Q53.

Is corruption as a strategic issue considered in the forward planning of operations? If so, is there evidence that commanders at all levels apply this knowledge in the field?

53a. Forward planning

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

53b. Application

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

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No information could be found on the forward planning of operations in general. On its website, the Defence Ministry only retrospectively informs about operations against terrorists or organized crime (1). No additional information on the planning of operations could be found in the magazine of the military. In the magazine, the military publishes the results of its operations monthly (2). The Algerian context, where corruption is a “system of governance” (3), makes it very likely that corruption is not considered a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations.

There is no evidence that corruption has been considered a strategic issue in the planning of operations (1), (2). No evidence could be found that Algeria takes part in peace operations (3).

There is no indication that corruption issues are taken into account in forward planning.

There is no evidence that corruption issues are considered in the planning and execution of operations, mishandling by officers during deployment is likely to occur.

Transparency International’s Defence and Sceurity Programme (2016) declared that “10 out of the top 25 TCCs are in band ‘F’ for preparing their troops to control corruption and behave with integrity in military operations, 8 are in band ‘E’ and 5 are in band ‘D’” (1). This shows corruption is not seen as a strategic issue, and it is not taken account in forward planning. Again, the law that applies is Law N° 038 (2016), as well as the current military policy (2), these do not mention this issue, not only about corruption in general but also about integrating corruption in forward planning. The Law of Military Programming, mentioned earlier, was passed to address the needs of the armed forces, including capacity building (3), but there is no evidence that it considers corruption as a strategic issue that needs to be integrated into forward planning operations (4).

There is no evidence that corruption is address in forward planning. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Information garnered from training institutions indicates that corruption is not considered a strategic issue in forward planning of operations [1] [2]. In addition, the overall absence of mitigating controls over corruption risk (i.e. no evidence of a military doctrine addressing corruption, or of risk assessments being carried out, the lack of a code of conduct addressing corruption, and limited training that addresses corruption) suggests that corruption as a strategic issue is unlikely to be considered in the forward planning of operations.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

There is a total absence of corruption as a strategic issue during the forward planning stages of military deployments (pré-déploiement opérationnel). For example, the training that Ivorian commanders and soldiers have received at military academies in Morocco recently has been focused on combatting terrorism and not in integrating corruption issues, as shown by Aline Leboeuf in the IFRI report of October 2017, she writes:

“It is important to note the role played by Morocco and South Africa in this respect. Since 1969, the Royal Military Academy of Meknes has provided training to Senegalese officers and many other African countries have sent their troops for training there, notably Côte d’Ivoire. Morocco’s training focusses these days on combatting terrorism…” (1).

There is no evidence for the integration of corruption as a strategic issue in the forward planning of military deployments in theory or in practice (1).

Having surveyed all relevant laws, by-laws and media platforms, there is no evidence that corruption issues are taken into account in forward planning or that commanders apply anti-corruption knowledge in the field. Moreover, according to interviews, corruption in the process of preparation of operations and acquisition processes has not been taken seriously and not considered a severe problem (1), (2), (3).

According to our sources, corruption is not taken into account in any of the operations conducted by the Egyptian army (1), (2), (3), (4). The main exercise the Egyptian military hosts and co-organizes is Operation Bright Star, which it conducts jointly with the US military. There is no evidence that corruption issues are taken into account during the exercise operation (5). As for peacekeeping forces, Egypt has 3000 personnel deployed around the world in peacekeeping forces which means it has the 7th largest peacekeeping operation in the world (6). It is understood that the UN Peacekeeping forces consider anti-corruption to a certain extent in the forward planning of its operations (7). However, there is no evidence whatsoever that anti-corruption is considered in forward planning of general military operations, namely against insurgency in North Sinai which is the major actual battle the military is currently involved in.

Corruption is not considered a key variable that informs the strategic calculus of the forward planning formula of operations (1), (2), (3), (4). Ghana has several institutions that are mandated with training military personnel before operations. In particular, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) provides training for civilian, police, and military personnel in areas of conflict prevention, conflict management and resolution, preparing them for their duties in regional and continental operations, such as Peace Support Operations (PSO) and Election Observation Missions (5).

The KAIPTC runs the pre-deployment courses for military personnel involved in peacekeeping operations. In 2017, 2400 officers were trained in peacekeeping. However, despite including corruption in its academic programmes the KAIPTC doesn’t address corruption as a strategic issue during the pre-deployment courses (6).

The Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) runs the courses for the GAF’s officers and delivers academic programmes in collaboration with the University of Ghana (7); while the Military Academy and Training Schools (MATS) offers basic military training to officer cadets from the GAF. Neither of these institutions covers corruption as a strategic issue.

Ghana participates in several UN peacekeeping operations. As of June 30, 2018, Ghana has 2603 military and police personnel deployed and ranks 10th for their troop and police contribution (1). However, corruption issues are not taken into account in the planning or execution of operations (2), (3), (4), (5).

No evidence could be found showing proactive incorporation of ‘corruption’ as a strategic issue in the planning of operations. Forward planning is generally lacking and intelligence formulation similarly lacks a definitive decision-making nucleus. Various deficiencies and cracks within the ISF is partly a symptom of “absent training … such as collective training programmes” at military bases (1). These operational shortfalls are likely to extend to the integration of corruption as a strategic issue. Defence contracts/arms procurement remain an area of high-risk, but there appears to be no relevant arms sales-related code, as a knowledge raising exercise to inform and warn future cadets of these risks.

Evidence suggests the contrary; that corruption risks are not considered important as far as military operations are considered, as a retired military officer (2) told TI. In some situations, military operations have been launched by PMF factions, independently of Baghdad, substantiates the claim that there is unregulated planning of operations. As a state priority, corruption ranks relatively low among commanders, several of whom over the years have been suspected but not convicted of engagement in corrupt activities. A source interviewed disclosed the rise of unlawful revenue-generating activities among security actors in light of the country’s severe cash deficit, across various parts of the country during deployment (2).

Sunni MP Mishaan Jabouri famously pointed to corruption cases concerning asset disposal, commenting on misspending, Jabouri, said that the GOI spent $1bn on warplanes that never arrived, and courthouses in Tikrit, post-liberation, “that have never been built” (3). As Jabouri explained, there appear to be no incentives to prevent the exploitation of situations that encourage profiteering and contractual fraud. These experiences underscore the lack of legislative scrutiny over defence contracting (at the operational level), the risks that security forces and civilians may face, and asset-disposal related risks (4). A score of ‘0’ is chosen to reflect the evidence uncovered.

A workshop held in August of this year in Baghdad invited coalition intelligence officers to present a workshop raising “awareness of the challenges facing intelligence operation centres and military intelligence schools” (1). The effectiveness of this training cannot be commented at such an early stage, but steps towards enhancing operations are being taken (1) NATO’s less than-year old agreement in response to the GoI (2), (3) to assist with security sector reform is further evidence of active moves to reform military institutions. An earlier source, however, contradicts the state narrative, stating that the agreement came “after a U.S. call for the alliance to help” stabilise Iraq and professionalise its army (2). Similar training efforts/workshops, with a focus on curbing corruption and operation performance, have been provided by Iraq’s international allies (4). In spite of progression, corruption as a strategic issue is largely absent in the planning of deployments and the general effectiveness of the ongoing NATO-led training programme is too early to show.

Corruption is not treated as a strategic issue within the defence sector generally, and there is no evidence to support that it is. In fact, evidence points towards it not being treated as a strategic issue in forward planning of operations. As demonstrated in Q51A, the armed forces do not have a military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue. Moreover, other than public statements and commitments to countering corruption made by very senior officials associated with the defence sector, including those by the King and the Prime Minister [1, 2,3], there is no evidence of corruption issues being considered at all in any operation. In addition to that, the defence sector does not publish any information about its operations, and most of defence matters are considered state secrets and are classified under Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. 50 [4,5,6]. There is no transparency in relation to defence operations generally, and there is no evidence to support that corruption is taken into consideration in the forward planning of operations.

Corruption is not treated as a strategic issue within the defence sector. In addition to that, there is no information available about defence operations and planning in general. Jordan provides military and police officers to seven UN Peacekeeping missions [1], however, there is no information available about whether corruption issues are taken into account in planning and execution. Due to this lack of evidence, as with the lack of information on forward planning, it is not possible to assess its application in planning and execution.

The Kuwaiti authorities are starting to take corruption into consideration in the defence and security realm however, there are no examples of corruption being considered in the forward planning of military operations. In March 2018, Parliament passed the conflict of interest act, which necessitates that officials who stand to gain personally from their position in any way (by, for exampling, having a spouse who owns a business that deals with the Government) disclose their conflicts of interests, and resolve them by either quitting or abandoning their private ventures. (1)

This, along with the facts that security leaders have been meeting with anti-corruption activists and auditors, shows that the security agencies in Kuwait are at least feeling the need to appear like they are taking corruption into consideration, a police official said. (2)

High-ranking officials have put corruption on the agenda in the planning of all operations by pushing forward the conflict of interest law, and there are older laws in place that show awareness of the issue, but when it comes to the day-to-day planning of military and security planning, officials don’t discuss corruption as an issue (1, 2 and 3). They do not punish or investigate the many instances in which their staff flouts anti-corruption laws by, for example, neglecting to report that they have received a commission from a weapons company to help push through an arms procurement deal and refusing to disclose their finances to the ACA, officials and an activist close to the Government said (4, 5, 6 and 7). It was not possible to acquire more information on the matter due to sensitivity.

It is also important to note that Kuwait is not involved in any conflicts, except marginally in the war to reinstall the internationally recognised Government of Yemen (8). Most of Kuwait’s military has no battlefield experience, officials and analysts said (9, 10, 4, 5 and 6).

The LAF’s DoO indicated that the Lebanese Army does not have specific corruption training, thus corruption issues are not taken seriously in forward planning operations (1). Furthermore, LAF does not conduct major operations regularly (2).

There is no evidence of corruption considerations for procurement or related aspects linked to operations’ execution (1). This also applied during LAF exercises with UNIFIL deployed in the South of Lebanon (2). As previously indicated, the LAF’s anti-corruption measures are integrated within its laws and rules which military personnel are continuously reminded off, according to the LAF DoO (3).

The government does not appear to make any reference to eliminating corruption as a strategic goal in its flagship reform programme for the military.¹ ² ³ ⁴ The programme, which is scheduled to run from 2015 to 2019, merely focuses on increasing military spending, recruiting more soldiers and buying more equipment. It will involve a financial commitment of 1.23 trillion CFA and should enable the armed forces to recruit an additional 10,000 troops over the five-year period.¹ However, one source warns of the danger and the folly of investing so much in the armed forces without first addressing corruption as a strategic issue, especially when the misuse of military funds often results in troops not even having enough fuel for their vehicles.⁴
A senior security governance expert agreed that the LOPM does not address corruption risks.⁴ The interviewee commented that “93% of expenditure was given to general administration, which makes it very difficult – even for financial experts – to trace flows of money and work out what is going on”.⁴ The stakeholder said the LOPM2 will be different. It will provide much clearer breakdowns of military spending to conform with a transparency initiative launched by the West African economic bloc ECOWAS.⁴ A security expert working with the Malian authorities confirmed that they had seen so evidence of the MDAC identifying corruption as a strategic issue.⁵

Corruption issues are not taken into account at all in forward planning or planning for operations.

As mentioned in Q52, over the past decade, a number of initiatives have been launched to fight corruption and promote transparency in the public and private sectors in Morocco, such as the adhesion to the 2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2007 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7) the creation of the ICPC (National Commission for the Fight against Corruption) in 2015, and its transformation into a National Body for the Fight Against Corruption, the creation of an e-gov platform (8) and the creation of a corruption vigilance platform and hotline in 2018 (9).

As Q52 explains, no evidence was found that Morocco’s civil and military authority consider corruption as a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations, including in anti-corruption, human rights and governance NGOs reports (10)(11)(12).

Such lack of evidence might indicate a lack of transparency which itself could imply corruption risks.

No evidence was found that corruption issues were taken into account in planning or execution, or were regularly mishandled by officers during deployment.

The assessor did not find any evidence that would suggest corruption is considered a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations (1).

No policy regarding the matter has been identified. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Corruption is not identified in operational plans, corruption is not seen as an operational issue which requires contingency planning at the operational planning phase. Periodic briefings, on corruption-related issues, do occur (1). “The Defence Headquarters has recently organized a three-day procurement awareness seminar for the various personnel of the armed forces responsible for procurement operations.” The seminar’s theme was “Understanding Public Procurement Policy Towards Efficient Defence Procurement in Nigeria,” was declared open by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Marshal Alex Badeh, who was represented by Air Vice Marshall A.A. Iya, Chief of Policy and Plans at the Defence Headquarters (2), (3).

There is no evidence that corruption risks are planned for during operations. Soldiers in the field are significantly hampered by corruption which manifests in poor pay and service conditions. The guidelines on corruption are not always effectively implemented in the field. This fact has been reported in the media by various personnel who describe how poor equipment and a lack of supplies affects operational efficiency (1), (2), (3).

As outlined in Q51, there is no military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations, therefore there is no evidence to support that corruption issues are taken into consideration in the forward planning of operations. It is difficult to discern if corruption issues are taken into account in forward planning, due to the lack of transparency around operational planning on the Royal Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence websites (1), (2). There is a lack of accountability regarding operational procedures with little media coverage apart from Omani-British joint exercises and natural disaster emergency operational plans (3), (4). No details are made publicly available on forward planning and the lack of transparency and accountability justify a score of zero for this sub-indicator. According to our sources, there is no forward planning that takes corruption as a risk. Although there is little forward planning (more than a year), corruption is never mentioned as a major risk factor (5), (6).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because corruption is not taken into consideration in forward planning.

The Omani Royal Armed Forces do not conduct significant operations, nor do they provide personnel for UN peacekeeping forces (1). The sole operation found relates to an emergency meeting on how to deal with a tropical cyclone (Mekunu) held by the Sultani’s Armed Forces’ Military Committee for Management of Emergency Situations (2). However, no reference is made to corruption risks in the media, no follow up articles were found discussing details of the operation (2), (3), (4). According to our sources, there are no major operations run by Oman’s armed forces and no deployment anywhere of the sultan’s forces; therefore, no corruption risks are taken into consideration (5).

The issue of corruption has never been taken seriously in either strategic or forward planning by the Palestinian Authority in general and the armed forces and security in particular. Further, most of the plans (forward plans) are routine plans that have no significance on the operations of the agencies. Nevertheless, corruption is not included or considered an issue within any plan. According to a senior officer, forward operation plans do not exist within the security apparatus, in term of operations.

Corruption issues can be taken into consideration in the planning of operations concerning recruitment and procurement. However, there are cases where junior officers break the Code of Conduct and are prosecuted. The absence of clear plans provides opportunities for corruption (1). Major corruption issues occur when recruiting new soldiers (nepotism) and in procurement (buying goods, food, equipment, etc). These issues are rarely taken into consideration at senior levels.

A 22-officer Palestinian training team trained to build integrity and transparency in the security establishment was formed within the project program in cooperation with the Anti-Corruption Commission, a British support team and the Royal Academy of Defence (2).

Corruption issues are not considered to be strategic issues within the defence sector overall (Q51) and there is no evidence of them being factored into plans. Corruption is not an issue that the armed forces or the MoD take into consideration in their various activities. [1,2] Defence and security issues are treated as confidential and secret, and both advanced planning and corruption are not part of the conversation on defence in the country. Whereas there is a general expressed Government commitment to combatting corruption as a strategic issue, these commitments do not extend to the defence sector. [3] For instance, communication on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Qatar needs to strengthen coordinated cooperation to address corruption. [4] However, none of these references to corruption are related to forward planning.

During operations and activities, the Qatari armed forces and the MoD do not take corruption issues into consideration. The commanders do not usually have guidelines or take practical measures on corruption during operations. [1,2]

Although KSA has no publicly available military doctrine, they try to consider corruption issues and risk in forwarding planning when it comes to large purchases, to avoid corruption scandals and bribes (1), (2). Therefore, there is no consistent system to take corruption issues into account when forward planning (1).

According to our sources, Saudi Arabia is engaged in operations in Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, and other small operations elsewhere, but there are no indications, internally or by the experience of the sources of anti-corruption measures being in effect (1), (2). Corruption issues are not taken into account either in strategic planning or during the execution of operations within the Saudi military.

According to a Gulf affairs expert:
“Corruption as a strategic issue is likely to be considered in the forward planning of operations when time and capacity permit. There is a doctrine and indeed, a blueprint to support the planning of operations, but it rarely functions in practice, for two main reasons: capacity issues (in the broadest sense; capabilities, competence, diligence); and poor chain of command issues. There is little evidence to suggest that commanders at all levels apply knowledge in this field owing to the factors mentioned above, plus poor discipline, planning itself and intervention from more senior figures in the armed forces” (3).

No evidence to support the claim that corruption as a strategic issue is considered in the forward planning of operations could be found (1). According to our sources, corruption is not taken into consideration during forward planing. Corruption is not a strategic issue within the armed forces and that’s why it is not taken into consideration during the forward planning or operations (2,3).

According to our resources, corruption issues are not taken into consideration when conducting operations or in planning. Besides that, there is no written and published evidence to support that corruption as a strategic issue is considered in the planning of operations (1,2).

Generally, forward planning is usually conducted in coordination with the Office of the Crown Prince; it does not take corruption into account (1), (2). It has been demonstrated that corruption is not considered a strategic issue in operations, as there is no evidence to support that it is, whether in terms of having military doctrine (Q51) or having an anti-corruption unit (3) or in terms of internal communications within the armed forces (Q34A). Despite the fact that the lack of evidence could be potentially related to secrecy in dealing with matters related to the defence sector, this lack of evidence also reflects a lack of transparency concerning the operations of the armed forces in general.

Corruption has not and never has been taken into account during planning. There is clear evidence by international institutions that the UAE armed forces are committing corrupt practices in their war in Yemen (1), (2).

Country Sort by Country 53a. Forward planning Sort By Subindicator 53b. Application Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 0 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 NA
Cameroon 0 / 100 NEI
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 0 / 100 0 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 25 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kuwait 0 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 0 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 0 / 100 NA
Nigeria 0 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 NA
Palestine 0 / 100 25 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 0 / 100 0 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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