Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
13a. Formal rights
Italy score: 100/100
No such legislative committee exists, or it lacks any formal powers over the defence budget.
There is a defence committee with formal rights of scrutiny of the defence budget, but lacks some of the powers listed in score 4.
There is a defence committee with extensive formal rights of scrutiny of the defence budget. The committee has the power to scrutinise any aspect of budget and expenditures. The committee is in a position to require expert witnesses to appear in front of it.
The analysis of the defence budget is carried out in the wider process of definition of the national annual budgetary law . Therefore, the IV standing committees of the Parliament are updated and informed on the proposition of the government that they can scrutinise, approve and amend . The IV standing committees are the parliamentary body which oversees the government work in matters of Defence. It is composed of both MP’s of majority and minority parties. Experts can be called by the Committees in both formal and informal hearings. They also approve the defence budget proposed by the executive branch and can scrutinise the budget dedicated to specific armament procurement and/or allocation to military operations abroad.
 Official Gazette of the Italian Republic, “Law 27 December 2019 n. 160”, https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2019-12-30&atto.codiceRedazionale=19G00165&elenco30giorni=true
 Senate of the Republic, “18th Legislature – 4th standing Committee, Summary report n. 35 of 07/16/2019”, http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=SommComm&leg=18&id=1118752&part=doc_dc
13b. Influence on decision-making
Italy score: 75/100
The defence committee has no impact on defence budget decision-making.
The committee reviews the defence budget, but fails to take advantage of its formal powers of scrutiny. It may exercise informal influence over the budget in the case of no formal powers.
The committee reviews the defence budget and attempts to influence budgetary decisions through formal mechanisms, but these attempts are limited.
The committee performs all the functions of score 4, but this may not be in a timely fashion or there may be clear instances where the committee fails to scrutinise effectively aspects of the budget before the start of the fiscal year.
The committee has introduced amendments to the budget and there is evidence that in some instances these have resulted in changes to the budget. The committee engages in mid-year expenditure review and can strike out expenditures before they are incurred.
When it comes to the capacity to influence the decision making process, Parliamentary committees can express their opinion on specific aspects related to the subject of their interest . Although opinions expressed by the committee are not mandatory, they could result in change because the commission has the power to modify how the budget is spent. Despite the possibility to strike out expenditures before incurring, this action would result in the activation of contractual clauses, which are, usually, more expensive than the obligation.
The government has to take into account the opinions of the IV Standing Committees according to art 536 of the Code of the Military system as amended by law 244/2012 . Should this not be the case, in order to block the approval of the document, the Committees need to express their disagreement by absolute majority . This holds valid for each expenditure determinations.
The Committees are informed on the mid-year expenditure review that is carried out by the Court of Auditors.
 To access opinions to the last approval procedures please see: Senate of the Republic, “18th Legislature – 4th standing Committee, Summary report n. 35 of 07/16/2019”, http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=SommComm&leg=18&id=1118752&part=doc_dc-sedetit_isc
 Official Gazette of the Italian Republic, “Law 244 of 31 December 2012”, https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2013/01/16/13G00013/sg
 Chamber of Deputies, Defence and armed forces, “Parliamentary control over armament acquisition”, https://www.camera.it/leg17/465?tema=programmi_d_arma#
Compare scores by country
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|Country||13a. Formal rights||13b. Influence on decision-making|
|Albania||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Algeria||0 / 100||NA|
|Angola||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Argentina||0 / 100||NA|
|Armenia||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Australia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Bahrain||0 / 100||NA|
|Bangladesh||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Belgium||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Botswana||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Canada||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Chile||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|China||0 / 100||NA|
|Colombia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||NA|
|Estonia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|France||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Ghana||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Greece||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Hungary||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Indonesia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iran||0 / 100||NA|
|Iraq||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Israel||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Japan||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||NA|
|Kenya||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kosovo||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Kuwait||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Lebanon||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Malaysia||50 / 100||NA|
|Mali||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Mexico||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Montenegro||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||NA|
|Myanmar||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Niger||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|North Macedonia||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||NA|
|Palestine||0 / 100||NA|
|Philippines||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Portugal||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||NA|
|Russia||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||NA|
|Serbia||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Singapore||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Sudan||100 / 100||NEI|
|Spain||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Sudan||0 / 100||NA|
|Sweden||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Taiwan||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Tanzania||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Thailand||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Turkey||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Uganda||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Venezuela||0 / 100||NA|
|Zimbabwe||50 / 100||25 / 100|