There is no formal, written defence policy or security strategy. So there is no public debate on this. Currently, the recently established Joint Centre for Study, Doctrine and Method is working on the design of this doctrine. But there is no public debate or consultation on the subject [1][2][3].

There is no official defense strategy document [1]. The process of its drafting is ongoing but there is no formal debate between the government and citizens on defense and security policy so this indicator is Not Applicable . These issues are considered sensitive areas, and discussions around defense and national security are often limited to government circles, without direct public participation or consultation. Citizens and civil society have few opportunities to interact or influence decisions on defense and security, due to the lack of structured public debate on these issues [2].

There is no formal national defence policy or national security strategy [1]. The process of its development is ongoing but citizens are not consulted in this process. Defence issues are considered as sensitive and no formal consultation process involved the public in the last 5 years [2] [3].

In Benin, there is no formal defense policy or security strategy made public, and no official document related to these policies is disseminated. Defense and security management is, therefore, more centralized within the government, with limited access to information relating to these areas.No information on the resources allocated, the management carried out, and the strategies to be implemented in case of any security situation [1] [2].

There is no structured debate on defence policy or security strategies. According to the government, there is a a “politique sectorielle de la défense”, though the document is not accessible. [1] On an individual basis, certain authorities, such as the President of the Republic, address issues relating to defence policy [2] [3]. This is not a debate as such, but simply a set of positions on defence and security issues. Local newspapers generally limit themselves to reporting these statements [4].

The various authorities and other players who comment on defence and security issues do so in a very superficial way. What we end up with is a rhetoric that lacks any foundation and is very much tongue-in-cheek. [1] [2]. The security debate seems superficial, focusing on naming potential threats without assessing practical solutions and concrete actions. Some disagreements, such as with Rwanda, have lasted for years, and there doesn’t seem to be any real dialogue toward a definitive solution. [3]

There are no formal consultations on defence and security issues in Burundi .[1] [2]

Documents on defence issues and security strategy are not open to the public at all. [1] [2]

While it is acknowledged that the Defence Committee raised concerns regarding the signing of military cooperation agreements with Russia, the broader debate surrounding the nation’s principal defence and security strategies, as well as significant reforms implemented in recent years, has largely been absent from public discourse. Internally, within the defence forces, there is a notable lack of substantial discussion regarding the country’s strategic direction. Moreover, such a strategy seems to be nonexistent. The public learns about these issues through the media, parliamentary sessions and oral questions from MPs to ministers are open to the press. Through this mechanism, certain aspects of national defence and security policy are minimally made public.[1] Similarly, all Ministers, including the Minister delegate in charge of Defence, present their budgets to the National Assembly. This has been done by the Minister delegate in charge of defence, who has presented their expenditure on procurement and munitions.[2] MPs may ask oral questions to the Minister, who responds orally; however the practice of oral questions in the Cameroonian parliament does not constitute meaningful debate. According to Article 8 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic is the head of the armed forces. Defence strategy, therefore, is one of his main prerogatives, as he is the guarantor of internal and external security.[2]

The debate on national defence strategy within Parliament seems superficial and embryonic: it consists only of oral questions and with no follow-up.[1] Debates on major threats and issues (e.g., Anglophone conflict, war against Boko Haram, and the situation in the Bakassi peninsula) are not conducted effectively. Regarding public participation there is essentially none. The executive has ruled out the referendum option on the Anglophonie issue, opting instead to organise a “Major National Dialogue” in 2019.[2] This dialogue did not include the staunch separatists and the main opposition party (CRM). Moreover, the resolutions from the dialogue have been slow to take effect.

Since the country’s independence, there has never been a formal consultation process involving the public. Colloquia held within military educational institutions do not serve as mechanisms for consultation. In Cameroon, even the parliament has rarely been involved in providing input on defence policy or security strategy. At most, on specific issues, the Presidency of the Republic occasionally seeks academic expertise, typically from individuals identified as organic intellectuals.[1][2]

The Cameroonian army is characterised by an outdated approach to secrecy, often referred to as “the great mute”. [1] As a result, no documentation related to defence policy or security strategy is publicly available, not even in a simplified form. Additionally, certain legislative and regulatory texts remain confidential. Given the current climate of evolving threats and global interconnectedness, the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) has improved its communication policy. Some documents are available for civilian scholars and security experts in army documentation centres. For instance, the navy’s information document called “Pompons rouges”, the air force’s ‘Armés de l’air Infos’, and the army’s “beret vert”, “Anciens combattants” are accessible to limited audience (high-ranking and middl- level officers, government officials and top civil servants, and civilian researchers, scholars, security experts, university professors).[2] Furthermore, MINDEF’s Communication Division offers some publicly available information on the conflict in Anglophone regions and in Far North. However, these documents do not cover defence policy or security strategy. The Significance and depth of the information also remain questionable. The data published in the newspapers tend to be broadand vague, mainly concerning data on human resources, operations, and national holidays. Although these reports and journalist trips resemble propaganda than genuine information, they represent a good start.[3]

Defence policy and security strategy have been the subject of broader debate for the past decade. In 2012, security sector reform (SSR) provided Côte d’Ivoire with a strategic framework and a set of reforms aimed at improving security governance [2]. This initiative is the subject of debate within the executive, legislative and public spheres, but in a rather inconsistent manner. There is no in-depth dialogue with the media or civil society [1]. Most of the time, the debate is initiated by opponents or members of civil society. There may be some form of self-censorship, as described by the academics interviewed. However, a strategic debate involving decision-makers, academics and the military has been taking place for a decade. This debate is reinforced by the presence of academics as civilian trainers in military academies [3][4].

Debate is limited to certain types of issues. Statements by the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency focus mainly on the threats facing the country and appear to be more one-sided [1] [2]. Debates conducted by a national body such as the Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies (IESD) on defence and security policy focus mainly on threats and the level of defence spending. The IESD aims to bring together civilian and military actors. To this end, the IESD organises two international strategic reflection sessions per year. The Institute addresses, for example, “African armies and internal security: current situation and challenges for development”, as well as topics such as “The Ministry of State, the Ministry of Defence and strategic companies in Côte d’Ivoire: what collaboration for national security?” [3] [4] [5].

There has been no formal consultation process involving the public in the last five years [1][2].

Information and documents exist, but in practice their availability is hampered by administrative measures. There are several types of administrative measures. In most cases, only privileged relationships can speed up the process of accessing this type of document. [1] [2]

There is evidence of discussions regarding threats to Ghana at the parliamentary committee level. For instance, the Report of the Committee on Defence and Interior on the 2023 Annual Budget Estimates of the Ministry of National Security makes reference to the terrorist threat to Ghana. (1) In addition to members of the Legislature, Civil Society Organisations, Media and Academia have created and engaged platforms to reflect on various aspects of the national security Strategy. STAR Ghana, in collaboration with the Ministry for National Security, organised an engagement of the Ministry with CSOs on the National Security Strategy. (2) (3) (4) There is, however, no evidence to establish the consistency regarding the level of involvement of CSOs, the media, and the general public regarding defence policies and national security strategies (5).

Parliament occasionally engages in debates about military activities, particularly when the minister of defence presents the ministry’s budget or responds to concerns about the military on emerging issues. Such discussions have extensively articulated the security threats and the measures taken by the army to address them. (1) These debates have linked military procurement to threats both within and outside the country. For instance, in August 2024, parliament debated and approved a loan of USD 74,120,000 to the ASHRA facility, which included a commercial loan of USD 12,000,000, as part of an agreement between the Ghanaian government and the Israeli Discount Bank. The minister of defence stated that the GAF was pursuing this loan facility to procure 154 and 155 armoured units for Tamale and Sunyani, respectively, as a counterterrorism capability measure. (2)

There have been consultations regarding threats to Ghana’s national security and the national security strategy. While these are not regular, they nevertheless involve parliamentarians, experts in academia and Civil Society, retired security practitioners, serving and retired service chiefs and serving and retired national security coordinators. (1) There are cases where consultative dialogues and expert opinion from outside the military architecture have been incorporated in the strategic and forward planning of the service. (2)(3) Additionally, these actors are not so neutral, as they are usually supporters of the government. Their engagement might be compensated by the government.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a public document prepared by the Ministry of National Security based on non-partisan and inclusive consultations involving Parliament and other stakeholders. (1) It identifies threats to national security and outlines plans to address them. The development of the Strategy is based on Section 24 of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030). The current version is dated 2020. This is publicly available. (2) There is also evidence indicating that Ghana’s National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET) was subject to stakeholder review before its finalisation. (3) (4) The document is not released with adequate lead time before the public is able to engage with it.

Kenya’s National Defence Policy (2017) is publicly accessible on the Ministry of Defence website and in the Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research & Analysis (KIPPRA) repository [1]. Parliamentary proceedings, including policy debates, are recorded in the Hansard and made available to the public, with live broadcasts of house sessions [2].
While Departmental Committee meetings are not televised, their proceedings are published and can be accessed on the committee’s website. The Medium-Term Plan (2023-2027), which aims to implement Vision 2030, includes a commitment to revise the Defence Policy [3].
Public participation in defence matters is facilitated by the National Assembly in accordance with Article 118 of the Constitution. This occurs through the Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committee, as well as through media channels such as newspapers, interviews, op-eds, and articles. However, it is worth noting that while public views are collected, there is no guarantee of their implementation, and the quality of public engagement can be inconsistent and lack long-term sustainability [4].

There is limited to almost non-existent substantive debate or discourse in public at both the civil society and the general public levels. An interview with a military expert confirmed that there is no public participation, especially on defence policy, unlike other issues that require public participation [1]. The discussions in the media are hardly in-depth, comprising reporting from official records about the level of defence spending, the link between threats and decisions on procurement, personnel, and budget, and the use of defence capability (operations). Most of the in-depth focus is on articulating the security threats that the country is facing and the level of defence spending [2, 3, 4].
For instance, Kenya’s Medium-Term Plan (2023-2027) seeks to implement Vision 2030, which has been in place since 2008. In the fourth MTP Plan, MoD spells out what it seeks to achieve in the next 5 years [5]. The plan includes aspects of policy and legal reforms, such as updating its Defence Strategy, planned projects, recruitment, and spending. Despite the importance of these plans, there is little to no public discussion or scrutiny. Procurement plans are captured in a separate document, which, in law, is supposed to be public, and the Treasury is required to publish them [6]. These plans only capture annual spending, and are not long-term in nature, except for multi-year projects. The lack of substantial public engagement with these documents further highlights the superficial nature of public debate on defence matters.
There is evidence to also suggest that MoD has a strategic plan, given the Director of Policy, Strategy and Planning is in charge of Strategic Planning, Performance Management and Monitoring. However, the strategic plan is not available online [7], further limiting public access and debate on these crucial national security issues.

The last review of Kenya’s National Defence Strategy was undertaken seven years ago. While Kenya is yet to initiate its review of its National Defence Strategy, the Medium-Term Plan (MTP) 2023-2027 commits to revising the Defence Policy [1]. According to the constitution, the right to access information is an enabler to public participation under Article 35. The Constitution of Kenya provides for public participation. Article 10(2)(a) 9 states that public participation is one of the national values and principles of governance while Article 118(1)(b) 10 requires Parliament to facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and other business of Parliament and its committees [2].
The making of the MTP Plan is a public process where sector working groups are invited to provide views and make presentations. There is evidence to also show that the Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations does invite public views in the considerations of Defence Cooperation Agreements, which form a significant part of Kenyan Defence Policy.

The Departmental Committee on Defence reports are generally available to the public [1]. However, the accessibility of certain confidential documents, such as annual performance reports and some Auditor General Reports, raises questions about adherence to security classifications [2, 3]. While Article 35 of the Constitution guarantees access to information, Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2023 outlines specific limitations. These restrictions are based on Article 24 of the Constitution, Section 6 of the Access to Information Act, 2016, and Sections 43 and 49 of the Kenya Defence Forces Act, 2012 [4, 5, 6]. This creates a complex balance between transparency and national security concerns.

There is no recent record of the national security strategy being debated. The last public consultation held on the national security strategy was held in 2013, following a previous public consultation carried out in 2008.[1] The previous national security strategy was debated by the executive, legislature, civil society and the independent commission of the government. Following the exit of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, these debates have not continued. The last review of the security strategy was done in 2017, when President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf completed her tenure. However, the revised strategy was supposed to be validated by the incoming government, but it never happened.[2]

In 2008, Liberia’s first post-war national security strategy document was drafted. The drafting was preceded by an extensive, countrywide consultation, which in effect opened a national debate on national security in post-war Liberia. The debate involved many stakeholders, such as elites, policy makers, academics, grassroots Liberians, as well as students.[1] This approach was new and innovative, but this momentum has not been sustained.[2] For example, a revised security strategy document has been revised since 2017, but a public validation is still pending.[3][4]
As there is no recent record of the national security strategy being debated, this indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

The last public consultation on the national security strategy was carried out in the last term of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s administration (2012-2017).[1] On June 29, 2017, the United Nations Mission in Liberia’s (UNMIL) Deputy Special Representative, Waldemar Vrey, commended Liberia for advancing human security through the revised strategy. He emphasised the importance of full implementation by national security institutions. The revised security strategy was supposed to be validated. President Sirleaf insisted that it was better for the validation to be by the incoming administration.[2] Even though security was one of the critical pillars of the previous regime, there was no public consultation, and debate over the national security strategy.[3]

A review of the official defence websites in Liberia reveals that the information provided is outdated and not updated in real time. For instance, in April 2016, 200 Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldiers were trained as ambassadors in the fight against sexual and gender-based violence. However, news of this important development was not published until two months later.
In addition to outdated online content, there are challenges in accessing defence-related information. Although Liberia enacted the Freedom of Information Act in September 2010, establishing the Independent Information Commission (IIC) to facilitate public access to information, implementation has been problematic. The IIC deploys information officers across various ministries, agencies, and commissions, including those linked to the defence sector. These officers have reported frequent delays and restrictions in accessing requested information.
Key documents—such as detailed defence budgets, work plans, and strategic priorities—often get held up in bureaucratic processes, even though they should be publicly accessible. These obstacles hinder transparency and limit the public’s right to timely and accurate defence information.[1][2][3]

In general, defense policy largely remains absent from public debate. The government establishes the general orientation of the national and local defense and security policy, with the initiatives always coming from the executive [1]. Sometimes, the executive communicates on the subject within the framework of its governance actions. In Madagascar, it is widely believed that the question of defense is a matter solely for the military without the public being invited to comment on the subject [2]. And if questions related to defense are asked of the main officials (Ministry of Defense, Chief of General Staff, etc.), they always put forward the principle of “state secret” [3]. There is therefore a desire to set aside any public debate on the subject. Nevertheless, a public debate exists, even if it is exceptional, concerning the policies and programs implemented by the State; e.g., bilateral agreements with nation states such as Russia, acquisition of artillery and vehicles, Madagascar’s position during the Russia vs Ukraine war, and Wagner’s presence in Madagascar etc [3]

The executive sometimes communicates on its defense policy, but this does not give rise to broad public debates [1]. However, some military personnel believe that the concept of defense must benefit from the support of all citizens. Parliamentarians must also participate in the debate on the concept of defense. But practically this does not exist. So, if there is a debate, it is always between the military, and the public is not invited [2][3]. But within civil society and in exceptional cases, a debate can appear, particularly on social networks.

It was in 2017 that Presidential Decree No. 2017-859 established the National Security Sector Reform Coordination Office. The public was not involved in its work [1][2].

Only press releases from the defense forces allow the public to have information concerning defense and security policy [1]. The politicization of the defense forces does not always allow the population to express themselves on the subject. Moreover, the military is bound by the obligation of reserve. Such a system does not allow them to open a broad debate [2].

Outside the formal consultation process, there have been several occasions when, with its own funding or funding from partners, the Security Sector Reform Commission has organised or participated in discussions with civil society, the media, and academia on security policies and strategies, as well as in the context of capacity-building on security issues for civil society, the media, and the general public.[1] Moreover, a workshop was organised in December 2024 on the validation of the new national security policy and strategy document, including for members of ministries, Forces de Défense et de sécurité (FDS), civil society organisations, and security experts[2][3]. This shows that some discussions are being held with the public on defence policy, although there is no evidence of in-depth debate.[2]

Questions related to national security policies or security strategy are generally only discussed after their adoption by the legislative body. Indeed, during the development phase of preliminary projects and draft laws, there is little communication, and few people are aware of the process in progress. It is usually only once the document is available and published in the official journal that debates, depending on the environment or expertise, are held. The nature of the debates may seem superficial or not in-depth in the media, but they are conducted thoroughly within academic circles, think tanks, and the activities of CSOs.[1]

Some issues related to defence and security were debated within the framework of the national foundations of the refoundation during the inter-Malian dialogue in 2021. These forums, organised by the government were held throughout the territory, allowing participants to share their opinions on a range of issues, including those related to peace and security.[1][2] The outcomes of these consultations have not yet been incorporated into defence policies.The reports from the various consultations are available and are being used to extract relevant elements for integration them into the different policies.

Defence policy documents are generally accessible.[1] Although the national security strategy document has not yet been adopted, validation workshops have been organised with members of the government, FRD, OSCs, and security experts.[2][3] Furthermore, the national strategy for security sector reform has been available since 2022 and is accompanied by an action plan for the period 2022-2024.[4] The implementation of this action plan was evaluated independently mid-term by civil society, revealing that out of forty actions included in the action plan, two had been carried out, around thirty were underway, and about ten had not yet been carried out. A final evaluation is planned for 2025.

There is a National Defence and Security Policy [1], but there is no National Defence and Security Strategy. The Defence and Security Policy is presented to the public through the Law published in the Official Gazette, the official publication of the Government – “Boletim da República de Moçambique” [1]. Defence and security policy is rarely discussed by the executive, the legislature, and the general public. The public debate involving media, academics, and civil society is limited, because the Defence and Security Forces are traditionally closed to discussing these matters, and these forces dominate Defence and Security issues somewhat. There are a few interviews and scientific and opinion articles on the subject. The discussion on defence policy and security strategy focuses more on the potential and real threats, the mission, objectives, responsibility and exclusivity of each Defence and Security Forces, and there is very little on the level of budget and defence spending [2]. There are more cases of academic debates than political and public opinion debates on the Defence and Security Policy, because these issues have been treated as secret, and there is little substantial knowledge on this subject [3, 4].

The discussion is not deep and focuses on issues related to the mission, objectives, responsibilities, and exclusivity of each Defence and Security Forces, civil-military relations, and defence spending since the start of the terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado in 2017 [1]. The discussions on the Defence and Security Policy are more academic, carried out by higher educational institutions linked to the Defence and Security Sector, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and students of the International Relations and Diplomacy course, where there are subjects related to security studies, strategic studies, and peace and conflict studies [2]. When members of the Defence and Security Forces participate in public debates on Defence and National Security, they rarely discuss the subject openly. Usually, they appear in the debates, but are reserved and make their comments more personal than institutional [2].

The Defence and Security Policy requires citizens to defend the homeland and promote state security and public order. It also outlines the involvement of all sectors of the state and society in national defence and security issues [1]. The Defence, Security and Public Order Committee of the Parliament does not offer much clarity about public consultation in the review processes of the Defence and Security Policy [2] and there are no references to formal and regular public consultations on defence policy, the security strategy, or the National Defense and Security Policy [2]. Defence and security education institutions and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies have been the entities that mostly participate in consultations on Defence and Security Policy [2]. However, there are few academics, journalists and civil society organisations specialised in defence and security issues. The review process of the Defence and Security Policy in 2018 was carried out without relevant public consultations [3]. Additionally, the 2018 Defence and Security Policy removed the article from the first edition that spoke of supervision and oversight by Parliament, opening space for possible corruption and abuses.

The public can access documents and information on the Defence and Security Policy in Parliament. There is the Parliament Library that makes all documents available: reports, opinions and legislation produced [1]. The “Opinion of Parliamentary Committees and Committees Reports” are compiled in the Parliamentary discussion documents on the Defence and Security Policy and are available at the Parliamentary Library, where it may be subject to public scrutiny [2]. However, the documentary collection is not yet digitised. Making them available in the Parliament’s library only makes them inaccessible to the majority of Mozambicans.
The transparency and accountability model of the Defence and Security Forces in Parliament is limited to a specific committee (Defence, Security and Public Order Committee) [3]. The Armed Forces have a program on Radio Mozambique called “Hora do Soldado” and on Television Mozambique called “Antena do Soldado” where they present the achievements of the Armed Forces. The Police also have a program on Television Mozambique called “Pela Lei e Ordem”, and every Tuesday, the Police General Command presents the situation of criminal occurrences. The Armed Forces and the Police have their Newsletters. All these programs and initiatives are for informational purposes only [4]. Furthermore, the General State Account presents the budget available for the Defence and Security Forces, but there is still a culture of secrecy that creates great limitations in terms of transparency and accountability in the defence and security sector. The institutions of the Defence and Security Forces are not yet fully open to collaborating and working with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on national defence and security.

Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, Niger’s defense and security policy was debated by the executive, legislature, and segments of the public. During this period, parliamentary debates—such as the April 22, 2022, session on the redeployment of French forces Barkhane and Takuba—were accompanied by media coverage and civil society engagement. [1, 2, 3] National strategies, like the Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Intérieure (SNSI), were adopted in 2017 and renewed in 2022 [4],. They were subsequently disseminated with the support of international partners and discussed publicly across various forums [5]. However, the military coup of July 26, 2023, marked a significant rupture in participatory security governance. The dissolution of the National Assembly eliminated the legislative branch’s contribution to public debate. Civil society engagement has been curtailed, and media freedoms have deteriorated sharply. In early 2024, the Interior Ministry revoked the license of the Maison de la Presse, following its criticism of post-coup restrictions, and its leadership was not renewed. International broadcasters RFI and France 24 were suspended, and foreign journalists faced intimidation and targeted attacks [6]. While the military authorities reportedly adopted a new military strategy in January 2025 [7], no evidence has been found to confirm that it was made publicly accessible or subjected to any participatory process. Information on security matters is now disseminated almost exclusively through state-controlled media, limiting critical analysis and alternative viewpoints [8].

During the period from 2018 to July 26, 2023, Niger witnessed active debate on key security and defense issues involving civil society organizations, the legislature, and the executive. Two central topics—defense expenditure and the presence of foreign military forces—sparked widespread public interest. These subjects were regularly covered in independent media outlets and debated by both state and non-state actors, reflecting a pluralistic and relatively open environment for public discourse [1][2].
However, this changed significantly following the military coup of July 26, 2023. Although security and defense remain in the public narrative, the nature of discussion has shifted from open and participatory to highly restricted and state-controlled. Criticism of government positions is now met with censorship, repression, and arrests [3]. Sensitive topics, such as Niger’s evolving relationship with international actors like Russia, are now only discussed in favorable terms, with dissenting or critical views effectively excluded from public platforms [4] Despite the presence of official statements and some coverage in state-run media about ongoing threats and security operation, the current discourse no longer includes substantive, pluralistic, or critical engagement with the underlying strategic issues that had previously shaped the national conversation—such as defense budgeting, transparency, and the strategic implications of foreign military cooperation. These statements are unidirectional, scripted communications, rather than participatory or responsive policy debates.

Between 2018 and July 26, 2023, Niger undertook some public consultations on defense and security policy, but these were largely organized through state-led or state-affiliated platforms. One of the key institutional mechanisms was the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP), a presidential body established in 1995 and mandated to promote dialogue and implement peace agreements. It was expected to engage external actors through its Technical Advisory Committee (CTC), as defined by Decree No. 2015-117/PRN of February 17, 2014. This committee was supposed to include both government institutions and civil society organizations. However, in practice, the mechanism was never fully operational, and its potential as a platform for inclusive public consultation remained largely unrealized [1].
Another forum was the National Center for Strategic Security Studies (CNESS), a presidential advisory body created in 2015. While closely tied to the security sector, the CNESS did incorporate input from selected academic experts through its Scientific Council [2]. However, it was dissolved following the military coup of July 26, 2023, and no replacement or alternative independent forum has since emerged.
Although the HACP technically still exists under military rule, there is no evidence that it continues to function as a platform for public consultation on security policy. The assessor found no record of new consultations or policy dialogue led by the HACP during the post-coup period [3].
Some meetings on defense and security have taken place—such as regional security councils and the National Defense Council—but these are convened and led by government officials, typically involve state-appointed participants, and are not open to independent civil society, academia, or the general public. These meetings serve primarily to reinforce existing government positions rather than gather and incorporate a broad range of public inputs.

Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, the overall defense objectives were explicitly stated in the Constitution, which is publicly available. Article 66 defines the role of the Niger Armed Forces as ensuring the defense of national territorial integrity against external threats, maintaining peace and security, and upholding national laws [1]. Beyond constitutional provisions, several strategic defense documents were accessible to the public. These included the National Internal Security Strategy (SNSI) and its 2022-2026 Action Plan, as well as the National Strategy for Community-Based Security (SNSP), which was adopted by Decree No. 2022-520/PRN/MI/D on April 14, 2022, along with its corresponding 2022-2026 Action Plan. [2][3] However, following the military coup, access to information on defense policy and security strategy has significantly declined. The new military authorities only formalized their military policy in January 2025 [4], and this document has not been readily accessible to the assessor, suggesting that it is not available to the wider public either. Additionally, under military rule, restrictions on media and civil society have intensified, further limiting public access to information on defense policies and security strategies [5]. While some security and defense strategy documents were previously available, public access to comprehensive defense policies was already limited. Since the military coup, transparency has deteriorated further, with increased restrictions on the media and civil society.

Nigeria’s defence policy was first formulated in 2006 and revised ten years after in 2017 [1]. However, the MOD inaugurated a committee to review the National Defence Policy in September 2021. According to the Permanent Secretary, MOD, “the essence of the review is to allow for the emergence of an all-embracing quality Defence policy that underscores the way forward in tackling the contemporary security challenges and proffer implementable solutions” [2]. Nearly seven years after the inauguration of the Committee, a draft revision is yet to be presented for input from other critical stakeholders, such as the National Assembly, Civil Society Organisations, and the Media [3]. There is no evidence in the form of official pronouncement, media reports or other publicly available material to indicate that the defence policy has been debated at all in the last year.
It is worth noting that the National Security Strategy (2019 edition), to a large extent, articulates the security threats faced by the country as well as the expected levels of coordination among Response Networks to counter the threats. However, over 5 years after its inception, the strategic document has not been put forward for review to capture recent threats and emerging development [4].

Nigeria’s defence policy was first formulated in 2006 and revised ten years after in 2017 [1]. Nigeria’s first-ever National Security Strategy was first formulated in 2014 and later revised in 2019 [2]. More than five years after the revision of both guidance documents, there is no public debate of them. The degree of public participation and inclusion in the NSS 2019 is not clearly outlined. A concrete plan detailing how the public will be involved in security discussions and decision-making processes would foster better-informed policies and enhance overall public support and understanding that could evoke feelings of patriotism which is a formidable defence [3]. However, references are occasionally made to these strategic documents by the media, executive and national assembly in reports, official releases and deliberations. The escalation of insecurity in Nigeria has underpinned persistent call for the review of the nation’s security architecture, including the NNDP and NSS, to reflect evolving and future security challenges.
Moreover, the National Security Strategy 2019 document is silent on other significant issues like procurement decisions or budgeting. While the National Security Strategy is publicly available, public debate on the strategic review is not enabled, owing to the inherent culture of secrecy dominating the Defence and Security sector in Nigeria. Debates around Defence and Security are treated as “Classified” or “Restricted” areas. Engagements revealed that these are deliberately upheld in the sector to prevent transparency and accountability to external/civilian oversight [4]. The Defence procurement enjoys deliberate protection against public scrutiny or external oversight from the contradictory provisions in the National Procurement Act, which requires Presidential permission in case of Defence procurement information.

The Nigerian National Defence Policy (NNDP) comprises the philosophy and objectives of the country’s defence policy [1]. In September 2021, the Ministry of Defence announced that it has inaugurated a committee to review the National Defence Policy in line with extant laws of the Federation. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence remarked that in addition to the three tiers of Government – Federal, State and Local – and their agencies, every Nigerian regardless of status gender or religion has a role to play in the National Defence Policy document [2]. There is no available media or public report in the last 5 years showing that there is any form of formal consultation process involving the public in the revision of the document to align it with the contemporary security challenges in the country.

The two critical national guidance documents in this regard are Nigerian National Defence Policy (2017) and National Security Strategy (2019).
While hardcopies of the defence policy were reportedly circulated to select offices in 2018, they have not been given sufficient dissemination to relevant stakeholders and even public institutions such as Universities that will need them [1]. Public availability remains limited: the Ministry of Defence website provides no downloadable copy [2]. A draft version was posted on the Nigerian Defence Academy website but is overtly labeled “Draft” and appears outdated [3].
The 2019 National Security Strategy (NSS) is publicly accessible via the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) under the Office of the National Security Adviser [4]. The NSS includes detailed threat assessments, strategic objectives, and proposed reforms.

However, the NSS does not include defence procurement planning or budget integration. The level of detail and dissemination remains limited; higher education and civil society institutions have had minimal access to the full defence policy document [1]. Additionally, the delay in releasing policy documents post-development—the NSS was published nearly two years after being announced—means dissemination is not timely.

There is a defence strategy is sometimes debated by the executive but not in details.These debates exist and are sometimes led by members of the army, gendarmerie and the police and even by peace and security experts and members of civil society. Newspaper articles are also written on the issue by specialists, even by former officers of the army. [2] However, these debates do not mention strategic issues and do not go into depth. [1]

The National Police recently relaunched its programme entitled ‘Les Mercredis de la Police’, an initiative designed to encourage reflection and analysis on security issues in Senegal and to establish a framework for dialogue and analysis on contemporary security issues. This television programme will enable specialists from a variety of backgrounds – e.g., sociologists, academics, lawyers and experts – to contribute to the debate on the country’s security challenges. The gendarmerie and the army are also invited to participate in that programme [1] . The issue of security expenses is also are dealt with the MPs and pubic areas, but not in details .
The spokesman for Senegal’s national police force makes regular appearances in the public and private media to talk about the security situation in Senegal and give advice and guidance to raise public awareness [2] .

Public bodies and institutions regularly organise panels to explore the dynamics between security forces and communities, highlighting best practices, the challenges encountered, and ways forward to build a relationship of mutual trust. [1] This concerned mostly the police and the gendarmerie, and sometimes the armed forces, and it happens when there is an event like the independence day celebration day. [3] In Senegal, security experts, representatives of civil society and members of law enforcement agencies come together to discuss innovative strategies that promote co-constructed security. [2] While occasional public workshops or community-focused security forums occur, they do not constitute structured, ongoing national defence policy consultations that inform official strategic documents

Not all information relating to the defence and security strategy is made available to the public. However, in order to raise public awareness of certain issues and for reasons of transparency, certain information that the authorities deem useful is published. These strategies include the new peace and security challenges and the mechanisms and means put in place by the army to face those issues [1] . Moreover, the Senegalese army’s Directorate of Information and Public Relations (DIRPA) was created on 1 September 1993, replacing the Service de Presse et de Cinéma des Armées. It provides regular information on security issues, but the information shared with the public is carefully selected. [2]

Parliamentary debates on defence policy are generally limited in South Africa, with plenary discussions often confined to annual budget votes [1]. However, two specialised bodies, the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans and the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, provide a more consistent forum where policy is examined in more depth. These committees meet regularly and their minutes and reports are publicly available, contributing to some transparency and institutional continuity.

Beyond Parliament, South Africa’s active defence think tank and academic community such as the South African Institute of International Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies, frequently contribute to debates through policy briefs, public seminars, and media commentary [2]. Nevertheless, while public and civil society involvement exists, such engagement tends to intensify around major policy milestones (e.g., the 2015 Defence Review). Therefore, while defence debate exists and occasionally engages a broad base, it is not consistently sustained over time.

Public debates as well as committee debates are generally comprehensive in scope, with examples of parliamentary committees reviewing procurement [1], defence spending, budgets [2], and active operations [3]. The development of South Africa’s highest-level strategy for the military, the Defence Review 2015, led by the Defence Review Committee, was active in consulting with a broad range of stakeholders and comprehensive in scope, including public debates on identifying threats, the defence budget, and operational capabilities [4].

South Africa’s political system places a strong emphasis on public participation, and opportunities for the public’s input into legislative and policy reform are often a requirement for policy adoption. This is seen, for example, in the legislative processing of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Amendment Bill, where opportunities for public consultation informed changes to the Bill during the committee process [1]. Generally, these opportunities for the public’s comments on legislative reform are well-advertised. Likewise, parliamentary committees and the Department of Defence have in the past invited experts to provide input on the military’s future force design and succession planning [2]. While opportunities for public engagement are widely available, these opportunities are generally only accessed by a small group of interested parties due to the broader public disengagement.

While major defence policies such as the Defence Review [1] and the Department of Defence’s Strategic Plan for 2020-2025 [2] are publicly available, transparency is undermined by the lack of accessibility of high-level strategies and budgets due to poor maintenance of the Department’s website [3]. Publication of these high-level documents is more readily available from civil society websites such as the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, which tracks parliamentary committees and publishes documents shared with them.

In South Sudan, informal public debate defence strategy or policy is extremely limited. However, such debates do occur mostly with national security issues such as when the National Security Service Bill was being debated [1]. However, even on national security issues tend to focus on short-term crises and specific security laws—not on broader defence strategy. Furthermore, an assessment of local and regional media reports did not show any significant unofficial debates on defence policies and strategies [2].

The scope of debate on defence policy and national security strategy in South Sudan is significantly shaped by discussions within the TNL, which also include consultations with members of the public in South Sudan and those living in regional countries. The Assembly has actively examined, reviewed, and scrutinized policies related to the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs. Notably, the Assembly has summoned key officials, including former Defence Minister Kuol Manyang, National Security Advisor Isaac Mbotu Mamur, and Acting Internal Affairs Minister Augustino Jaddallah, to address the government’s response to security challenges in the country [1].
This engagement highlights that the focus of security policy and strategy debates within the TNL centres on addressing major threats to national security and defence spending. The Committee on Defence and Veteran Affairs, in particular, plays a crucial role in scrutinizing the defence budget, ensuring that the allocation of resources is aligned with the country’s security needs [2]. This structured approach indicates a concentrated effort within the Assembly to address and manage the country’s defence and security concerns effectively.

Public consultation in South Sudan on defence policy and strategy is often limited to few instances within the framework of the TNL. The consultations are not often regular and, in most cases, occur when there are urgent security emergencies [1]. In some instances, there are donor-facilitated or informal consultations engagements, however these are not often structured mechanism that can see the findings incorporated into the final defence policy frameworks. Overall, the wider public voices especially those from informal consultations— media, civil society, community groups—are mostly excluded from defence policymaking [2].

Providing official documents to the public is crucial for fostering transparency. However, in South Sudan, the accessibility of defence policy and strategy documents is significantly restricted. While it is common for governments to keep sensitive defence documents confidential, the difficulty in accessing such materials in South Sudan is particularly high. Even less sensitive documents, like the White Paper on Defence [1], which could be made public, are not easily accessible. According to a key informant, these documents are available in print form but are not widely disseminated to the public [2]. For instance, there were concerns raised regarding lack of transparency in the development by the SDSR-Board members of the defence and security policy documents. The draft policy documents were not circulated to the public for scrutiny.
Moreover, the lack of digitalization in government ministry websites further limits public access to these documents. Notably, even ministries that maintain websites, such as the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs [3], do not have dedicated sections where the public can access relevant documents. This lack of online accessibility exacerbates the challenges faced by citizens and researchers in obtaining crucial information.

Uganda’s approach to security and defence policy is characterized by thematic policy documents rather than a single, comprehensive strategy. Documents such as the National Cybersecurity Strategy and the White Paper on Defence Transformation reflect a consultative approach, engaging government agencies, civil society, and academia. Additionally, the Security Sector Development Plan (SSDP) 2015/16–2019/20 was developed through a highly participatory process, showcasing efforts to align security objectives with national priorities.[1]
However, Uganda does not provide a unified, publicly available defence and security strategy. Instead, national defence themes are selectively addressed through different institutional frameworks, making it difficult for the public and Parliament to engage holistically. Discussions on security matters often take place on an issue-by-issue basis, as reflected in ministerial policy statements and parliamentary debates recorded in the Hansard. These documents lack the binding authority of a formal policy, limiting their ability to provide a long-term strategic direction.[2]
Another concern is the irregularity of policy updates. While consultations occur during policy formulation, there is no evidence of a structured review mechanism to ensure continuous adaptation to emerging threats like cyber warfare and climate change.
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MODVA) and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) are taking proactive steps to address emerging security challenges, as demonstrated by their ongoing development of a climate change and environmental security strategy. The planned consultation process, involving professionals, policymakers, academia, and civil society, signifies a recognition of the interconnectedness between environmental degradation and national security [3].

The Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs (MoDVA) in Uganda routinely informs Parliament and the public about imminent security threats, demonstrating a degree of transparency regarding potential dangers. However, this transparency is significantly undermined by the substantial portion of the MoDVA budget designated as classified expenditure. As evidenced in the Auditor General’s Report for the Financial Year 2022/2023, a staggering UGX 728 billion was classified, a practice sanctioned by Section 24 of the Public Finance Management Act, 2015. This classified expenditure, while subject to a separate, restricted audit, creates a significant accountability gap as indicated in the report of the Auditor General to Parliament for the Financial Year Ended 30th June 2023 [1]. This limited transparency raises serious concerns about potential financial abuse and mismanagement, as these large sums of money exist outside the scope of regular parliamentary scrutiny.
The process of debating classified budgets, restricted to a select sub-committee of MPs and defence sector players, further exacerbates these concerns. Furthermore, the limited engagement of NGOs in defence and security debates, coupled with instances of media house closures (CBS) for discussing sensitive security issues, further restricts public discourse and scrutiny [2]. This chilling effect on public debate limits the ability of civil society to hold the MoDVA accountable.
The constraints placed on public discussion concerning security matters extend to the highest levels of government. As demonstrated by President Museveni’s intervention to stop his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, from discussing security issues on social media, there exists a strong desire to control the narrative surrounding defence and security [3]. This control, while often justified on grounds of national security, can stifle critical debate and prevent the public from fully understanding the rationale behind defence policies and expenditures. The combination of classified budgets, limited parliamentary scrutiny, and restrictions on public debate creates a situation where the MoDVA operates with a significant degree of opacity.

The Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) conducts internal sector review workshops to evaluate performance and planning within the security sector. Public consultations in the formal regular sense are, however, not central to this process, although the government does seek input from various stakeholders, particularly experts from military leadership and government agencies. These reviews primarily involve government-aligned institutions, such as the Internal Security Organisation (ISO) and External Security Organisation (ESO), as well as military leadership and key government agencies [1]. While Uganda’s defence doctrine emphasizes a strong civil-military relationship, this does not consistently translate into formal public consultations.
Similarly, the MoDVA and the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) have launched a task force on Climate Change and Environmental Security, led by the UPDF Air Force Chief of Staff. Although framed as an inter-agency effort, consultations are largely limited to state-controlled institutions, such as the Ministry of Water and Environment, with little evidence of engagement with independent experts or civil society organizations [2].
While Uganda has previously engaged in broader consultation efforts, such as during the development of the Security Sector Development Plan (SSDP) 2015/16 – 2019/20, there is no formal public consultation.

While there’s evidence of accessible documents, the reality is a nuanced picture of selective disclosure. The availability of ministerial policy statements, non-classified budgets, and UPDF publications through official channels like the Ministry of Finance website, Parliament, and the MoDVA website, provides a degree of transparency regarding the sector’s general operations and financial allocations [1][2]. This access allows the public to gain insights into planned expenditures and broad strategic themes. However, this accessibility is significantly limited by the strategic withholding of core defence and security strategies as comprehensive, consolidated documents.
Information is released selectively, creating a fragmented and potentially misleading picture of Uganda’s defence priorities. While certain themes appear in publications and policy statements, the lack of an overarching, regularly updated strategy prevents the public from fully understanding the country’s defence direction [3]. As a result, public engagement with security matters is limited, and informed discourse on defence strategy is constrained.

There is very limited involvement of the public in the formulation of the Zimbabwe defence policy. The defence forces show a lack of trust in civil society [1], resulting in rare instances of public consultations with these groups. Historically, the only significant debate surrounding the defence sector was focused on Security Sector Reform. However, such discussions have ceased, as the defence forces actively suppress these debates by targeting and arresting civil society members suspected of participating [1][2].
The limited information available on defence policy comes from extracts presented at military forums, such as lectures at the Zimbabwe Staff College. These lectures are delivered by the Minister of Defence, during which no questions are asked. The only media coverage is provided by the state media, such as The Herald newspaper, the state broadcaster, and state television, which report on the policy extracts presented by the Minister of Defence in passing [1][2].

There is no public debate on the Zimbabwe national defence policy. As indicated above, the policy is only presented in snippets, and no further questions and discussions are attended or accommodated [1]. The Minister presents this lecture on the defence policy in a military cantonment, where there is no access for the general public including independent journalists and other private media houses. The defence policy is only presented to commissioned officers, by the Minister of Defence [2].

There are no public consultations on the defence policy.The policy remains largely confidential, with the Minister of Defence only disclosing select information to the public [1,2].

Defence policy is not debated, and it is also not available on the Ministry of Defence website [1]. From the formulation of the defence policy to its selected extracts presentation at military gatherings, there is no transparency, as the public cannot access the defence policy [1]. It is also unclear why the Minister of Defence chose to present certain extracts from the defence policy [2]. The defence policy is viewed as a security-sensitive document which is not supposed to be shared with the public [1].