This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Benin has general legislation on procurement of all kinds. This is the Public Procurement Code in the Republic of Benin, which sets out the rules governing the award, control, execution, settlement and regulation of public procurement. This law covers “all public works, supply and service contracts concerning the day-to-day functioning of the administration in the field of defence, public security and similar” [1].
This law excludes from its scope defence and national security needs requiring secrecy or for which the protection of the essential interests of the State is incompatible with publicity measures. In this category of needs, the Public Procurement Code classifies “information, processes, objects, documents, computer data or files of interest to defence, public security and similar which have been the subject of protective measures intended to restrict their dissemination or which are kept secret in the interest of national defence and the search for which, appropriation, misappropriation, reproduction, disclosure or destruction constitute offences against the security of the State” [1].
A decree establishes the procedures and conditions for the award of public contracts relating to national defence and security needs requiring secrecy. Articles 6 to 10 of this decree provide for the various methods and procedures for awarding contracts relating to defence and security needs. This decree favors, for this category of public contracts, a national or international restricted call for tenders without advertising with the consultation of at least three contractors, suppliers or service providers when the works, supplies or services can be carried out by several candidates [2]. Also, the same decree creates special commissions for public procurement in defence, security and similar contracts. These commissions are responsible for conducting all procedures related to the award of contracts and the monitoring of their execution [3].

In general, the law on public procurement recognizes the risks of corruption. For this, sanctions are clearly defined in Articles 122 to 128 of the Public Procurement Code [1] . Also, Decree No. 2020-603 of December 23, 2020 provides that members of ad hoc special committees may be removed from office in the event of active or passive corruption [2]. The Public Procurement Code sets out the procedures and various penalties for non-compliance with the prescribed procedures [1]. Articles 8 to 11 of the 2020-601 decree specify behaviors and good practice in public procurement. The violation of these principles constitutes a violation for which the sanction, notably disciplinary, is also provided for by this same decree. The law and its decrees explicitly provide for active and passive corruption as risks in procurement.

The means of effectively verifying the effectiveness of the application of this legislation are very limited because this is covered by the defense secrecy [1]. Apart from open purchases of operating supplies concerning the day-to-day functioning of the administration in the field of defense which are not part of the exceptions, most military expenditure is covered by secrecy. These exceptions concern defense and national security needs requiring secrecy or for which the protection of the essential interests of the State are incompatible with publicity measures. Among these we have information, processes, objects, documents, computer data or files of interest to the defense, public security and the like which have been the subject of protective measures intended to restrict their dissemination or which are kept secret in the interest of national defense and whose research, appropriation, diversion, reproduction, disclosure or destruction constitutes offenses against state security [2]. The exceptions are major; and it has not been possible to confirm whether the defence purchases are generally procured in line with the legislation. However, according to people involved in the process, defence procurement legislation is fully implemented and complied with for all defence procurement contracts [3]. During the period under review, no scandals related to defence procurement were reported [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Burundi has had a public procurement code since 2008, which was revised in 2018. It covers all sectors, including defence and security which are not excluded from the code of public procurement.[1]

Burundi’s Public Procurement Code refers to the risk of corruption and contains clear provisions to mitigate it [1] [2] [3]. Article 35, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the code give the public procurement regulatory authority the power to take legal action to outlaw corruption and take action against those guilty of it [1].

Generally speaking, there are many violations of the public procurement code in Burundi and in the defence and security sector in particular, the public procurement code is almost completely ignored [1] [2][3]. Defence secrecy is invoked to create obscurity in the procurement circuit within the defence and security sector [2]. The issue has been raised by the press and civil society, who are calling for transparency in procurement processes and stricter limits on exemptions [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In Cameroon, there is no procurement code specific to defence. The legislation is based on general texts related to public procurements and codified the 2018 public procurement code. However, Public procurement contracts relating to defence are legally classified as special contracts, that is, contracts with secret clauses related to national security and the strategic interests of the State. This means that the conclusion procedures are not open to the public. It should also be noted that special contracts are awarded after prior authorisation from the President of the Republic.[1] In 2011, a Ministry of Public Procurements was created. This ministerial department acts as the hub of the entire process, the guarantor, and manager of the procurement system overseen by all the project owners of public administrations.[2] However, procurements in the defence sector often do not pass through the Ministry of Public Procurement. Other procurements are conducted over the counter, meaning without any public tender or competitive and objective process.[3]

The country has no legislation specifically regulating defence procurement. Meanwhile, the public procurement code does not apply to the defence sector (articles 30 and 31). The public procurement code does not specifically mention the risks of corruption in the defence sector, but addresses risks of corruption in general. For example, according to the provisions of article 197-1 of Decree No. 2018/366, “Is convicted of an act of corruption any person who offers, gives, sollicits or accepts any advantage with a view to influencing the action of a person during the award or execution of a contract”.[1] The legislation also does not specify how to mitigate the risks of corruption.[2]

The country has no legislation specifically regulating defence procurement. Meanwhile, the public procurement code does not apply to the defence sector (articles 30 and 31) [1]. Notably, the purchase of weapons and defence equipment is conducted without transparency and effective oversight by the public procurement Ministry. The defence sector is largely exempt from the control rules that govern the procurement cycles of other institutions, shrouding this process in secrecy.[2][3]. Likewise, purchases made in the defence sector are rarely made public, as almost no information regarding calls for tenders or contract awards is revealed.

This indicator is not scored in the GDI.
In Côte d’Ivoire, public procurement is governed by Ordinance No. 2019-679 of 24 July 2019 on the public procurement code. However, public procurement relating to the defence and security sector is excluded under Article 7, which stipulates that “this code shall not apply to works, supply and service contracts when they concern national defence and security matters requiring secrecy or for which the protection of the essential interests of the State is incompatible with publicity measures” [1].

The defence and security sector is excluded from the Public Procurement Code and there is no other legislation governing it [1].

The defence and security sector is excluded from the Public Procurement Code and there is no other legislation that could govern it, so this indicator is marked as Not Applicable [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The military operates with the same procurement regime enabled by the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663). Personnel in charge of supply and logistics are therefore trained in the requirements of the Act. There are no provisions made for the exemption of the expenditure of the MOD by the Public Procurement Act. There is, however, a confidentiality clause as stated in Section 32 (A) of the PPA under the circumstance where the disclosure of procurement details may pose a challenge to national security, impede law enforcement or impede fair competition.

The Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) recognises the risk of corruption and tries to Address this. “Some of the salient provisions in the Act 663 that could serve as effective antidote for procurement related corruption are:
1. Establishment of a regulatory body: Considering the stakes involved in public procurement, the Act has also established an independent regulator which is the PPA to supervise procurement activities as they occur at the procurement entity levels. They do this by conducting periodic assessments to uncover any probable lapses and initiate appropriate policies and programmes to remedy them.
2. Establishment of Procurement Structures: Decision making is one critical function of any procurement process. To rid the process of individualism, and forestall the many risks associated with procurement decision making, Section 17, 20 & Schedule 1 & 2 prescribes the establishment of Entity Tender Committees (ETCs) and Tender Review Boards (TRBs). Membership of these bodies are supposed to provide a fair representation of each Entity and be made up of people with integrity who will guide decision making and collectively review reports for concurrent approvals in consonance with the provisions of the law.
3. Procurement Rules: To preserve the integrity and sanctity of the procurement system, the Act 663 prescribes a set of rules. For instance: the strict adherence to competition (as a default) in the conduct of public procurement; the involvement of representatives of tenderers during tender openings; the disclosure of evaluation criteria prior to the start of tendering processes; the publication of tender and disposal notices and contract awards; rules for procurement planning, procurement records keeping, and grounds for rejection of tenders, proposals and quotations; these therefore reduce the tendency for capriciousness and the worst forms of subjectivity in the procurement process.
4. Methods of Procurement: Too much discretion in the use of procurement methods could also have the potential of breeding corrupt practices in the procurement system, hence, Part 4, Schedule 3 of the Act 663 provides a sound basis for the application of any method of Procurement taking into consideration thresholds and appropriate conditions that will warrant their use.
5. Administrative Review: To effectively manage vested interests that lead to corruption in procurement, and also provide an avenue for conflict resolution Ghana’s Act 663 has put in place an appeals and complaints mechanism that adjudicates procurement cases through an administrative review process” (1) (2).

While the law is designed to be applied comprehensively, there are indications that some personnel exploit loopholes to manipulate the tender process in favor of preferred contractors. A common practice involves individuals within the military procurement system secretly collaborating with contractors by leaking sensitive information about tenders, giving them an unfair advantage in securing contracts. (1). As a result, concerns have been raised about unethical practices within the supply and logistics sector of the Ghana Armed Forces, where certain personnel in charge of logistics may prioritise personal interests over integrity in procurement. (2)

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 33 of 2015 (Revised Edition 2022) is the overarching public procurement law for all public entities including Defence. The law is an Act of Parliament that seeks to implement Article 227 of the Constitution of Kenya, but there is an exemption under section 90 that addresses classified procurements and disposals [2]. Part 2 of Section 90 requires National security organs and other procuring entities that deal with procurements of classified nature to manage their procurements and disposals on the basis of a dual list which is maintained by the respective procuring entity as provided by the law. The dual list is supposed to make a distinction between open and classified procurement and disposals accordingly. The law requires procuring entities dealing with classified items to agree annually with the Cabinet Secretary on the category of classified items to be included in the classified list of procurements or disposals to be applied. The Cabinet Secretary is required to submit the list of classified items to Cabinet for approval. Those involved in procuring classified items are expected under part 7 of section 90 to maintain confidentiality and not disclose any information that may otherwise compromise national security. It is an offence if items meant for open tendering are categorised as classified. Open tendering items are mostly common user i.e. water and printing paper are procured through the legal framework [1]. The law was assented in 2015 and commenced in 2016. It was revised in 2017 and most recently 2022 [Act No. 33 of 2015, Corrigendum 60 of 2016, Corrigendum 73 of 2016, Act No. 15 of 2017, Act No. 32 of 2022]. In 2020, the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations were gazetted by the Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury on 22 April 2020 through Legal Notice Number 69 of 2020 [3, 4]. The new revised regulations published in 2022 require public entities to publish their procurement plans.

The National Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Policy aims to address gaps in the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal system that have led to loss of government funds and subsequent underdevelopment over the years. It highlights inherent financial and operational risks. However, while these risks apply to all public entities, the policy lacks specific provisions for the Defence and Security Sector. According to this policy, one strategy to mitigating likely risks is to ensure public procurement and asset disposal legal framework include administrative and legal sanctions, as well as penalties for non-compliance. The policy emphasises strict compliance with the legal framework and guidelines to strengthen enforcement capacity. It seeks to standardise and seal loopholes in procurement and asset disposal processes, contract formation, and management. These processes have previously been characterised by unfairness, unclear contract terms and conditions, non-performance, unwarranted variations, delays, and cost overruns [5].
Sections 55(3a), 62, and 66 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 33 of 2015 (2022) PPADA address risks on conflict of interest, corruption, coercion, obstruction, collusion, and fraudulent practices. The law includes a declaration not to engage in corruption [1]. While the law is not specific to security, it applies to all public entities which includes the Ministry of Defence. Section 9 of the Act confers the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority with specific functions on monitoring classified procurement information, including scrutiny of specific items of security organs, and allows the authority to make recommendations to the Cabinet Secretary. The Act establishes the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, among other functions, to monitor, assess, and review the public procurement and Asset Disposal system to ensure they respect the national values (Article 10 of the Constitution of Kenya) and other provisions including Article 227 of the constitution on public procurement. Article 10 (c) of the National Values provides for good governance, integrity, transparency, and accountability [2]. Article 124 of the KDF Act addresses Corruption, economic crimes, and other offences in section 124 [3, 4]. The law observes that any person who engages in corruption while in the course of duty for selfish purposes or gains; or causes loss by their dereliction of duty, commits an offence and shall, upon conviction, be punished, as the circumstances may require, in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code (Cap. 63), the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 (No. 3 of 2003), the law relating to public procurement and disposal of public property, or any other written law and this person will be charged in civil courts [ibid]. Kenya Defence Force standard tendering documents has a section on fraud and corruption. The section addresses issues of corruption, and conflict of interest, and covers repercussions for likely offenders such as debarment [5].
Key findings of the Auditor General on the procurement of foodstuff, released in 2021, established the following risks with the MOD’s procurement processes. The MOD failed to comply with section 95(3), 102(1), Section 46(4c), 16(7), Section 95, 74(1), 84 (1-3), Risk of loss of public funds and failure to realise value for money. Section 68(1), Section 154 (a) of the PPADA and, section 8(3) and 8(3) of the regulations of 2006 [6, 7].

Defence purchases do follow the law. However, there are instances where this has not been the case. A special audit ordered by the National Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee covering financial years 2014-15 to 2017-18 revealed irregularities in the purchases of foodstuffs and identification of suppliers. The audit noted that the Ministry of Defence engaged non-prequalified suppliers, used irregular procurement methods, and paid for goods not delivered. Some firms awarded contracts were not on the prequalified list of suppliers. The Kenya Army irregularly paid more than Sh34.7 million for dry rations. Irregular payments were also flagged at the Kenya Air Force, where inconsistent supporting documents and differing payee names were found: “The audit noted instances where items were procured and delivered but the LPOs (local purchase orders) could not be traced. It was difficult to ascertain the specific amounts,” the report stated. Additionally, the Kenya Navy failed to account for Sh37 million of the Sh871 million spent during the period under audit [1].

In another report, the Auditor General (OAG) in 2021/2022 revealed that the Ministry of Defence signed contracts exceeding the actual funds received, resulting in an unbudgeted expenditure of Kshs. 1,429,858,358. The Auditor noted this was contrary to Section 53(8) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015, which requires an Accounting Officer to ensure sufficient funds are reflected in the approved budget estimates before commencing any procurement proceeding. While a physical verification confirmed the projects’ completion, the unbudgeted expenditure was not included as pending bills at the financial year’s end. The Ministry of Defence Management failed to disclose how the extra expenditure of Kshs. 1,429,858,358 committed by the Ministry would be funded without an approved budget [2]. Yet, the auditor General as per Section 7(1)(a) of the Public Audit Act, 2015, highlighted nothing had come to their attention to cause them to believe that internal controls, risk management, and governance were not effective.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Liberia’s procurement framework includes the amended and restated Public Procurement and Concessions Act of 2010 and applies to all MACs. However, there are provisions in the law that grants special dispensation to the security and defence sectors regarding procurement. Subsection 3(c) stipulates that: “with the prior approval of the President and the National Security Council, determines that any procurement related to national defence or national security requires the application of special procedures, the procedures set out in this Act may be modified by the Commission for the specific procurement, but the modification shall be governed strictly by considerations relating to defence or security.”[1][2][3]
This Act provides significant exemptions for defence and security-related procurement, this involves potential risks to operate outside the general government’s procurement process.
Besides this special dispensation, the Defence Act, in Section 9.7 of the Defence Act (2008) emphasises the need for “recognised and credible system of auditing and accountability for all public property, including real property and funds in charge of the AFL.[4]

The Public Financial Management Law underscores corruption in the public sector.[1] According to the PFM law, its objectives are to promote integrity, fairness, accountability, and public confidence in the procurement process. The Public Procurement and Concessions Act outlines misconduct relating to the submission of bids, including corruption, collusion, price fixing, a pattern of under-pricing of bids, breach of confidentiality, and any other misconduct implied under this Act.
To mitigate corruption risk the law outlines debarment, criminal conviction,[2][3] and cancellation of the procurement proceedings at any time prior to the acceptance of a bid, where continuing with the procurement is evidence of corruption, fraud, coercion or collusion among bidders.[4]
The new Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) Act of 2022 further strengthens the anti-corruption framework by enhancing investigative and prosecutorial powers, including in the prosecution of procurement-related offences.[5] However, while the legislation recognises corruption risks and includes mitigation mechanisms, exemptions for defence and security procurement suggest these provisions are not fully comprehensive for the defence sector.

Liberia’s procurement legislation—including the Public Procurement and Concessions Act of 2010 and the Public Financial Management Act of 2009—provides a clear legal framework for oversight through bodies like PPCC, IFMIS, and audits by GAC and IAA, with debarments, contract cancellations, and sanctions as enforcement mechanisms.
Though these policies and laws are in place to safeguard procurement processes, and to mitigate the risk of corruption, evidence reveals that the process is often bypassed or circumvented under the guise of national security concern. The PPCC Act provides significant exemptions for defence and security-related procurement, effectively limiting oversight and increasing vulnerability to corruption.[1][2]
In August 2025, it was reported that Liberia’s National Biometric ID contract—valued at nearly USD 9.8 million and executed via restricted bidding—was approved by the President despite a formal recommendation by PPCC to use competitive bidding, raising serious questions around transparency and rule of law.[3] Although this does not focus on defence, it shows how executive power can override procurement protocols under claims of urgency or national importance.
With respect to the defence sector, recent GAC audits (2021–2023) do not provide evidence of military procurement or security-sector procurement being formally exempted or bypassed under the guise of national security. However, by law, the procurement of military hardware are allowed a certain contingency with the PPCC process, but not all military transaction are covered[4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
National defense is an almost exclusive prerogative of the executive, which defines the country’s defense and security policy. As such, it is up to the government to define the policy on the purchase of equipment for the country’s defense. No clear legislation specific to defense and national security purchases has been defined in this area [1][2]. The President of the Republic, as supreme commander of the army, decides, with the agreement of the government, on arms acquisitions. In terms of defense sector purchases, they must respsect the Public Procurement Code [3].

Article 17 of Decree No. 2006-343 establishing the Code of Ethics for Public Procurement recognises the existence of corruption risks such as conflicts of interest or active and passive bribery/corruption. Provisions have been defined to combat them and sanctions are provided for indictment (investigations, imprisonment, fines etc.). These provisions concern all public procurement, including the defense sector. [1][2][3]

Defence purchases must comply with the Public Procurement Code [1]. However, exceptions exist and concern certain large purchases such as aircraft offered to the armed forces [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There is a Code of Public Procurement and Public Service Delegations, but this legislation is opaque in parts.[1] Moreover, a decree of May 2023 excludes certain aspects related to defence, including contracts for works, supplies and services, outside the scope of normal procedure, in particular for reasons of defence secrecy and the essential interests of the State.[2]

The country has legislation on public sector procurement in general, but contracts of the defence and security sector are excluded from its scope so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. [1][2] Issues relating to corruption, bribery, conflicts of interest and cronyism are addressed generally rather than specifically in the defence and security sector. The public procurement code and the penal code devote a long period o developing the subject.

Exceptions have become almost the rule in recent years, given that most spending in the security and defence sector is carried out in a somewhat opaque manner and is outside the scope of standard procedures.[1][2][3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The country has a general legal framework for public procurement that also applies to defence acquisitions [1, 2, 3, 4]. The framework, established by Decree No. 79/2022 of 30 December [3], regulates public procurement of works, goods, and services for the state. Additionally, Decree No. 34/2007 of 10 August approves the Regulation on Equipment and Armament of the Defence and Security Forces of Mozambique [1]. However, neither decree explicitly mentions exemptions for defence and security purchases.
Import and export regulations are outlined in Article 11 of Decree 34/2007, which states that: 1) All imports and exports of Defence and Security Forces equipment require prior authorisation from the Ministers of Defence, Interior, and Finance, 2) Imports and exports of lethal equipment require additional approval from the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence and Security Forces [4].
The requirement for high-level authorisation for imports and exports could imply restrictions, but the lack of explicit mention of exemptions makes it unclear whether all defence acquisitions are fully covered by procurement laws.

The legislation superficially acknowledges the risks of corruption and has vague provisions on how to mitigate these risks. Corruption issues are addressed in general legislation, which can be applied to the Defence and Security Forces: Law on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption [1]; Strategy for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption in Public Administration – EPCCAP (2023-2032) [2]; or legislation on military crimes [3]. Therefore, the military legislation does not clearly address issues regarding corruption risks, which are dealt with in general legislation.

The acquisition of defence and security products is generally carried out according to the Regulation on Equipment and Armament of the Defence and Security Forces in force in Mozambique [1], and the international instruments ratified by the Mozambican State, with emphasis on the Arms Trade Treaty [2]. Although there are some exceptions, such as the cases of direct adjustment provided for in Article 97, Paragraph F, of Decree No. 79/2022, of December 30, which approves the Regulation for the Contracting of Public Works, Supply of Goods and Provision of Services to the State: “[…] contracting intended for the supply of military units, ships, vessels, military air units or troops and their means of transport, when on an occasional and short-term stay in ports, airports or locations other than their nationality and only for the purpose of an emergency and for the duration of their duration” [1]. For instance, in the processes of acquiring defence products, after the outbreak of the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, there were exceptions in contracts with PSCs and PMCs and acquisition of other defence and security products as a matter of urgency.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Niger’s legal framework for defense and security procurement has undergone significant changes over the last 7 years, shifting between secrecy, limited regulation, and partial reintegration into public procurement laws. However, the most recent legislative developments have eroded transparency and accountability, reintroducing broad exemptions and discretionary powers for authorities. Historically, defense procurement was completely exempt from public procurement regulations. Article 20 of the 2013 decree on defense and security procurement classified the acquisition plan as “top secret,” prohibiting its publication and mandating that all related correspondence be carried out exclusively through “confidential mail” [1]. Similarly, Article 7 of the 2016 Niger Public Procurement Code explicitly excluded defense-related goods, services, and equipment from regulatory safeguards, further reinforcing opacity in military acquisitions [2]. A notable reform came in 2022 with the adoption of Decree No. 2022-743/PRN/PM, which repealed the 2016 exemptions and reintroduced defense procurement into the public procurement framework under a “derogatory regime.” This approach did not fully eliminate secrecy but sought to regulate acquisitions with tailored provisions while preserving confidentiality for national security purposes. The revised framework also integrated procurement by diplomatic missions and security forces, aiming to balance operational flexibility with improved oversight [3].
However, these transparency efforts were reversed with the adoption of Ordinance 2024-05 on February 23, 2024. The ordinance grants authorities unchecked discretionary power to award contracts without competitive bidding or oversight, exempts certain operators from taxes and duties, and excludes specific expenditures from scrutiny by oversight bodies and the public. This rollback has eliminated both preventive and corrective controls on defense spending, contradicting the procurement safeguards introduced by the 2022 decree [4]. Civil society organizations have strongly criticized the ordinance, warning that it undermines financial accountability and governance in the defense sector, increasing the risk of corruption and mismanagement.

The Ordonnance N° 2024-05, issued on February 23, 2024, introduces sweeping exemptions from public procurement laws, taxation, and financial oversight during Niger’s transition period [1]. It effectively removes all expenditures related to defense and security forces, displaced citizens affected by insecurity, as well as acquisitions and services for the presidential palace and official residences from the scope of public procurement regulations and public accounting laws. These expenses are not subject to competitive bidding or standard financial controls, significantly reducing transparency and accountability. Additionally, the ordinance grants full tax, duty, and fee exemptions for these acquisitions, further shielding them from financial scrutiny. The implementation of these provisions is left to future decrees by the President of the CNSP, centralizing control over procurement decisions. This measure contradicts previous procurement reforms (Decree No. 2022-743), which sought to regulate defense acquisitions under a structured derogation regime rather than an outright exemption [2]. By eliminating both prior and post-procurement controls, the ordinance institutionalizes financial opacity in defense and security spending, heightens corruption risks, and undermines public trust in governance.

While Niger has laws governing defence and security procurement, their effectiveness in mitigating corruption risks is severely compromised by weak enforcement, systemic fraud, and the repeated bypassing of regulations through exemptions and opaque financial practices. The 2013 and 2016 procurement laws originally excluded defence-related acquisitions from public procurement regulations, fostering a culture of secrecy and enabling fraudulent activities. [1][2]. A notable reform occurred in 2022 with Decree No. 2022-743, which partially reintegrated defense procurement into public procurement laws under a “derogatory regime.” [3] This framework aimed to balance confidentiality with greater oversight, but it was effectively dismantled by the 2024 Ordinance No. 2024-05, which exempted defense and security expenditures from procurement and financial accountability laws entirely [4]. The lack of effective controls in the previous years, even before the 2024 ordonnance, has enabled massive fraud, mismanagement, and corruption in military procurement. Investigations led in 2020 have revealed sophisticated corruption schemes, including: Use of offshore shell companies; Falsification of procurement documents, fake tenders, and inflated invoices to justify fraudulent defense expenditures; Delivery of defective or non-existent military equipment, including undelivered aircraft, unusable ammunition, and malfunctioning weapons; Direct involvement of high-ranking government and military officials in procurement fraud, as highlighted by leaked financial records and audits [5]. Despite extensive evidence of wrongdoing, very few officials or contractors have faced legal consequences. The 2024 procurement exemptions further institutionalize impunity, making oversight of defense procurement nearly impossible. .

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Nigeria has a Public Procurement Act (Public Procurement Act, 2007) that serves as a legal framework for all public procurements in Nigeria including defence and security procurements [1]. The Act provides the legal and institutional framework for the enthronement of transparency, accountability, value for money and efficiency in the procurement of works, goods and services within the Ministries, Departments and Agencies. However, the provisions of the act are not applicable to procurements involving national defence or national security. According to section 15, sub section 2 of the Public Procurement Act 2007, “The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods, works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President’s express approval has been first sought and obtained”. However, the Federal government in November 2023 inaugurated a committee to review the Public Procurement Act 2007 in line with current economic realities in the Country. The objective of this review is to ensure realistic procurement outcomes in the face of current economic realities and to enhance budget implementation and ease of doing business [2].

The legislation in Nigeria recognises the risk of corruption [1]. Article 58(4)b recognises ‘conducting or attempting to conduct procurement fraud by means of fraudulent and corrupt acts, unlawful influence, undue interest, favour, agreement, bribery or corruption’ as an offence under this Act. The legislation requires a procuring entity, in implementing its procurement, to advertise and solicit for bids, as well as invite two credible persons as observers in every procurement process, one person each representing a recognized private sector professional organisation whose expertise is relevant to the particular goods or service being procured, and non-governmental organisation working in transparency, accountability and anti-corruption areas. It also specified some procedures for mitigating such risk. For instance, it provides in Article 19(4), (i) that ‘non-governmental organisation working in transparency, accountability and anti-corruption areas, and the observers shall not intervene in the procurement process but shall have right to submit their observation report to any relevant agency or body including their own organisations or associations’ [2].

The exemptions provided in public procurement acts with reference to national deference or national security creates room for opaqueness in defence procurement process in Nigeria. The Chairman of the EFCC, Ola Olukoyede, has recently noted that the greatest number of corruption cases in the country’s public sector space revolved around contracts and procurement [1]. This corroborates the argument that, “particularly in the defence sector, corruption has led to the misappropriation of billions of public funds through corrupt defence procurement procedures and the misuse of the opaque “security votes” system for defence spending” [2]. This partly informed the call for legal, policy, and institutional reforms to address the gaps in the nation’s procurement process [3] [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The Senegal Public Procurement Code Decree no. 2022-2295 of 28 December 2022 is the legal framework regulating public procurement in the country, and it applies to all sectors including defence and security. However, the law allows for broad secrecy exemptions for defence contracts, limiting its effectiveness in ensuring transparency [1] .
Given the current security challenges and the need for the State to provide appropriate responses, it was deemed useful to supplement Article 3 of Decree no. 2014-1212 of September 22, 2014 on the Public Procurement Code, amended by Decree no. 2020-22 of January 07, 2020 in order to exclude from the scope of the Public Procurement Code works, supplies, services and equipment carried out for the defence and security of Senegal and classified as “secret-defense” which are incompatible with the advertising measures required by the Public Procurement Code [2] .

The legislation recognises the risk of corruption and specifyies on Article 445-2 of the Penal Code was introduced by Law no. 2005-750 of July 4, 2005 to punish passive corruption in business dealings. The penalty for individuals is up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of €500,000, which can be increased to twice the amount of the proceeds from the offence [1] . The numerous provisions contained in these international instruments and relating to the fight against corruption in the private sector are directly’ invocable by litigants before the courts and also applicable in all anti-corruption policies and strategies at international level. At sub-regional level, Senegal plays an important role in inter-state cooperation, and is home to the headquarters of one of Africa’s largest anti-corruption platforms. This is the Network of National Anti-Corruption Institutions, a strategic vector for regional cooperation. [2]

Although the legal framework applies to all sectors, including defence, the frequent use of confidentiality clauses creates opportunities for corruption risks. The Syndicat National des Entreprises du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics du Sénégal (Snbtp) held a round table yesterday at the Dakar Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Cciad). The union called on the government to reform the public procurement system, given that nearly €5,000 billion worth of ‘disguised’ contracts have been awarded on the basis of direct agreement, ‘Secret défense’ and ‘Procédure d’urgence’ (emergency procedure). [1]

Senegal’s prime minister, known as SONKO, has revealed that more than 2,500 billion has been spent over the last 4 years under the seal of defence secrecy in order to avoid the rules governing public contracts. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
South Africa’s legal framework for procurement is underpinned by section 217(1) of the Constitution which outlines that the organs of state, when contracting for goods or services, must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective. [1] A Public Procurement Act was passed in 2024 which will serve as the over-arching legislation for public procurement but secondary legislation including regulations under the Act have yet to be prepared and consequently, the Act has not yet been brought into effect. [2] In lieu of the Procurement act, relevant regulations and instructions on procurement processes are issued in terms of the Public Finance Management Act [3] and preferential procurement policies supporting affirmative action are guided by the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act. Additionally, Department of Defence personnel must comply with the Defence Act, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa Act, and the Defence Special Account Act. [4]
The PFMA does not provide specific exemptions for defence procurement, but Treasury Regulations issued under the PFMA allow for deviations in cases of emergency, sole-source procurement, or security-related justifications. These deviations require justification and approval from the relevant treasury authorities. [5]

The Public Finance Management Act establishes procedures for addressing financial misconduct including requirements that the accounting officer adopts systems to “prevent irregular expenditure, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, losses resulting from criminal conduct, and expenditure not complying with the operational policies of the public entity”. [1] While the Public Finance Management Act does not explicitly refer to corruption, acts of corruption are criminalised in terms of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. [2] The newly enacted Public Procurement Act, yet has not yet been brought into effect, outlines measures to prevent abuse of the procurement system. [3] This includes checks of the lists of debarred persons. It also makes the provision for accounting authorities to reject or cancel bid or contract in cases where bidders/contractors have misrepresented or been convicted of offences related to corruption and fraud.

In the latest financial year, procurement irregularities were incurred to the value R553 million, amounting to 4% of the Department of Defence’s goods and services expenditure. [1] The Department has seen numerous high value contracts irregularly procured in recent years and the state-owned Armscor, responsible for armaments acquisition on behalf of the Department of Defence, has likewise received audit findings indicating irregularity in procurements processes and ongoing corruption investigations. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018 is indeed a comprehensive legal framework that covers all sectors including defence and security [1]. The aim of this act is to ensure that there is accountability, transparency and value for money in the management of public resources [2]. The act is intended to provide guidelines for contract management, competitive bidding, and ethical standards necessary to promote fair competition in procurement and prevent corruption. The act also establishes the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority which when fully operational will ensure compliance with the act. However, since the act does not specifically mention corruption in the defence and security sector. Furthermore, Section 36(2) of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018, all provisions of the Act—including competitive bidding and transparency requirements—do not apply to defence and national security institutions, allowing these entities to conduct procurements without adhering to standard procurement procedures. This exemption enables the Ministry of Defence, the National Security Service, and other security agencies to bypass formal procurement—potentially carrying out direct contracting, secret tenders, or classified procurement—on grounds of protecting national security and confidentiality.

Despite the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 being hailed as a milestone in combating corruption in South Sudan, its architects failed to fully grasp the depth and pervasive threat posed by corruption in the country and its impact on security [1]. Consequently, the Act is not equipped with the necessary powers to address the endemic corruption effectively. While the Act ostensibly promotes transparency and accountability, it notably omits any direct mention of corruption or the consequences of engaging in corrupt practices. The Act is also limited in its definition of various forms of corruption. Across its 83 sections, corruption is not treated as a significant threat to procurement processes, whether within the defence and security sectors or other government ministries [2]. This oversight reflects a critical gap in the Act’s capacity to confront and mitigate corruption in public procurement.

The effectiveness of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 especially with regard to the procurement in the defence sector is hampered by three factors. First, the implementation process of the act has been slow with critical institutions such as the PPDAA needed to fully operationalise and regulate the provisions of the act not being fully established. The authority’s board members were inaugurated on March 21, 2023, and by July 2023, the PPDA board was still benchmarking in regional countries such as Uganda to see how similar institutions were operating [1]. At the time, important managerial positions were yet to be filled with the Authority advertising for recruitment for some important positions on May 21, 2024 [2]. Similarly, the porous borders and the flow of SALW from neighbouring countries challenge the effectiveness of existing legal frameworks [3]. Even though the legislations exist, reports by organisations such as Freedom House have found that military commanders in South Sudan had accumulated significant wealth due to the corrupt manipulation of procurement processes. [4] This reflects the lack of effectiveness of existing laws on defence procurement. In addition, during the procurement of the food and non-food items for the training and unification of forces, there were concerns raised by Civil Society and Business Community that the NTC did not follow the procurement process as established by law.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (2014) and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Regulations (2017) provide the legal framework for procurement in Uganda, including defence and security procurement. Article 48 (1 and 2) of the Uganda People’s Defence Force Act also outlines procurement processes by the MODVA and refers to the PPDA Act. [1][2][3][4]
The public procurement legal and regulatory framework in Uganda is generally comprehensive, publicly available, and follows a well-established order of precedence. A key limitation concerns the frameworks’ applicability to classified defence purchases. Section 42 permits Defence and National Security Organs to manage procurement through a dual-list system, which can include classified items. This provision enables certain procurements to bypass standard procedures.

The PPDA Act (2003) allows the Defence and National Security Organs to manage their procurement and disposal based on a dual list. It also requires these institutions to comply with the PPDA Act by following all the laid-out procedures in public procurement and disposal of public assets.[1] However, this legislation superficially recognises the risks of corruption and/or has vague provisions without providing specific measures on how these risks can be mitigated. Under Section 94, the PPDA Act can suspend providers from participating in procurement processes if they are found guilty of corrupt or fraudulent practices. Although the Law recognises and define “corrupt practice”, it does not specifically define forms of corruption or corruption risks.
While the PPDA Act applies broadly, it allows for certain exemptions concerning defence and national security procurements. Specifically, Section 42 permits Defence and National Security Organs to manage procurement through a dual-list system, which can include classified items.
Recently the President accused the army of corruption and promised to address the matter [2]. Some of the corruption allegations include theft or diversion of fuel, food, and other essential supplies [3]. The PPDA Act does recognise corruption risks through general anti-fraud provisions, but there are no detailed or defence-sufficient oversight and accountability mechanisms for mitigating corruption risks.[2,3]

The PPDA sets terms under which the Defence and National Security Organs shall agree annually with the PPDA on the category of restricted items to be included on the restricted list and on which restricted procurement or disposal methods, set out in Part VI. The restricted list of items shall be subjected to a classified audit and laid before Parliament in the Annual Performance Evaluation Report. The Defence and National Security Organs shall appoint Contracts Committees to handle the procurement and disposal of their classified items. The members of the Contracts Committees of the Defence and National Security Organs shall be nominated by the respective accounting officers and approved by the Secretary to the Treasury [1].
However, despite the above provisions, there are cases of corruption allegations in the MoDVA. For example, President Museveni said corruption has crept into the UPDF. He accused the army of siphoning fuel and embezzling money [2]. In addition, the security sector is prone to inflated prices and purchase of sub-standard goods and services. [3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
While the Defence Forces are guided by the Defence Procurement Act [Chapter 11:03], which requires the Ministry of Defence to maintain proper accounting and audited records, the Act does not specifically address corruption issues [1]. The Defence Forces are also subject to national procurement laws under the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [2]. However, certain exceptions apply due to their status as a national security entity, as outlined in the Official Secrets Act, which grants the President the authority to approve such exemptions for the Defence Forces [3]. These exemptions, however, could create opportunities for loopholes to be used under the justification of national security.

Corruption risk is not specifically mentioned in either the Defence Procurement Act nor the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [1,2]. These Acts might help in minimising corruption risks in the defence forces through compliance procedures, though they do not have specific parts of the Act which refer to corruption risks [1,2]. The Acts emphasise accounting and keeping audited books, as part of compliance with procurement practices [1] [2].

Defence procurements are often subject to certain exceptions, as outlined in the Official Secrets Act [1]. These exceptions are frequently used by the Defence Forces [4], despite the procedural guidelines established in the Defence Procurement Act and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [2,3]. The procurement process is shrouded in secrecy, with exceptions defined under Section 4 of the Official Secrets Act. For example, when the military procures weapons from countries such as Russia, the details of the transaction—such as the process and contents—are not disclosed [5]. The public becomes aware of the purchases only when they are reported in the media or shown on state television. These practices reflect the military’s preference for confidentiality in its procurement activities.