Article 98 of the Beninese Constitution classifies in the field of law, “the rules relating to constraints imposed in the interest of national defence and public security” [1]. The same article specifies that “the law determines the fundamental principles of the organization of national defence”. Article 101 of the same Constitution provides that “the declaration of war shall be authorized by the National Assembly”. The same article submits to parliament for approval the declaration of a state of siege or a state of emergency” [2]. These provisions indicate that the National Assembly has the constitutional power to approve or veto security laws. In its legislative action, parliament can also modify defence policy if it deems it useful.
In terms of the budget, Article 99 of the Constitution empowers parliament to determine the revenue and expenditure of the State [3]. Thus, the MPs vote each year on the general budget of the State. During the budget session, they receive all the ministers, including those of national defence and public security, to examine their budgets [4]. In its role of supervising government action, the National Assembly receives from the competent authorities, as stipulated in Article 119.1 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly [5], documents and information intended to enable the exercise of control of the general State budget and autonomous budgets or the audit of the accounts of public enterprises.

In accordance with its constitutional prerogative, the Beninese parliament examines and adopts security laws. In recent years, it has passed a few laws to accompany the government’s defence policy. Thus, it approved a law creating a national guard within the Beninese armed forces in 2020 [1]. It also approved a law authorizing the compulsory retirement of a category of defence and security forces [2]. This law passed in 2020 enabled the government, in 2024, to force “1074 agents of the Defence and Security Forces including 700 soldiers, 315 police officers, 30 customs officers and 29 foresters” to retire [3] without providing convincing explanations. This means that the parliament effectively validates the state’s defence and security policy.
Also, in its role of reviewing and approving sectoral budgets, it examines the forecasts for the purchase of equipment for the benefit of the defence and security forces and approves the budget. However, some equipment is not covered by the national budget, but acquired through international cooperation. For example, in April 2024, the United States gave the Beninese army military equipment worth one billion eight hundred thousand CFA francs [4]. The National Assembly often does not control how the equipment obtained in this type of cooperation is obtained, even less so if there are conditionalities linked to this type of donation. The government is also not accountable to the National Assembly.
The Parliament can summon ministers or defense officials for hearings or current affairs issues, as part of the scrutiny proess. Parliamentarians have the power to demand accountability for policies and decisions in matters of defense and security. Among the mechanisms, we must also add the Ratification of international military agreements by the National Assembly [5]. This allows legislative control of Benin’s international commitments in this area. It must, however, be emphasized that control is not systematic and is not exercised on all military cooperation agreements.
Generally, it has not happened in the last five years, once the National Assembly has examined and vetoed a purchase of military equipment [6].

As a rule, the executive power and the military do not exert undue pressure on parliament to vote in their favor. The army is republican and placed under the direct authority of the President of the Republic, who is its supreme commander [1]. And the constitution guarantees the separation of legislative and executive powers.
However, the decisions of the National Assembly do not regularlways reflect the lack of freedom from the will of the government. Debates on defence and security policy are also almost non-existent in the National Assembly [2]. As proof, while we observe the rise of the terrorist threat in the north of the country, the Beninese parliament has almost never conducted an in-depth debate on defence and security policy. It seems to let the government decide and is content to validate the government’s choices when there is a need to pass a law [3]. From 2019 to 2023, Benin’s parliament was composed of 100% Members of parliament (MPs) from the two incumbent (presidential) parties [4]. This contributed to a reduction in the influence of parliament on defence and security policies, as the National Assembly had become a place fofr the regular approval of the government’s will.

The Constitution of the Republic of Burundi requires the defence forces to work transparently. Article 249 stipulates that parliamentary committees must be set up to oversee the work of the defence forces [1]. Article 11 of the organic law governing the national defence force “subjects it to parliamentary control”.[2] Legally speaking, the Parliament formally has the power to approve and reject laws on security or defence policy. It has also the right to conduct oversight of defence budgets and military procurement, as well as defence decisions.

Parliament never debates Burundi’s defence policy.[1] It has in the past but not since 2011 [2]. However, there are parliamentarians who have had to ask questions relating to Burundi’s defence policy. The response from the various members of the executive, whether the Prime Minister or the Minister of National Defence and Veterans, has always been that this is a matter of defence secrecy. [3] [4] A current example is the involvement of the Burundian armed forces in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Parliament has never been consulted or informed on this subject, even though this is provided for in Article 256 of the Constitution. [3]

The Burundian parliament is often seen as a sounding board for the executive. Very rarely, if ever, does it take a direction contrary to the will of the executive. In the country’s system, although there is a formal separation of powers de jure, it is often disregarded in practice. The executive and certain political leaders wield significant unchecked authority, directly influencing the legislature and judiciary, with no effective checks and balances in place [1].With the 2018 Constitution, the President has acquired exorbitant powers that allow him to counter acts of Parliament that go against his will [2][4].
What’s more, Burundi’s military have a strong presence in the political process. The current government is in fact the product of a former rebellion, some of whose members joined the army and others occupy senior positions in the state. As a result, no major decision or initiative can be taken by government bodies in general or parliament in particular without the authorisation of the senior army officers who were part of the rebellion. The independence of parliament in defence matters is therefore ipso facto called into question [2] [3].

The 1996 Constitution provides the National Assembly with areas of intervention in government policy. The Parliament can vote on, amend, and veto laws and policies related to the defence sector, approve and vote on the defence budget, as well as control government actions, including those related to defence matters.[1] The defence budget is submitted to the National Assembly in the same way as budgets for other ministries. Legally, there is a National Defence and Security Committee within the National Assembly, which in theory monitors government spending and policies related to the armed forces, gendarmerie, national security, military justice, and the fire brigade. In addition, the Law 2016/015 on the general regime for arms and ammunition in Cameroon autorises quarterly inspections by the administrative authorities, including the National Assembly.[2] However, there is no mention of the Parliament having formal rights to review major arms procurements .

Regarding the effectiveness of legislative control over the defence policy, it is inconsistent. Specifically, laws are enacted at irregular intervals. For instance, the law on the general regime for arms and ammunition in Cameroon dates from 14 December 2016, and the law on the code of military justice was adopted on 12 July 2017.[1] However, critical aspects of defence and security remain under the exclusive purview of the President of the Republic, who holds primary authority over both law enforcement and military operations. The fundamental components of defence and security in Cameroon are governed by presidential decrees. Moreover, the establishment of the Cameroonian army was enacted through an ordinance (Ordinance No. 59-17 of 11 November 1959 on the general organisation of defence) by the former President, who had been granted full powers. More recently, Law No. 67/LF/ of 12 June 1967, which governed the general organisation of defence, was superseded by 21 decrees issued by the President of the Republic on 25 July 2001.
Furthermore, the parliament has not passed a single law on National Defence concerning the ongoing Anglophone conflict in the North-West and South-West regions, which has persisted for over seven years. A functioning parliament would have convened a special plenary session to find a lasting solution to the civil war.[2] Some Anglophone MPs from the opposition (SDF) and even the ruling party (CPDM) tried to request a plenary sesssion on this issue, but without success. The government (CPDM party) enjoys an overwelming majorty in parliament and has used that to silence any meaningful debates on issues such as the conflict in the Anglophone regions or other sensitive security issues. This is because security is the backbone of the State in Cameroon.[3] Although the National Defence and Security Committee of the National Assembly formally, and in theory, holds the right to monitor the control and purchase of arms, the lack of expertise by its members hampers effective monitoring. The Senate’s National Defence Committee is even more problematic than that of the National Assembly one.[4][5]

Parliament does not exercise independent legislative control over defence and national security policies. The ‘presidentialisation’ of security reinforces the authority of the person holding executive power.[1] In Cameroon, the President is the true Minister of Defence. That is why there is only a ‘Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Defence’. Moreover, as explained above, 90% of MPs are from the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Rally (CPDM), and most of them regard the President as a ‘God’. That is why they usually vote for laws and projects from the executive branch, particularly the Presidency, regardless of whether these laws relate to Defence or not.[2] Meanwhile, over the past 40 years, the parliament has not initiated a single law proposal related to Defence. All originate from the executive. Furthermore, it is said to be common practice for parliamentarians to be summoned to the party’s headquarters to receive directives regarding their voting behaviour. This raises questions about adherence to the Constitution, which, in Article 15, paragraph 3, states that “any imperative mandate is null and void”.[3]

Following a constitutional reform in 2016, revised in 2020, the Parliament is now bicameral. The Ivorian Parliament (with its two chambers) has formal rights and mechanisms to effectively control defence policy and budgets. Under the Constitution, it is responsible for overseeing the government’s actions and voting on amending laws, particularly those relating to military and security planning and the budget. It can also set up committees of inquiry, question the government and carry out field visits, while reviewing or approving only defence procurement indirectly through its power to adopt finance laws and legislate on defence matters [1].

Parliament attempts to control Ivorian defence policy, particularly when laws are being adopted. The National Assembly adopted a military programming law in 2016. This is the first military programming law since the country’s independence. However, its influence remains very limited.[1][2][3]

The army has very little influence on parliamentary debates and few contacts with parliamentarians. However, the executive can influence Parliament. Indeed, the close ties between MPs and their parties of origin compel the majority of MPs to approve government bills. [1][2]

Legislative scrutiny of defence policy is offered by the Parliament of Ghana through two main platforms. Its committee system as provided for under Article 103 (3) of the 1992 Constitution (1) as well as the role played by the plenary in underwriting recommendations made at the Committee level. The Select Committee on Defence and Interior is primarily responsible for monitoring defence and security affairs, including examining policy, budget, and procurement. Their modus operandi, which includes working visits, allows them to consider operational nuances in the activities of defence and security institutions. The committee’s bipartisan constitution ensures a broad representation of perspectives and interests.
Additionally, the Public Accounts Committee provides some level of scrutiny over defence and security activities. Its primary duty is to examine “the audited accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure of the government,” as presented to the House by the Auditor-General of Ghana. This examination sheds light on how funds have been deployed in relation to defence and security issues. (2)
The Finance Committee also provides channels to scrutinize the activities of defence and security institutions. Entrusted with handling general issues of finance and the economy, the committee is able to monitor the purchase of military hardware from international suppliers. According to parliamentary procedure, recommendations made at the committee level are presented to the plenary for consideration. Consequently, the plenary provides an additional layer of scrutiny for defence and security issues.

The often-partisan nature of debates in parliament has resulted in few rejections compared to approvals of proposals put forward by the executive. Debates on defence and security matters in plenary sessions have also been limited. However, this is not due to a lack of expertise on defence and security matters; as evidence suggests otherwise. Instead, it reflects the level of negotiation and consensus-building that occurs at the committee level (1). Parliament’s effectiveness at the level of the Committee of Defense and Interior, however, justifies this score. This is because the Committee debates and recommends budgets for approval. In 2022, for instance, the Committee on Defence and Interior, following its consideration of the budget for the Ministry of Defence, recommended to the plenary to approve the 2023 budget estimate of a little over 3.742 Billion Cedis (2) (3). Plenary subsequently rounded up the figure to 3.7 Billion Cedis. The score provided justifies the work of the legislative arm of the government in approving laws on security, the exercise of budgetary power on key issues, and relatable arms procurement and decisions. The justification provided in the score assessed the work of the PSCDI, debates on the floor of parliament, and the approval regime of the committee.
Moreover, Parliament’s work on some cases of abuse of human rights by the military has been fairly scrutinised by the PSCDI. For instance, as indicated in a news item suggesting the findings of the committee on the Ashaiman military brutality that took place in March 2023, the committee has further made several recommendations for dealing with the said military personnel who were engaged in the act of brutality (4).

While there is no evidence of attempts by the military to influence legislative scrutiny, the independence of legislative scrutiny on defence policy cannot be fully guaranteed (1). In a hybrid system of government, the majority party, often representing the ruling government, works to ensure the approval of executive actions. Thus, the majority may sometimes lobby their counterparts in the minority to influence the consideration of matters in the house. Four factors have been offered to explain the poor oversight performance of the Ghanaian Parliament, namely “the executive co-optation of Parliament; the executive dominance of Parliament; an expanded space for corruption; and excessive partisanship within Parliament” (2). Recent allegations of attempted bribery of the Majority Caucus by a businessman also highlighted the reality of such occurrences in Parliament (3). Moreover, with the high turnover of parliamentarians at every election and the limited expertise on defence and security issues, scrutiny is a challenge.

The Kenya Parliament has powers over the defence laws. In addition, Chapter 8 of the Constitution gives formal powers to make laws to the National Assembly [1]. Parliament has formal legal powers to approve or veto laws on security, and to reject or amend defence policy. It also has the right to review budgets, major arms procurements and defence decisions [2]. However, details on arms procurement are usually classified and budget presented as a vote [3, 4]. Through the Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly, Parliament scrutinises defence policies formulated by the executive branch; reviews defence strategies and operational plans; and performs budgetary oversight. It also assesses and monitors defence operations; produces reports based on its oversight activities; and makes recommendations and proposes policy changes submitted to the National Assembly for debate and consideration. Parliament further conducts public participation, but it lacks technical expertise in accessing classified information [5, 6].

Articles 94, 241, and 242 of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution empowers Parliament to regularly approve and veto laws on security, exercise budgetary power, and review and approve major arms procurements and decisions. Parliament can also reject or amend defence policy [1]. Major arms decisions are approved in the budget. While the detail is left to MoD, Parliament oversees and audits the budgetary processes and compliance [2]. However, there is evidence to suggest that the MoD has in some instances declined to provide details on expenditures on grounds of national security, limiting their oversight role [3]. For instance, in March 2024, Kenya Defence Force (KDF) was asked to explain how they spent KSH (Kenyan Shilling) 135B. CS Aden Duale, the Defence Cabinet Secretary, declined to reveal this detail, citing national security risks. Citizen Digital noted that ‘The Defence Cabinet Secretary refused to give a breakdown of the expenditure of how KDF spent the billions in the 2022/2023 financial year when he appeared before the National Assembly’s Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations’ [3].

While there is no evidence of coercion, it is common practice for stakeholders such as ministries to lobby and engage Parliament before presenting new legislation. This engagement ensures a common understanding of proposed laws [1].

Also, Kenya’s Parliament and military are separate and independent offices in law. However, Parliament’s oversight role is occassionally hindered by the Defence Ministry’s secrecy. For example, in 2019, the Defence ministry prevented the Auditor General from conducting a special audit on allegedly biased tender awards worth millions of shillings. This audit was ordered by the House Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in 2020 following claims that the Department of Defence (DoD) had misused restricted tendering procedures [2]. Moreover, the Executive rarely presents the defence budget estimates to Parliament for discussion, undermining Parliament’s ability to scrutinise defence budgets [3]. The Busia Senator, Okiya Omtata, for instance, raised this issue on the floor of the house.

Liberia has a bicameral legislature: a Senate and a House of Representatives.[1] The Constitution provides for these legislative bodies to oversee of the defence.[2] The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement created the Governance Reform Commission (GRC), which was later amended and made permanent as the Governance Commission. The GRC is an independent Commission mandated to advise on the democratisation of the defence and security sector. The National Defense Act (2008) calls for robust legislative oversight of the defence sector.[3] These laws are further supplemented by the Liberia Code of Conduct Policy (2014), which mandates the heads of ministries, agencies, and autonomous bodies, including the defence and security, to enforce laws of oversight. Chapter V of the Liberian Constitution outlines the main powers of the legislature.[3][4] Article 34 in Chapter V outlines that the Legislature has the power to provide for the common defence, to declare war and authorise the Executive to conclude peace; to raise and support the Armed Forces of the Republic. Article 34(d) provides the power over budgetary control. Article 35 defines the approval and veto of laws. The legislative scrutiny of defence policy is primarily conducted by the National Legislature, particularly through its Committee on National Security, Defence, Intelligence, and Veteran Affairs in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
In summary, Liberia’s legal instruments provide the Legislature with formal powers to oversee and influence defence and security policies, including budgetary decisions and legislative approvals.

In the Legislature, there are two oversight committees on defence and security. In the Upper House, the Senate, the Committee is referred to as Defence, National Security, Intelligence and Veteran Affairs. In the Lower House, there is the Defence and National Security Committee.[1] These two committees are statutorily mandated to play a rigorous oversight role on matters of defence and security. By law, they are required to cite the Minister of Defence for a hearing if they deem it appropriate. Likewise, they are authorised to invite the Minister of Finance and Development Planning to address questions regarding the budget and appropriation to the defence sector.
There is evidence that the committees occasionally exercise these formal powers, particularly in budgetary processes. For example, the Legislature amended and approved the FY2024 National Budget of USD 880 million in December 2024, following months of hearings and queries on defence allocations.[4] The Legislature is therefore able to influence defence funding through amendment and approval powers. Similarly, the Liberian Legislature has exercised scrutiny of national security policies in public hearings, a practice encouraged by recent governance reforms. [5]
Despite their statutory mandate, these committees are irregular in their oversight duties, particularly in public scrutiny of the defence sector. Debates over or reviews of matters of concern involving the sector are rarely held. However, when these committees convene, deliberations occur behind closed doors. While Parliament formally possesses veto, approval, and budgetary powers over defence, it does not use them consistently or systematically.

The independence of the Liberian Legislature is formally enshrined in the Constitution, which clearly establishes a bicameral legislature, the Senate and the House of Representatives, with full legislative authority: “the legislative power of the Republic shall be vested in the Legislature of Liberia…” [1] Despite this constitutional provision guaranteeing the separation of powers, there have been concerns about the Executive’s indifference towards the rules governing this separation and the true extent of parliamentary autonomy.
Journalists and civil society actors have repeatedly criticised the President’s tendency to bypass the Legislature or pressure it into alignment with executive priorities, particularly in areas like security policy and budget oversight.[2]
This perceived de facto influence was exemplified in the recent political manoeuvring around the removal of former House Speaker, Jonathan Koffa. While official narratives cited committee assignment grievances — such as MPs being excluded from key committees like Ways and Means or Defence and Security — others claimed the real reason was Koffa’s unwillingness to allow the Executive to exercise control over legislative processes. His replacement, Richard Nagbe Koon, is a member of the President’s Unity Party, a move that many observers interpret as consolidating executive influence over parliamentary leadership.[3]
Concerns about executive influence over the legislature persist. The election of individuals with military backgrounds or affiliations to legislative positions raises questions about the independence of parliamentary oversight in defence matters. Such developments suggest a continued pattern of executive dominance in Liberia’s political landscape.[4] Also, there is evidence that the legislature poorly exercises its oversight functions. Legislators’ interests in private gain routinely take precedence over national or even political party considerations.[5]
While formal structures suggest legislative independence, the executive branch may occasionally coerce or undermine the legislature’s scrutiny of defence.

The Constitution gives the rights to adopt laws relating to national defence and public security; review, amend, and adopt the national budget, which includes military and security allocation. There is no specific law requiring Parliament’s prior approval of arms procurement contracts. [1].

The Constitution clearly stipulates in its article 86 that two out of the four weeks of parliamentary session are reserved for the examination of texts and debates between the executive and Parliament [1]. During these question-and-answer sessions, Parliamentarians can debate defense policy, including the defense budget. However, defense and security policy is part of the sovereign responsibilities of the executive.But, it is rare for parliament to vote against a law presented by the executive. In this case, laws relating to defense and security always benefit from the support of the parliamentary majority aligned with the presidency. Moreover, during question-and-answer sessions between the executive and parliament, it is rare for deputies to ask questions about national defense [2] [3]. Parliamentarians generally believe that defense issues belong to the military and only to them. Thus, politicians must not interfere too much in defense and security policy [4].

Certain parliamentarians close to executive leaders can exercise indirect and informal influence on defense policy, particularly military personnel who have become parliamentarians [1].
Even if they are military, these parliamentarians exercise a political function and as such their actions are regularly dictated by political imperatives, particularly when they belong to the same political camp as that of the Head of State. So, they rather use their knowledge of the armed forces to influence defense policy at the level of Parliament [2] [3].

There is currently no elected parliament in Mali. However, the National Transitional Council, a body whose members are appointed, functions in the role previously held by the National Assembly. As such, it has a Defence, Security and Civil Protection Commission, tasked with proving opinions, monitoring defence policy, and questioning those responsible for the defence sector on certain issues.[1][2] According to article 115 of the 2023 Constitution, Parliament can also vote on issues related to the overall organisation of the defence and security.[3]

In practice, these powers conferred on them by law are not sufficiently exercised. The defence committee can examine the defense budget but only when associated with the Finance Committee, and possibly issue opinions and reservations [1].The members of the Defence Commission, like most members of the CNT, are active or retired officers or non-commissioned officers and, based on their basic training, have a direct impact on their openness to issues related to defence and security.[2][3] This situation, which means that the CNT is essentially composed of members who belong to the defence and security sector, such as the Forces de Defence et Security, is likely to influence their desire to fully exercise their oversight prerogative and to push, control, and supervise as it should be. It also likely affects their independence, especially since they were appointed because of affinity and not elected, which could lead them to feel indebted and work to validate the decisions of the executive.[3] However, it is difficult to discuss what the true nature of the debate on defence policy is in practice, as no information is actually made public in this regard, even though we know that documents on defence and security issues are being discussed by the Defence, Security and Civil Protection Committee of the National Security Council, in particular the draft law on national security policy (which is still under discussion), the law on the national strategy for security sector reform, which was voted on by the National Security Council.

Both the defence institutions and the executive branch regularly undermine control of defence policy. While this has been the case with the National Transitional Council, which consists of individuals appointed by the executive with significant number of personnel from the defence and security forces, it was also a reality when a regular assembly was in place.[1] Infact, the legislative branch, particularly its defence committee, is often not able to scrutinise certain issues related to defence and security effectively. Moreover, the members of the defence committee, like most members of the CNT, are active or retired officers or non-commissioned officers, and their basic training influences their perspectives on defence and security matters. This composition, coupled with the fact that it was the president of the transition who appointed the members of the National Transitional Council, suggests they are likely to impact the council’s independence in terms of control and supervision.[2][3]

Formally, Parliament approves, enforces, and supervises laws on defence and security; approves and reviews state budget included in the defence and security budget; and amend the defence and security policy [1]. Parliament has formal instruments to approve, veto, or review laws on defence and security. It also has the right to approve and review state and political defence decisions [2]. Parliament has formal powers over defence and security policy, but it does not have the capacity to design specific laws. Usually, specific laws about defence and security are presented by the government through proposals from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior, and the Intelligence Service [3]. Parliament has the right to employ formal mechanisms to conduct scrutiny over defence and security policy; national defence and security policies; policies for training and developing the Armed Forces capabilities and policies for combating crime; developing the efficiency of Police Forces and promoting their ethics and intelligence and state security policies; and generic policies for military service and services that may replace or complement it [4].
In formal terms, the legal framework is very robust and gives Parliament the power to legislate and oversee the defence and security sector, while reviewing and approving the general state budget, where they have been included in the defence budget [5]. However, usually the aspects related to major acquisitions of defence products are not discussed at the level of Parliament, but at the Government or Joint Command level (Armed Forces, Police Forces and Intelligence Services). The strategic decisions on defence are not taken in Parliament, and Parliament only exercises the legislative power for defence issues – defence sector legislation.

There is legislation guaranteeing legislative oversight over defence policy. Article 178(n) of the Constitution assigns the Assembly the responsibility to define defence and security policy after consulting the National Defence and Security Council. Additionally, Article 90(a) of the Assembly’s regulations grant the Defence, Order, and Public Security Committee legislative and oversight authority over national defence and security policy.
Nonetheless, the exercise of these powers in reality is limited. Recently, there have been instances where Parliament has engaged in defence-related legislation. In 2022, a debate ensued over the legalisation of the Frelimo militia, which was approved by the Frelimo majority in parliament, but opposed by Renamo and MDM’s representatives [1]. Similarly, in 2023, Parliament discussed extending military service to five years;. The law passed unanimously, though Renamo’s proposed amendment was refused [2].
Despite these activities, the overall influence of Parliament on defence and security matters is constrained by political dynamics, limited expertise, and institutional capacity [3]. Notably, Article 19 of Law 17/97, which empowered Parliament to oversee defence and security policy, was repealed in 2019 (Law No. 14/2019). Nonetheless, Article 178(n) of the Constitution assigns the Assembly the responsibility to define defence and security policy after consulting the National Defence and Security Council. Additionally, Article 90(a) of the Assembly’s regulations grants the Defence, Order, and Public Security Committee legislative and oversight authority over national defence and security policy [5, 6].
Informally, parliamentary influence is often exerted through political party committees, where key decisions are made and later ratified in plenary sessions [4]. This process, combined with the challenges mentioned, results in limited parliamentary effectiveness in shaping defense and security policies.

According to the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure [1] and the Defence and Security Policy [2], legislative scrutiny of defence policy is required to be effective, independent, and systematic. However, in practice, defence and security matters are primarily driven by the Executive, which presents legislative initiatives that Members of Parliament (MPs) largely assess and approve without substantial amendments [3, 4].
Parliamentary oversight is further constrained by the dominance of Frelimo in Parliament, where strict party discipline ensures that legislation proposed by Frelimo ministers is consistently passed. This illustrates the claim that the “parties guide and direct the action of the parliamentary benches in Parliament”, while reinforcing allegations of “an umbilical link between political parties and parliamentarians, which imposes party discipline on the functioning of the parliament, and consequently on the parliamentarians in the Assembly of the Republic” [5].
Although legal guidelines exist, the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security, and Public Order lacks the internal capacity to conduct thorough and independent scrutiny [6, 7]. Structural issues in defence and security are predominantly shaped within the Armed Forces and the government, with Parliament playing a limited role in policy formulation, mainly approving the legislation that is necessary.

Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, under the Constitution adopted in 2010, the Nigerien National Assembly (NA) held formal rights to oversee government actions, including those related to defense and security policy. However, on July 26, 2023, the military announced the removal of the President and the formation of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP). This move was accompanied by the dissolution of the Constitution and the suspension of state institutions under the Seventh Republic [1]. On July 27, the military further declared a suspension of all political party activities until further notice.
During the period since the last evaluation (2018–2023) of the Seventh Republic, the Nigerien National Assembly (NA), under the Constitution, held formal rights to oversee government actions, including defense and security policy [2]. While no provisions for veto existed, Article 67 of the 2010 Constitution empowered the NA to assess and terminate emergency powers if deemed abusive. Article 105 designated the NA as the sole body authorized to extend a state of emergency beyond the 15-day limit set by the Constitution. Additionally, the NA could pass a motion of no confidence (Motion de Censure; Article 107) with an absolute majority. Although the Constitution did not explicitly mention NA oversight of major arms procurements and defense decisions, the Security and Defense Committee (Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité), established at the start of each legislative cycle, was specifically tasked with overseeing defense and security policy. The NA had formal mechanisms to scrutinize defense policy but lacked certain broader powers.
However, Niger is exploring the establishment of a transitional parliamentary body following the dissolution of its National Assembly during the July 2023 coup. A delegation from Niger, led by Colonel-Major Idé Abdou Kambé, has visited Bamako and Ouagadougou to learn from the experiences of transitional legislative bodies in Mali and Burkina Faso. This initiative aligns with broader regional efforts under the Sahel States Alliance (AES), formed in December 2023 by Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, which aims to create a confederal parliament to legislate on shared interests [3].

Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, the National Assembly (NA) debated issues of defense and national security and attempted to influence government policy through formal mechanisms. It authorized declarations of war and the dispatch of troops abroad, as stipulated in Article 104 of the Constitution [1]. In cases of martial law, where the decision was made by the Council of Ministers, the NA was required to provide an opinion (Article 67 of the Constitution). This function was exercised on February 10, 2015. The Council of Ministers examined and adopted the draft law extending the state of emergency in the Diffa region. The draft law was submitted to the NA for opinion [2]. On March 17, 2017, with the same procedure, the state of emergency was also declared in parts of the Tillabery region (Ouallam, Ayorou, Bankilaré, Abala, and Banibaand) and the Tahoua region (Tassara and Tillia) [3]. On April 22, 2022, the Nigerien National Assembly debated the proposed redeployment of foreign forces Barkhane (2,400 personnel) and Takuba (900 personnel) from Mali to Niger, following their official withdrawal from Mali announced by French President Emmanuel Macron on February 17, 2022. The voting outcome following the debates showed that 131 deputies supported the redeployment, while 31 opposed it. Notably, the dissenting votes came from members of both the majority and the opposition [4]. The abovementioned examples demonstrate that though NA engaged in debates on critical issues such as state-of-emergency extensions and troop deployments, its influence remained largely procedural, reflecting limited utilization of its formal oversight powers. Before the coup, the NA, at least formally, was revieweing the defence budget and approving defence procurement. Following the military coup on July 26, 2023, national institutions, including the National Assembly, were formally suspended. This suspension was codified in L’Ordonnance n° 2023-01 du 28 juillet 2023, which abolished the Constitution of November 25, 2010, and established the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP) [5]. This means that Parliament no longer debates or reviews defense policy.

Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, the NA actively engaged in debates and decisions on critical defense and security issues, as seen in its authorization of troop deployments [1], and extensions of the state of emergency. However, the independence of the Nigerien National Assembly (NA) from the military and the executive for this period appears constrained, as its role often reflected alignment with the executive rather than autonomous decision-making. This pattern suggests a dependence on the executive’s guidance rather than an exercise of independent legislative authority. This dependency may reflect structural imbalances in the political system, where the executive dominates decision-making processes, and the legislature lacks the institutional capacity or political will to assert itself independently.
A notable example illustrating this dynamic is the case of Kalla Moutari, who, after serving as Niger’s Minister of Defense from 2016 to 2019, was elected as a deputy of the ruling PNDS party in the National Assembly. As the president of the Committee on General and Institutional Affairs (CAGI), he oversaw critical issues, including human rights—particularly significant during the ongoing security crisis and military operations [2]. This transition from a key executive role to a legislative leadership position highlights the interconnectedness between the executive and legislative branches, further underscoring the challenges to the NA’s independence and its capacity for effective oversight.
Consequently, while the NA had formal powers, its inability to leverage them effectively demonstrates a lack of true independence from the executive and military influences during this period.

The National Assembly (NASS) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is made up of the Senate and House of Representative (HoR), and both have oversight responsibility regarding scrutiny over defence policy [1]. The NASS also scrutinised and made input in the 2017 National Defence Policy of Nigeria, which is currently being reviewed by a committee inaugurated in September 2021 by the Ministry of Defence [2]. Section 88 of the 1999 Constitution, empowers each house of the NASS to investigate anything to which it has the powers to make laws, the conduct of affairs of any person or Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDA) charged with the responsibility for executing or administering laws enacted by the NASS [3]. This function is exercised primarily through its committees – special, standing or ad-hoc committees established by Section 62 of the 1999 Constitution [4]. It conducts scrutiny over defence-related issues and policy through summoning officials from the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Nigerian Armed Forces, and other related agencies to answer questions and provide information on defence policies and operations. It also Conducts hearings on specific defence issues, where they can gather testimonies from experts, stakeholders, and government officials. The NASS also reviews and approves the defence budget. It also has the power to audit defence expenditures to ensure funds are used appropriately. However, certain prerogatives remain within the executive or the MOD, such as the kind of weapons to procure [4].

As part of their oversight responsibilities and their role in shaping national defence policies and operations, the NASS debates and reviews defence policy and attempts to influence it through several formal mechanisms. Through Committee hearings, like the Senate Committee on Defence, the HoR Committee on Defence, and related sub-committees hold meetings where they review defence policies, scrutinise budgets, and query military officials to provide more information regarding defence strategies and operations. In November 2022, for instance, the Nigerian Senate suspended consideration of the budget for the Ministry of Defence over the Minister’s refusal to honour multiple invitations by its Adhoc Committee on the Resuscitation of the Nigerian Navy Ship, NNS ARADU [1]. The NNS ARADU is Nigeria’s largest and most powerful Naval fleet, but has been grounded for some months. The lawmakers can also introduce motions and resolutions to express their positions regarding defence matters, call for specific actions, or urge the executive branch to adopt certain policies. For instance, The Senate held a 10-hours closed-door session with the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the nation’s service chief over the worrying state of security in the country. The Senate President, Godswill Akpabio, opined that “the Senate decided to take this option for us to have a session because of the various petitions that we have received from our constituents. As part of our major oversight function, we decided to do this through the Committee of a Whole” [2]. Similarly, in October 2023, the Senate in one of its resolutions challenged the military to conduct special operations to dislodge bandits in the North-West and other parts of the country while calling on the Federal Government to address the manpower deficit in the armed forces and police [3].

However, attempts by the NASS to influence defence policy are limited due to limited knowledge of the intricacies of the defence sector by most legislators and, sometimes, the failure of service chiefs to honour invitations or summons by the NASS, especially that of the HoR [4]. A good number of their resolutions in 2020, including a call on the President to sack the service chiefs, were completely ignored.

Section 89 of the 1999 Constitution, provides that the National Assembly can summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence before it over any matter that the Assembly can enact legislation [1] The point to make is that the National Assembly has the power to enact laws in respect of the armed forces. By that token, the President who chiefly administers security issues in Nigeria can be summoned by the National Assembly and even committees of the National Assembly for questioning. In light of this constitutional provision, the Senate or HoR exercises such powers through holding committee hearings, embarking on oversight visitations, summoning government officials to appear before it, and organising public hearing on any issue pertaining to defence policies and operations. Occasionally, either the executive branch or the military attempt to undermine parliamentary scrutiny of defence either by withholding some critical information from lawmakers or shunning invitations to appear before the NASS. In the past, officials of the executive arm have shunned the invitation or disobeyed the directives of committees of the NASS often without repercussions. In December 2020, President Muhammadu Buhari failed to honour the invitation by members of the HoR to address them on the security situation in the country [2.] Similarly, in November 2023, the service chiefs failed to appear before the HoR for crucial meeting on the nation’s security challenges. The angry lawmakers sent back the representative of the Service Chiefs, insisting they must appear in person to underscore the significance of the interface [3].
Additionally, there are regular attempts by Defence agencies to undermine independent scrutiny by the National Assembly. However, it is also difficult to state that the National Assembly or relevant Committees are independent in absence of adequate and holistic power to sanction the agencies for non-compliance. More importantly corruption and personal interest within relevant Legislative Committees to large extent determines the strength of independent [4].

According to article 103 and 67 of the Senegalese Constitution, the Representative Assembly of the Republic of Senegal exercises legislative power. It alone passes laws, oversees government action, and evaluates public policies. [2] . The law also allows parliament to examine and approve arms purchases by the army. In Senegal, the parliament has the right to exercise control over national defence policy by examining the Ministry of Defence’s budget and when war is declared. Laws are voted at the National Assembly, the members of the parliament also approve all budgets of the ministries including the one of armed forces and defencebut even if they have the right to control they are limited [1] .

Even if the law allows the parliament to scrutinize and approve the army’s armed procurement, some information is classified for security reasons, and even MPs do not have access. [1] Normally, some decisions have to be made by the parliament through a vote accepted by the majority (more than 80 PMs). The Parliament does not approves major arms procurements and decisions, and it cannot reject or amend defence policy. The Parliament submits amendments of the defence budgets, a form of scrutiny, even if they are not always taken into account by the government. For the first time in 2022, the budget vote of the Minister of the Armed Forces has been debated for the first time in the National Assembly since Senegal gained independence. [2]

In Senegal, there is a strong executive dominance over the Parliament. The executive branch can sometimes coerce or unduly influence parliament to vote in its favou, and it has also blocked certain parliamentary inquiries into its activities. [1] The National Assembly also faces constraints in opposing executive decisions, particularly in defence matters. [2] [3] However, there is no evidence showing that the military influences the Parliament.

In line with Chapter 11 of the Constitution of South Africa, national security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive.[1] The National Assembly is constitutionally empowered to consider, pass, amend or reject any legislation before the assembly, including budget bills. The law also provides Parliament with the formal powers to approve or veto laws related to defence and security. As set out in the Defence White Paper, the South African National Defence Force is subordinate and fully accountable to Parliament and the Executive. [2] Oversight powers were extensively used by Parliamentary committees to scrutinise the Strategic Defence Packages in the early 2000s illustrating the mechanisms available to Parliament in exercising oversight in the review of defence procurement [3].

While Parliament is empowered to debate and review defence policy and budgets, this power is rarely exercised by the Parliamentary plenary, and there are a few instances where defence policy has been debated by the plenary. [1] Parliamentary committees, including the Joint Standing Committee of Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans, exercise more regular oversight of defence policy. [2] Parliamentary effectiveness is, however, limited by a political culture of ruling party members blocking oversight in various instances of impropriety and the weakness of parliamentary committees due to the lack of robust debate [3].

While there are no overt attempts by the military to exert influence on parliamentary oversight, scrutiny is often limited by the nature of party politics which ensures that members of the ruling party align with the executive. The dominance of the ruling party in parliamentary committees has often meant that decisions are taken despite the widespread disagreement of opposition parties. [1] Members of the ruling party are routinely punished for breaking ranks, ensuring alignment with the executive. The Commission of Enquiry into State Capture found that while Parliament has the necessary oversight powers and tools for public scrutiny, Parliament failed to use these powers due to the governing party’s determination to protect leaders implicated in malfeasance. [2]

The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011) Article 57 (a, b, c, d, f, g) grants the National Legislative Assembly formal authority to scrutinize and oversee government policies, including those pertaining to defence and security [1]. Specifically, Article 57(f) delineates the powers of the National Legislative Assembly to summon ministers for the purpose of addressing inquiries raised by members of parliament regarding the activities of their respective ministries. Furthermore, Article 72(1) establishes specialized committees within both houses of National Legislative Assembly designed to enhance the legislature’s oversight capabilities. Among these, the Defence and Veteran Affairs Committee is particularly pertinent in the examination and evaluation of the nation’s defence policies [2]. Equally important is Article 88 (3), which gives the National Legislative Assembly the power to adopt, amend, or reject the national budget, and schedules, and Article 88 (6), which prohibits the transfer of funds from one chapter to the other or expenditure to be incurred without the approval of the National Legislative Assembly. These formal rights have the potential to make the legislature an important actor in the oversight of defence polices and budget. These legislations provide the formal rights [3].

The capacity of the Transitional National Legislature to effectively influence budgetary decisions and defence policy is significantly constrained by the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. This limitation is evident in the manner in which budgetary allocations are determined. In 2022 and 2023, South Sudan registered the second-highest year-on-year increase in its defence budget, with surges of 78% and 108%, respectively [1]. This stark increase in military expenditure occurred despite South Sudan’s ranking of 192nd out of 193 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index, highlighting a disconnect between resource allocation and the broader developmental needs of the nation [2]. The Committee on Defence and Veterans scrutinises and makes recommendations on budget allocations to the defence ministry [3].
Effective oversight of defence procurement is further compromised by international sanctions, particularly those imposed by the United Nations Security Council under Resolution 2731 (2024) [4]. These sanctions have compounded the challenges faced by public institutions in monitoring arms procurement processes. According to Amnesty International, various security forces within South Sudan continue to import small arms and ammunition, repurpose armoured vehicles for military use, and engage in the illicit concealment of weapons, all in violation of the sanctions in place [5]. The involvement of combatants from both the government and opposition in the covert importation of arms exacerbates the difficulty in monitoring the origins, quantities, and destinations of these procurements, thereby undermining the effectiveness of legislative oversight.

The level of independent scrutiny within South Sudan’s TNL has been increasingly questioned since the appointment of the new assembly on August 2, 2021. The assembly is predominantly composed of members appointed by the parties to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) within an agreed responsibility sharing framework. Since members are not appointed directly by the people, their loyalty is mostly to the appointing authority and not the would-be voters. A majority members are from the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and the structure of the executive, which includes members from both the SPLM and the opposition, further complicates the distinction between the ruling party and the opposition. Despite this apparent inclusion, opposition legislators have raised concerns about intimidation and harassment, specifically citing the presence of officers from the National Security Service within the parliamentary premises.
In an interview with Voice of America, Juol Nhomngek Daniel, an opposition member of the TNL, highlighted the extent of this interference, stating, “There is a high level of intimidation and a high level of restrictions on freedom of speech in the Assembly because members of [the] National Security are deployed everywhere in the Assembly”[1]. This situation persists despite Article 77 of the South Sudanese Constitution, which guarantees legislators the freedom to express themselves within the legislative body. However, Nhomngek Daniel reported that opposition members were denied the right to hold press conferences, effectively stifling their ability to express their opinions freely.
The concerns regarding the legislature’s lack of independence are not confined to issues of intimidation; they also encompass the manner in which key legislation is passed, often without adequate consideration of public interest. A notable instance is the passing of the National Security Service Bill in July 2024, which faced significant opposition from civil society, political opponents, and the diplomatic community. Michael Adler, the United States Ambassador in Juba, condemned the bill’s enactment, describing it as “regrettable under any circumstances, but especially now, when it undermines the transitional government’s commitment to fostering political and civic space”. [2] These developments underscore a troubling erosion of legislative independence in South Sudan, where the intersection of security presence, executive dominance, and the suppression of dissenting voices within the assembly. It raises questions over the country’s commitment to good governance principles.

The Ugandan Parliament is constitutionally vested with significant formal powers to oversee Uganda’s security and defence. Its legislative authority empowers it to enact laws governing the security sector, thereby shaping the legal framework within which the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), the police, and other security agencies operate. This allows Parliament to establish standards for conduct and accountability, ensuring that these forces function within a legal and ethical framework [1]. While the executive branch is primarily responsible for formulating defence policy, Parliament retains the crucial right to review and scrutinise these policies. However, its influence over defence policy remains largely consultative rather than directive, as it lacks the authority to veto or amend security policies independently [1]. Final decisions on defence policies ultimately revert to the executive and military leadership, limiting Parliament’s ability to shape security strategies beyond an advisory role.

The Parliament’s most potent tool for influencing defence policy resides in its control over the national budget. This budgetary power enables the legislature to approve or reject defence spending proposals, encompassing major arms procurements. This capacity allows the Parliament to exert influence over the allocation of resources within the defence sector, promoting the efficient and effective utilisation of public funds[2][3][4]. This influence is constrained when it comes to classified expenditures, where the executive retains significant influence.
The ability of the Parliament to review and investigate the actions of security forces, through its committee system, notably the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee, reinforces accountability. Ministers can also be subjected to questioning regarding defence and security-related actions, ensuring a degree of public scrutiny and transparency. Although the Ugandan Parliament possesses a robust set of formal powers designed to guarantee civilian oversight of the security sector, the practical application of these powers can be influenced by prevailing political dynamics and a complex interplay of other factors [5].

The Ugandan Parliament engages with defence policy through established formal mechanisms, such as debate and review in committees, especially the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee. These bodies scrutinise defence budgets and proposed legislation, including recent bills like the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (Amendment) Bill, 2024 [1]. Parliamentary debates provide a forum where members can raise concerns and seek clarifications on defence issues, and budgetary powers technically allow Parliament to question or amend allocations to the defence sector [2].
However, Parliament’s actual influence on defence policy is significantly constrained in practice, making its oversight partial and often symbolic. According to Section 39(2) and (3) of the UPDF Act, 2005, parliamentary approval is required for peacekeeping deployments. Nonetheless, Ugandan troops have been deployed abroad without prior parliamentary approval or without adequate debate on mission mandates, risks, or financing, as in the case of operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo [3].
A substantial portion of the defence budget is classified as “security-sensitive,” which limits parliamentary access to detailed financial information and prevents effective scrutiny [4]. The Executive—particularly the President—retains centralised authority over defence matters, which further restricts the legislature’s ability to reject or amend defence policy. In sensitive situations, such as Uganda’s involvement in foreign conflicts or controversies surrounding military figures like Muhoozi Kainerugaba, parliamentary oversight has been sidelined or ignored [3].
In addition, systemic limitations such as underfunding, lack of technical capacity among MPs, and weak institutional support undermine Parliament’s ability to carry out thorough scrutiny of defence activities [5].

The Commander-in-Chief regularly influences or undermines parliamentary decisions on security matters, particularly in cases where military operations have proceeded without prior parliamentary approval. [1] For example, the State Minister of Defence, Hon Jacob Marksons Oboth asked Parliament to allocate UGX 89.7 billion to finance Operation Shujaa in the Democratic Republic of Congo when the UPDF was already deployed in DRC. Appearing before the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs, Oboth emphasised that the money would strengthen the ground, air and intelligence operations required to neutralise the outfit. On November 30, 2021, the Congolese army (FARDC) and the Ugandan military (UPDF) launched joint operations in the Beni territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group that originated in Uganda but has operated in Eastern Congo. A section of the MPs in the Committee (led by Lwemiyaga MP, Theodore Ssekikubo) were concerned that the troops went to DRC without Parliament’s authorisation, yet the Ministry of Defence came to Parliament for resources for the same [2]. This shows a mixture of some parliamentary oversight amidst preponderant executive influence.
Beyond specific incidents of executive influence, the structure of Parliament itself also affects its ability to provide independent oversight of the security sector. The presence of 10 UPDF representatives in Parliament raises concerns about potential conflicts of interest. These representatives, appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, serve as “listening posts” for the military rather than independent legislators. President Museveni himself has described their role in Parliament as one of monitoring discussions rather than actively engaging in legislative debate [3]. This arrangement can limit the extent to which Parliament can critically scrutinise defence and security policies, as the military effectively has a direct, regular presence in the oversight process.
While Parliament retains formal powers to oversee defence and security matters, these structural and political realities create significant challenges to its ability to function as an independent check on executive and military decisions.

Section 119 (2) (3) provides the Parliament with the formal rights to pass any laws which govern the defence forces [1]. Parliament also has the formal right to vote for/against the defence forces’ procurement of military equipment and budget spending. Parliament has the formal power to summon the Minister of Defence on issues affecting the defence forces, including internal and external deployment of defence forces personnel [2].

Even though the Parliament has the right to oversee the structure and management of the defence budget as per the constitution, in practice, there is no evidence of Parliament exercising this right over the defence forces [1]. Zimbabwe’s parliament is dominated by the ruling ZANU-PF, and the latter is supported by the military Generals, including the army commander [3, 4]. The main challenge with serious scrutiny of the defence lies in the strong link between the ruling party ZANU PF, the government, and all security institutions. The parliamentary portfolio Committee on Defence, Security, Home Affairs and War Veterans, pays more attention ton less sensitive political issues, such as conducting public hearings on stateless migrants, and the delays on issuing national identity cards, rather than the defence, especially the military and the intelligence services [2].

While the constitution provides the Parliament with powers to monitor the defence forces’ operations, this does not easily happen in practice [1]. In a context where the military publicly supports the party in power, ZANU-PF, it is difficult for parliament to have an independent scrutiny over the defence forces [2]. While there is no evidence on the obstruction of parliament to debate the defence policy, ZANU-PF has a two-thirds majority, and it is publicly supported by the military [3]. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the parliamentary portfolio Committee on Defence, Security, Home Affairs and War Veterans, only pays more attention ton less sensitive political issues [4].