. Forward planning exists but not within the bounds of a known strategy, but is, the UN notes, undercut by political in-fighting and the system of spoils known as Muhasasa (sectarian apportionment) (4), (5). The perceived sectarian bias, as one report provides evidence for, eroded the potentiality for interagency cooperation (5). The UN has emphasised the need for robust planning to halt the return of the ISG following the renewal of its Assistance Mission to Iraq, till May 31, 2020 (6), (7).

There is rarely any data about future purchase plans unless the information is leaked from inside the MoD. This was the case back in February 2018, when Iraq considered the purchase of a Russian air-defence system. Coverage centred around comments and disclosures made by a member of Iraq’s parliamentary Committee on Security and Defence (1).

Since 2008, Israel publishes a summary of a five-year plan that includes the main goals of the IDF in terms of personel and resources needed to realise them. The current plan, ‘Tnufa’ runs from 2020 to 2024 and succeeds ‘Gideon’ whcih covered 2015 to 2020 (1). While some planned procurement information is included in this, the details included in the plan are vague and not fully detailed. as the full plan is classified, the public version is of limited use as a tool tp monitor potential defence purchases. Detailed future procurement plans are not publicized. Regardless, potential purchases are often changed rapidly, with every new chief of staff, rendering details included in the five-year plan quickly obsolete (2).

As mentioned in 60A, for the past 11 years Israel have a five-year plan. This plan is made public and specify many planned purcases (1). However, a former general in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) said that there are several projects that are made public are only the ones that you must plan 5-10 years ahead, like purchasing tanks. There are many projects that are (a) classified; (b) are year to year and not published (2) (3).

According to Law 244/2012 [1] the Ministry of Defence has to annually present a Multiannual Programmatic Document (Documento Programmatico Pluriennale, DPP), in which all necessary acquisitions, developments and strategic considerations regarding equipment and related resources are identified [2]. Each identified programme has to have forward planning of at least three years. Looking at the information available in the DPP, in addition to the financial aspects related to the next three years, it is possible to receive information in aggregated terms on the foreseable economic effort for the subsequent three years. Further information is possible to be found in the annual budget of the Ministry. In the estimated budget, there is an indication of all planned expenses, including potential defence purchases [3]. In addition, all public administrations need to publish a bi-annual planning of procurement of good and services with a value exceeding 40.000 euro and a triennial plan of public works with a value exceeding 100.000 euro [4]. Comprehensive forward planning with a longer timeframe occur not frequently. An example in this sense is the Naval programme that goes from 2014 to 2034. For such programmes detailed description, as well as external audit reports can be found online [5].

On the website of the Ministry [1] and on those of each armed forces [2] is possible to access a webpage with information on the biannual and triannual plans, as well as on call for tenders. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that in 2018 Italy was among the EU countries against which an infringement procedure on the application of EU Directive 2009/81 has been started. The aspects of the directive object of the procedure were related to miss publications on online tenders on the EU dedicated platform [3].

The Government publishes comprehensive forward planning for potential purchases which extends 10-15 years. This is done through the production of several documents. One is the National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), which gives a forecast of security challenges for approximately the next ten years and outlines how Japan will meet the challenges. It includes targets for the number of soldiers that Japan will have and arms in different categories that it will acquire. [1] The Mid-Term Defence Program (MTDP), which covers five years, builds on the analysis of the NDPG and gives more details on arms to be acquired. [2] “Defence of Japan,” Japan’s annual defence white paper, also gives information about procurement plans, but these are often for a shorter term than the ones in the above documents. [3]

The Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) gives an overview of military procurement plans for the next five years. [1] It is publicly available on the homepages of the MOD (see the answer to Q11B). [1] The media was not, however, able to discuss the content of the MTDP for FY 2019-2023 before they received information about parts of the document approximately one month before it was made public at the end of 2018. [2] The MTDP is comprehensive and gives details on the measures that Japan should take to meet likely security challenges over a period of five years. For example, the MTDP for FY 2019-2023 provides information on the planned major procurements for the different service branches and measures to raise the standard of the personnel, promote defence cooperation with the US and security partners and strengthen the defence production base over pages 1-28. [1] The MTDP for FY 2019-2023 provides an estimate of how much these procurements and measures will cost on page 28 and a list of the target quantities of major categories of arms to procure on page 29. [1] Annual budgets give an overview of planned procurements for one year. [3] For major products such as military aircraft and ships, for which the MOD sets requirements that are not set in the civilian sector, the common procedure is that the MOD will invite potential producers to a meeting where it will request offers. The process after this meeting, which is not made public on the website of the Ministry, is that the MOD will receive offers and make a selection among them. Both domestically procured equipment and equipment purchased from abroad, for example through FMS from the US, have been selected according to this procedure. [4] For products that the civilian sector can readily produce, the Ministry of Defence posts calls for tenders on its website. [5] The branches of the Self-Defence Forces also post calls for tenders for equipment for their forces on their websites. [6] Almost all such calls are open for competitive bidding. On April 14, 2020, there were 53 calls for tenders on ATLA’s webpage for central procurement. The categories of calls were apparel, fuel, rental of equipment and “other”, a category that included a bomb detector, helicopter engine parts and airplane tires. These had all been published in March 2020, tender deadlines were in April or May 2020 and the latest delivery date, which was for helicopter engine instruments, was 20 months after the publication of the call. [7] Similar lists for planned central procurement are also found on one of ATLA’s webpages. There are lists for thirteen different categories of defence equipment, with information on the types and amount of equipment to be procured, the target month for contract signing, the defence institution that will use the equipment, and the delivery deadline. There was generally about one year from the contract month to the delivery deadline. The lists still covered FY2019 on April 14, 2020 but had been updated to cover 2020 by August 23, 2020. [8] Regional procurement was handled by the institutions of the service branches. For example, there were 34 calls for tenders on the webpages of the ASDF 4th depot procurement division on April 14, 2020. All calls had been published in March 2020, the deadline for submitting bids was April 2020 and the latest delivery deadline was 10 months after the publication date. [9] Lists of planned regional procurement are also available. In March 2020, this depot published a list of 2,413 items of products that it planned to procure and work that it planned to assign, with information on when, during the next six months, it planned to post a call for tenders on its website. The items included missile and fighter aircraft components and work to deploy these assets. Delivery time was generally less than one year. [10] For all these calls for bids, there were links to technical specifications of the requested product and a one-page description of bidding procedures and contract requirements. Whereas the MTDP provides information on planned purchases of major equipment for several years ahead, delivery time for planned procurements at an ASDF air depot was generally less than one year. Most of the latter procurement is mass-produced products such as fuel and ammunition, but it also includes some sensitive missile and fighter aircraft components.

There is planning within the armed forces. This planning is less than five years or every two years. The planning is meant to serve as a document for international donors (mainly the US army) who provide the Jordanian Defence Forces with arms. In other cases, such as food, logistics equipment, uniforms and vehicles, forward planning extends to less than one year [1,2,3].

There is no publicly available information on forward purchase plans for the defence sector. As discussed in the previous sub-indicator, there is no evidence to support the idea that forward planning takes place. Additionally, a plan, as part of U.S. military assistance to Jordan, might exist, but this plan is not publicly available [1]. Some information about potential purchases can be found through the Directorate of Defence Procurement for the Jordanian Armed Forces, which posts tenders and calls for proposals [2]. Other information is available through the Government Tenders Directorate [3]. However, this information is only relevant to tenders and bids and not aimed at informing the public of planned purchases, and they also do not prove that the defence sector had forward planned these tenders [4].

The Supply Chain Management Services Division oversees all procurement activities in the Ministry of Defence. According to the MOD, one of the functions of this Division is the preparation of the civilian annual procurement plan. [1] No evidence is available of the strategic defence review. Thus, the public hardly gets any information on potential defence purchases. Any information is only available after purchases have been made.

No information about future defence purchases is regularly published by the government. There are instances when local media publishes information about planned purchases by the Ministry of Defence. In 2017, the media carried the story of the planned acquisition of 14 new fighter jets by KDF to help in the fight against terrorism in Somalia. [1] Even when made available through the media, information on planned purchases is not comprehensive. In addition, the procurements of such huge purchases are classified, meaning that most if not all details do not include information about the entire procurement process.

The Ministry of Defence has in place a Comprehensive Transition Plan for the Kosovo Security Forces, approved by the Minister of Defence of Kosovo on 22 January 2019 [1]. The Comprehensive Transition Plan covers the period from 2019-2027 and acts as a guiding strategic document for the development of defence capabilities in Kosovo [1]. With regards to expense efficiencies, the plan states that these will be based on cost analysis, including a comparison of their benefits, operational and maintenance expenses, and improvement- and update- potentials for new purchases. Furthermore, the document’s table of content shows the following purchase plans for the Kosovo Security Forces for the period 2019-2027: Equipment Purchasing Plan, Vehicle Purchasing Plan, Armament Purchasing Plan, Ammunition War Reserve Purchasing Plan, Radio-Communication Purchasing Plan, and IT Equipment Purchasing Plan [1]. Given the document is not fully published, the content and details of these purchase plans are not indicated in the short summary document published by the Ministry of Defence. The full document is not publicly available, but the Ministry has published a short summary of the transition plan on its website [1].

The Comprehensive Transition Plan for the Kosovo Security Forces is only published in summary form [1]. The detailed purchase plans of the Ministry of Defence and the Security Forces indicated in this document are not publicly available.

The Government does not announce potential defence purchases. The public only learns of them when an officials leaks the news to the press or if the company they are buying from announces it or leaks it to the press, officials said (1, 2 and 3).

There is no information available on forward plans.

The Government has adopted the long term National Defence Forces Development Plan for 2016-2028. The plan is published publicly in general terms without specification or comprehensive detail. [1] Every year, the MoD publishes a two year defense purchase plan with specifications. [2]

The MOD follows the Law on Public Procurement, which ensures that potential defence purchases are made public, except for secret items. [3] In order to ensure communication with the public and dissemination of information about defense purchases and performance of the MoD at large, the MoD publishes an annual defence review. Those reviews are available on the home page of the ministry. [4,5]

A list of expected procurements and expected centralised procurements is published for the upcoming year, [1] whereas longer-term purchases are only generally identified, e.g. what capacities are planned to be developed, for example the Development plan of the National Armed Forces 2016-2028. [2]

Lebanon created a 5-year Capabilities Development Plan (CDP), which assesses critical mission areas, capabilities, and professionalization targets linking it to budgeting and future funding and weapons procurement (1). Both CDPs 2013-2017 (1) and 2018-2022 (2), respectively, were the closest documents to a white paper, prepared by the LAF command, with limited political buy-in (1). Neither documents are publically available, so its content and comprehensiveness cannot be assessed (3). A source indicated that the CDP 2 information was not presented to the Parliamentary Committee for National Defence, Interior, and Municipalities until the committee requested (4). While a former MP indicated that only one session was dedicated to presenting the CDP 1 (5).

In general, the LAF does not purchase weapons, with the promised $3bn aid to the LAF from Saudi being earmarked for weapons purchases. Instead, it receives weapons in the form of military assistance by foreign countries. The CDP which outlines arms procurement is superficially outlined with its details being restricted (1). However, some information about military assistance from foreign countries is published online. For example, the $3bn Saudi aid to the Lebanese Army, which was later halted, in 2015 was going to be used to purchase weapons and equipment from France. Some of the information about the list of purchases were published online via media outlets (2).

Forward planning for potential purchases is published a year in advance [1]. The goal is to introduce more long-term planning [2]. The long-term plans, however, are not detailed enough yet. There is no strategic defence review or white paper.

According to the government reviewer, the Defence Material Agency organizes meetings to present potential purchases [3]. Moreover, the Agency also publishes information about potential purchases for the next 10 years [4].

Forward planning for potential purchases is published a year in advance [1].

The former Defence Minister was quoted as mentioning an Asset, Training and Preparedness Agenda. [1] However, information regarding this agenda is not publicly available, therefore it cannot be ascertained what the agenda entails. In Malaysia, defence procurement is very much user-driven. The four services (Army, Navy, Airforce and Joint Command) determine their procurement needs and draw up plans that can range from 3 to 5 years. When maintenance of assets is factored in, procurement plans can stretch for longer. Nevertheless, defence procurement is generally tied to the nation’s 5-year development plans (Rancangan Malaysia). Because the allocation that the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) gets for its procurement of assets and development is spread over a five-year period, it makes sense to plan within that span. [2] On the other hand, there have been efforts to draft a Malaysia Defence White Paper (DWP) which include procurement plans over the next ten years and beyond. [3] [4] Force Structure in Chapter 4 on the Future Force of the DWP covers future defence procurement plans. [5, 6] However, since the DWP was only recently published (2020) and is the first of its kind, it remains to be seen whether the plans in this document are implemented.

Several defence purchase plans have been made public, typically at the two larger defence exhibitions in Malaysia, Defense Services Asia (DSA) and the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA). [1] The media may occassionally report on purchase plans. [2] [3] [4] Purchase plans are also announced with the release of the Annual Budget, [5] and the recently published Defence White Paper (DWP) also contains some details of future acquisitions for the next ten years. [6] However, details on the purchase plans are not extensive. An interviewee shared, from their personal experience serving in MINDEF, that notice of planned purchases are mostly kept under wraps and it is difficult to obtain information on planned puchases even for internal officials. [7] Additionally, offset requirements become an afterthought or are not discussed until a later date.

The LOPM, which passed into law in February 2015, provides for USD 2.3 billion of investment in the armed forces until 2019. The document specified that the military intended to recruit an additional 10,000 soldiers over the next five years to plug the major gaps in the armed forces.1 The LOPM also included plans to purchase helicopters, aeroplanes and uniforms.⁶ Since 2015, the Malian government has gone on to buy two used helicopters (Super Puma S 332 L) from Airbus and two helicopters from Russia. 2,3 Furthermore, the LOPM outlined plans to purchase fighter jets, combat helicopters and various intelligence gathering equipment. There is, however, no defence plan in place for beyond 2019.

There is no information made publicly available by the government on forward purchase plans. In February 2016, Airbus announced it had received an order for a C295W from the Malian government, the first public record of this contract.¹ The aircraft was delivered in December 2016, indicating that the release of information related to a quick purchase rather than strategic forward planning.² It is noteworthy that it was Airbus rather than the Malian government who made the announcement, highlighting the MDAC’s general reluctance to disclose information.
Similarly, MDAC’s purchase of Russian attack helicopters in September 2016 was not revealed by the government, but was reported in November 2016 thanks to a source within the Russian company Rosoboronexport.⁴ The company delivered two attack helicopters to Bamako in October 2017, again indicating that news of such purchases only relates to immediate acquisitions, rather than long-term planning.⁵ This is understandable given the FAMa’s clear need to rebuild and re-equip quickly in the wake of its collapse in 2012.
Another major defence purchase was reported in June 2015. Brazilian company Embraer Defense & Security announced that Mali had ordered six A-29 Super Tocano combat planes.⁶ An unpublished report by the BVG notes that the Malian government agreed to pay USD 88.7 million (51.7 billion CFA) for the six planes.⁶ The BVG shows that the Malian state had paid two of the three instalments of the contract by 2016 (the third was scheduled for 2017), but Embraer is now set to deliver only four of the six planes.⁶ In none of the cases above has the government publicly revealed what it has paid for the aircraft.¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷
A defence attaché working in Bamako said that the Brazilian aircraft were displayed at an air show in Paris.⁸ At the time, it was known that the Malian government were planning to buy them, although the contracts had not been signed at that point.⁸

The Public Sector Acquisitions, Leasing, and Services Law states that the agencies, in this case SEDENA and SEMAR, “must make them available to the general public, through CompraNet and their website, no later than 31 January of each year, its annual programme of acquisitions, leases, and services corresponding to the fiscal year in question, with the exception of information that, in accordance with the applicable provisions, is of a reserved or confidential nature.” [1]

Through the Annual Acquisitions, Leasing, and Services Programme, SEDENA publishes “the needs previously determined by the Air Force Command and each one of the Directorates of Arms and Services, so that it can be judged and approved by the Committee on: Acquisitions, Leases, and Services of the Ministry of National Defence. It must be planned according to the nature of the goods, leases, and services to be acquired or contracted if the projects will cover more than one fiscal year.” [2]

In the case of SEMAR, “the Deputy General Directorate of Supply will be responsible for presenting the Annual Procurement, Leasing, and Services Programme to the Procurement, Leasing, and Services Committee in order to review and analyse said program; before its publication in CompraNet and on the SEMAR website in accordance with the approved budget for the corresponding year.” [3] [4]

SEDENA and SEMAR publish their Annual Procurement, Leasing, and Services Programmes, which only mention in a general way the concept, the estimated value, quantity, unit of measurement, and type of estimated procedure. [1] [2] [3]

It is possible to find journalistic articles that inform about plans to acquire vehicles and planes by SEDENA and SEMAR in order to fulfill their defence functions. [4] [5] However, due to the increase in violence, it is not feasible to plan defence acquisitions more than a year in advance; in fact, the plan can be modified monthly. [6] For this reason, this is not a debatable topic among civil society or the press.

The government published a 10-year plan for the development of defence. [1] The plan contains information about future purchases. It contains a specific list of projects and an indicative time frame for the start and end of each one.

Only information on annual public procurement plans of the Ministry are publicly available [1] and they do not include any information about secret procurements, nor is this information provided to the public. [2] Other annual plans for investments in defence are confidential. [3][4]

According to the MoD reviewer, the needs for potential procurements are foreseen by strategic documents such as the Defence Strategy, the Strategic Defence Review, as well as the Long-term Defence Development Plan of Montenegro, which are reflected in the budget of the current year and ultimately in the Public Procurement Plan according to the Law on Budget and the Law on Public Procurement. All procurement procedures related to defence and security are conducted according to the Law on Public Procurement and these documents are publicly avaliable on the Public Procurement Portal – from the assessment of procurement needs to the conclusion of the contract. All exceptions are related to beforementioned provisions of the Law on Public Procurement and the bylaw. [5][6]

Publishing of potential purchases for the Moroccan armed forces extends less than 5 years in advance (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8). No evidence of the existence of a strategic defence review or white paper was found. The potential budget is not disclosed in detail. According to the 2018 budget law (N°68-17), an amount of 10 800 000 000 dirhams had been allocated for the acquisition and repair of Royal Armed Forces material (code 3.1.0.0.9.34.001), and 5 871 510 000 dirhams to National defence administration/ material and various spending (code 1.2.1.2.0.34.000). The budget law showed allocations for potential purchases for one year. As articles 38 and 22 of the 2018 Budget Law show, sums allocated and extra numbers of staff planned are given in aggregated form. The report is the same in the budget: sums are given in aggregated form, and concern mainly paramilitary establishments (teledetection centre, military hospitals, surgery centres, storage units).

The local and international press regularly report major defence purchases with foreign nations. Given that the budget for armed forces is not published in detail it is unclear whether or not these purchases are taken into account in the budget. As explained in the previous questions, the King has the final decision over defence purchases, and is often the one suggesting these purchases in the first place.

There is no information in the sources surveyed about detailed planned purchases for the armed forces.

The Defence White Paper does not include future procurements [1]. A National Strategy and Defence Policy is mentioned in the Defence White Paper [1], but the military rarely makes defence purchases public in advance and there is no policy formulated by the government on publishing the military’s future ambitions. It should be noted that this White Paper is not available online to the public.

There have been some announcements made by the military about its future purchases, but defence purchases are normally made in secret and planned purchases are not publicly available [1,2].

Comprehensive forward planning documents have been released in recent years, which detail planning for potential purchases up to 2035. Published in 2018, the Defence White Paper details future threats and the strategy to overcome these threats, as well as future goals and the means of achieving them (including materiel needed) [1]. Potential purchases are thus linked to strategy. The Defence White Paper details the investment programme for procurement up to and including 2033 in disaggregated form [1]. The Defence Vision 2035 was published in 2020 and similarly outlines future threats and the capabilities that the MoD needs in order to meet the challenges it faces, including modern IT infrastructure, for example [2].

The annual Defence Project Overview details current plans for defence purchases up to and including 2025 [1]. This overview shows the financial planning for each procurement project in defence, as well as the strategy/reasoning behind each (potential) purchase, its link to broader organisational goals and a description of the product [1]. The Defence and Security Procurement Act lists a number of exemptions from its provisions (see Articles 2.16, 2.17 and 2.127) and therefore potential purchases (e.g. for intelligence purposes) may not be public [2].

Major Defence purchases are guided by Defence White Papers which provide long-term (up to fifteen years) Government expectations of the Defence [1]. This is followed by Strategic Defence Policy Statements which inform Defence Capability Plans and are articulated within MoD Statements of Intent [2, 3, 4]. This pattern ensures that procurement, and therefore capabilities, are matched to strategic intent and policies set by the Government and prevents the acquisition of unnecessary systems, personnel, or other items. Together these documents present a comprehensive indication of Defence procurement patterns in such a way that an educated analysis can accurately predict the type of systems that need to be acquired to fulfil the Government’s expectations.

Apart from the Defence White Paper, the periodic Defence Capability Plans signal planned purchases. Defence Capability Plans are linked to the White Paper and set out indicative planned investments out to 2030, while further identifying potential investments to be made after 2030. [1] Generally, unless an operational emergency appears, all major procurements stem from the Defence Capability Plans. Those future projects within the Capability Plans with the highest priority have a dedicated information page on the MoD’s website. Projects within the Capability Plan are provided with indicative capital costs. The Bidding process are not contained within the Capability Plans, as that information is available on GETS, however the Capability Plan does include the procurement process through the Indicative, Detailed, and Implementation Business Case stages. As of April 2021, there are two future Defence Capability Projects listed: Cyber Security and Support Capability; and the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel. [2] Together with the Defence White Paper, these present a comprehensive indication of Defence procurement patterns. [3, 4] Tender details are available on GETS, and these are included in either Current or Future Procurement Opportunities, the latter of which are provided before an official notice of procurement is released. The timing of current tender opportunities must comply with Government Procurement Rules 29-34 pertaining to the provision of sufficient time by an agency to a potential supplier(s).

Where there is a possibility of joint bids, a Notice of Procurement must allow at least 27 business days for suppliers to consult and collaborate, although this represents a minimum period and the Government strongly recommends that agencies allow as much time as possible so as not to risk a faulty procurement planning process. This includes approaching the market well before the official Notice of Procurement. It should also be noted that a Notice of Procurement is not a Request For Information. [5, 6] As per major defence procurements, information on GETS is provided years ahead of the planned procurement date. Regardless, this provides information on timeframe (procurement duration), components, and expectations of contracts, and includes past, current, and future procurement opportunities. [7] The MoD also provides guidance for prospective suppliers via its website. [8] For current suppliers, the NZDF maintains SmartProcure; a website that provides suppliers and NZDF personnel “with a simple, secure, and efficient means of conducting procurement activities.” [9]

The government has a process in place for acquisition planning as a result of the programming act of the Ministry of Defence. According to Art. 20 of the 2013 decree on defence and security procurement, there is an annual acquisition plan. It is drawn from the needs identified by relevant technical departments of the Ministry of Defence. The plan must be drawn up no later than the end of January of the current budget year, but it is flexible and regularly updated (1). Decree No. 2013/570/PRN/PM, Chapter V, Article 20, states that all forward planning for potential purchases cannot be disclosed and is strictly confidential. The plan is not available to the public and is classified as top secret (1).

Article 20 states:

“The competent technical departments identify the needs and prepare market research relevant to this Decree and which constitute an annual acquisition forecast plan. This plan is classified as a top-secret defence matter… This plan is not to be published, and any correspondence regarding acquisitions is to be strictly confidential” (1).
(Consultant translation French to English)

The Nigerien government does not disclose information on planned defence purchases (1).

There is no forward planning as far as potential defence expenditure is concerned. The priorities shift from year to year. What is clear is that the defence budget is consistently one of the top four expenditure items each year. There is a lack of long-term planning for military acquisitions, primarily because of the lack of a defence policy (1). Moreover, very few details are provided on even the smallest programmes. The lack of information on how many well-known military activities are funded is a major source of concern to those who deal with the military, not least the National Assembly and Civil Society. “The National Assembly’s major criticism of the budget is the absence of the kind of detail that would facilitate the process of authorization and monitoring” (1). In discussions with a public official, it was stated that the National Defence Policy (NDP) has been reviewed and is being followed although information from the press contradicted this statement. The official stated that the NDP had been reviewed since 2016 (1). Under the 2007 Regulations to the PPA, there is a requirement for advanced planning by the procuring entity (2), but it does not apply to defence purchases.

Recurrent expenditure may be subject to planned purchases as these appear in the budget from year to year. However, capital expenditures in the defence sector for things like purchases of weapons systems are not subject to disclosure in a systematic manner. There is a lack of long-term planning for military acquisitions, primarily because of the lack of a defence policy (1). Moreover, very little detail is provided on even the minimal programme that exists. The lack of information on how many well-known military activities are funded is a major source of concern to those who deal with the military, not least the National Assembly and civil society. “The National Assembly’s major criticism of the budget is the absence of the kind of detail that would facilitate the process of authorization and monitoring” (2). In discussions with a source, it was stated that defence purchases are a matter of national security and therefore are not subject to disclosure.

Forward planning for potential purchases is made public. Indeed, the 2012 White Paper on Defence estimated the defence purchases for the coming decade [1]. The document is comprehensive. Emphasis were lain on developing the capacity of aerial defence (to be fully equipped by 2020); on the Republic’s integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air defence systems (by 2015); and on reforming the artillery battalions and Ministry of Defenceernising the army howitzers (from 2016 – 2020). The latest 2018 Strategic Defence Ceview presents an updated and thorough plan of the next 10 years of development and purchases in the defence sector, entitled “Towards NATO Membership and Future Force 2028” [2].

The government publishes the plans for defence purchases in detail for at least the next 4 years. The adequate and timely information (e.g. elements of the defence equipment plan, itemized budget proposals) is sufficient to enable prospective suppliers to prepare and seek further information, and enough for oversight agencies and civil society to debate the necessity of the proposed purchases (e.g. the average procurement duration, justification of exceptions, and specific overview records by type of bidding procedure). Namely, in the Strategic Defense Review, 2018 [1], the future plans for procurement, including weapons systems and infrastructure are listed, alongside the planned changes in the defence budget. In the Long Term Plan for Development of Defense Capabilities 2019-2028 [2], all potential procurements are listed. This plan is also open to the public.

With regards to public procurement, the Ministry of Defence publishes an annual procurement plan, available also on its website [3]. This plan is comprehensive and outlines every procurement detail for the following year. Public budgeting and procurement planning is annual and based on the Law of Public Procurement [4]. In the defence sector, this Law stipulates that annual defence procurement plans are to be prepared and submitted to the Government by January each year.

The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the long-term planning process that outlines the continuous development of the Norwegian defence sector with respect to organisation, infrastructure, personnel and material. The Long-term Plan – Material forms the basis for all material procurements in the short-term (4 years), the medium-term (8 years) and the long-term (20 years). The plan is updated annually to reflect updates based on changing requirements, available resources and progress in on-going acquisitions. The Long Term-Plan – Material is not publicly available [2]. Based on the Long-term Plan – Material, the Ministry of Defence prepares and publishes an unclassified overview of long-term material requirements called “Future Acquisitions in the Norwegian Armed Forces”. The document presents both planned and potential defence purchases for the next 7-8 years. The latest available plan was published in March 2019 and covers the years 2019-2026 [1]. In addition, every 10 years the Ministry of Defence prepares a white paper on national defence industry strategy which defines a framework for cooperation with industry based on national security interests and the specific needs of the Norwegian Armed Forces [3]. The Long-term Plan – Material, which includes forward planning for potential planning extending to 10-15 years, is not publicly available and no summary is provided.

The Ministry of Defence publishes “Future Acquisitions in the Norwegian Armed Forces”, an overview of both planned and potential defence purchases for the next 7-8 years. The latest available overview was published in March 2019 and covers the years 2019-2026 [1]. The publication is updated annually with a new issue. The projects listed in “Future Acquisitions in the Norwegian Armed Forces” are not approved for implementation and may subsequently be terminated or changed without any further explanation or liability. The publication does not examine each planned project in detail but provides an early insight into potential material investments. The information about the possible and planned projects includes background and overall objective, scope, project status, cost estimates and planned procurement duration. Due to sensitivity reasons, acquisitions for the Special Forces are not described in full range. In accordance with legislation on defence and security procurement, the publication is available in both Norwegian and English. However, more detail is provided on future procurements later on in the cycle, they are published in the Norwegian database for public procurement [2].

There is no forward planning for potential purchases and procurement with exception to normal logistical needs such as uniforms, and food supplies (1), (2). Furthermore, the e-Government website, the Ministry of Defence and Secretary of the Ministry of Defence websites were consulted, no information was found on forward planning for potential defence purchases (3), (4), (5). Oman releases very little information about its defence sector, its budgets, purchases, procurement, and expenditures. This lack of information demonstrates that Oman treats defence information, including potential purchases as classified information (6), (7).

As defence purchases are not subject to forward planning in Oman, there is no information available to be published. With a lack of forward planning in purchases an assessment of notices of planned purchases is irrelevant in this context.

There is no planning for potential purchases within the PA or its national forces. Preparation for purchases usually happens within months, or in less than a year in advance of purchase (1), (2). There is no strategic national forces or security review. The researcher checked the websites for the MoF and the security apparatuses; there is no evidence of a review or strategy. However, it is also true the PA forces share their needs assessment with the donor community on what do they need in terms of defence purchases for the donor planning purposes (3).

There is no information available about purchase planning. According to the MoF and the military department at the MoF, this data is not available (1). The researcher asked about the possibility of finding out what the purchasing plan for the next few months was; however, the concerned department denied any knowledge of purchase plans (3). They only know about bids and purchases already made. Information on purchases is not readily accessible or available, however, the sectoral plans of the PA ministries (in this case the MoI), and through its strategic affairs department, list the future needs (with the help/leadership/priorities of the donor community) (2). These sectoral plans are normally associated with action plans that spell out further details and set some operational objectives (although not quantified or linked with clear deadlines and timelines), but these are not publicly available (3).

Planning is made available in accordance with the updated “Horizons” modernisation programme and periodic white papers and press announcements; information is increasingly being made available but the details provided are not comprehensive and are subject to change. This is also true of the revised AFP modernisation act which attempted to set out plans for a 15-year period [1, 2, 3].

In 2018, the government confirmed the approval of Horizon 2 (2018-2022) of the country’s military modernisation plan [1, 2]. The announcement came from the defense department, which also provided some infromation on forward purchase plans for the next two to four years [3]. However the information is not extensive and the defense department usually declines providing any details [1, 2, 4]. At times, purchases are added that have not been telegraphed previously and are announced via press briefings [2].

Procedures of long term acquisition planning are based on Act on reconstruction, technical modernization and financing of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. [1]
Council of Ministers, after consultation with the Sejm defence committee, adopts resolution on detailed directions of reconstruction and technical modernization of the armed forces for 10 year period. Such document for the period 2017-2026 was accepted with delay in June 2018. It is classified and only abbreviated information on its content were published. [2]
On the basis of the resolution, minister of defence, after consultation with the Sejm defence committee, adopts programme of development of Armed Forces. The current programme, for the period 2017- 2026, was adopted with delay in November 2018. [3] It is classified and only abbreviated information on its content were published. [4]
The programme formulates the base for development and adoption of a 15 year (previously – 10 year) “Plan for technical modernisation of armed forces”, which is the most detailed long term acquisition document. Plan for 2017 – 2026 was signed by the defence minister in February 2019 [5], and for the period 2021-2035 in October 2019. [6] The plans are classified and MoD publishes or releases abbreviated information on its content and on armament programmes. [7, 8]
The plans are comprehensive, however in 2015 the old modernisation plan was changed without required planning procedure [8] and the new one was adopted with delay. Consequently for some period acquisitions were based on no valid multiyear plan.

Long term (15 year) plans for modernisation of armed forces are classified and only some general information on armament projects are published. [1]
For purchases based on general part of the Public Procurement Act there is an obligation to publish 1 year procurement plans. MoD publishes them on its website and logistic units on theirs websites. [2, 3, 4]
Plans of procurements based on defence and security part of the Public Procurement Act (under Article 131ba) may be withdrawn from publication for reasons of national security. There are no obligation to publish plans of procurements excluded from the Public Procurement Act.
Consequently, the Armament Inspectorate does not publish annual plans for defence procurements, as the document is classified. [5, 6]

The Military Programming Act [1] and the Military Infrastructure Programming Act [2] are comprehensive policies of forward planning in defence procurement and investment from 2019 to 2030.

Although the Military Programming Act and the Military Infrastructure Programming Act show forward planning from 2019 to 2030, budget items are only partially disaggregated [1, 2]. Further information may be found in the yearly State Budget’s additional information [3, 4], but there is no evidence of multi-year purchase plans with clear specifications.

Although Qatar does not release much information about the defence sector, our sources confirm that the MoD has a strategic unit that assesses its needs and plans future purchases. [1,2,3] Forward planning is a major issue within the armed forces, as it requires expansions and training for personnel, particularly when the purchases are strategic weapons such as tanks or planes. Sometimes, however, impromptu strategic purchases are made. The only information available about Qatari defence purchases is through foreign media platforms that announce arms deals and acquisitions. This all supports the idea that forward planning in relation to defence purchases is limited.

There is no public information available on planned purchases. However, strategic purchases such as jets and tanks are made public as a part of power show in the region [1,2,3].

According to Article 4 of Federal Law No. 44 ‘On the Contract System for the Procurement of Goods, Work and Services to Meet State and Municipal Needs’, all purchasing plans should be published on the government’s official public procurement portal – http://zakupki.gov.ru [1]. According to Clause 4 of Article 4, information classified as a state secret should not be published on the portal [1]. Without the significant number of secret item purchases, the plan cannot be considered comprehensive.

As for timing, Federal Law No. 44 does not set a minimum timeframe for publishing potential purchases in advance [1]. The planning schedule, on the other hand, is to be published on an annual basis, as detailed in Article 21, Clause 1 [1]. Point 10 of the rules detailed in Government Decree No. 932 ‘On the rules for purchase planning’ stipulates that the ordering party may define their own timeframe for purchase planning [2].

As for strategic defence review, Government Decree No. 555 ‘On the procedure for justifying purchases’ states that the ordering party shall justify the size and price of the potential purchase [3]. Also, according to Article 22 of Government Decree No. 1255 ‘On the rules for forming state defence order’, the Board of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation conducts some revision of the ordering party’s purchasing plans [4,5]. No reports of such revision are available on the Board’s official website [6].

Federal Law No. 275 stipulates that state defence orders are planned in accordance with the Russian Military Doctrine, the State Armament Programme, the economy mobilisation plan, international military cooperation plans, etc. [1]. Clause 4 of Article 4 states that the key indicators of the state defence order are defined during the process of setting the annual federal budget [1]. A huge part of the defence budget is classified under federal legislation on state secrets and the official MoD website does not provide any plans for purchases, only random post-factum marketing reports [2,3].

According to our sources, there is a forward planning process in place, in terms of the government’s strategic defence purchases, which is usually between 3-5 years. (1), (2). However, such planning is politically motivated and linked to strategic allies or defence cooperation with other countries (3). “It’s clear that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is centralizing power, although whether he is controlling money more tightly is harder to determine. It’s far from clear that what’s being done is having any real impact on the quality of forwarding defence planning” (4).

Sources have said, the MoD does not publicly announce expected purchases. Purchases remain secret until the final days unless they are leaked by another party. However, in logistics and strategic purchases, forward planning exists, and bidders are informed one year before the actual purchase (1), (2). According to the Government Tenders and Procurement Law of 2006, government authorities are required to announce the results of public tenders and government procurements that exceed one SAR 100,000. Nonetheless, military equipment and other defence-related purchases are exempted from this rule (3). In practice, the government does not announce forward purchase plans, rather military and defence acquisitions are typically made public after the fact, most often through foreign media sources though also covered locally. According to Anthony Cordesman, the Saudi defence budget has “no meaningful transparency” (4).

Long-term objectives and priorities in attaining capabilities, including financial framework and potential purchases, are defined in the Long-term development plan for defence sector [1]. The current long-term development plan extends to the time frame of ten years (2011-2020). However, this document is classified, which is particularly puzzling given that it was, in accordance with the Law on Defence, adopted by National Assembly [2, 3] and that most members of parliament do not have security clearance to access secret files. There is no other document or format in which the government comprehensively publishes plans for potential defence purchases.

Following requirements by the Public Procurement Law [1], annual procurement plans are published on the MoD’s website [2]. The plans list all individual purchases which are foreseen in the respective year, with details such as quantities, when each procurement is due and type of procedure (e.g. open tendering, negotiation procedure with/without publishing a call for bids, etc.). Since 2016, the MoD has included estimated contract value in the annual procurement plans.
Only annual public procurement plans are published. Annual public procurement plans in the field of defence and security and annual plans of procurement in the field of defence and security to which the law is not applied are classified. All information about the planned procurement of arms, military and security-sensitive goods, services and works is withheld, even the aggregate amounts of money planned to be spent for these kinds of procurement or a general overview of items to be procured (without any further details on their characteristics and quantity).

The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) has outlined a roadmap for the modernisation of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) with extensive details on the required capabilities and potential purchases that extend to the next decade via a strategic defence review as well as parliamentary speeches, all of which are accessible by the public [1, 2].

The MINDEF does not generally release public information on its specific requirements for most procurement programmes, and when it does there appears to be very little lead time for prospective suppliers to prepare and seek further information, and enough for oversight agencies and civil society to debate the necessity of the proposed purchases. For example, the MINDEF only revealed its plans to seek replacement submarines in a March 2013 debate [1]; however, by that December it had already awarded a submarine construction contract to a German builder, along with a separate contract for a jointly developed combat management system [2]. It can be inferred from this evidence that the tender and selection process had been ongoing already for some years.
Minor armament quotations (as spares for aircrafts and ships) and non-armament acquisitions are published in GeBIZ tender electronic system, in most cases about month or two before close of tender. [3].

Planning for major acquisitions (note: not procurement) is discussed and detailed through the Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan (SCAMP) process [1]. SCAMP is considered “highly sensitive” and has not been made available to the public [2].

According to the Defence Acquisition Handbook (DAHB) 1000, the SCAMP was developed as a planning tool that quantifies the armament acquisition requirements over the next 30 years [3]. In addition to SCAMP, the 2014 Defence Review Programme laid out broad purchase requirements for the military based on the country’s defence requirements. These are regarded as larger guiding directives rather than specific, itemised defence systems requirements [4].

According to interviewee 2, planned acquisitions were robustly discussed and debated within the defence force [1]. Media reports also show information on planned purchases during the bidding phase of acquisitions [2].

Armscor’s policy regarding the awarding of contracts specifies that Requests for Proposal should be issued for at least seven days to allow prospective bidders to provide a competitive response, with approval by a department head required for shorter advertisement periods [3]. New requests for proposal are listed on Armscor’s website, however, this does not include major capital acquisition programmes for which Armscor contacts industry directly [4].

Article 13 of the Defence Acquisition Programme Act requires that the Ministry National Defence formulate a mid-term national defence plan, including potential defence purchases, for the following 5 years. [1] The Joint Chiefs of Staff also develop a Joint Strategy Objective Plan (JSOP) which contains forward planning for potential arms purchases over the next 5 years. [2]

Both plans are classified as military secrets which may impact national security if disclosed, and they are not made public. [1] The Ministry of National Defence publishes a press release on the mid-term national defence plan every year but it lacks much details of potential defence purchases. [2] [3] Due to the general public’s limited access to information on defence purchases, South Korean media has been actively covering stories on potential purchase plans. [4]

There is no publicly available information to grade this indicator according to the types of timelines mentioned; as such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. Sources contacted for information have not been forthcoming. While the SPLA White Paper, in its discussion of logistics, talks about the need for short and long term planning, it does not mention forward planning cycles as discussed in this indicator. [1] Nevertheless, the SPLA White Paper talks about a policy document called “The Logistics Policy Guidelines,” published by the SPLA’s Logistics Branch. [1] But this document is not publicly available, and sources contacted have not seen or heard of it. Defence policy documents issued in 2012 (Transformation Strategy 2017: Part 1: Objective Force 2017” and “Transformation Programme 2012– 2017”) seem to indicate, from their titles, a hint of forward planning. [2] For instance, there is mention of the purchase of fixed wing aircraft after 2017. Nevertheless, in 2015, the Defence Ministry reportedly purchased three Mi-24 helicopters from Motor Sich, a Ukrainian company, for $42.8 million, according to the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan established by the United Nations Security Council. [3] At the very least, this seems to indicate that established priorities are not followed.

There is no information made publicly available on forward purchase plans. Official policy documents such as the SPLA White paper suggest that there is a logistics policy document titled “The Logistics Policy Guidelines.” [1] Because it is not available to the public, it is not known whether or not it mandates the army to make public its forward purchase plans.

The Spanish White Paper on Defense dates back to the year 2000, and the Strategic Review of the Defence (SRD) is from 2003 [1]. It has been a long time since the SRD was elaborated, and a new review in the years to come has been suggested [2]. Annex F of the SRD, entitled “Defence material resources”, contains specific pronouncements on the procurement policy in the short (up to 2 years), medium (6 years), long term (15 years), and very long term (25 years); and also on key aspects such as logistical integration, as well as the financing of new weapon systems [1]. However, there has been no comprehensive planning.

The Annual Plan of Contracts of the Ministry of Defence (PACDEF) is required by Law 19/2013 to have “transparency, access to public information and good governance” [1]. This plan identifies many potential contracts by the contracting organs within the Ministry of Defence for the current year, and it is publicly available [1]. Special Armament Programmes, which account for most of the economic volume of procurement in Spain are not included in the PACDEF, as they “have a particular idiosyncrasy” [2]. In the PACDEF for 2020, only 4,483 out of 6,630 proposals (or 67.6 per cent) accounting for €893M out of €2,188M (or 40.1 per cent) were open processes [3].

The most relevant positions, in terms of decision-making, within the Ministry of Defence are occupied by officers rather than civilian public workers. It is widely known within the defence sector in Spain that the defence industry is indulged by the Ministry of Defence, and a higher corporative relationship is expected from military ranks. Moreover, the industry is present in different working groups with the Ministry of Defence, such as the one on “internationalisation of the defence industry”. It is believed that informal contacts and information regarding potential purchases in the future are made in these and other forums [4].

Phone interviews with independent experts suggested that the Government of Sudan does not undertake any forward planning for potential purchases or does not make such planning public [1,2]. No information about Sudan’s defence procurement planning could be found on the websites of the Ministry of Defence [3] (which is no longer in operation), the Ministry of Interior [4] or the Ministry of Finance [5]. Because Sudan’s defence organisations independently collect and use their own revenues, or are directly allocated resources by the head of government (President Bashir until April 2019 and the military-headed Sovereignty Council since then), and are free to spend these revenues without the involvement of or disclosure to the Ministry of Finance, it is possible to conclude that the Government of Sudan does not implement a holistic forward planning process for all potential purchases and that procurements are not necessarily based on centrally organised and transparent strategic defence policies and strategies. Phone interviews with two experts on Sudan’s defence sector confirmed that defence purchase priorities and authorisations usually derive from the leadership of the various defence force components [1,2]. One expert summarised [1]: ‘Sudan essentially has two governments: 1) the cabinet of ministers, who have no authority over soldiers or police, and 2) the chiefs of the army and national police, who can move forces and police’. He added that all of the revenue coming in from industries owned by these forces is only accessible to the latter, and not to ministers, to use for purchases as the commanders see fit. It is possible (although this study did not find evidence of this) that individual organisations within the defence forces conduct some degree of forward planning for purchases, but these would largely be based on the priorities of the head of each organisation, the priorities of Sudan’s head of state and/or the priorities of trade partners abroad that have the ability to influence some defence organisations’ procurement activities.

Sudan’s defence purchase planning is deliberately kept secret. Independent experts on Sudan’s defence sector verified that solicitations and public notices of intent to solicit defence items are not made public by Sudan’s government [1,2]. No notice about Sudan’s defence procurement plans could be found on the websites of the Ministry of Defence (which is no longer in operation) [3], the Ministry of Interior [4] or the Ministry of Finance [5]. In addition, an extensive internet search did not yield any media coverage or solicitations referencing government announcements of intent to purchase defence items. The International Budget Partnership’s 2017 Open Budget Survey for Sudan scored Sudan’s transparency 2 out of 100, its public participation 0 out of 100 and its budget oversight 31 out of 100 [6]. Sudan’s security and defence activities are exceptionally secret and opaque.

The Government recently published a lenghty public investigation report on the ‘Long-term materiel needs of the defence organisation’ which introduced the general directions for potential purchases in the future, extending 13 years in advance [1].

Forward planning for potential purchases extend 8 years in advance are listed in the Sswedish Armed Forces document ‘planned materiel supply 2014-2021’ [1]. This document provides adequate and timely information on a number of potential and planned procurement projects in different areas of the defence organisation, from weaponry to infrastructure. However, details on the planned projects can still be vague or sparse: procurement dates are indicated only by year, delivery periods can extend to up to four years, and preliminary budgets can have a range of up to SEK 50 million.

The so-called MASTERPLAN is developed annually by the Armed Forces Staff [1]. According to a brochure produced by the Federal Office for Defence Procurement, the MASTERPLAN defines the required capabilities and translates the strategic goals and the medium and long-term planning into short term steps, and is continuously reworked. This plan is approved by the Minister of Defence. The brochure states that the MASTERPLAN covers forward planning for eight years, however the DDPS site indicates that it covers “measures that are to be planned and implemented over the next 20 years” [2]. The Federal Government of Switzerland also indicated that the plan covers the next 20 years [3], though little evidence was found to confirm this in official documentation.

Every year the government submits a “Message” (“Armeebotschaft”) to Parliament containing a defence spending plan (“Rüstungsprogramm”) and a property plan (“Immobilienprogramm”) [1]. Since 2017, the Armeebotschaft has contained framework credits for military materiel. Currently, the Parliament defines then the so-called “payment frame” (“Zahlungsrahmen”) for four years. It did so for the first time in 2016 [2]. The “Zahlungsrahmen” is subdivided into several specific credits including financing of current effectiveness and needs, Equipment and Renewal (AEB), Projects, Testing and Procurement preparation (PEB), Ammunition (AMB), and the property plan. The spending is approved on a yearly basis while inscribed in the four-year payment frame [1]. The message does contain some information on the procurements, especially if it concerns more important systems but does not cover all items in detail. The Ordinance on Public Procurement (VöB) defines the respective deadlines for each category of tender (Article 19 VöB) [3]. Beyond those financial documents there appears no publication of detailed procurement plans short of the published tenders.

Forward planning for potential purchases is discussed during the process of policy design and strategy formulation through the roadmap of Ten-year Military Build Concept (10年建軍構想) and Five-year Force Build-up Plan (5年兵力整建計畫) [1]. However, the comprehensiveness of plans for potential purchase varies, while the volatile security environment in Taiwan is being challenged [2]. Both the “Ten-year Military Build Concept (10年建軍構想)” and the “Five-year Force Build-up Plan (5年兵力整建計畫)” are reviewed and revised on an annual basis. The changes to policy and procurements are adjusted with a roll-over mechanism.

There may be some information on forward purchase plans for the next few years disclosed in the National Defence Report; however, discussion tends to be superficial and not extensive [1]. In addition, specific procurement programmes, especially arm sales from foreign countries, are not well disclosed or discussed due to confidentiality [1].

The current National Defence Policy dates from 2004 and a copy is not publicly available. Searches of defence analysis-related websites, and public Tanzanian state documentation online reveal no such forward planning policies.

Reviews of Parliamentary Committee reports, and available public documentation reveal no such information being released. [1]

On February 27, 2017, the Defence Council approved a 10-year military development programme entitled ‘Modernisation Plan: Vision 2026’, which was drawn up in accordance with the military reform policy in order to enhance military capabilities and readiness to tackle any potential threats to national security [1]. The plan aimed to raise defence spending from 1.4% to 2% of the country’s GDP by 2020. Since 2016, the junta government has emphasised the importance of procuring armored vehicles, helicopters and frigates to counter southern insurgency and to modernise its structure in general. Nevertheless, defence experts found the strategy to be ambiguous and inconsistent regarding equipment types and strategic requirement [2]. According to the Ministry of Defence’s budget analysis report for the fiscal year 2020, the ministry, as well as each armed force, are encouraged to promote public understanding about the necessity of their purchases and the costs of technological development or knowledge transfer to deal with cyber threats, for instance [3].

According to Section 30 of the Budget Procedures Act B.E. 2502 (1959), when a fiscal year ends, the Minister shall issue a report on income and expenses covering the annual budget, which must be published in Royal Gazette as soon as possible [1]. According to the Thailand Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, the report on expenditure, after being audited by the National Audit Council, shall be collected for the purpose of issuing a second report for submission to the Cabinet, which shall then be presented at the House of Representatives. According to Section 4, ‘Fiscal Year’ in Thailand means a period of one year commencing on 1 October and ending on September 30 the following year [2].

However, it should be noted that the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, which is currently in effect, does not require state agencies to publicly disclose information about their planned purchases. Since the 2019 election, more information about the future purchased plans has been available at the parliamentary reviews on the defence budget. This is illustrated by the opposition’s attack of the proposed 124-billion-baht budget for the Ministry of Defence, including the planned purchase of two submarines worth 22.5 billion baht. Another example is the disclosure of the fact that, in 2017, the former coup-installed government approved the navy’s plan to buy three submarines from China, worth a total of 36 billion baht [3]. However, according to the country’s auditor-general, there were accounting errors in the disbursement of the military budget in the fiscal year 2019 [4]. In short, it is clear that information about smaller purchases is still not publicly disclosed, while purchases for major initiatives are not accountable either. While agencies are encouraged to promote public understanding of the necessity of their purchases, which may amount more to encourage propaganda, they are not required to publicly disclose information about planned purchases. The case of the planned purchase of two submarines worth 22.5 billion baht is the only current forward purchase plan made publicly available. The proposal was reviewed in the parliament in 2020, and the installment payment plan was expected to start from 2021 to 2021. However, the proposal was eventually postponed to be presented in the parliament again in 2022 [5].

According to our sources, there is a some publication of small military purchases. These purchases are usually logistics, food, uniform, benzin, and similar items(1,2).

The availability of defensive procurement is mainly due to the application of the provisions of Ordinance No. 36 of 1988, on the control of some of the expenses of the Ministries of National Defence and Interior, and revised by Government Order No. 842 of 2017, dated 26 July 2017, which defines the general principles of procurement in the field of defence(3).

According to our sources, there are rare times when forward planning purchases are made public. They usually advertise for procurement a few months before the actual purchases(1,2). Some information about forwarding planning is available. However, this information lacks detail (3).

As explained in the ‘Political Risk’ section, Turkey has the OYTEP (On Yillik Tedarik Plani – the 10-Year Procurement Plan) which guides the preparation, prioritisation and budgeting of programmes. However, as emphasised earlier, the OYTEP is a ‘Cosmic Top Secret’ document that even generals working at the J4 level (Logistics and Procurement Commands) in the General Staff and service commands cannot access [1]. This primary document, as well as the other secondary documents that are prepared in accordance with the OYTEP document and influence possible future procurements, are not made public. So, in the case of Turkey, the forward planning for potential purchases extends 10 years ahead, but it is rarely comprehensive or made public.

Interviewee 3 suggested that all defence procurements may be classified into three categories [1]:

1. Those at the service command (Army, Navy and Air Force) level: these are procurements/biddings that are carried out for urgent operational needs and unexpected circumstances in a budget year (most counter-terror operations, procurements related to cross-border operations and critical missions abroad, such as the Libya campaign, are conducted in this category). Interviewee 3 argued that some of these ‘unexpected procurements’ are carried out with notices of planned purchases and some are not, such as those for operational needs for ongoing counter-terror operations in Turkey’s Kurdish majority southeast and abroad [1,2].

2. Procurements in the second category are conducted, with notices, by the Ministry of Defence from its allocated budget. Interviewee 3 said that, according to the contracting/bidding regulations, notices should be published in the media and contract information boards available at the entrances of all military units [1].

3. The third category is for multi-million-dollar procurements. Interviewee 3 suggested that these procurements are out of professional military control and are extremely politicised. He suggested that, as seen with the purchase of the S-400s, the entire process, from procurement planning to implementation, is kept totally hidden and that even those military personnel in charge of the procurement are excluded from all processes [3]. Articles 3 and 4 of the Law on Public Procurement explain these categories [4]. He then suggested that biddings of Category 1 type purchases are publicly available yet Category 2 and Category 3 types of purchases are not publicly available.

Though the government developed the white paper on defence transformation in 2004, it is not an indicator of forward planning as a strategy for potential purchases because most of the defence issues related to purchases are classified. No any such document has been developed since then. One MP [1] said defence officials work under the “feeling that defence matters are confidential,” and therefore, not many of their plans are known by the public. According to local media reports [2], a colossal sum of money has been set aside for the purchase of an unnamed item by the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces. The classified asset is billed at Shs 1.9 trillion, about six per cent of the 2019/2020 national budget of 34.3 trillion. It was further reported that the Shs 1.94 trillion, was separate from the customary classified expenditure of Shs 225 billion also planned for in the same financial year. With all this money, it is not known what it is used for.

There are few notices of planned purchases, but most planned purchases are not made public because they are considered classified and therefore not closed to the public [1]. In what seems to be a routine practice now, according to the Daily Monitor in 2020, The Ministry of Finance wrote to Parliament to approve additional Shs400 billion worth of supplementary request for the classified expenditure under the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs. The newspaper further reported that under the new supplementary request, State House needed an additional Shs35b to finance “urgent classified expenditure requirements” and another Shs17b for the purchase of undisclosed transport equipment [2]. Sometimes the public gets to know these from the press. For example, The East African newspaper reported that the latest report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) showed that Uganda spent $18 million in 2017, against the previous year’s purchases that were below $1 million. It was further reported that Uganda expected five helicopters from the United States later in 2017 as part of an $87.6 million contract with Bell Helicopters signed in September 2016 [3].

Ukraine started implementing mid-term budget planning, and the Ministry of Finance declared it was going to introduce corresponding changes to the Law of Ukraine On the Budget Code of Ukraine [1]. For the first time in 2017, Ukraine drafted the State Defence Order (classified military and security procurement plan) for three years instead of one year as was previously the case [2]. Additionally, the MoD also drafts three-year budget requests [3]. However, MoD procurement plans are currently drafted on an annual basis [4]. There is a strategic defence review in place with the last one being conducted in 2016 [5].

There is a three-year procurement plan [2] for classified military procurement but MoD does not publish any information on procurement plans for classified goods and services. Corresponding state customers both organize and execute procurement procedures [1] (including the selection of the vendor amongst both private and state-owned enterprises possessing relevant licenses [1]). Military (uniforms, food, fuel etc.) public procurement plans (MoD Annual procurement plan) are not published. There are also the “annual plans” provided by Article four of the Law of Ukraine On Public Procurements which are to be published online within five days from the date of their approval [3]. As distinct from the MoD Annual procurement plan, these “annual plans” provide information on short notice (most of them are published, according to the Prozorro system, in the same month when the MoD is planning to procure a particular good) only on particular items to be procured, specify the procurement procedure, the expected value, and tentative date of the start of the procurement procedure [4]. Announcements of the procurement procedure and tender documentation are to be published no later than 15/30 days, depending on the price [3].

According to our sources, there is clear and well-established planning for defence purchases in the UAE. This can extend to up to five years of planning in some cases. In some cases, the UAE defence purchases are politically motivated and/or are reactions to regional turmoils (1), (2), (3).

There is no information available for the public or other sectors within the state. Plans are restricted to the Office of the Crown Prince (1), (2), (3).

The Ministry of Defence publishes an annual Defence Equipment Plan [1]. The plan sets out the equipment budget and forecast expenditure on equipment over a ten-year period. It includes spending on both new equipment and support costs for in-service equipment [2]. The strategic context of the Equipment Plan derives from the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015 [3].

Additionally, the Defence Supplier Portal is used to create and publish all notices (PINs, VTNs, Contract Award Notices), for upcoming contracts. The DSP provides a single point of input for all the types of notices that will be used.

Specifically, the DSP provides:
a. drafting templates for all Find a Tender and contracts Finder notices and access to MOD DSP notice templates;
b. the ability to post notices to the correct advertising websites (i.e. DSP, Find a Tender and contracts Finder) depending on the nature of the requirement; and
c. a central Opportunity Listing on the DSP to point suppliers to published notices or to publish DSP specific notices, as appropriate [4].

The Equipment Plan sets out the equipment budget and forecast expenditure on equipment over a ten-year period. It includes spending on both new equipment and support costs for in-service equipment [1]. The National Audit Office publishes its assessment of the Plan alongside the Equipment Plan [2]. The Public Accounts Committee usually takes evidence on the Equipment Plan using information provided by the National Audit Office and produces a report [3]. The adequate and timely information is sufficient to enable prospective suppliers to prepare and seek further information, and enough for oversight agencies and civil society to debate the necessity of the proposed purchases.

Procurement is undertaken via the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process. The planning phase produces the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which draws from the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) [1,2]. Previously, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (published every four years) outlined the procurement desires of each strand of the military in vague detail [3]. The 2018 NDS, which replaced the QDR, is only produced in summary form and does not have any details on the future procurement strategy [4]. The 2018 NSS mentions ambitions for ‘new approaches to acquisition’ but no detailed procurement plan [5]. The Defense Planning Guidance is classifed Secret and therefore not publicly available. According to one source, the planning phase of the PPBE determines the needs for the DoD for the next 5, 10 and 20+ years, however, there is no official source that corroborates this [6]. Acquipedia (produced by the DoD corporate university, Defense Acquisition Univerity) suggests, however, that planning extends only five years [7].

The Navy publishes an annual long-range plan for the construction of navy vessels, which examines a 30-year period and outlines the plans for shipbuilding [8,9,10]. Beyond this, however, there is no publicly available forward-planning document for the other military services that extends beyond 6 years into the future (as outlined in 60B). It is therefore unclear whether forward planning extends beyond a 6-year period, with the exception of the Navy.

The Future Years Defence Plan (FYDP) is a congressionally mandated annual requirement from the Secretary of Defense [1], which outlines the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the upcoming fiscal year and the four subsequent fiscal years (totalling a five-year period). According to the legislation, the FYDP must be submitted in unclassified form to Congress, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Comptroller General and the Congressional Research Service no later than five days after the President’s budget is submitted to Congress that year [1]. In this form, the FYDP outlines the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations included in the budget and the four subsequent fiscal years.

The data included in the FYDP is submitted by a DoD component (i.e. military service or defence agency) and includes details on the total resources allocated to a programme, the weapons systems and support systems within a programme and the funding category for the resource [2]. Given that the FYDP is not publicly available, prospective suppliers and civil society are not able to scrutinise the plans however, the CBO’s analysis of the FYDP, which outlines the implications of the plans, is publicly available [3,4]. The CBO report however, does not provide extensive detail on the planned acquisitions outlined in the FYDP. Some details about specific programmes and their costs are outlined, but there is not a disaggregated list of planned purchases.

In March 2020, the DoD asked Congress to rescind the requirement to publish the unclassified FYDP data to Congress, the CBO, the Comptroller General and the Congressional Research Service, which would mean that the CBO would not publish its long term analysis for the public [5]. As of early 2021, however, nothing has changed yet in how the DoD publishes the FYDP.

For procurements which are contracted using the Multiyear Procurement (MYP) process, in which the DoD uses a single contract for two to five years’ worth of procurement for a specific item, these details and cost projections can be found publicly published with the Comptrollers budget materials [6,7].

The acquisitions of the defence sector acquisitions are not announced through forward planning; only strategic information is available, demonstrating an explicit intention to acquire weapons and equipment that has been upheld since the first government of President Chávez. However, in recent years this has not taken the form of concrete forward planning for procurement nor coherent plans in which government objectives are adjusted to macroeconomic conditions.

Defence sector strategy papers and the country’s plan for economic development (Patria Plan) each include the reinforcement of military armaments among their objectives, as part of the goal of strengthening national security [1]. An intention to acquire weapons has been expressed over the last two decades. For the 2005-2012 period, some information the procurement of various equipment and training contracts for the management of these equipment was recorded by unofficial sources [2]. However, no documents were published detailing the prior planning of these purchases. Although the government’s strategy has maintained the objective of increasing defence capacity through weapons acquisitions, there have been no planning documents for the past five years; moreover, evidence suggests a contradiction between this strategy and actual purchasing capacity. According to monitoring of weapons acquisitions by national and international organisations, recent years have seen a drastic decrease in purchases [3, 4], possibly associated with the decrease in oil prices, the default of the Venezuelan economy, and the general economic crisis in the country.

In recent years, public notification of acquisitions has occured within the context of presidential speeches or military parades seeking demonstrate the strengthening of National Defence [1, 2]. However, forward purchase plans are not made public, and there is no information on plans for procurement and contracting for the current fiscal years, since the budgets have not been submitted to the National Assembly or made public since 2016.

Strategies for strengthening national defence and the objective of increasing armed capacity are being upheld [3, 4], despite the fact that acquisitions of arms and military equipment have declined over the past few years for economic reasons [5].

There are no strategic defence reviews and white papers on potential defence purchases which are publicly published [1]. The documentation on forward planning for potential purchases is not publicly available, even to the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and the Home Affairs Committee. They do not have access to this information as it is considered classified information [2]. Military expenditures and arms purchases are usually completed in an opaque manner, with the media providing details after the fact [3].

There is no information made publicly available on forward purchase plans [1, 2].

Country Sort by Country 60a. Policies Sort By Subindicator 60b. Notice of planned purchases Sort By Subindicator
Albania 100 / 100 25 / 100
Algeria 0 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 25 / 100 25 / 100
Argentina 75 / 100 25 / 100
Armenia 25 / 100 25 / 100
Australia 75 / 100 25 / 100
Azerbaijan 0 / 100 0 / 100
Bahrain 0 / 100 0 / 100
Bangladesh 100 / 100 50 / 100
Belgium 100 / 100 100 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 75 / 100 25 / 100
Botswana 25 / 100 75 / 100
Brazil 75 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 25 / 100 25 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 0 / 100
Canada 100 / 100 25 / 100
Chile 25 / 100 0 / 100
China 25 / 100 0 / 100
Colombia 0 / 100 25 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 25 / 100
Denmark 100 / 100 100 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 75 / 100 75 / 100
Finland 75 / 100 75 / 100
France 75 / 100 25 / 100
Germany 100 / 100 100 / 100
Ghana 25 / 100 0 / 100
Greece 25 / 100 25 / 100
Hungary 0 / 100 0 / 100
India 75 / 100 25 / 100
Indonesia 100 / 100 25 / 100
Iran 0 / 100 25 / 100
Iraq 25 / 100 25 / 100
Israel 25 / 100 25 / 100
Italy 25 / 100 75 / 100
Japan 100 / 100 100 / 100
Jordan 25 / 100 0 / 100
Kenya 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kosovo 50 / 100 0 / 100
Kuwait 0 / 100 0 / 100
Latvia 75 / 100 25 / 100
Lebanon 50 / 100 25 / 100
Lithuania 50 / 100 25 / 100
Malaysia 75 / 100 50 / 100
Mali 50 / 100 0 / 100
Mexico 0 / 100 25 / 100
Montenegro 100 / 100 25 / 100
Morocco 25 / 100 0 / 100
Myanmar 0 / 100 25 / 100
Netherlands 100 / 100 100 / 100
New Zealand 100 / 100 100 / 100
Niger 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 0 / 100
North Macedonia 100 / 100 100 / 100
Norway 100 / 100 100 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 0 / 100 0 / 100
Philippines 75 / 100 50 / 100
Poland 100 / 100 25 / 100
Portugal 100 / 100 50 / 100
Qatar 25 / 100 0 / 100
Russia 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 25 / 100 0 / 100
Serbia 75 / 100 25 / 100
Singapore 100 / 100 25 / 100
South Africa 75 / 100 50 / 100
South Korea 50 / 100 25 / 100
South Sudan NEI 0 / 100
Spain 75 / 100 25 / 100
Sudan 0 / 100 0 / 100
Sweden 100 / 100 75 / 100
Switzerland 75 / 100 50 / 100
Taiwan 75 / 100 50 / 100
Tanzania 0 / 100 0 / 100
Thailand 75 / 100 25 / 100
Tunisia 0 / 100 25 / 100
Turkey 50 / 100 0 / 100
Uganda 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ukraine 25 / 100 25 / 100
United Arab Emirates 50 / 100 0 / 100
United Kingdom 100 / 100 100 / 100
United States 50 / 100 50 / 100
Venezuela 0 / 100 0 / 100
Zimbabwe 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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