Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Mali score: 100/100
Offences are not defined; no evidence of other formal mechanisms. Or the military are exempt from law.
Bribery and/or corruption are not defined offences in law that apply to the defence sector, but there are wider legal mechanisms in place (e.g. national laws supported by policies, regulations, or other laws) used to address this.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Sanctions exist in law, but maximum penalties constitute less than 1 year imprisonment or weak fines that would not act as a deterrent.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
There are a range of clearly defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector. These offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
The Penal Code specifically outlaws corruption and acts of bribery for all public servants, including military personnel. Article 121 states that “Anyone that, in either the performance or the obtaining of an act that benefits or favours, uses violence or threats, promises, offers, gifts or presents, or acts tending to corruption will be subject of the measures included in article 130, ‘five to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of twice the value of the approved promises or things received or requested, without such a fine being less than 100,000 francs”.¹ In 2014, Malian MPs voted in a law against illicit enrichment.² This new law updates a previous one, adopted in 1982. In the new law elected representatives are specifically cited and subject to prosecution in cases of ‘illicit enrichment’. However, MPs amended the text to prevent individuals in charge of the state budget from being prosecuted (in other words MPs are not subject to this law because they vote for the state budget).
1. République du Mali, Code pénal 1961 [Penal Code 1961], http://www.droit-afrique.com/images/textes/Mali/mali%20-%20code%20penal.pdf
2. Assemblée Nationale de la République du Mali, Loi n°2013 portant prévention et répression de l’enrichissement illicite [Law n°2013 on the prevention and repression of illicit enrichment] (Bamako: Journal officiel, 2014) http://news.abamako.com/documents/docs/Loi%20Corruption.pdf
Mali score: 0/100
There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence.
Instances of bribery or corruption are superficially investigated or rarely disclipined.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated but not often disciplined. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes, but undue political influence is attempted and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes and without undue political influence.
Investigations relating to corruption in the state administration, including the armed forces, frequently take place, but they rarely result in prosecutions. For instance, in 2011, a colonel was arrested for allegedly embezzling approximately EUR 457,000 of military funds.¹ Meanwhile, in 2016, the DGSE arrested four senior members of the armed forces for allegedly embezzling CFA 700 million of military allowances.² As of March 2018, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the individuals in these cases were charged, dismissed or prosecuted.
In 2014, defence contracts signed under former Defence Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (Sep 2013 – May 2014) were found to be irregular – according to Malian media, one contract, with a Chinese supplier, involved supplies invoiced at CFA 600 million but budgeted at CFA 3 billion.⁵ ⁶ As a result, the Ministry of Defence cancelled 10 defence contracts (in which several private companies agreed to provide the Malian state with military equipment). Maïga was subsequently put into police custody in Paris, where he was questioned in relation to an ongoing investigation into the French businessman Michel Tomi, who was implicated in the dodgy arms deal.⁷ In 2016, IBK appointed Maïga as General secretary of the President’s Office, after he escaped any legal inquiries in Mali.⁷
Moreover, in 2017, it was revealed that four gendarmes had allegedly been skimming off CFA 5,000 each month from payments made to gendarmes from the institution’s housing cooperative.⁸ This scam continued from 2004 until 2014, allowing the four gendarmes to amass an estimated fortune of CFA 2.3 billion.⁸ According to sources within the gendarmerie, several internal inquiries had found substantial proof of wrongdoing. But the sources alleged that a senior official, Brigadier Salifou Koné, was blocking the case from being investigated by the ministry of defence because of his links to the accused.⁸ As of June 2018, none of the accused have been brought to trial.
The judicial system in Mali is unable to efficiently deliver prosecutions as a result of internal corruption. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption.³ The same month, four judges and a court clerk were arrested on suspicion of corruption. This incident also indicates that those suspected of corruption can be arrested, however, as with the Maiga case there is no evidence of them having been charged, tried or fined.⁴ A US State Department report also noted that “corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts (…) There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time”.⁴
1. “Mali : un colonel arrêté pour détournement de fonds publics” [Mali: a colonel arrested for the embezzlement of public funds], Jeune Afrique, June 5, 2011. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/154005/politique/mali-un-colonel-arr-t-pour-d-tournement-de-fonds-publics/
2. Boubacar Sidibe, “Arrestation des magistrats et auxiliaries de justice” [Arrests of judges and court officers], Malijet, December 19, 2013, http://malijet.com/la_societe_malienne_aujourdhui/actualite_de_la_nation_malienne/89450-arrestation-des-magistrats-et-auxiliaires-de-justice-menace-de-g.html
3. Abdoulaye Diakité, “Luttre contre la corruption: 4 magistrats et un greffier placés” [Fight against corruption: 4 judges and a clerk arrested], Malijet, December 11, 2013, http://malijet.com/actualite-politique-au-mali/flash-info/88792-lutte-contre-la-corruption-4-magistrats-et-un-greffier-places-so.html
4. Mali Human Rights Report 2013 (Washington, DC: US State Department, 2013) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220345.pdf
5. “Mali: le ministère de la Défense annule des dizaines de contrats” [Mali: the Ministry of Defence cancels dozens of contracts], Maliweb, September 27, 2014, http://www.maliweb.net/armee/mali-ministere-defence-annule-dizaines-contrats-552212.html
6. “Corruption : IBK ordonne la révision de tous les contrats signés par Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga” [Corruption: IBK orders the revision of all contracts signed by Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga], MaliActu, August 8, 2014, http://maliactu.net/corruption-ibk-ordonne-la-revision-de-tous-les-contrats-signes-par-soumeylou-boubeye-maiga/
7. Marc Leplongeon, “Comment Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, actuel secrétaire général de la présidence du Mali, a été interpellé à Paris en octobre 2014” [How Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, the current Secretary General of the Malian presidency, was arrested in Paris in October 2014], Le Point, July 20, 2017, http://news.abamako.com/h/166024.html
8. Sinaly Keita, “Détournement de 2 milliards 289 millions à la mutuelle de la gendarmerie : Le général Salifou Koné couvre Balla Koné et Cie” [Embezzlement of 2.289 billion at the Gendarmerie health insurance: General Salifou Koné covers for Balla Koné & co], Malijet, March 15, 2017, http://malijet.com/la_societe_malienne_aujourdhui/actualite_de_la_nation_malienne/180220-detournement-de-2-milliards-289-millions-a-la-mutuelle-de-la-gen.html
Compare scores by country
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|Country||35a. Sanctions||35b. Enforcement|
|Albania||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Algeria||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Angola||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Argentina||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Armenia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Australia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bahrain||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bangladesh||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Belgium||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Botswana||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Canada||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Chile||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|China||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Colombia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Egypt||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|France||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Ghana||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Greece||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Hungary||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iran||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iraq||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Japan||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Jordan||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kenya||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kosovo||25 / 100||75 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||NEI|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Mali||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Mexico||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Montenegro||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Myanmar||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Niger||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Oman||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Palestine||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Philippines||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Portugal||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Qatar||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Russia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Serbia||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Singapore||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Sudan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Spain||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Sudan||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Sweden||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Thailand||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Turkey||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Uganda||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Venezuela||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Zimbabwe||100 / 100||75 / 100|