There is no provision from the Public Procurement Code either prohibiting, authorising or regulating the use of offset contracts [1]. Although this interpreted by the interviews we had with people involved in procurement process as a prohibition. [2] [3][4]

There is no provision from the Public Procurement Code either prohibiting, authorising or regulating the use of offset contracts [1]. Although this interpreted by the interviews we had with people involved in procurement process as a prohibition. [2] [3][4]

There is no provision from the Public Procurement Code either prohibiting, authorising or regulating the use of offset contracts [1]. Although this interpreted by the interviews we had with people involved in procurement process as a prohibition. [2] [3][4]

There is no provision from the Public Procurement Code either prohibiting, authorising or regulating the use of offset contracts [1]. Although this interpreted by the interviews we had with people involved in procurement process as a prohibition. [2] [3][4]

In Burundi, there are no formal policies or procedures regarding reporting and delivery obligations under offset contracts. It depends on the compromise between the protagonists of said contracts. [1] [2]

Details regarding offset contracts are not provided. [1] [2] The obscurity which marks the public procurement process in Burundi in general and the Defence sector in particular, remains relevant for offset contracts.

Public procurement managers provide regular reports on offset contracts. These reports are produced after each contract. They are checked separately by the Inspectorate General, the department responsible for monitoring the various procedures within the Ministry of Defence, and by their superiors, i.e. the Head of Administration and Management and the Head of Logistics at the Army General Staff. [1] [2]

There is a chain of compromises regarding the performance of these offset contracts that means that supplier failures are not reported. The reports are generally positive. As a result, there is no action to be taken [1] [2].

Cameroon has not explicitly prohibited offset contracts in the defence sector. It has neither defined them nor scheduled a legal provision related to this commercial practice.[1][2]

Cameroon has not explicitly prohibited offset contracts in the defence sector. It has niether defined them nor scheduled a legal provision related to this commercial practice.[1][2]

Cameroon has not explicitly prohibited offset contracts in the defence sector. It has neither defined them nor scheduled a legal provision related to this commercial practice.[1][2]

Cameroon has not explicitly prohibited offset contracts in the defence sector. It has neither defined them nor scheduled a legal provision related to this commercial practice.[1][2]

Defence offset contracts are not regulated within the legal framework for public procurement in Côte d’Ivoire [1].

Defence offset contracts are not regulated within the legal framework for public procurement in Côte d’Ivoire [1].

Defence offset contracts are not regulated within the legal framework for public procurement in Côte d’Ivoire [1].

Defence offset contracts are not regulated within the legal framework for public procurement in Côte d’Ivoire [1].

In Ghana, there are no laws or policies that mention offset contracts as part of procurement processes or anti-corruption safeguards (1). Therefore, there are no formal policies or procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts. (1)(2)(3)

There is no available sources to establish contract offsetting even if in theory it exist because there are no legal provisions made for same and there are no reported cases of such (1)(2)(3)

Because there are no regulations on off-set contracts, there are no formal policies or procedures that outline conducting reports (1).

Because there are no regulations on offset contracts, there are no formal policies or procedures for enforcement (1).

There is no specific policy, procedure, or framework in place to monitor offset contracts in Kenya. Section 152 of the PPADA requires procurement entities to monitor and report on contract implementation. However, offset contracts are not mentioned, and there is no mechanism to assess offset obligations [1].
The Ministry of Defence publishes general Annual Performance Reports, but these contain no information on supplier performance, let alone performance on offset clauses. There is no database or reporting tool through which offset commitments are tracked, verified, or published [2].

The government lacks transparency regarding offset contracts. Many details about Kenya’s military purchases are obtained through media reports, other countries’ websites, and Defence Cooperation Agreements. However, these agreements often provide only top-line information without specifics. Not all agreements include clauses on intended equipment purchases [1,2,3,4].
A factsheet released by the White House during the Kenyan President’s state visit highlighted Kenya’s status as one of Africa’s largest recipients of U.S. Foreign Military Sales. Kenya has chosen approximately 150 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles from U.S. Excess Defence Article stocks, with their arrival in Kenya expected in September 2024 [5, 6]. Kenya plans to modernise its military with significant investments in weapons and equipment. The government will allocate 7 billion Kenyan shillings ($45 million) yearly for five years to acquire tactical vehicles, drones, and other modern defence tools. This investment includes drones for monitoring border and coastal areas vulnerable to bandit and terrorist activities [7].

There is no evidence that the Ministry of Defence monitors offset obligations in procurement. While general contract performance monitoring is mandated under section 152 of the PPADA, this only applies to cost, delivery, and output — not to offset-specific elements like local content delivery or technology transfer [1].

The Ministry of Defence’s annual performance documents do not report on supplier compliance with offset commitments. No monitoring reports, independent evaluations, or audits of offset obligations are publicly available or referenced in parliamentary documents [2].

The 10th Parliament Defence Committee’s investigation into the F-5 fighter jet procurement exposed serious irregularities, including direct procurement without valuation, but did not involve or reference offset contracts [1].

While the Committee recommended investigation by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), no prosecutions or corrective actions are known to have occurred. Moreover, even if offset clauses were included in the procurement (which is unverified), no enforcement related to offset performance has been documented .

Kenya’s current enforcement system (PPRA, EACC, and the courts) handles procurement violations broadly but does not address offsets as a distinct area of contract enforcement.

​Liberia does have general reporting obligations: procuring entities must submit quarterly procurement reports to the PPCC, and the PPCC publishes compliance summaries. However, these obligations are general procurement reporting—not offset-specific. As of now, Liberia does not have a formal legal framework or documented implementation practices specifically governing offset contracts in its defence procurement process. There are no formal policies or procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts.[1][2]

​As of now, Liberia does not have a formal legal framework or documented implementation practices specifically governing offset contracts in its defence procurement process. Details about this transaction taking place remains unknown.[1][2]

As offset contracts are not stipulated in the legal framework, there are no monitoring mechanisms or information regarding report and delivery obligations.[1][2]

As offset contracts are not stipulated in the legal framework, there are no procedures for enforcement mechanisms.[1][2] If there is no legal framework for offsets, then there can be no enforcement actions for breaches of offsets because such contracts do not formally exist.

The Public Procurement Code does not mention the existence of compensation markets. [1] [2] [3]

The Public Procurement Code does not mention the existence of compensation markets. [1] [2] [3]

The Public Procurement Code does not mention the existence of compensation markets. [1] [2] [3]

The Public Procurement Code does not mention the existence of compensation markets [1]. Specialists in the field also confirm this absence even in practice [2][3].

There are no formal policies and procedures related to offset contracts.[1]

There are no formal policies and procedures related to offset contracts.[1]

There are no formal policies and procedures related to offset contracts.[1]

There are no formal policies and procedures related to offset contracts.[1]

Outside of Article 9 and 19 of the Regulation on Equipment and Armament of the Defence and Security Forces in Mozambique [1], which refers this matter to the contacts themselves and to International Law, there are no public policies and procedures on offset contracts in Mozambique: “the transfer of equipment technologies of the Defence and Security Forces complies with the rules established in the respective contracts and, in their absence, the rules of International Law” [2]. This regulation does not specify procedures for reporting and delivery obligations.

Offset contracts are mentioned under Mozambican legislation, specifically the Regulation on Equipment and Armament of the Defence and Security Forces (Decree No. 34/2007, of 10 August), which in Article 19 provides for technology transfer and compensation arrangements for defence and security equipment procurement. However, this regulation neither includes transparency as a guiding principle, nor establishes any specific requirements for public disclosure of offset agreements, their terms, or implementation status [1]. By contrast, the principle of transparency appears as a guiding principle of the legislation that regulates the contracting of public works contracts, and acquisition of goods and provision of services to the state along with “legality, purpose, reasonableness, proportionality, pursuit and protection of the public interest, transparency, publicity, equality, competition, impartiality, good faith, stability, motivation, responsibility, sound financial management, speed and other principles of public law” [2]. These general provisions do not, however, translate into dedicated transparency mechanisms for defence offset contracts.

The Regulation on Equipment and Armament of the Defence and Security Forces in Mozambique does not mention or specify the monitoring of offset contracts [1]. The only thing left is the Internal Regulation of the National Defence Inspectorate, which gives this body powers to monitor offset contracts, but the reports of this monitoring are classified, per the legislation on military secrets and State secrets [2, 3].

The National Defence Inspectorate reports on monitoring of offset contracts were not made available because they are classified [1, 2]. There is no evidence that breaches of offset contract terms themselves are acted upon or sanctioned in Mozambique.
The Hidden Debts scandal — involving PRIVINVEST, a United Arab Emirates–Lebanese shipbuilder — included contracts for vessels and maritime security systems that had features resembling offset arrangements. While PRIVINVEST was found liable for bribery in the UK High Court [3] and several Mozambican defence and security officials were prosecuted domestically in connection with corruption and fraud related to these contracts [4], these proceedings did not address or enforce specific offset obligations.

Niger does not have any formal policies or procedures outlining the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts. A review of the 2013 decree on defence and security procurement found no provisions regulating offset agreements, nor any mechanisms for monitoring, auditing, or ensuring compliance with contractual obligations [1]. Additionally, there is no evidence that Niger has engaged in offset contracts in the past, making it unclear how such agreements would be supervised or enforced if they were to be introduced [2]. Without clear legal guidelines, oversight mechanisms, or formalizsed reporting requirements, there is a significant risk that any future offset contracts would operate without transparency or accountability.

Niger does not provide any transparency regarding offset contracts, as there is no evidence that such agreements are regulated, negotiated, or disclosed to the public. A review of the 2013 decree on defence and security procurement found no provisions addressing offset contracts, nor any requirement for public reporting or disclosure of these agreements [1]. Additionally, since there is no legal framework governing offset contracts, there are no obligations for the government to publish details on offset agreements, including contract terms, financial commitments, or performance monitoring [2]. The absence of transparency measures significantly increases the risk of opaque deals and potential corruption if such contracts were to be introduced in the future.

Niger’s procurement offices do not conduct any reporting or monitoring of offset contracts, as there is no legal framework regulating such agreements. A review of the 2013 decree on defence and security procurement found no provisions requiring government agencies to track, report, or enforce offset contract obligations [1]. Additionally, there is no evidence that Niger has ever engaged in offset contracts, making it impossible to verify whether any form of monitoring exists. Without specific policies or oversight mechanisms in place, there is no structured approach to ensuring that suppliers fulfill their contractual commitments in defense procurement [2].

Niger does not enforce any consequences for breaches of offset contracts, as there is no legal framework regulating such agreements. A review of the 2013 decree on defence and security procurement found no provisions outlining penalties, enforcement measures, or remedial actions in the event of non-compliance with offset contracts [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Niger has ever engaged in offset contracts, making it unclear how breaches of contract would be addressed if such agreements were introduced. Without formal oversight mechanisms or accountability measures, suppliers who fail to meet contractual obligations would face no repercussions, creating a high-risk environment for corruption and fraud [2].

The Public Procurement Act (2007) does not explicitly regulate offset contracts, especially in the defence sector. Instead, such arrangements are often treated as national security exceptions, meaning defence procurements—including offsets—can be exempted from competitive bidding if approved by the President [1].

While the Nigeria Open Contracting Portal (NOCOPO) publishes many government contracts, defence-related procurements (including offset agreements) are excluded from publication under secrecy provisions. As such, offset contracts operate outside the standard procurement framework, contradicting prior claims that NOCOPO oversight applies to them. This limited disclosure of program information, although apparently for the benefit of national security interests, has often led to criticism of defence procurement. On account of national security, the procurement of military arms or weapons in Nigeria is usually shrouded in secrecy [3].
There is no specific legal or procedural regime covering offset contracts in Nigeria’s procurement law.

General information about major defence procurements—and their stated purpose—is occasionally disclosed through media statements or government press releases (for example, regarding UAV purchases or defence deals with foreign partners) [1]—but no detailed documentation of offset agreements (terms, obligations, performance metrics) is made public.

Because defence offset deals are classified under national security or presidential exemption [2], no portion of these agreements is visibly disclosed on official portals or through FOI mechanisms.

Even though the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) oversees general contract compliance, there is no evidence that offset agreements in defence are subjected to post-award monitoring, performance assessments, or regular audits.

Procurement offices may produce internal contract reports, but these are rarely accessible externally and rarely cover offsets. Defence personnel—both serving and retired—report that offset arrangements are not publicly scrutinized, and there is no institutional mechanism (internal audit, parliamentary oversight, or civil society access) for performance evaluation or follow-through [3].

There is no evidence that offset contracts in Nigeria’s defence sector are systematically enforced or sanctioned for non-compliance. While the Office of the Auditor General and the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) can investigate irregularities in public contracting, these mechanisms rarely, if ever, extend to defence offsets, which are opaque and exempt from standard procurement laws [1].
The Financial Regulations (Paragraph 3106) allows for contract breaches to be sanctioned, but its application to offset agreements in the defence sector is unclear. Moreover, lack of transparency, absence of reporting obligations, and security exemptions make enforcement difficult. Experts note that enforcement is further weakened by limited expertise within the government to evaluate complex industrial or technological offset arrangements [2,3].

The government explicitly prohibits offset contracts [1] . Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The government explicitly prohibits offset contracts [1] . Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The government explicitly prohibits offset contracts [1] . Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The government explicitly prohibits offset contracts [1] . Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Related to offsets, South Africa has used formal policy instruments to agree offsets, credits and monitor offsets through the Defence Industrial Participation (DIP) program for offsets in the defence industry and the National Industrial Participation (NIP) program for offsets in the civil sector. In practice, however, there are clear shortcomings in securing compliance with offset agreements and there are limited instruments for imposing penalties to failure to achieve offset targets [1].
Since the Strategic Defence Package, South Africa has seemingly not engaged in trade offsets in the defence sector.

Basic details of offset contracts have been made public, but are by no means shared in a comprehensive, transparent form. [1] Where available, this includes basic information on the international investor, local partner and the offset value of projects (which may be different from the actual economic value of investments arising from multiplier incentives). [2]

While the National Industrial Participation guidelines include provisions for monitoring trade offsets, [1] the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition has not released a public report on National Industrial Participation programmes since 2008 [2].

There is clear evidence that the actual investment amounts regarding the offsets agreed under the Strategic Defence Package were significantly lower than anticipated. Additionally, offset credits were granted even in cases where projects failed, illustrating a lack of effective enforcement of offset agreements [1][2].

An examination of procurement-related policies, including the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 [1], and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011 [2], does not reveal any formal policies or procedures for reporting and delivery obligations related to offset contracts. Even the PLA White Paper on Defence of 2008 [3] fails to address such obligations. Additionally, a review of local, regional, and international media sources did not uncover any relevant information on these policies and procedures [4]. This indicates that no publicly available documents detail these specific policies and procedures.

There are pre-independence and post -independence laws that aim to improve transparency in public sector management. Some of these laws include the 2012 Companies Act [1], the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 [2], the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011 [3] and the Banking Act [4]. However, these laws do not explicitly address the issue of offset contracts. The lack of transparency is captured in the U.S State department report of 2023 which found that “Despite significant PFM reforms, the government did not announce or implement new enforcement reforms in 2022. The legislative body does not provide effective administrative compliance oversight of government ministers nor do ministries or agencies adequately regulate one another. There were no significant corruption prosecutions in 2022” [5].

An analysis of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 [1], and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011 [2], did not reveal any policies or procedures that specifically monitor or require officers to report on contract delivery. Similarly, no media reports from 2020 to 2024 provided information relevant to the monitoring of offset contracts [3].

Due to the opaque nature of procurement in the defence and security sector, it is challenging to find any publicly available information regarding the enforcement of contract breaches. Since details about the contracts and the companies awarded them are not accessible either through the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs [1] or media sources [2], it is difficult to determine whether the government has enforced any actions on breached contracts.

There are no legislation, policies and procedures dealing with offset contracts in Uganda or outlining the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts [1][2].

It is the Auditor General’s Office that conducts an audit to ensure transparency and accountability in government contracts, including offset contracts. However, there was no evidence of offset contracts identified in the annual audit reports [1]. Interviews conducted with two senior UPDF officers confirm the observation made on the AGs report [2][3].

There was no information found on any monitoring concerning offset contracts in the official Auditor General’s Annual Reports to the Parliament [1]. Interviews conducted with two senior UPDF officers confirm these observation regarding the AGs [2][3].

There is no evidence of offset contracts identified in the Auditor General’s annual reports or any public information[1]. Therefore, breaches of contract are not acted upon. [2][3].

The defence sector does not have policies for offset contracts [1]. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [2] does not provide specifications for offset contracts.

There is no evidence on offset contracts in the defence sector [1]. Only when the country receives military equipment from other countries like China, that where the media publish stories of the President talking about how the military has received equipment with no specific details on the contractual agreements [2].

Contractual agreements within the defence forces, are not made public [1]. This include the specific contractual performance, only known to the senior command structure of the military and the rest of senior command in other defence forces units [2].

The contractual agreements are not made public; there is no public evidence that breaches are acted upon [1][2]. The lack of transparency surrounding procurement processes makes it difficult to assess whether enforcement mechanisms exist.