The use of agents and intermediaries is not provided for by law [1] [2] [3]. The government has not made public pronouncements regarding this, especially in defence and security sector [3].

The use of agents and intermediaries is not regulated by the law [1] [2] [3]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There are no restrictions from the government on the use of agents and intermediaries and the government often uses agents and intermediaries in the award of public contracts [1] [2].

There are no restrictions from the government on the use of agents and intermediaries. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable. [1][2]

No special conditions are required from suppliers by the Cameroonian authorities. There are also no anti-corruption requirements for subcontracting companies involved in the public procurement process within the defence sector. Moreover, there appears to be no structure within the government that oversees the use of agents or intermediaries by companies in public procurement. Similarly, the government does not restrict companies from using agents and intermediaries.[1][2]

The Public Procurement Code does not tackle the issues of using agents and intermediaries, and in the defence sector, there is no legal document regulating that issue.[1][2] Therefore, the indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

The use of agents is not regulated, but regulations are being developed for the defence sector [1, 2, 3].

There are no real regulations on the use of agents and intermediaries, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable [1, 2, 3].

There are cases over the use of intermediaries and agents in the procurement processes, but there is no direct legislation that governs the employment of these intermediaries and agents in the procurement process (1) (2).

Since there is no publicly available legislation and policies pertaining to the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement process, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable (1).

Section 51 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA), 2015 provides for the use of procuring or asset disposal agents, but under strict conditions. Procuring entities may only appoint such agents if they demonstrate: (1) a lack of internal procurement capacity; (2) inability to establish such a function internally; or (3) inability to use the services of other public entities. Moreover, agents must be selected from a list registered and licensed by the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA), which enforces a prescribed Code of Conduct that includes anti-corruption standards [1].

While these provisions offer a structured framework for the use of procurement agents acting on behalf of public entities, several critical elements expected at score 4 are absent or not publicly documented. For instance, there is no clear requirement in law or policy that:

Anti-corruption clauses must be included in contracts with agents (though ethical conduct is required by regulation).

Companies using agents (e.g., defence contractors) must register and declare their agents or disclose remuneration.

Agents receive payments only into local accounts.

Government has the right to audit agent financial accounts.

These gaps are particularly relevant in the context of high-value or sensitive sectors like defence, where the use of third-party brokers or intermediaries by suppliers may occur. There is no evidence of a separate regulatory framework or additional safeguards specifically for intermediaries acting in private interest during defence procurement.

There is not enough information on the application of sanctions against agents in defence procurement to score this indicator. While the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA) [1] and professional codes of conduct (e.g., by the Kenya Institute of Supplies Management) provide legal instruments for sanctioning agents who contravene procurement rules, there is no public record of any agent involved in defence procurement or offset contracts facing sanctions for misconduct.

Despite consulting the PPRA debarment registry [2], procurement bulletins, professional association records, audit reports, and relevant media sources, no evidence could be identified on the regularity or frequency of sanctions applied to agents in the defence sector. This suggests that while enforcement frameworks exist in law, their practical application in sensitive areas like defence procurement remains undocumented.

Liberia’s Public Procurement and Concessions Act does not define or restrict the use of “intermediaries” (such as agents or brokers) as a distinct category, and there is no explicit policy on private military companies. However, under the PPCA framework (section 32), any third-party service provider engaged in procurement must still meet the same registration, screening, and oversight requirements as contractors.[1] These measures create indirect controls on outside engagements, even in the absence of specific intermediary provisions.
Overall, Liberia has no explicit restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries, but section 32 of the PPCA requires, to some extent, that any outside party must be a registered legal entity subject to PPCA procedures.

PPCC’s compliance reports mention some entities failed to report or misapplied procedures, but these refer to procuring entities, not private intermediaries.[1] No public cases where a supplier/agent was sanctioned for acting as an intermediary.

Article 22 of the Public Procurement Code Law stipulates that “companies may present their application, their offer or their proposal in the form of a joint group or joint group”. In this case, the use of an agent or intermediary is authorized by law [1]. The agent is thus subject to article 17 of Decree No. 2006-343 establishing the Code of Ethics for Public Procurement which specifies that “all candidates and all holders of public contracts expressly undertake to renounce any corrupt practices passive or active or influence peddling. To this end, they refrain from promising, offering or granting, directly or through an intermediary, an undue advantage of any nature whatsoever to the staff of public procurement bodies for the purposes of that he performs or refrains from performing an act in violation of his obligations, as defined by this Code” [2]. But no anti-corruption clause is included in the contracts concluded between companies and agents. The law also does not provide for a right of audit of the financial accounts of agents by government agencies [3].

In the event that an agent does not comply with his obligations regarding corruption, he is subject to Article 17 of Decree No. 2006-343 on the Code of Ethics for Public Procurement, which specifies that “all candidates and all holders of public contracts expressly undertake to renounce any practice of passive or active corruption or influence peddling. To this end, they shall refrain from promising, offering or granting, directly or through an intermediary, an undue advantage of any nature whatsoever to the staff of public procurement bodies for the purpose of them carrying out or refraining from carrying out an act in violation of their obligations, as defined by this code” [1]. However not enough evidence has been found on the application of sanctions to score this indicator.

The use of an agent or intermediary is regulated by a strict procedure. Anti-corruption clauses are in fact included in contracts with agents as part of the mandate or intermediation. The law requires total transparency on the agents, the company, the remuneration and the channels through which payments are made.[1] Anti-corruption clauses are included in both calls for tender and contracts. Provisions on the company’s compliance with legal requirements through the issuance of tax clearances, clearances from the national social welfare institute, certificates of non-bankruptcy, etc. are systematically required under penalty of being eliminated. Payments are also made to local accounts, and all these requirements are subject to control by the financial control unit, which operates independently of the finance and equipment department.[2]

There is not enough evidence to assess this indicator. No evidence has been found on the enforcement of these regulations. [1][2]

Under Mozambican law, the use of agents and intermediaries in public works contracts, procurement of goods, and service provision is either prohibited or strictly regulated [1, 2, 3, 4]. The legal framework on anti-corruption, public probity, and public contracting establishes clear policies to prevent corruption and ensure transparency.

Key regulations require that:

Anti-corruption clauses must be included in all contracts involving agents.
Companies must register agents and declare all forms of remuneration paid to them.
Agent payments must be made into local bank accounts to ensure traceability.
Government agencies have the right to audit agents’ financial accounts to detect irregularities [4].

The anti-corruption law provides for sanctions of 2 to 8 years for cases of passive corruption and fines [1, 2]; the public probity law provides for prison sentences of 1 month to 2 years and various fines [3]. A notable example is the case of the Dívidas Ocultas” [4] and the five senior officials of the Ministry of Defence accused of making transfers to companies, supposedly contracted, for public contracts and acquisition of goods for the State, without complying with the launch of the tender and without signing a contract, under the pretext of military contingency and urgency [5].. In the case of Hidden Debts, intermediaries were punished with loss of assets or values illegally added to their assets, full compensation for damages caused; expulsion from the profession, severe penalties of 10 to 12 years in prison, and fines, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of the Anti-Corruption Law [6].

Niger does not impose any restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries in the defense procurement cycle, nor has it publicly committed to doing so. A review of the 2013 decree on defense and security procurement found no provisions regulating the role of agents or intermediaries in defense contracting [1]. This lack of oversight allows third-party intermediaries to operate without transparency or accountability, increasing the risk of corruption, favoritism, and fraudulent procurement practices. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) further weakened procurement controls by removing competitive bidding requirements and exempting defense contracts from public procurement regulations. With no independent oversight mechanisms, the government has effectively created an environment where agents and intermediaries can operate unchecked, without scrutiny or restrictions [2].

Niger does not enforce sanctions when policies and laws on the use of agents and intermediaries are violated, as there are no legal provisions regulating their role in defence procurement. A review of the 2013 decree on defence and security procurement found no mechanisms for monitoring, investigating, or penalizing intermediaries involved in procurement irregularities [1]. This regulatory gap leaves room for unchecked influence and corruption, particularly in high-value defence contracts. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) has further weakened procurement integrity by removing competitive bidding requirements and eliminating independent oversight. By exempting defence-related contracts from standard procurement regulations, the decree effectively allows the use of agents and intermediaries without accountability, making sanctioning violations highly improbable [2]. Moreover, the 2020 corruption scandal involving the Ministry of Defence revealed widespread misuse of agents and intermediaries. The audit uncovered $120 million (71.8 billion CFA francs) in fraudulent contracts linked to fake tenders, inflated prices, and non-delivery of military equipment. Some contracts were awarded through opaque deals with shell companies registered in tax heavens, intermediaries with no proven defence experience, and corrupt procurement officials. Instead of facing legal consequences, many of the individuals involved—including senior military officers and high-ranking officials—were promoted to government positions, reinforcing a culture of impunity [3]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Nigeria has historically relied on intermediaries in defence procurement, with several high-profile cases highlighting the associated risks of corruption and mismanagement. One such case is the 2014 arms procurement deal involving Dolarian Capital Inc., where funds became entangled in legal disputes due to the absence of proper oversight and irregular contracting procedures. [1] These incidents prompted a shift in an executive directives concerning third-party involvement in arms purchases.
In response, former President Muhammadu Buhari issued a presidential directive in 2015, banning the use of commission agents or intermediaries in military procurement. This ban was re-emphasised in 2019, when Buhari ordered that all arms acquisitions must proceed through government-to-government (G2G) arrangements, directly managed by the Federal Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Police Affairs. [2][3]

However, these political actions do not constitute binding legislation, nor are they embedded in Nigeria’s Public Procurement Act (2007) or in any formal defence procurement regulation. The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) and the Defence Procurement Division do not appear to have developed implementing regulations or compliance mechanisms to institutionalise these third-party actors. Investigations by journalists and civil society suggest that third-party brokers and politically connected agents have continued to play unofficial roles in recent defence acquisitions, despite the ban. [2][3]
Nigeria lacks a formal legal or regulatory framework specifically governing or prohibiting the use of intermediaries in defence procurement.

There is no evidence that sanctions have been applied for violations of the directive banning intermediaries in defence procurement [2]. For example, when the NSA was found to have pursued a $2.51 billion arms deal via commission agents, President Buhari revoked the approval but did not impose disciplinary or legal sanctions [1].

Since there is no formal legislation or procurement policy, nor is there an institutional framework to enforce it, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Article 11 of the Public Procurement Code provides that the “tender shall also contain the discounts proposed by the candidate and an undertaking not to grant or promise to grant to any person involved in any capacity whatsoever in the contract award procedure any undue advantage, pecuniary or otherwise, directly or through intermediaries, with a view to obtaining the contract; and in general to comply with the provisions of the Charter of Transparency and Ethics in Public Procurement adopted by Decree no. 2005-576 of 22 June 2005 [1] “. The Government imposes no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle.

Senegal has no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries so this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable. [1]

There are no controls over the issue of intermediaries and agents and there are numerous examples of agents supporting the bidding process [1] and often acting as intermediaries for soliciting bribes [2]. Since the Strategic Defence Package, South Africa has seemingly not engaged in trade offsets in the defence sector.

South Africa has not restricted the use of intermediaries and no relevant provisions for restricting the use of agents are found in the Public Finance Management Act which governs public procurement currently [1]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 [1], and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011 [2], which regulate procurement by various government agencies, do not specifically mention the use of intermediaries or agents in the procurement cycle. This omission creates a loophole that could be exploited by middlemen. Additionally, a key informant was unable to provide any information on government controls over the use of agents and intermediaries in defence procurement [3].

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 [1], and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011 [2], which regulate government procurement activities, do not specifically address the use of intermediaries or agents in the procurement cycle. Without clear policies governing the use of agents and intermediaries, it becomes challenging to enforce relevant measures. Additionally, a key informant was unable to provide any information on government enforcement related to the involvement of agents and intermediaries in defence procurement [3].
Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There is no policy regulating the use of agents. However, the use of intermediaries cannot be ruled out in procurement processes. Several proxy companies provide services to the Uganda government [1] [2].

The government does not have a policy regulating the use of agents [1][2]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There are no regulations restricting the use of agents and or intermediaries, in the country’s procurement cycle [1]. The country’s statute Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act does not in any way forbid this practice of using agents and or intermediaries [2].

There is a lack of regulation [1] as the use of intermediaries is not specified in the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [2]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.