At the beginning of each legislature, after the election of the Board, the National Assembly shall set up five standing commissions for the study of the matters before it, each comprising at least thirteen MPs. Among them is the Commission on External Relations, Development Cooperation, Defence and Security. This commission is responsible for matters relating to, inter alia, the general organization of defence, the military field, the policy of cooperation and assistance in the field of defence and security, civilian and military personnel of the armed forces, military justice, the police, security and territorial integrity, and the safety of people and property [1].
The commissions may call on any person it deems useful to consult, and in particular, experts and authors of bills or resolutions. These experts may be heard in session at the request of the National Assembly [2]. In its legislative work, the commission has the power to examine the draft budgets of the Department of National Defence. It also examines all defence and security-related bills and proposals before they are voted on in plenary [3].

The Board of the National Assembly allocates the MPs to the commissions after consultation with the presidents of the parliamentary groups, considering as far as possible the profile and abilities of each MP concerned [1]. However, this provision does not guarantee the presence of experts among the members of the commission because this depends on the profiles of the elected MPs [2].

In practice, the commission is much more dominated by MPs with expertise or an interest in diplomacy [3]. Two out of the 18 members of the current Committee are retired military officers (Robert Gbian and Théophile M’po N’tia) [4]. The previous Committee (2019-2023) had one retired military non-commissioned officer (Zimé Kora Gounou) and one retired customs services officer (Mamoudou Zoumarou Wally Boda) [4].In the event that the commission does not have an expert in the field, they occasionally call on external experts for guidance on specific issues [2].

According to the Rules of Procedures of the National Assembly, the Speaker of the National Assembly refers all issues relating to bills or proposals to legislationve commissions falling within their competence [1]. The Committee on External Relations, Development Cooperation, Defence and Security, therefore, does not examine important defence policies and decisions at a fixed interval [2]. There are no recent reports produced by the said committee following a review of national defence policy [3]. Generally, the committee examines bills/proposed laws instead.

The commissions are convened at the request of their chairperson, but they are not required to meet monthly [1]. The committee is not in the habit of issuing budgetary amendments or recommendations related to defence [2] [3].

The National Assembly may authorize standing commissions or special and temporary commissions to carry out fact-finding or investigative missions on issues within their competence [1]. The Defence Committee has this responsaibility, and it can be authorized to investigate any defense issues [2]. The purpose, duration and composition of the mission shall be specified by the National Assembly. However, no fact-finding or investigative missions were deployed by the commission during the period under review to deal with issues related to defence and security [1] [3].

During the study of the budget of the various ministries, the Members of the commission make observations and/or amendments to the initial draft that the ministers are required to integrate before the final finance bill is transmitted to the National Assembly for study and adoption in plenary [1]. Apart from this, the ministries do not receive any recommendations from the commission [2]. Generally, the government often fails to take into account recommendations that have financial implications for the budget [3].

There are defence and security committees within the National Assembly of Burundi and the Senate which are authorised to analyse all aspects of the defence budget. They are also authorised to call on external expertise to fully assume its role. Other institutions are the Inspectorate General of the State, the Anti-Corruption Brigade, the Anti-Corruption Court and the Court of Auditors. However, these institutions confine themselves to analysing the annual budget allocated to the army. They do not go into detail to gather information on aspects such as personnel management, arms procurement, defence policy, etc. Suspicions of corruption are not investigated by these bodies.[1] [2]

Within the various bodies, there is some expertise in defence and security. Some of them are former fighters in the various rebel movements, which may have provided some practical experience in defence and field operations [1]. From 2005 to the present day, the National Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee has been chaired by the Honourable Zénon Ndaruvukanye, a former combatant in the CNDD-FDD rebel movement, now the present ruling party [2]. He is considered to be one of the most influential members of the ruling party[2].The other members of the commission are currently the Honourable Gaston Sindimwo, a former chauffeur and former Vice-President of the Republic, who has a background in arts and culture, and the Honourable Nadine Barampama, a former secondary school teacher, who has a background in African languages and literature. The two are respectively Vice-Chairman and Secretary of the committee. The tendency is to appoint influential and loyal members of the party in power to the defence and security committees, who blsindmply follow what is going on and, above all, cannot question the government’s choices in the defence sector [1].

Decisions in the defence sector are taken regularly but the defence and security committees rarely meet to evaluate these decisions. Any questions that might reveal certain aspects, such as the use of budgets, are hushed up by certain members of the committee. The bulk of the work of the defence and security committees consists of analysing the share of the budget allocated to defence in the general budget, as well as analysing military cooperation agreements in very general terms. [1][2]

The Defence and Security Committee only has two opportunities to examine the budget allocated to the defence sector. These are the discussions on the Finance Bill and the examination of the budget . And at these two times, it makes no amendments or recommendations. Rather, it simply notes what has been planned without comment. [1][2]

The idea of long-term investigations has not been incorporated into the practice of Burundi’s defence and security committees. [1] [2]

The positions taken by the Executive in defence matters never change baccsed ording to the discussions held with the members of the Defence and Security Committees [1] [2].

The National Assembly comprises nine committees that focus on the study of current State affairs.[1] One of these is the Defence and Security Committee, which addresses issues related to national defence, the armed forces, the gendarmerie, national security, military justice and the fire brigade. [2] Legally, the committee has the power to scrutinise any aspect of the performance of the defence ministry or its agencies, such as budgets, personnel management, policy planning, arms acquisition, and to demand information on these matters. The committee can also summon expert witnesses to appear before it.[2]

In terms of expertise, members of the Defence Commissions of both the National Assembly and Senate have no particular expertise in security issues. The National Assembly’s Commission comprises a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and two Secretaries-General. The Honorable Djirilla Kaou, who passed away in February 2021, was a chairman and doctor of medicine; his expertise was clearly not in the field of security. Moreover, the fact that he has been deceased since 2011 and no replacement has been appointed, indicates the commitee’s operational intertia. Its current role seem negligible, especially since the commitee’s chairman died in February 2021.[1] As far as the Senate is concerned, the chairman of the committee is a civil administrator, former prefect and governor who was Minister in charge of Sport after his retirement. Although he has managed day-to-day affairs of the state, including security-related issues, he is not recognised as an expert in national security. Conversely, he has a degree in economics and he contributed to establishing Cameroon’s budgetary and financial discipline council.[2] The expertise of the vice-president of this commission is sometimes noted, as a master corporal deserter from the Cameroonian army who has transitioned to gold and diamond business.[3]

In legal terms, the committee does exist, but the effectiveness of its missions is so limited that it cannot exercise its power. [1] This committee does not implement comprehensive defence policies. Firstly, the lack of expertises among the members prevents them from effectively addressing defence issues outside their scope. Secondly, the committee’s lack of power does not contribute to the establishment of effective mechanisms on a regular basis.[2]

Although the committee exists in legal terms, its capacity to effectively carry out its mandate is greatly limited. In practice, the oversight it provides is minimal, and the committee does not fully perform this function.[1] As its membership mainly consists of ruling party MPs, the likelihood of it challenging the executive on defence matters are limited, especially since this area falls under the direct authority of the President of the Republi.[2]

In legal terms, the committee exist, but the effectiveness of its missions is so limited that it cannot exercise this power. Investigative procedures, which also take the form of oral questions, are virtually non-existent.When they do occur, MPs merely provide advice or recommendations, which are not binding. Furthermore, the defence sector, a reserved area, is not scrutinised.[1][2]

In legal terms, the committee does exist, but the effectiveness of its missions is limited. As such, it cannot exercise this power.[1] Given that the committee’s activities are very limited, the Ministry of Defence usually does not take account of their advice or recommendations.[2]

There is a special committee on security and defence within both chambers of the Ivorian Parliament [1]. According to the rules of procedure of the National Assembly, this committee may examine bills and proposals relating to national defence, the armed forces and internal security, matters relating to defence and security budgets, and texts concerning law enforcement and public security. However, the CSD does not have the power to control the actions of the Ministry of Defence in matters of personnel, policy or arms procurement [2]. Under the law, members of Parliament may summon members of the government. To this end, they have several means at their disposal to obtain information on the government’s actions: oral questions, written questions, committees of inquiry and evaluation missions. The powers of the members of the Security and Defence Committee are exercised in particular during the adoption of the Finance Act, but also during the adoption of the Military and Security Planning Act [3][4].

Some members of the committee, due to their affiliation with the former rebellion, have expertise in the defence sector, but they are in the minority and their ability to influence decisions is limited. We have observed genuine solidarity among the parliamentarians on this committee, and partisan divisions have no influence on the functioning of the committees [1] [2] [3].

In practice, the constitutional and regulatory powers granted to Parliament and specialised committees (Security and Defence Committee) are not used, and the committee does not examine major defence policies and/or decisions. There is no record of written or oral questions or of any committees of inquiry set up by the committee. [1] [2]

In practice, the committee exercises very limited control over defence policy. It plays its role in reviewing and adopting defence policy legislation, but there is no record of any amendments or recommendations made by this committee [1] [2]. For example, in 2023, it ratified the ordinance establishing the International Academy for the Fight against Terrorism, but without any amendments [3].

To date, no long-term investigation by any institution is known. [1] [2]

No sources report on the implementation by the ministry of the committee’s recommendations. [1] [2]

The Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI), operating (as other Parliamentary Committees) per Article 103 (3) of the 1992 Constitution, is tasked with examining all questions relating to defence and internal matters. Per Article 103, the Committee investigates and inquires into the activities and administration of ministries and departments as parliament may determine. This may lead to proposals for legislation. The Auditor General’s audit of accounts of the defence institution is also subject to scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee, which is provided with the formal powers of oversight in questioning the rationale behind the usage of funds. Although the Auditor General is an executive appointee, recent reports point to the possibility of the Auditor General acting independently and issuing reports which have incriminated public institutions and appointees of the ruling government. (3)
In summary, the PSCDI possesses the formal rights of oversight over all issues regarding the performance of the security agencies in Ghana. This includes budgetary scrutiny, policy planning, personnel management, arms acquisition and all other duties of the security agencies, in this particular case, the military. The committee possesses the equivalent power of the High Court in Ghana and therefore has the formal right to summon key expert witnesses on oath for cross-examination. (4)

The current committee comprises persons with varied experiences, including disaster management, health, policing, defence and local government, among others. (1) In any case, with security assuming a much more population-centred orientation, the contribution of these persons to debates and committee discussions is deemed as highly valuable. (2) The reports of the PSCDI suggest a relative influence over policy planning, budget scrutiny, and arms procurement. They appear empowered to demand information from the MOD. (3)

The Committee has been instrumental in reviewing major defence and security policies, such as the Securities and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2020, which sought to replace the Securities and Intelligence Agencies Act 1996 (Act 526). The Committee has also been active in reviewing operational issues relating to the conduct of defence institutions. An example is the Committee’s investigation into the invasion of Ashaiman by soldiers following the killing of a soldier by residents of Ashaiman. Its recommendation was that military personnel involved be identified and prosecuted is noteworthy. (2) Moreover, the National Development Planning Commission Act, 1994 (Act 479) section 1(g) further amplifies that “the Commission shall, at the request of the President, Parliament, or its own initiative; (g) Formulate comprehensive national development planning strategies and ensure that the strategies including consequential policies and programmes are effectively carried out,” (3) in that light the PSCDI in accordance with section 5 (a) and (b) Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) which suggests that “the annual budget shall (a) be based on (i) sound analysis and forecasts of macro-economic developments and fiscal projections in relation to the Medium-Term National Development Plan; and (ii) approved plans; (b) be consistent with the Fiscal Strategy Document” (4) indicating that the country has medium-term policy and expenditure planning for each ministry, agency and department of which the PSDI is a stakeholder in the development of such medium-term defence policies for the MOD. A Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is periodically developed for each ministry, and the contribution of the PSCDI plays an instrumental role in developing policies that address emerging threats. For instance, the current MTEF for the MOD is for the 2024-2027 fiscal year. (5)

The frequency of the Defence and Interior Committee meetings depends on the volume of work to be considered. Given the current state of the sub-region and the significant matters related to internal security, the committee invariably meets at least once a month. (1) It also reviews budgets regularly per the Annual Budget Cycle and makes recommendations for consideration by plenary. Where necessary, through plenary, the Committee requests heads of key defence and security establishments to appear before it for consultations. (2)

Either the Committee for Defence and Interior or a Special Committee of Inquiry may be tasked with conducting investigations, including those on operations. (1) In 2021, for instance, the Defence and Interior Committee, acting on a referral by the First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, undertook an investigation into the military-civil brutality in Wa in the Upper West Region. (2) (3)

In the case of bills, for instance, once changes and amendments are voted upon, the amendments are incorporated. (1) In July 2023, Parliament passed the Armed Forces (Amendment) Bill 2022 to amend sections of the Armed Forces Act (1962). The new Act replaces the death penalty with life imprisonment. Per the new law, the Ministry of Defence as the supervising ministry, must ensure full implementation. (2) Differently, PSCDI’s recommendations are implemented, but budgetary constraints may prevent the ministry from meeting PSCDI expectations. This is indicated in the 2023 report of the PSCDI, which suggests that the committee had approved the allocation of GHc 352,728,819.75 for capital expenditure; only GHc 51,837,905 was disbursed, representing 14.7% of the amount required. Moreover, the government only disbursed GHc 33,067,250 out of the GHc 464,728,730.91 required for goods and services. (3) Differently, the recommendations of the PSCDI on the brutalisation of some civilians at Ashaiman on March 7, 2023, by some armed military men over an alleged killing of a uniformed military officer suggested that the government of Ghana provide compensation for the victims while identified military men who were involved in the brutality be punished in accordance to the Ghana Armed Forces Act, 1962 (Act 105) by the GAF. However, it is alleged by the member of parliament for Ashaiman, Mr. Ernest Norgbey, that the PSCDI’s recommendations were not adhered to by the MOD and the GAF. (4) (5)

The Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations is established under the National Standing Orders No. 216 [1]. The committee’s mandate includes oversight, scrutiny of budgets, studying and reviewing legislation, investigating, inquiring into, and reporting on all matters relating to the mandate, management, activities, administration, operations, and estimates of the assigned ministries and departments. The Defence and Public Accounts Committee can also summon witnesses [2].

The Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations in Kenya’s 13th Parliament faces a unique challenge due to the limited military expertise among its members. Unlike previous parliaments, where retired military officers played a significant role in the committee’s deliberations, only one member, the Vice Chair—retired Major Bashir Abdullahi—possesses military experience [1]. This contrasts with earlier iterations of the committee, where continuity and returning members contributed to a rich repository of institutional knowledge. Current analysis of both the National Assembly and Senate committees reveals that most members lack substantial expertise in military affairs, which may impact the depth of their oversight and decision-making capabilities [2].
To address these gaps, Parliament has sought innovative approaches to enhance the committee’s capacity. Partnerships with international organizations, such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, provide members with opportunities for peer-to-peer learning and exchanges, enabling them to adopt best practices from other jurisdictions. Additionally, Parliament organises joint retreats with the MoD, which serve as induction sessions for committee members. These retreats aim to deepen members’ understanding of the MoD’s mandate and foster collaborative working relationships [3].
The Defence Cooperation Agreement further supplements these capacity-building efforts by fostering a joint working approach between the MoD and the Departmental Committee. This has enhanced the committee’s ability to engage critically on defence issues. For instance, in a recent session chaired by Hon. Nelson Koech, the committee scrutinised the MoD’s proposed budget allocation of KES 168.09 billion for the 2024/2025 fiscal year. Members, including the Vice Chair, pressed for detailed justifications of spending irregularities and proposed budget increases. This demonstrated a commitment to fiscal responsibility and transparency, underscoring the committee’s evolving role in ensuring accountability within the defence sector [4]. While the lack of expertise poses challenges, these initiatives reflect the committee’s proactive approach to bridging the knowledge gap and strengthening its oversight functions [5].

The review is often undertaken whenever the need arises, such as during the debate on various Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCAs). An example is the Kenya-UK DCA that led to some changes in policy. Kenya demanded the extradition of soldiers implicated in the murder of Agnes Wanjiru, who was allegedly murdered over 10 years ago, and sought compensation for Laikipia fire Victims involving over 5000 residents. These demands led to a stalemate in the review of the contract for over a year [1].
Members of Parliament approved the Public Finance Management, National Peace Support Operations Funds Regulations 2023 [2]. That facilitated the creation of a Peace Fund that is delinked from the Ministry’s budget to enable the KDF to participate in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) [2].

Kenya’s financial year runs from July 1st of the current calendar year to June 30th of the following year. The budget-making process begins in August of the current financial year and concludes in December of the following financial year. A financial year serves as the accounting and budgeting period for governments and encompasses financial reporting. It is also known as a fiscal year or, occasionally, a budget year. In Kenya, a financial year is divided into four quarters, each spanning three months. The first quarter runs from July 1st to September 30th, the second quarter from October 1st to December 31st, the third quarter from January 1st to March 31st, and the fourth quarter from April 1st to June 30th.The budget process in Kenya allows for public participation at various stages and occurs at both the national and county levels [1].
Budgeting is done through sectors. The Defence budgeting process falls under the Security Sector, and approvals are done annually in line with Kenya’s budget cycle. These approvals include re-adjustment and amendments. The Supplementary budgets are usually introduced when monies are expended and targets are not met, or when the government wants to readjust its figures or certain unbudgeted expenditure. In the current and previous parliaments (12th) supplementary budgets have been introduced twice in a year, while in the previous houses, like the 11th parliament and below, supplementary budgets were often introduced once in a budget cycle. Debt could be one argument as to why this has occurred [2].
The Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations met with Principal Secretary (PS) for Defence, Hon. Patrick Mariru, and Vice Chief of Defence Forces, Lt. Gen. J. M. Omenda. The team appeared before the Committee, chaired by Hon. Nelson Koech (Belgut), to discuss the budgets.
Members sought a detailed explanation for spending irregularities and proposed budget increases in relation to the Revenue and Expenditure Estimates (2024/25 FY) and Supplementary Estimates II for FY 2023/24.
The Committee scrutinised the MoD’s proposed allocation of KES 168.09 billion for FY 2024/25. Regarding the Kshs.6.5 billion supplementary allocations, Members directed the PS, Hon. Mariru, to provide a breakdown of how the funds will be utilised. Hon. (Rtd. Maj) Bashir Abdullahi (Mandera North) requested a detailed breakdown of how funds will be expended, while Gilgil MP, Hon. Martha Wangari, sought to know the details on the status of equipment modernisation [3].

Modernisation of the KDF is one of Kenya’s Vision 2030 flagship projects [1]. However, long-term oversight and investigations into defence-related matters have been inconsistent. For example, the Defence, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations Committee has raised several queries regarding the progress of modernisation efforts. However, the last comprehensive inquiry into this matter was conducted in 2011, during the 10th Parliament [3].
Article 216 (4) of the Addendum of the Standing orders provides for the Departmental Committee to investigate, inquire into, and report on all matters relating to its mandate, management, activities, administration, operations, and estimates of the assigned Ministries and departments [2, 4]. In recent years, the Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations has launched specific investigations. One notable case involved allegations of ethical breaches by the British Army Training Unit in Kenya (BATUK) based in Laikipia County [5]. On August 1, 2024, the Defence Committee questioned the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) regarding these allegations. The EACC acknowledged receiving reports about corruption, labour disputes, improprieties, and nepotism related to BATUK but noted that these issues fell outside its institutional scope [6].
Therefore, there is some investigative activity, (e.g., on modernisation and corruption), but no indication that operations are being examined. The committee is active, but limited in scope and frequency.

Follow-up mechanisms are weak despite legal and policy frameworks in place to ensure that recommendations are implemented. Failure to implement recommendations can result in budget cuts. The Committee on Implementation in Parliament is mandated to follow up on how different committees implement recommendations made in the House, and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) scrutinises whether specific recommendations were implemented during the examination of accounts [1].
The Kenya Ordinance Factories Corporation, at the end of June 2021, received qualified opinions for June 2021 and June 2022. Some of the issues raised by the Auditor General included unexplained inconsistencies in the financial statements, budgetary control and performance, unresolved prior years matters [2].
Following up on the Auditor General’s report, the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Hon. Mbadi, put to task the MoD to explain why they engaged in the implementation of costly projects that had not been budgeted for. According to the Auditor General’s Report, the Ministry of Defence signed contracts for amounts above the actual funds received for various projects. This resulted in unbudgeted expenditure of Kshs 1,429,858,357.00. The Chair of the PAC sought to understand whether MoD was aware it was illegal to implement a project without a budget. The accounting officer, PS, Hon. Patrick Mariru, noted, ‘the Ministries that did the work failed to remit the contractual amount in full, leading to overstretching the budget. The Ministries that owe us have requested for additional money from the National Treasury to pay’ [3].
While the PAC publicly questioned the MoD’s conduct, no clear follow-up recommendations were documented, and there is no publicly available evidence that corrective action was implemented by the MoD [2]. This case illustrates both Parliament’s willingness to challenge the MoD and the MoD’s partial engagement with oversight processes, but also highlights a lack of systematic follow-through.

Liberia’s Legislature has designated security and defence oversight committees in the Upper House and the Senate. This committee is referred to as Defence, National Security, Intelligence and Veteran Affairs. In the Lower House, the Defence and National Security Committee is constitutionally mandated to conduct extensive oversight over the defence and security sector. This mandate includes scrutiny of key areas such as defence budgets, personnel management, policy planning, and arms acquisition. These committees also hold the formal power to request and obtain critical information from the Ministry of National Defense and related agencies.[1][2]
The committees are empowered to call upon external experts to provide technical input and strengthen their capacity to scrutinise complex defence and governance issues. This need for expert engagement was notably emphasised by Hon. Amara Konneh, Chairman of the Senate Public Accounts Committee (PAC), during a civil society engagement in May 2024. He publicly advocated for increased collaboration with specialists, citing gaps in legislative expertise in areas such as personnel management, security policy, and foreign affairs.[3]
In sum, Liberia’s legislative oversight Committees are constitutionally empowered to scrutinise all areas of defence governance and have the authority to call on expert witnesses when needed.

The committee is comprised of members with some level of expertise in the defence sector. [1][4] Some of those in the committee include former police officers, proprietors of private security companies and former personnel of the National Security Agency (NSA). Others are former heads of the defunct warring factions, as named in the TRC Final Report. Despite the background, as cited in the TRC Report, some members of the Committee have the required expertise in matters of defence and security, and are perceived to be using this expertise in conducting oversight.[2][3]
Membership includes figures without technical defence careers as well. Other members listed across Senate sources have mixed professional backgrounds (law, administration, politics).[5] This indicates heterogeneous expertise rather than a committee dominated by defence technical experts.The committee does exercise influence procedurally, for example, through confirmation hearings on defence appointments.[6]

These Committees were much more responsive to policymaking during the period of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) [1] However, since UNMIL exited Liberia in March 2018, the level of responsiveness observed during the years of the UN peacekeeping has dwindled. Beyond deliberations at the Senate confirmations and the national budget, the work of the committees is largely unknown.[2] Historically, the administration of security in Liberia has followed the paradigm of regime security rather than human security. The 2008 National Security Strategy called for a shift away from this practice; as a result, Liberia was to adhere to this new approach during the period of UNMIL.[3] To illustrate, contemporary arms acquisition has not frequently been subject to formal legislative inquiry, mainly because Liberia’s arms supplies have historically come through international partnerships, especially support from the United States during the post-conflict reconstruction of the Armed Forces of Liberia. However, the lack of inquiry is not due to a lack of formal power, but rather the nature of Liberia’s procurement history.[4]

The committee meets regularly, at least once a month. The short-term oversight entails conducting a budget hearing and making amendments to the budget. The amendments impact the final allocation to the defence sector. The National Budget was passed in December 2024 after months of queries, amendments and hearings.[1][2][3][4]
The Public Financial Management Act (2009) empowers Parliament to review, amend, and approve the budget, promoting transparency about fiscal planning. However, the law does not require line ministries to provide formal written responses to committee proposals within a fixed timeframe.[5]

The committee’s long-term investigation is not commissioned, nor conducted. The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) highlights that Liberia’s Legislature lacks systematic, long-term strategies for overseeing the security sector. Interactions are described as “largely ad hoc,” with no established mechanisms for continuity between outgoing and incoming legislators.[1]. The regular revision and update of the National Security Strategy provides an ideal opportunity for the Committees to be engaged and conduct new rounds of defence policy assessment. [2] However, these Committees have been largely hands-off or indifferent.[3] Though the Committee is empowered by law to play a long-term oversight role, it meets at irregular intervals and its discussions are held behind closed doors.[4] This practice is unique to both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The Senate confirmation hearing provides an opportunity for the minister to share his vision for the office. Such a vision is more often aligned with the President’s overarching defence strategy. Recommendations to improve the ministry are often not taken forward.[1] Such suggestions are infrequently adopted, and when they are, the changes tend to be minor. For instance, during the confirmation of Brigadier General Geraldine Janet George as Minister of Defence, the proceedings were largely ceremonial, with limited substantive questioning or scrutiny from the Senators.[2]
The second institutional outcome is the budget hearing process. Although the Legislature has the formal power to amend and approve the national budget, there have been instances where the Executive branch has made unauthorised alterations after the budget’s approval. In 2024, allegations surfaced regarding unauthorised modifications to the approved national budget by the Executive, raising concerns about the erosion of legislative authority and the undermining of the separation of powers.[3] Furthermore, investigations revealed that certain budget documents were improperly recalled and altered without proper legislative approval, highlighting procedural irregularities and a lack of transparency in the budget process.[4] Deliberations held behind closed doors are unknown, and the outcome cannot be measured.[5]
These practices indicate that, despite the Legislature’s formal oversight powers, the Executive often proceeds with decisions without adequately incorporating legislative recommendations.

At the start of each legislature, Parliament forms a number of committees[1]. Since 2020, within Parliament, there have been two committees, one in charge of public security and the other of national defense [2]. Any defense bill must be examined by these committees before being discussed in full session. The parliamentarians who are members of the committeession debate with the leaders of the Ministry of Defense on all subjects that they consider relevant (budget, defense policy, personnel management, etc.).
Members of the committees have power allowing them to influence defence and security policy, including the budget. The ministries of defense and public security must take their recommendations into account. Their agreement is, in fact, necessary for a defense bill to be discussed in plenary session [2] [3]. Sometimes, experts, especially military personnel, transmit their vision of Ddefense to certain members of the Defense Commission, thus, allowing Parliamentarians to better act on the country’s defense policy [4]. As mentioned in the internal regulations of each assembly, the standing committees may convene all persons whom they consider useful to consult. In addition, the Committees may organize public hearings for matters falling within their competence [5].

Civilians are members of the National Defense Commission, and some of them do not have defense expertise [2]. Indeed, each Member of Parliament must be part of at least one committee or join at most two committees of their choice. Furthermore, any Member of Parliament has the right to attend committee sessions and participate in their debates, even if only members of the committee have the right to participate in votes [3]. Final decisions concerning defense laws and internal security are made in full parliamentary sessions. Modifications occur when laws are voted on. The results depend on the political affiliation of the person proposing the amendment. If they belong to the majority group, the amendment is voted on. Otherwise, the change will be rejected [1].

The National Defense and Public Security Commissions are only contacted when a law relating to these subjects is introduced [1]. The concept of defense is a notion considered too complex by non-military people. In this case, it is considered in the country as a subject that only concerns the military. This is the reason why parliamentarians refrain from intervening [2].

The committees meet after the tabling of a law on defence and internal security. However, such tabling of a law is occasional. Therefore, they do not sit regularly [1][2]. In fact, their activities are not permanent and are carried out mainly during parliamentary sessions (twice a year except in the case of an extraordinary session of Parliament). They do not exercise any short-term supervision sometimes due to lack of time. Most of the time, parliamentarians prefer to focus on purely political issues and are only occasionally interested in defence and security issues.[3].

The committee has never conducted long-term investigations [1]. Already, defense-related issues are generally considered a military matter, and the committees do not always sit on a permanent basis to be able to conduct long-term oversight [2]. They prefer to leave questions of defense and security to the military and almost always adopt their views. [3].

The committee meeting is related to the tabling of a law on defense and internal security before the plenary sessions of Parliament [1][2]. Sometimes, members of the committees can make suggestions but the Ministry of Defense has no obligation to take them into account. Generally, the Ministry does not take the recommendations into account [3]. One example among others was the issue of transparency regarding the concept of defence. A former minister indicated that despite the recommendations on the matter, the ministry is reluctant to respond feverishly by evoking the principle of “defence secrecy”[4].

The Commission, exercising its prerogatives, can question experts on certain issues to gain understanding and clarification. It has the right of inspection through its attributions on the defence and security sector in a global manner. The Defence, Security and Civil Protection Commission of the National Transitional Council[1] is the body authorised to exercise supervision in accordance with legislation[2] relating to the defence and security sector.The CNT is indeed empowered to review any aspect of the performance of the ministries responsible for defence and security, including issues related to the budget, personnel, policy planning, arms acquisition and to demand information on these areas.

The National Transition Council consists of officers from the defence and security forces, along with civilians who have worked on security issues. Most members of the commission are equipped and have expertise in the defence sector and are likely to influence decisions.[1][2][3] Critical and objective positions are rare, if not almost absent, due to the very nature of the National Transitional Council. Members are appointed and feel accountable; they do enjoy complete independence of action. Moreover, the Defence, Security and Civil Protection Commission is headed by a retired general who is a staunch supporter of the executive branch. This situation renders the CNT more of a body for validating the government’s will rather than one for monitoring, proposing and guiding.

The CNT Defence Committee plays a role in budget development, management, and overseeing expenditure and activities. The work of the committee is reported to the National Assembly office for processing in plenary sessions, with all Members of Parliament. In theory, the committee holds meetings with all stakeholders involved the security and defence system. Consequently, the committee and its chairperson meets with the army’s budget team, the police, the general directorate of migration, and the intelligence services.[1][2] The committee reviews defence and security policies when available, subject to parliamentary validation. This was the case for the military orientation and programming law, the security sector orientation and programming law,[3] and the justice sector orientation and programming law.[4][5] There is no fixed schedule. The committee and Parliament intervene whenever a policy requires parliamentary approval.
The national strategy for security sector reform and its action plan 2022-2024 is the latest document examined and validated by the national transitional council.

The defence, security and civil protection commission of the national transitional council, either in theory or according to the constitution and the internal regulations of the CNT, has the right to review the national defence policy. [1][2] However, in practice, this power is only activated by the CNT in very limited way because the executive brand and the defence sector itself are effectively removed from legislative control on matters considered as defence secrets or given ‘defence exceptionalism’. These aspects are exempt from legislative control. This practice is maintained by a legal ambiguity surrounding the concept of “defence secret,” which prevents the legislative body from accessing most activities within the defence sector. The public procurement code has been amended accordingly, and a decree issued in 2023 excludes contracts for works, supplies, and services related to defence and security from the public procurement code.[3]

The law authorises parliament the possibility to conduct long-term investigations into ongoing activities, including operations.[1][2] However, in practice, there is no evidence that some long-term investigations are not being conducted or commissioned.[3]

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Sometimes draft laws are subject to amendments by members of the CNT.[1][2][3] These amendments may be considered by the Ministry of Defence or Security before submitting the document to the legislative body for approval or adoption. However, it is almost impossible to determine whether the ministry is incorporating these elements in practice or not.

In Parliament, there is the Defence, Security and Public Order Committee responsible for national defence and security policies; policies for training and developing the Armed Forces; policies for combating crime, developing the efficiency of police forces and promoting their ethics; state intelligence and security policies; and generic policies for military service and services that can replace or complement it [1]. This committee deals with general issues related to defence and security by reviewing and revising the defence and security policy: training and development of the Armed Forces; combating crime, developing the efficiency of the Police Force and promoting its ethics; intelligence and state security activities; and military service and services that may replace or complement it [2]. The Parliament’s Defence, Security and Public Order Committee has formal instruments to conduct scrutiny, but for general aspects of defence and security policy and not on operational issues related to National Defence, Public Security and Intelligence activity [1]. The Defence, Order and Public Security Committee has the power to summon witnesses, academics and experts to appear for consultations, clarifications and discussions [1].
In formal terms, this committee can examine any aspect of the performance of the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Intelligence Service; and visit and inspect military units, budgets, personnel management, and policy planning, among other aspects. Its main limitation is related to operational aspects [3].

It has been alleged that a number of the Parliamentary Defence and Security Committee members do not possess sufficient knowledge of the National Defence and Security Sector despite having military experience. This makes it difficult to discuss defence and security laws properly and to supervise and request accountability deeply [1, 2].

Usually, the parties appointed some deputies with military backgrounds to this committee, but most of the members are civilians, with relatively little knowledge about the defence and security sector [3, 4]. In the penultimate legislature (2014-2019), there were two members of the Defence, Security and Public Order Committee with military knowledge and training: one is a Lieutenant General and the other a Major General (legislature 2019-2024). In the last legislature, only two had military training [1]. Hence, between 2019-2024, from the 17 members of the Defence, Order and Public Security Committee consulted in the Assembly of the Republic, only a few had military experience [1].

The Defence and Security Policy of the Republic of Mozambique was approved by Act 17/97, of October 1, in 1997 [1, 2], and revised by Act 12/2019 of September 23 2019 [3]. This is first version of the Mozambican Defence and Security Policy, and this period is very long, considering that defence and security issues are dynamic (meaning they evolve rapidly in response to changing political, and social contexts) and transversal, in that, they interact with multiple sectors beyond the military [3]. According to its mandate under the Defence and Security Policy and the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security reviews issues related to defence and security threats and risks when necessary. However, there is no fixed schedule or requirement for regularly reviewing or updating this instrument. [5]. Usually, the review and update come up after real perception of new threats arise or when there is a special request from government or the Defence and Security Forces [4]. The 2019 and latest revision, focusing on addressing the Cabo Delgado insurgency and implementing the Maputo Accord, demonstrates that reviews do take place when such triggers occur.

Short-term oversight of Defence and Security Units is rarely conducted due to a lack of resources, particularly for funding the travel of members of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security, and Public Order. The financial constraints of the State Budget allocated to the functioning of Parliament, and specifically to the committee, limit its ability to fulfill its mandate effectively [1].
Despite these challenges, the committee engages in consultations with ministries, academics, and civil society to provide input on defence and security matters for parliamentary debates [2]. These consultations contribute to the opinions presented in plenary sessions [3]. The committee has conducted oversight in specific cases, such as visits to military education institutions, rehabilitation projects for military units, and meetings with Armed Forces structures. However, these efforts remain sporadic due to financial difficulties to carry on its oversight activities [4].
In practice, the Committee’s role appears to be more of a formality than an active oversight. For instance, in 2020, it undertook an unusual trip to Zambezia province to examine the proliferation of mosques and its potential links to the jihadist insurgency in Cabo Delgado [6]. In 2024, it consulted the Minister of Defence regarding a proposed law on drones, which was subsequently passed without amendments just two weeks later, following the committee’s recommendation [5].”

There is a Parliamentary Committee for Defence, Order and Public Security whose mission is to provide long-term supervision [1]. However, usually, long-term and strategic issues, like military programming, acquisitions of defence products, and matters of high strategy and national security, are discussed in the Ministries of Defence and Armed Forces [2, 3]. The Parliamentary Defence, Security and Public Order Commission does not have the capacity to carry out long-term oversight [4]. Therefore, long-term investigations are not conducted by the Committee [4]. For instance, there are difficulties in supervising private security companies operating in Maputo, Beira, and Rovuma Basin, where there is resource exploitation and there is a threat of terrorist insurgency attacks [5]. There are several PSCs and PMCs operating there, and investigations remain a great challenge [6].

The Ministry of Defence, sometimes, incorporate recommendations into their practices, taking into account what is established by the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique [1], Defence and Security Policy [2], the National Defence and Armed Forces Law [3], and the principle of subordination, non-partisanship and interdependence [4]. For instance, according to an interview with an employee of the National Defence Inspectorate, the activation and equipment of this body with administrative and operational inspection powers was a recommendation by the National Parliament [5]. The Inspectorate was created in 2006 as part of the Organic Statute of the Ministry of Defence approved by the National Council of Public Administration in 2005. However, the Ministry incorporating recommendations is not a regular practice.

For the period from 2018 to July 26, 2023, the National Assembly had a Security and Defense Committee (Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité), which was established at the beginning of each legislative cycle, as outlined in Article 30 of the National Assembly’s Internal Rules. Composed of 24 members from various political parties, the Committee was responsible for overseeing the work of ministries in charge of national defense and security policy[1]. In 2021, the DCAF supported the transfer of knowledge between outgoing and incoming members of the Defense and Security Commission in Niger [2]. However, national institutions, including the National Assembly, were dissolved on July 26, 2023 and there is currently no Security and Defense Committee in Niger.

Since July 2023, there has not been a National Assembly’s Security and Defense Committee. Before that (2018 to July 26, 2023), the Committee received capacity-building support from DCAF. At the end of the 2016-2021 legislative term, the Committee produced a final report with the support of DCAF. This report included the monitoring and evaluation of the Committee’s 2017-2021 action plan. The development of oversight activities by the Committee during this period included conducting field missions in the regions of Niger. The Committee was also involved in the process of developing the national security policy and reviewing the security and defense budget [1]. The new action plan 2021-2025 was presented by the President of the Commission in December 2021. A first parliamentary effort was to produce an evaluation of the current legislative framework related to “defense secrecy,” aimed at identifying concrete ways to improve transparency and enable Parliament to fulfill its role in civilian oversight.[1][2] Since no committee currenlty exists, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Given that national institutions, including the National Assembly, were dissolved on July 26, 2023, the score is NA. From 2018 until the dissolution of national institutions on July 26, 2023, the Defense and Security Committee played an active role in major discussions on defense policies. This engagement is reflected in the responses to prior questions [1][2]. While technical support from international partners did contribute to policy dialogue and planning processes, it is important to clarify that the Committee was not completely dependent on external expertise. Its leadership included individuals with relevant professional backgrounds, such as MP Mounkaila Issa, then head of the Committee and a retired General in the Nigerien Gendarmerie, who brought experience in defense and security. [3]
Nevertheless, the Committee’s oversight role should not be overestimated, particularly as the security situation deteriorated and the executive expanded its influence. Although the Committee engaged in discussions, it did not consistently review or evaluate major defense policies—such as those related to the ongoing state of emergency—on a five-year basis or more frequently in response to emerging threats. However, the National Assembly and its committees was formally disolved under L’Ordonnance n° 2023-01 du 28 juillet 2023, which suspended the 2010 Constitution and established the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP). Since no committee currenlty exists, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Given that national institutions, including the National Assembly, were dissolved on July 26, 2023, the score is NA.
Chapter III of the Internal Rules grants the Defense and Security Committee the authority to propose amendments and issue recommendations [1]. Although there is no publicly available record of formal legislative amendments initiated by the Committee between 2018 and July 26, 2023, this does not imply that the Committee did not engage in shaping defense policy. It was known to suggest adjustments to the defense budget and contribute recommendations during policy discussions. Nonetheless, studies on parliamentary oversight in Niger—particularly during 2017–2018—highlight that the legislature generally exerted limited influence over public policy implementation, with its role often confined to information sharing rather than robust accountability mechanisms [2]. Even so, this context should not entirely obscure the Committee’s active participation in defense affairs. However, the National Assembly and its committees was formally disolved under L’Ordonnance n° 2023-01 du 28 juillet 2023, which suspended the 2010 Constitution and established the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP).Since no committee currenlty exists, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Article 30, line 7 of the Internal Rules grants the Commission the authority to conduct investigations into policies within its jurisdiction [1]. However, according to interviewees, no long-term investigations have been carried out in the years preceding the military coup of 2023 [2]. Given that national institutions, including the National Assembly, were dissolved on July 26, 2023, the score is NA.

The National Assembly’s ability to exert institutional influence on defense policy remained limited between 2018 and July 26, 2023. According to interviewees, deputies were unable to propose any defense or security-related legislation that was ultimately adopted by the ministries [1][2]. Given that national institutions, including the National Assembly, were dissolved on July 26, 2023, the score is NA.

The National Assembly of Nigeria is empowered to scrutinize various aspects of the performance of the Ministry of Defence and its agencies’ activities and resources, including budgets, personnel management, policy planning, and arms acquisition. This responsibility is executed through various standing, ad hoc, and joint committees’ engagements. Specialised committees, such as the Senate Committee on Defence and the HoR Committee on Defence, conduct hearings and investigations on various aspects of the defence sector [1]. They can summon defence officials to testify and provide documents related to their areas of oversight [2]. In April 2021, for instance, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lieutenant General Ibrahim Attahiru, appeared before the HoR ad-hoc committee on arms and ammunition to defend some documents provided to the Committee investigating arms purchase by the military [3]. Derived from inherent powers of legislative oversight, the NASS, through its committees such as the Senate Joint Committee on Defence, Army, Navy and Air Force, can hold meetings to solicit expert input from defence and security experts or to address matters of urgent national security importance. For instance, President of the Association of Industrial Security and Safety Operators of Nigeria, Dr Ona Ekhomu, in February 2020, addressed the Senate Ad Hoc Committee on Security Challenges on the imperative of reinvigorating the country’s security architecture, which is considered outdated and ineffective [4]. In March 2023, the Senate Joint Committee on Defence, Army, Navy and Airforce held an investigative hearing into the circumstances that resulted in the killing of 16 soldiers in Okuoma Community in Delta while they were allegedly responding to a distress call during fighting between two communities in the state on14 March 2023 [5].

Although the NASS has formal oversight rights over the defence sector, its capacity to perform its oversight functions is considerably limited by the lack of expertise of the legislators on defence and security-related issues [1]. Appointments to the various legislative committees, including the security and defence committee, are made on patronage considerations rather than on professional competence and merit [3][4]. Hutchful, 2004; Aluko, 2015). In addition, the trend of high turnover in the Nigerian legislature after each cycle of general elections, meant that legislators who, overtime, have acquired considerablye knowledge and expertise to ensure thorough oversight have declined over the years. A 2014 report by the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS) described Nigeria as the country with the lowest retention rate of lawmakers in national parliaments globally [5]. At least 58 senators (about half of the total 109 senators) did not return to the NASS after the 2023 [6]. The result is that the legislature is limited in its ability to significantly influence decisions or policies.
The extensive turnover in the National Assembly and new members frequently joining defence and security related committees [2], characterised by high patronage-driven appointments, suggests that few members are likely to possess specialised defence or security expertise.

The formulation of Nigeria’s Defence Policy is a core responsibility of the MOD [1]. The Ministry of Defence, in July 2023, noted that defence policy implementation is very critical to our national security as it plays a vital role in ensuring the safety and security of our citizens, as well as the integrity of our nation. Although the MOD recently emphasised the need for a harmonious working relationship with the NASS to enhance efforts at addressing the various security challenges in the country [2], it has failed to work with the relevant Committees of the NASS to ensure speedy review of major defence policies and decisions every 5 years or earlier in the face of new threats. Nigeria’s defence policy was first formulated in 2006 and revised ten years after in 2017 [3]. However, the MOD inaugurated a committee to review the National Defence Policy in September 2021. According to the Permanent Secretary, MOD, “The essence of the review is to allow for the emergence of an all-embracing quality Defence policy that underscores the way forward in tackling the contemporary security challenges and proffer implementable solutions” [4]. Nearly seven years after the inauguration of the Committee, not even the draft revision has been presented for input by the Senate and HoR Committees on Defence.

In Nigeria, the government’s fiscal year is the same as the calendar year. It runs from 1 January to 31 December [1]. The government uses annual regular budgets and supplementary budgets. The national budget process occurs at three stages namely ministerial approval, executive approval and legislative approval [2]. In this wise, the relevant NASS committees occasionally issue amendment to budgets and recommendations for the defence sector both in the regular budgets and supplementary budgets, but not on a regular basis. In November 2023, for example, the NASS passed the ₦2.17 trillion 2023 supplementary budget, including ₦605 billion for national security and defence [3]. The Minister of Defence, Abubakar Badaru, who defended the budget before the joint sitting of the Senate and House of Representatives committees on defence disclosed that “the purpose of the 2023 additional budget is to have simultaneous operations in all our theatres so we can end insecurity at once” [4].

In the realm of lawmaking, legislative committees play a fundamental role in maintaining official oversight and governance of the defence sector in Nigeria [1]. These include Standing Committees that are permanent fixtures in the Nigerian Assembly, Ad hoc committees established on a short-term basis to address specific issues or conduct investigations, and Special Committees usually established for a variety of purposes but mainly to deal with specific functions that do not fall under regular legislative oversight [2]. Despite the existence of these committees, there is no evidence of a long-term, sustained investigation into the national defence policy that was last revised in 2017, current pressing issues of security and defence priorities such as oil theft in Niger Delta region [3], and the allegation of corruption in counterinsurgency operations in the northeast [4]. In October 2023, for example, the Senate set up a committee to investigate the problem of oil theft in the Niger Delta and present its report in six weeks. The Nigerian Assembly has, in the past, responded to security challenges by establishing committees with very short durations to conduct investigations.

Ministries sometimes incorporate recommendations into practice, but not regularly. For instance, the National Defence Policy 2017, which had input from the NASS provides for the Ministry of Defence to establish a well-staffed Liaison Unit at the National Assembly to facilitate synergy between these two critical bodies [1]. The recommended Unit is yet to be established after seven years. In National Defence policy also proposed that Nigeria shall continue to implement the removal of gender restrictions in the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN). Measures shall be introduced to increase the participation of women in the defence of the Nation; thus, enhancing the employment and promotion opportunities available to women [2]. In March 2021, Nigeria adopted the Gender Policy for the AFN, which seeks to among others, ensure 35 percent affirmative action of women [3,4]. The Ministry of Defence has demonstrated the government’s commitment to bridging gender gaps and ensuring increased roles and opportunities for women in the AFN through the adoption of some policies. The Minister of Defence, Alhaji Muhammed Badaru, in 2023, reiterated the government’s commitment to addressing barriers to recruitment and career progression for females in the Ministry of Defence and its various departmental agencies, including the armed forces [5].

In accordance with the National Assembly’s Rules of Procedure, the Defence and Security Committee is limited to broad organizational issues. It is responsible for issues relating to the general organisation of defence, military cooperation and assistance policy, and the general organization of internal and external security. Its areas of work are: National Defence and Preservation of Territorial Integrity, International Military Cooperation, Military and Paramilitary Establishments, Civilian and Military Personnel of the Armed Forces Security, Gendarmerie, Military Justice. However, it does not have the power to scrutinise any aspect related to personnel management, policy planning, arms acquisition and even not call an expert to do it. Accorting to Article 24, the Committee is also in charge of drafting a report on the paragraphs of the finance law that are related to security issues, for submission to the finance standing committee. [1]

Most of the members of the committee have no advanced expertise in defence and security issues.[1] They are politicians who joined this committee because they are interested in these issues so as a result, they have little influence. However, they regularly build their capacities in order to learn more about the sector. [2] They also have other programmes includding visits to defence-focused establishments. For instance, as part of the Programme Député, Défense, Sécurité et Paix (P2DSP) of the Centre des Hautes Etudes de Défense et de Sécurité (CHEDS), a visit to the General Staff of the Armed Forces was organised for the parliamentarians of the XIIIth Parliament in September 2018 [3] . The aim was to enable the Honourable Members to become more familiar with the relevant concepts and themes of defence and security and to strengthen their understanding of the mission of the Armed Forces in the context of current risks, challenges and threats [3] . Some trainings also happenned at the international level to enhance parliamentary scrutiny. [4]

The defence and security commission does not review major defence policies and decisions every 5 years or even earlier. [1] There is still control through questioning and committees of enquiry. Question time allows Committee’s members to put questions to the ministers concerned, in particular the Minister of Defence or the Minister of the Interior. In this way, they can clearly state how they are managing the budget available to them. However, periodic reviews are not carried out on a regular basis. [2] While the Defence and Security Committee formally submits amendments and recommendations during defencebudget deliberations, these are rarely adopted by the executive. There is no evidence of independent, regular, or substantive scrutiny of defencepolicy formulation. However, parliamentarians do exercise limited oversight through questioning and committee activity, particularly during the annual budget cycle. [2] .

The committee regularly submits amendments to budgets during the annual budgetary votes and sometimes makes recommendations, which the minister does not necessarily take into account. [1] Parliament exercises oversight over national defence policy by examining the Ministry of Defence’s budget, in particular through the Defence and Security Committee. [2]

The commission does not have the resources to fully fulfill its role, let alone carry out long-term investigations. [1] The defence and Security Committee has the prerogative to set up a parliamentary commission of inquiry to investigate military spending, but that is it. [2] [3] .

Every November, the National Assembly of Senegal examines precisely the budget of each ministry. This examination is carried out by the Committee on Finance and Budgetary Control, enlarged to include members of the sectoral committees concerned. These ‘enlarged committee’ meetings are chaired by the chairman of the committee responsible for the ministry whose budget is being examined and the chairman of the committee [1] . During the round of the ministry of armed forces and dence, MPs, in this case those of the defence and security committee, make recommendations even if there is no debate. However, none of these recommendations are taken into account by the minister.[2][3]

Parliamentary committees’, including the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, work span both houses of Parliament [1]. The Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans comprise members of the National Assembly mandated with oversight of the Ministry of Defence [2]. The Select Committee of Security and Justice comprise members of the National Council of Provinces mandated with oversight over several ministries, including Defence and Military Veterans [3]. The Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence performs oversight over intelligence and counter-intelligence functions, which include the State Security Agency (SSA), Defence Intelligence (DI) Division of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the South African Police Service – Crime Intelligence division. [4] Parliamentary committees are empowered by the Constitution to summon any person to appear before them to give evidence or to produce documents, and require any person or institution to report to them. [5]

Of the 30 parliamentary members constituting the three defence committees, only a single member has experience in defence and security, and the majority of committee members are career politicians, in several cases with limited formal qualifications. [1] Committees are, however, supported by parliamentary researchers with a high level of expertise in the sector, which would have guided committee member debate and recommendations. [2]

Major defence policies, including the Defence Review, have not been updated since 2015. [1] While parliamentary committees exercise oversight over relevant departments/agencies’ Annual Performance Plans, high-level strategy documents such as the Department of Defence’s Strategic Plan for 2020–2025 did not receive scrutiny from the committees and were not considered in any committee sessions in the Sixth Parliament. [2] There has been no new legislation in the Department of Defence in the assessment period, 2020-2024, but the Committees have exercised oversight of policy implementation, including deployments. [3]

While relevant parliamentary committees meet frequently, often on a monthly basis, the level of oversight is limited by the quality of committee meetings. Committee meetings in general are consumed by presentations and limited debate, with little consideration for detailed recommendations on Departmental budgets. [1] There are also cases where committees have expressed frustration with the slow response from the Department of Defence to requests by committees, such as seen with the military’s Human Resources Strategy, which speaks to a broader issue with accountability and performance management. [2] Committees have, however, been responsive to oversight of large procurements, particularly in cases of allegations of impropriety, such as that which occurred in the large purchase of unapproved medication from Cuba during the COVID pandemic, which constituted wasteful expenditure. [3]

Evidence of long-term investigations is seen in relation to the so-called “Arms Deal,” where investigations into allegations of irregular procurement and corruption spanned multiple years. [1] While “Arms Deals” may be outside the assessment period, it is an excellent example of long-term oversight of one of the largest corruption scandals in SA history and in the defence sector.
Oversight of operations is also seen with regard to military deployments in Mozambique [2] and Democratic Republic of Congo. [3] Investigations are likewise conducted by investigatory bodies such as the Auditor-General of South Africa, and the Military Ombudsman.

In cases where parliamentary committees have sought to influence policy, such as in relation to the development of the military’s Human Resources Strategy, committee members have expressed frustration at the half-hearted responsiveness from the Department of Defence. [1] Several parliamentary committee sessions have been dedicated to issues of accountability and “consequence management” related to a lack of accountability in response to poor performance and non-compliance with legislation such as the Public Financial Management Act and instructions issued by the Auditor-General of South Africa, indicating a lack of accountability [2].

Article 72 (1) (2) and (3) of the Constitution of South Sudan 2011 gives parliament formal powers to establish parliamentary committees [1]. In addition, regulation 143 (2) of the Revitalized Transitional National Assembly Conduct of Business Regulations, 2011 (amended in 2021) and the South Sudan Audit Chamber Act (2011) (Public Accounts Committees) [2] gives the specialised committees the mandate to organise meetings [2]. These committees can either be specialised or ad hoc in nature depending on the needs. The transitional National Legislative Assembly has several specialised committees with the most relevant in this case being the Committee of Defence and Veteran Affairs and the National Security and Public Order currently headed by Hon Kom Kom Geng [3]. While Article 72(2) states that “The functions of the standing and ad hoc committees of each House shall be determined by its Conduct of Business Regulations” [3], the committees are expected to expose administrative and financial failures. They also have the power to call witnesses on a matter they have interest on [3]. The witnesses can be accompanied by an official whose role is to support them but not to testify. In addition, Section 36 (5) of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act gives the Transnational Legislative Assembly the mandate to scrutinise arms and other classified procurements, and the reports go through the Defence committee. [5] It is worth noting that the Speaker of the TNLA reconstituted the leadership of the Parliamentary Specialized Committees in April 2024 changing the composition of some of the members mentioned here. [4]

In terms of expertise, the Defence and Veteran Affairs committee has 16 members [1] with past involvement in SPLM/A activities. This means they are well grounded in defence issues through practical experience. For example, the current chairperson Rev. Michael Ayuen Johnson is former SPLA officer who also worked for the Criminal Investigation Department in the Republic of South Sudan. [2] However, there are concerns that their practical experience does not match the necessary technical expertise, especially in procurement and finance matters. This shortcoming is, however, being addressed through trainings. For example, according to an officer working at the Transitional National Assembly, members of the Defence and Veteran Affairs Committee undertook a workshop on financial oversight on April 13th and 14th 2023 [3]. However, given the composition of the committee, which has a majority of the members from the ruling party, then their ability to scrutinise defence policies or apply their expertise could be limited. [4]

A look at the Annual Report on the Activities of the Transitional National Legislature, 2022-2023 and 2023 -2024 [1] shows that the Defence and Veteran Affairs committee has been active in reviewing policies and issues touching on the ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs. In addition, other relevant Parliamentary Committees (Legal, Constitutional, Defence and Security Affairs) were able to review six security related laws which have since been enacted into law by Parliament. They include the SPLA Act 2009, and other security related laws such as the National Security Service Act, 2014; the Police Service Bill, 2009; The Prison Service Act, 2011; The Wildlife Service Act, 2011; and The Fire Brigade Act; However, some of these activities are not directly related to defence policy or oversight. For example, in 2023-2024, the committee handled 13 issues, some touching on the development of an Annual Action Plan (2023-3034), conducted public hearings on the National Mine Action Authority Bill, Reviewed the 2023/2024 budget of the ministry as well as conducting a workshop on mental health on August 30-31, 2023 [1]. Some of the findings of the committee have been included in the budget estimates [2]. Furthermore, the SPLA White Paper on Defence was deliberated, adopted passed by Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly in June 2008. Since then, the defence policy has not been reviewed even after the independence of South Sudan [3].

The committee is actively involved in short-term oversight, convening periodically to address various issues related to the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs [1]. For instance, in 2023, the committee held meetings specifically to review the budget estimates for the 2023/2024 fiscal year. In 2024, the ministry’s budget saw a substantial increase, a development that can be attributed, in part, to the committee’s role in scrutinizing and advocating for necessary financial allocation [2].
Beyond financial oversight, the committee also established a sub-committee to investigate the expropriation of a disputed piece of land intended for public use. This issue was brought to the committee’s attention by the Managing Director of the South Sudan Pension Fund (SSPF), highlighting the committee’s role in addressing grievances and ensuring that public interests are upheld [3]. The report from the committee requires that the relevant minister, either from the defence or finance ministries to respond to the issues raised. [3]

There is no evidence that the Defence Committee in South Sudan has conducted long-term investigations or sustained oversight into corruption or irregularities within the defence sector. The committee’s engagements with corruption issues have been sporadic and largely reactive, often triggered by immediate crises rather than guided by a systemic or long-term oversight mandate [1].
To date, there is no record of consistent follow-through, public disclosure of outcomes, or accountability enforcement stemming from committee activities. No long-term oversight reports have been published [2].
That said, the committee has demonstrated some potential to expand its focus beyond short-term matters. In 2023, for example, it hosted two international consultants who presented lessons from the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reforms (SSR), offering exposure to comparative long-term oversight models [3]. Furthermore, in 2024, the Security and Defence Sector Reform (SDSR) Board validated five strategic security policy documents that, if approved by the presidency, could lay the groundwork for broader institutional reforms, including those related to anti-corruption and oversight [4].
These developments suggest a slow and early-stage evolution in thinking toward institutional reform, but they do not yet reflect actual practice of long-term oversight or investigation by the committee. Structural constraints such as high turnover, limited capacity, and the exclusion of operational matters from the committee’s remit continue to hinder the development of a systematic approach to sustained oversight [5].

The Defence Ministry of South Sudan has made limited strides in incorporating recommendations especially pertaining to anti-corruption. A scan of parliamentary documents [1] and the media [2] did not reveal any direct policy recommendations from the committee to the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs. However, the involvement of the committee in scrutinizing the national budget and proposing recommendations cannot be overlooked in the recent increase in budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs [3]. There have been some recommendations of financial management. For example, the ministry did take up the recommendation to establish internal audit office and through it, it has been able to flag misappropriation and ghost workers; however, despite of this, there has been very limited impact on but stopped short of systemic change. Enforcement, transparency, and long-term reforms have largely remained unchecked [4].

The Parliament of the Republic of Uganda has a committee on defence and security known as the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs [1]. It has the power to scrutinise the performance of MoDVA. The committee can summon the minister and technical staff of the MoDVA to appear before it. The committee can also scrutinise some aspects of the defence budget. For example, the committee made a recommendation to the Parliament to provide UGX 55.8 billion to be spent on recruiting 9000 personnel and re-training up to 40,000 personnel to equip the force with relevant skills and knowledge to execute military operations and missions effectively [2].
However, the committee have limited powers in the matters of classified expenditure and arms acquisition [3]. Some of the committee’s proceedings and reports are not publicly available, making it difficult to hold the committee and the defence sector accountable.
The Public Finance Management Act (Section 24) attempts to provide some oversight by mandating a three-member committee to scrutinize classified security budgets. However, the law allows the classified budget to be presented as a single-line item with no further details. This limitation reduces Parliament’s ability to conduct thorough financial scrutiny, ensuring that key aspects of defence spending remain opaque [4].

The defence committees of the Parliament, while nominally including members with defence sector expertise, demonstrably struggle to exert meaningful influence on policy decisions. Consequently, informed challenges to expert opinions or the formulation of alternative strategies are consistently hindered [1]. The majority of committee members have limited expertise in defence and security. While the current chair has a background in law and security studies, the deputy chair is a former political mobilizer with a degree in Environmental Conservation Science. The most notable defence expertise on the committee often comes from the sitting officers of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), whose presence may further tilt discussions in favour of the executive’s security policies rather than independent scrutiny [2].
Even when committee members have relevant knowledge, they are often unable to influence outcomes if their views conflict with the dominant political agenda [1].
In addition, the committees face serious capacity constraints. There is insufficient funding for independent research, few opportunities to consult external experts, and limited ability to conduct on-the-ground inspections or site visits. These constraints hinder informed scrutiny and leave committee members reliant on the executive for information and framing [3].

The law (e.g., Section 39 (2) and (3) of the UPDF Act, 2005) permits Parliament to review defence policies and activities, even if Parliament is in recess. This legal requirement underscores the oversight role of Parliament, even though, in practice, executive decisions on security matters often face limited resistance due to political dynamics and are sometimes taken without the parliamentary committee’s review.
In reality, the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs plays a critical role in reviewing the Ministerial Policy Statements of the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) and making recommendations on security matters. While the committee does conduct reviews, there is no explicit mandate requiring a comprehensive review every five years. Instead, the committee typically assesses policies as they are proposed or modified. For example, in October 2021, members of the Parliament asked the Government to sign and ratify the treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, whose delay will diminish Uganda’s international standing. Members of Parliament also asked the government to tackle the insecurity at Uganda-South Sudan border, which has worsened since the attack on Ugandan traders by South Sudan soldiers in 2021 [1] [2] [3].
The Parliament also scrutinises the decision of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs. For example, the parliament rejected the proposal by the committee to reduce UGX 27.5 billion budget for the Karamoja peace mission after several legislators questioned the motive behind such a recommendation when Turkana cattle rustlers from Kenya continue to attack the Karamojong [4]. Furthermore, Parliament has a constitutional role in scrutinising military deployments.
But there are times when the executive bypasses Parliament and its committee. A recent example is the government’s handling of troop deployments to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where concerns were raised about the lack of prior parliamentary debate or clarity on the mission’s mandate, chain of command, and budget [5].

The Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs meets at least once a month to discuss issues that may have arisen in the sector, and consider reports from oversight visits and investigations.[1] They also have powers to summon and caution the minister of MoDVA. For example, Members of Parliament on the defence and Internal Affairs Committee voiced their disappointment with the degenerating conduct of Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) soldiers.[2]
While the committee can issue recommendations based on its findings, it lacks direct enforcement powers. Ministries and government agencies are expected to respond to these recommendations, but the level of compliance largely depends on political dynamics and the extent of cooperation between Parliament and the executive branch.

The Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs oversees the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA), focusing on budget performance, procurement, and financial transparency. It reviews audit queries and reports from the Public Accounts and Budget Committees, recommending improvements in areas like record-keeping and procurement to prevent financial irregularities. However, a significant limitation to the committee’s oversight capabilities lies in its exclusion from reviewing classified budgets, projects, and activities. Dissenting MPs and former auditors argue that this exclusion allows inflated costs and mismanagement under the cover of national security. For instance, during parliamentary investigations into the mistreatment of the Banyarwanda community, concerns were raised about defence spending on border security without proper scrutiny [2]

Despite this limitation, the committee actively engages in oversight visits to military bases, project sites, and unclassified areas of operations, such as Nakasongola. A 2023 visit to forensic laboratories in Eastern and Western Uganda revealed funding gaps and logistical challenges that hinder effective service delivery [3]. These visits, while limited to unclassified areas, contribute to a broader understanding of the activities of the MoDVA and allow the committee to make informed recommendations for improvement. However, the inability to apply this same level of scrutiny to classified projects consistently raises concerns about the completeness and effectiveness of their oversight.

The perception that Ugandan parliamentary decisions are largely advisory, and therefore non-binding on the executive, significantly impacts the practical application of legislative oversight, particularly in sensitive sectors like security. This perception stems from the constitutional balance of power, which grants the executive branch considerable authority in policy formulation and implementation. Consequently, ministries often operate with a degree of autonomy, interpreting and implementing parliamentary recommendations based on their perceived impact on national security and operational efficiency. While ministries are expected to acknowledge and consider parliamentary recommendations, they are not always obligated to adopt them [1][2]. This creates a situation where the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight is contingent on the willingness of the Executive to engage constructively.
The discretionary power exercised by ministries in incorporating parliamentary recommendations raises concerns about the actual influence of the legislature. Ministries may prioritise their own strategic objectives or security assessments, potentially disregarding recommendations that challenge their established practices. This is particularly evident in the defence sector, where the rationale of national security is frequently invoked to justify deviations from parliamentary directives. Interviews with a leader of a civil society organisation reveal that this selective implementation undermines the principle of accountability and transparency, as it allows ministries to operate with limited external scrutiny [3]. Furthermore, the perceived advisory nature of parliamentary decisions can discourage robust engagement from legislators, as they may question the practical value of their efforts [2].
The lack of a clear mechanism to enforce parliamentary recommendations exacerbates this issue. While parliamentary committees can conduct investigations and issue reports, their ability to compel ministries to implement changes is limited [3]. This creates a situation where the executive can effectively circumvent parliamentary oversight, particularly in areas deemed sensitive.

The country, through its parliament, has a Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence, Home Affairs, and Security Services, which functions as a committee of the lower house (Parliament), while the upper house (Senate) has a corresponding Peace and Security Committee [1]. These two committees are tasked with discussing issues related to the defence forces. In principle, the committees can request the Minister of Defence to address questions related to the defence forces portfolio, including matters such as budget allocation, soldiers’ welfare, and military infrastructure, among others. Additionally, the committees can conduct public hearings on the social and economic benefits affecting war veterans because they are classified under the same portfolio as the defence forces and Home Affairs [2].

The majority of the MPs have less expertise in defence and security issues. Of the 20 members of the parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security Services, only two have experience in the military [2]. Those serving in the committee are mainly supporters and or members of the ruling party, with limited knowledge on the defence sector especially on what has to be done and how it is supposed to be done in a more professional manner [1].

The Committee on Defence, Home Affairs, Security Services and War Veterans Affairs does not review the defence policy [1]. The defence forces do not share the defence policy with the parliamentary portfolio committee on defence, security and home affairs as the defence policy is viewed as a strategic document for the defence forces [2]. The defence policy resides with the Ministry of Defence in the office of the responsible Minister who shares and liaises with the service chiefs who include the General, the Army Commander, Police Commissioner, Prison Commissioner, Air Vice Marshal and Director of Intelligence [1]. So the parliamentary portfolio Committee on Defence, Security and Home Affairs does not contribute in the policy making process of the defence policy [2].

The Committee on Defence has some oversight on the defence forces and security [1]. For example, the Minister of Defence has been invited to respond to some questions pertaining to the welfare of soldiers going hungry in the barracks [1][2]. Overall, the committee rarely meets to review issues. It only acts when there are serious issues or when they are brought to the attention of the public through independent media.

The Committee on Defence has powers to play an oversight role, but it does not involve itself in sensitive military activities and operations of the military but on civil registry issues [2]. The defence committee only limits itself to trivial issues on its portfolio, such as focusing on migration issues and the country borders issues [1][2]. Thus, the parliament portfolio committee lacks long-term investigation on defence operations [2].

The defence committee does not make recommendations on sensitive institutional issues [1][2]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.