Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
Colombia score: 75/100
Procurement oversight mechanisms are not formalised and their activity is inconsistent across changes in government. There may be persistent undue influence, e.g. by parliament or the military.
Procurement oversight mechanisms are not formalised. Or they are formalised but are dominated by undue influence and are not independent due to widespread undue influence.
Procurement oversight mechanisms are formalised, but they may be subject to persistent undue influence, e.g. by parliament or the military.
Procurement oversight mechanisms are independent, formalised processes. They may be subject to occasional undue influence from parliament, the military, business or politically well-connected individuals.
Procurement oversight mechanisms are independent, formalised processes. Parliament, the military, business, or politically well-connected individuals have no undue influence on their performance.
There is no specific body with defence-wide jurisdiction. The Comptroller General has control offices within the defence sector, and specific entities like the Action Group for Institutional Transparency (GRATI) operates within certain military branches, but, unlike the Comptroller, it does not have functional independence. The function of GRATI is to collect information from the processes advanced by the different units of the Ministry in the field of contracting and management of resources, to conduct checks and assessments on recruitment and execution of resources, and to create controls on contractual and financial processes.
Each entity attached to the Ministry and each Armed Force, has a monitoring manual which defines, inter alia, the duties and rights of supervisors and auditors and in which it is considered an undue practice to request and/or receive, for personal uses or for a third party, favours or any kind of benefit from the procuring entity or contractor. [3, 4] The process of supervision of contracting and procurement is formalised in the Anti-Corruption Statute, Law 1474 of 2011:  all entities of the State must carry out supervisory or intervention actions. External audits for the fiscal control are carried out by the Comptroller General, in which financial, compliance, and performance aspects of public appeals are assessed.  From 2016-2018, 20 audits were released and published to the entities that make up the defence sector. While the Comptroller appears to have independence on paper, this is limited in practice.  It is not possible to demonstrate a coherent practice in the development of supervisory activity, as there have been multiple cases of administrative corruption in procurement in recent years.
1. Ley 1474 de 2011. 2011. “Por la cual se dictan normas orientadas a fortalecer los mecanismos de prevención, investigación y sanción de actos de corrupción y efectividad del control de la gestión pública.” [Law 1474 of 2011. 2011. “By which norms are issued aimed at strengthening mechanisms for the prevention, investigation and punishment of acts of corruption and the effectiveness of public management control.”] Colombia, Congreso de la República. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional. 12 July.
2. Contraloría General de la República. 2017. Principios, fundamentos y aspectos generales para las auditorías en la Contraloría General de la República. [Principles, foundations and general aspects for audits in the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.] Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia.
3. Contraloría General de la República. n.d. Auditorías Defensa. [Defence audits.] Accessed on: 23 May 2019. https://www.contraloria.gov.co/resultados/proceso-auditor/auditorias-liberadas/sector-defensa-justicia-y-seguridad.
Colombia score: NEI/100
Procurement oversight mechanisms are highly inactive, or not active at all.
Procurement oversight mechanisms are active but they do not consistently engage in all the activities listed in score 4.
Procurement oversight mechanisms are highly active in summoning witness and documents, demanding explanations, issuing recommendations or conclusions that are being followed or implemented, and they can exercise their ability to cancel projects.
The Comptroller General has issued a report addressing in part the state of defence procurement, but in such a way that it remains unclear if procurement oversight mechanisms are active and transparent.  The effectiveness of the supervision model is especially unclear, given administrative corruption in public procurement, which has been found in recent years within the Military Forces and the Police. According to Transparency for Colombia, 46% of the acts of administrative corruption are associated with public procurement, 29% refer to the irregular awarding or celebration of contracts, 17% to the violation of the principles of transparency, suitability, and responsibility in state contracting, 8% abuse of direct contracting, 8% capital loss for breach of contract, 6% illegal appropriation of resources in contracts, and 6% on costs for irregularities in the conclusion of contracts.  Given the lack of available evidence on procurement oversight activity, this indicator is not scored and is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.
1. Contraloría General de la República Delegada para el Sector Defensa. 2019. Sector Seguridad en 2019. [Security Sector in 2019.] Informe CGR-DS No. XXX. November 2020. https://www.contraloria.gov.co/documents/20181/466201/diagnostico+seguridad.pdf/ebfd5e17-2e18-421c-8e60-5dbea98311e1?version=1.0
2. Transparencia por Colombia. 2019. “Así se mueve la corrupción. Radiografía de los hechos de corrupción en Colombia 2016-2018.” [“This is how corruption moves. X-ray of the acts of corruption in Colombia 2016-2018.”] Tercer informe, Monitor ciudadano de la corrupción. Bogotá: Transparencia por Colombia. May.
Colombia score: 25/100
Procurement oversight mechanisms are entirely non-transparent about their activities.
Evidence of activity is rarely made public by the relevant procurement oversight institutions and the content is missing key information.
Evidence of activity is occasionally made public by the relevant procurement oversight institutions but content is either completely aggregated or missing key information.
Evidence of activity is made public by the relevant procurement oversight institutions but content is limited to the justification or rejection of procurement.
Comprehensive evidence of activity (e.g. reports, announcements in the press of the cancellation of procurement programmes, the release of financial information) is made available to the public by the relevant procurement oversight institutions (e.g. parliamentary committee, a national audit function or bureau of public procurement).
The advertising and transparency of contracts concluded by the defence sector are characterised by the type of procurement-related expenditure. Contracts concluded with reserved expenses are not supervised by the procuring entity of the Ministry of Defence or Armed Forces and Police, but by the Comptroller General of the Republic.  The Comptroller General has issued a report addressing, in part, the state of defence procurement, but without full details.  The monitoring of fiscal management and control of the results of the resources allocated to reserved expenses falls to the delegated Comptroller for Defence, Justice, and Security. Audit, surveillance, and control reports have a legal reservation, and therefore such information is not publishable within 20 years and only competent authorities have access to this report.  Not all contracts are subjected to this reservation. According to Decree 1082 of 2015,  all state entities are required to publish all documents related to the procurement process in the SECOP, including studies and previous documents; the notice of call; specifications or invitation; the contract amendments; the offer; the evaluation report; the contract; information regarding the performance of contracts; and approvals, authorisations, requirements, or reports of the Supervisor or the Controller that approve the execution of the contract. In some cases, however, information related to contractual processes are not found on the SECOP site, especially with regard to the supervisory process.
1. Ley 1097 de 2006. 2006. “Por la cual se regulan los gastos reservados.” [Law 1097 of 2006. “By which reserved expenses are regulated.”] Colombia, Congreso de la República.Bogotá: Diario Oficial No. 46.440 de 2 de noviembre de 2006. 2 November 2006.
2. Contraloría General de la República. 2015. “‘Resolución Reglamentaria Orgánica.’ Por el cual se adopta el sistema de control fiscal sobre gastos reservados.” [“‘Organic Regulatory Resolution.’ By which the fiscal control system on reserved expenses is adopted.”] 2015.
3. Decreto número 1082 de 2015. 2015. “Por medio del cual se expide el decreto único reglamentario del sector administrativo de planeación nacional.” [Decree number 1082 of 2015. 2015. “Through which the single regulatory decree of the administrative sector of national planning is issued.”] Departamento Nacional de Planeación- DNP. 26 May.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||59a. Independence||59b. Effectiveness||59c. Transparency|
|Albania||50 / 100||0 / 100||75 / 100|
|Algeria||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Angola||25 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Argentina||75 / 100||NEI||25 / 100|
|Armenia||50 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Australia||100 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Bahrain||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Bangladesh||75 / 100||NEI||0 / 100|
|Belgium||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Botswana||100 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Brazil||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Canada||100 / 100||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Chile||75 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|China||25 / 100||NEI||0 / 100|
|Colombia||75 / 100||NEI||25 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Egypt||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||75 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|France||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Germany||75 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Ghana||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Greece||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Hungary||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|India||100 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||75 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Iran||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Iraq||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||50 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Japan||100 / 100||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Kenya||50 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kosovo||50 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Lebanon||25 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Malaysia||50 / 100||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Mali||50 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Mexico||50 / 100||25 / 100||75 / 100|
|Montenegro||75 / 100||0 / 100||75 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Myanmar||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Niger||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||0 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||100 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Palestine||25 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Philippines||75 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Poland||75 / 100||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Portugal||100 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Russia||50 / 100||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Serbia||25 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Singapore||100 / 100||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Korea||75 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|South Sudan||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Spain||50 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Sudan||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Sweden||100 / 100||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Taiwan||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Tanzania||50 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Thailand||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Turkey||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Uganda||75 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Ukraine||75 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|United Kingdom||75 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||50 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Venezuela||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Zimbabwe||25 / 100||25 / 100||0 / 100|