Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there evidence that these measures are being carried out?
France score: 75/100
Offences are not defined; no evidence of other formal mechanisms. Or the military are exempt from law.
Bribery and/or corruption are not defined offences in law that apply to the defence sector, but there are wider legal mechanisms in place (e.g. national laws supported by policies, regulations, or other laws) used to address this.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Sanctions exist in law, but maximum penalties constitute less than 1 year imprisonment or weak fines that would not act as a deterrent.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
There are a range of clearly defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector. These offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
In France there is no military justice. Military personnel are subject to civil law, like any citizen. There is no legislation targeting corruption specifically in the defence sector.
Active and passive bribery by military personnel – considered by law to be persons “holding public authority” – are offenses incurring the same penalty: a prison sentence of up to 10 years and a fine of 150,000 Euros. Article 432-17 of the Penal Code  provides for additional penalties that may include the main penalty: they consist mainly of forfeiture of civil and civic rights, the prohibition of the exercise of a public office or profession and the confiscation of funds received in the past. The refusal of registration on the electoral lists is valid for a period of 5 years after the final decision (Article L.7 of the Electoral Code). 
The absence of measures specifically designed to tackle corruption and bribery within the defence sector, the broad use of the “secrecy of defence” label to classify all operational information, and the culture of secrecy as a whole in the French army are cause for concern.
However, since the 2016 law on anti-corruption and transparency (“Sapin 2”),  the creation of the French Anti-Corruption Agency (AFA) in 2018  and the new “ethics chief” function for the “contrôleur general des armées” [General Comptroller of the Armies],   some reorientation, the start of a shift in the culture of transparency and compliance is being displayed.  [7bis] 
2. Electoral Code, art. L.7, available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070239&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006353029&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid.
3. Loi n°2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique [Law n°2016-1691 of December 9, 2016 on transparency, anti-corruption and the modernisation of economic life], available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000033558528&categorieLien=id.
4. French Anti-Corruption Agency, https://www.agence-francaise-anticorruption.gouv.fr/fr
5. Interview with Jean Tenneroni, « Contrôleur général des armées » [General Comptroller of the Armies], General rapporteur of the Military Ethics Committee, March 15, 2019.
6. (APPENDIX) Letter from the AFA director to MOAF « ethics chief » M. Tenneroni about the AFA launching its investigation on enquête on integrity infringements , Nov 2019
7. Interview with Jean Tenneroni, « Contrôleur général des armées » [General Comptroller of the Armies], General rapporteur of the Military Ethics Committee, December 29, 2019.
8. (APPENDIX) letter by the contrôleur général des armées and « ethics chief » of the MOAF accompanying the corruption risk questionnaire sent out to the various departments at risk within the ministry, Sept 2019
8 bis. (APPENDIX) MOAF’s own corruption risk questionnaire (15 pages long)
9. (APPENDIX) Decree creating an ethics code for internal audit agents, Dec 3, 2019
10. (APPENDIX) MOAF Charter of procurement
France score: 75/100
There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence.
Instances of bribery or corruption are superficially investigated or rarely disclipined.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated but not often disciplined. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes, but undue political influence is attempted and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes and without undue political influence.
Cases are investigated or prosecuted by the civil judicial system, like any case involving civilians, through formal processes that enjoy separation of powers, without undue political influence.
For instance, an influence-peddling and corruption case involving high-ranking officers of the Ministry of Defence and a subcontractor (ICS) is currently being prosecuted by the Parquet national financier (National Financial Prosecutor, PNF). 
In 2015, three people were indicted in the “Balard scandal” (concerning the construction of the new defence HQ in Paris): one military officer working at the Ministry of Defence, a manager of Bouygues construction company and a Franco-Tunisian serving as an middleman in the favouritism corruption scheme. 
However, the absence of measures specifically designed to tackle corruption and bribery within the defence sector, the broad use of the « secrecy of defence » label to classify all operational information, and the culture of secrecy as a whole in the French army are cause for concern. Companies which have been convicted of corruption have still been able to work as subcontractors for the French army for logistics support in the Sahel region, on the Barkhane operation.  
1. Geoffrey Livolsi and Benoît Collombat, “Aerial transport: suspicions of influence-peddling in the army”, France Inter, March 10, 2018, https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/secrets-d-info/secrets-d-info-10-mars-2018.
2. Alice Mérieux, “Crazy extra costs of the Ministry of Defence HQ”, Challenges, February 7, 2018, https://www.challenges.fr/economie/la-cour-des-comptes-accuse-le-ministere-de-la-defense-de-graves-derapages-financiers-a-son-siege-de-balard_565582.
3. Simon Piel, Jérémie Baruch and Joan Tilouine, “How the negligence of the army endangers French special forces”, Le Monde, June 18, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/06/18/comment-l-incurie-de-l-armee-met-en-danger-les-forces-speciales-francaises_5477980_3210.html. 4. Externalisation du soutien aux forces en opération extérieure [Outsourcing of support to forces in external operations] (Paris: Cour des comptes, 2019),
Compare scores by country
Please view this page on a larger screen for the full stats.
|Country||35a. Sanctions||35b. Enforcement|
|Albania||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Algeria||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Angola||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Argentina||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Armenia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Australia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bahrain||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bangladesh||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Belgium||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Botswana||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Canada||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Chile||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|China||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Colombia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Egypt||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|France||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Ghana||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Greece||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Hungary||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iran||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iraq||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Japan||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Jordan||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kenya||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kosovo||25 / 100||75 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||NEI|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Mali||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Mexico||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Montenegro||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Myanmar||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Niger||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Oman||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Palestine||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Philippines||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Portugal||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Qatar||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Russia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Serbia||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Singapore||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Sudan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Spain||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Sudan||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Sweden||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Thailand||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Turkey||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Uganda||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Venezuela||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Zimbabwe||100 / 100||75 / 100|