This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The Constitution of the Benin Republic does not permit private military companies [1]. After interviewing military officers and security specialists, they confirmed that there is no private military contractors employed in Benin [2][3][4][5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Constitution of the Benin Republic does not permit private military companies [1]. After interviewing military officers and security specialists, they confirmed that there is no private military contractors employed in Benin [2][3][4][5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Constitution of the Benin Republic does not permit private military companies [1]. After interviewing military officers and security specialists, they confirmed that there is no private military contractors employed in Benin [2][3][4][5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In Burundi, there is no law prohibiting the use of private military contractors. They can therefore be mobilized even if they have never been mobilized as such.[1] On the other hand, private groups such as the youth of the ruling party, the Imbonerakure, are mobilized for operations.These groups of young people from the ruling party act in the same way as members of the army [1] [3] [4]. The Imbonerakure group is estimated to have 50,000 members today [5].Howeverm, there is no law governing their deployment, and no law addressing the issue of corruption in this area [2]. Everything is done in the shadows, giving rise to numerous abuses as they operate with impunity. In the course of operations, these young people have been accused of acts of corruption, embezzlement and human rights violations. [3] [4]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In Burundi, there is no law prohibiting the use of private military contractors.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In Burundi, there is no law prohibiting the use of private military contractors.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The constitution and several Cameroonian laws emphasise that the Cameroon Defence Forces are the only legal body authorised to conduct military operations within Cameroon.[1][2] To date, there is no legal basis permitting PMCs to operate on the ground in Cameroon. It should be noted that, having not participated in the development of the Montreux Document on PMCs, Cameroon does not yet allow the deployment of private militias in its territory. National defence and territorial security issues fall under the public services of sovereignty sector. The particularity of this sector is that it does not allow the presence of foreign agents serving among the personnel deployed in theatres of operations.[3][4] Moreover, since 1986, Cameroon has engaged private Israeli contractors to oversee the operations of the rapid intervention battalions and the Presidential Guard. The leading Israeli contractor serves as the technical advisor to the President of the Republic, with specific responsibility for the elite forces.[5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There is no legal framework allowing the deployment or operation of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in Cameroon. However, there are numerous security compagnies. The privatisation of defence and security refers to the increasingly growing delegation of defence functions. As such, Private Military Companies are defined as commercial companies that provide services traditionally provided by the national armed forces. These PMCs employ former members of the armed forces and are managed by former executives of elite unites of regular armies. Based on that, PMCs do not, it is outside any legal framework. However, some authors argue that PMCs exist in Cameroon, such as G4S, former Wackenhut (an American company taken over by the Danes of Group 4 Falck, headed by an American General), and Africa Security (created by Colonel Robert, product of the French secret services funded by the oil group Elf; It was long led by PatrickTurpin, French Colonel). These two companies are responsible for safeguarding diplomatic representations and offices of international organisations, the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, and, in short, the security of key sites. [1][2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The country has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs and PMC deployment does not occur in Cameroon; however, some “sociétés de gardiennage” which are local security companies, operate there. Some belong to foreigners, others to Cameroonians. The institutionalisation of private security results from a gradual and controlled process of legalisation. Before carrying out their activities, security companies must obtain approval granted by decree of the President of the Republic, following the approval of a commission whose composition and operation are set by presidential decree.[1][2] The census of these PSCs is carried out by the Ministry of Territorial Administration. About fifty security companies (société de gardiennage) operate de facto in Cameroon, but to date, only nine companies have formal approval and legal documentation. The others operate and benefit from administrative tolerance.[3]

This indicator is not scored in the GDI.
The country does not use private military companies in operations and there is no legislation on the matter [1, 2].

This indicator is not scored in the GDI.The country does not use private military companies in operations and there is no legislation on the matter [1, 2].

This indicator is not scored in the GDI.The country does not use private military companies in operations and there is no legislation on the matter [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Ghana has traditionally relied on its armed forces and police for security and military operations. Private security companies are also used for less critical tasks such as guarding private premises. These companies differ from PMCs in that they do not engage in military operations or direct combat roles. The regulation of private security companies is governed by L.I. 1571, which provides the legal framework for registering and supervising these companies (1). The law, however, applies mainly to private security guards and does not extend to companies providing military services like PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no policies, legislations or the use of private military companies in the GAF. (1)

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no policies, legislations or the use of private military companies in the GAF. (1)

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Kenya does not have a specific legal framework governing the operation of Private Military Contractors (PMCs). The Kenya Defence Forces Act is silent on the engagement of foreign or domestic PMCs in military operations [1]. While the Private Security Regulation Act (2016) establishes oversight for the broader private security industry and sets up a regulatory authority, it does not extend to military contractors or provide clear provisions about their role in national defence [2].
Furthermore, the Act neither clarifies whether PMCs are permitted to operate in conflict or security-sensitive areas, nor does it explain how offences committed by PMCs are handled in relation to state security forces. In the absence of specific regulation, PMCs operate in a legal grey zone, and corruption or misconduct risks remain unaddressed.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The existing Private Security Code of Conduct under the Private Security Regulation Act does does not address core issues relevant to PMCs in defence contexts—such as accountability mechanisms, oversight of operations, or contracting processes [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no evidence of active enforcement mechanisms or documented cases of sanctions against PMCs operating in Kenya. The cited articles on Chinese PMCs protecting infrastructure projects highlight concerns about their role in the country, but there is no official government response or legal proceedings associated with these operations [1, 2].
The articles suggest that these PMCs operate in legal ambiguity, and there is no indication that Kenyan authorities regularly monitor or prosecute violations involving PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The National Defense Act indicates that the composition of the Armed Forces of Liberia should be the “Army, Coast Guard and Air Force.”[1] In the National Security Strategy (2008), it specifies the need to vet and train competent Liberians. For coordination, the National Security Strategy states that: “as the basis for development of a coordinated, accountable and democratic security architecture of embracing all security agencies.[2] While the logic of Liberia’s post-war security needs is grounded in promoting human security, the strategic goal is to ensure that matters of national security are in the hands of trained state actors and nationals, rather than non-state actors or private military companies. In part, the vision of the National Security Strategy is based on lessons of the Liberian civil wars, which saw the destruction of Liberia through warring factions and non-state actors. This vision is further reinforced by the Oath of Alliance, declaring to defend the country against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
In other words, the law is against military activity being in the hands of non-state actors, whether domestic or foreign. In 2008, the Ministry of Justice released the guidelines for organising private security agencies (PSCs). The guideline, administered under the Department of Public Safety at the Ministry of Justice, requires PSCs to register with the Department to adhere to procedures/rules on firearms, uniforms and training. These guidelines do not include the outsourcing of defence and security responsibilities to PSCs.[3]. Instead, the role of PMC was restricted to train the Armed Forces of Liberia and not to share or outsource constitutionally mandated security responsibility to them. The two PMCs that trained and helped to rebuild the Armed Forces of Liberia from scratch were DynCorp International and the Pacific Architects and Engineers.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The guideline, administered by the Department of Public Safety at the Ministry of Justice, requires PSCs to register with the Department and adhere to procedures/rules on firearms, uniforms and training. These guidelines do not include the outsourcing of defence and security responsibilities to PSCs.[1] Instead, the role of PMC was restricted to training the Armed Forces of Liberia and not to share or outsource constitutionally mandated security responsibilities to them.[2][3] In the post-war security sector reform effort, two U.S.-based PMCs — DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) — were contracted by the United States government (through USAID and the Department of Defence) to recruit, train, and mentor the restructured Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), without transferring sovereign security responsibilities to these contractors. Their role was limited to building basic military capacity, not engaging in combat or command functions.
Liberia does not have a dedicated legislative or regulatory framework providing for the oversight of PMCs beyond the 2008 Guidelines for Private Security Companies. The agreements with PMCs such as DynCorp and PAE were primarily administered and funded by the U.S. government rather than directly by the Liberian state.[4]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The guideline, administered by the Department of Public Safety at the Ministry of Justice, requires PSCs to register with the Department and adhere to procedures/rules on firearms, uniforms, and training. These guidelines do not include the outsourcing of defence and security responsibilities to PSCs.[1] Instead, the role of PMC was restricted to training the Armed Forces of Liberia, not to share or outsource constitutionally mandated security responsibilities to them.[2][3] In the post-war security sector reform effort, two U.S.-based PMCs — DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) — were contracted by the United States government (through USAID and the Department of Defense) to recruit, train, and mentor the restructured Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), without transferring sovereign security responsibilities to these contractors. Their role was limited to building basic military capacity, not engaging in combat or command functions.
Since PMC involvement was limited to U.S.-funded post-war training programs and did not extend into combat or operational command,[4] there are no documented cases of PMCs engaging in unauthorised security activities in Liberia.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Madagascar does not use private military subcontractors. Some information has indicated the presence in Madagascar of men belonging to the Russian Wagner group but they do not interfere in the activities of the defence forces [1].
The law establishing the General Status of the Military, in its article 2, clearly stipulates that “the Armed Forces are at the service of the Nation. They are required, if necessary, by the force of the armed forces:
– to ensure at all times, in all circumstances and against all forms of aggression, security and territorial integrity as well as the protection of the population whose material, intellectual and moral capacity for resistance they tend to develop
– to preserve the life, integrity and potential of the Nation” [2].
Private contractors are not mentioned anywhere in the legal framework relating to defence and security issues.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Malagasy legal framework in terms of security and defense does not include provisions on PMCs [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Malagasy legal framework in terms of security and defense does not include provisions on PMCs [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Mali does not have legislation that allows the use of private military service providers for territorial defence missions. However, despite this absence of legislation, the country has contracted with the private military company Wagner for the deployment of more than half a man as part of the reconquest of territories under occupation and in the fight against terrorism. The government of Mali refers to them as Russian instructors and has never officially recognised the presence of fighters from Wagner private military group, despite numerous evidence. The contract which governs this presence and the use of the fighters of this private military company, now known as “Africa Corps” has not been made public and is classified defence secret. Therefore, it is impossible at this time to know which legal standard(s) apply to this group in the event of a breach.[1][2][3][4][5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.The legislation does not authorise the possibility of using private military subcontractors, which is why the presence of Wagner and subsequent Africa Corps was never recognised by the authorities. They are talking more about “Russian cooperators”.[1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.The legislation does not authorise the possibility of using private military subcontractors, which is why the presence of Wagner and subsequent Africa Corps was never recognised by the authorities. They are talking more about “Russian cooperators”.[1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Following the economic and democratic transitions in the1990s, the use of private military contractors is regulated by the private security legislations in force in Mozambique, including Decree No. 26/90, of 29 November [1], Decree No. 9/2007, of 30 April [2] and Judgment No. 5/CC/2008, of 8 May of the Constitutional Council [3]. With the start of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado in 2017, two PMCs stood out: Russia’s Wagner Group and South Africa’s Dick Advisory Group.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The scrutiny of PSCs and PMCs is carried out by the National Defence Inspectorate and the Police Inspectorate of the Republic of Mozambique, depending on the entity that establishes the contract [1]. In the case of the Dick Advisory Group, a South African PMC based in Velddrif and founded in 2012 by ex-military colonel Lionel Dyck, the contract was established with Mozambique’s Defence and Security Forces, specifically the Police. Therefore, internal oversight fell under the jurisdiction of the Police Inspectorate [2]. Dick Advisory Group was contracted to provide close fire support and air operations as part of the counter-terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado [3]. This PMC assisted the Mozambican military and police forces in combating the attacking insurgents and his operatives engaged several of the terrorists as well as rescued wounded police officers and trapped civilians [4]. According to the State Secrets Act, due to the classified nature of their operations, the findings from inspection reports regarding their activities remain confidential [5]. In terms of external scrutiny, Parliament, through the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Public Order, has the task of carrying out external scrutiny, but it is unable to do so effectively due to a lack of financial capacity, technical capacity and the influence of the dominant party in the Assembly of the Republic, which receives guidelines from the Political Bureau that coincide with the government’s decisions on defence and security matters [6]. In the case of external scrutiny of companies created to protect the Exclusive Economic Zone, which gave rise to the “Hidden Debts” and the corruption scandal, scrutiny was made difficult by the State Secrets Law, according to the results of the Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry to Investigate the Situation of Public Debt [7].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In the case of counter-insurgency operations in Cabo Delgado, the Wagner Group and the Dick Advisory Group carried out their operations and withdrew, but there was neither accountability for their actions nor effective external scrutiny from civil society, journalists, or academics.
Information regarding violations of policies or laws related to the use of PMCs, as well as any sanctions applied for such violations, is limited due to the classified nature of these operations, as governed by the State Secrets Act and the Law on the Right to Information [1, 2]. Although some external scrutiny by civil society does exist, it remains largely ineffective [3]. Organisations such as the Public Integrity Center and the Budget Monitoring Forum have made efforts to exercise oversight using the Right to Information Law, but their effectiveness is hampered by the constraints of military and state secrecy laws, as well as a general lack of expertise and experience in the Defence and Security sector [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Niger does not have an explicit policy banning the use of Private Military Contractors (PMCs), nor does it provide a clear legal or regulatory framework governing their operations. Additionally, Niger has not signed or adopted the 2008 Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, which outlines international best practices for the regulation and oversight of PMCs [1]. Until recently, Niger’s military partnerships and training were led by France and the United States. However, following the July 2023 military coup, the French military was ordered to withdraw by December 2023, and in May 2024, the U.S. was similarly expelled, leading to a shift in Niger’s security alliances. Currently, Russian military personnel from Africa Corps have been deployed to an airbase previously used by U.S. forces. Africa Corps is considered the successor of the Wagner Group, which has been active as a PMC in Mali and other Sahelian countries. Reports indicate that between 150 and 300 Africa Corps personnel were in Niger as of August 2024, but their exact role, contractual arrangements, and oversight mechanisms remain unclear [2]. Furthermore, newspapers articles suggest that Turkish private military contractors (PMCs), such as SADAT, may also be operating in Niger [3][4]. However, there is no official confirmation of these allegations, nor any transparency regarding their activities.
• No established selection process for PMCs, nor criteria for excluding those convicted of corruption.
• No evidence of contract provisions ensuring that the state can terminate agreements for integrity-related violations.
• No oversight mechanisms for monitoring PMC operations, results, cost increases, or accountability structures.
• No transparency regarding contractual terms between the Nigerien government and Africa Corps or other foreign security actors.
Given the absence of a clear policy framework, lack of adherence to international norms, and no documented oversight measures, Niger’s engagement with PMCs appears to be ad hoc and unregulated, raising significant concerns about transparency, accountability, and potential risks of corruption or human rights abuses. Niger employs private military contractors or foreign security forces without a clear oversight framework. The state does not implement or adhere to the Montreux Document, and there is no evidence of structured scrutiny or accountability mechanisms for PMCs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Niger does not have an explicit policy banning or regulating the use of Private Military Contractors (PMCs), nor does it provide legal or regulatory frameworks for their oversight. The country has also not signed or adopted the 2008 Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, which outlines international best practices for PMC governance. [1][2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Niger does not have any laws or policies governing the use of Private Military Contractors (PMCs). The country has not signed or adopted the 2008 Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, which establishes international best practices for PMC regulation and oversight. [1][2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There is an absence of an international legally binding instrument on the use of PMC’s in Nigeria. For example, South African contractors in Nigeria are not bound by local laws [1].
Media report and studies have shown that the Nigeria’s government has hired PMCs for a variety of military purposes, including the establishment of communication and surveillance networks, insurgency and counterterrorism, military training, asymmetrical warfare, and naval and air security [1]. The strategy of using foreign paid fighters was considered and applied during President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration [2]. The Jonathan administration had used Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection, (STTEP), a South African company to combat the insurgents in the North-east [3]. In 2018, Eeben Barlow, the founder of STTEP, in a Facebook post, revealed how Mr Buhari, as an opposition figure, rejected the use of foreign mercenaries by the then administration [4]. Notwithstanding, a perception study found that the majority of Nigerians are in favour of using private military contractors against Boko Haram [5]. In November 2020 and March 2021, respectively, the governor of Borno state, Babagana Zulum, asked the federal government to hire mercenaries in the fight against insurgency. About the same time, the House of Representatives also asked the federal government to hire foreign mercenaries to combat Boko Haram insurgents [6]. However, the advantages and disadvantages of the use of PMSCs have been a subject of debate in Nigeria.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Nigerian government has hired PMCs for a variety of defence, security and intelligence purposes, dating as far back as during the Nigerian Civil War (6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970), also known as the Biafran War [1]. However, the use of PCM’s is not regulated in the country.
The diverse uses of PMCs are usually a function of exercise of executive discretionary powers without any serious legislative oversight or scrutiny of such decisions. In late 2014, for instance, President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration through the ONSA brought in South African private military contractors to train an Army unit in order to find and rescue the abducted Chibok Schoolgirls. However, the mandate subsequently transitioned towards filling counterinsurgency knowledge and experience gaps to support aggressive operations against Boko Haram [2]. However, there is a bill undergoing consideration before the national assembly for the creation, composition, and function of the Nigerian Private Military Companies Registration Council [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As noted earlier, Nigerians government has hired PMCs for a variety of purposes, dating as far back as during the Nigerian Civil War (6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970). Yet, there is no publicly available policies or laws on the use of PMCs in the country. Private security operations in Nigeria have grown exponentially over the past few decades due to the upsurge in the outbreak of internal security challenges at the national and subnational levels across the country. On February 2019, there were about 1110 licensed private guard companies operating in Nigeria, and about 740 unregistered private guard companies under processing and yet to start operations [1]. The current scope of regulation of the Nigerian legal framework – through the Private Guard Companies Act No. 23 of 1986– is limited only to Private Security Companies (PSCs). As such, it does not regulate neither individuals who are not employed by a PSC nor the activities or services of PMCs [2]. In Nigeria, the demand for private security services in complementing the conventional security establishments has risen over the last decade. However, there is a bill undergoing consideration before the national assembly for the creation, composition, and function of the Nigerian Private Military Companies Registration Council [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In Senegal, the army or private sector does not use private military contractors, which is forbidden by Senegalese law [2] . Any civil or military agent of the State or a public authority will also be punished by five to ten years’ imprisonment [1] .

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In Senegal, the army or private sector does not use private military contractors, which is forbidden by Senegalese law [2] . Any civil or military agent of the State or a public authority will also be punished by five to ten years’ imprisonment [1] .

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In Senegal, the army or private sector does not use private military contractors, which is forbidden by Senegalese law [2] . Any civil or military agent of the State or a public authority will also be punished by five to ten years’ imprisonment [1] .

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

South Africa’s legal framework primarily addresses mercenary activity, but does not explicitly regulate or define private military and security companies (PMSCs/PMCs) operating either domestically or abroad. This creates a significant legal grey area [3].
The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, No. 15 of 1998, prohibits South African citizens from participating in foreign military activities unless granted permission by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC). It focuses on foreign combatants and mercenary work, especially in the context of post-apartheid fears about South African nationals joining foreign wars. [1]

However, PMCs, which offer logistics, training, intelligence support, or site protection are not explicitly addressed in this Act. As a result, PMCs that avoid direct combat roles can legally operate in South Africa or abroad without formal regulation, as long as they do not cross the threshold into “foreign military assistance” as defined by the Act.

Furthermore, neither the 1996 Defence White Paper nor the 2015 Defence Review consider the risks of corruption or accountability issues related to the use of PMCs in operations [4]/

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

While South Africa has a strict anti-mercenary legal stance [1], it lacks a comprehensive regulatory framework for PMCs, including oversight of their conduct, anti-corruption provisions, or operational integration. This legal ambiguity allows some forms of private security contracting to fall outside effective state control [2].

.
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Regulations on private military contractors and participation in foreign militaries are widely violated with examples of South African PMCs working in a variety of African countries and individual South Africans working for foreign PMCs and enrolling in foreign militaries [1]. The government has thus far shown a reluctance to prosecute transgressions [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Chapter 1, Section 151 (3) of the South Sudan’s Constitution of 2011 [1] details the possibility of having other armed or paramilitary groups in the country. Although the chapter prohibits the formation of other armed groups, it is open to interpretation since it states that the establishment of such army has to be withing the constitution (which can be subject to amendment to allow for the formation of PMCs). However, despite the vague nature of the constitution on the matter, several armed groups continue to operate in South Sudan, whether they qualify to be PMCs or not is also debatable. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

South Sudan has not formulated policies or laws on the use of PMCs in the country. Even relevant acts such as the SPLA White Paper on Defence [1] or the SPLA Act [2] have not touched on the issue.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

South Sudan has not formulated policies or laws on the use of PMCs in the country. Even relevant acts such as the SPLA White Paper on Defence [1] or the SPLA Act [2] have not touched on the issue.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The UPDF Act under the employment section does not specifically address the recruitment of private military contractors. Article 51 (4) of the UPDF Act states that Notwithstanding subsections 2 and 3, the Defence Forces Council may undertake such special recruitment as the interests of the Defence Forces require. The recruitment mainly addresses local recruitment of Ugandans but leaves no restriction on the private military contractors [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no policies or laws on the use of PMCs [1][2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There are no policies or laws on the use of PMCs [1][2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There are currently no private contractors employed [1]. There are no policies guiding private military contractors on corruption issues [1][2]. There is no law which covers the employment of military contractors in Zimbabwe defence forces [3]. In general, the Zimbabwe military hardly employs private military contractors [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No private contractors in the military. There is no legal framework covering the employment of military contractors in Zimbabwe defence forces [1][2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

No private contractors in the military. There is no legal framework covering the employment of military contractors in Zimbabwe defence forces [1][2].