The Public Procurement Code formalises the entire procurement cycle in all materials, including in the defence sector. Article 23 imposes the obligation to determine precisely the needs before any call for tenders or any negotiation procedure by direct agreement. The law specifies that “the public contracts concluded by the contracting authority must have the exclusive purpose of meeting these needs by taking into account the sustainable development objectives in their economic, social and environmental dimensions” [1]. Title III of the Public Procurement Code details in ten chapters all the general and specific procedures relating to the award of contracts; from the documents to be provided by tenderers until the award of public contracts [2]. Chapter IV governs the performance of the contract and lays down the conditions under which the services are to be received [3]. The conditions for subcontracting, co-contracting, assignment and termination of contracts are also laid down in the Public Procurement Code [4]. There is also a formal procedure for the award of contracts relating todefence and security needs requiring secrecy. In fact, the handover starts from existing needs, and is carried out by the national or international restricted tender procedure without advertising. A special ad hoc commission for opening and evaluating offers established by the contracting authority concerned, is created. The signing of contracts falls under the exclusive competence of the person responsible for public procurement [5].

Detailed procedures for the entire defence procurement cycle are disclosed to officials involved in the supply chain, and not to the public [1]. The agents assigned to the Central Directorate of Services of the Commissariat of the Armed Forces and the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces are therefore aware of the provisions of the Public Procurement Code. The treasurers general, accountants and auditors serving in the Beninese armed forces are the main targets of this disclosure [2].

Legislation provides for three types of procurement procedure: open, restricted and direct. The circumstances in which the administration may resort to a procedure are indicated. For each type of procedure, the legislation specifies the procedure, from needs assessment to contract execution, including the call for tenders, the number of compulsory files, the review of files, etc. These provisions are set out in the Public Procurement Code [1] and the decree laying down the procedures and conditions for awarding public contracts relating to national defense and security needs requiring secrecy [2]. Agents involved in the supply chain confirm that procedures are being followed. In recent years, no financial scandal in the Beninese armed forces has been made public [3]. There is therefore no evidence that the procedures are not followed.

The procurement process in the Defence sector is by no means formalizsed. It is managed on a discretionary basis by a small group of senior army officers, including the Head of Administration and Management and the Head of Logistics at the Army General Staff [1] [2] [3].

Information on public contracts in the Defence sector is sometimes published. These are published in online newspapers, offline newspapers and at the offices of the Ministry of Defence and the Army General Staff. These are generally public contracts for the supply of foodstuffs to the various military camps [1] [2] [3]. The publicly announced tenders concern only ‘small supplies,’ even when related to the military hospital [4].The information provided concerns, in a general and succinct manner, the assessment of needs, the publication of invitations to tender and the awarding of contracts. However, the execution of contracts remains a matter of secrecy. [1] [2] [3].

There is a manual of administrative and financial procedures within the army which deals in a general way, without going into detail, with the process of awarding public contracts. It states, among other things, that all contracts must be published and open to competition, and that the lowest bidder principle must be observed [1] [3]. In any case, there is no indication that the manual is being used [2] [3].

In terms of administrative organisation, it should be noted that the MINDEF and MINMAP report to the Presidency of the Republic.The defence procurement process is not formalised at all. The opacity of procurement within the defence sector remains a concern to this day.[1] Public access to information about the defence acquisition planning process is restricted in Cameroon.[2] Furthermore, budget information is far from comprehensive, with most figures being highly questionable and lacking justification.

The defence procurement cycle is not disclosed, despite the existence of public procurement control mechanisms. Within MINDEF, at the Budget and Equipment Directorate, there is a public procurement department. However, the lack of independence and resources hinders the exercise of functions.[1] Moreover, beyond MINDEF, ordinary Cameroonians are not informed of the procurement process.[2]

In practice, there are policies and procedures for each stage of the public procurement cycle implementation process, but there are some gaps in execution. Evidence showed the existence of an internal document and reports within MINDEF that explain the different stages of the procurement cycle, but it has not been possible to access to these documents and reports.[1][2] The only publicly available document that contains some information about the various stages is the Administrative Procedures Manual of the Ministry of Defence (Central Services), specifically from pages 39 to 46.[3] Due to the secrecy clause covering several defence procurements and the absence of specific regulations concerning public procurement in the defence sector, the procurement process cycle lacks transparency.

As the defence sector is excluded from the public procurement code, the public procurement cycle in this area remains opaque, particularly with regard to the implementation and signing of contracts [1]. In addition, needs assessments and public procurement planning were carried out for the period 2016-2020, but no updated documents have been published since then [2]. Finally, some rules exist for the elimination of small arms in relation to the National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, but no other information is available for other equipment [3].

Although traces of acquisitions may appear in the budget or in the press, the rest of the procedures are not public. Some acquisitions are reported in the press and are the subject of public ceremonies, particularly for ships. The annual defence budgets also mention the investment appropriations allocated to acquisitions [1, 2].

Internal procedures and policies exist, but they can be largely circumvented. The gendarmerie headquarters and the high command submit their requests to the National Security Council (CNS), or suppliers propose equipment to them. Discussions take place between the CNS, the commands and the service providers for orders, and the CNS appears to have decision-making power over acquisitions [1, 2].

The procurement cycle, from needs assessment to asset disposal, is formalized (1) and primarily governed by the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) (2) and its amendments. In accordance with Section 20 of the Act, the Ministry of Defence and the Ghana Armed Forces have established entity tender committees responsible for ensuring that each stage of the procurement process adheres to the regulations outlined in the Act.
The various cycle of defence procurement are not made public. (3) Recent Auditor-General reports tend to summarise contract management/ stores–procurement irregularities at aggregate level and do not consistently show MoD-specific examples demonstrating the full cycle in practice (e.g., systematic evidence that every contract moves from implementation to formal close-out with all sign-offs documented). That points to incomplete public evidence of implementation rather than gaps in the legal framework (4).

Despite the formalisation of procedures, the confidentiality clauses in Section 32(A) of the Public Procurement Act (2003) allow for non-disclosure in situations where disclosure could compromise national security. This provision has created challenges, particularly with large capital acquisitions and asset disposals, which has, in turn, limited the level of transparency in the procurement processes within the defence sector in Ghana. (2) (3)
The MoD’s budget estimates/MTEF show aggregate spend, but do not present the procurement cycle or contract-level documentation (4). GHANEPS and the PPA portal, the Ministry of Defence has entries for specific procurements (e.g., “Emailing System for Ghana Armed Forces”; “Procurement of clothing with accessories for Ghana Navy/Air Force”), often marked Single Source. These pages show title, reference number, method, and status; sometimes an award line exists in the generic “Awarded Contracts” view, but values/details for MoD items are frequently absent (5). PPA reiterates that entities must advertise tender notices under s.47(4), but this does not equate to publishing the full cycle (contract implementation, sign-off).

There are detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle, based on the Public Procurement Act (2003). (1) Nevertheless, its implementation is often fraught with challenges including the lack of transparency and interference by political actors. (2) (3) Research with a sample size of 100 public institutions in Ghana, for instance, indicates that familiarity, incompetence, political interference, and poor monitoring were significant factors resulting in non-compliance with the Ghana Public Procurement Act. (4)

The entire procurement cycle is formalised. The set formal process encompasses procurement planning, processing, inventory and asset management, asset disposal, and contract management. The National Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Policy, PPADA 2015, the Constitution, and Vision 2030 establish the comprehensive legal and policy framework for public procurement and asset disposal for all public entities including MoD. Section 53 of the PPADA outlines the process for procurement and asset disposal planning [1]. The National Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Policy seeks to ensure public entities achieve value for money and foster good governance in the public procurement system and embed sustainability in their procurement processes [2]. Sustainable procurement involves procuring public entities meeting their needs for goods, works, and services while achieving value for money on a whole life cycle basis, resulting in benefits for the organisation, society, and the economy, while minimising environmental damage. This aligns with Article 42 of the Constitution, which commits to safeguarding the environment for current and future generations [2].
However, key findings of the Auditor General on the procurement of foodstuff, released in 2021, identified several risks in the MOD’s procurement processes:
Instances of public procurement law violations include:
– Absence of approved procurement plans
– Failure to comply with regulations on restricted tendering and direct procurement
– Non-compliance with decisions of the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board [3].

Some elements of the procurement cycle are provided, but not entirely. The procurement law obligates procurement entities to publish their annual procurement plans and make them public. However, details of the entire defence procurement cycle are not disclosed, nor is a clear explanation provided in disaggregated form. Assessment of needs, contract implementation and sign-off, asset disposal, process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation are also missing.
New amendments introduced in 2022 under section 53 of the PPADA require procuring public entities to publish annual procurement plans [1]. Part 12 of section 53 states that upon submission of the procurement plans to the National Treasury, the accounting officer of a procuring entity shall publish and publicise its approved procurement plan as an invitation to treat on its website. Equally, on receipt of the procurement plans submitted by the procuring entities, the National Treasury shall publish and publicise the procurement plans as an invitation to treat on the state tender portal. The Ministry of Defence has yet to make public their annual procurement plan, and the National Treasury has also not published MOD’s annual procurement plan on its website. These two requirements have not been met.
Additionally, Executive Order 2 of 2018 directed all procuring entities to submit reports on public procurement and asset disposal transactions to the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority [2]. However, the MOD has not been publishing its contracts and tenders on the https://tenders.go.ke/ocds website [4]. Instead, it has been publishing asset disposals, tenders, and contracts on their portal on the MoD site [3]. The MOD has been publishing pre-qualification adverts, disposal of assets through invites to Public Auction, open tenders, and even restricted tenders.

The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) publishes its annual report every year and among the compliance issues, it provides a highlight of procuring entities publishing its annual procurement plans. In the most latest annual plan of 2021/2022, MoD had not submitted its plan [1].
Equally, the PPRA list of non-compliant entities for the 2023/2024 financial year captures MoD among those who wilfully failed to cooperate with the Authority in its mandate to inspect, assess, review, or audit procurement records. This non-compliance involved failing to provide requested procurement records and information for assessments, thereby hindering the Authority’s staff from conducting procurement and asset disposal audits of the listed entities. The PPRA cited non-compliance with sections 43(1) and 176(1)(a) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA), 2015.
In Feb 2022, a special audit undertaken by the OAG noted massive irregularities in Sh.8.9bn military for tendering. The special audit scrutinised 226 contracts following a request from Public Accounts Committee (2018). Regarding how the procurement laws are being implemented, the audit established there were instances restricted tendering had been utilised without justification. The audit covered financial years 2014/15 to 2017/18. The OAG noted that MoD had “engaged 18 suppliers with contracts for supply of foodstuffs through restricted tendering to suppliers who were not prequalified.” The OAG noted that this was against section 95(3) of the PPADA 2015. The section provides for procuring entities to invite tenders from approved persons who are prequalified [2]. Likewise, key findings of the Auditor General on the procurement of foodstuff, released in 2021, identified several risks in the MOD’s procurement processes: instances of public procurement law violations, including absence of approved procurement plans, failure to comply with regulations on restricted tendering and direct procurement and non-compliance with decisions of the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board [3].

Liberia’s procurement processes are governed by the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (PPCA), which establishes the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC) as the regulatory body overseeing public procurement and concessions.[1] Due to the special dispensation provided for in subsection 3(c), this exemption allows for special procedures in defence procurement, allowing modifications to standard procedures with the approval of the President and the National Security Council. This special dispensation means that key elements of the procurement cycle—such as open needs assessments, competitive bidding, and transparent implementation—can be bypassed under the justification of national security.[2]
In addition, the PPCC has introduced an electronic procurement portal (e-GP), which formalises the procurement cycle by requiring line ministries and agencies to publish procurement plans, contract awards, and related documentation online.[3] The Ministry of National Defense is listed among the participating institutions, showing that defence procurement is, in principle, integrated into the national procurement framework. However, because of the statutory exemptions, not all defence-related contracts are subject to the same level of transparency and formalisation as those of civilian ministries.[4]

Liberia’s Public Procurement and Concessions Act (PPCA) mandates that each procuring unit prepare an annual procurement plan [1]. According to the PPCA, the defence procurement cycle entails assessment of needs, which is often reflected in the budget. Moreover, the PPCC has introduced an electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) portal, which provides a formalised procurement mechanism whereby procuring entities—including the Ministry of National Defense—are expected to publish procurement plans, invitations to bid, awards, and contractor registrations online. However, asset disposal and mechanisms for contract implementation are not publicly visible, and detailed disclosures are missing even through the e-GP platform. The defence procurement cycle process is not disclosed to the public on the PPCC website. We can only find annual reports, but such information is not regularly updated. Such reports only correspond to general information regarding procuring entities’ contracts without specifying the procurement cycle.[2][3]
While the e-GP portal signals an institutional intention toward transparency, statutory exemptions under Section 3(c) allow defence procurement to bypass these processes in the name of national security, meaning not all defence contracts undergo this public cycle.[4]

Both the PPCC and PFM laws are clear on the process and steps establishing procedures for each stage of the procurement cycle. The laws are clear and articulate on the process.[1][2] However, there are shortcomings in the implementation, while the PPCC publishes some procurement information, data is often incomplete, outdated, and not easily accessible to the public. Moreover, the PPC publishes a compliance report with public procurement planning, but the latest report is from 2020.[3] This limits oversight and accountability.[4]

The procurement and needs assessment cycle is defined by the armed forces each year [1]. These needs must be included in the budget of the Ministry of Defense. And like any other ministry, the authorization of contracts and disposal acts are formalized following the public procurement procedure. According to the legal framework, the public market must obey the principle of transparency of procedures: publication of General Procurement Notices, publication of Call for Tender Notices, Calls for Expressions of Interest (AMI), Notices of Consultation or Request for Prices (ACP, ADP) and award notices [2]. However, concerning the defense sector, part of the procedure is not always known [1].

Information on defense procurement may be publicly known because it is included in the finance law [1]. The Ministry of Defense’s calls for tenders are also published either in the press or through posters. It is a legal obligation. But the details of the supply cycle are not publicly known. And moreover, the civil authorities and the military authorities do not provide details on this point [2]. It is important to precise that for infrastructure construction the Ministry of the Armed Forces calls for tenders and the procedure is made public and established according to the laws in force. However, regarding arms purchases, the President of the Republic decides, and the procedure is confidential.

In terms of public finances, Madagascar has detailed policies and procedures for each stage of the procurement cycle implementation process. At least two decrees govern public procurement, including those of the Ministry of Defense: Decree No. 2005-215 of May 3, 2005 relating to the organization and operation of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority and Decree No. 2006-344 of May 30, 2006 establishing the constitution, composition, attribution and operation of the Tender Commission (CAO) [1]. But effective implementation presents shortcomings, particularly in the cases of acquisition of military equipment which fall outside of these regulations [3] [4]. Indeed, Madagascar sources its supplies from foreign countries and often within the framework of a bilateral agreement. Such an agreement thus constitutes a bias towards full compliance with the public procurement procedure [2].

The process is formalised in such a way that makes it escape certain possibilities of control, which is likely to encourage the risks of corruption and kickbacks. Indeed, by excluding from the provisions of the public procurement code contracts for works, supplies and services in the defence and security sectors for reasons of defence secrecy and vita national interests, it becomes difficult to examine the process and judge whether it complies with laws and regulations.[1] All steps are formalised as required by law but remain inaccessible to the public. However, there are mechanisms for a priori control of compliance with procedures, notably through financial controls detached at the level of the ministries and which must affix their visa to the contracts.[2]

Part of the procurement cycle in the defence sector appears in the annual procurement plans with expressed needs and forecast amounts.[1] However, the fate reserved for the rest of the process remains opaque to a certain extent, as it is not made known to the public or because the details of the breakdown do not appear in a given public report.[2]

The process is governed by a range of procedures[1] and texts.[2] The different stages are governed by legislation and must comply with rules that are in principle predefined. However, in the defence sector, the procedures may lack precision and their implementation may present gaps due to the existence of a certain opacity, which is officially attributed to sensitivities and defence secrecy.

The defence procurement cycle — from needs assessment and planning to contract approval and implementation — is not disclosed to the public, as it is classified information under the State Secrets Act [1, 2, 3]. The acquisition cycle itself is not regulated in detail by public legislation. For example, Decree 34/2007 of 10 August, which approves the Regulation on Equipment and Armament of the Defence and Security Forces, does not set out the steps of the procurement or acquisition cycle. Instead, it regulates only the conditions under which equipment may be acquired, imported, or exported — decisions that fall under the authority of the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of the Interior, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence and Security Forces [4].

The defence procurement cycle is not disclosed because it is classified by the State Secrets [1]; Right to Information [2] and Military Secrets Act [3]. Defence procurement information are part of “data, information, materials and documents, regardless of their form, nature and means of transmission, to which a security classification level has been assigned and which require protection against unauthorized disclosure, the knowledge of which by unauthorised persons is likely to jeopardise or cause damage to national independence, unity, the integrity of the State and internal and external security” [2].

There is the Regulation on Equipment and Armament of the Defence and Security Forces [1]. This regulation contains the procedures for the defence product acquisition cycle. However, it lacks specific and procedural details, such as needs assessment processes and procedures; aspects about contracting and contract signing and what can or cannot be made available to the public for scrutiny and external evaluation, taking into account the legal framework that regulates the contracting of public works contracts, acquisition of goods and provision of services to the State, approved through Decree No. 79/2022, of December 30 [2].

The defense procurement cycle in Niger is partially formalized, primarily governed by the 2013 decree on defense and security acquisitions [1]. This decree establishes a structured process for procurement, covering assessment of needs, contract implementation, and post-procurement controls. The assessment of needs is regulated by Article 3 and Article 20, which mandate a yearly acquisition plan developed based on requirements identified by the technical departments of the Ministry of Defense. This plan is flexible and regularly updated to account for changing operational priorities. The decree also defines various procedural aspects of defense procurement, structured as follows:
• Chapter III (Art. 6-13): Candidate qualifications.
• Chapter IV (Art. 14-19): Subcontracting regulations.
• Chapter V (Art. 20-34): Procurement process, including needs assessment.
• Chapter VI (Art. 35-39): Approval procedures and contract entry into force.
• Chapter VII (Art. 40-41): Digitalization of procurement procedures.
• Chapter VIII (Art. 42-49): Guarantee provisions.
• Chapter IX (Art. 50-53): Amendments to procurement processes.
• Chapter X (Art. 54-57): Contract cancellations and adjournments.
• Chapter XI (Art. 58-70): Payment mechanisms.
• Chapter XII (Art. 71-75): Post-procurement controls and sanctions.
Important to note that the Decree No. 2022-743, partially reintegrated defense procurement into public procurement laws under a “derogatory regime.” [2]. This decree contradicts the 2024 Ordinance No. 2024-05, which exempted defense and security expenditures from procurement and financial accountability laws entirely [3].
If referred exclusively to 2013 decree, the procurement process is structured, ensuring that contracts undergo formal approvals, implementation measures, and procedural oversight mechanisms.

The defense procurement cycle in Niger is not disclosed to the public, with no meaningful information available on assessment of needs, contract implementation, or asset disposal. While the 2013 decree on defense and security acquisitions provides a structured framework for procurement, it explicitly classifies the annual acquisition plan as “top secret” (Article 20), preventing any public access to details on defense spending or contract awards [1].
Furthermore, the recent adoption of Ordinance No. 2024-05 has further exempted defense-related expenditures from procurement oversight and public scrutiny, removing even the possibility of retroactive controls. There are no published reports, audits, or publicly available records detailing how defense contracts are awarded, executed, or finalized [2].

Although Niger has a formalised legal framework for defense procurement, there is little evidence that policies and procedures for the implementation process are effectively used in practice. The 2013 decree on defense and security acquisitions outlines a structured procurement cycle, including needs assessment, contract execution, and post-procurement controls. However, multiple corruption scandals and investigative reports have exposed widespread violations of procurement procedures, including fraudulent contracts, fictitious tenders, and severe mismanagement in contract implementation [1]. The lack of enforcement of procurement rules has led to irregular contract awards, failure to deliver military equipment, and the use of offshore shell companies for fraudulent transactions. Reports indicate that official procurement procedures are often bypassed, and contracts are awarded through direct negotiation rather than competitive processes. Furthermore, the recent Ordinance No. 2024-05 has removed prior and post-procurement controls, further weakening implementation oversight [2].

Nigeria has established regulations intended to promote transparency in defence procurement. However, full public disclosure of all details related to the procurement cycle is limited, particularly due to high level secrecy and opaqueness often cloaked under national security considerations [1]. Issues of secrecy and the continuous reference to the Section 97 (1) of the Criminal Code Act in Nigeria which states that “Any person who, being employed in the public service, publishes or communicates any fact which comes to his knowledge by virtue of his office, and which it is his duty to keep secret, or any document which comes to his possession by virtue of his office and which it is his duty to keep secret, except to some person to whom he is bound to publish or communicate it, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for two years” [2]. This lack of transparency has raised concerns over corruption and inefficiency within the procurement process [3]. Various oversight bodies, including the National Assembly’s Committees on Defence and Public Accounts, may conduct reviews and produce reports which are also not disclosed to the public [4].

The Public Procurement Act (2007) and the Freedom of Information Act (2011) provide exemptions with reference to National Defence. For instance, according to Section 11 of the ‘Freedom of information Act (2011), “A public institution may deny an application for any information the disclosure of which may be injurious to the conduct of international affairs and the defence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria” [1]. As Nigeria confronts various security challenges, its Armed Forces – navy, air force, and army – have also made public some of their arms and weapons procurement policies and drives towards safeguarding national interests. In August 2024, the MOD began enforcing local arms sourcing, barring foreign procurement and requiring MDAs seeking to procure arms and ammunition to clear with it before going ahead with the procurement to ensure that arms and ammunition that could be sourced locally are not purchased from foreign companies [2]. The restrictions were in accordance with the new defence industries corporation of Nigeria (DICON), Act signed by President Bola Tinubu, in November 2023. The MoD had in 2022 disclosed that a document containing templates on jointness of the Armed Forces in operations planning, synchronization of procurement process as well as joint capacity development programme for the services was being worked out [3]. For instance, the 2022 Defence Headquarters budget comprised several projects including the purchase of motor vehicles and defence equipment, procurement of military equipment, kits, arms and ammunition while the Army headquarters had generic lines mentioning construction projects, maintenance and procurement. The Air Force listed, among others, the procurement of two surveillance capable Beechcraft Air 360 aircraft, spares and ground support equipment [4]. However, aspects of contract sign-off and asset disposal are rarely disclosed to the public.

The policies on public procurement are defined in the relevant laws and regulations governing procurement in Nigeria. There are formal policies and procedures in place for the implementation of the defence procurement cycle in Nigeria. The Public Procurement Act (PPA) of 2007, outlines general procurement guidelines for all MDAs, which understandably includes the defence sector [1]. However, its application to defence procurement is often limited by exemptions granted for national security reasons [2]. The Nigerian DP cycle has detailed policies and procedures for the assessment of needs, planning, budgeting, contracting, and contract management, as well as disposal. However, while these are fairly comprehensive on paper, significant shortfalls persist in their implementation [3]. As a result, Nigeria still faces considerable corruption risk across its defence sector, with extremely limited controls in operations and procurement [4].

Despite the existence of some processes, there is a lack of information regarding specific and proper formal procedures in the defence procurment cycle process. [1] The Procurement Unit is responsible for ensuring the quality of procurement files and the smooth operation of the procurement committee. To this end, it is responsible, in particular, for the prior examination of tender documents, comparative bid analysis reports, provisional award reports and draft contracts for amounts below the review thresholds of the Directorate responsible for prior control [2] .
As part of its 2012 consolidated investment budget and operating budget, the Ministry of the Armed Forces has obtained funding for the new construction of four gendarmerie brigades in Dakar, Kaolack, Louga and Kolda for the national gendarmerie. [3] However in some cases the procedure is not respected because the material the army needs is considered as sensitive for the national security.In Senegal, article 79 of the organic law is an obstacle for the Cour des Comptes, as it gives it no power to judge financial offenders, such as the people singled out in the report on the Covid Fund.

The Ministry of the Armed Forces is seeking sealed bids from eligible and suitably qualified candidates for the purchase of 4×4 vehicles. This open invitation to tender consists of a single lot. The lot is indivisible. Delivery will take place at the Samba Diéry DIALLO barracks. The delivery period is forty-five days from the date of notification of the contract. The award of the contract will be conducted by open tender for a contract as defined in the Public Procurement Code, and open to all eligible candidates. [1] .
The conditions for tendering for Army contracts are clearly defined by the Senegal Army Commissariat and are accessible to everyone. [2] Most of the time, it’s the implementation and signing of contracts and the transfer of assets that are the source of the equipment and the use to which the army has put it. Because sensitive data is involved, procedures are always followed and some data is classified as defence secrets. Works, supplies, services and equipment carried out for the defence and security of Senegal, undertaken by the Armed Forces, the National Police, Customs, the National Fire Brigade, the Prison Service, the departments responsible for Water and Forests, Hunting and Soil Conservation, as well as National Parks, and when they are incompatible with the advertising measures provided for in the Public Contracts Code because they require secrecy and the protection of the essential interests of the State. [3]

In the first half of 2022 alone, 725 contracts were awarded by private treaty. These were worth CFAF 474 billion, of which CFAF 396 billion came from external funding and CFAF 76 billion from the State budget. A total of more than 662 billion CFA francs. Non-compliance with procedures and the tendering procedures that are the norm in the area of defence spending for the Army and security spending for the Police and Gendarmerie. Clients may request the DCMP’s opinions, but these are not binding on them .[1] [3] Morever, there is a platform called the Senegal Public Procurement Portal. This is a central platform for suppliers and any other players interested in public contracts awarded by the various ministries, including the ministry of armed forces. It is a central platform for suppliers and any other players interested in public contracts awarded by the various ministries, local authorities, national companies, companies with a majority public shareholding, etc. It is a working tool for the new institutional structure comprising the Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics (ARCOP (ex-ARMP)) and the Direction Centrale des Marchés Publics (DCMP) [2] .

The Public Finance Management Act requires public entities to develop their own procurement policies in line with the principles set out by National Treasury. [1] The Department of Defence has a formalised procurement cycle including four steps: 1) planning, 2) acquisition, 3) operational deployment and maintenance, and 4) disposal. [2] Planning is guided by the Defence Review which serves as the highest-level strategy which informs Force Structure Plans identifying capabilities and needs. This informs the acquisitions phase which itself is structured according to steps to identify technical specifications and the development of an acquisitions plan before procurement occurs.

Neither the Department of Defence nor Armscor charged with armaments acquisition and disposal publicly disclose internal procurement processes and policies. General guidance on procurement processes and principles are, however, publicly available based on guidance issued by National Treasury in terms of the Public Finance Management Act. [1]

South Africa has clear and detailed procurement policies governing procurement in the defence sector. [1] There are, however, shortcomings in implementation with recurrent findings by the Auditor-General related to procurement irregularities and in the last financial year 4% of the Department’s good and services expenditure was irregular and failed to comply with procurement requirements. [2]

The Public Procurement and Disposal Act is very particular in Section 36 (1), (2), (3) (4) and (5). Section (4) is clear that security sectors are not exempted from formal procedures stating that “Defence and National Security Institutions shall comply with the categorization of items on the classified (restricted) and unclassified (open) as determined by the Council of Ministers according to Section 24 (3) of the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011” [1]. The Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs has outlined a formal process guiding its procurement activities. The Ministry states that contracts are awarded through procurement methods determined by a preliminary evaluation report and/or a pre-qualification process, conducted by an external consultant. Currently, the Ministry has outsourced consultancy services to M/s Executive Ventures Ltd. The procurement process may employ one of three methods: International Selective or Open Competitive Bidding, Direct Procurement, or Restrictive (Single-Source) Procurement. These methods are chosen based on the specific needs and requirements identified during the initial evaluation and pre-qualification stages. Nonetheless, cases of off budget procurements and the opaque nature of acquiring weapons despite sanctions undermine the formal procedures mentioned. [3]

There are no publicly available documents that provides the defence procurement cycle in South Sudan, this is in part because of the sensitive nature of defence procurement, the conflict environment in the country and the arms embargo that has been imposed on South Sudan by the United Nations [1]. On the sanctions, the Security Council voted to extend the embargo by adopting Resolution 2731 (2024) (file no. S/RES/2731(2024)) for another year amid speculation that the country was violating the arms embargo [2]. The very act of violating arms embargo shows that there is no transparency in the procurement of defence equipment.

There is no evidence of established policies or procedures for implementing the procurement cycle. Similarly, there have been no public reports on weapons acquisitions over the past five years. If any weapons were procured, it was done clandestinely, making it difficult to scrutinize the procurement cycle’s implementation. In an interview, a police officer in Kajo Keji village revealed, “We have never seen new weapons from the government…this is from Anyanya I,” referring to the first liberation struggle by South Sudanese against the Khartoum-based government between 1955 and 1972 [1]. This indicates that the arms procurement process does not significantly impact the areas most affected by conflict. An interview with a SPLM official confirmed that the implementation of procurement cycle is affected negatively by the ongoing conflict and sanction situation in the country. [2]

The Procurement and Disposal Unit department is tasked with sourcing and acquiring a wide range of military equipment, weapons, vehicles, ammunition, and other essential supplies from both domestic and international suppliers to support the armed forces’ operational needs. [1]
The extended explanation of Uganda’s defence procurement cycle is based on the regulatory framework established by Uganda’s Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (PPDA Act). According to this, the procurement cycle consists of 1) assessment of needs, 2) budgeting and planning, 3) tendering and contracting, 4) contract implementation and oversight, 4) Asset Utilization and Maintenance, 5) asset disposal.[2][3][4][5].
However, the defence procurement cycle process in Uganda is not fully disclosed to the public. While some information is available, some limitations and exemptions prevent full transparency. This is affected by the idea of classified information and the national security agenda. Classified procurements, particularly those related to national security and intelligence operations, may follow separate protocols with restricted public disclosure.

The PPDA Act mandates all ministries to be transparent. Although some aspects of the defence procurement cycle are disclosed (weapons, vehicles and other essential supplies), the process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation are not available in the public domain. There is no information on the classified expenditure. The details in terms of the costs and the bidders are not known to the public.[1] [2] [3]

The MoDVA uses the local media when calling for open bids. There are also adverts on the website of the UPDF. Policies and procedures for each step of the procurement process are detailed, but what happens after the advert is not known to the public.

It should be noted that the defence procurement act, states the procedure on the assessment of needs; contract implementation and sign-off, and asset disposal, and the procedure is fully formalised [1] [3]. The defence procurement cycle is not disclosed to the public mainly because the Official Secrets Act may provide exceptions as classified information [1], but Section 3 of the Defence Procurement Act, Chapter 11:03, mandates the defence forces to establish the Defence Procurement Board, whose function among others include: to provide for the manufacture and sale of equipment and the supply of equipment to the Defence Forces;
and to manage the funds [2]. The disposal of equipment is also guided by the board working in conjunction with the disposal committee as defined by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [3].

While the procurement process is handled within the defence forces guided to some extent with the Defence Procurement Act, and extended procedures as determined by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [1,2], the information is not available on the Ministry of Defence website and there is no public communication on how the processes of procurement were done [1]. In accordance with the Public Procurement Act, the parliament is supposed to be served with such procurement documentation which reveal that due processes were followed in the procurement procedure [2]. However, the defence forces do not always submit such documentation which reveals that the process was followed from contracting to signing off [3]. If it is submitted, it will be sketchy information, difficult to comprehend and understand [3].

Section 3 of the Defence Procurement Act, Chapter 11:03, requires an establishment of the Defence Procurement Board, to provide for the manufacture and sale of equipment and the supply of equipment to the Defence Forces; and to manage the funds [2]. The disposal of equipment is also guided by the board working in conjunction with the disposal committee as defined by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [3]. In addition, the implementation is overseen by the Procurement Directorate situated at both the defence House and army HQ in Harare, and they are responsible to ensure that procurement procedures are adhered without violating the Public Procurement and Disposal Act [1,2]. But it is important to note that the Director is of a rank of at least a full Colonel or Brigadier General, and such ranks in Zimbabwe are linked with the ruling political party hence the process can be potentially flawed without any negative consequences [3] [4] [5].