The Defence Committee does not review the defence budget. According to the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, matters with a financial impact must be submitted to the opinion of the Committee in charge of finance [1]. The defence committee may appoint one of its members to participate in the work of the Finance Committee when the defence budget is examined. But the latter has only an advisory vote [2]. It is therefore the Finance Committee of the National Assembly that examines the defence budget which is included in the general budget of the State. The committee may call on any person whom it seems useful to consult, and in particular experts, to obtain their opinion on specific subjects before deliberating [3]. The administrative and technical staff of the National Assembly are also allowed to give advisory opinions when the subject falls within their competence [4].

The Defence Committee does not review the defence budget so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. According to the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, matters with a financial impact must be submitted to the opinion of the Committee in charge of finance [1]. The defence committee may appoint one of its members to participate in the work of the Finance Committee when the defence budget is examined. But the latter has only an advisory vote [2]. It is therefore the Finance Committee of the National Assembly that examines the defence budget which is included in the general budget of the State. The committee may call on any person whom it seems useful to consult, and in particular experts, to obtain their opinion on specific subjects before deliberating [3].

On paper, in Parliament, in both the National Assembly and the Senate, there is a Defence and security commission, which is authorised to analyse all aspects of the Defence budget. It is even authorized to call on external expertise to fully assume its role. [1] [2] [3]

The Defence and security committees, whether in the National Assembly or the Senate, do not have the power to change the executive’s choices regarding the Defence budget, despite the prerogatives conferred on them by the various legislative texts. Moreover, when there are points likely to raise controversy on the Defence budget, parliamentarians from the party in power are summoned to receive instructions before the formal session. [1] [2].Members of parliament who are members of the party in power are therefore given instructions on what to say and what not to say during debates and, above all, they are told how to vote in the end [1].

There is a Defence Committee in both the National Assembly and the Senate of Cameroon, responsible for all matters related to the security sector, including research and development missions, intelligence, the organisation and strength of the forces, and the awarding of contracts. In fact, it can fulfill this role by preparing studies and investigations, and asking oral questions to members of the government. However, there is a significant parliamentary gap in the democratic oversight of the security sector. The committee has the power to scrutinise any aspect of the performance of defence ministry or agencies, including budgets, and can summon expert witnesses to appear before it.[1][2][3]

In practice, there is a significant parliamentary deficit in the democratic control of the security sector[1]. The Parliament examines the budget and tries to influence relevant decisions, and in most cases, this task falls to the Finance and Budget Committee rather than the Defence Committee. The Defence Committee has very limited impact; its role is confined to ruling on legal issues relating to the country’s security and defence.[2] It is the Finance and Budget Committee that can influence the decision-making process, as it does request amendments to the budget of various components of the State. However, this Finance Committee is made up of 20 members, including 4 from the opposition and 16 from the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM). Given this composition, the influence of decisions remains very limited, since the majority of the ruling party has strong ties to the government. The overwhelming majority of the ruling party in the Commissions tends to diminish the opposition’s influence, which in reality acts as a counter-power to the National Assembly.

Both houses of Parliament have a security and defence committee, which is in principle responsible for the upstream oversight of security and defence issues and has the official right to scrutinise defence expenditure. These powers are conferred on them by the Constitution of 8 November 2016 and by the rules of procedure of the National Assembly and the Senate. In addition, the standing committees, including the Defence and Security Committee, have the right to hear experts, members of the government and competent persons in order to inform their legislative and oversight functions [1] [2] [3].

The defence and security committees, together with the economic and financial affairs committees, analyse the defence budget but do not exercise the oversight powers required by law. The impact of these committees is minor. [1] [2] [3]

There are two institutions of parliament charged with the responsibility to serve as oversight bodies to scrutinise the defence budget. First, the 19-member Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior reviews and provides recommendations on all MOD budgetary allocations and expenditures (4). As a result, the committee presents an annual report on defence expenditure and allocation, assessing the MOD’s expenditure (1,2,3). This Committee has jurisdiction to investigate and inquire into the activities and administration of ministries, departments, and agencies under its mandate, including the power to investigate proposals for legislation (4). Secondly, the Public Accounts Committee has the responsibility to review and call key MOD stakeholders to answer key questions from the Auditor General’s report. (1,2,3)

The Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior commands the powers to make major amendments to the defence budget. However, in practice, there is no publicly available data to suggest major amendments to the budget. (1) Instead, recommendations are made based on reviews of previous budgets from the ministry. Note that the committee and plenary of parliament can only exercise their powers to make such amendments by reducing the budget, as stipulated in Article 108(a) i of the 1992 Constitution. (2) The committee has formal requirements to influence the budget, but these may only be advisory reports. According to reports, the committee’s chairman, Hon. Kennedy Ohene Agyapong, noted during the plenary debate for the approval of the 2023 defence budget that the committee’s important recommendations were not included in the estimates for the annual budget. These requirements, as mentioned by the Chairman, included procurement of ships, aircraft, communication, and surveillance tools, including drones and military handsets. These requirements, as recommended by the committee, were to enhance the GAF readiness to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, which will be beneficial to the country, he added. (1)(2)

The Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations is one of 20 departmental committees established under Standing Order 216, with 11 core functions. These include extensive formal rights to scrutinise the defence budget. The committee has the mandate to investigate, inquire into, and report on all matters relating to the mandate, management, activities, administration, operations, and estimates of the assigned ministries and departments. They study program and policy objectives of ministries and departments and evaluate their implementation effectiveness. Additionally, they monitor and report quarterly on the national budget implementation within their mandate [1]. The committee has the authority to summon expert witnesses to appear before it.

The Public Accounts Committee and Implementation Committee provide additional oversight on expenditure and follow up on recommendations respectively [2].

There are instances where the Departmental Committee on Defence and Parliamentary Accounts have raised questions about utilisation of Defence budgets in previous FYs and these questions have not been adequately addressed [1]. The Committee reviews the defence budget and attempts to influence budgetary decisions through formal mechanisms, but these attempts are limited.
The Ministry of Defence accounting officer, PS Patrick Mariru, was put on task to explain why the ministry engaged in the implementation of costly projects that had not been budgeted for. The Parliamentary Accounts Committee wanted to understand why MoD expenditure of Sh 1.4 billion had not been budgeted for [2].
In March 2024 KDF was tasked to explain how they spent 135B. Defence Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale declined to reveal this detail, citing national security risks. Citizen Digital noted that “the Defence Cabinet Secretary refused to give a breakdown of the expenditure of how KDF spent the billions in the 2022/2023 financial year when he appeared before the National Assembly’s Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations’ [3].

There are two legislative committees mandated to scrutinise the defence budget.[1] Both the Ways and Means Committee and the Defence Committee review and scrutinise the budget. [2] By law, the defence committee is authorised to request an expert witness to appear before it and to respond to questions that the Committee may have. The 2008 National Security Strategy was prepared by a Liberian security expert who was required to appear before the Defence and Security committees to provide guidance on the development of Liberia’s post-war security strategy.

These Committees possess formal power+K49:K51s to influence decision-making. These powers include the authority to confirm or reject presidential appointments to key positions within the defence and security sectors, such as assistant ministers, deputy ministers, and agency directors. The committees also hold closed-door sessions to deliberate on national security issues. For instance, in 2024, the Senate’s Defence and Security Committee confirmed Prince C. Johnson as the Minister of National Defence. Johnson, a retired General and former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Liberia, faced public protests from soldiers’ spouses who demanded the withdrawal of his confirmation due to unresolved grievances within the Armed Forces. In response, members of the Defence and Security Committee convened and subsequently advised the President to request Johnson’s resignation. This incident illustrates the committee’s capacity to exercise both formal and informal influence over defence-related appointments and decisions.[1][2][3]
While legislative committees have formal authority to review and influence the defence budget, their engagement in this area appears limited. The committees often do not fully utilise their powers to scrutinise budget proposals proactively. Instead, their involvement tends to be more reactive, responding to issues as they arise rather than engaging in continuous oversight throughout the budget planning and execution phases.[4][5]

The National Defense Commission is an institution of Parliament. Its opinion is important for a defense law to pass in plenary session. According to sources, members of the commission can recommend to the ministry to modify the budget allocated to defense [1]. As mentioned in the internal regulations of each assembly, the standing committees may convene all persons who they consider useful to consult. In addition, the Committees may organize public hearings for matters falling within their competence [2].

The committee reviews the defence budget and attempts to influence budgetary decisions through formal mechanisms, but these attempts are limited. It is the plenary session of Parliament which ultimately decides on the state budget, including the defense budget. In this case, it is the balance of power between the different political currents making up the parliament which decides the budget [1]. During the adoption of the state budget in 2022, for example, a member of the presidential movement clearly indicated that we “always vote” on the budget presented by the executive [2].

There is a defence commission within the National Transition Council which has among its prerogatives, according to the constitution and internal regulations of the national transition council, an official right of control over the defensce budget.[1][2] As such, it has the right to review the budget of the defence and security sector and may convene meetings and encounters for the purposes of understanding and clarification.[3][4] As part of the exercise of the prerogatives conferred on it by law, the defence, security and civil protection commission of the national transitional council, in addition to voting on the budget, holds meetings with the budgetary teams of the actors of the defence and security sector to discuss and obtain information on the different budget proposals to be presented to them by the various security and defence actors. Alongside this prerogative, the commission also has other legal means to obtain information and control the defence, security and civil protection sector. This control is generally carried out either through interpellations, which allow questions to be asked of the ministers concerned regarding the budget as well as any other actions. It can also be done through commissions of inquiry. In theory, the work of this commission in this specific case is to verify whether the funds actually allocated to the defence sector have been used in accordance with the substantive framework and efficiently.

In practice, due to the composition of the CNT’s defence, security, and civil protection commission (composed mainly of military, gendarmerie, and police officers), it happens that the commission censors itself or is subject to interference by the executive on certain issues.[1][2]The commission cannot fully perform this role for matters related to considerations of state secrets or essential interests of the state regarding the use of certain budgets, particularly those relating to certain expenses connected with contracts for works, supplies, and services, which are excluded from the scope of the public procurement code and on which the defence commission has no real visibility.

The Parliamentary Defence, Security and Public Order Commission has powers to supervise the defence budget [1]. The defence budget is incorporated into the General State Budget and is presented, proposed, approved or rejected in a plenary session of Parliament by the deputies [2]. The Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Public Order has formal rights to scrutinise the defence budget, and examine any aspect of the budget and expenditure. It may also require expert witnesses to appear before it [1].

The Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Public Order has the authority to analyse the Defence Budget and attempts to influence budgetary decisions through formal mechanisms, but these attempts are limited [1]. The deputies try to influence the Defence Budget, but the structural and strategic decisions are taken at the government level, according to priorities [2]. Even the Defence and Security Forces do not have much room to negotiate their budget, because they depend on the government’s allocations and financial resources, which are influenced by international donors who finance the Mozambican State Budget [3]. It is public knowledge that the International Monetary Fund, European Union and other donors to Mozambique are influencing the reduction of the defence and development budget for the Defence and Security Forces [4, 5]. In practical terms, the actual influence of the members of the Defence, Security and Public Order Committee is minimal in the design, analysis and review of the Defence Budget. The Government has been the decision-maker in the process and has been heavily influenced by donors to verbally allocate more to social areas than to the Defence and Security Sector.

Since the military coup of July 26, 2023, there is no legislative committee responsible for scrutinizing the defense budget, as the National Assembly (NA) was dissolved. Prior to this, between 2018 and July 26, 2023, the NA was constitutionally empowered to oversee all government actions, including defense budget approval and execution control, as outlined in Article 114 of the 7th Constitution. The Constitution and the Internal Rules of the NA granted the legislature formal rights to vote on legislation, including defense budgets, and to exercise oversight over their execution [1][2]. However, despite its oversight role, budgetary analysis was not explicitly listed as a function of the Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité, which limited the committee’s capacity for in-depth financial scrutiny.

Since the military coup of July 26, 2023, there has been no legislative committee responsible for scrutinizing the defence budget, as the National Assembly (NA) was dissolved so this indicator is marked Not Applicable [1]. Before this period, from 2018 to July 26, 2023, the Defense Committee of the NA faced significant limitations in its oversight of defense budget implementation. These limitations included a lack of access to critical information and the technical capacity needed to verify aspects such as the pricing of military equipment [2].

The National Assembly (NASS) has established standing committees in both houses of the Senate and House of Representatives to ensure parliamentary oversight of the defence sector [1]. These committees have specific mandates and functions regarding oversight of the sector, including scrutiny of the defence budget. For instance, Senator Ahmed Lawan chairs the Senate Committee on Defence [2], while the House of Representatives (HOR) Committee on Defence is currently led by Hon. Babajimi Benson [3]. During the presentation of the 2023 supplementary budget of the Ministry of Defence in December 2023 by the Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Badaru, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Defence, Sen. Ahmad Lawan, posited that “the joint committee would work assiduously to scrutinise the ministry’s 2024 proposal” [4]. In June 2024, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Defence, Babajimi Benson assured the Nigerian Armed Forces of the readiness of the legislative body to provide all necessary resources and support to enhance the operational capabilities of the military. As he puts it: “Be rest assured, we will continue to prioritize the welfare, training, and equipment needs of our troops to maintain their operational readiness and efficiency” [5]. Additionally, an expert can be invited to speak to the Committee on Defence, Internal Security or any of the Committees of the National Assembly to make a presentation or submit a memorandum [6].

The National Assembly of Nigeria is empowered to scrutinize various aspects of the performance of the Ministry of Defence and its agencies, including budgets, personnel management, policy planning, and arms acquisition. This responsibility is executed through various standing, ad hoc and joint committees’ engagements. Specialised committees, such as the Senate Committee on Defence and the HoR Committee on Defence, conduct oversight of the various aspects of the defence sector, including in scrutinising the budget [1]. The committee reviews the defence budget and attempts to influence budgetary decisions through formal mechanisms, but these attempts are limited. In November 2022, for example, the Senate suspended the consideration of the 2023 budget for the Ministry of Defence over the failure of the Minister, Bashir Magashi to honour its invitations from its ad hoc committee on the resuscitation of Nigerian Navy Ship (NNS Aradu) [2]. Furthermore, the Senate promised to improve the budgetary allocation of the Ministry of defence in the 2023 budget, once he is able to defence the budget of every agency under his purview to ensure that the country’s security agencies do not work in silos [3].

The defence and security committee exists in the National Assembly and this committee makes a particular contribution to the study of the defence minister’s budget, which is its portfolio. However, this committee does not have enough power and expertise in the field of defence finance and sometimes requires it from experts. [1] One of the most important roles of the Committee and Parliament is to vote on the State budget. Before this budget is voted on by the Defence Committee, the Committee holds meetings with all those involved in the security and defence system. So, for example, the committee and its chairman have meetings with the budget team of the Army, the Police, the Directorate General for Migration, and also the intelligence services. [2] . The Organic Law on the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly determines: the composition and operating rules of the Bureau, as well as the powers, prerogatives and term of office of its President; the number, method of appointment, composition, role and competence of its standing committees, without prejudice to the right of the National Assembly to set up temporary special committees. [3]

Since Senegal’s independence, the Armed Forces Minister’s budget has only once been debated in the National Assembly, in 2022. Even the members of the Defence and Security Committee who have the opportunity to review the budget can make recommendations but do not lead the debate. [1] . The committee has the will to influence budgetary decisions specially of the ministry of armed forces and defensce, howewver the lack of expertise is the limit of the commission, more, the minister do not forceablways impliement the recommaendations of the committee [2] . Parliamentary committees prepare the legislative debate: every bill or draft law is sent to a committee for examination and debate. The text adopted by the committee is then debated in a public session. The Defence and Security Committee is responsible for National Defence and Preservation of Territorial Integrity, International Military Cooperation, Military and Paramilitary Establishments, Civilian and Military Personnel of the Armed Forces, Public Security, Safety, Gendarmerie, Military Justice. [3]

Three parliamentary committees related to defence exist including the Joint Standing Committee on Defence spanning both houses of Parliament, the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans comprised of members of the National Assembly, and the Select Committee on Security and Justice comprised of members of the National Council of Provinces. The Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans leads on issues of budget oversight and as part of the annual budget process prepares a Budgetary Review and Recommendations Report which is tabled in the National Assembly every October. [1] This reflects on the Department’s use of its budget allocation and provides recommendations as part of the budget preparation process. In this way, the Portfolio Committee scrutinises and provides input to the budget process. Parliamentary committees are empowered under Chapter 4 of the Constitution to summon any person to appear before it to give evidence or to produce documents and require any person or institution to report to it. [2]

Although the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans provides oversight of the Department of Defence’s annual budget including in-year reviews and provides recommendations as part of the budget preparation process, the final decision for departmental budgets is made by the Standing Committee on Public Appropriations. [1] As a result, the Portfolio Committee’s influence on annual budgets is constrained despite the existence of formal mechanisms.

The Standing Specialised Committee on Defence and Veteran Affairs of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly has formal rights to scrutinise defence budget [1]. During the report of the committee for the 2023/2024 budget, it made observations including the challenges facing the defence budget such as the unbudgeted debts and incorporation of other armed groups into the military without a dedicated budget [1]. When conducting its investigations, the committee has the right to call witnesses to appear before its members [2].

The Standing Specialised Committee on Defence and Veteran Affairs of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly has influence in decision making given the growing budget of the defence ministry. The powers of this committee are derived from the constitution of South Sudan [1]. The influence can be attributed to recommendations made by the Committee to the Finance ministry over the years. In the 2023/2024 financial year, the committee recommended the following issues [2].
-The Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs must manage and operates its budget to enable it implement its activities
-The Committee on Defence and Veterans’ Affairs proposed increase of pay of a 150,000 SSP for a private soldier to meet the current market prices. The food procurement of the army should be prioritized when discussing this budget.
– The Committee recommends that to achieve adjustments of wages of organize forces we must cut from Peace Budget/ NTC, Consolidated Funds and Roads budget.
– As the parade for recently graduated unified forces is not available, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs will submit supplementary budget when their parade is availed by National Transitional Committee (NTC).
– Surveillance equipment, air space management and Defence is very important for the Army to provide maximum security protection for the country.
Despite the recommendations, the influence of the committee can be limited by lack of funding to actualise the proposals made as a result of budget constraints given that the government has been forced to suspend payments in the recent months. [3]

Article 90 [1] of the Constitution states that Parliament shall appoint standing committees and other committees necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions. The Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs is responsible for scrutinising the defence budget. The committee has the powers and responsibility to scrutinise the defence budget. However, their major weakness is their inability to scrutinise classified budgets [2].
While most parliamentary committees lack access to classified budgets, some members of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) have limited oversight in this area. These members may review classified expenditures internally and only in consultation with the Speaker of Parliament. However, the findings from such reviews are not open for public engagement or broader parliamentary debate, reinforcing the opacity surrounding classified defence spending [3].

The Defence and Internal Affairs Committee holds significant formal powers of scrutiny over the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs (MoDVA). It is responsible for examining budgets and expenditures, ensuring that public funds are allocated and utilised appropriately. Additionally, the committee has the authority to summon the Department of Procurement and Disposal Unit, reinforcing accountability regarding procurement processes and contractual obligations. [1]
Beyond formal oversight, the committee actively seeks to influence defence budgetary decisions. For instance, during the 2021/2022 national budget cycle, the committee recommended modifications to allocations related to military infrastructure and personnel. In the 2022/2023 budget cycle, committee members twice turned away officials from the MoDVA after detecting discrepancies in the budget framework paper, demanding that the figures be corrected before further discussion. [2]
However, while the committee plays an active role in defence budget scrutiny, its influence is still constrained, particularly regarding classified expenditures that remain beyond full parliamentary oversight. This limitation reduces the extent to which the committee can enforce full transparency and accountability over all aspects of MoDVA’s financial management. [3][4]

Parliament has a committee which oversee the matters concerning the defence forces. This is the Committee on Defence, Security, and Home Affairs, which, in principle, is tasked with debating issues related to the defence forces and Home Affairs, including the budget [2]. However, despite the powers granted to the committee by parliament, it does not receive key information from the defence forces [1]. The committee lacks the power to enforce the defence forces to appear before the committee to answer any questions [1].

While the parliamentary committee on Defence, Security and Home Affairs has the power to engage on the budget and scrutinise it as per the constitution [1], the defence sector does not comply with requests from the committee for clarification on budget details or to provide itemised budget information [2]. Despite the committee’s legal power to request such clarifications from the Ministry of Defence, including details on itemised budget spending and operational financing, the defence sector leverages its political influence to avoid conforming to these requests [2]. Furthermore, communications or requests made by the committee to the defence forces regarding budget clarifications are neither published nor made public.