Q51.

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

51a. Military doctrine

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

51b. Transparency

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

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No evidence could be found that the Algerian armed forces have a military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue on operations, suggesting that the military does not consider corruption a strategic issue for operations. There is no military doctrine available on the website of the Ministry of Defence (1). Furthermore, there are rarely any statements made by military officials on corruption; see question 34, (2). Algeria’s strict noninterference, which does not allow any deployments of Algerian troops abroad, as noted in the country’s last assessment (3), is still written down in the constitution of 2016 (Art. 29), (4). Algeria has moved “to a more flexible stance on direct intervention” (5) but still does not deploy troops abroad. Domestically, the Algerian military operates against “terrorists and organized crime” (1), (6). No evidence could be found that the military addressed corruption during these operations.

This question has been scored Not Applicable because no evidence could be found in the military (1), (2), see the answer to question 51A, that the Algerian armed forces have a military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations, the question on transparency cannot be assessed.

There is no indication of the existence of a military doctrine addressing corruption in operations. A well-documented example for the presumed lack of a military doctrine addressing corruption in domestic operations is the endemic corruption of the military and police with the diamond-mining business, particularly in the Cuango area of Lunda Norte province (1), (2).

There is no indication of the existence of a military doctrine addressing corruption in operations. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no evidence that Burkina Faso’s military has a doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. However, the military does recognize corruption as a strategic issue that could affect operations. For example, they know that when the recruitment process is poor and corrupt; it could lead to them fielding young men and women who are not a good fit for the job. Article 44 of Law N° 038 (2016) imposes an investigation on all the recruits and a medical check before they are accepted. Article 45 says that “recruits who are medically found unable to join the contingent are sent back home” (1). Majeed, Muhammad Tariq and Ronald MacDonald support this argument that “in the presence of the military operations (either combat or non-combat operations) one direct effect is a rise in the military budget, and that military officials manipulate the military budget for private gains” (2). Moreover, for many years, the military, deployed in Liberia and the Central African Republic (CAR) for peacekeeping operations, openly accused the military hierarchy of embezzling great parts of the funds allocated for their participation in these operations (3), (4). Furthermore, the military knows that the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC), has recently classified the Municipal Police as the most corrupted government institution (6). Finally, TI-DS (2016) says that “None of the top 25 UN troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for peacekeeping operations, have military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic threat to operations.” Indeed, Burkina Faso is a UN/TCCs (6).

Since there is no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The military doctrine in Cameroon is not comprehensive. It is based on a notion known as popular defence. The document on military doctrine, which is considered highly confidential, has not been revised since 1979, when former President Amadou Ahidjo approved it [1]. However, the army has submitted a revised version of the military doctrine which is yet to be approved by the President of the Republic. This doctrine envisions five types of threat which the defence and security personnel may be called upon to address. These include: regional conflict, attacks against territorial integrity, contributions to international peace operations, natural disasters and threats against public order [2]. Neither the 1979 version nor the yet-to-be-approved military document make mention of anti-corruption as part of the package that will facilitate the objectives of the military doctrine [1] [2].

The International Committee of the Red Cross has published a number of military manuals from Cameroon and corruption is not addressed anywhere in these documents [3].

The 2017 US State Department Human Rights Report states: “In the context of the fight against Boko Haram, local sources indicated that corruption-related inefficiencies and diversion of resources from their intended purposes continued to represent a fundamental national security vulnerability” [4]. The evidence above shows the likelihood either that no part of the military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations exists, or that any such document is ineffective.

Military doctrine is consider a secret doctrine and so is not made accessible to the public [1,2]. It also does not address corruption as a strategic issue for operations, and consequently, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no official military doctrine within the armed forces which specifically addresses corruption as a strategic issue during military operations. This does not mean that the armed forces are unaware of these issues. Military personnel in Côte d’Ivoire are required to follow Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of February 16, 2016, as a Code of Conduct. However, this law cannot be interpreted as a military doctrine addressing corruption issues during operations because it covers general aspects of personnel integrity and discipline for active service and reserve personnel. The law makes no mention of corruption risks during operations. Further, the types of conflicts of interest addressed by Law No. 2016-1109 are unrelated to corruption risk (1). For example, operations of active military personnel are covered in Chapter 7 (Positions statuaires), Section 3 (Positions de service détaché), Articles 90-93. Ivorian military personnel can be deployed internationally for a maximum period of five years, renewable only once. No mention is made, however, about anti-corruption guidelines that must be followed. Likewise, Title II (Réserve opérationnelle), Articles 127-14,3 applies to the army and police reserve forces that can support the Armed Forces whenever required. This section of Law No. 2016-1109 also contains no practical anti-corruption guidance for personnel (1).

In a 2017 joint report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and ECOWAS in which delegates discussed how to integrate International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the doctrines and teachings of the Armed Forces in West Africa, there was no mention of such a doctrine for the Ivorian Army. By contrast, the Nigerien Army was used as an example of a country in the sub-region that had developed a Handbook of IHL for its defence and security forces in 2015 (2). The executive has turned issues such as racketeering at roadblocks into a policy priority and has managed to investigate and prosecute cases successfully in 2018. This proves that political will could help mitigate the corruption risk faced by military personnel during operations, such as how to interact with the local population and partner with local forces. However, if there is political will, it has not been translated into an official MoD doctrine.

Given the absence of a comprehensive or even token military doctrine that addresses corruption during peace and conflict operations, and the subsequent lack of practical guidance for military personnel.

Côte d’Ivoire has no military doctrine stating that corruption is a strategic issue for operations. Therefore this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

After reviewing and surveying all relevant laws, by-laws and media platforms, no evidence was found that the armed forces have a military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue for operations. According to our sources, there has never been any military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic risk (1), (2), (3). However, one source mentioned that there were discussions in 2013 of issuing anti-corruption guidelines within the armed forces, this was halted in 2014 (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Egypt has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue concerning operations.

The armed forces are aware that corruption is an important issue for operations. For instance, corruption is often mentioned as an issue to address in public statements by the minister of defence (1), (2); senior officers in the GAF have also expressed their concerns with regards to corruption and stressed the need to build integrity to consolidate the confidence of the civilians in operations of the GAF (3), (4).

However, the GAF does not hold any specific anti-corruption training for its military. For instance, the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC), which is the GAF’s training institution, does not include anti-corruption courses in its military programmes at the senior or junior level (5).

As there is no explicit doctrine on this subject, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no military doctrine in the Jordanian armed forces that considers corruption a strategic issue. However, JIACC considers anti-corruption efforts a strategy for the development of Jordanian institutions. The only instance that was found where corrupt activities within the defence are prohibited by law for the armed forces is Law No. 35 of the year 1966 [1]. However, this law does not constitute a military doctrine, nor does it address corruption as a strategic issue. It is important to note that corruption is not treated as a ‘military’ crime according to the Military Penal Code [2]. Corruption is generally not treated as an issue within the defence sector, nor is it scrutinised by any external entity. Despite the fact that Jordan has made major advancements in relation to corruption legislation [3], there is no evidence to support that this has been extended to the defence sector. There is no evidence of the existence of a military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue in defence operations in Jordan.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Jordan does not have a military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations [1,2,3]. Therefore, assessing its transparency is irrelevant within this context.

The country does not have a doctrine that address corruption as a strategic issue for peace and conflict or for operations. Military leaders are aware that it is a serious issue that impacts their operations, but they do not try to fight it and they only acknowledge it in closed meetings with people close to the royal family, a police official said (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no military doctrine which addresses corruption as a strategic issue.

The LAF is aware of corruption as a strategic issue at the operational level, but there is no explicit doctrine for specifying that. The LAF has conducted some workshops on combatting corruption (1). In February 2019, the head of the Directorate of Orientation the LAF’s commitment to work on increasing transparency and cooperation with international organizations (2). According to the LAF, combatting corruption is part of the institution’s life. Military personnel are reminded constantly of the laws and regulations (3).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as Lebanon does not have a military doctine addressing corruption. Furthermore, Lebanon does not have a clear national defence strategy (1).

Despite numerous commentators identifying corruption as a major problem within the armed forces,¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ the government does not appear to make any reference to eliminating corruption as a strategic goal in its flagship reform programme for the military.⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ The programme merely focuses on increasing military spending, recruiting more soldiers and buying more equipment.
A senior security governance expert agreed that the LOPM does not address corruption risks.¹⁰ The interviewee commented that “93% of expenditure was given to general administration, which makes it very difficult – even for financial experts – to trace flows of money and work out what is going on”.¹⁰ The source said the LOPM2 will be different. It will provide much clearer breakdowns of military spending to conform with a transparency initiative launched by the West African economic bloc ECOWAS.¹⁰
Moreover, a defence attaché based at a foreign embassy in Bamako said that the Malian military doctrine is still being developed.¹¹

Mali has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

No evidence was found of an explicit and written military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. This might indicate a lack of transparency which in itself could imply corruption risks. None of the recent anti-corruption (hotline/platform, national body for the prevention of corruption) and transparency initiatives (e-gov platform) mention corruption risks within the Moroccan armed forces, let alone on operations (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7).

In particular, no evidence was found in the two main sources detailing codes of conduct within the Moroccan armed forces:
⁃ Military Justice Code: although there are a number of rules detailing soldiers’ required behaviour, as well as a list of sanctions for those who violate these rules, there is no mention of bribery, misuse of public goods or corruption in general in the rules and the sanctions sections (8).
⁃ Regulations on general discipline of the Moroccan royal armed forces (9). There are a number of rules detailing soldiers’ required behaviour when deployed on operations. As an example, Art. 25.2 states that it is forbidden to steal from the wounded or the dead, or to raid private goods.
There is also a detailed list of the sanctions for those who violate these rules. Like in the Military Justice Code, there is no mention of bribery, misuse of public goods or corruption in general in the rules and the sanctions sections. No military doctrine in any form was found and therefore none appears to exist.

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable, as Morocco has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations.

Niger has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations. Corruption in the defence sector is not addressed regularly; instead, some ad hoc measures are taken. The 2003 Military Penal Code addresses corruption in article 228 which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary Military Police that report to the Ministry of Defence (article 46). The Military Police are responsible for investigating all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the Armed Forces (article 48) (1).
Generally, the Armed Forces do not see corruption as a strategic issue; but, this is not always the case. For instance, some joint operations conducted by IGA and IGSS are kept a secret until the last moment to avoid leakage of information and to preserve the confidentiality of the planned audit. (2).

There is no explicit military doctrine that would address corruption as a strategic issue for operations. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Corruption is identified as a strategic challenge in military circles. The official policy is that corruption is not tolerated, and any infringement of the policy is met with disciplinary action.
While Armed Forces Decree 105 spells out corruption-related crimes and penalties, it is not a doctrine and provides neither guidance and support for soldiers and other military personnel on how to prevent corruption, nor a strategic appreciation of how corruption may impact operations. Further, in the National Defence Policy endemic corruption is identified as a strategic issue which affects national security. Operational guidelines recently shared with the public contained no reference to corruption risk in operational guidelines (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations.

Oman does not have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. No doctrine or statements relating to procedures of the Sultani Armed Forces’ operations were identified either on the Royal Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence or Omanuna the eGovernment portal websites (1), (2), (3). According to an army officer in Oman, there is no military doctrine or a strategy that mentions corruption by name. Corruption is not seen as a risk at all (in the country and the army) (4).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because there is no military doctrine.

The sole reference to military doctrine in the Omani media is in reference to the military relationship between the Omani Sultan’s Armed Forces and the British Armed Forces, “the exercise also aims at enhancing cooperation through contemporary joint military doctrine and plans relevant to modern technology, interagency cooperation, interoperability, and strategic planning” (1).

There is no military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue. And there is not a document that addresses corruption as a strategic issue within the armed forces or security agencies (1), (2).

As the doctrine does not exist, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable. The Ministry of Interior largely performs the job of the MoD, corruption and transparency issues are included in the PACC’s main principles, mission and strategies (1), (2).

Qatar does not consider corruption a strategic issue for its defence operations and does not have a military doctrine that suggests that. [1,2] Qatar established the ACTA to follow international standards in institutional development. [2] It has been established so far that there is very little information in the public realm about the defence sector and its operations, as they are considered secret. It has become apparent that the defence sector in Qatar does not go through any form of external auditing or scrutiny. [3] In addition to that, the defence sector is exempt from Labour law No. 14 (2004) and the Audit law No. 11 (2016) [4], which address corruption.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as the country does not have a military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations, and thus assessing its transparency is irrelevant in this context.

The KSA army has no official, publicly or internally available doctrine that focuses on corruption as a strategic issue. While the Saudi military as a body has not addressed the issue of corruption publicly, there are some indications that Saudi leaders and defence sector authorities are aware of the corruption issues and practices in the army (1). According to our sources, the lack of doctrine has led to arbitrary arrests based on tribal and political power motivations (1), (2).

According to a Gulf affairs expert, the KSA armed forces have an unofficial military doctrine “imported” from the US military, which acknowledges that corruption is an issue in operations. It exists in principle, with policies, procedures, and processes that support it, but as they are not based on official doctrine, they are susceptible to the interventions of either senior officers, or to more junior officers that make decisions in the interests of more senior figures in the military. The major vulnerability of these circumstances is that very senior figures in the military or elsewhere in the system are able to subvert anticorruption policy and practices with quiet approval from above (3).

According to David Roberts:
“Corruption is considered a strategic issue especially since the al-Yamamah arms scandal and the enormous embarrassment that went with that, and I know that from the British [defence] companies’ side they are beyond at pains to make sure that everything is done in a transparent way, because the professional risk for them is almost fatal; and now with the MBS approach, it is extremely clear that if there’s even a whiff of a perception of corruption it’s entirely possible that you will end up detained, so it’s fair to say it’s a concern on everybody’s mind (4).”

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as there is no public evidence of a military doctrine. Nevertheless, evidence on whether Saudi Arabia treats corruption as a strategic issue is mixed.

According to our sources, there is no doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic threat as an issue that deserves resources. Another source confirms that there is a military doctrine, but it does not include corruption as a strategic issue. This doctrine is not available for the public (1,2). Furthermore, the Military Justice Code (3) and the Law on the General Status of the Military (4) do not mention corruption.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable there does not seem to be a doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue. According to our sources, there may be a doctrine, but it is not available for the public. It is a basic doctrine that is not available for all units (1,2).

Although there are no explicit anti-corruption policies or an anti-corruption military doctrine, the leadership of the UAE is aware of corrupt practices and their risks, especially in offset contracts and external hiring (1), (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable. The armed forces do not have a military doctrine addressing corruption, assessing the transparency of the doctrine is irrelevant in this context (1), (2).

Country Sort by Country 51a. Military doctrine Sort By Subindicator 51b. Transparency Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA
Angola 0 / 100 NA
Burkina Faso 25 / 100 NA
Cameroon 0 / 100 NA
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 NA
Egypt 0 / 100 NA
Ghana 25 / 100 NA
Jordan 0 / 100 NA
Kuwait 25 / 100 NA
Lebanon 25 / 100 NA
Mali 0 / 100 NA
Morocco 0 / 100 NA
Niger 0 / 100 NA
Nigeria 25 / 100 NA
Oman 0 / 100 NA
Palestine 0 / 100 NA
Qatar 0 / 100 NA
Saudi Arabia 25 / 100 NA
Tunisia 0 / 100 NA
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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