There is no formalised defence and security strategy [1]. It cannot therefore be said that the supply needs are the result of such a strategy [2]. In general, the needs are defined according to the military challenges facing the country [2]. Needs are identified each year using a bottom-up procedure. The units report their needs to senior management. The Armed Forces General Staff is responsible for arbitrating and making decisions based on strategic priorities [2]. In Benin,defence acquisitions are not fully formalizsed as part of a national defense and security strategy accessible to the public. Defence acquisition decisions are generally aligned with the country’s security needs, particularly in response to the growing threats of terrorism and transnational crime in West Africa. Auditing ofdefence-related procurement often involves special procedures due to the classified nature of these transactions. It is managed internally within the Ministry ofdefence.

There is no formalised defence and security strategy. Purchases of equipment for the armed forces are subject to a certain control, in accordance with the principles of public procurement. But for reasons of national security, this control could not be verify. Which implies that transparency in acquisitions is not always a reality [1][2].

The Ministry of Defence bases purchases on needs that are clearly identified and quantified in advance [1]. It is done according to military priorities, specific equipment needs fordefence missions, and thedefence capabilities necessary in the face of threats, such as terrorism. In fact, the identification of needs is done through a process that starts from the basic structures and goes up through the hierarchical channel [2]. Needs are identified each year and purchases are planned in subsequent budgets. Only budgeted purchases can be executed [3][4].

There is no well-established defence and security strategy in Burundi. Procurement cannot therefore be based on a defence and security strategy that does not exist [1]. Rather, it is based on needs that are felt or expressed in an irregular and unsystematic way [2].

The Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Defence can control or audit certain purchases within the army [1], but external bodies such as parliament or the Court of Auditors cannot do so, even though the legal framework authorises them to do so [2]. Even the Inspectorate General has very limited powers in this area, since it cannot control all purchases but only some, such as the purchase of food for military camps [1].

As there is no well-established defence strategy or clear forecasts for procurement [1], purchases are often made opportunistically at the whim and according to the interests of senior managers in the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces General Staff. [2]

There is no public procurement evaluation strategy. Purchasing requirements do not follow any formal procedure. Acquisitions are made based on the needs of the Joint Materials Directorate to the MINDEF.[1][2]

In terms of controlling actual purchases, external control mechanisms outside MINDEF are ineffective for certain transactions. This is justified by the confidentiality clause that covers the defence sector. The audit function operates internally without the intervention of general control institutions such as the parliamentary oversight committee, the inspector general, or the Ministry of State Audits. The latter, whose scope covers the entire governement, are not involved in audits.[1] Finally, because the results of controls are not published, there is a lack of transparency in the control procedure and its outcomes.[2]

During the parliamentary session dedicated to the vote and approval of the budget, MINDEF sets its budget envelope for the year. This serves as a statement of priority needs related to major and/or specific annual purchases. This statement is made to the National Assembly and is therefore public. However, the priority needs are not very detailed. The minister might say, for example, that they need to reinforce the army’s equipment to better equip troops fighting Boko Haram. They may also mention the need to strengthen Air Force capabilities.[1] However, it may happen that during the financial year, this envelope or budget is adjusted due to unforeseen events that may arise during the year.[2] Cameroon has not established a quadrennial defence review, white paper, or a “loi de programmation militaire” (military planning framework), but the country plans to develop these in the coming years.[3] As a result, purchases are often made reactively and opportunistically.[4]

Planning of requirements based on national strategic priorities is progressing. Programming laws, national development plans and even budgets reflected the efforts made in this direction [1, 4]. The acquisition of patrol vessels for the navy, for example, is included in the provisions of the 2016-2020 military programming law [1, 2].
More specifically, during the presentation of the 2024 draft budget, it was emphasised that several perspectives based on the challenges and priorities defined in the National Development Plan had been adopted as part of the operational capacity building of the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire [4]. However, there has been no programming law since 2020 and acquisitions continue to be guided by emergency situations or made to fill gaps in previous planning [5].

In theory, oversight tools exist, notably through the two chambers of Parliament and the army inspectorate, but they are rarely used [1, 2, 3].

Procurement is a mixture of planning and opportunism [1, 2]. Some purchases appear to be justified by pre-established strategic needs [3]. However, others seem unplanned, as was the case with the creation of the Northern Operational Zone following the attacks in Kafolo, which required the emergency purchase of equipment outside the framework of programming laws or the budget [4].

Ghana established a National Security Strategy in 2020, outlining the country’s strategic plans for security. It does not contain clear procurement requirements for its operations (1). The National Security Strategy’s procurement processes must adhere to the requirements outlined in the Public Procurement Act (Amendment) 2016 (Act 914) (2)(3).

The Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI) has the oversight responsibility to ensure that the MoD and Ministry of National Security (MNS) expenditures comply with legally required standards and meet the National Security Strategy (NSS). (1) The National Security Strategy (NSS) stipulates in Section 5.6 of parliament’s oversight responsibility that the PSCDI, the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, and the plenary of parliament conduct this oversight. (2) In practice scrutiny is done on a case by case scenario; however, the PSCDI may have to produce an annual report which details the major activities of the MOD, major procurement lapses per the Auditor Generals Report and profess recommendations (1). As part of their reports the various procurement needs that were not met in the previous financial year is captured as part of recommendations for the next financial year.

The Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), and the intelligence agencies make the budgetary allocation for the National Security Strategy (NSS) based on the national budget (1). It is, however, unclear whether there is an alignment between the defence expenditure and the NSS, but the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI) maintains an oversight responsibility to ensure that defence purchases align with the NSS and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for the Ministry of Defence. (2) Such plans are usually varied over time depending on the necessity of emerging threats and the need to respond with specific logistics (3). The possibility of opportunistic purchases cannot be ruled out, but it is hard to prove beyond decision-making circles. Without a formal board of inquiry report, such opportunism can only be inferred. In Paragraphs 5.20 – 5.23 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s report on the Airbus Scandal “Government Official One”, the key decision-maker for Ghana’s aircraft orders addresses reasons why the purchase of the aircrafts at the time may not be cited as opportunistic. (4) The deals covering them were argued at the time to be in line with the 2009-2012 Strategic Plan of the Ghana Armed Forces.(5)

The National Defence Policy (White Paper) comprises four main sections: Foundations of National Defence Policy; Threats and Opportunities; Framework for Defence; and Responsibilities for National Defence. While it explores areas of focus for the Ministry of Defence (MoD), it lacks specificity regarding future purchases [1]. Kenya’s Vision 2030—the country’s long-term development blueprint—and the Fourth Medium Term Plan 2023-2027 prioritises the modernisation of KDF but only offer high-level objectives without detailed plans [2]. Nonetheless, all acquisitions must comply with Treasury directives during budgeting and procurement planning processes [3, 4].

The Ministry of Defence Internal Audit conducts system audits to ensure key operating systems—such as cash management, procurement, transport revenue/AIA, and assets management—are functioning effectively. These audits suggest that the ministry’s strategic and operational objectives are being met consistently, efficiently, and cost-effectively. Additionally, they perform Value for Money (VFM) Performance Audits aimed at promoting economic, effective, and efficient use of the ministry’s resources. These audits focus on sound expenditure management to enhance value for taxpayers’ money [1]. The OAG, Parliamentary Accounts Committee and the Departmental Committee also scrutinise and audit procurements. Parliament sometimes does not have access to classified detail of purchases and there are instances where the OAG has sought the indulgence of the courts to audit classified expenditures [2].

While purchases are generally planned, the OAG reports highlight instances where shortcomings have occurred [1]. The Auditor General (OAG) noted that in FY 2021/2022, the Ministry of Defence signed contracts exceeding the actual funds received, resulting in an unbudgeted expenditure of Kshs. 1,429,858,358. This was contrary to section 53(8) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015, which require an Accounting Officer to ensure sufficient funds are reflected in the approved budget estimates before commencing any procurement proceeding [2, 3].

Procurement requirements in Liberia’s defence sector are formally expected to be guided by the National Defense Act of 2008, which mandates that acquisitions align with the country’s overarching national defence and security priorities. This requires careful needs assessment that reflects priorities of national security strategy. However, some of the procurement needs have been rather arbitrary and not necessarily derived from the Act as should be.[1][2]
Furthermore, recent media investigations into audit reports by the General Auditing Commission (GAC) reveal recurring issues of misaligned or unjustified expenditures within the defence sector. For instance, Senator Amara Konneh’s remarks ahead of the public hearings on GAC audit reports signal widespread concerns about irregular procurement practices and the absence of proper planning and accountability mechanisms.[3]

The Internal Audit Agency (IAA), an autonomous integrity institution, is mandated to ensure the MACs have a strong internal control system. Likewise, the GAC is an external audit commission mandated to improve transparency in the management of public resources. Likewise, the Public Accounts Committees are the legislatures reviews the GAC audit report to recommend judicial action where necessary.
Although there are strong policies and laws regarding procurement, procurement processes are set up to validate procurements that have already been made. This has been a problem across administrations. The most recent case involves the procurement of yellow machines for road projects. Reports have uncovered that the purchased bypassed the procurement standard.[1][2][3]
Additionally, the legislative oversight’s role can be limited, as there is little evidence that recommendations or findings from the GAC’s defence-related audits are followed by meaningful corrective actions or public legislative scrutiny.[4]

In view of the context described above, purchases are often undertaken outside of national security requirements. Although certain procurements, such as military hardware, are somewhat exempt from the normal procurement scrutiny, the full extent to which defence related procurements are addressed is unplanned or not fully justified.[1][2]
Evidence from General Auditing Commission (GAC) reports highlights systemic weaknesses in procurement planning and irregularities across ministries, with limited disaggregation of defence spending.[3][4] Although defence-related procurement is formally subject to audit under the PFM and PPCA frameworks, in practice, audits have not consistently covered defence purchases, and reporting is delayed. Nonetheless, the last compliance audit to the MoD for the period 2017-2021 (published in 2024) recommends that “management should ensure that the requisite procurement methods are utilised for all procurement transactions”.[3][4]

According to government officials, defense procurement answers to the country’s defence and security policy but there is no clear national defence strategy with quantitfied needs available to the public . For example, the provision of aerial equipment such as helicopters to the army jhas been explained by the State’s desire to be able to intervene almost anywhere in the country, including in the most isolated regions [1]. The modernisation of the armed forces and in particular the air force has constituted a main axis of the defence strategy for several years. As a result, the State recently decided to equip it with a new helicopter. This new machine will not only fulfill security missions but will also be used in ancillary missions of the armed forces and in particular medical evacuation (of injured military personnel for example) or even the fight against bush fires [2]. Until recently, in 2025, the security forces had benefited from aircraft allocations.

In reality, no active control exists. The Parliamentary Commission in charge of National Defense does not really have the supervisory power to control whether procurement respects the national security strategy. Some parliamentarians are interested in it, but they do not always have the necessary expertise in the matter [1][2].

Defence and security requirements are more or less respected [1]. However, in the case of Madagascar, and given the weakness of financial resources, the purchases have a certain opportunistic character. The country prefers to buy military equipment within the framework of bilateral cooperation to get a better price at least according to state officials [2].

The fact that procurement in the defence and security sector is largely opaque due to restrictions[1] makes it almost impossible to determine whether procurement requirements arise from a national defence and security strategy. However, from 2015 to 2019 all procurement was based on the Justice Sector Orientation and Programming Act,[2] and since 2020, procurement planning has become annual. Therefore, they are not justified on the basis of the national strategy. As a result, procurement lacks a great deal of visibility and is not necessarily accessible to the public.

In theory, the Constitution[1], the transition charter, and various legal texts authorise parliament (the CNT in this case) and certain control and prosecution bodies [2] to exercise a right of supervision over security sector supplies. This control is not necessarily dependent on the existence of a national security strategy. However, in practice, the control and audit bodies have not taken into account any control or audit mission of the defence sector since 2020. The CNT, beyond the vote on the defence budget and the questions of the Minister of Defence on certain aspects, does not seem to really have a free hand despite the existence of legal prerogatives to supervise and confirm that the supply of the defence and security sector complies with the legal framework.[3]

From 2015 to 2019, defence procurement was based on clear and identified requirements but no document has been published since.[1] When purchases are disclosed to the press, the justification is often linked to the need to increase the level of operational capacity of Mali’s defence and security forces and the fight against terrorism.[2][3]

Acquisition requirements are guided by the Regulation on equipment and armament of the Defence and Security Forces [1], derived from the Defence and Security Policy [2] and the Law on National Defence and the Armed Forces [3]. However, there are occasions when acquisitions are determined by the Military Programming, taking into account the national, regional and global context of threats that may affect national security. After the emergence of the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the acquisition of defence and security products and services were influenced by the situation and not by legal instruments, because these were out of step with the context and reality of 2017 [4, 5].

The acquisition of defence products is based on the military programming provided by the Government’s Five-Year Plan, which guides defence procurement, ensuring alignment with the Defence and Security Policy and the Regulation on Equipment and Armament of the Defence and Security Forces. These acquisitions are subject to both internal and external scrutiny [1, 2, 3]. Internal scrutiny is conducted by the National Defence Inspectorate, which is responsible for inspections, audits, and monitoring. It assesses whether defence acquisitions are used correctly, comply with the National Defence and Security Policy, and align with the Military Programming outlined in the Five-Year Plan [4].
However, external scrutiny, carried out by the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Order, and Public Security, as well as civil society and academia, has been limited. This is due to restricted access to classified information and the lack of key documents, such as the Military Strategic Concept, the Force System of the Armed Forces of Mozambique, and a Specific Law on Military Programming detailing the Armed Forces’ needs [5, 6, 7]. These limitations prevent a thorough evaluation of procurement details and their alignment with national security policies.

The “non-operational” products and services are purchased by the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces in accordance with clearly identified requirements in the legislation on contracting public works contracts, purchasing goods and providing services to the State [1]. However, there are opportunistic and unplanned purchases according to the context and situation [2, 3]. The “operational” products and services do not follow this logic and are classified under the law on military secrets and state secrets [4]. According to the Annex to Decree 34/2007 of 10 August, which approves the Regulation on Equipment and Armament of the Defence and Security Forces in Mozambique, there are nine groups of operational and non-operational equipment, namely [5]:
Group I: Weapons and Ammunition (operational);
Group II: Barracks and Field Equipment (non-operational);
Group III: Hospital, Medical and Surgical Equipment (non-operational);
Group IV: Air Defence and Anti-Aircraft Equipment (operational);
Group V: Vessels and Floating Structures (operational);
Group VI: Communications and IT Equipment (mixed);
Group VII: Cars and Armoured Vehicles (operational);
Group VIII: Engineering Resources (mixed);
Group IX: Energy Equipment: Generators and Accessories (non-operational).
The purchases of “non-operational” defence products and services are made in accordance with the requirements clearly identified by the National Defence and Security Policy, while “operational” products and services do not follow this logic, being matters classified by the law on military secrets and state secrets.

While Niger previously had formal national security strategies, including the National Internal Security Strategy (SNSI) and the National Strategy for Community-Based Security (SNSP), both with 2022-2026 action plans, it remains impossible to assess whether defence procurement requirements are derived from these strategies [1][2]. Following the military coup of July 26, 2023, the new military authorities only formalissed their military policy in January 2025, but this document has not been made publicly accessible, making it unclear whether procurement planning aligns with national security objectives [3]. Additionally, the defence acquisition plan is classified as “top secret,” and there are no publicly available details on how defense purchases are prioritized or justified [4]. With no formal public procedure for defining procurement requirements, and no verifiable link between military procurement decisions and a national defence strategy, it is impossible to determine whether purchases are based on clearly identified and quantified requirements.

There is no scrutiny of actual defence purchases in Niger, as procurement decisions and expenditures remain entirely opaque and exempt from independent oversight. The acquisition plan is classified as “top secret,” and there are no publicly available reports or mechanisms for external review of military purchases [1]. Furthermore, Ordinance No. 2024-05, enacted on February 23, 2024, removed defence expenditures from public procurement regulations, eliminating prior and post-procurement controls [2]. This legal change grants authorities broad discretionary powers to award contracts without competitive bidding, oversight, or financial accountability, effectively shielding actual purchases from any form of institutional or public scrutiny. Additionally, there is no evidence that the National Assembly, civil society, or independent audit institutions have access to procurement data. Past corruption scandals, including the 2020 procurement fraud involving 71.8 billion FCFA ($120 million), were exposed by investigative journalism rather than government oversight bodies [3]. Despite clear evidence of procurement mismanagement, those responsible have largely escaped legal consequences, further indicating the absence of enforcement mechanisms for scrutinising defence purchases.

Assessing whether defence purchases align with a national strategy is challenging due to the opaque nature of Niger’s military procurement process. Most available information comes from media reports rather than official disclosures, making it difficult to determine whether acquisitions follow clearly identified and quantified requirements. One of Niger’s most significant recent purchases is a $87.5 million military equipment order, which includes Turkish Karayel-SU combat drones. The Nigerien junta opted for these drones over additional Bayraktar TB2 units due to cost considerations, signaling that economic factors influence procurement decisions [1][2]. While this purchase appears aligned with Niger’s counterterrorism efforts, there is no transparent evidence that it was based on a structured national defense strategy. At the same time, inconsistencies and misinformation surrounding military acquisitions raise concerns about the planning and rationale behind defense purchases. Following the departure of French and American troops, Niger deepened its military partnership with Russia, receiving military equipment. However, in the beginning of August 2024, multiple misleading Facebook posts falsely claimed to show new acquisitions, with AFP Factuel debunking them as outdated or unrelated images [2]. This lack of clarity and the use of disinformation narratives suggest that the military authorities do not consistently provide accurate information about defense acquisitions, making it difficult to assess whether purchases are systematically planned or opportunistic.
Given the lack of transparency, media-driven reporting on acquisitions, and misinformation surrounding procurement decisions, it remains unclear whether Niger’s defense purchases systematically follow a national strategy. While some major purchases, such as the drones, seem justified by operational needs, the overall procurement process lacks formal visibility.

Nigeria does have a national defence policy and various strategic documents that outline the country’s defence priorities and objectives, such as the National Defence Policy (NDP, 2017 and National Security Strategy (NSS), 2019 [1]. They are intended to guide defence procurement by identifying the needs and priorities for military equipment and capabilities. For instance, chapter 8 of the NDP provides that Nigeria’s defence procurement process shall be guided by the provisions of the Public Procurement Act 2007 with focus on delivering the right equipment to the Defence Sector in a timely manner. The defence acquisition imperatives shall focus on threats, mission success, achievement of defence sector objectives which are unity of effort, jointness and rapid response, and promotion of reverse engineering. It equally provides that all defence procurement shall be prioritized and drawn from a 5 to 10-year Defence Sector Requirement, and that defence sector acquisition shall take into consideration all the dimensions of modern warfare capabilities on air, land, sea and cyber space, and involving the combined effort of equipment acquisition professionals who are specialists in their own right in the military, Security Agencies, the MOD civilian employees and the legislature in the provision of the desired equipment [2]. While procurement requirements for defence are expected to be derived from national defence and security strategies, the actual acquisition has been poorly executed due to corruption, a lack of transparency in military procurement and absence of monitoring and control mechanisms [3] [4].

In theory, institutions responsible for oversight, such as the National Assembly, Auditor General’s Office; as well as Anticorruption agencies such as ICPC and EFCC are expected to scrutinise defence procurement, but they often lack the capacity, resources, or political will to thoroughly investigate defence procurement [1]. In addition, the opacity of the procurement process makes it difficult to track expenditures and ensure value for money. The opaque nature of defence procurement and weak oversight of arms contracts were further brought to light when Babagana Monguno, the NSA lamented during a BBC Hausa interview in March 2021, that the president had provided enormous funds but the equipment was not purchased. He then suggested the possibility of the President sanctioning an investigation [2]. As noted by one analyst, “various public scrutiny institutions, particularly audit agencies, anti-corruption bodies and Parliamentary Public Accounts Committees, were usually reluctant to investigate the military. There were even instances in which it appeared they had been prevented from doing so” [3].

Nigeria’s defence purchases to some extents are reflective of the contemplations in its national defence strategy, although some acquisitions are opportunistic in nature. As noted earlier, chapter 8 of the NDP provided, among others, that defence acquisition imperatives shall focus on threats, mission success, achievement of defence sector objectives which are unity of effort, jointness and rapid response, and promotion of reverse engineering [1]. However, recent procurement decisions are often reactive and ad-hoc, focusing on immediate needs rather than aligning with broader strategic objectives [2]. After decades of underfunding its military, Nigeria’s defence budget has increased substantially during the past 10 years leading to sustained improvement in defence acquisitions. Nigeria has recorded a dramatic escalation in its spending on arms, with weapons import climbing by a staggering 418% between 2022 and 2023 [3]. In June 2024, the Chief of the Air Staff, Hassan Bala Abubakar, announced that Nigeria will procure 50 new military aircraft to further boost its counter-terrorism capabilities. This seems so unplanned and unreal. Thus, a defence analyst bluntly questioned the intent of the plan, noting that procuring dozens of military aircraft is “overambitious” and possibly misdirected [4]. Despite considerable investment in defence acquisition, the security situation in Nigeria remains dire, with kidnapping and other forms of violence continuing unabated. This situation raises critical questions about the government’s underlying strategies and military operational effectiveness.

Senegal lacks a formal and systematic process for deriving defence procurement requirements from a capabilities-based planning framework. Current processes are ad hoc, often influenced by immediate needs or external partnerships rather than strategic assessments . Contracts relating to national defenceare carried out by the Ministry of the Armed Forces or the Ministry of the Interior and their security bodies, and there is a logical link between the strategy and the various public contracts, even if in practice this does not necessarily apply. [1] With the exception of contracts relating to defence and national security, which are subject to the procedure described in the Public Procurement Code, and depending on their strategies, all sectors are subject to the standards set out in the Public Procurement Code. [2] Senegal has a National Strategy for the Fight against Corruption (SNLCC), which is the result of a wide-ranging, participatory and iterative consultation with government structures, the private sector and civil society. [4] . However, it is impossible to assess whether procurement requirements derive from a national defence and security strategy.

There are mechanisms in place to check that the national security strategy is upheld, but these are not carried out by external bodies. It is within the defence and security structures that this control is carried out. [1] These structures, such as the ARCOP (ex-ARMP), are independent national agencies which are not part of the defence and security sector and which are mandated control mechanisms. [2] However, works, supplies, services and equipment carried out for the defence and security of Senegal, undertaken by the Armed Forces, the National Police, Customs, the National Fire Brigade, the Prison Service, the departments responsible for Water and Forests, Hunting and Soil Conservation, as well as National Parks, and when they are incompatible with the advertising measures provided for in the Public Contracts Code because they require secrecy and the protection of the essential interests of the State. [3]

After the violent demonstrations which resulted in the death of several people, the Ministry of defence and the armed forces decided that the Senegalese Army could support the police and gendarmerie in their mission to maintain order, as often happens in Casamance in the south of the country. The Minister also took delivery of equipment from the Armed Forces Equipment Department. The equipment includes vehicles for use in combat zones, army ambulances and robots, as well as riot shields and arm and leg protection helmets. [1] In line with the national defencestrategy, aimed at guaranteeing internal security and maintaining Senegal as a major player in peacekeeping missions in Africa, a large batch of tactical vehicles has been received by the Equipment Department. This initiative aims to improve the land mobility of army units, a crucial aspect for their effectiveness in the field. [2] . The ceremony was presided over by Air Force General (2S) Birame Diop, Minister of the Armed Forces, in the presence of senior military officials, including the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces base at least their major purchases on clearly identified requirements. However, there are some unplanned and unclear purchases. For example, the Ministry of Defence and the Senegalese armed forces have been involved in purchases of military equipment that have sparked controversy and raised questions. Investigations and parliamentary commissions have been called for to shed light on certain transactions, particularly due to their lack of transparency and potentially high cost. [3] A 45 billion CFA franc arms deal, intended to equip Water and Forestry Agency and National Park officials with military equipment including assault rifles, ammunition, pick-up trucks, tankers, motorcycles and drones, has raised many questions and sparked controversy. According to military experts, this equipment far exceeds the actual needs of this corps, as highlighted in the letter from the MP to the President of the National Assembly. Furthermore, the equipment ordered has never been delivered, and several observers believe that the contract amount was overvalued. Specialists estimate that such a purchase should not have exceeded 25 billion CFA francs, raising doubts about the use of the remaining 20 billion.

The process for identifying procurement requirements is generally comprehensive and is guided by the Defence Review as the highest-level strategy determining military posture. [1] In the medium-term, this is translated into Force Structure Plans and Force Development Plans which establishes force requirements in line with the available budgets and in terms of acquisitions, system requirements are determined by Required Operational Capability assessment establishing the criteria for acquisitions. [2]. While there is a comprehensive formal system in place, events surrounding the “Arms Deal” reveal irregularities in procurement decisions and instances where procurement has not been legitimately justified by actual requirements. [3]

Scrutiny of defence procurement by the Auditor-General and relevant parliamentary committees is largely concerned with regulatory compliance rather than alignment with high level strategies. [1] Parliamentary committee scrutiny of defence purchases is generally superficial and does little to consider alignment of purchases with high level strategies or consideration of technical requirements. Instead, committee meetings show more concern for budgeting and implementation progress [2].

The Department of Defence’s system for procurement planning is generally comprehensive and systematic, [1] but there are examples of large procurements seemingly made without sufficient planning which has resulted in wasteful expenditure. This includes the procurement of unused medical equipment, payments for unoccupied office space, and the procurement of unregistered medication during the COVID pandemic. [2] Questions have also been raised over the practical valuable of weaponry procured under the “Arms Deal”, some of which has not been used. [3]

Since the SPLA became a regular Army in 2018, there is not publicly available national defence and strategy document to examine the nexus between procurement requirement and defence/security needs. The only related documents are the SPLA White Paper on Defence 2008 [1] and the SPLA Act 2009 [2]. While these two documents highlight a number of issues related to the military, they are not the country’s official defence and security documents. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether the acquisitions made are relevant to the national strategy. Similarly, according to one informant, the constraints imposed on South Sudan by UN sanctions could also undermine efforts to procure equipment needed to fulfil the country’s defence goals [3].

While South Sudan has formal policies that require auditing of public procurement and in the case of defence and security establishment, the Defence Committee of the National Legislative Assembly, National Audit Chamber, and the army inspector general’s office having such mandate in line with the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018, there is no publicly available information from local and regional media [1] that auditing have been done on defence procurement in the last five years. The Defence Committee has, in a number of occasions, invited security officials and discussed defence expenditure but did not have access to the contents of the discussions [2].

The conflict situation in South Sudan means that the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs is keen on dealing with the crisis in the country and therefore defence and security procurements are aligned with the goal of dealing with the current insecurity. Despite the security needs and a growing defence budget [1], there is no evidence that the procurement is based on systematically identified and quantified needs. This is partly because there are no publicly available documents on defence and security strategy that can be compared if the MoD has followed its defence requirement. However, the government of South Sudan has been accused of irregular procurements. For example, a Panel of Experts on South Sudan report found that ‘skewed prioritisation and low quality in the acquisition of public goods and services, as well as instances in which the item supposedly acquired through public contracting does not materialise [2]. These challenges facing also face the defence and security sectors.

The inherent tension between national security imperatives and transparent procurement practices creates an environment where adherence to established guidelines can be selectively applied. The classification of military purchases, while understandable, provides a convenient justification for bypassing standard procurement procedures[1]. This can lead to situations where procurements are driven by factors other than strategic necessity, such as political relationships. The lack of public oversight and the limited availability of detailed procurement data make it difficult to verify whether acquisitions align with national defence and security objectives. Therefore, while the UPDF has a legal and regulatory framework for procurement, the evidence suggests that its implementation is inconsistent, and that procurements are not always driven by sound strategic considerations [2][3].

The Parliamentary Committee of Defence & Internal Affairs scrutinises the accounts of the MoDVA. For instance, this information is captured in the report of the committee on the Ministerial Policy Statements and Budget Estimates for FY 2024/2025 [1]. However, there is no evidence to support whether the procurement of defence items is aligned with the defence strategy/white paper.[2] Defence sector procurements especially those on equipment are mostly outside the scrutiny of civilian oversight.

The PPDA Act governs procurement processes of purchases by the UPDF. The Defence Forces Standing Orders contain internal regulations governing UPDF procurement. However, urgent needs arising from military operations may result in unplanned purchases by the UPDF. For example, The Parliament approved supplementary funds for different activities including Shs77 billion under State House for classified expenditure, sh64.49 billion to facilitate UPDF Operation Shujaa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), 87.5 billion for UPDF operations in Karamoja sub-region, 251.7 billion for wage shortfalls and others [1][2][3].

It is challenging to assess whether the procurement requirements are derived from the national defence and or security strategy, because in the first place, the national defence strategy is not known, and importantly the defence procurement requirements are not known to those who are not within the senior command positions [2]. The procedure for procurement in the defence sector is that the Defence procurement board lease with the Minister for approval of such [1]. Because the process involves those in the defence sector, it is difficult to analyse whether what was purchased is what is of priority or required by the defence units [2].

Section 309 (2a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, and Section 54 (1) and 54(2b) Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, gives the Auditor General the powers to scrutinise the procurement done by all public entities, including the military and other defence sectors [1]. However, the military does not easily submit procurement documents as required by the auditor General [2]. In practice, the Auditor General does not have the power to force the military to submit such documentation [2]. This therefore makes scrutiny difficult. Parliament is supposed to receive documentation on purchases done by the Ministry of Defence through the Committee on Defence, Security and Home Affairs, but the military does not comply and the Auditor General reports do not contain defence procurement reports [2].

Since the defence strategy is not known to the public, it is difficult to know if the purchases were determined by the defence strategy [1] [2]. An example of this was the delivery of military hardware from China, which was not publicly identified as a priority purchase [3].