How strongly does the government control the company’s use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Mali score: 50/100
The government imposes no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries, nor has it publicly committed to doing so.
There are no controls over the use of agents and intermediaries, but the government has clearly indicated that it intends to rectify this issue.
There are some controls over the use of agents and intermediaries, but no clear policy.
The use of agents and intermediaries is regulated by a strict and clear policy, but this policy does not include all the requirements laid out in score 4.
The use of agents and intermediaries is either prohibited by law or regulated by a strict and clear policy which requires as a minimum that anti-corruption clauses are included in contracts with agents, companies register agents and declare all forms of remuneration, agents receive payments into local accounts and company contracts outline the right to audit agent financial accounts by government agencies.
The public procurement code (Code des Marchés Publics et des Délégations de Service Public) regulates the use of agents or intermediaries in procurement processes, albeit to a fairly limited degree.¹
Article 29, which is dedicated to mitigating the risks of corruption, stipulates that:
“Offers and submissions must contain a commitment by the candidate or tenderer to:
– neither grant nor promise to grant to any person involved in the process of awarding a contract an improper advantage, financial or otherwise, directly or via an intermediary, with the intention of securing the contract.
– inform the contracting authority of any payment, advantage or privilege accorded to the benefit of any person, acting as an intermediary or an agent, to recompense them for any service provided”.¹
Meanwhile, article 20 states that “any person who personally or via an intermediary in the form of their spouse, parents or children, notably in the capacity of director, associate or employee at a company that is bidding for a contract from a tender board on which he or she is participating, must declare this interest, withdraw from the board and not participate in any aspect of the tender process”.¹
Articles 127 and 128 state that entities found guilty of acts of corruption via intermediaries can have their contracts confiscated and be banned from competing for public contracts for a variable period of time, the length of which is determined by the seriousness of the offence(s) committed.¹ Such bans can extend to companies holding a majority share in firms that contravene the rules and for companies in which the offending entity retains a majority stake.¹ The procurement code underlines that any sanctions issued under the code are not prejudicial to any legal prosecution that may follow.
However, beyond saying that candidates or contract holders must not seek to bribe public officials via intermediaries and must avoid conflict of interests via direct family members, there are no further controls imposed on the use of agents or intermediaries in the procurement process.
The Penal Code reinforces this message. Article 121 notes that anyone seeking to offer gifts, promises, threats, presents or any kind of benefits or favours, directly or via an intermediary, can face five to ten years imprisonment.²
The assessor found no evidence of policies that would directly apply also to the defence procurement cycle.
1. Gouvernement de la République du Mali, “Code des marchés publics et des délégations de service public” [Code of public tenders and of public service delegations], 2015, Bamako: Journal Officiel, Numéro 43, 1689, http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2015/mali-jo-2015-43.pdf
2. Gouvernement de la République du Mali, “Code Pénal” [Penal Code 1961], 1961, Bamako, http://www.droit-afrique.com/images/textes/Mali/mali%20-%20code%20penal.pd
Mali score: 0/100
Sanctions are not generally applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.
Sanctions are sometimes applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.
Sanctions are usually applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.
Cases of possible corruption involving intermediaries in defence contracts are seldom investigated and there have been no signs that the authorities are willing to or capable of prosecuting offenders. Indeed, there have been no such prosecutions since IBK became president in 2013.
The judicial system in Mali is unable to efficiently deliver prosecutions as a result of internal corruption. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption.¹¹ The same month, four judges and a court clerk were arrested on suspicion of corruption.¹
A US State Department report also noted in 2013 that “corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts … There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time”.¹
When the IMF, the World Bank and the EU suspended their aid programmes to Mali following reports of the off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet in 2014, the BVG audited the account (see Q16C). The BVG determined that the former Minister of Defence, Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, and the Minister of the Economy incorrectly interpreted article 8 of the Procurement Code that allows for certain acquisitions to be off-budget (see Q29A).²
The audit found that the government had spent 87.77 billion CFA (USD 163.44 million) on defence items that were not declared in the official budget.² ³ The report found that 18.59 billion CFA went towards the presidential jet, of which CFA1.4 billion were commissions and fees paid to a broker linked to the president’s friend, Michel Tomi.⁵ It is not clear what Tomi did to warrant the fee, nor is it clear whether his deployment as an intermediary was lawful or unlawful.
The public prosecutor launched an investigation into the affair, but as of April 2018, no charges had been brought against Tomi or any of the other individuals or companies implicated in the BVG’s report.⁶
Meanwhile, a further 69.18 billion CFA was spent on other military equipment, primarily transport vehicles.⁹ The BVG found that the MDAC had failed to respect the 2014 Finance Law requiring it to register these contracts and submit them as part of the annual budget. Many of the contracts were found to be heavily overpriced, strongly suggesting that these acquisitions involved substantial illicit activity.³ ⁴ ⁵ The Defence Minister responsible for signing these contracts, Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, has since returned to government as Prime Minister.
This is despite the fact he was reportedly arrested in Paris by French police in 2014 in connection with an ongoing investigation into French businessman, Robert Franchitti. Franchitti, whose company MagForce bought military equipment from Guo Star and sold them to Mali for ten times the price, was arrested on arrival at the hotel where Maiga was staying.⁷ ⁸ Franchitti reportedly had EUR 10,000 in cash on him, which he was intending to pay to Maiga.⁷ ⁸
Moreover, IBK’s special advisor, Sidi Mohamed Kagnassy, was reportedly Director General of Guo Star at the time of the deal (he denies this), indicating an obvious potential conflict of interest and a significant potential for collusion.⁹ Although Franchitti was the subject of a police investigation in France, there is no evidence that the Malian authorities have launched their own investigation into why Franchitti was allegedly seeking to give Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga EUR 10,000 in cash.
Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that Kagnassy has been investigated by the Malian authorities for his role as intermediary between IBK and the MDAC and his own company, Guo Star.
1. Mali Human Rights Report 2013 (Washington, DC: US State Department, 2013)
2. “Scandale autour d’un nouveau marché de fourniture d’engrais: Surfacturation de plus de 15 milliards et versement de rétro commissions” [Scandal over a tender for the supply of fertiliser: Overcharging of over 15 billion and payment of retro-commissions], Niarela, 2016, https://niarela.net/politique/corruption/scandale-autour-dun-nouveau-marche-de-fourniture-dengrais-surfacturation-de-plus-de-15-milliards-et-versement-de-retro-commissions
3. Ibrahima Dia, “Achat d’avion présidentiel-contrat d’armement : Comment fut opéré le casse du siècle : 38 milliards dans la cagnotte” [Purchase of the Presidential plane-arms contract: How the robbery of the century was accomplished: 38 billion in the kitty], Malinet, 2016. http://www.malinet.net/societe/achat-davion-presidentiel-contrat-darmement-comment-fut-opere-le-casse-du-siecle-38-milliards-dans-la-cagnotte/
4. “Corruption : IBK ordonne la révision de tous les contrats signés par Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga” [Corruption: IBK orders the revision of all contracts signed by Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga], MaliActu, August 8, 2014, http://maliactu.net/corruption-ibk-ordonne-la-revision-de-tous-les-contrats-signes-par-soumeylou-boubeye-maiga/
5. Amadou O. Wane and A. Karim Sylla, “Corruption and the presidential plane”, Bridges from Bamako, August 15, 2017, https://bridgesfrombamako.com/2017/08/15/corruption-and-the-presidential-plane/
6. Issa Kaba, “Affaire Boeing 737 et contrats d’armement militaire : le Procureur général prés la Cour d’appel de Bamako se saisit du dossier” [Boeing 737 and military arms contracts: the Prosecutor general of the Court of Appeal of Bamako takes on the case], Bamada.net, October 23, 2014, http://bamada.net/affaire-boeing-737-et-contrats-darmement-militaire-le-procureur-general-pres-la-cour-dappel-de-bamako-se-saisit-du-dossier
7. “Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga arrêté à Paris quand il s’apprêtait à recevoir 10 000 euros en liquide” [Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga arrested in Paris while on the verse of receiving 10,000 euros in cash], Mali-web, July 23, 2017, http://mali-web.org/politique/soumeylou-boubeye-maiga-arrete-a-paris-quand-il-sappretait-a-recevoir-10-000-euros-en-liquide
8. Kassim Traoré, “Mali : Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga arrêté à Paris par la brigade financière (Source diplomatique)” [Mali: Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga arrested in Paris by the financial brigade (diplomatic source)], MaliActu, October 3, 2014, http://maliactu.net/urgent-mali-soumeylou-boubeye-maiga-arrete-a-paris-par-la-brigade-financiere/
9. “La Mafia IBK : Comment le Président a détourné 29 milliard de FCFA ?” [IBK Mafia: How did the President embezzle 29 billion FCFA?], Bamada.net, July 28, 2017, http://bamada.net/la-mafia-ibk-comment-le-president-a-detourne-29-milliards-de-fcfa
10. Rémi Carayol, “Mali : Kagnassi, un conseiller très spécial” [Mali: Kagnassi, a very special advisor], Jeune Afrique, March 31, 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/133996/politique/mali-kagnassi-un-conseiller-tr-s-sp-cial/
11. Abdoulaye Diakité, “Luttre contre la corruption 4 magistrats et un greffier placés” [Fight against corruption: 4 judges and a clerk arrested], Malijet, December 2013, http://malijet.com/actualite-politique-au-mali/flash-info/88792-lutte-contre-la-corruption-4-magistrats-et-un-greffier-places-so.html
12. A. Karim Sylla, “Comment la fraude est devenue monnaie courante dans le système IBK” [How fraud become common currency in IBK’s system], Le Républicain, April 26, 2018, http://ibk2018.net/materiel/Malversation_MDAC_2018.pdf
Compare scores by country
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|Country||73a. Policies||73b. Enforcement|
|Albania||0 / 100||NA|
|Algeria||0 / 100||NA|
|Angola||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Argentina||0 / 100||NA|
|Armenia||0 / 100||NA|
|Australia||50 / 100||NEI|
|Azerbaijan||0 / 100||NA|
|Bahrain||0 / 100||NA|
|Bangladesh||50 / 100||NEI|
|Belgium||75 / 100||NEI|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||0 / 100||NA|
|Botswana||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||NEI|
|Burkina Faso||25 / 100||NA|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||NA|
|Canada||50 / 100||NEI|
|Chile||25 / 100||NA|
|China||25 / 100||NEI|
|Colombia||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Denmark||0 / 100||NA|
|Egypt||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Finland||50 / 100||NEI|
|France||50 / 100||NEI|
|Germany||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ghana||0 / 100||NA|
|Greece||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Hungary||25 / 100||NEI|
|India||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iran||0 / 100||NA|
|Iraq||0 / 100||NA|
|Israel||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Italy||0 / 100||NA|
|Japan||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||NA|
|Kenya||0 / 100||NA|
|Kosovo||50 / 100||NEI|
|Kuwait||0 / 100||NA|
|Latvia||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||NEI|
|Lithuania||50 / 100||NEI|
|Malaysia||0 / 100||NA|
|Mali||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Mexico||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Montenegro||0 / 100||NA|
|Morocco||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Myanmar||0 / 100||NA|
|Netherlands||50 / 100||NEI|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||NEI|
|Niger||0 / 100||NA|
|Nigeria||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|North Macedonia||50 / 100||NEI|
|Norway||0 / 100||NA|
|Oman||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Palestine||0 / 100||NA|
|Philippines||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||0 / 100||NA|
|Portugal||50 / 100||NEI|
|Qatar||50 / 100||100 / 100|
|Russia||0 / 100||NA|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||NA|
|Serbia||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Singapore||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||0 / 100||NA|
|South Korea||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|South Sudan||0 / 100||NA|
|Spain||0 / 100||NA|
|Sudan||0 / 100||NA|
|Sweden||0 / 100||NA|
|Switzerland||0 / 100||NA|
|Taiwan||0 / 100||NA|
|Tanzania||25 / 100||NEI|
|Thailand||0 / 100||NA|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Turkey||0 / 100||NEI|
|Uganda||0 / 100||NA|
|Ukraine||0 / 100||NA|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA|
|United Kingdom||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|United States||75 / 100||NEI|
|Venezuela||0 / 100||NA|
|Zimbabwe||0 / 100||NA|