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Q61.

Are actual defence purchases made public?

61a. Comprehensiveness

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61b. Accessible data

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The defence purchases conducted through the open procedure (following the Law on Public Procurement (LPP)) are made public in details through the annual procurement plans and the public procurement bulletins. The data provided includes information on the object of the procurement the number of funds awarded, the value of the contract, the time of the procurement procedure and the contracted operator(s) [1, 2]. The purchases conducted through “restricted,” “negotiated,” or “state-to-state” (the procedures exempted from the LPP) are not all announced. Some contracts, the ones that are adopted by law or government decision are made public in advance, but not all undergo this procedure [3, 4]. In accordance with the Albanian Institution (Article 100) and the CoM decision dated 2007 (updated in 2008) “For procurement of some goods and services which are exempted from general rules of public procurement” the MoD is allowed to buy goods or services which do not undergo LLP procedures. These types of purchases, do not provide too much details. In 2017, the Albanian government signed the contract between the Ministry of Defense of Albania and Lockheed Martin Global, Incorporated, USA, for the purchase of the integrated airspace surveillance system, Phase I. The purchase of this equipment is done under the general regulation of the Ministry of Defense for goods or services which are exempted from the general rules of public procurement and the decision does not give too much information. (4)
From the State Supreme Audit Institution’s (SSAI) experiences, the secrecy clause in procurements fledged by the MoD is not always justified [5].

Data on defence purchases conducted through the open procedure (following the LPP) is released in Excel format by the PPA. The contracts adopted by law or government decisions provide detailed financial information [1, 2]. However, the information released only provides some of the purchases planned or announced in the forward planning documents. For example, a tender for acquiring technical support for the operation of maritime radars in Albania a few years ago, which as the assessor points out, was later disclosed in a contract that was awarded to Lockheed Martin [3]. Furthermore, the MoD has been criticized by the SSAI for conducting direct procurements with a single bidder and justifying the actions under national security requirements; for example, in 2018 SSAI found that the amount of money spent in this way had increased by over one million USD from the previous years and no clear explanations were provided [4]. These types of purchases, when made public, often have limited information releases [3].

Generally, as has been outlined in previous questions, matters related to defence are classified as secret. There are reports about some defence purchases in the military’s magazine, but no justification was found as to why further information is withheld. In the military magazine, the army sometimes reports about acquisitions, such as a corvette in 2016. Some technical details were presented, but not the cost of the ship (1). The budget only provides an aggregated number for general defence spending (2). There are no disaggregated numbers for defence purchases.

No information on purchased items was found on the website of the Ministry of Defence (1). Occasionally, the army reported about acquisitions in the military magazine, but no systematic data was published in it (2). Information on purchased items was found in international magazines and journals, which reported about acquisitions made by Algeria’s armed forces (3), (4), (5). SIRPI also provided aggregated data on Algeria’s arms imports (6), (7).

Contract approvals by presidential decree are published in the official gazette, including defence contracts. However, such approval announcements lack significant detail. Records of the other stages of the procurement process are not consistently made public, until the publication in summary form in the general budget proposal (1).

For example, in June 2017 former President Dos Santos approved additional credits from the state budget with a value of 285 million Euros for the “promotion and equipment of the Angolan Armed Forces”, and in August 2017 – three weeks before the elections- an additional 19.7 million Euros “to cover expenses of the President’s Security Bureau”, without further explanation (2).

Data is rarely released in an accessible format.

Public contracts, including those related to the defence sector, are published on the government webside COMPR.AR. An exception to the rule that all contracts should be published can be found on Law 1030, Article 3 that states that certain contracts, including those with foreign governments and multilateral investment organisations, shall not be made accessible. However, they do not cite confidentiality or any other specific reason for this. The purchases and contracts of the Ministry of Defence are published on the public portal COMPR.AR and CONTRA.AR, which disclose information regarding the offer and award of contracts, according to a report from the ACIJ. The contract, the item purchased, the winning bidder, the final beneficiaries, the price paid, the total life cycle costs, maintenance costs, parts costs, but not the date of signature are described in the publication, as well as information and dates for the milestones of implementation of the contract. The information published in open formats only includes calls and awards. [1] It should also be clarified that the purchases made to other States through or under the umbrella of bilateral agreements or memorandums of understanding are outside the information accessible on this portal as long as this is part of the exceptions regulated in Decree 1023 of 2001 and 1030 of 2016. [2] The acquisitions are also published in the news section of the Ministry of Defence and in the media, but mostly, except for those listed on the COMPR.AR and CONTRAT.AR portals, they do not have contract details, award, total costs and maintenance costs, etc. [3] [4]

In the COMPR.AR portal [1] you can access data by item, supplier, stage and type of process, as well as generate a database in Excel. However, it is not possible to access purchases made outside the framework of Decree 1023/2001 and Decree 1030/16. [2] [3]

Defence purchases can be found online through the electronic procurement system. The major purchases, especially related to arms purchase and related items, are not disclosed to the public. According to Article 15 Clause 2 of the Law on Procurement the purchases related to the provision of national security are classified [1]. The rest of the purchases are publicly accessible [2]. Some have the opinion, that secrecy is partly, but not fully, justified [3].

All defence purchases, except those classified as confidential and secret, are publicly accessible through www.armeps.am. Furthermore, the list of the purchases, the contracts concluded with suppliers are also made public. Data is released in an Excel spreadsheet through the electronic procurement system, but the data lacks information on arms procurement and related items [1].

The Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) clause 7.18 provides that “Relevant entities must report contracts and amendments on AusTender within 42 days of entering into (or amending) a contract if they are valued at or above the reporting threshold,” [1] however, the level of detail that is required to be and is normally provided is minimal. Any defence contracts over $10,000 – or, in limited cases, above that amount – must be publicly published [1, paragraph 7.19]. This information ends up on the AusTender website [2], and is usually linked to the Standing Offer Notice that accompanied the contract [3]. The level of detail provided in the contract view is minimal, including the contract value, period, a few word’s description, and basic details about the supplier [4]. The Standing Offer Notice provides a few more details, such as the potential suppliers who participated and a longer description. However, even this longer description can be vague and unhelpful, as in the case of one recent Standing Offer Notice: “Major Service Providers have been selected as strategic partners to CASG to deliver a range of integrated services across a number of skill sets and skill levels” [5]. A detailed description of the procurement, precise timelines, lifecycle costs and beneficial ownership, among other details, are not revealed. Close observers have noted that, particularly for bigger procurements, it is regularly impossible to know how much exactly was spent on procurement and will be spent on sustainment [6, 7]. In addition, particularly in the case of Foreign Military Sales of US military materiel, AusTender does not always provide a complete accounting of actual defence purchase data [8].

AusTender has extensive search functions available for approaches to market [1], contracts [2], and standing offer notices [3], which include tender data. The results of any search can easily be exported into an Excel file. Historical data is further available in Excel format from the Australian Government’s data.gov.au project [4]. However, particularly in the case of Foreign Military Sales of US military materiel, AusTender does not always provide a complete accounting of actual defence purchase data [5].

Some defence purchases are not made public, and there is a little security justification as to why this information is withheld. In media reports, the Ministry of Defence has made it clear that they are not making public certain defence purchases, namely those which have the offensive-destructive capability. This is probably a strategic policy to ‘surprise’ the enemy, i.e. Armenia, and limit Yerevan’s ability to make counter-purchases.
In some cases, information on the purchase of weapons from different countries is publicly available. These are only general features and no information is provided in detail (1, 2). According to the Law on Public procurement (19.3), the procurement agency uses a closed tender when goods (works and services) are intended for defence and national security needs. “Procurement for clothing, food, inventory, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, service vehicles, repair and construction works for these needs is carried out through open tender” (3).

Information on procurement, tenders and their results is almost never disclosed. In some cases, information on the purchase of weapons and military equipment is disclosed, with an aggregate figure at that time (1, 2). It is sometimes possible to obtain weapons statistics for Azerbaijan from the UN Register of Conventional Arms (3).

Based on sources, there is no publicly available data or information on the actual purchase of the defence forces. Although the external sources (such as foreign newspapers and websites) write about defence purchases, no official or formal disclosure mechanism for military purchases or spending exists [1, 2]. Following a search of the websites of the Parliament, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Finance, the government and other media sources, and then verified by interviewees, there is no more information on this topic. There are other sources such as the Carnegie Endowment, which include more information based on external sources (foreign diplomats or military personnel) as informants [3].

According to interviewees, data on defence procurement and spending is confidential and a matter of national security. It is not publicly available, and if one asks about it, it may put them in jail [1, 2, 3]. Following a search of the websites of the Parliament, the MoD, the Ministry of Finance, the government and other media sources, and then verified by interviewees, there is no more information on this topic.

Actual defence purchases are detailed in the DGDP’s annual report. However, this is a restricted document. Some selected defence purchases are detailed in the defence budget, which is published by the Ministry of Finance [1].

For example, during the last 3 fiscal years, the Army purchased the following equipment: type-A vessel, type-D vessel, MBT-2000 tank (dynamic), RR repeater station, RR terminal station, sound ranging equipment, fixed-wing aircraft, electric met station, radar control AD gun system, locating warning radar, type-B VSL, etc.

And during the last 3 fiscal years, 2 submarines, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes, 1 fleet tanker, 2 landing craft utilities, 2 large patrol crafts, 2 submarine tugs and 2 landing craft tanks have been added to the fleet of the Bangladesh Navy.

The Ministry of Defence’s 2019-20 annual report [2] also provides information about certain types of defence equipment purchases made by the three forces.

Data is not released in an accessible format [1].

Defence purchases are published on the e-Procurement portal of the federal government and published in the ‘Bulletin van Overheidsaanbestedingen’ (Bulleting of Public Procurement) [1, 2]. Information that is subject to a confidentiality clause or which may impact national security will be redacted. If the description of the item purchased, the winning bidder, beneficial owners, price, additional lifecycle costs and delivery or completion date do not fall under either of these two categories, the information is not redacted.

Additionally, contract awards are published on the TED portal [3]. Lastly, the law on Freedom of Information allows the public to request insight into more detailed information, which is held by the DGMR (Directorate General of Material Resources) of Belgian Defence [4].

Information is generally provided in a full text format [1, 2]. While holding extensive information, the e-Procurement portal is found wanting in its user-friendliness. This impacts accessibility and how easily comparisons can be made. The same is true for the TED portal [3]

Actual defence purchases are made publicly available [1, 2]. Generally, these documents are not published, but using the Freedom of Information Access Act the listed documents can be obtained [3]. The contract award notice has to be published on the procurement portal, as stated in Art 36, paragraph 1, of the Public Procurement Law (PPL) [4]. The notice has information on the contracting authority, details of the object of the contract (type, lots, value, and description of the object of the contract), basic information about the procedure and the criteria used, as well as the supplier. According to the written contribution by the MoD, in the defence budget for 2018, there were no secret procurements related to the national security and intelligence. Transparency International BiH has received analysis of procurement procedures conducted in 2016 and 2017 in accordance with the requirements of the Audit Office of BiH [5].

Public procurement plans are publicly available on the MoD website. All tenders are published on the official MoD website [1]. On the MoD’s webpage, the information on suppliers can be found along with the overall of the won contracts and very often with the values of those contracts[2].
Notifications are published on the procurement portal [3], where it is possible to access information on contracts that were awarded by the contracting authority, but also from which contracting authority a supplier has been awarded contracts. However, it is not possible to download all the information in an accessible format which would allow easy comparison.

According to the government reviewer, the MoD approaches the spending of budget funds transparently and in accordance with the law. The MoD regularly publishes Public Procurement Plans, PPP amendments, as well as published tenders on its website. Regular reporting on concluded contracts is also made. This includes the publication of Contract Award Decisions, the Contract Award Notice, which links PPP with the concluded contract, and the subsequent publication of complete details in the Contract Information section, which shows all information on the type of goods, the supplier, type of procedure, value and the duration of the contract, the date and scope of the contract, and if there are, a link to the Framework Agreements. The MoD, from the moment of an announcement, reports on all further steps in the spending of budget funds.

The Military’s purchases are publicised by the PPADB, which are accessible via the link below:
[1,2,3]. The information available on the PPADB website, highlighting the actual purchases include the following: the amount of the winning bid, the name of the winning bid, the general contractual terms or agreement. There are some defence procurements that are not published due to being classified as security in nature.

Data regarding the purchases is released mostly using the PDF and EXCEL. This too is available on the PPADB website [1,2].

As the previous assessments showed, most of the defence acquisitions occur under the same acquisitions law, Law 8.666/1993 [1]. Article 24 of Law 8.666/93 establishes possible exemptions from public bids when: (a) there is the possibility of harming National Security, in cases established by a presidential decree, with the approval of the National Defence Council; and when (b) for the contracting of high technology related to national defence [2]. Decree 2295/97, establishes a bidding exemption for warfare assets, technology development and services related to intelligence. Law 12598/2012 establishes special norms for defence acquisitions, defining important concepts such as Defence Product (Prode), Defence Strategic Product (PED), Defence Systems (SD) and Defence Strategic Company (EED) [2]. Defence purchases are made public as any other purchase in the Brazilian public administration. Public Bidding information is published in the Federal government Public Biddings Portal [3], and contract information is published in the Federal Government Contract Portal [4], both within the Federal Transparency Portal. The Contracts Portal shows a brief description of the item purchased, the winning bidder, the beneficial owners, price paid, total costs, detailed payment execution and delivery/completion date.

All government acquisitions are registered and displayed on government websites, whether on Transparency Portal (the federal government’s acquisition portal, Comprasnet, used to be available for consultation from the public, but now requires registration to be accessed) [1, 2] or on specific strategic programs websites of the Brazilian Armed Forces. One example of that is the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB) website, which contains all the submission of prices received in electronic biddings [3]. The Air Force and the Army do not present acquisition documents and contracts the same way the Navy does, which separates them by the project. However, the contacts and bidding processes are available in the Transparency Portal [4], linked to the access-to-information area of each website. This is a prerogative of the Freedom of Information Law 12.527/11 [5]. The Transparency portal, in turn, allows the download in csv. format of a maximum of one thousand items. For wider databases, the portal indicates the Open Data Portal as an appropriate source. The Open Data database is monthly updated and has general information about public biddings and contracts, with dates, contractors, winners, contract object, and others [6].

Article 6 (1) of Law No. 039 (2016) states for defence and security purposes, the purchase of some military items are not made public. Based on this provision of the law, the purchase of all other military items should be public record (1). However, unfortunately, this is not the case. As a government body, Burkina Faso’s government does not provide for public access to its information (2), (3), (4). According to the Executive Secretary of the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC), the purchase of military equipment is not made public and is not made through open competition (5).

Data on defence procurement and contracting is not released in the accessible format (1). In 2008, the government of Burkina Faso created the regulatory authority for government tenders (ARMP), to monitor public procurement and contracting (2). According to the 2015 Burkina Faso’s Government/Defence Anti-Corruption Index (3), the ARMP “aims at establishing and enforcing bidding criteria, as well as ensuring free access to government contracts, equality in the bidding process and overall transparency.” Unfortunately, most (if not all) defence purchases escape from the regulation of the ARMP. Government data in general and defence data, in particular, are hard to access (1), (4).

Defence and security items related to weaponry are considered ‘secret items’ or special contracts. Such items are exempted from the different pathways which all other government expenditure must follow [1] [2].Legislation that covers procurement in Cameroon exempts defence and security contracts (‘Special Contracts’) as per Article 71 of the Public Procurement Code (2018). According to Article 4 (2) (e) of the Code (2018), bilateral contracts (between the state and forreign party) that fall under the category of article 71 (special contracts) are exempted from the code’s provisions [2].

Information on military procurement usually only filters through supplying organisations and media outlets when purchases have been made [3]. There is no information available in the existing literature that was made public while defence purchases were being planned. Military donations made to the government of Cameroon are however aired on state media outlets [4]. The rise of the Boko Haram sect has increased this trend as the government of Cameroon receives more and more military support in the form of training, logistics and weaponry [5].

Furthermore, some defence procurement is made public by the supplying organisations, institutions or countries. The Cameroonian Ministry of Defence sometimes publicly confirms such purchases or donations [6]; however, such confirmation from the Ministry of Defence is rare. The SIPRI Arms Transfer Database has information on each known arms transfer to Cameroon [7].

Data is rarely released concerning such purchases. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “some of the equipment Cameroon’s armed forces have acquired in the last five years include five Type-07 armoured personnel carriers, six Type-07P/VN-1 infantry fighting vehicles, 12 WMA-301 Assault armoured fire support vehicles, four Z-9 helicopters and two P-108 patrol craft from China, a second-hand OPV-54 patrol boat from France, two Mi-17 helicopters from Russia, two Aresa-3200 patrol craft and a single CN235 transport aircraft from Spain, and two Bell 412 helicopters from the United States. The United States is sending military supplies and troops to the central African country to aid the fight. And in December it donated 18 Toyota pickup trucks, a truck, a front-end loader and other equipment to Cameroon’s military… In October, Cameroon received six armoured personnel carriers from the United States. At least 300 US soldiers arrived in Cameroon in October to provide intelligence and training support to Cameroonian forces fighting Boko Haram” [1]. However, data on stationery items and expenditures are not publicly released by the government.

Procurement initiatives are made public in their early stages (through soliciting Letters of Interest and Requests for Proposals) on the Canadian Government’s “Buy and Sell” website. [1] They are very comprehensive in their descriptions, including information regarding the identity of the seller and the ‘end user’ (i.e. the Department of National Defence), a detailed history of amendments made to the contract, the relevant dates and timelines associated with the agreement, the value of the contract, and the goods/services to be delivered. [1] As part of Canada’s ‘Action Plan on Open Government’ the government has committed to the public disclosure of contracting data through a centralised database with the intention of strngthening transparency in Canada’s procurement process and meeting the agreements set out in international trade negotiations. [2] There may be circumstances where disclosures are not made public on national security grounds using the National Security Indicator. [3]

In addition to the information noted in 61A, the government makes available raw data (CSV format) that can be used to make detailed comparisons for specific expenditures across a range of variables. This data is not exclusive to the defence sector and includes all government contracts in excess of CAD10,000. [1] [2] This may make it difficult to disaggregate the defence-related data from other sectors of government spending. However there has been some controversy over Canada’s supplying of Light Armoured Vehicles to Saudi Arabia and the question of whether they have been used to commit human rights infractions in Yemen. This resulted in legislation to enhance the transparency of data; however, the Globe and Mail, pointing to a major hole, stated: “the legislation won’t require public reporting of arms exports to the US, the country that accounts for more than half of our military exports. Weapons sold to the US are also reportedly resold to governments with patchy human rights records. And because the bill won’t force the government to disclose US weapons sales, Canadians won’t know the kind and quantity of military equipment that is later resold to countries such as Nigeria.” [3]

The acquisitions of goods and services made through public bidding in the web system Chile Compras can be traced and disaggregated by the respective institution [1, 2]. For each public bidding, there is a description of the institution, the item or service purchased, total and per unit values, and dates, the purpose of the purchase and project, dates of projects, location, respective department, etc. The information may vary depending on the project, and there is no information available for purchases that follow other mechanisms, such as private tenders or direct contracts.

Data released through the Chile Compras is available in an accessible way through a centralised search engine [1, 2]. The information published pertains to acquisitions of goods and services made through public bidding but not for purchases that follow mechanisms of private tenders or direct contracts.

Defence purchases are made public in two ways. Regarding major weapon systems, the public is informed through official press releases and military parades. For mundane procurement (non-weapons), the plap.cn military procurement website contains information on completed tenders. Overall, the MoD does not release information on the cost of these purchases or other details. There is also extensive secret procurement taking place. [1,2,3]

Αpart from official press releases and announcements on the type of weapons systems purchased, its origin and its operational stage, there is no other data made public in an accessible format. [1,2]

The annual procurement plan identifies the needs of the defence sector in the area of hiring and procurement. As a part of the contract signing process, contracts are to be published publicly on SECOP I, unless the contract reserved expenses. For reserved expenses, information on defence acquisitions is not public, as stipulated by Law 1097 of 2006, [1] Law 1219 of 2008, [2] and Resolution No. 6302 of 2014. [3] Article 1 and 2 of Law 1219 of 2008 define that such acquisitions are related to: intelligence activities, counterintelligence, criminal investigations, witness protection, and informants. For unreserved expenses, Law 1150 of 2007, [4] Decree 1510 of 2013, [5] Decree 734 of 2012, [6] and Decree 1082 of 2015 [7] define the contractual process on acquisitions and the publication processes. SECOP I publishes information related to previous studies and documents; the notice of call; specifications or invitation of the call; amendments; the offer; the evaluation report; the contract, which includes the total cost, duration, delivery, and termination dates; and any other documents issued by the State Entity during the procurement process. [8] Defence acquisitions are published with a few exceptions, as justified in the rules. SECOP I contains relevant information on the contractual process, which has easily accessible and up-to-date information.

With regard to the accessibility of the documents in SECOP, the platform publishes all the procurement processes and uses a basic information template for each contractual process. [1] This makes it easy to identify the contracting entity, the type of contract, the status of the call, the contracting regime, the group, segment, family, and class of the good or service to be contracted, the description of the object to be contracted, the amount, the currency of payment, place of the process, schedule, contact details, and the documents supporting the contractual process. SECOP does not publish information regarding the number of offers or contracts assigned to certain companies or contractors, so traceability between contract type, procuring entity, and number of times a contractor participates in the process is missing.

Few actual defence purchases are disclosed by Ivorian media. Some information is available via Côte d’Ivoire’s military partners (mainly France) or by international suppliers of military equipment.

There is no legal provision requiring the MoD to make public its contracts with suppliers given that Article 8 in the 2009 Code of Public Procurement (Décret n° 2009-259, Portant Code des marchés publics) exempts the MoD from this kind of disclosure due to the confidential nature (secret défense) of military spending (1).

There is no evidence that the MoD release data on actual purchases in any type of format because there is no legal provision mandating the release of such data to the public due to the confidential nature of such purchases.

Research found no evidence that all defence purchases are made public in a comprehensive and standardised manner.

However, due to EU directives and local legislation on public procurements and defence procurements, notices on procurements covered by EU directives and contract awards above certain threshold have to be published in TED Tenders Electronic Daily database. [1] Review of TED indicates that from 01 January 2020 to 09 June 2021 DALO has published 30 contract award notices, which shows that only part of actual purchases are covered by that requitements.
TED contract award notices contains information about: date of contract award decision, number of offers, name and address of economic operator (winner), value of contract and subcontracting. [2,3]

In some cases DALO also publishes there voluntary ex ante transparency notices. Such notice on contract award may be published when EU directives do not require obligatory publication. [4] Review of TED indicates that from 01 January 2020 to 09 June 2021 DALO has publised 5 such notices.

Moreover, DALO website press releases contain information on new defence purchases [5]. Further, DALO annual reports contain some information on the defence purchases [6]. Neither of these sources are comprehensive. The Finance Act contains information on the expenses of purchased materials [7].

Database of contract notices and contract award notices published in TED Tenders Electronic Daily is accessible in CSV format [7].

The general information on defence purchases as it appears in the DALO annual report, DALO press releases and Finance Act (see Q61A) is summary in nature and not very comprehensive [1, 2, 3]. It should be noted that there is substantially more information available on the ongoing procurement of the country’s new F-35s than of “normal” defence purchases, where the DALO and MoD for instance have (and still do) maintain websites for public communication of the procurement [4, 5, 6].

Information about actual defence purchases is not made public on a routine basis. As discussed in Q60, there are several legal provisions the allow and even encourage secrecy in defence purchases. With regards to arms procurement, it is not subject to any form of monitoring by the MoF or the CAA as per Law 204 (1957) (1). Moreover, Law no. 14 (1967) prohibits the publishing or broadcasting of any information or news about the armed forces and its formations, movement, armaments and personnel, and everything related to the military and strategic aspects except after obtaining written approval from the director of the military intelligence department (2). Therefore, when some information makes it to the public domain about actual defence purchases, it usually comes from foreign sources (e.g. the selling country) or is information that the MoD chooses to disclose to the media.

As explained in 61A, data about defence purchases is not published.

The European Commission’s evaluation concluded that, overall, Estonia’s performance in the public procurement sector in 2018 was satisfactory. [1] Based on the data gathered, in terms of transparency, the situation in Estonia’s public procurement sector has gotten worse since 2015. This means that the public buyers in Estonia are not submitting sufficient information about the seller of goods, and the works or services they selected following a procurement procedure.

In accordance with the Procurement Registry Statute, completed procurement projects are listed in the Public procurement Registry, E-Procurement Estonia, under the Archive. [2]

However, the registry was completely renewed in autumn 2018 [3] and changes were made throughout 2018 and 2019. [4] Specific completed projects are now much easier to find.

Both restricted and open defence procurement procedures are listed in the e-registry, but it is unclear how many are not made publicly available.

In Estonia, over 90 per cent of public procurement is done via the e-registry. [5] The analysis written before the new e-registry was created states that the overall aim of the renewal of the registry is to make the electronic exchange of information compulsory for public procurement, “with few exceptions”. [6] There is no specification about what these exceptions entail. Moreover, there are no explanations offered in the case of restricted procurement.

Based on the concrete examples of the restricted procurement projects uploaded in the e-registry, the public can see the short description of the project, the person responsible, the tender, the full cost of the contract. Not many further details are added.

For the non-restricted procedure, additionally to the previously mentioned data, the contract and conditions are added, but detailed costs are not added. There are sometimes, although rarely, also the number and names of the tenders added. [7]

The new e-registry makes it easy to have an overview of the winning bids of different companies and the overview of all the public procurement cases by the Defence Ministry. The information is in an accessible format in all cases, and allows for useful comparisons. [1]

The Ministry of Defence publishes on its website (under “news”) contracts that it has granted. [1] The Association of Finnish Defence and Aerospace Industries publishes on its website (under “news”) contracts that Finnish corporations have won. [2] However, neither of the information sources provides information about the bidding process. The Hilma-system (a digital notification channel where public sector buyers announce their upcoming procurement plans, ongoing tendering procedures and the results of tenders that have already ended; owned by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy) provides the best information source also on defence procurement. When it comes to actual defence purchases, the system gives information on the item purchased, the corporation that won the contract, the overall value of the contract, the number of bidders, the type of the bidding process, and whether the acquisition includes e.g. options for additional purchases.

The same system also provides information in case there are changes to the bidding process or the already agreed purchase has to cancelled for a reason or another. [3] Yet, it does not provide comparable information e.g. how many contracts a corporation has won etc. Moreover, only procurement regulated by Act on Public Defence and Security Procurement and/or Act on Public Procurement and User Agreements is included in the system.

According to Act on Public Defence and Security Procurement, Chapter 16, Section 109: The contracting unit must draw up a written report on every procurement contract and framework agreement that includes the pivotal information on the acquisition, procurement process and participating candidates, tenderers, and decisions made. The report must be delivered to the European Commission if so requested. A separate report is not required if the respective information can be found from the procurement decision or other documents. In addition, the unit must carry out necessary procedures to document electronic procurement processes. [4]

The Hilma-system (a digital notification channel where public sector buyers announce their upcoming procurement plans, ongoing tendering procedures and the results of tenders that have already ended; owned by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy) provides the best information source also on defence procurement. When it comes to actual defence purchases, the system gives information on the item purchased, the corporation that won the contract, the overall value of the contract, the number of bidders, the type of the bidding process, and whether the acquisition includes e.g. options for additional purchases. The same system also provides information in case there are changes to the bidding process or the already agreed purchase has to be cancelled for one reason or another. [1] Yet, it does not provide comparable information e.g. how many contracts a corporation has won etc. Further information on contested bidding processes and purchase decisions can be found through the website of the Market Court > Decisions or Pending procurement cases. [2] Users can search for records easily to see who has won tedners but it does not seem possible to download the data. One would have to record the data manually.

According to order n°2015-899 of July 23, 2015 [1] and Decree n°2016-361 of March 25, 2016 on defence and security procurements, [2] it is common for defence and security contracts to be awarded without competitive bidding and without publication. The public procurement law (“Code de la commande publique”) makes exceptions for procurement of defence and secuirty materials. [3] Most defence and security public tenders are awarded outside of the general legal framework for public procurement, without having to justify the sensitive nature of the market and without having to use the “secret-défense” label. However, some items or procurements with no strategic nature are published on the specific e-platform for State procurements (marchés-publics.gouv.fr) where – according to Order n°2015-899 of 23 July 2015 dealing with public procurement – each ministry or public institution publishes it’s planned acquisitions online. To find public, open defence tenders, defence and security providers or the public can search for planned purchases by researching posts by the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and have a list of acquisitions planned up to one year in advance. [4] The Ministry of the Armed Forces also has its own online e-procurement website which lists open tenders for non-kinetic civilian use items for the defence forces and include details on the requirements, type of tenders, their cost, timelines and application forms for suppliers. However, there is no publcily available information on the purchase of hardware items for the armed forces [5]. Research could also not find full details of arms contracts that have been passed for both hardware and non-hardware items including the winning bidder, the beneficial owners, whole of lifecycle costs, cost of servicing, costs of parts, and the delivery/completion date.

There is no publcily available data on the purchase of hardware items for the armed forces for reasons of national security [1]. However, some information about the Year–1 purchases are posted online on the “public performance” website. [2] The actions of the “defence mission” are divided into 4 budget programs called “annual performance budgets” (PAP):
– p.144 “Environment and prospective of defence policy” (studies, upstream studies, prospective, intelligence…)
– p.146 “Force Equipment” (basically all weapons programs)
– p.178 “Preparation and Use of Forces” (Armed Forces Expenditures, Including OPEX)
– p.212 “Support for defence policy” (support expenditure including infrastructure, major IT projects…)
For each PAP, past, updated-present and future expenses are put into perspective with the strategy planned in the LPM.
On the “public performance” website is also published the annual performance report (RAP), also called “justification at the first euro” for the year Y-1. [3] It compares the budget assigned to each PAP of the Defence mission (as voted for in the initial finance law) to the actual spending, as stated in the “règlement law”.
However, no mention is made of which company won which tender, and no comparison can be drawn from these figures. Also, it is notable that the layout of this information is rather technical, not explicit and not easy for the public to access and understand.

Defence purchases are generally made public, but some information is omitted or included in aggregate or abbreviated form [1,2]. In line with EU Directive 2009/81/EC, Germany now publishes tenders for the procurement of ‘hard’ defence materials in the European public procurement journal ‘Tenders Electronic Daily’ (TED). The TED also includes the contracts awarded for the tender processes, while additional information regarding procurement can be found in the Ministry of Defence budget [3]. However, aside from tender information, there is very little publicly available data on the contracts themselves, for example, there are no descriptions of total life-cycle costs, costs of servicing, costs of parts or delivery/completion date. Equally, in accordance with Section 35, Paragraph 2 of the VSVgV and in accordance with Article 30(3) of Directive 2009/81/EC, the contracting authority is not bound to publish the award of a contract if doing so would be contrary to defence or security interests [4,5].

The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) also provides online information about selected procurement projects and, in some specific cases, special webpages are created with additional information [6,7]. However, it too lacks relevant contract details and there is no evidence that comprehensive contract information is provided by defence agencies in Germany.

Data is released in an accessible format, which allows for useful comparisons (e.g. how many tenders a company has won) [1,2]. In line with EU Directive 2009/81/EC, Germany now publishes tenders for the procurement of ‘hard’ defence materials in the European public procurement journal ‘Tenders Electronic Daily’. The TED also includes the contracts awarded for the tender processes, while additional information regarding procurement can be found in the Ministry of Defence budget [3].

Invitations to tender for potential procurements (with the exception of cases without competition pursuant to the ‘Act against Restraints of Competition’) are made publicly available on the website of the Federal Government [4]. The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) also provides online information about selected procurement projects and, in some specific cases, special webpages are created with additional information [5]. A private magazine called ‘Griephan’ offers a large amount of information about current procurement projects [6]. However, there is no proper overview of defence purchases, and the information provided by the BAAINBw about selected projects seems to focus on advertising instead of transparency.

A new regulation on procurement statistics, designed to enhance transparency, is currently being implemented, but results are not yet publicly available [7].

Actual defence purchases should be made publicly available on the Public Procurement Authority website, which as a dedicated page for the MOD (1). In practice, this is not frequently done as national security concerns are often raised by the MOD and the GAF to avoid going through the tender process and directly procure with the single-source method.

Some defence purchases are not made public, and there is no security justification as to why this information is withheld (2),(3), (4). Although Ghanaian officials and legislation often provide justification for this through the guise of national security, this explanation to the public is a vague disguise or not even considered security justification at all.

Data on hardware like tanks, artillery and related ammunition are never released in an accessible format. Data on actual defence purchases is seldom released in an accessible format. Generally, such purchases are only released for political expediency (1), (2), (3).

When it is released, data is published on the PPA website in an accessible format which provides details of the tender, the name of the company that won the tender, the contract date, the estimated contract completion date, and the contract award price (4).

Defence purchases are made public with almost no exceptions. The information provided includes description of the systems, the winning company, the price paid, and usually the costs of servicing and the delivery date [1,2]. The recent contract signed by the Greek Government for the purchase of the 18 Rafale fighter jets is example of this [3].

Mundane procurement (non-weaponry) is routinely published on the MoD’s procurement website, while there is plenty of information on the armament programmes on official websites and in the media [1, 2]. The information is published in a searchable format. More specifically, it is usually published in notices.

Most defence purchases are made public. The smaller the purchase, the greater the chance of accessing detailed information on the purchase [1]. In larger purchases (value-wise) security is the official reason of secrecy and as full information on the contract is not public (therefore details such as full specification, servicing or whether training is included ) even the total budget of the procurement does not help to evaluate the purchase (price per unit is unknown).

Data is available in case of smaller purchases, but for the important military procurments no data available. The data of smaller purchases is accessable in a format that is hard to access, evaluate or properly research [1].

Actual defence purchases are made public through an official press release by the Government of India’s Press Information Bureau; some strategic purchases are not made public [1]. Information provided usually includes a description of the item purchased, the winning bidder, the price paid, the reason for the and the proposed delivery/completion date [2][3][4][5][6]. Information on beneficial owners, whole of lifecycle costs, cost of servicing and costs of parts is not readily available.

Data on tenders is available online. Non-sensitive defence tenders are published on the government’s Defence eProcurement Portal and the Indian Army provides information on its website under “Tenders/RFI” [1][2]. Information on annual defence purchases are available in annual ebooks published by the government [3] and through official press releases [4]. No data seems to be available in an accessible format such as an Excel sheet which allows for comparisons.

The amount of information on arms procurement released to the public is inconsistent. There are descriptions of purchased items, prospective users, prices paid and time of completion of work (delivery time), as in the case of the procurement package for missile development [1]. However, most instances of defence procurement are not included on the Public Procurement Portal (INAProc) because they are carried out through direct appointment or limited tender. Information regarding the details of the purchase plan may not be disclosed to the public because it relates to the use and management of state defence and is therefore covered by the confidentiality and security of the State Defence Information System Policy [2]. Most information about defence contract plans is only available through media coverage and press conferences by the Ministry of Defence and users [3]. Life cycle costs have not become part of procurement practices, even though they were directly mandated by the President in 2017 [4]. The costs incurred outside the procurement of goods, such as spare parts, training, etc., are not always mentioned in detail.

There is no publicly accessible procurement data presented in a form that enables any useful comparison. There are two ways in which announcements are made by the Ministry of Defence and the TNI regarding procurement data. The first way is by announcing procurement contracts in the form of an aggregate number of contracts [1,2], along with information on budgetary sources (domestic or foreign loans). The second way, which is more commonly done, is by making public announcements at the point of signing certain procurement contracts [3] and delivery [4]. Announcements of the signing of procurement contracts contain information on the types of defence equipment, quantity, contract value, supplier and country of origin and delivery deadline. The scope of arms procurement contracts, such as weapon systems packages and training, is not always explained in detail. Alternatively, procurement comparison data can be obtained in aggregate form from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) website, but this is limited to foreign procurement only, while procurement data from within the country must be obtained manually by compiling it from newspapers.

It would seem that defence purchases of major weapons systems are disclosed, when they occur [1, 2]. However, other smaller purchases are not disclosed. An aggregate total spend is never disclosed [1, 2]. No security justification is provided as to why this information is withheld.

Data is never released. Although, weaponry is often put on display [1, 2].

Potential and actual defence purchases are not disclosed on official ministerial platforms, nor are the legal provisions that demand the GoI or MoD to publicise such deals, an Iraqi lawyer interviewed for this assessment corroborated (1). Wider media discussions offer important details regarding defence purchases and long term business interests with foreign suppliers upon which Iraq depends (2). While defence purchases must not be disclosed in the absence official approval, whistleblowers that exist inside of every ministry, are “are notorious”, a military affairs expert explained in an interview (3), for leaking sensitive information on varied subjects, including defence fraud, particularly on big-ticket military deals. On other occasions, publicised details regarding deals the government has allegedly agreed to, have been recanted. Two cases stand out in this regard the deal with Iran that Iran and, later Baghdad, denied. A similar blunder centres on the potential purchase of a Russian air defence system and the involvement of various actors seeking to lobby or influence buyer’s decision (4), (5). Older cases (6), (7) point to identical patterns from which it is reasonable to conclude that transparency after procurement deals are agreed, is muddled. Discussions in the press on U.S. supplies, as part of its military partnership with Iraq, are more widely discussed in the public domain. A declaration of intent was signed between both governments that offer Iraq a “further USD2.7bn Foreign Military Financing credit line to Baghdad” (2), allowing for delayed payments but little else about this backstop is available publicly. Contemporary news coverage provides a satisfactory if an incomplete picture of defence purchases and what occurs during the post-procurement phase. What can be gleaned, is that public coverage corresponds with official visits to procure military equipment. Over the past two years, potential defence purchases with Ukraine, Czech Republic, Russia, among others have received scant media coverage (8), (9), (10). Other officials have openly discussed arms deals, as Maliki revealed to Sputnik during his visit to the Russian capital in 2017 (11), (12). Few details regarding the post-procurement phase are afforded by the local press often related to the timeline of delivery (13), (14), (15), but often by the supplies as opposed to the GoI.

Even when deals are publicly disclosed, ambiguity reigns; it happened in 2014 when a defence purchase with Iran was made public, but then immediately denied by the GoI. Signed contracts were allegedly seen by Reuters (1), which prompted the US to probe Iraq on the matter, as a potential violation of a UN embargo (2), (3). While four years have passed, the matter is no clearer. To conclude, although details of defence purchases are made public, the full picture is not always discernible.

A former general in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) explained that several defence purchases can not be made public for security reasons (1). However some purchases are made public in the report of the accountant general and other purchases, especially from other countries, are made public such as the purchases with companies like Lockheed Martin (2). Usually when the purchases are a part of a long term program it is open to public.

As mentioned in 61A, several purchases are classified and as a result the data from these purchases is not available. On the other hand, some data is available for ceratin defence purchases but it all depends on the company and if it wants to publish reports (1) (2). which can be found on the MOD’s e-commerce website (2). However, accessing this service necessitates a vendor login, significantly reducing the accessibility of data. As such, data is only occasionally released on actual purchases.

Information on actual defence purchases is made public on the website of the Ministry and most of the time includes item, winning bidder, beneficial owner, price, cost of lifecycle, servicing, parts and completion date [1]. For major programmes it is also possible to access the opinions of the relevant Parliamentary Committees [2]. The provisions that regulate every aspects of purchases are those of the national code for contracts (codice dei contratti), including the release of information [3]. Nonetheless, given the specificities of defence procurement, the Ministry of Defence agreed with the National Agency for Anti-Corruption, the exemption, for those items or programmes that serve secret purposes or that are especially sensitive, to proceed with a confidential procedure, thus not publishing object and outcome of the procedure, in order to safeguard the security of the country [4].

Data is released in an accessible format, but comparison, particularly on the number of contracts awarded to the same company, is difficult (no xls files) [1].

Procurement contracts that have been awarded by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) are announced on the website of the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA). The contract price, description of the items purchased, the company number of the business awarded the contract, the date of agreement on the contract, and whether the contract was awarded following competitive bidding or as a discretionary contract are listed. This information is given for both non-confidential purchases and confidential purchases (such as through FMS). [1] Contracts awarded by the different service branches are announced on the webpages of the regional organisations of the Self-Defence Force (SDF). They include the same categories of information as for central procurement. [2] Some information, such as the delivery date and whether the cost of servicing and costs of parts are included, is stated in the original tender call. The MOD and service branches also make separate tender calls for parts and servicing. [3] There is no statement about whether the beneficial owners are distinct from the contract party. Aggregate information on the cost of actual purchases are included in the settlement of accounts. [4]

Procurement contracts that have been awarded by the Ministry of Defence are announced on the homepages of ATLA. This data is provided in excel files. [1]

Actual defence purchases are never made public by authorities in Jordan. For instance, there are no publicly available audits or financial reports for the armed forces. Some reports, mainly in the form of financial reporting, submitted by the Audit Bureau to the Parliament include the expenditure of the General Intelligence Directorate and the Public Security Directorate, but not the armed forces [1, 2]. In addition to that, the annual financial reporting carried out by the Ministry of Finance does not cover either defence income, expenditure, or actual purchases [3,4].

Data on defence purchases in the way of reporting is not available for the public, and access to such data is denied to any journalist. It is treated as secret information. However, occasionally the intelligence and the armed forces reveal some data through newspapers. This method is used to send messages to either the public, or regional powers such as Iran and the Gulf countries [1,2,3].

The defence purchases that the public gets to know about are those published by local media. [1] The tenders are also published on MOD’s website. [2] In most if not all cases, the public has no access to information about the tendering or the contract awarding process. Confidentiality on matters of national security is one of the regulations provided for in Section 90(7) of the Public procurement and Asset Disposat Act. [3] Disclosure of any information that may compromise national security is prohibited, which explains why the Defence Ministry exercises secrecy in its purchases. However, it is unclear whether all the secrecy is justified for security purposes or just a means of avoiding scrutiny and accountability.

Data related to defence purchases are hardly made available to the public. The public has to depend on the research of the media or organisations that focus on security matters. One such organisation is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI gathers information on purchases of fire arms by defence ministries from open sources. [1, 2]

Defence purchases of the Ministry of Defence are made public in the Ministry’s annual report. However, the implementation of capital projects and the cost of these projects are only superficially mentioned [1]. This document also outlines donations received by the Ministry, which stem mainly from Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, and other donors [1].
Some information relating to defence procurement activities is available prior to the initial contract-signing. The Public Procurement Regulatory Commission (PPRC) publishes on its website contract-signing notice documents for procurement activities [2]. These documents contain information on the subject of the procurement activity, the type of contract, details of the contracting authority, details of the chosen economic operator, the contract duration as well as the value of the awarded contract [2]. However, the defence procurement contracts are not published and they are not publicly available [3].

As mentioned in 61A, defence purchases of the Ministry of Defence are only made public in the Ministry’s annual report. The annual reports of the Ministry of Defence are publicly available in electronic format on the Ministry’s website, and can be downloaded from there [1]. The archive notices of the Public Procurement Regulatory Commission (PPRC) are accessible on the Commission’s website [2].

The Government does not announce defence purchases. The few incidents where purchases were in the public, as discussed above, only came to light because the seller announced the agreement or someone involved leaked information to the press, officials said (1, 2 and 3). State news only addresses these reports if lawmakers or politicians talk about them.

Data on defence purchases is never released.

Defence purchases are made public with almost no exceptions – major ones are usually announced by the Ministry of Defence to the media (previously mentioned examples), smaller ones published on the websites of the Ministry of Defence and of the Procurements Monitoring Bureau, including agreements concluded. [1] [2] In major procurements, usually some data is redacted for national security reasons, e.g. the list of all bidders, the beneficial owners, the price paid, the entire lifecycle costs, cost of servicing, costs of parts (previously mentioned examples).

Information about the major defence purchases usually is announced by the Ministry of Defence to the media either in press releases or interviews, while information on smaller, non-classified procurements and signed contracts is published on the websites of the Procurement Monitoring Bureau (www.iub.gov.lv), Electronic Procurement System – www.eis.gov.lv under section of e-tenders and TED (www.ted.europa.eu) if applicable.[1] [2] The Ministry’s Annual Public Report reports on the most significant procurements, indicates what has been done to improve the procurement system and what major procurements have been made. Comprehensive and comparabe data (e.g. excel) is not released, though it could be extracted from the website of the Procurements Monitoring Bureau [3] on request.

The LAF does not purchase defence weapons in the traditional sense. There is no portion of the defence budget that is allocated to the defence purchases due to the lack of resources (1). Thus, the LAF depends on donations from foreign countries to purchase defence weapons (2). Despite the selective publicization of donations by media outlets, the “value of the arms donations are not mentioned in the national budget. It is mentioned in the accounts of the Human, Economic and Infrastructure Recovery commission in Lebanon which never publishes any amount for the public,” according to former LTA director Yahya Hakim (3).

Since defence purchases are not made public, this question has been marked as NA (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

Expenses, with all details itemised, are provided on the official website of the Ministry of Defence, in particular as of 2019 [1] [2] and the following details are provided: the description of the item purchased, the bidders, costs and completion date [3]. Contracts are made public as well.. Some information is withheld based on the fact that public procurement discussions are carried out as part of unpublished negotiations [4]. The Law stipulates that the tender cannot be confidential (unless it is a secret procurement), nor can the name of the supplier, the winning bidder, prices, and the description of products and services [3].

Lithuania has a central procurement information system. Information about public procurements is available online [1], however not in an open data format. The Public Procurement Office started an open data initiative together with civic open data advocates FREEDATA.LT [2] which led to an experimental portal with freely and conveniently available data. Nonetheless, this initiative did not lead to wider change in the system.

Several defence purchases have been made public, typically at the two larger defence exhibitions in Malaysia, Defense Services Asia (DSA) and the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA). [1] [2] Several defence purchases have also been disclosed in Parliament. The media may also occasionally report on purchases made. [3] [4] However, details on the purchases are not extensive. The lack of transparency is typically explained by national security concerns and details are kept secret under the Official Secrets Act.

Procurement tenders are advertised on the Defence Ministry’s website but the results of the tenders are not made public. [1]

As a general rule, the government does not disclose information relating to large defence purchases. In fact, most of the limited information revealed about such procurements comes from the companies that have won the contracts, rather than from the MDAC.
The LOPM outlines that between 2015 and 2019, the MDAC will have a budget of:
– 200 billion CFA to purchase aircraft and technical support equipment for the armed forces
– 100 billion CFA to buy combat vehicles and modern transport vehicles
– 70 billion CFA for equipment specifically for the security forces, notably for the national guard and the national gendarmerie.
– 20 billion CFA for intelligence and communications equipment.⁸
Beyond the re-publication of the LOPM in its full form on a Malian news website (it is not available on either the government’s website, the FAMa website, nor in the Journal Officiel database), no further breakdown is provided.
In February 2016, Airbus announced it had received an order for a C295W from the Malian government, the first public record of this contract.¹ The aircraft was delivered In December 2016, indicating that the release of information related to a quick purchase rather than strategic forward planning.² It is noteworthy that it was Airbus rather than the Malian government who made the announcement, highlighting the MDAC’s general reluctance to disclose information.
Similarly, MDAC’s purchase of Russian attack helicopters in September 2016 was not revealed by the government, but was reported in November 2016 thanks to a source within the Russian company Rosoboronexport.⁴ The company delivered two attack helicopters to Bamako in October 2017, again indicating that news of such purchases only relates to immediate acquisitions, rather than long-term planning.⁵ Another major defence purchase was reported in June 2015. Brazilian company Embraer Defense & Security announced that Mali had ordered six A-29 Super Tocano combat planes.⁶ An unpublished report by the BVG notes that the Malian government agreed to pay USD 88.7 million (51.7 billion CFA) for the six planes.⁶ The BVG shows that the Malian state had paid two of the three instalments of the contract by 2016 (the third was scheduled for 2017), but Embraer is now set to deliver only four of the six planes.⁶ In none of the cases above has the government publicly revealed what it has paid for the aircraft.¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷
However, smaller purchases are routinely recorded and published by the DGMP-DSP. The website of the DGMP-DSP displays a list of public contracts issued between 1 January 2016 and 30 September 2016.⁹ The list contains details of 36 contracts awarded by the MDAC, of which:
– 20 were subject to open bidding
– 10 were subject to restricted open bidding
– 5 were concluded by direct agreement
– 1 was concluded by restricted competition.⁹
The most expensive defence purchase on the list was for 120 4×4 pick-up vehicles, which cost just under 3 billion CFA (USD 5,4 million).⁹ This tender was conducted via restricted open bidding, while there is also evidence that other larger contracts were awarded via completely open bidding.⁹

As a general rule, the government does not disclose information relating to large defence purchases. In fact, most of the limited information revealed about such procurements comes from the companies that have won the contracts, rather than from the MDAC.
The LOPM outlines that between 2015 and 2019, the MDAC will have a budget of:
– 200 billion CFA to purchase aircraft and technical support equipment for the armed forces
– 100 billion CFA to buy combat vehicles and modern transport vehicles
– 70 billion CFA for equipment specifically for the security forces, notably for the national guard and the national gendarmerie.
– 20 billion CFA for intelligence and communications equipment.⁸
Beyond the re-publication of the LOPM in its full form on a Malian news website (it is not available on either the government’s website, the FAMa website, nor in the Journal Officiel database), no further breakdown is provided.
In February 2016, Airbus announced it had received an order for a C295W from the Malian government, the first public record of this contract.¹ The aircraft was delivered In December 2016, indicating that the release of information related to a quick purchase rather than strategic forward planning.² It is noteworthy that it was Airbus rather than the Malian government who made the announcement, highlighting the MDAC’s general reluctance to disclose information.
Similarly, MDAC’s purchase of Russian attack helicopters in September 2016 was not revealed by the government, but was reported in November 2016 thanks to a source within the Russian company Rosoboronexport.⁴ The company delivered two attack helicopters to Bamako in October 2017, again indicating that news of such purchases only relates to immediate acquisitions, rather than long-term planning.⁵ This is understandable given the FAMa’s clear need to rebuild and re-equip quickly in the wake of its collapse in 2012.
Another major defence purchase was reported in June 2015. Brazilian company Embraer Defense & Security announced that Mali had ordered six A-29 Super Tocano combat planes.⁶ An unpublished report by the BVG notes that the Malian government agreed to pay USD 88.7 million (51.7 billion CFA) for the six planes.⁶ The BVG shows that the Malian state had paid two of the three instalments of the contract by 2016 (the third was scheduled for 2017), but Embraer is now set to deliver only four of the six planes.⁶ In none of the cases above has the government publicly revealed what it has paid for the aircraft.¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ However, smaller purchases are routinely recorded and published by the DGMP-DSP. The website of the DGMP-DSP displays a list of public contracts issued between 1 January 2016 and 30 September 2016.⁹ The list contains details of 36 contracts awarded by the MDAC, of which:
– 20 were subject to open bidding
– 10 were subject to restricted open bidding
– 5 were concluded by direct agreement
– 1 was concluded by restricted competition.⁹
The most expensive defence purchase on the list was for 120 4×4 pick-up vehicles, which cost just under 3 billion CFA (USD 5,4 million).⁹ This tender was conducted via restricted open bidding, while there is also evidence that other larger contracts were awarded via completely open bidding.⁹

Defence acquisitions are published quarterly as part of Open Data and contain: date of the contract, name of the natural or legal person, object of the contract, amount, start and end date of the contract.

Some of the acquisitions are not published, safeguarding the right to classify it as reserved or confidential. [1] However, analysts point out that this classification has become excessive and the transparency of information has been violated due to corruption issues. [2] [3] [4] [5]

SEDENA and SEMAR publish their Procurement Reports periodically on their official website. In CompraNet it is also possible to see the relevant data report of the contracts entered into this platform, by the Buying Units of the Dependencies, such as SEDENA and SEMAR. The reports are published in PDF or Excel format. [1] [2]

Some defence purchases are not made public, and there is no proper justification as to why this information is withheld. The Government did not adopt yet a Regulation for secret procurements, [1] despite the obligation prescribed by the law. [2] Therefore, the Ministry implements secret procurements on the basis of its own Regulation, which was not provided upon request. [3]

The Ministry also claims state secrecy about direct procurements in cooperation with governments of other countries (government-to-government procurements), claiming that the other government requested secrecy. [3] For example, the Ministry claims that only the price and some conditions of the loan related to the procurement of helicopters from Canada are publicly available, while information about the equipment, maintenance and training are secret, at the Canadian government’s request. [4]

In addition, the Ministry publishes open tenders for some procurements, but claims secret conditions for them, without proper justification. [5]

Documents for each public tender are published online. [1] Data can be researched, but the results are unreliable. [2] The Ministry’s annual reports have some general information about procurements, and they are provided in the form of a pdf document, but data is not always available in an accessible format. [3]

According to the MoD reviewer, all documentation related to procurement procedures are avaliable on the Public Procurement Portal and in accordance with the Article 118 of The law on Public Procurement. The Ministry of Defence prepares the annual report and for procurement that are excluded from the Law there is no obligation prescribed by the Law, relating to public notice in them. All data for each public tender is published regularly online and is released in an accessible format.

No evidence was found that defence purchases are made public by the Moroccan authorities. Only the budget law gives details about the purchases of the year, and only in a highly aggregated form. The local and international press regularly report major defence purchases with foreign nations. Given that the budget for the armed forces is not published in detail, it is unclear whether or not these purchases are taken into account in the budget. As explained in the previous questions, the King has the final decision over defence purchases, and is often the one suggesting these purchases in the first place (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8).

No evidence was found in the Moroccan press and from Moroccan official sources (legal and governmental) that data is released in an accessible format (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8). The only information indirectly available comes from international media or websites specialised in defence issues such as SIPRI (9)(10). It is then republished by local media. However, it is not detailed and not sourced.

The military rarely publishes its actual defence purchases. The responsible person at the Ministry of Defence explains the MoD’s defence spending to Parliament on an annual basis and the military published the Defence White Paper in 2015 [1]. It should be noted that this White Paper is not available online to the public. In addition, the published spending information is unclear and not detailed. Some unverified information on defence purchases comes to light through media allegations [2,3].

The Myanmar military is always secretive about its military purchases and never publishes them publicly. There is only one Defence White Paper, published in 2015 [1], and there is no information about actual defence purchases [2].

The Ministry of Defence provides information on defence purchases over 25 million euros through the Defence Projects Overview, which is released annually [1]. The following information is disclosed for each project: projects for tender, description of the items and their strategic importance, financial information for the extent of the procurement process, any major changes or issues and the expected delivery time [1].

The winning bidder/successful contractor is not mentioned unless there are major changes to the contract award and the costs of the product for its life cycle (including maintenance costs) are not detailed [1]. Often, public announcements of high-profile projects are used to draw more public attention to the MoD.

Purchases under 25 million euros are listed in the Defence Annual Report in aggregated form according to the project they are a part of [2]. Some contractual information, such as the successful bidder, delivery/completion date and the beneficial owners, is absent. However, the actual costs, life cycle costs and maintenance costs can be deduced from lump sum amounts [2].

Some exceptions exist for secret expenditure. In 2020, this amounted to just over 15 million euros or 0.13% of the 11.6-billion-euro defence budget [3]. This is permitted under Article 2.8 of the Governments Accounts Act 2016, which allows spending to be secret if it is in the interest of the state [4]. The small size of the secret budget suggests that this provision is not used unduly or abused.

Data on bigger defence purchases, which were awarded on the basis of EU classic or defence procurement directives, are published in TED (Tenders Electronic Daily).. The data may be obtained in an accessible format. [1, 2]

The winners of other defence tenders are not available in an aggregate document and no accessible format (such as an Excel file) exists to allow for useful comparisons and analysis.

All Defence Request for Tenders are publicly available, without redactions, on New Zealand Government Electronic Tenders Service (GETS). Contract Award notices are also published on GETS. [1]
All major defence purchases are made public and can be monitored through the MoD’s Major Projects Reports, which are also briefed to the FADTC [2, 3, 4]. The MoD’s Annual Reports also contain financial information relating to system integration and costings [5]. As part of the FADTC and AOG’s oversight process for the Votes and Annual Reviews, information relating to procurement, contractors, consultants, and providers of professional services are scrutinised, with the Frigate Combat Systems Upgrade and P-8A Poseidon aircraft being two recent examples [6, 7, 8, 9]. Life-cycle costs are not disclosed, though delivery/completion dates, and descriptions of items purchased are. The redaction of life-cycle costs is somewhat made redundant by the financial details provided in Annual Reports/Reviews.

Data on actual defence purchases are released. Currently, one may identify successful bidders by viewing individual closed tenders on GETS. [1] The MoD website identifies all prime suppliers by project [2] Further details on Defence purchases are provided in the conduct of regular oversight activities by the OAG and FADTC described in previous questions. There is no excel file available or the ability to download information. Useful comparisons can be undertaken by an interested party but the analysis is not provided by the Government [i.e. the Government does not announce, for example, that this is the tenth instance in which a supplier has won a contract, although one may deduce that from viewing previously released data].

Defence purchases are rarely (if ever) made public, though, some acquisitions are made public through media (1,2). As in sub-indicator 58B, purchases of military equipment may be lumped together with in-kind donations or heavily subsidised sales by international partners such as France, Germany, the United States or the European Union. As a result, such “purchases” are often disclosed by external channels rather than by the government of Niger.
For example, on October 27, 2017, France’s Ministry of Defence published a report on its website showing a donation ceremony for a series of armed military vehicles in the presence of Niger’s Minister of Defence, Mohamed Bazoum (3). Another recent example is the barracks of the School of Officers of the Nigerien Armed Forces (l’Ecole des Officiers des Forces Armées Nigériennes), constructed and equipped by the United States for approximately 960 million FCFA. The inauguration ceremony took place in August 2018 (3).

The assessor did not find any evidence that data regarding defence purchases were publically released.

Major and significant defence purchases are sometimes reported in the media. The aggregate spend might also be reported. However, there are significant gaps in the information provided. Some purchases only become available to the public following some corruption scandal (1). It is relevant to note the distinction in practice between “civilian purchases” which are non-special goods as defined in the Public Procurement Act 2007. Concerning the latter, special goods which are defence related expenditures such as defence-related goods and services, there is little information provided to the public (1). “Recently, the Buhari administration purchased a number of TUCANO fighter planes from the United States” (2). The Nigerian military in response to a query on the matter yesterday also confirmed the arrangement, saying, “It could take more than a year for the jets to be delivered to Nigeria. Fighter jets and aircraft are not picked off the shelf; normally, it is after a contract would have been signed and money released that they start manufacturing the aircraft,” said military spokesman Olatokunbo Adesanya (2). “It is unlikely that we would even have them in one year” (2). Adesanya, an Air Vice Marshal and Director, Public Relations and Information at the Nigeria Armed Forces (NAF) headquarters also confirmed that Nigerian government had made full payment to the United States government for the war jets” (2). It is worthwhile to note that although the total price is given it is not broken down into the unit price of each plane neither is there any detail as to the cost of the technical support services tied into the agreement.

Data concerning defence spending is rarely in the public domain. Subjects such as technical specifications and price issues are largely undisclosed; neither is any information about the role and or payment to any intermediaries involved in transactions. Beneficial ownership information of companies involved in arms purchases is also not disclosed. Although the PPA 2007 states in Section 16 (12) that every procuring entity shall maintain paper and electronic copies of the records of procurement proceedings for a period of ten years from the date of contract awards and that the records will be open to inspection by the members of the public. Additionally, Section 16 (14) also provides that all unclassified procurement records shall be open for inspection by the public (1). The provisions of the PPA 2007 are largely not complied within this regard, therefore the formal processes do not meet the minimum standards of transparency (2). The question to what extent the Ministry of Defence complies with this requirement is an open one. For example, these records are not open to inspection by the public. Further, The Office of the Auditor General has failed to submit any reports for over seven years which calls into question whether such record-keeping is available (3). The Bureau of Public Procurement has also announced the adoption of the Open Contracting policy, which will include a searchable database of contractors in the public sector with an E-portal so that contracts awarded can be tracked and monitored. The Open Contracting policy aims to ensure that “timely, current, and routine publication of enough information about the formation, award, execution, performance, and completion of public contracts” is available to the public to prevent corruption in public procurement (1). The question raised by this development is the extent to which the MOD will comply with this development. Will it apply to special defence-related goods and services?

The defence procurements are made public and shared on the Electronic System for Public Procurement (EPPS), maintained by the Bureau of Public Procurement [1]. The Law on Public Procurement stipulates that all public procurement is to be conducted in electronic form [2]. The types of procurements, calls and contracts concluded is open to the public, and this is categorised according to the value of the contract: (EUR 20,000) [3]. Confidential purchases, in accordance with Article 7-11 from the Law on Public Procurement are not made public [2].

Data from non-confidential purchases is published in excel format and is accessible to the public for comparison [1]. However, confidential purchases are not published.

According to the Public Procurement Regulation [1], all contracts above the EEA threshold have to be published in DOFFIN (The Norwegian national database for public procurement) and TED (Tenders Electronic Daily) [2, 3]. As of 6 April 2020 the EEA threshold corresponds to NOK 1.3 million [4]. For contracts with a value between NOK 100 000 and NOK 1.3 million, it is not mandatory to publish procurement notices. Such contracts can be awarded applying the general principles for public procurement (transparency, competition, predictability and non-discrimination). However, if necessary, DOFFIN and TED may also be used to publish contracts below the EEA threshold [1]. The tender and the contract awards for defence purchases above the EEA threshold are made public in detail and include a description of the item purchased, the winning bidder, price paid and the delivery/completion date. This regulation does not apply to contracts to procure confidential items [1].

Data on actual defence purchases is not released in an accessible format (e.g. excel file) which would allow for comparisons of tenders.

Defence purchases are never released by government institutions, including the Ministry of Defence’s Directorate of Purchasing, or the Secretariat of Tender Board (1), (2). Our sources confirm that information on defence purchases and expenditures are never released to the public or even being released upon request. The data is considered confidential and is not released publicly (3), (4). The e-government portal Omanuna states that freedom of information excludes defence and national security data (5). Domestic media outlets never report on defence purchases; the extent of coverage around defence issues is military co-operation with other countries (6), (7). Some information, in English, was found about defence purchases on international defence specialist websites. This information has not been confirmed by the state of Oman (8), (9), (10). The only figure made public is the annual defence budget, expenditure is not released to the public (11). There is a lack of comprehensive publicly available information around actual defence purchases.

There is no data available on defence purchases. The data is confidential and secret. Any release of this information could be criminalized and the person who accessed the information could be prosecuted. Information that was found on defence purchases was all in English (1), (2), (3). No information was found in Arabic, on local domestic media outlets, or institutional websites (4), (5), (6). No datasets collating actual defence budgets were found, websites consulted include the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Defence Office of the Secretary-General (7), (8).

Security sector and military purchases are rarely (if ever) made public, though a total aggregate may be disclosed in the general budget of the Palestinian Authority (1), (2). The total budget of the security apparatuses mention the salaries of the employees only, but no other costs. According to Alaa Tartir, the budget of the security sector takes up to 30%, but it is not detailed. What is made public on multiple occasions is the celebration of donations of defence-related equipment. The quantities of items are normally revealed but the price is not revealed (3).

According to AMAN, HR organizations and journalists, there is no access to information law enforced in Palestine, and to access information related to purchases, or budget of the security sector, it requires hard efforts or connections within the security apparatuses (1). The researcher contacted the MoF’s and the military’s financial departments to ask about the possibility of getting such information, however, requests were denied. Data is available in an abridged format (in the case of donors), or not at all (in terms of direct purchases of the PA forces (2), (3). If a civil society organization exposes some of the purchases, then sometimes the PA forces issue a statement to clarify the matter (and discredit the voices of the civil society) (4). The exceptional regulations of the General Supplies Law on procurement of the security establishment gave the security services a way to justify keeping purchases secret (5).

Defence purchases are made publicly available in accordance with Republic Act No. 9184 and are subject to audit by the COA. Purchases are also announced via briefings and relayed to the media. However some details (for example itemisations of costs) may be left out in certain cases due to various cited or uncited reasons, including sensitivity and confidentiality [1, 2].

The level of accessiblity with respect to data tends to vary: at times, data may be released in an accessible and comprehensive manner that allows for comparison, with officials clarifying differences in briefings. On other occasions, purchases are announced but details are omitted [1, 2].

In the case of public procurements based in principle on the Public Procurement Law, the documentation of proceedings is public and is initiated after a public announcement. Due to the lack of defence and security orders via the open tender procedure, the essential terms of a contract are transferred directly to previously verified contractors. The details of a contract such as the case of a delivery carried out by the Armament Inspectorate is classified and there is no public access (other documents of the proceedings are usually public).
In the case of an order covered by the Public Procurement Law, the contractor, the total of the contract, and the time granted for the performance of the contract are public and provided upon the awarding of the contract. All information, if there is no clause related to the protection of classified information, is publicly available subject to disclosure under the terms of the Act on Access to Public Information. The statutory provisions do not require a price breakdown of individual components [1].
In the case of a contract that is excluded under Article 346 of the Treaty [2], its documentation of proceedings is public. The description of the subject of the order is usually excluded, due to information being classified for national security.
In the case of a contract excluded under Article 346 of the Treaty, access to information about the proceedings may is limited when the proceedings are not public. When conducted publicly, it is possible to obtain incomplete information (price, description) [3].

Data on open, non-classified defence (and not-defence) procurements can be to some extend downloaded form two obligatory electronic information services, where procuring entities publish calls for tenders and award notices above certain threshold. They are: TED system (tenders electronic daily – supplement to the official journal of the EU) and national Public Procurement Bulletin. [1, 2]
TED offers downloading yearly contract notices and contract award notices in CSV format [3]
Public Procurement Bulletin offers downloading of search results in XLS or CSV format. [2]
It is worth to notice existence of an open database Barometr Ryzyka Nadużyć (Fraud Risk Barometer) [4], run by the Bathory Foundation and Zamówienia 2.0. It collects data form the two obligatory procurement services.
The Barometer allows some useful comparisons (e.g. how many tenders a company has won).

Most defence procurement information is made public, as indicated by the Military Programming Act. While a description of purchased items, winning bidders, price paid and delivery/completion date is available, there is no publicly available information on beneficial owners, lifecycle costs (whole or partial), cost of servicing, discrete parts cost. As per the legal framework of defence procurement [1], ongoing deficiencies in overall procurement reporting [2] and an excessive reliance on single-source awards, which are potentially exempt from publication, it is reasonable to assume that publication is not comprehensive.

Tenders and awards require publication, but defence procurement is exempt under conditions specified under the law, namely national security restrictions; not all contracts apply and the publication of these is mandatory [1]. Data, when available, is sometimes released in a machine-readable format [2], but supporting documents, including contracts, are published as non-machine-readable scanned PDF documents.

The Qatari Government does not release any information in relation to defence purchases on its official website. The only online presence of the MoD is a Twitter account. Most of the information regarding defence is considered to be classified state secrets, and it is almost impossible to retrieve any official information around defence purchases (1,2). There is a high chance that the government announces substantial purchases or purchases included in a bilateral agreement. However, it is rare to announce or publish the routine purchases of the MoD and its agencies (3).

It has been established that the Qatari Government does not release any official information about its purchases through official means. [1] As there is no public deliberation, and motives of accountability, the Government sees no reason to publish such data. Most information in relation to defence is considered confidential. There is no accessible data in relation to defence purchases, although some information may be sporadically reported through foreign media platforms. [2,3] However, comprehensive information about purchases has historically never been released in an accessible format through official means.

According to Article 5, Clause 2 of Federal Law No. 5485-1 ‘On State Secrets’, information about the volume and plans of defence orders is considered a state secret and shall be classified [1]. No security-related justification is provided. Tenders for secret items are either closed or there is only a notification about such tenders without any documentation. Only licenced contractors may participate in such tenders.

The percentage of secret parts of the defence budget is over 60% [2]. As such, the official procurement portal only provides information about the MoD tenders regarding non-secret items [3]. One should enter ‘MOD’ in the ‘ordering party’ field to see all the tenders/contracts made by the Ministry. To see the tenders/contracts by the MOD units or regional divisions, it is better to visit another website – rostender.info [4]. The MoD does not publish any information about its tenders/contracts. The MoD Department of State Orders does not provide any relevant information [5].

MoD does not provide any data about MoD tenders/contracts for non-secret items (secret items are classified under the law on state secrets) [1]. Some data is only available on the official procurement portal – http://zakupki.gov.ru or in the unofficial catalogue – http://rostender.info. There, one can see the tenders presented by the MoD or its military/regional units [2,3]. But even that information is quite sketchy. The tender and purchase information includes the purchase item description, the contract price, protocols and decisions about shortlisted bidders and sales by auction [4].

According to our sources, there is no law or policy of disclosing military and defence purchases. Purchases are dealt with in secretively. Total defence expenses are published but not in detail (1), (2). Defence deals relating to Saudi Arabia are typically made public in international press sources after these deals have been approved (3), and more recently have also been covered by Saudi media outlets such as Okaz and Arab News (4), (5), (6).

The government itself does not release details on defence purchases. According to our sources, accessibility to such data is not possible either to the public, or researchers and CSOs by request (1), (2), (3).

Quarterly reports on implemented public procurement and signed contracts are regularly published on the MoD’s website [1]. The reports contain data on the items purchased, types of procedure applied, numbers of bidders, the names of the winning bidders, contract numbers and contract values.
Neither the MoD nor the government systematically publishes information about implemented procurements in the field of defence and security. Occasionally high profile arms purchases or donations are typically announced by high state officials [2, 3] or revealed in the media with reference to anonymous well-informed sources [4], but there is no consistency when it comes to what kind of information is revealed (for instance, contract value is sometimes published and sometimes not, and even when it is, it is not always specified what it entails).

Quarterly reports on public procurement are published by the MoD in .pdf files, which does not make it easily searchable. Public Procurement Office makes data available as open data in .csv format [1]. This database includes purchases made as public procurement in the field of defence and security, but it does not contain information about selected bidders and contract values.
No systematic reports/overviews are published on purchases in the field of defence and security to which the law does not apply. Some information is retrievable through statements shared by MoD/state officials in the media [2, 3, 4]. Nevertheless, this information is difficult to follow and gather because purchases could be announced for years before they ensue and data is scattered across news items and appears in different moments.

Most big-ticket defence acquisitions – such as combat aircraft, major naval combatants, and armoured vehicles – are typically announced to the public via the local media, official announcements, or parliamentary debates; although, generally, the costs of these programmes are not revealed. However, several investigative media reports have surfaced in recent years that show certain capabilities/platforms remain undisclosed [1, 2] or were only acknowledged after being exposed [3], although no explanations have been given for their secrecy.

General data on defence acquisitions is sometimes released to the media and general public via official announcements and fact sheets [1, 2]. However, not all pertinent information – such as cost – is revealed, and not all acquisitions are announced. Moreover, these are not always in accessible formats for comparisons.

Defence acquisitions and procurement notices are made public, with the exception of sensitive or restricted items. These are listed through the Department of Defence’s (DoD) Annual Report [1]. The scope, scale, budget, and technical requirements – broadly – are listed during this process.

Data is released broadly via annual reports and appendices from the DoD and Armscor. Defence procurement data is regularly updated and listed via the Armscor Tender Bulletin system. This includes a list of tenders awarded, and to whom they have been awarded [1]. The data, however, is not accessible in an accessible downloadable format.

Defence purchases are made public with almost no exemptions in South Korea. Article 7 of the Act on Contracts to Which the State is a Party requires that government contracts should be open tenders, except for some cases prescribed by Presidential Decree. [1] The Defence Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) publishes tender results with the name of items purchased, the price paid, the contract type, the winning bidder and the beneficial owners via the Defence Electric Procurement System, which is a website run by the DAPA. However, some information, such as delivery and completion date, does not appear on the website. [2]

Data is released in an accessible and downloadable format with excel files via the Defence Electric Procurement System. The information published includes the name of the winning bidder, the items purchased, the contract methods and the price paid. [1]

With an arms embargo in place, there isn’t any public information available on purchases. Under the embargo, non-lethal materials/equipment can still be purchased by the Ministry of Defence (with approval from the UN sanction committee, for example to assist with ARCSS implementation such as weapons storage containers for cantoned soldiers, etc.), but this information is not public.

Data is hardly released to the public on defence procurement, which is also not made public. Information about defence procurement has in the past become public only through investigative reports by organisations based outside the country (see 58B).

Defence purchases/contracts of the Ministry of Defence are publicised in accordance with Law 9/2017 through the Public Sector Contracting Platform [1]. However, Article 5.1 of Law 9/2017 expressly specifies that the agreements included in the scope of Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that are concluded in the defence and security sector are excluded. And, more importantly, Article 5.2. states that contracts for works, supplies, and services that are concluded in the field of security or defence that are included within the scope of Law 24/2011 are also excluded from the scope of Law 9/2017 [2]. Article 35.3 of Law 24/2011 states that “the contracting authority may not publish certain information related to the award of the contract, duly justifying it in the file, provided that its disclosure may constitute an obstacle to applying the legislation, is contrary to the public interest, in particular to the interests of defense or the internal security or harms the legitimate commercial interests of public or private candidates or bidders, or could harm fair competition between them” [3]. This means that contracts may not be public, in part or whole, in cases not related to concerns over security and defence.

The Annual Plan of Contracts of the Ministry of Defence (PACDEF) is required by Law 19/2013, to provide “transparency, access to public information and good governance” [4]. This plan identifies many contracts by the contracting organs within the Ministry of Defence for the current year, and it is publicly available [4]. Special Armament Programmes, which account for most of the economic volume of procurement in Spain, are not included in the PACDEF as they “have a particular idiosyncrasy” [5]. In the PACDEF for 2020, only 4,483 out of 6,630 listed proposals (or 67.6 per cent) accounting for €893M out of €2,188M (or 40.1 per cent) were open processes [6]. It should be noted that non-R+D contracts negotiated without publicity are excluded, which means that the percentage of open processes is probably significantly lower. As for indicators, in 2014, seven in ten contracts for the Ministry of Defence were negotiated. While in 2013 and 2014, the percentage of contracts negotiated without publicity were, respectively, 58 per cent and 54 per cent [7]. In many of these contracts, parts of or the entire document are not made public.

Defence purchases/contracts of the Ministry of Defence are publicised in accordance with Law 9/2017 through the Public Sector Contracting Platform [1]. The platform openly provides basic information about the contracts without the need to register, and there is a useful search tool.

Information on the contracts adjudicated (e.g. how many tenders a company has won) is public but not always easily available. As per Law 24/2011 of contracts in the defence and security sectors, “the award of contracts and framework agreements, whatever their amount, will be published in the contracting authority’s contracting profile, once they have been formalised”. For contracts whose amount is equal to or greater than 100,000 euros, the award notice must also be published in the “Official State Bulletin” or the respective Official Bulletin of the Autonomous Community, in less than 48 days from the date of formalisation of the contract. In the case of contracts subject to harmonised regulation, the notice must be sent within 48 days to the “Official Journal of the European Union” and published in the “Official State Bulletin”. However, this article also states that “the contracting authority may not publish certain information relating to the award of the contract, duly justifying it in the file, provided that its disclosure may constitute an obstacle to applying the legislation, is contrary to the public interest, in particular to defence interests or internal security or harms the legitimate commercial interests of candidates or public or private bidders, or may harm fair competition between them” [2]. This represents a wide range of options for non-publication.

Official information on public contracts in Spain can be found in several ways: the registry of Contracts of the Public Sector (as specified by Royal Decree 817/2009); the Platform of Contracts of the Public Sector [1]; the Portal of Centralised Contracting of the Ministry of Finance; the autonomic platforms in different regions of Spain; and the European “Tenders Electronic Daily” (TED) [3]. Private platforms do exist that provide information on contracts by type of contract, contracting body, or by the winner of contracts. For instance, INFOconcurso.com provides detailed information about contracts, including the Ministry of Defence and the defence industry [4], but they cannot provide the information the contracting body decides not to disclose.

The government is highly secretive about its defence purchases. Phone interviews with a Sudan defence sector expert [1] confirmed that even the total defence spending budget released by the Minister of Finance in a press conference in late December 2019 [2] – during which he claimed that defence expenditure accounted for only 7% of the total budget – probably only included the anticipated cost of payroll and various administrative processes, not defence purchases; figures cited by research analysts consistently estimate Sudan’s defence spending to consume 60-80% of its budget each year [3,4,5]. The absence of even a credible top-line budget figure for defence spending makes it impossible to determine whether any disclosures or discoveries about defence purchases add up to a ‘comprehensive’ total. An additional factor that would motivate the government to keep its actual defence purchases secret is the fact that many such purchases probably reflect deals that violate arms embargoes that the US, EU and UN Security Council have placed on Sudan. In 2017, Africanews cited a Conflict Armament Research report in an article it published about the Sudanese government’s ease of access to military imports ‘in spite of a European Union (EU) arms embargo imposed since 1994 and a United Nations arms embargo on the Sudanese state of Darfur since 2005’ [6].

No data on actual defence purchases was available on the websites of the Ministries of Defence, Interior or Finance [1,2,3]. The Ministry of Finance website main page includes a link entitled ‘Procurement’, but the link’s sublinks lead to empty pages. Global Integrity’s 2019 Global Integrity Index for Sudan indicated a score of zero against the criteria ‘In practice, citizens can access the results and documents associated with procurement contracts (full contract, proposals, execution reports, financial audits, etc.)’ [4]. Two experts on Sudan’s defence sector confirm that data is rarely, if ever, released about defence purchases [5,6]. The International Budget Partnership’s 2017 Open Budget Survey for Sudan scored Sudan’s transparency 2 out of 100, its public participation 0 out of 100 and its budget oversight 31 out of 100 [7]. Sudan’s security and defence activities are exceptionally secret and opaque.

Defence purchases are made public with almost no exceptions, as Swedish Defence Materiel Administration Agency (FMV) lists ongoing defence procurements as well as upcoming tenders in the publicly available national database ‘e-Avrop’ [1] and the EU database Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), both available via the FMV website. FMV states on their website that in 2019, ‘all procurements and Requests for Information (RFI) were published through the advertisement tool e-Avrop’ [2]. However, contracts from previous years are currently not accessible, and contracts signed thus far in 2020 significantly lack details. Moreover, as detailed in Q58B, Sweden is one of the ‘worst’ countries in Europe when it comes to providing follow-up information regarding contract value and winning bidder, as this data have been frequently and systematically lacking [3] [4].

As noted in Q58B and Q61A, information on, and advertisement of, current and planned procurement contracts is shared widely via two tender bidding tools. However, accessible and/or detailed information on signed contracts, including total value and winning bidder, has been frequently and systematically lacking. FMV states on their website that ‘all procurements’ in 2019 were published online [1] [2]. Contracts from previous years are currently not accessible, and for contracts signed in 2020, detailed information or data in an accessible format have not been provided. It seems like the government has recognised and begun to address this issue, though, as a new law on ‘procurement statistics’ [3] will gradually enter into force between July 2020 and January 2021 [4]. The law will enable tighter regulation of post-procurement transparency in line with EU standards, but its effects are yet to be observable.

There are different types of tender (open procedure, selective procedure, invitation procedure and negotiated procedure) and the rules vary depending on the procedure that applies [1]. Switzerland is among the initial signatories of the World Trade Organization’s Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement and follows those rules on public tenders [2]. Tenders, as well as, the companies they were awarded to, are published on a dedicated website but with limited details (Date, issuer, deadline, procurment type, procedure, duration of contact, good/service, etc) [3]. These rules apply to some defence procurements only. Chapter 3 of the Ordinance on Public Procurement (VöB) lays out the rules for arms producers. Procurement falling under Chapter 3, do unlike all others, also allow for the invitation procedure. Under Chapter 3, no legal recourse is possible and publication only does not occur for invitation and negtotiated procedures [4].

Data is released in an aggregate form. Some projects are more detailed. In general, the information is provided in the “Armeebotschaft” [1] the annual financial reporting, both in pdf format. Aggregated statistical data is downloadable as a spreadsheet, according to international standards to allow for international comparisons.

In general, defence procurements are made public; however, there are still specific defence purchases that are classified. Certain procurement programmes that are kept in secrecy are un-avoidable due to Taiwan’s unique “status-quo” and pressures from the PRC [1, 2]. Taking the programme of M1A2 Abrams tanks as an example, procurement is made public and transparent as the programme progresses through the US approval process from the executive branches to the Congress [3].

Information disclosed to the public indicates the tender and the contract awarded. For the contract, general descriptions are supplied concerning the item purchased, winning bidder, beneficial owners, price paid, entire lifecycle costs, cost servicing, costs of parts, and the delivery/completion date. Confidential information kept secret is likely to be challenged by the LY or by the public [4].

Specific procurement programmes kept secret are protected by the “The Classified National Security Information Protection Act” and the “The Enforcement Rules of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act” [1, 2]. General procurement information in the defence and security sectors is to be identified in the “Government Procurement Information System (GPIS)” managed by the Public Construction Commission (PCC) of Executive Yuan [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. General data, in addition to information to be kept in secrecy by laws, related to defence purchases is made public [1, 9, 10].

Contract awards can be tracked in CSV format form from the Government e-procurement System. For example, a sheet with 2019-2020 contracts published on MND integrity page contains data such as: agency code, agency name, tendering unit, tender case number, tender name, tender award method, budget amount, tender method, Legal basis for restricted bidding, winning vendor, the award announcement date , awarded date, reserve price amount, total awarded amount and bid ratio [11,12].

Reviews of Parliamentary Committee reports, and available public documentation reveal no such information about defence purchases being released. [1] [2]

Reviews of Parliamentary Committee reports, and available public documentation reveals no such information about defence purchases being released. [1] [2]

According to the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, the Ministry of Defence is not required to disclose information about its purchases to the public, even though it must record and report decisions, details, procedures and processes of procurement and systematically retain this information for the purpose of examination of information upon request. Procurement information involving the confidentiality of the state agency or related to national security can only be accessed by a general solicitation notification method [1]. In practice, given this legislation, defence purchases are rarely (if ever) made public.

Additionally, the FFP leader also revealed that there is a loophole in the Financial and Fiscal Discipline Act of 2018, passed by the former junta government, which allows the Ministry of Defence to seek an exemption from the Ministry of Finance, enabling it to be subject solely to internal audit. In other words, the ministry budget can bypass compliance with the laws and regulations that apply to all other state agencies [2].

Much like the result from the GDI Index 2015, accessible, comprehensive data on actual defence purchases could not be found on the basis of open-source desk research conducted in both Thai and English [1]. Even though the Thai Government Procurement Database System is available for finding existing procurement announcements, the system requires specific inputs from users in order to search for information and it does not provide data on actual purchases either [2]. The Thailand Government Spending Database provides data on the procurement and supply projects of state agencies, including the four armed forces; however, the data is not systematically organised. For example, the projects are not presented in categories [3]. Nonetheless, based on the data from Thailand Government Spending Database, Isranews Agency concluded that the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence itself concluded no less than 43 billion baht worth of procurement and supply contracts with the private sector in 2018 (with a footnote clarifying that these figures may not be accurate due to the complicated accessibility) [4].

According to our sources, strategic purchases are usually published online before the actual purchases occur. However, other items such as ammunitions may not be published online as they are treated with confidentiality(1,2). In almost all cases, donations are made publicly , but with actual purchases it is not clear if they are published. As our sources confirmed, not all purchased items are publicly announced. A review of the Tunisian press showed that major defence purchases are announced in the media, such as the purchase of two new patrol boats from a Dutch company, (3) the reception of 9 armored vehicles offered by the USA, (4) the reception of an American ship for the surveillance of maritime borders, (5)and the reception of 6 US combat helicopters for counterterrorism (6). Other details on defence purchases can be found through external, publicly available sources (7). However, information on confidential purchases (data on contracts, bidders, etc.) can not be found through official publications.

According to our sources, there is no detailed information about all purchases. It is hard to have access to all data because this information is seen as confidential or as needing to be confidential for security reasons (1,2). Apart from media articles describing the purchased items, as outlined in Q61A, no data on the described format (excel) or other formats could be found (3).

The availability of defensive procurement is mainly due to the application of the provisions of Ordinance No. 36 of 1988 on the control of some of the expenses of the Ministries of National Defense and Interior and revised by Government Order No. 842 of 2017 dated 26 July 2017, which defines the general principles of procurement in the field of defense (4).

In relation to the procurements presented above, Interviewee 3 suggested the following:
– Some of the first-category procurements/bids (around 30%) are occassionally made public by publishing the calls for procurement and contracts in the media and online sources and by putting the calls on the contract information boards available at the entrances of all military units, open for the access of interested parties. However, no recent information can be found for these procurements.
– All Ministry of Defence procurements that go through public tenders are made public [1,2].
– When it comes to the third category, i.e. multi-million-dollar procurements such as the S-400 procurement, the purchase of drone/aircraft engines from the Ukraine, the Altay tank project, the TXF Turkish aircraft project, the Hurkus training airplane project and the procurement of armed drones from Baykar and the Kale Group, Interviewee 3 suggested that these are non-transparent and excessively politicised processes that are directly managed at the presidential palace level [1]. There are media reports supporting Interviewee 3’s comments [2].

As emphasised above, for procurements in the first category, some calls/bids are made public [1]. For procurements in the second category, all calls for procurement are made public. See, for instance, the calls for bids published by the Turkish Navy on its official website [2]. However, almost all procurements in the third category, i.e. multi-million-dollar projects, are not made public. However, there is no publicly available database regarding all defence purchases.

Defence purchases are not made public because most of the time these purchases fall under classified budget/expenditure [1]. According to Lieutenant Colonel Deo Akiiki, the actual defence purchases are made public through an end-user certificate [2]. For example, if the purchases are made in Europe or the United States, the end-user certificate will indicate the prices and the final destination of these purchases. However, an end-user certificate can only be traced by big organisations, like the United Nations, which is technically out of reach to the general public. According to the same MP, “other minor purchases” which are not necessarily weapons are potentially within the public domain. They also do not published a total, aggregated figure for defence procurement each year.

With almost everything being classified, no such information is accessible to the public [1]. There are only three MPs [2] (the speaker, chairperson of the Budget Committee, and the chairperson of the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee) who have access to the classified expenditure. The public is not aware whether the contents of expenditure budgets are accurate or made-up figures.

Classified military purchases are not published in any form, although public officials can provide general information on classified purchases [1], and the MoD White Book provides aggregate information on procured classified items [2]. MoD non-classified purchases are published in detail on the Prozorro website with disclosure of the tender and the contract award [3]. For the contract, one can find information about the item purchased, the winning bidder, the price paid, delivery date, and other information [3]. Beneficial owners can be verified in the State Register of Legal Entities [4].

Data on classified procurements is not publicly available and thus not released in an accessible format. Non-classified procurements (including those of the MoD) are always released in an accessible format which allows for useful comparisons. Firstly, there is Prozorro website which indicates all tenders and provides the ability to search tenders with respects to price, keyword, date, number of procurement, customer, procurement status, procurement procedure etc. [1]. In addition to that, there is an analytics module Qlik [2] which provides the ability to conduct 360-analysis of public procurements (including with possibility to download the data needed in excel-file). The analytics module Qlik provides the possibility to sort out the data by type of procedure, by bidders, by selected bidders, by customers, by type of goods or services procured, by location and many other criteria as well as to apply several indicators at once [2]. Furthermore, the analytics module Qlik by itself analyses customers, bidders, customers, complaints etc. and provides separate data on that [2].

There is very little information available on the UAE’s defence purchases. The majority of information about defence purchases is available via sporadic media reports, rather than the official websites of the government (1), (2), (3), (4). For instance, in 2017, the UAE signed 82 contracts with domestic manufacturers in an attempt to support local manufacturers in growing its defence industry (4). The total amount for these contracts was made available as a topline figure, and not in a disaggregated official format. Additionally, media outlets have reported that the UAE armed forces are planning to purchase squadrons of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, but this information was not made available through official publication at all and did not include any financial information about the deal (5). Defence purchases are seldom made public, and defence expenditure and budgets are rarely disclosed to the public, as established throughout this assessment.

Data is rarely if ever, released in an accessible format by defence institutions about their actual purchases. It has been established already that no information about defence procurement is shared on the official government websites. In addition to that, since there is no information provided about defence purchases on Tawazun’s webpages, which is the company that manages, partially, defence procurement, it is safe to assume that data is rarely if ever, released in an accessible format. However, some information is shared with the media sporadically though not in a formal way. For instance, some media outlets estimated the UAE’s defence expenditure to be an average of US$23.4 Billion per year between 2013 and 2017 (1), (2), (3), (4). Other platforms reported that the UAE invested in unmanned systems for air and sea, with Italian and Finnish military firms. This indicates that data accessibility about defence purchases is minimal and often not through official sources (5), (6), (7).

The Defence contracts Bulletin is a monthly MoD publication that provides access to ‘all MoD contracts above £10,000… the MoD’s ongoing and upcoming equipment projects…[and] future MOD requirements’ [1].

Regularly updated information on all spending above £25,000, as well as above £500 on a Governmental Procurement Card, is available on the MoD website [2, 3]. However, there is no description of the item purchased, the beneficial owners, price paid, whole of lifecycle costs, cost of servicing, costs of parts, and delivery/completion date. The data available only indicates the expense type, payment date, expense area and supplier name [2].

Data on all spending above £25,000 as well as above £500 on a Governmental Procurement Card is available in an accessible format, viewable online, published monthly. It outlines the amount spent, reason for expenditure and companies involved [1]. However, as indicated in 61A, the data released lacks comprehensiveness.

Information on all unclassified contracts over the minimum purchase threshold ($10,000) is published on the beta.SAM.gov website (previously the Federal Procurement Data System). This includes indefinite delivery vehicles, delivery orders, purchase orders, modifications and other types of contract actions [1,2]. The government does not make actual defence contracts publicly available; some can be obtained through FOIA, however, they are usually heavily redacted [3,4]. Contracts awarded (and modifications) at a value of over $7.5 million are announced each business day at 5 pm on the DoD website. This information is presented as text, with information on the value, the number of bids received, the winning contractor, the locations of production (including percentage of work per location), the contracting authority and the expected completed date [6,7]. This also includes the contract number and funding data, so that the public could look up the contract via the beta.SAM.gov system [8]. The completion date, as well as disaggregated costs of parts and lifecycle costs, are not made public, however, if parts are contracted for separately, these details would be available.

The beta.SAM.gov website allows users to produce a variety of reports and datasets relating to contract awards. Once a user account is created, members of the public can download data in csv or pdf form [1]. Actual contracts are not made public.

Information on defence procurement is not officially made public. Information on the sector’s acquisitions is rarely available within the context of military speeches or parades in which some equipment is advertised, acquired to demonstrate increases in the country’s defensive capacity.

Due to the propagandistic character and use of these announcements to reinforce the image of the government’s military strength, most are featured in the press or in informative reports of public entities [1, 2], but there are no official supporting documents containing details of the models of equipment purchased. Given that there have been no accountability reports submitted to the National Assembly (AN) in recent years, and that even previously the AN’s debates were heavily controlled by the ruling party, defence sector authorities have not been questioned on the justification for the lack of information on defence equipment purchases [3].

International organisations have published data on the estimated total amount of the country’s military expenditure and on some weapons acquisitions; however, these calculations are based on the information regarding some reported imports, and details are not offered on the true expenditure or the characteristics of the purchased equipment [4, 5].

Data are not disclosed by official entities. There are no public information systems or documents showing details of defence procurement. Even the data submitted in the 2015 accountability report [1] – the last to be made public – do not show detail on acquisitions beyond summary amounts.

Available information on defence procurement is collected by civil society organisations, relying on press sources and estimates and information compiled by international agencies based on the international arms trade [2]. Reports from these organisations – undertaken by monitoring secondary information – include the models of equipment purchased and, where possible, the FANB body to which each is awarded and when it was received. However, there is no detailed information on costs and financial packages [3].

Defence purchases are rarely made public. Even internally, only the personnel responsible for procurement have access to information on planned purchases [1]. In most cases, other than the procurement personnel, only the chain of command for regiments making the purchases and the units responsible for the custody of the purchased assets are aware of the planned purchases [1]. Occasionally, civilian personnel in the Ministry of Defence are requested to assist in the procurement processes. The total expenditure on purchases is sometimes reported in financial statements from the Ministry of Defence. Specific details of the purchases are not made available even if they are requested by Parliament [2].

Data on defence purchases are not made public, even though the Public Procurement Act and Disposal of Public Assets Act requires that information be made available on request, including on bids and final purchases [1, 2]. The data is not available to the parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Home Affairs [3].

Country Sort by Country 61a. Comprehensiveness Sort By Subindicator 61b. Accessible data Sort By Subindicator
Albania 50 / 100 50 / 100
Algeria 25 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 25 / 100 0 / 100
Argentina 75 / 100 75 / 100
Armenia 50 / 100 100 / 100
Australia 75 / 100 100 / 100
Azerbaijan 25 / 100 0 / 100
Bahrain 0 / 100 0 / 100
Bangladesh 50 / 100 0 / 100
Belgium 75 / 100 50 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 75 / 100 50 / 100
Botswana 50 / 100 100 / 100
Brazil 75 / 100 75 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 0 / 100
Canada 100 / 100 100 / 100
Chile 75 / 100 100 / 100
China 25 / 100 0 / 100
Colombia 50 / 100 50 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 0 / 100
Denmark 25 / 100 50 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 75 / 100 100 / 100
Finland 75 / 100 50 / 100
France 25 / 100 0 / 100
Germany 50 / 100 50 / 100
Ghana 50 / 100 50 / 100
Greece 75 / 100 50 / 100
Hungary 25 / 100 0 / 100
India 50 / 100 0 / 100
Indonesia 25 / 100 0 / 100
Iran 25 / 100 0 / 100
Iraq 25 / 100 25 / 100
Israel 25 / 100 25 / 100
Italy 75 / 100 50 / 100
Japan 100 / 100 100 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kenya 25 / 100 0 / 100
Kosovo 50 / 100 0 / 100
Kuwait 0 / 100 0 / 100
Latvia 75 / 100 25 / 100
Lebanon 0 / 100 0 / 100
Lithuania 25 / 100 50 / 100
Malaysia 50 / 100 25 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mexico 25 / 100 75 / 100
Montenegro 25 / 100 50 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100
Myanmar 0 / 100 0 / 100
Netherlands 75 / 100 50 / 100
New Zealand 100 / 100 75 / 100
Niger 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 0 / 100
North Macedonia 75 / 100 100 / 100
Norway 75 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 0 / 100 0 / 100
Philippines 75 / 100 50 / 100
Poland 75 / 100 100 / 100
Portugal 75 / 100 50 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 0 / 100
Russia 25 / 100 25 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 0 / 100
Serbia 25 / 100 50 / 100
Singapore 50 / 100 25 / 100
South Africa 75 / 100 0 / 100
South Korea 75 / 100 100 / 100
South Sudan 0 / 100 0 / 100
Spain 50 / 100 50 / 100
Sudan 0 / 100 0 / 100
Sweden 50 / 100 0 / 100
Switzerland 75 / 100 75 / 100
Taiwan 75 / 100 75 / 100
Tanzania 0 / 100 0 / 100
Thailand 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 25 / 100 0 / 100
Turkey 25 / 100 0 / 100
Uganda 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ukraine 0 / 100 100 / 100
United Arab Emirates 25 / 100 0 / 100
United Kingdom 50 / 100 100 / 100
United States 75 / 100 100 / 100
Venezuela 0 / 100 0 / 100
Zimbabwe 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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