It is difficult to find a single, comprehensive publication on all B enin’s revenues [1]. According to the people interviewed, thedefence sector is essentially financed by the national budget. However, the government receives donations of military equipment from foreign partners. But there is no public record of all the sources of such donations. [2].[3]

The Court of Auditors is the supreme audit institution in Benin and the internal audit office of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) are responsible for controlling all the defence funding [1]. However, no scrutiny report on non-central government funding is available because Benin does not receive non-central government allocation [2].

Public scrutiny of non-central government sources of funding is non-existent [1]. No media, citizens or civil society scrutiny reports on external defence funding are available. [1][2][3][4]

There is total silence on the army’s other sources of income outside the general state budget. However, it is known that the Burundian army brings in large sums of money mainly from international missions .[1] [2][3] The OLUCOME has also required from the governement to to allocate in the general State budget of each year, the real amounts of the headings “AMISOM and MUNISCA” and “Recettes Office Burundais des Mines et Carrières” in order to avoid misappropriation of State funds. [4]

Existing institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Brigade, the Anti-Corruption Court, the Court of Auditors or the General Inspectorate of Revenues can afford to ask questions about the budget allocated by the central government to the army. However, they have no right to review other sources of income. [1] [2]

Sometimes, civil society organizations and the media try to make noise to demand more transparency or communication from state institutions, including Defence and security institutions [1] [2]. For example, the Organisation de lutte contre la Corruption et les Malversations Economiques (OLUCOME) has been producing a series of reports for many years, pointing the finger at the lack of transparency surrounding Burundi’s participation in peacekeeping missions [3][4]. However, these reports remain limited by the fact that they are not based on evidence, and take the form of denunciations [3]. The lack of information means that actions taken by civil society organizations remain superficia and there is no thorough monitoring of the defence sector’s sources of income.

It is important to note that, since Cameroon does not possess an arms industry like some other countries on the international scene, it finds it difficult for its army to generate additional financial resources from the sale of its products. In this regard, the State remains the primary source of funding for the Ministry of Defence. However, the Cameroonian army might receive equipments and donations from friendly foreign countries and these donations are publicly announced. In the event of the sale of army equipment or assets, the proceeds are paid in full to the Ministry of Defence’s general budget.[1] Since MINDEF’s income mainly derives from the State, equipment is purchased using the allocated budget funds. The fact that these sources of revenue do not exist renders the publication of these revenues null and void.[2] Nonetheless, the revenues generated by military engineering from both national and international public contracts continue to be undisclosed.[3]

This control is effective despite many flaws stemming from the low level of democratic practice in Cameroon. Regarding internal audit, it is carried out by the General Control of the Army and the General Inspection of the Army, whose missions and responsibilities are outlined in Articles 12 to 19 of Decree No. 2001/177 of 25 July 2001 on the organisation of the Ministry of Defence.[1] Positions in these departments are often held by general officers, such as brigadier generals or lieutenant generals, who are experienced individuals and therefore have a very good grasp of the issues for which they are responsible. Sometimes senior officers, particularly colonels nearing retirement, are appointed to these posts. Overall, the role of the Supreme Audit Office of the Armed Forces is to ensure legal compliance, detect irregularities, and identify operational or organisational deficiencies in administrative, financial or accounting matters; safeguard rights, persons, and interests of the Treasury and enforce military regulations and ethical principeles. To achieve this, auditors appointed by the President of the Republic may carry out missions to uncover numerous irregularities within the army’s operations. The same applies to the Inspectorate General of the Armed Forces, which conduct within all branches of the armed forces. The Inspectorate General of the Armed Forces is responsible for overseeing the organisation and efficient functioning of all bodies under the Ministry of Defence; proposing necessary measures to maintain operational readiness of personnel and equipment; and executing specific missions assigned by the Minister of Defence. This control and inspection system is highly effective in Cameroon, to the extent that these services are called the Pentagon, in reference to the American Ministry of Defence, due to their central role in the functioning of the Cameroonian army.[2] Conversely, Cameroun’s supreme audit institution, the CONSUPE, is expected to audit in government departments; however, MINDEF in Cameroon is rarely audited by this institution. Furthermore, these integrity bodies do not scrutinise non-governmental funding, particularly the funding of the BIR and Presidential guard by the SNH.

Public scrutiniy of non-central governement sources of funding, such as donations and free trainings for the Cameroonian armed forces, is minimal. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) lack the capacity to effectively scrutinise these financial allocations.[1][2] No one in the public knows, for example, the content of the deal that allows American soldiers to settle in the city of Garoua. No one knows the details of the agreement that enables them to train the Rapid Intervention Battalion or even the deal permitting the French to train the special forces. However, the government sometimes announces when it receives a donation of military equipment from a foreign country. Academics in the field of defence and security issues publish books and articles that help raise awareness of the armed forces sources of funding.[3] Within the Ministry of Defence itself, there is a Military History Commission, responsible for critically examining the past actions of the Cameroon armed forces in operational terms. To date, it has organised two major colloquia and published numerous documents on certain aspects of Cameroonian military history.[4]

Article 3 of the Finance Act establishes the origin of budgetary resources. Thus, the resources of the draft state budget consist of: general budget resources, budget revenue and cash resources. Budget revenue consists of tax revenue, non-tax revenue, programme subsidies and project subsidies. Cash resources include proceeds from the sale of assets, proceeds from short-, medium- and long-term borrowings, and proceeds from the repayment of loans granted. These data are publicly available and can even be downloaded from the websites of the relevant ministries [1].

Oversight is exercised by several institutions, including the General State Inspectorate (IGE). The IGE is the supreme body for administrative oversight, audit, inspection and the promotion of good governance. It is placed under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic. The General State Inspectorate (IGE) has national jurisdiction. It coordinates the activities of all other inspection, audit and internal administrative control bodies [2]. The IGE’s general and permanent mission is to inspect, control, audit, investigate, study, advise and inspect public and semi-public services with a view to ensuring compliance with laws and regulations and optimising the performance of these services. The High Authority for Good Governance, which is part of the system set up by the Ivorian government to prevent and combat corruption and related offences. This mechanism is part of the implementation of the National Plan for Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption [1]. The Ministry of State, Ministry of Defence, has a General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces and National Gendarmerie, as well as a General Inspectorate of Defence Administration and Finance (CGAFD) [3]. However, there is little information on the practice of this oversight of the ministry’s sources of revenue.

There are no control mechanisms outside the government and administrative sphere. [1] [2].

There is selective publication of sources of funding to the Ghana Armed Forces. (1) Donor agencies may report funding to the military, such as the USD 3.7 million Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations (EIF), which aims to boost the deployment of women in UN peacekeeping missions over a three-year period. (2) The European Peace Facility also announced an assistance measure worth €8.25 million under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the GAF’s operational capabilities. (3) Inferring from the various budgetary expenditures stated in the MTEF for the MOD for 2024-2027, which highlights the expenditure for 2021, 2022 and 2023 fiscal years, suggests the publication of amounts received from the government of Ghana and the amount spent and also the amount accrued from internally generated funds; however, there is no component of the publication to show the amounts received from external partners like the EU, the EIF, and the UN, among several other institutions that support the MOD. (4)

The Ghana Audit Service (GAS) conducts regular financial audits of the Ghana Armed Forces to ensure that military expenditures are in line with approved budgets and financial regulations. These audits assess whether funds allocated to the GAF have been used appropriately and in accordance with the law, but they also seek to examine whether income generated from sources other than the central government is used per approved financial regulations. (1) (2) (3) For instance, the Report of the Auditor-General on the Public Accounts of Ghana with specific reference to the ministries, departments and other agencies for the year ended 31 December 2022 highlights the audited expenditure of each ministry and department, highlighting various findings from the audit. The document revealed that the MOD made a total of GH¢470,417.57 in purchases, with only GH¢368,082.14 supported by payment evidence, leaving GH¢102,335.43 unaccounted for. Therefore, the report recommended that the Chief Director of the MOD reclaim the unaccounted amounts. Neither the audit report nor the budgetary allocation as indicated in the MTEF makes provisions to indicate an internal audit of income. (4)

Public scrutiny of non-central government sources of funding is minimal or non-existent. (1) (2)

The Minisrtry of Defence produces an annual report on budget allocation and expenditure, broken down into National Defence, Civic Aid, National Space Management, General Administration, Planning and Support Services. Section 290 of the KDF Act requires the Defence Council to prepare an annual report for each financial year. This report must be submitted to Parliament and the President within three months after the end of hte year. Internally, these requirements establish an institutional arrangement to safeguard funds and maintain accountability levels [1]. The MoD annual performance report provides toplines on amounts received or the allocation of its income [2]. The Auditor General also prepares and forwards to parliament the Ministry of Defence annual report and financial statements at the end of every financial year [3].
The Annual Performance Report discloses broad revenue categories, including UN reimbursements amounting to KShs 4,337,107,775.00, housing rents, sale of goods and services, fines, and sundry revenue. However, the report lacks detailed breakdowns of amounts per category, explanations for the revenue sources, and guidance on how these funds are allocated internally [2].

Scrutiny mechanisms are in place to assess other sources of defence income other than Treasury allocation [1]. These sources of income are audited by the OAG and there are reports to ascertain these. The internal audit department provides guidance on expenditure management and serves as a link between the Ministry and external auditors [2]. This complements the audits conducted by the Auditor General. Internal audit guidelines mandate auditors to oversee ledger accounts and budget controls, ensuring proper coding of income and expenditure, including suspense accounts, and verifying that projected budget income aligns with historical revenue patterns [3, 4].
However, recent events have highlighted potential weaknesses in these oversight mechanisms. A case involving significant irregularities in an Sh8.9bn military food tender has raised questions about the effectiveness of internal audits. Furthermore, the Auditor General has identified issues within an MoD-affiliated agency. The audit report for the Space Agency revealed several concerns, including the absence of an internal audit function, expired terms for Board Members, and delays in staff recruitment despite existing approvals [5].

Public and media scrutiny of defence matters is constrained by limited access to information. The KDF Act’s definition of classified information presents challenges for public oversight. According to Section 49 (3), classified information includes details on strategy, doctrine, capability, capacity, and deployment whose unauthorized disclosure could compromise national security. However, this broad definition may sometimes hinder legitimate public interest in defence affairs [1].
Public and media scrutiny of defence matters is constrained by limited access to information.
However, some scrutiny occurs through parliament and civil society when income figures are included in performance reports. The FY 2022/23 report listed KShs 4.3 billion in revenue from various sources, though without item-level transparency [2]. Public debates occasionally arise when such figures are contested, as seen in the 2023 scrutiny of Sh1.4 billion unbudgeted spending by MoD, which attracted media and parliamentary attention [3].
While defence income is sometimes scrutinised through parliamentary processes or media exposés, limitations in access and the generality of disclosures prevent full oversight.

There is no alternative source of income for the Ministry of National Defense. The primary source of income is the budgetary support as allocated through the MFDP. However, during special operations such as peacekeeping mission, the Ministry receives some form of administrative overhead support. This level of income is not available to the public but might be reflected in the internal and external audit reports of the Ministry.[1][2][3]

In Liberia, the Internal Audit Agency (IAA) is legally mandated to establish and oversee internal audit functions across all branches of government, including the Ministry of National Defense (MoD).[1] However, in practice, the IAA’s efforts to audit the MoD have faced significant resistance.
For instance, while the IAA has successfully deployed auditors to various government entities, including the Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs, there is no public record of similar deployments within the MoD. This absence suggests a lack of cooperation from the MoD, hindering the IAA’s ability to conduct thorough audits.[2]
As a result, there is minimal public scrutiny of non-government sources of funding within the MoD. Any oversight that does occur is likely conducted behind closed doors, such as within legislative committee sessions, and is not accessible to the public.[3][4] This reinforces the point about the Ministry of National Defense being resistant to audit through the Internal Audit Agency. The Ministry’s desire to handle its internal controls without the interference of the IAA has been a cause of concerns.

In Liberia, formal mechanisms for scrutinising non-central government sources of funding within the defence sector are limited.[1] While the General Auditing Commission (GAC) and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) are tasked with oversight responsibilities, their activities often focus on general budgetary issues rather than specific alternative funding sources.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) have played a role in highlighting ambiguities within the national budget to demand accountability.[2] For instance, in 2021, CSOs pointed out several unexplained line items in the draft national budget, raising concerns about transparency and accountability. However, these efforts are typically reactive, involving specific incidents or revelations, rather than a proactive oversight process.[3]
The legislative branch has occasionally responded to public scrutiny. In 2024, the Liberian Senate established an adhoc committee to probe allegations of budget alterations in the approved fiscal year 2024 national budget. This is an example of reactive oversight, often prompted by crises or public demonstrations.[4] There is a lack of proactive and institutionalised scrutiny over non-central government funding in the defence sector.

Normally all defense-related spending comes from the state budget. The Executive defines this budget according to the country’s security and defense strategy [1]. the amounts are, in this case, publicly accessible [2]. But certain equipment is provided by technical and financial partners within the framework of bilateral or multilateral agreements. So, for example, China has provided for years part of the IT equipment of the Malagasy defense forces. It also provided law enforcement equipment for the benefit of the Malagasy defense forces [3]. The amounts of this external aid are not publicly available.

It is up to the Court of Auditors to carry out the audit. However, with regard to the audit, the audit only concerns the allocation of public funds and does not control the non-governmental sources from which the armed forces benefit [1] [2].

The public does not always have information regarding non-governmental funding and thus cannot scrutinise it.[1] [2].

There is a comprehensive record of all revenue sources, the amounts collected, and the allocation of these revenues may lack readability.[1] The main source of revenue for the defence and security sector remains the national budget. However, alongside this source of revenue with the various crises that the country is experiencing, what was agreed to be called “voluntary contributions to the war effort” was regularly instituted in 2012, during the transition period when a little more than 3 billion had been mobilised.[2][3] This practice has continued in recent years and throughout crises. In 2022, a press release from the Ministry of Economy and Finance indicated that “the transitional government had opened a Transition Support Account” in the books of the Bank for the Development of Mali (BDM-sa), at the request of Malians wishing to make their financial contribution to the actions of the transitional government. The amount of voluntary contributions on the account, on the date of the press release, was 101,949,283 FCFA and the government at the time indicated that on the date of the press release there had been no debit movement on the account. Since then, there has been no public information regarding the allocation of these contribution.[4] This voluntary contribution is open to all citizens, companies and other entities willing to participate in the effort. Officially, it is the only source of income in addition to the budget.

Control structures such as the accounts section of the Supreme Court, the general control of public services, the general inspection, the office of the auditor, the central office for the fight against illicit enrichment, etc., have, depending on the case, the legal authority to either intervene upstream to prevent irregularities or downstream to carry out controls on the management of finances in the defence and security sectors. However, in practice, when controls are carried out in the management of the budget of the defence and security sectors, the reports are generally not made available to the public. As for the general control of public services (CGSP), only the Prime Minister and the President receive its reports, even if a summarized version of the annual report may be available depending on the year.[1] The other structures, when they happen to carry out controls, which is quite rare for some and not yet done for others, do not publish the control reports for reasons of sensitivity.[2][3] Furthermore, the general inspection of the armed forces and services can carry out internal control missions, the results of which are not made public.

Public control of non-governmental sources of financing for the defence and security sector proves to be difficult because this type of financing is not necessarily common and is limited in most cases to advertisement. The details of the allocations are almost impossible for the public (CSOs, media, etc.) to have, and on the other hand the public very often lacks the skills to monitor this type of non-government funding. Nevertheless, there are media and CSOs who try as best as they can to follow government funding sources and, when they can, seek information on non-governmental funding sources. The budget monitoring group, the Citizens’ Alliance for Security Sector Reform, the RSS Media Network, etc. sometimes organise activities where the defence sector budget may be discussed.[1][2][3]

The Defence and Security institutions (Armed Forces, Police Forces and Intelligence Services) have their companies and economic and financial enterprises, such as “Empresas Monte Biga” or “Dalo Construções”, but they do not appear in detail in the General State Account or in the budget execution map or in the Economic and Social Plan Balance Sheet [1, 2 , 3]. The link to the General State Account, State Budget Execution and Economic and Social Plan Balance Sheet – BdPESOE is available on the website of the Ministry of Economy and Finance under the link “Economic and Social Management Instruments”: https://www.mef.gov.mz/
Moreover, there is no evidence that these companies are audited by the Administrative Court (Tribunal Administrativo). They are not listed in the General State Accounts (Conta Geral do Estado) as public companies or that they have ever been audited [4, 5].

Mechanisms for scrutiny and oversight are in place and administered by a central government department. At the Ministry of National Defence, the General Inspectorate of Defence serves as the primary oversight body [1]. The General Inspectorate of Defence is responsible for supervising and controlling the proper administration of human, material, and financial resources allocated to the Ministry of National Defence, the Armed Forces, and other affiliated bodies and services under the Ministry’s jurisdiction [2]. Its oversight functions include:
• Administrative and operational inspections of Human Resources, Material Resources, and Financial Resources.
• Operational inspections to ensure compliance with policies and regulations [3].
However, all audits are conducted internally within the Ministry. There is no higher independent authority overseeing the scrutiny of non-central government budget allocations.

The defence revenue sources other than central government allocations are monitored and audited internally and externally. Internal audits are conducted by the National Defence Inspectorate [1] and external audits by CSOs such as the Centre for Public Integrity [2] or the FMO – Budget Monitoring Forum, which is a platform for CSOs interested in the area of public finance management, and in strengthening the collective action of CSOs to monitor and influence fiscal and financial policies, based on the State Budget, for the benefit of less favoured groups [3]. It is important to note that monitoring and external scrutiny by CSOs began to have some impact with the outbreak of the “Hidden Debts” scandal in 2016, and after the start of counter-insurgency operations in Cabo Delgado in 2017 [2].

There is no defense industry in Niger, nor does the military own revenue-generating property managed by the defense sector. Prior to the military coup of July 26, 2023, Niger received significant assistance from its primary international partners. This assistance varied depending on the partner and could take the form of specialized military and police training, as well as donations of armaments, ammunition, and military equipment. Information about these cooperative efforts was publicly accessible through the websites of Niger’s international partners, analytical reports from think tanks specializing in the Sahel region, and coverage in both national and international media (for example 1 and 2). Following the coup, key international military partners—including the United States, the European Union, and several European countries such as France, Germany, and Italy—have progressively ended their cooperation with Niger [3][4][5]. In response, Niger has intensified military cooperation with non-Western countries, particularly Russia and China, which have provided the country with military equipment (6,7). However, this shift has not altered the previous situation, as there is still no systematic publication of military gifts or their financial details. Furthermore, given the overall deterioration of transparency in all sectors under military rule, the situation has worsened since the coup. While the sources of military assistance were identifiable, no comprehensive or official records detailing the financial value of these contributions, their allocation, or any potential revenue-generating activities were systematically published or scrutinized.

Institutional scrutiny of non-central government sources of defense funding in Niger is theoretically ensured by oversight bodies within the Ministry of Defense, primarily the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA). This body, which operates under the Chief of State (see question 8), is tasked with enforcing administrative, financial, and budgetary regulations, ensuring the transparent and efficient management of public resources. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense houses the Office of the Inspector General of Services (IGS), which functions as an internal control mechanism for the Ministry’s administration, similar to counterparts in other ministries [1][2].
However, in practice, these oversight mechanisms have historically faced limitations, particularly in their ability to scrutinize defense-related funding that does not originate from the central government. The absence of publicly available, detailed records regarding military assistance, equipment sales, or property disposals suggests that institutional oversight over these areas is weak or ineffective. The military coup of July 26, 2023, has further exacerbated these challenges. Under military rule, institutional mechanisms are increasingly subject to political influence, undermining their independence and reliability. Given this context, any scrutiny that may occur is unlikely to be impartial or effective.

Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, public scrutiny of defense funding in Niger was limited but not completely absent. Civil society organizations occasionally attempted to engage in budget oversight initiatives, such as the “Session Budgétaire Citoyenne” organized by the Association pour l’Éveil Citoyen (AEC), which provided a forum for debating defense spending [1]. However, these efforts were largely symbolic: real control over defense budgets remained tightly held by the executive branch, and critical voices were often met with repression, including arrests of activists raising concerns about military spending [2]. After the military coup, the situation deteriorated drastically. A presidential decree issued on February 23, 2024, formally repealed the law mandating oversight of defense expenditures, explicitly exempting all military-related spending from: public procurement regulations, taxation controls, and any form of external scrutiny. This move effectively eliminated any public access to information concerning defense financial flows and institutionalized total opacity in military funding. The Association Nigérienne de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ANLC) publicly condemned this decree in a communiqué, warning that it constituted a grave blow to transparency, governance, and anti-corruption efforts in Niger [4]. Further supporting this analysis, Freedom House’s 2024 Freedom in the World report confirms that Niger’s post-coup governance has severely regressed, noting a “collapse of institutional checks and balances” and emphasizing the shrinking space for civil society, press freedom, and government accountability [5].

The defence sector is not primarily a revenue-generating institution in Nigeria, but the Nigerian military has struggled over the years to develop a robust military industrial complex, leveraging its Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON). The DICON has been making strides recently, making drones, light weapons, vehicles and recently secured a contract to manufacture 52 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles in 2021 [1]. The military also runs some business ventures which generate some revenue such as the Nigerian Army Properties Limited (NAPL) Navy Holdings Ltd, Nigerian Air Force Investment limited (NAFIL), and Command Guest House (CGH) Limited, among others [2,3]. There is concern by some security experts and stakeholders that the growing penchant for the establishment of commercial ventures could be a black hole that sucks defence funding without a trace or accountability. This means that billions that could be ploughed back into the economy, especially the defence and security sector are largely unaccounted for [4]. It is unlikely that revenues from these outfits are remitted to the single treasury account following the Single Treasury Account policy which requires all revenues from government agencies to be remitted to the central account.
Some organisations, through various engagements and publications focused on accountability in the defence and security sector, have repeatedly highlighted the lack of transparency surrounding these military-run enterprises. Revenue and expenditures from these ventures are not publicly disclosed, nor are they subject to taxation or federal audits [5].

Beyond central budget allocations, the Nigerian military generates revenue through quasi-commercial activities, such as rental of military infrastructure (e.g., the Nigerian Army Jetty in Lagos), property leasing, and sometimes involvement in logistics or contracting services through affiliated companies [1].
There are mechanisms in place to monitor corruption within the services, including internal auditing units, court martials, and military boards of inquiry. A notable example is the October 2023 case of Maj. Gen. Umaru Mohammed, who was convicted by a special military court for misappropriation of revenues from the use of military property [2][3]. These proceedings demonstrate that internal justice mechanisms do exist and can act when such revenues are mismanaged.
However, the broader institutional scrutiny of these income sources remains fragmented. There is limited information on how consistently internal audits are conducted, and no evidence that the Auditor-General’s office or external oversight bodies systematically review non-budget income streams [4]. Thus, while ad hoc internal disciplinary actions occur, there is no regular, institutionalised oversight from independent or external audit bodies over these alternative revenue streams.

Defence and security institutions in Nigeria invest on several revenue-generating commercial interests especially in real estate, hospitality, health centres, and education [1]. Despite the existence of a plethora of commercial ventures set up by the defence and security institutions, public scrutiny of these non-central government sources of funding is minimal or non-existent. Some efforts are being made by the media in fulfilment of its watchdog role, which are also complimented by inputs by the anti-graft agencies and some civil society organisations like BudgIT and CISLAC amongst others [2].

No evidence of reporting on extra-budgetary income streams such as arms sales, natural resource revenues, or military business activities.There is no external income known by the public, all sources of defence income are supposed to come from central government allocation. In the budget table for all the programmes and projects of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the source of funding is the State of Senegal and there are no other sources of funding for the Ministry of Defence.This is why it is useless to publish the army sources of income [1] . As part of the partnerships between Senegal and other countries, the Senegalese army receives military equipment or the construction of premises from Western countries, particularly the Americans [2] and this is published and known, however, there is no publication on amounts of money given to the Senegalese army by anyway .

The General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces, headed by Inspectors of Weapons and Operations (IAO) and Inspectors of Services and Logistics (ISL), is made up of general or senior officers, appointed by decree, who enjoy the prerogatives of a Director General in the ministries. These technical inspectors, whether from the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie or the paramilitary forces, have key responsibilities in the preparation and use of forces, and play an active part in the Supreme Councils for National Defence (CSDN) and Security (CNS), among others except the fundings. [1] The Court of Audit’s (Cour des Comptes in French) remit is defined by the Constitution and by Organic Law no. 2012-23 of 27 December 2012 on the Court of Audit (articles 29 to 32). These include jurisdictional control of the accounts of public accountants (art. 29), control of the implementation of the Finance Acts (art. 30), control of the parastatal sector (art. 31) and sanctioning mismanagement (art. 32). [2] However, there is no evidence that any scrutiny exist in practice. No reports of the Court of Auditors include information on the Mininistry of Defence’s extra governmental sources of incomes. [3] . The General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces does not publish its reports.

In carrying out its activities, Senegalese civil society undertakes to contribute to improving the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for combating corruption and to develop a critical mass of virtuous citizens anchored in their values, to meet the challenge of consolidating the emergence of citizens and rebuilding public governance: Working closely with the people in terms of capacity building; Cooperating with state audit bodies and parliaments on draft legislative proposals; Raising awareness and advocating for improved public governance. However, their influence may not be in-depth or consistent and their scrutiny of non-central government sources of funding is inexistant because their is no evidence of the existance of it [1] .
The CSO Partners West Africa Senegal works on the fight against corruption within the FDS, it conducted a survey in 2020 to determine the perception of citizens of the defenceet Sécutity Forces, especially in terms of corruption. The CSO carries out monitoring and makes recommendations even when they are not necessarily taken into account by the authorities, none of them is on non-central government sources of funding. [2]

The Department of Defence’s Annual Report includes information on departmental revenue including the sources of revenue such as the disposal of assets, and the provision of services in the form of deployments to peace-keeping operations. [1] Departmental revenues generally form part of the main Defence budget, although the revenue accrued from the disposal of armament assets is returned to the Special Defence Account. [2] The reliability of this information is reinforced by the fact that the annual report is audited by one of the highest-rated supreme audit institutions. [3]

Both internal and external scrutiny mechanisms are in place not only for expenditure but also for other income sources. The Department of Defence (DoD) reports all revenue, including transfers, sales of goods and services, and donations in its Annual Report, which is audited by the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA). The Internal Audit Division completes annual plans that include audits of income-generating activities, such as reimbursements from peacekeeping missions and rental income. For the 2022/2023 financial year, the DoD reported R2.1 billion in revenue, including R40 million from services rendered. This revenue is monitored and subjected to performance and compliance audits, ensuring oversight beyond core budget allocations [2].

While South Africa has an active civil society and media environment, interest and scrutiny of defence revenue (primarily from the disposal of assets) receives limited attention. There are, however, examples of specialist groups scrutinising revenue accrued from the disposal of assets. [1] International arms sales by Armscor are at times scrutinized by media groups, but this is generally rare. [2]

Defence procurement and sales in South Sudan remain opaque making it difficult to know whether the sources of defence income outside those of the central government. For example, in 2015, Green Horizon a multi-million-dollar farming project operated by Israeli security services firm Global CST organised the sale of approximately US$150 million in weapons, including rifles, grenade launchers, and shoulder-fired rockets. [1] According to a report by Amnesty International which was investigating photographs of Chinese made ammunition used by the National Security Service (NSS) at Luri, concluded that “either these cartridges breached the arms embargo, were secretly sold beforehand, or were acquired from a third-party seller who would have broken the embargo or illicitly diverted the ammunition.” [2] These findings reveal just how complex it is to understand arms business in South Sudan both in terms of the origin of the weapons, sources of funds or circumstances under which they were acquired. Nationally, the National Audit Chamber of the Republic Of South Sudan report of 2023 -2024 did not indicate anything on external sources/donations for the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs even though a similar column exists for the ministries. [3]

There is no publicly available information on non-central government funding sources used for procurement in the ministry, including both financial contributions and in-kind payments such as equipment donations and sales. [1] Additionally, a review of the summary of activities conducted by the Standing Specialized Committee on Defence and Veteran Affairs of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly reveals no mention of funding sources outside the central government. [2]. Despite of this, there are other internal and external mechanisms that could ensure institutional scrutiny such as the Audit Act, specialised legislative committees as well as the Procurement Act [3].

There is no publicly available information of members of the public, the media or civil society scrutinizing non -central government sources of income to the ministry of defence. A look at media reports between 2020 and 2024 did not reveal any debate, discussion or report on non-central government sources of income to the ministry of defence [1]. Similarly, when the question was posed to a South Sudanese scholar, the answer was not forthcoming [2].

There is a level of transparency in the resource allocation to the MoDVA. The Parliament has approved Shs 962.23 billion for the enhancement of the salaries of the UPDF. Under the new salary structure, private officers will see their monthly pay rise from the current Shs485,279 to Shs828,426. Similarly, sergeants will receive an increase from Shs514,175 to Shs1,387,992, while warrant officers class 1 will enjoy a rise from Shs591,715 to Shs2,096,800. Captains will see their salaries increased from Shs845,638 to Shs2,736,333. According to budget estimates, the Ministry of Defence has been allocated Shs3.856 trillion, the Ministry of Internal Affairs Shs74 Billion, National Citizenship and Immigration Control Shs158 billion, the Uganda Police Force Shs835 billion, and Uganda Prisons Shs329 billion [1]. In addition to income received from the central government during the financial year and through supplementary budgets, the MODVA also receives income from the sale of equipment, through occasional disposal of property, donor support and from its own streams of investments and businesses. But this accumulated income remains unpublished and scrutinised by the committee on defence and internal affairs [2].

The information provided regarding the audit and oversight mechanisms within the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) is indeed clear and presents a structured system designed to ensure financial accountability and transparency. The presence of internal audit departments within Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) forms the first line of defence against financial irregularities.

While there is a report of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs on the Budget Estimates and while the MoDVA has established mechanisms for auditing and financial oversight, there is limited transparency and scrutiny regarding defence income sources other than the central government allocation [1][2][3]. The MoDVA’s Procurement and Disposal Unit (PDU) is responsible for managing the sale or disposal of surplus and obsolete assets. However, there is no publicly available data on the defence revenue generated from such activities. The Auditor General’s annual reports and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) occasionally flag procurement or disposal irregularities, but do not consistently track or report income from these activities [4][5]. Parliamentary committees such as the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs and the Public Accounts Committee provide general oversight, but there is no clear indication that defence income from property disposal or other sources is regularly scrutinised or debated [1].

Revenue from military property sales, equipment sales, and other activities does not receive significant or consistent scrutiny. Publicly available information on these sources of funding is scarce, and the mechanisms governing their allocation and expenditure remain largely opaque.
Additionally, classified expenditure is not disclosed to the public for national security reasons [1], making it difficult to assess how such funds are utilised. While the justification for confidentiality is often linked to security concerns, this lack of transparency raises accountability concerns [2]. Calls for increased scrutiny of classified budgets have been made by opposition politicians and civil society organizations, but access remains restricted.[3]

The Zimbabwe defence forces is involved in offshore business activities [1]. The military owns private companies, which benefits individuals within the military especially the high command and other senior officers [1]. Additionally, the military has financial ties with influential business figures, such as tycoons like Tangwirei [1]. But the income is neither known nor remitted or declared to treasury [2] .

The defence sector, in particular the military does have an internal audit unit housed at Army HQ and the Defence House to help to audit any sales by the defence sector [1]. Institutional scrutiny exists, but is not effective because of lack of independence, and because it involves the military chiefs and other senior officers [1]. Institutional scrutiny is very difficult because military chiefs do not allow to be scrutinised [1].
The auditor is mandated to audit all government entities including the military [2], but it is always difficult to report about the military. The Auditor General only scrutinises the public sector whose budget is funded by the central government.

No public scrutiny on sources of income derived outside the central government [1][2]. It is very difficult for the public to scrutinise the defence sector on issues; they are not even made aware of either by parliament and or by the central treasury [2].