This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The government formulates its own military equipment procurement requirements based on the country’s strategic needs. It should be noted that Benin is not an arms manufacturer. As a result, the country faced with attempts by exporting countries to influence it. Benin and France have enjoyed a strong military cooperation, strenghtened in recent years by the fight against regional security threats like terrorism and France assising with the strenghtening of the Benin’s armed forces. This also helps France in its regional strategic strategy [1] On July 27, 2022, during an official visit to Cotonou by French President Emmanuel Macron, the President of the Republic of Benin denounced France’s refusal to deliver drones to Benin and the member countries of the Accra Initiative, even though they have the money to pay for them [2]. Although the President did not give more details, observers see this as an attempt by France to influence Benin’s strategic decisions [3] [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The government is not in the habit of publicly discussing and justifying its choices of military equipment, let alone the suppliers from whom it obtains its supplies. This information is classified and not publicly debated. [2][3] However, the President of the Republic has cited the fight against terrorism to justify Benin’s need for military equipment in recent years to justify equipment ordered to France or Turkey [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There is no evidence that acquisitions are granted as a result of domestic political pressures [1]. Military equipment acquisition is a secret subject for the government and this is not publicly discussed [1][2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Burundi’s main arms suppliers are Russia and China and these two countries have long exercised political influence over Burundi. The support they give Burundi in bodies such as the UN, on issues of violation of democratic principles and human rights, obliges Burundi to be indebted to them in one way or another. [1] [2][3] As a result, Burundi cannot enter into major contracts with other countries that do not help it politically, such as Western countries (Belgium, USA, etc.), which are more demanding of Burundi on issues of political and economic governance. [1][2][3] Military acquisitions seem to fall within a broader framework of national and geopolitical interests.This trend has been reinforced by the crisis of 2015, which saw Burundi distance itself from Western countries.[3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The Burundi government sometimes cites the need to strenghthen its military capacity as the reason behind its procurement decisions. For instance in 2019, Burundi expressed an interest in purchasing a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system from Russia to strengthen its air defence and acquire new equipment and materials. [1] However, reasons out of the military capacity building have been voiced. Indeed,the fight against imperalism has also been expressed as reasons behing the military cooperation with Russia. [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
It is clear that members of the political and military elite are under the influence of states such as China and Russia, who direct the army’s preferences towards these two countries when it comes to signing arms contracts. On the other hand, on an internal level, civil society organizations or even ordinary citizens exert no pressure on the army regarding its preferences when it comes to signing arms contracts. This is a reserved area to which the public pays less attention and there is no opportunity for dialogue from civil society [1] [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Cameroon is not a major arms buyer. Its limited purchasing capabilities (around half a billion dollars per year) prevent the country from sitting at the same table as major buyers in Africa, such as Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Morrocco, and Algeria.[1] Cameroon’s arms import policy is partly influenced by foreign governments. For instance, during periods strained relationships with France or the US, the country tends to buy fewer weapons from those countries and more from others, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Serbia. Conversely, high-profile visits by Western presidents, especially France, are sometimes followed by arms purchases from those countries. Historical ties have also allowed French arms suppliers to secure privileged access to Cameroon’s defence contracts, often sidelining merit-based, competitive procurement. However, it is important to note that the country has the capacity to resist foreign political pressure to some extent. Since independence, Cameroon has consistently avoided relying on a single country for its arms supply. This approach became more pronounced after the failed coup in April 1984. Currently, Cameroon’s main arms suppliers include Israel, France, China, Russia, the USA and Turkey.[2][3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Cameroon’s military expenditure has been increasing steadily over the past two decades. Cameroon lacks capacity to produce weapons or ammunitions, so it imports all its weaponry. The government has managed to justify to parliament, and sometimes to the media, the need for and the rationale behind increases in the defence budget. Typically, it cites the fight against Boko Haram in the Far North, the conflict in the Anglophone regions, piracy in the Bakassi Peninsula, and similar issues. However, the government has never provided a justification for specific weapon purchases, nor explained the choice of particular countries or companies.[1][2]
For example, a. few years ago, Cameroon purchased CESSNA C208B aircraft and Scan Eagle drones from the USA.[3] No explanation has been given for the necessity these purchases or for selecting a USA company, especially when several other countries produce drones. Sometimes, indirect justifications appear in the official magazines of the Ministry of Defence. An army officer from the communication division may interview the Minister of Defence or General, and through that interview, the public can learn about the acquisition of certain equipment by Cameroonian army and understand its usefulness.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In Cameroon, opposition parties and civil socieity rarely exert influence to pressure the government on issues related to weapons purchases. However, domestic pressure may originate from within the government apparatus and the Ministry of Defence. In fact, important generals or influential individuals close to President Biya have their own networks and preferences. When the country is about to purchase new equipment, they attempt to ensure the market favours either the country or foreign companies they are connected to, or even organisations within those foreign company.[1][2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Historically, France has been Côte d’Ivoire’s leading strategic military partner. However, its influence is gradually waning. The priority given to French acquisitions in the agreements of the 1960s no longer exists in the new agreements. Furthermore, the diversification of Côte d’Ivoire’s military acquisitions signals the end of France’s virtual monopoly. While geopolitical developments must be taken into account, it is Côte d’Ivoire’s interests that take precedence. The country competes on the basis of its resources, the effectiveness of the equipment and, of course, as with any arms purchase, its relations with the seller.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The Ivorian government often justifies its military acquisitions by citing the modernisation of the armed forces or the need to increase its capacity to fight terrorists [1, 2]. Closer ties with Turkey have also been presented as a means of countering security threats [3]. Nor should we overlook the value for money that leads Ivorians to purchase equipment from China, Turkey and Eastern European countries and to explore opportunities in South Africa.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There is not enough information to provide more details on this indicator. [1][2][3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There is tremendous political influence in the sales of defence equipment to Ghana, as these equipment are usually capital intensive, requiring huge sums to purchase, and selling nations usually use that to their political advantage to increase their chances of achieving their foreign policy objectives (1). This includes donations, loan agreements, and other medium acquisitions, as exemplified by the US-commissioned donation of ships to the Ghana Navy on September 9, 2023 (2) (3).

The government has frequently justified significant military hardware purchases, citing the need to enhance the military’s ability to address evolving threats in the subregion and revitalize specific military capabilities. This is particularly important given the prevalence of terrorism in the Sahel region and its potential to spread to the littoral states of West Africa (1) (2).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There are no cases where political pressure from particularly Parliament has resulted in no acquisition made despite the submission of a proposal for such purchases from the defence architecture (1) (2).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Kenya’s military acquisitions are driven by its modernisation efforts, strategic and mutual security interests, and foreign policy objectives. The modernisation agenda driven by the MOD began in 2004. This initiative has shaped Kenya’s international engagements–with its quest to modernise while creating credible deterrence, addressing emerging security threats and safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Kenya [1].

Over the years, Kenya has diversified its defence partnerships by acquiring equipment from a wide range of nations, including Turkey, Israel, the United States, India, China, South Korea, Spain, and South Africa. These relationships are often underpinned by strategic cooperation, donations, or soft loans. For example, Kenya secured a €20 million grant from the European Union’s Peace Facility in July 2024 to strengthen its army, navy, and air force in response to al-Shabaab threats [3]. The country is also becoming a key U.S. strategic partner in East Africa, having signed a five-year bilateral defence cooperation agreement in September 2023 [5], and was designated a “Major Non-NATO Ally” by the U.S. in June 2024 [4].

Although Kenya’s relationships with selling nations are strong and deepening, there is limited evidence to suggest that these countries exert undue political influence over Kenya’s procurement choices. The state retains discretion over its acquisitions, which align with national security priorities and regional peacekeeping objectives. However, strategic alliances and access to grants or donations, such as helicopter donations from South Korea [2] or Israeli loan financing [1], may shape or steer procurement decisions in practice.

Thus, while political relationships clearly facilitate procurement [6, 7, 8], there is no clear indication that they override Kenya’s internal procurement rationale or lead to coerced purchases. The available evidence does not suggest that procurement decisions are politically dictated by donor states. No significant scandals or exposures have revealed undue foreign influence in procurement decisions

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Defence purchases in Kenya are primarily guided by the country’s national security objectives, particularly the need to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity [1]. Kenya has faced security challenges in the past including terrorist attacks by groups like Al-Shabaab, which has significantly shaped its approach to defence acquisitions. These experiences have underscored the importance of maintaining a well-equipped and prepared military force to respond effectively to both conventional and asymmetric threats.
Procurement decisions are influenced by various factors. The evolving nature of security threats, such as terrorism and regional instability, plays a crucial role in shaping Kenya’s defence strategy. Additionally, there is a constant need to modernise and enhance the capabilities of the Kenya Defence Forces to keep pace with emerging challenges. Strategic partnerships and international defence cooperation agreements also factor into procurement choices, allowing Kenya to leverage global expertise and resources. Finally, budgetary considerations and economic factors are carefully weighed to ensure that defence spending aligns with the country’s overall fiscal priorities and capabilities.
Purchases are informed by User Service Specification Requirements. In 2021, Turkish company Katmerciler secured a deal worth approximately Sh7.7 billion ($69 million) to supply 118 Hizir armoured vehicles between 2022 and 2023 [2]. The acquisition was approved by the procurement board following a meeting at the Department of Defence that reportedly sanctioned the single-source procurement of the HIZIR Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), after they met the User Specifications Requirements (USR) set by the Kenya Army [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Kenya maintains a policy of confidentiality regarding its military acquisitions, with parliamentary oversight being the primary means of scrutiny for security-related expenditures⁠. Given this secrecy, it is difficult to know whether purchases are influenced by domestic pressures except in situations where there are leaks or parliamentary scrutiny [1, 2, 3]. When this information is disclosed, justifications such as modernisation and securing the country through maintaining well equipped military to counter war on terror are advanced.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Since the end of the civil war, almost all defence acquisitions have been externally financed, with the United States playing a dominant role in rebuilding the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The U.S. has provided training, vehicles, communications systems, uniforms, and other hardware through security assistance programs, rather than Liberia procuring these independently through competitive processes.[1][2]
The US government sponsored huge purchases of military hardware for the Armed Forces of Liberia. It is still unclear how much of the direct funding from the US goes towards the Armed Forces budget. This means that Liberia’s acquisitions have largely been shaped by donor priorities and U.S. strategic considerations. Much of this procurement, involving training and the acquisition of military hardware, has occurred on US terms, without competitive bidding.[3][4] While this does not necessarily indicate undue coercion, it does mean that external political influence, specifically from the U.S. has been a decisive factor in Liberia’s post-conflict defence acquisitions.

The government’s justification for military aid from the US in terms of restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and strengthening Liberia’s postwar military away from the prewar orientation of the military that led to Liberia’s destructive civil wars.[1][2]
More recently, the AFL has received U.S.-funded vehicles, logistics trucks, communications equipment, and engineering tools, as well as medical facilities such as the Tuberculosis clinic opened in 2024 with U.S. support.[3] These priorities are implemented under formal U.S. programs such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and AFRICOM initiatives.[4]
On the Liberian side, the government has justified acquisitions in broad, strategic terms, not in detailed procurement plans. It frames U.S. assistance as necessary to rebuild a professional, apolitical military after the war. Reports that the Government of Liberia cited maritime safety, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping capacity as the drivers of cooperation with the U.S.[5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Liberians are keen on maintaining the old historic relations with the United States of America. Subsequent political regimes have aligned with domestic pressure to maintain the special, strategic relationship with the US, which provides military aid to the Armed Forces of Liberia. Following the end of the civil war and the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the country’s defence procurement system has been characterised by limited local capacity and strong donor influence. These factors constrain the extent to which domestic political pressure can drive major acquisition decisions.[1][2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In Madagascar, certain countries have a certain influence on the country’s provisioning of military equipment. First, France, as a former colonizing country, has great influence. Some of the Malagasy officers were trained in France [1]. So the military is used to using weapons manufactured there and it is the same for Russia [2]. In recent years, China has also become a supplier of military equipment following the existence of cooperation agreements [3]. This is the consequence of the “all-out” diplomacy developed in the 1980s and which allows the country to have close relations with geopolitically opposed countries. Moreover, Madagascar has passed into the orbit of the “Eastern Bloc” after having been in that of the “Western Bloc” in the decades 1960-1970.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
When justifying procurement from Russia, the Malagasy authorities stated that since all the weapons we have, artillery, small arms, armored vehicles, date from the 1980s from Russia there is a need for spare parts. [1] Other justification such as cooperation in terrorism control, anti-piracy, and law enforcement have been put forward to justify the signatre of a five-year military cooperation agreement with Russia in 25 March 2022 [2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Certain high-ranking military officers exercise influence over countries supplying military equipment. This depends, in particular, on the countries in which these military officials received their training. Those who completed their war training in China, for example, do not fail to influence the acquisition policy of the Ministry of Defense from Chinese suppliers [1][2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Since 2021, all acquisitions have been made influenced by the political interests of countries such as Russia, China and Turkey with which orders are made. Arms purchases from foreign companies are largely dependent on political relations and alliance strategies with these counties.[1][2][3][4]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The Government is in fact invoking clear and justifiable military needs, in particular considerations of the fight against terrorism and organised banditry. The choice is now being made for acquisitions from partners such as Russia and Turkey to meet this need.[1][2] The government claims that it is easier to work with these new suppliers because they respect the country’s desire to acquire military equipment to carry out operations on the territory. It accuses countries such as France and the United States of having blocked the government’s desire to acquire weapons in the past.[3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Part of the military and political elite in power since 2020 is exerting pressure through various channels to strengthen partnerships and acquisitions with Russia, Turkey, China, etc.[1] This pressure is justified by the fact that these countries, unlike former allies, understand the need for the country to make acquisitions in order to effectively combat terrorism and cross-border banditry. This turnaround follows vetoes placed on the European Union and the United States’ desire to acquire certain types of weapons.[2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The defence acquisition decisions are based on military programming [1] and specific needs to address internal threats, participate in peacekeeping missions, and provide humanitarian assistance [2]. These decisions are guided by the vectors of the Foreign Defence and Security Policy [3] and the International Cooperation Policy [4] that favour the traditional partners of the Mozambican State. Traditional allies supported Mozambique during the National Liberation Struggle, during the civil war and in the process of professionalising the creation of the non-partisan Mozambican Armed Defence Forces. These allies also stood with Mozambique after the General Peace Agreement, through the provision of weapons, training and other defence products, within the scope of technical-military cooperation agreements [5]. Since 1975, Mozambique has had technical-military cooperation agreements with China, Russia, Romania, Brazil, Portugal and more recently with Rwanda, within the scope of the fight against terrorism in Cabo Delgado [6].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In general, the government justifies military needs based on military programming [1]. This programme operationalises the defence component of the Government’s Five-Year Plan [2], and the materialisation of the Strategic Concept of National Defence [3], which deals with internal, regional and global military threats, and the need to participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations [4]. The political influence of nations that sell defence and security products to Mozambique has been guided by traditional and privileged ties and relationships established since the period of the National Liberation Struggle, as is the case with China, Russia or Romania [5], and issues of multilateral cooperation, as is the case with the CPLP and the African Union, for military technical cooperation with Portugal and Ethiopia, which supplies helicopters to the Air Force [6].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
According to the regulations governing the acquisition of defence and security products, acquisitions are made in accordance with the military programming established by the Government’s Five-Year Plan. This programming defines the limits, quantity and quality of equipment for the Defence and Security Forces, responsibility and accountability in their acquisition, organisation of reception and storage in the best conditions of safety and conservation, rational operation and maintenance taking into account the specific level of demand for each piece of equipment, organisation of infrastructures, suitability to the technological level and the issue of acquisition costs, taking into account peacetime or wartime [1, 2].
All these aspects are considered by the government. However, specific aspects are not in the public domain because they aim to ensure the fulfilment of the mission of the Armed Forces, defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity, aspects protected by the legislation on military secrecy and State secrecy [3, 4].
Thus, in Mozambique, there are no cases yet in the public domain where a procurement of defence services and products was blocked as a result of internal political pressures [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Due to the confidentiality of Niger’s defence acquisition process, assessing the extent of political influence by selling nations remains challenging. However, since the military took power on July 26, 2023, defence acquisitions have increasingly reflected geopolitical alignments rather than purely strategic military needs. Following the coup, Niger significantly shifted its defence procurement strategy away from traditional Western partners and toward non-Western suppliers. The most prominent defense suppliers now include Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, and Egypt, each playing a distinct role in Niger’s military acquisitions. For instance, data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that in 2023, Egypt supplied Niger with 30 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles and 12 122mm M-30 howitzers [1]. This transaction reflects the growing defence ties between Niger and Egypt, a relationship that has strengthened in parallel with Niger’s broader shift toward non-Western military partnerships. Additionally, in April 2024, Russia delivered military equipment to Niger, further illustrating how Niger’s defense acquisitions have become part of political influence and strategic realignments [2]. And in October 2024, Niger has finalised an agreement worth approximately 80 million euros (about $87.56 million) to acquire five Karayel-SU Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), military drones [3].The country’s post-coup shift in defence procurement aligns with broader geopolitical considerations, highlighting the role of political influence in its defence acquisition decisions.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Niger’s government officially justifies its defence acquisitions on the basis of counterterrorism needs, given the country’s persistent security challenges from extremist groups [1][2]. However, there is no detailed public explanation regarding the rationale behind the selection of specific suppliers, leaving room for speculation about the role of political influence in procurement decisions. Following the July 26, 2023 coup, Niger has increasingly shifted away from Western defence partners and toward non-Western suppliers, including Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, and Egypt. While these acquisitions are framed as necessary for enhancing counterterrorism capabilities, there is no transparent assessment of why particular vendors are chosen over others. While there is some alignment between defence purchases and national security needs, the lack of transparency surrounding supplier selection raises concerns about potential political influence in procurement decisions

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In the current post-coup context, defence acquisitions in Niger are primarily driven by the military leadership rather than by pressure from civilian political elites, parliamentarians, or opposition figures. With the dissolution of the National Assembly and the suspension of constitutional governance following the July 26, 2023 coup, there are no parliamentary mechanisms to scrutinize procurement decisions or exert pressure on military purchases [1]. The decision-making process is now centralized within the ruling military authorities, significantly reducing the role of domestic political actors in influencing defence acquisitions. Since taking power, the military-led Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP) has reoriented Niger’s defence procurement strategy toward non-Western suppliers, including Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, and Egypt [2][3]. The justification provided for these acquisitions has been the need to strengthen national security and counterterrorism efforts. However, these decisions appear to be self-determined by the military junta, without significant external debate or domestic political contestation. Given the absence of a functioning civilian government and institutional checks on procurement, there is little evidence of domestic political elites exerting pressure on procurement choices. Instead, military authorities dictate defense acquisitions based on their priorities, with limited transparency or accountability.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Western sanctions on Russia and Belarus, Chinese arms suppliers are actively working to displace the West and strengthen their foothold in Nigeria. Since 2020, Nigeria has procured a wide variety of combat systems from China which includes 105 mm Fire Support Vehicle, VT-4 Main Battle Tank, SH-5 105mm self-propelled Artillery System, and SH-2 122mm self-propelled artillery systems. Others include VT4 main battle tanks, ST1 120 mm tanks destroyers, SH2, SH4 self-propelled artillery, and KIA tactical vehicles [1]. China is also Nigeria’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade growing from $19.27 billion in 2019 to $22.6 billion in 2023 [2]. China has invested heavily in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry and aims to increase daily oil production. China’s defence supplies to Nigeria have increased in recent years, and its s push into Nigeria’s defence sector also aligns with its broader ambitions to secure energy interests and expand its influence in Africa.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Nigeria in recent times has witnessed an unprecedented level of insecurity such as terrorism, insurgency, separatist agitation, banditry, kidnapping, Herders-Farmers clashes, and oil theft. In response to these insecurity threats, about 80% of the country’s military personnel are currently deployed in internal security operations (ISO) in all 36 states of the federation [1]. Between 2015 and June 2020, for example, the military launched over 40 different operations and exercises to contain various security challenges across the country [2]. Nigeria has seen a dramatic increase in its defence spending in recent years. According to a review of budget documents of Ministry of Defence, in the last five years, Nigeria’s defence budget has risen by 134.80 per cent, from N589.955 billion in 2019 to N2.98 trillion last year [3]. The government therefore justifies growing defence acquisitions based on the need of military operations to provided security. Despite Nigeria’s huge allocation to defence, the nation is still ravaged by insecurity thereby raising the question of accountability and performance vis-a-vis the Nigeria’s cumulative spending on defence in recent years.

Amidst escalating insecurity, President Bola Tinubu has repeatedly pledged to use his constitutional powers to continue to equip, arm and empower the Nigerian military. On August 23, 2024, President Tinubu reiterated that he “will continue to do everything within my constitutional powers to ensure that the Nigerian military is well-resourced and fit for purpose” [1]. Sustained or enhanced budgetary allocation is meant to better equip the military and other security agencies towards effective delivery of their constitutional responsibility of defence and security provisioning. Despite the dramatic increase in defence and security allocation in recent years, Nigerians are daily confronted with pervasive insecurity. Given the opaque nature of allocations and spending of defence and security budgets, Nigerians question the existence of sound financial management that is key to efficient and effective armed forces capable of responding to the citizens’ legitimate security needs [2] [3]. It is feared that that continued huge budgetary allocations to the defence might in fact be incentivizing insecurity in the country [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
France has historically exerted significant political influence over Senegal’s military sales. France had some potential for exporting military equipment, but this is limited by Senegal’s budgetary capacities and competition from countries such as Brazil, South Africa and the United States. . However, this trend has changed in recent years, particularly following the regime change in 2024. Since then, Senegal’s military sales have become more politically independent as the military diversifies its operations and partnerships with other countries, including the United States. [3] [4] Military cooperation is still limited, but is nevertheless progressing [1] . French Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu ended his February 2024 African tour in Dakar, where he met his Senegalese counterpart and President Macky Sall. Discussions focused on the purchase of military equipment. In this area, the Senegalese are keen to buy equipment from the French: ammunition, radar, optronic equipment, etc. They told the French Minister of the Armed Forces that they sometimes feel shunned by the French arms industry, which prefers larger customers in the Middle East and Asia [2] . Despite accusations of closeness between the Senegalese president and his French counterpart, no evidence of any influence has been found.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In West African countries such as Senegal, their fleets are limited to a few transport aircraft and a handful of helicopters. The Senegalese Air Force wanted to strengthen its fleet to better face security threats, and placed a $147 million order for four F/A-50s. The Senegalese Air Force is already a KAI customer, since it has four KT-1 Woongbi training aircraft, which are also capable of ground support missions. [1] Senegal is strengthening its military posture with the delivery of a large batch of tactical vehicles by the Direction du service du Matériel. This initiative aims to improve the land mobility of army units, a crucial aspect for their effectiveness in the field. According to General Diop, Minister of the Armed Forces, the acquisition of these vehicles is aimed at strengthening operational capacity in a context of rapidly evolving security threats in the sub-region. It also aims to modernise and professionalise the armed forces, which are an integral part of the national defence strategy. [2] [3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
No pressure from parliament or the political opposition was behind the decision to buy weapons. [1] People are asking the authorities to take measures to ensure greater security for their citizens, but not to the extent of putting pressure on them to buy weapons. On the contrary, the opposition is critical of the acquisition of certain weapons, especially for maintaining law and order. They see it as a way of suppressing political demonstrations by the police or the gendarmerie. [2]

There is documented evidence of political influence shaping the acquisitions process related to the Strategic Defence Package with political figures in selling nations involved in advocating on behalf of weapons manufacturers [1].
For instance:
1. The UK’s BAE Systems and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp were awarded major contracts amid strong lobbying by their governments [1].
2. Reports from the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and the Joint Investigation Report revealed that the arms deal involved a government-to-government arrangement wherein diplomatic influence, economic offsets, and political considerations overrode technical assessments [2]

While these events date back to the late 1990s and early 2000s, they represent the most significant example of foreign political influence in South African defence procurement. No similar large-scale acquisition process since then has demonstrated comparable levels of foreign political involvement [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Major purchases such as the Strategic Defence Package have supposedly been justified on the basis of military need derived from the Defence Review and force requirements [1]. These justifications have, however, been called into question based on the actual use of the equipment required, and the fact that the winning bidders in several cases did not receive the highest scores for military capability and bids were instead won based on promised offset agreements [2].

The identification of acquisition requirements is not necessarily driven by domestic pressures, but there is evidence that acquisition and procurement processes have been politically influenced to determine winning bidders. The choice of winning bidders related to the Strategic Defence Package was seemingly heavily influenced by political decisions [1]. The Zondo Commission (State Capture Commission) confirmed that politically exposed persons used influence to manipulate procurement outcomes across various sectors, including security and defence, often to direct contracts toward favoured contractors or facilitate access to offset deals.[2] [3].
There is evidence of political manipulation in determining winners, but limited evidence that political pressure alone drives the decision to initiate acquisitions [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
South Sudan continues to source defence acquisitions from a variety of countries despite being under a UN arms embargo since 2018. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, South Sudan’s known suppliers include China, UAE, Ukraine [1], and regional partners such as Uganda [2]. However, there is no publicly available information regarding the contractual process, procurement procedures, or terms of engagement with these countries, indicating a deep lack of transparency in defence acquisitions.

The absence of transparency, however, does not equate to an absence of foreign influence. Contextual evidence suggests that procurement decisions are likely influenced by the geopolitical affiliations of arms-supplying nations. A March 2024 report by Sudan Tribune noted that the South Sudanese government awarded a $15 million arms procurement contract to a foreign company while still under an arms embargo, without public tendering or oversight mechanisms. This underscores how foreign actors with strong links to Juba are able to bypass international [3]. restrictions and directly engage with South Sudanese defence institutions through opaque deals.
Moreover, The East African reported that South Sudan ranked highest in military spending across East Africa in 2023, despite the arms embargo. This high level of spending, without corresponding transparency or parliamentary oversight, raises concerns that supplier countries may be leveraging arms deals to secure political or strategic influence in Juba [4].
Thus, while official documentation of influence is absent, the alignment of procurement practices with supportive foreign governments, coupled with the lack of competitive or transparent processes, points to a high risk of political influence from selling nations in South Sudan’s defence acquisitions.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Despite the lack of transparency in defence and security acquisitions, the government of South Sudan has made a compelling case for the need to acquire weapons. In light of the UN-imposed sanctions, defence procurement has been particularly challenging for the world’s youngest nation [1]. During the vote to extend arms sanctions on South Sudan in May 2024, Cecilia Adeng, South Sudan’s U.N. ambassador, argued that the Security Council’s sanctions would “impede our progress,” emphasizing that “eliminating the arms embargo will enable us to build robust security institutions necessary for maintaining peace and protecting our citizens” [1]. Given the fragile security situation in the country, the government’s justification for defence acquisitions is understandably rooted in the need to stabilize and protect the nation.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There is increasing domestic pressure to lift the arms embargo on South Sudan to facilitate the acquisition of weapons for the unification of forces under the R-ARCSS. However, the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee has tied the lifting of the embargo to the implementation of Chapter 2 of the R-ARCSS, which pertains to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements [1]. While domestic political actors and other stakeholders may advocate for the removal of restrictions, the extent to which domestic pressure directly influences government defence acquisitions remains unclear. A thorough review of local, regional, and international media does not reveal specific allegations of direct domestic influence in this regard [2].

While there’s no documented case of a defence procurement directly bypassing oversight due to political pressure, the broader context strongly suggests risk. Reports show that defence acquisitions in Uganda have been shaped by political considerations and supplier ties, especially with China, whose expanding military diplomacy includes technology cooperation and joint production facilities [1] Scholars note that arms exports often serve as instruments of foreign policy, and Uganda’s purchasing patterns have reflected strategic alignment with supplier countries, including China and the U.S [2][3][4].
Taken together, this creates political corruption risks in defence procurement, even if concrete cases of improper influence haven’t been verified in the public records.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
The Ugandan government does not publicly disclose or justify its decisions regarding arms procurement from specific countries. However, in East Africa, Uganda was ranked Russia’s biggest market in 2022, importing weapons worth $48 million out of a total import bill of $55 million. Its other sources were Czechia ($4 million), Israel ($2 million), China ($1 million) and South Africa ($1 million)[1][2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There is no documented evidence of defence acquisitions in Uganda being explicitly granted due to domestic political pressure. While high-level political dynamics, such as President Museveni’s succession planning and his son’s military ascendancy, indicate systemic politicization of defence institutions [1][2], these factors have not been shown to shape procurement decisions in a documented, direct manner.
As background, however, Uganda’s purchase of four Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets in 2011 illustrates how domestic political considerations influenced procurement. At the time, the acquisition was linked to protecting newly discovered oil reserves, despite concerns about the country’s ability to maintain the aircraft. While this example falls outside the current period of observation, it underscores a legacy of politicization in procurement, even though no such cases are documented in 2020–2025.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Zimbabwe’s arms deal is determined by the historical political relations with countries such as China and Russia. A brief background to Zimbabwe-China relations and Russia is premised from the late mid to late 1960’s when the country sends guerilla fighters to be trained in China and Russia for the liberation of Zimbabwe [2]. China and Russia continued offering support in terms of weapons and further training [1]. This relationship has continued to today as evidenced with the continued arms deal. Zimbabwe arms deal with China and Russia is also due to an arms embargo which was placed on Zimbabwe by the EU in February 2002 [3]. The arms embargo is still in force up to February 2025, and there is potential for the embargo to be extended again, as it has been regularly extended for the past 22 years [3].The European Union imposed a number of sanctions on Zimbabwe in response to a Council assessment that the Government of Zimbabwe was engaged in serious violations of human rights, as well as violations of the freedom of opinion, freedom of association and freedom of peaceful assembly [3].The sanctions included an arms embargo as well as travel and financial sanctions [3]. The arms embargo was part of Council Common Position of 18 February 2002 concerning restrictive measures on Zimbabwe, (2002/145/CFSP) [3]. In February 2004, the arms embargo was renewed by Common Position 2004/161/CFSP. Council Regulation (EC) No 314/2004 of 19 February 2004 modified the existing embargo [3]. Therefore, it is prohibited to “grant, sell, supply or transfer technical assistance related to military equipment” [3].

The Zimbabwean government does not publicly provide clear and justifiable military rationales for defence acquisitions or for choosing particular suppliers, particularly in its relationships with countries like China and Russia [1]. Defence procurement decisions are often shrouded in secrecy, and no formal strategic documentation is released to justify specific purchases based on operational requirements, threat assessments, or cost-effectiveness [2].
While Zimbabwe has signed military cooperation agreements and deepened defence ties with China and Russia—such as receiving equipment and training—these engagements are rarely accompanied by public explanations from the Ministry of Defence or the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) about the military necessity or selection criteria behind these procurements. [1]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
There is evidence that domestic political dynamics could influence defence acquisition decisions. The close relationship between the ruling party and the military has at times shaped procurement and seen the opposition political party and protests as potential enemies of the state [2]. This has a bearing in the ruling party purchasing equipment used in internal security operations [1]. Public statements by public officials may have a bearing in terms of the defence acquisition meant to protect the party to potentially stay in power. While detailed procurement data is not publicly available, the alignment between political interests and acquisition decisions suggests a level of domestic political influence on procurement choices [3].