Albania adopted the Law on Whistleblowing and protection of Whistleblowers in June 2016 [1]. The law provides channels for reporting wrongdoings; procedures for the investigation of disclosures; and procedures for the protection of whistleblowers from retaliation. The law has a broad personal scope and includes all people working in either the public or private sector. This includes defence and security personnel also. However, the law only covers the reporting of suspected acts of corruption, making it rather limited when reporting potential crimes such as a violation of fundamental rights, dangers to public health, public safety or the environment, abuses of public authority, breaches of legal obligation, unauthorised use or waste of public funds or resources, conflicts of interest, etc. [2].
The law includes the protection of identity (Article 15), protection against retribution (Articles 17-18), and a reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation, provided in a bylaw [3], while it does not provide for sanctions of whistleblowers for misguided reporting. The legislation lacks any explicit reference to the waiver of liability for the whistleblower and the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing.

Guidelines and regulations have been adopted by the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI) [1], the Information and Data Protection Commissioner (IDPC) [2] and the Council of Ministers [3].
The Council of Minister’s Decision “On the structure, selection criteria and labour relations of the employees of the responsible unit in public authorities pursuant to the law on whistleblowing and protection of whistleblowers” provides the criteria and competences of the internal reporting units in the public authorities with over 80 employees [3].
Awareness-raising campaigns have been limited to NGO efforts, while little has been done to raise the capabilities of the media to improve reporting on whistleblowing [4].
In 2017, there were 163 responsible units within the public authorities [5]. However, results achieved in the capacity building efforts have been poor. Out of 609 internal reporting units (446 responsible units have been established in the private sector), training was provided to only 32 of them in 2017 [5].

The results achieved with the implementation of the law so far have been very limited. In 2017 there were only seven internal reporting units that have received one or two whistleblower cases, while eight other cases have been directly reported to the HIDAACI. No whistleblower case cases were recorded by the defence and security institutions [1]. This is indicative of a low level of information but also trust in the system.
No sufficient information or encouragement to report wrongdoing by making use of the legislation on whistleblowing is provided to defence personnel [2].

There is legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption. There is also evidence that it applies to military and official personnel. Laws mentioned below make explicit reference to the protection of whistleblowers but they only provide limited protection, such as the protection of identity.

Art. 45 of the Anti-Corruption Law concerns the “Protection of witnesses, experts, whistleblowers and victims” and states that the person who resorts to revenge, intimidation or threats against witnesses, experts, whistleblowers shall be punished by imprisonment from six months to five years and a fine between 50,000 DA to 500,000 DA (1). Moreover, order No. 15-02 of July 23, 2015, amending and supplementing the Code of Criminal Procedure specifies that witnesses, experts and victims are protected. It moreover stipulates that witnesses and experts on cases of corruption may benefit from extra procedural measures when their life, physical integrity, or that of their family members are seriously threatened. This includes concealing information on the identity, providing a special phone number, designating a contact point within the security services, provide the person with physical protection, install preventive technical equipment in the house, change his place of residence, provide him with social or financial assistance; place him, if he is a prisoner, in an especially secure area (2).
Both rules do not explicitly refer to the security services but Art. 69 of the Statute of Military Personnel says that the military is subject to the provisions of ordinary criminal law and the Code of Military Justice (3). Therefore it is assumed that the legislation on whistleblowing also applies to the military personnel. In this regard, the social media outlet, El-Khabar, claimed in November 2018 that the Ministry of Defence has begun providing protection for whistleblowers in corruption-related cases as it had only applied the provisions included in the first and second laws to cases related to terrorism (4).

No evidence could be found that the Algerian government is actively encouraging whistleblowing on corruption cases. Training provided by the anti-corruption watchdog agency ONPLC, which is targeted at public officials that are exposed to corruption, do not explicitly address whistleblowing according to the information provided on the ONPLC’s website (1). According to the head of the ONPLC, the first training cycle focused on four themes: the legal and institutional framework for the fight against corruption, transparency of public life, the code of conduct for public officials, and recriminations. The second training covered fraud risks in public procurement and internal control (2), (3). No further information could be found, for example, on guidance or informative material on whistleblowing. No information could be found on whether the Ministry of Defence, in particular, encourages whistleblowing. However, there is information that the Ministry of Defence had begun offering protection for whistleblowers in corruption-related cases (4). But no statements, for example, by the Vice Minister of Defence encouraging whistleblowing could be found.

There are very few indications that defence officials and personnel would trust that they are adequately protected when they report corruption; see the country’s last assessment (1). For example, there are reports of whistleblowers that have reported corruption and hereafter become subject of harassment and prosecution. In 2017, the president of a workers union was sentenced in absentia to six months in prison after he exposed corruption in the state-owned energy company Sonelgaz (2). In another case, a former manager of the public Oran Port Company was demoted and then dismissed after having questioned his superiors about malfunctions and malpractices in connection with the port’s activities (3). Moreover, authorities arrested the brother of a popular Algerian activist known as Amir Dz to stop him from leaking information and documents regarding the proliferation of corruption in the government’s institutions (4). There are also other reports of people that have been harassed, dismissed or prosecuted after reporting corruption while in office (5).

No legal provisions exist that facilitate corruption reporting or protection of whistleblowing. On the contrary, in 2016 new media legislation was enacted that established a media regulatory body, the ERCA (Entidade Reguladora da Comunicação Social de Angola) that reinforces ruling party control over media organizations, social media and the internet (1), (2), (3).

No legal provisions exist that facilitate corruption reporting or protection of whistleblowing. On the contrary, in 2016 new media legislation was enacted that established a media regulatory body, the ERCA (Entidade Reguladora da Comunicação Social de Angola) that reinforces ruling party control over media organizations, social media and the internet (1), (2), (3).

There is a proven track record of whistleblowers being prosecuted by government authorities for exposing and reporting corrupt activity. Well-documented examples are the judicial proceedings against Rafael Marques – 2012 under the charge of defamation in a lawsuit brought by senior military officials whom the journalists had accused of involvement in corruption and torture in the diamond and private security business, and in 2017 under the charges of defamation and outrage in a lawsuit brought by the former attorney general whom Marques had accused of corrupt practices (1), (2), (3).

The country has legislation that provides mechanisms for reporting irregularities by the Public Administration and is applicable to all personnel performing public functions. Argentinian legislation establishes the Anti-Corruption Office as one of the agencies responsible for receiving complaints from individuals regarding acts of corruption by personnel in the Centralised and Decentralised National Public Administration, companies, societies, and all other public or private entities with State participation, etc. [1] Regarding the current lack of specific legal framework for protection of whistleblowers, in 2019 an online petition was filed by civil society for Congress to pass a law to protect witnesses and complainants of corruption cases. [2] In the case of the Ministry of Defence, the body receiving complaints is the General Directorate of Institutional Transparency of the Ministry of Defence of the Nation. In the Ministry of Security, it is the Coordination of the Regulations and Transparency of the Ministry of Security of the Nation. [3]

Protection of whistleblowers under the Criminal Procedure Code (Protection of the victims) confers rights such as: dignified and respectful treatment; payment of expenses of transfer; protection of physical and moral integrity; to be informed about the results of the procedural act; and required protective measures for safety. There is no specific mechanism that provides protection against reprisals, reversal of the burden of proof, or the exemption of responsibility for the complainant. [4]

The reporting of irregularities is encouraged through training, information, and guides on corruption and protection of whistleblowers. An example is the “whistleblower’s guide” which is published by the Anti-Corruption Office [1] and the information and training offered by that body are also related to issues related to public ethics and integrity. [2] However, internal campaigns to promote the reporting of irregularities are sporadic or only aimed at a small sector of the staff. They appear in links on the website of the Anti-Corruption Office with an online form that can be anonymous and a line to report cases of corruption, which the Ministry of Security put into operation in August 2018. [3] [4] There is a unit dependent on the EP, Anti-Corruption Office, in charge of the application of the Law of Ethics in the Exercise of Public Function, which receives complaints and has the capacity to present itself as a complainant before the Justice in corruption cases involving officials of the national administration. [5] However, the press and civil society point out that it lacks independence as long as the control is diffuse “when the controlled (PE) designates and coordinates the budget and structure of that office.” [6] The OECD reiterates this, saying that it believes that “in order for the Anti-Corruption Office to be able to realise its potential to drive systemic change, it should make its role as a designer and policy advisor more visible. Likewise, increasing financial and administrative autonomy and detailing the criteria for selecting and removing the highest authority could strengthen the entity to a greater extent.” [7 In turn, civil society organisations such as the Citizen Power have appeared before the Argentine courts for coercion of judges, thus violating the principle of independence of the judiciary, leaving a clear lack of protection for those who act on corruption cases. [8]

With regard to the confidence that whistleblowers have adequate protection of their identity, the absence of a specific law in the matter creates some complication in practice. For example, whistleblowers’ identity is anonymous only at the beginning while the administrative investigation lasts, after which it must be revealed when the facts are reported to the Judiciary branch. Likewise, there have been cases of pressure on those who have officiated as witnesses. [1] In terms of effectiveness, ACIJ convened different sectors in 2018 to discuss the need for a collective complaint tool in criminal cases that investigate corruption offenses. This in order to increase citizen control over the state bodies that are responsible for investigations and final resolution of the conflict. [2] In the defence jurisdiction, the body receiving complaints is the General Directorate of Institutional Transparency of the Ministry of Defence of the Nation. However, there is no evidence that there is public knowledge regarding the mechanism it uses, the complaints it receives, or whether it confers protection on the complainant. In the case of security forces, at the end of 2017, the Ministry of Security created the Investigation Unit against Corruption, but its scope is limited to the security forces of the nation (Federal Police, Gendarmerie, Police Airport Security, and the Naval Prefecture of Argentina). [3] In this jurisdiction, protection of whistleblowers has been extended, for example against fear of reprisals. [4] The Anti-Corruption Office that channels complaints and that can be brought to justice, according to its 2018 report, presented 2 complaints against defence personnel and 1 against a security personnel. On the other hand, civil society organisations have filed complaints before the courts such as Amicus Curiae and, due to a court ruling, they have been allowed to present themselves as complainant in corruption cases. [5]

The Law on Whistleblowing entered into force on January 1, 2018. It frames the rights and responsibilities of whistleblowers and regulates whistleblowing as a public phenomenon. It defines the concept of whistleblowing, the explicit protection of whistleblowers and related persons and procedure of whistleblowing concerning corruption and any other misconduct of public service [1]. Three types of whistleblowing are defined by the Law: internal whistleblowing, external whistleblowing, and whistleblowing to the public/society [2]. Article 10 of the law provides the whistleblowers have a right to protection. So does the related person if proven that he/she is harassed based on the activities by the whistleblower. The whistleblower who reported to the criminal prosecution authorities us subject to protection through the Criminal Procedure Code. Article 11 provides anonymity for the whistleblower and the non-disclosure of his/her personal information to any third body unless approved by the whistleblower. Article 12 of the law sets out the judicial protection provided to whistleblowers and related persons [1]. The legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists and applies to military and official personnel, as the law regulates the relations of whistleblowers with all state bodies. There is an explicit reference to the protection of whistleblowers, including protection of identity, protection against retribution (Article 10, Clause 2). However, the reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation is not regulated by the law, waiver of liability for the whistleblower exists only in cases of conscientious behaviour, sanctions may be applied in cases of misguided reporting if deliberate unfair actions took place (the information about this should be sent to the Prosecutor’s Office (Article 6, Clause 8)). The law distinguishes between wrongdoing and conscientious behaviour of the whistleblower [1].

Different state agencies and institutions promote the application of the law, and it is not yet clear whether the recent cases of corruption, bribery, and misconduct are related to the application of the Law on Whistleblowing, or if they related to other channels of information [1]. The RA “Law on Whistleblowing System” and the RA Government Decree N272-N of March 15, 2018 “On Adopting the Exemplary Form of Registering and Formulating of Reports of Internal and External Whistleblowing, as well as the Procedure for the Implementation of Protective Measures for the Whistleblower”, by the order of the Minister of Defence the Head of the MoD Human Rights and Integrity Building Center is appointed responsible for internal and external whistleblowing [2].The Center maintains a register of whistleblowing cases, and whistleblowers are protected by law.

Based on the Law on Whistleblowing and Decision N 272-N, On the Definition of Exemplary Form of Registration and Formulation of Reports in the Event of Internal and External Whistleblowing, as well as the Procedure for the Implementation of Protection Measures of the Whistleblower, by the order of the minister of defence, the head of the Centre for Human Rights and Good Behaviour of the MoD was appointed to be responsible for internal and external whistleblowing at the MoD. This gives the Centre for Human Rights and Good Behaviour an opportunity to more effectively ensure the protection of the rights of citizens that whistleblow on corruption cases and ensures the requirements of the law on the protection of the personal data of whistleblowers are upheld [1].
MoD claims, that the content analysis of the calls received by the MoD’s hotline shows that both the military and civil servants use the hotline to alert/blow a whistle about violations of their rights, consequently the personell trust the system. [2].

The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 [1] (PID Act) is the Australian government legislation on whistleblowing, which allows for whistleblowers – civilian and military – from government agencies, including the Department of Defence (DoD) [2], to disclose information about wrongdoing and be protected from retaliation [3]. Whistleblowers have a broad range of protections under the PID Act. These include an expectation of general secrecy around details of the disclosure [1, s. 65], and a specific prohibition around their identity being revealed [1, s. 20, p61-63]. Whistleblowers are also protected from reprisals (retribution) in the form of detriments [1, s. 59(3)(a)]. However, the burden of proof is not explicitly reversed when the whistleblower appeals to the Court for remedies relating to reprisals [1]. Whistleblowers are protected from civil, criminal, or administrative liability in relation to disclosures [1, s. 10]. Though a government agency can decide to end an whistleblower investigation if it decides that the disclosure is “frivolous” or does not pertain to “serious disclosable conduct” [1, s. 41(1)(c), 48(1)(d), 3, p37-38] there are no sanctions for “misguided reporting,” and any disclosure would be protected from reprisals, even if it is not substantiated or significant. There is no explicit right to not participate in wrongdoing; however, this is implied by the fact that whistleblowing “does not automatically protect the discloser from the consequences of their own wrongdoing, including where they have been involved in the misconduct they are reporting,” implying that whistleblowers are actually expected not to participate in the wrongdoing they are reporting [3, p27]. DoD has its own implementation policy that lays out specific whistleblowing processes for personnel, in line with its obligations under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 [4]. The Public Interest Disclosure Act only allows external disclosure – for example, to the media or a federal politician – under extremely limited circumstances, such as an imminent threat to health or life or an “inadequate” or delayed investigation, where the public interest is not endangered [3, p11-15]. This has led commentators to note that private sector whistleblower protections are stronger than those for the public sector [5].

Whistleblowers in Defence can make disclosures under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 exclusively to Authorised Officers within Defence, who are all assigned to the high-level Office of the Assistant Secretary Fraud Control. Although it is unclear how many personnel and other resources are assigned to (be) Authorised Officers, there have been no public indications that they are understaffed or under-resourced since the Public Interest Disclosure Scheme began in 2013 [1]. Guidance materials, taking the form of guidelines specific to Defence [2] and general disclosure guidelines provided by the Office of the Ombudsman [3], are readily available to Defence personnel. Training is provided as well, though the quality, participation model (mandatory or not), and content are unknown. In response to a question in Parliament, Defence stated: “Defence has also released an online training course to further assist personnel in understanding the operation of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 in Defence. Finally, the Fraud Control and Investigations Branch, who manage the Defence Public Interest Disclosure Scheme, raise awareness of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 through face-to-face Fraud and Ethics presentations and other communication streams including the Defence Ethics Matters publication” [2]. There are also regular internal campaigns to encourage whistleblowing. For example, the Audit and Fraud Control Division used full-page feature articles in each of the three service branch’s newspapers (Army News, Navy News, and Air Force News) to spread awareness of the public interest disclosure scheme and encourage whistleblowing on 3 occasions since 2017 [4, 5, 6]. The Authorised Officers who have the authority to hear disclosures sit within the Office of the Assistant Secretary Fraud Control, which is a highly-regarded but nevertheless not entirely independent office (the Assistant Secretary Fraud Control ultimately reports to the Secretary of Defence).

Though members of the public service appear to be aware of whistleblower protections in theory, in practice, confidence in whistleblower protections is shaky. In the 2018 APS Employee Census survey, over 80% of respondents agreed that their agency had procedures in place to manage corruption, and that they felt confident they would know what to do if they identified corruption [1]. However, on a scale of 1-5, federal Australian public servants – which would include those in Defence – rated their confidence in the response to whistleblowing at 3.45. This was higher than respondents from Australian state and local governments and New Zealand government employees [2]. Additionally, the same survey revealed that some 80% of those who had reported wrongdoing had experienced some type of repercussion, either formal or informal, though this figure includes both private and public sector employees [3]. In addition, the official Moss Review of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 said that surveyed public servants who blown the whistle under the Act “reported that, despite the protections in the legislation, they experienced reprisal and did not feel that they had their agencies’ backing after making their disclosures”, though “For many disclosers, the protections inherent in the [Public Interest Disclosure] process can provide confidence and certainty that their concerns are being seriously considered” [4].

Like many countries, Azerbaijan is a dangerous country for whistleblowers. Still, a legislative group, the Anti-Corruption Commission is working on the draft law on whistleblowers (1). There is no law to protect whistleblowers in Azerbaijan, but current legislation protects people participating in criminal proceedings. According to the Law on State Protection of Persons Participating in Criminal Proceedings (Article 3) People towards whom the relevant executive authority has made the decision on application of security measures is considered the protected persons (2).
Following are considered as protected persons:
1. Person, who informed law enforcement agency on the crime, or participated in the revealing, prevention or detection of crime;
2. Persons, who considered a victim under the criminal case, his authorized representative, special prosecutor or his representative;
3. Suspected or accused persons, his attorneys and representatives;
4. Civil plaintiff, civil respondent, his representatives;
5. Witnesses;
6. Expert, specialists, translator and witnesses.
Security measures can also be applied toward close relatives of secured persons in the event of influence on close relatives to put pressure on protected people.

Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government. There is no government messaging on whistleblowing. Mass media, TV channels do not discuss any information about it (1). On the contrary, those reporting on crimes are, in many cases, humiliated, removed from their jobs or are arrested (2).

According to the experts, the protection of those who provide information about the offences in the security and defence sectors is not properly implemented. As there are serious subordination relations with military law. Many servicemen have been arrested for this issue at the Defence Ministry. For example, Colonel-Lieutenant Rasim Muradov was arrested for reporting corrupt crimes at the Defence Ministry’s Peaceful Tabor (1). The Ministry of Defence has anonymous reporting mechanisms such as “Trust line” and “Trust Mail” in military units (2). However, it is always questionable to ensure the safety of the person reporting the crime in the army.

There is no legal framework that encourages whistleblowing and provides or promises protection for such individuals. It has not been communicated at any level that whistleblowing is encouraged [1, 2]. An online search of the websites of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and the king’s office’s, as well as other official websites, showed there is no information about whistleblowing at all.

There is no guidance, training, or communication on reporting corruption and whistleblowing. Additionally, there are no units that can communicate and encourage whistleblowing [1, 2, 3]. An online search of the websites of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and the king’s office’s, as well as other official websites, showed there is no information about whistleblowing at all.

Sources state that the sectarian division, loyalists and non-loyalist, foreign personnel, all play roles in creating minimal trust between staff, and senior and junior personnel, which makes it difficult for whistleblowers or individuals to report corruption [1, 2, 3]. There is no effective capacity to protect whistleblowers if they come out against corrupt activities [1, 2, 3]. An online search of the websites of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and the king’s office’s, as well as other official websites, showed there is no information about whistleblowing at all.

Bangladesh enacted the Public‐interest Information Disclosure Act (Provide Protection) in 2011 [1]. Popularly known as the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, it provides scope for whistleblowers to make a ‘public interest disclosure’ to the competent authority and to receive protection from civil and criminal prosecution, as well as from employment disadvantages, and to have their identity protected, etc. The Act defines ‘public interest information’ as information relating to the misuse of public money or resources, abuse of power, criminal acts, acts against public health, safety or the environment, and corruption. According to the Act, the identity of whistleblowers is protected and they are also protected against criminal, civil or departmental lawsuits, demotion, harassment transfer or forced retirement or any other measures that could incur loss of their psychological, financial or social standing, including protection against discriminatory departmental actions. The whistleblower’s identity also may not be disclosed as evidence in civil or criminal cases. However, the disclosure of false information or information that is not in the public interest is punishable under this Act.

The uptake of this law is very limited among government ministries. Although the Anti-Corruption Commission conducted a few orientation events on this Act in 2018 [1], the Ministry of Defence [2] is not reported to have arranged any orientation or training events on this Act for its own officials or military officials.

Section 168 of the Army Act includes provisions for complaints made by officers to their superiors or to the government if grievances are not redressed, in case they were wronged by their commanding officer (CO). On the other hand, the media is yet to report of any corruption charges emanating from this Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. People, government officials and even lawyers are not fully aware that it exists [1], let alone know how to use it effectively.

The Whistleblower statute of the Federal government protects personnel in the federal administration, based on the law of 15 September 2013 [1, 2]. It introduced a mandatory hotline and confidant. Secondly, article 29 of the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure states how governmental officials can whistleblow [3]. Following the EU directive ‘on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union Law’, a whistleblowing framework is currently being estalbished, which includes Belgian military personnel [4]. To this point, the procedure for whistleblowing means approaching the Inspector General. This body handles complaints and thus also whistleblowing reports. Military staff are aware of its existence, as it is explained in the internal regulations [5].

Training on whistleblowing is provided within the deontology training of the Belgian Defence [1]. Within the procurement division of the Belgian Defence, a specific office gives anonymous advice to potential whistleblowers on cases related to deontology.

Any claim or corruption case can also be handled internally by the General Inspectorate of the Belgian Defence [2, 3]. It handles complaints and thus also whistleblower reports. Military staff knows this exists, as it is put in the internal regulations. The General Inspoctorate is outside of the hierarcy of potential whistleblowers as it reports directly to the Chief of Defence.

The new procedures will further implement the protections of officials and personnel. To this point, protections prove adequate. By way of example, the whisteblower who leaked information on the lifespan of the F16-fighter jets, was twice passed over for promotion because of ‘disloyal behaviour’.

In 2021, the highest administrative court, the State Council (‘Raad van State, Conseil d’Etat’) ruled this was unlawful and the individual got promoted in rank [1]. That being said, the particular culture of Belgian Defence does hamper and does not facilitate whistleblowing [2, 3]. Naturally, there is a difference between legal protection and atmosphere in the work environment.

There is a Law on Protection of Whistle-blowers in the institution of Bosnia and Herzegovina explicitly regulating whistleblowing and it applies to military and official personnel and it provides explicate reference to the protection of whistle-blowers with regards to:
1. Pre-emptive protection to employees – before retaliation has occurred;
2. Right of whistle-blowers to refuse participation in wrongdoing,
3. Protection of identity;
but it lacks the following protection mechanisms:
2. Reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation;
3. Waiver of liability for the whistle-blowers;
4. No sanctions for misguided reporting [1].
Under the law, state employees may apply for whistleblower status regardless of whether they have suffered reprisals or only suspect they could occur. However, there must be an “objective prospect” of retaliation. The status does not protect employees from disciplinary and other measures that are not related to their act of whistleblowing [3].
Additionally, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has established an ethic hotline, where all irregularities can be anonymously reported. In the MoD [2], there is the Office of the Inspector General as a separate organisational unit of MoD, which, according to the Defence Law, Chapter VII, is responsible for taking care of ethics and integrity in the MoD and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH). Competences/responsibilities and operating procedures of the MoD’s Office of the Inspector General are further regulated in the Guidelines for the work of the Office of the Inspector General and the inspectors in AFBiH No. 04-02-4046/2006 dated 28/07/2006 and Amended Guidelines No. 05-03-32-1-44/10 dated 12/10/2010. Guidelines are a piece of secondary legislation which was passed pursuant to Article 55 of the BiH Defence Law [4]. The Office of the Inspector General deals not only with the handling of reports related to corruption but also other forms of irregularities, including corruption. Office of the Inspector General and inspectors of AFBiH make up the MoD’s and AFBiH’s system of inspectors, which operates as an organised and single whole [4]. The system provides for a total of 16 inspectors, including the MoD’s Inspector General, who has the rank of general, manages the system of inspectors and reports for its work to the MoD. From a total of 16 inspectors, six work in the MoD’s Office of the Inspector General, and nine work in the commands and units of AFBiH throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The system of inspectors is filled with 15 inspectors or 93.75% of the envisaged number [4]. Conditions for performing the duties of inspectors and the process of appointment of persons to the office of inspectors are defined by the Guidelines for the work of the MoD’s Office of the Inspector General and the inspectors in AFBiH, and all inspectors meet the requirements for performing their duties. The MoD and AFBiH have put in place the e-system “Ethics Line”, through which e-complaints, suggestions and other comments on all MoD’s and AFBiH’s activities can be filed [4]. The system provides adequate and timely consideration of all complaints and suggestions received from anonymous and non-anonymous complainants, two-way communication with them, and the undertaking of appropriate measures. The MoD adopted the Rules on the tracking of complaints and suggestions on MoD’s work and polling on MoD’s services, No. 06-02-3-2308-1/18 dated 02/08/2018. The rules are available on the MoD’s website [4]. The Rules support the implementation of the objectives and activities defined under the Revised Action Plan 1 for the implementation of the BiH Public Administration Reform Strategy, which provides that all interested persons and beneficiaries of MoD’s services may submit complaints and suggestions on MoD’s work [4]. The process of receiving and handling complaints and suggestions, which may also include reports of certain illegal acts, is organised as follows:
– Head of the MoD’s Department for General and Common Affairs ensures the receipt of complaints and suggestions and submits them to the MoD’s Secretary;
– MoD’s Secretary reports to the Minister of Defence and Deputy Ministers of Defence on the complaints and suggestions received, and they jointly determine whether further action is warranted;
– after determining that there is need for further action, the MoD’s Secretary submits the complaints and suggestions for further processing to heads of relevant MoD’s organisational units, which prepare a response, propose or take appropriate action, and report thereof to the MoD’s Secretary;
– MoD’s Secretary reports to the Minister of Defence and Deputy Ministers of Defence on the response and action taken or proposed;
– Minister of Defence and Deputy Ministers of Defence approve the actions and responses to the complaints and suggestions received,
– Responses to the complaints and suggestions which were not filed anonymously are submitted to the complainants within five working days of receipt of complaints and suggestions [4].

Reporting all types of irregularities in MoD and AFBiH, including corruption, is actively encouraged through training that is organized and carried out by inspectors of General Inspectorate of BiH MoD and inspectors of units commands (system of inspectors of BiH MoD and AF), but also within AFBiH Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) [1]. The PSOTC organizes courses for non-commissioned officers in the field of corruption prevention and fights against corruption [1].
Aside from the mentioned, training in the subject of the fight against corruption is also performed with specially selected groups that are assessed to be exposed to the greater risk of corruption. For instance, during 2018, the training has been conducted with two such groups that lasted for two hours [2]. One group has 20 participants from the group of officers appointed to assess candidates in the admission phase 2 in the process of assessment of candidates for professional military service. The second group had 64 participants from the group of officers’ candidates for professional military service. The training was conducted in the Center for Professional Development in Travnik by inspectors of the MoD General Inspectorate [2].

Further, the general inspector and other inspectors of the AFBiH General Inspectorate conduct activities of visiting units and commands and informing members of the AFBiH on competences of GI and possibilities of reporting of irregularities. Sometimes it is organized together with representatives of international forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina like it was the case during the visit to the AFBiH Logistics Command and unit for the destruction of surplus weapons, mines and explosives together with EUFOR Commander [1]. The state’s anti-corruption agency, the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption, is by law the institution that grants whistleblower protection and has established a hotline for corruption reporting and campaigns of promoting reporting of corruption and protection for whistleblowers [3].

The MoD has established the electronic reporting of corruption and other irregularities through Internet and application “Ethics Line” as a form of protection of those reporting. This channel enables those reporting to report corruption and other irregularities, to communicate with the MoD inspectors, to deliver information and evidence while remaining anonymous which completely protects their identity. The MoD is one of the first institutions in BiH that established such a way of protecting persons reporting. This application has been used in the MoD since 2013 and the engagement of inspectors was required 307 times through this application since then. For instance, since the beginning of 2018 up to the time of writing of this report, the inspector’s engagement was required through this application 26 times. Out of 26 requests, 24 were anonymous [1].
Furthermore, up to June 2018, General Inspectorate of the MoD received and processed the total of 745 requests received through different channels (letters, personal reporting, phone calls, e-mails, Ethic Line channel). Out of 745 requests, 291 were anonymous and 454 were authorized [1]. The stated data shows that there is confidence in established mechanisms within BiH MoD and that there is also the protection of those reporting for the mechanisms are being applied in practice [1].
In cooperation with The Norwegian Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector – CIDS, within the recently established project of cooperation of BiH MoD and CIDS in three areas in the following three years (2018-2020):
1) Strengthening of capacities of human resources management;
2) Strengthening of capacities of the public procurement system;
3) Strengthening of capacities of General Inspectorate.

The MoD General Inspectorate organized the workshop on August 30-31, 2018 during which, among other things, the form of the survey questionnaire was created to determine the degree of confidence of those requesting engagement of inspectors. The survey should be conducted at the end of 2018 and during the first quarter of 2019 [1].
Generally, it can be concluded that just enacting regulations and amending them cannot build confidence in a system that most citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have lost. This further produces some doubts about the effectiveness of the protection system itself [2].
A researcher for Transparency International wrote for Mediacentar Sarajevo that “The national law on the protection of whistleblowers came into force at the beginning of 2014, and according to the latest report by APIK only 16 requests for whistleblower status have been submitted so far, 3 of which were accepted. These small numbers, decidedly disproportionate compared to the perception of corruption in BiH, signal the widespread distrust of potential whistleblowers towards the existing protection model and the institutions that should implement it. (…) It seems that the main weakness of the system of whistleblower protection, regardless of whether it is considered advanced or not, lies in the fact that, in spite of all the claims and guarantees, citizens are not convinced at all. The deep lack of trust in the institutions’ ability to implement the rules also involves whistleblowers because, despite the various protection mechanisms available and the belief that corruption is omnipresent, the number of legally recognised whistleblowers remains residual” [3].

The Whistleblower Protection Act 19 of 2016 provides for how a person may disclose conduct adverse to the public interest; to provide for the manner of reporting and investigations of disclosures of impropriety; and the protection against victimisation of persons who make the disclosures; and to provide for related matters [1]. This law applies to Whistleblowers in the defence and security services. According to this Act, its applicable to government employees, who have entered into a contract of employment for the hire of his or her labour in terms of the Public Service Act, Employment Act, Botswana Defence Force Act, Police Act or Prisons Act [2]. It is important to note that the Act applies to both military and official personnel. In terms of Part IV of the Whistleblower Protection Act 19 of 2016, there is explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers, including: protection of identity, protection against retribution, reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation, waiver of liability for the whistleblower, no sanctions for misguided reporting, right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing.

There is no Unit that deals with whistleblower protection training as of yet. This can be explained by the fact that the Whistleblower Act is a relatively new Act, which requires a lot of training and familiarisation by the authorities that are responsible for its adminsitration as well as its implementaion [1]. Ever since its enactment, in 2016, there have been calls for further training so that the Act can be fully embraced in Botswana. In the same light, there is no reported training that has been done in the Military [1]. There is no information of internal campaigns on the establishment of the Whistleblower Protection Unit.

There is not enough information to score this indicator as this is a new Act and it is too early to make determinations on its effectiveness [1]. However, the provisions that are meant to esnure its effectiveness are there in the Act. Section 4 of the Act, provides that 1) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a disclosure of impropriety is protected if (a) the disclosure is made in good faith; (b) the whistleblower reasonably believes that the disclosure and an allegation of impropriety contained in the disclosure is substantially true; and (c) the disclosure is made to an authorised person [2].
(2) A disclosure of impropriety made by a public officer to the Auditor General or by any person is protected under this Act where it shows or tends to show that a public body or officer of the public body has seriously and substantially wasted public money. This provision is yet to be tested in Botswana [2].

In 2018, in order to comply with several international treaties [1], the government enacted Law 13.608/18 [2], which institutionalizes whistleblowing protection in the Brazilian legislation and allows for public institutions in all levels and branches to offer rewards for whistleblowers. This legislation; however, does not offer many tools for physically protecting the whistleblower, nor does it mention the reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation, and there are no sanctions for misguided reporting. In 2019, the General Ombudsman of the Union also launched an internal regulation establishing some measures for whistleblower protection [3]. There is also the Delação Premiada (Witness Immunity) tool, which does not have the capacity to reward the ‘good whistleblowers’ [4].

Whistleblowing is not only not encouraged; it is discouraged by the current government. In 2019, Brazil’s president stated that he could stop giving security support to a municipality if the mayor instituted a Crime Stoppers Program for policemen [1].

There is almost no information available regarding corruption cases concerning military whistleblowers. Generally, the media has only reported that the Military Public Ministry (MPM) made a denunciation regarding corruption [1].

There is no legal framework for whistleblowing that applies to military and civilian officials in Burkina Faso (1), (2), (3).

There is no demonstrative evidence within the online literature showing any priority towards the protection of whistleblowers in Burkina Faso (1), (2), (3).

There is no demonstrative evidence within the online literature showing any effective program towards the protection of whistleblowers in Burkina Faso. The newly adopted anti-corruption laws do not have any provisions on the protection of whistleblowers (1), (2), (3), (4).

The practice of whistleblowing is one that is yet to permeate the socio-political landscape of Cameroon. Although there is no specific legal framework on whistleblowing, the state has put in place organs that could play the role of protecting whistle-blowers. According to the UNCAC Implementation Review (p. 6), “Cameroon has not implemented the provisions on the protection of witnesses and reporting persons. However, Article 3 (3) of the CONAC Decree [4] provides for the anonymity of reporting persons and thereby affords some protection to them” [5]. This suggests some protections are provided to whistleblowers by granting anonymity, although explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers seems to be absent. The absence of specific legislation protecting whistleblowers makes it challenging for citizens, especially those in the public sector, to engage in whistleblowing in terms of reporting corruption for fear of losing their jobs [1] [2] [3]. According to a GAN report (May 2017), civil servants and private-sector employees are not legally protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when they report cases of corruption [6].

The government have put in place a system to report corruption through the mandate of CONAC that provides for the anonymity of reporting persons and thereby affords some protection to whistleblowers [1] [2]. CONAC has anti-corruption units in almost every ministerial department. It has established a free hotline for individuals to report cases of corruption [2,3,4]. However, this practice is not encouraged by the government [2,3,4].

Whistleblowing in Cameroon is limited by several factors. The anti-corruption unit can only investigate but cannot prosecute. This organ was created by the President of the Republic and is answerable to the President with no oversight structure. Members of this body are appointed by and answerable to the President, which means that the President, who is Chief of the Armed Forces, cannot be investigated by this body. In the same vein, NCHRF is answerable to the President. Sometimes the organ does not have the necessary resources to carry out its activities [2]. Media are sometimes suspended by the National Communication Council for playing the role of whistleblowers [1]. There is little evidence that journalists do effectively carry out whistleblowing when it concerns the military and defence personnel as the anti-terrorism law of December 2014 is often used against journalists [3].

Also, according to the 2017 Investment Climate Statement, “The government has introduced anti-corruption mechanisms and measures for all economic actors, but provides little support to “whistleblower” cases and especially non-governmental organizations” [4].

The whistleblowing legislation that incorporates both civil and military staff is the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act which establishes a procedure for the disclosure of (actual or perceived) wrongdoings in the public service and also provides provisions to protect those that come forward as whistle blowers. [1] [2] The term’ whistleblower’ is conspicuously absent from this legislation; however, section 19 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act does explicitly prohibit reprisal when it states that, “No person shall take any reprisal against a public servant or direct that one be taken against a public servant.” [1] Additionally, section 22 of the Act states that it is the role of the Public Service Integrity Commissioner to protect the identities of those involved with the disclosure of wrongdoings “to the extent possible in accordance with the law.” [1] The authority of the Public Service Integrity Commissioner is limited as, according to Section 25.2 they may not “delegate the conduct of an investigation that involves or may involve information relating to international relations, national defence, national security or the detection, prevention or suppression of criminal, subversive or hostile activities, except to one of a maximum of four officers or employees of the Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner specifically designated by the Commissioner for the purpose of conducting those investigations.” [1] As such there is a limited applicability of this legislation to the Canadian Forces. [3]

An expert notes that whistleblowing is discouraged [1]. It is also a low priority for the government. A report released by the House of Commons Government Operations and Estimates Committee in 2017 recommended significant changes that would increase protections for federal public servants that act as whistleblowers; however these changes were never implemented [2]. Although services and guidance material is available [3], the unit handling claims reports to the defence minister. An External Review Authority on Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the CAF, headed by Marie Deschamps, issued a 2015 report that recommended the government set up an independent body to review whistleblowing and compliants about sexual misconduct in the CAF [4]. This body was not established but a new effort is being undertaken in 2021, under Louise Arbour, that may force the government to set up an independent mechanism. [5]

There are concerns about the effectiveness of this legislation. For instance, Colonel-Maître Michel W. Drapeau suggested at interview that the legislation “is very weak and ineffective; it simply does not adequately protect whistleblowers.” [2] The Canadian Forces, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the Communications Security Establishment are excluded from the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, and as a result are expected to develop their own procedures. [1] As such, the effectiveness of this legislation is quite limited as it serves as more of a guideline for internal practices. “Hence, whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries are offered no protection from not only reprisal but punitive disciplinary action if they disclose any information outside formal channels.” [2] When coupled with the shortfalls in insitutitonal commitments to military justice noted by the Auditor General of Canada, it is evdent that significant gaps exist in both the existing legislation and the willingness to commit resources to improve processes related to military justice and protections for individuals. [3]

The protection of whistleblowers has been a contentious issue in Chile. Analysts have claimed that the lack of legislation and legal concepts and procedures for the effective protection of whistleblowers constitute one of the main vacuums in the country’s anti-corruption system [1, 2, 3]. As part of the commitments of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, in 2007 a new legislation was established to protect public employees that denounce irregularities and faults to the principle of probity in public agencies (Ley 20.205) [4]. The regulation specifies that public employees that denounce irregularities, especially those that contravene the principle of administrative probity fixed by Law 18.575, cannot be subject to disciplinary measures or dismissal from the date on which the authority receives the complaint and up to ninety days after having completed the investigation (Art. 90A). However, it has been criticised for being excessively restrictive and the limited scope of protected subjects. Only public employees are considered protected subjects, which does not include members of the police and the armed forces. Moreover, legislation requires that denounces are well-founded, and it does not include forms of compensation to the complainant for potential reprisals [5]. There is no similar policy for protecting whistleblowers from military personnel. As this report is written, the National Defence Commission of the Chamber of Deputies approved an amendment to Law 20.205, which may allow soldiers of the armed forces to report corruption without being accused of treason or sedition [6].

Analysts have pointed out the lack of encouragement and the weaknesses of the protections for whistleblowing in Chile [1, 2]. Since whistleblowing, as prescribed in Law 20.205, has not been an effective tool in the investigation of irregularities in the Armed Forces and the Police, efforts are being made to strengthen this mechanism. In 2017, the National Prosecutor’s Office and the Chilean Chapter of Transparency International, Chile Transparente, signed a cooperation agreement to assist in the generation of a System for the Protection of Victims of Corruption (ALAC). The system seeks to establish more effective procedures to protect whistleblowers from acts of corruption and to stimulate denunciation in civil society [3]. Nonetheless, effective measures have not been implemented yet. Moreover, there has been evidence of espionage and intimidation of whistleblowers [4].

Current procedures and guarantees for reporting irregularities have shown several shortcomings. To report irregularities, whistleblowers must submit written, signed, and well-founded denouncements to the Public Prosecutor’s Office or to the police in case of crimes and the “competent authority” in case of irregular activities [1]. Denouncing irregularities to direct authorities discourages whistleblowers. The protection system does not cover private individuals or members of the police or the armed forces. Likewise, there is no specialised unit that handles these cases, and although security against reprisals and confidentiality are offered, there is no guarantee of anonymity to whistleblowers. All these factors dampen trust in the system for protecting whistleblowers, triggering new efforts to design and install an ALAC in the country in coordination with the Prosecutor’s Office, the General Comptroller, and the Unit of Financial Analysis of the Ministry of Finance [2, 3].

Article 41 of the Chinese Constitution stipulates whistleblower protection. In addition, in March 2016, the Chinese government issued the Provisions on Protecting and Rewarding Whistleblowers for Reporting Duty Crime (关于保护，奖励职务犯罪举报人的若干规定), that has provided more incentives and protections to whistleblowers. [1,2] These regulations explicitly apply to all military personnel. [3] They cover protection of identity (articles 4 and 5) and protection against retribution (articles 7-12).

The CCP and the PLA conduct information campaigns promoting reporting on corruption on a regular basis. [1] The PLA has set up online whistleblowing platforms and hotlines encouraging the public and military personnel to use them, and the information is gathered by Discipline Inspection Commissions. There is no public information on the internal operation of Discipline Inspection Commissions in the PLA in relation to whistleblowing but we know that high-ranking military personnel had significant capacity to interfere with and influence their work (Bitzinger and Char, 2018:28). Frequent reports in Chinese media on the channels available to whistleblowers provide evidence that the government is actively promoting reporting as part of its anticorruption efforts. [2] There are also reports of training of DIC personnel. [3]

There is a long history of retaliation and retribution against whistleblowers in China, which renders reporting a dangerous decision. [1] Although there are cases of military personnel that acted as whistleblowers and were then publicly praised for their actions, [2] whistleblowers must enjoy the political support of senior figures in the Army and the Government to secure themselves from retaliation. A recent study [3] demonstrated that factional ties with high-ranking political leaders would protect an official from being investigated for corruption, important evidence that also undermines confidence in the impartiality and effectiveness of whistleblowing.

Although Laws 734 of 2002 (Art. 244) [1] and 906 of 2004 (Art. 67), [2] establish the obligation of public officials to report any misconduct or suspected corruption, there has been little done regarding the protection of those who denounce these cases. In fact, one of the pending issues regarding Colombia’s membership in the OECD is the adoption of a law focused on whistleblower protection and the strengthening of mechanisms for following up on complaints made to trace the linkages between the accused and the complainant. [3] In fact, in 2017, a bill for the protection of whistleblowers of corruption was filed in Congress, which called for: (i) the creation of mechanisms to effectively protect retaliatory actions against whistleblowers; (ii) reporting channels; (iii) awareness and pedagogy strategies; and (iv) incentives for reporters. [4] However, this initiative was not approved. The Anticorruption Statute, Law 1474 of 2011, [5] defines some institutional and pedagogical policies around the construction of anti-corruption strategies, including the construction and implementation of an anti-corruption and citizen service plan in which all public entities must include a map of corruption risks, measures to mitigate such risks, strategies, procedures, and mechanisms to improve citizen care. It also defines the obligation to create offices and means for the processing of complaints, suggestions, and claims, in which citizens report acts of corruption carried out by the officials of the entity in question. As part of the anti-corruption strategy, the Ministry of Defence has had the Line of Honour since 2012, a hotline in which citizens and public officials can alert or report on possible improper acts or acts of corruption. [6] Interviewee 3 states that Colombia does not need a law for the protection of whistleblowers since there are already regulations that require public entities to generate procedures for the promotion of complaints related to corruption, and the defence sector has a policy guaranteeing anonymity during the reporting process on acts of corruption within the Armed Forces. [7] For Guerrero, [8] Colombia must generate a protection policy for whistleblowers, since a good anti-corruption strategy lies in the generation of guarantees for whistleblowers. If this does not occur, Guerrero argues that there is no motivation or reassurance to report. Along these same lines, the Public Ministry (IEMP) finds that the process of complaints by civil society represents a high risk, given the context of the armed conflict and the multiple actors that control territorial ties and relations. By generating complaints, a social leader can be threatened or killed. [9] The media consistently makes complaints about corruption within the Military Forces, with Semana, Noticias Canal 1, La W, and The New York Times leading these actions. Complainants understand that media outlets can make complaints public without generating retaliation for the complainants. While there are guidelines regarding citizen participation in the processes of reporting acts of corruption, there is a lack of legislation that protects whistleblowers.

The Ministry of Defence’s campaign, the “Anticorruption Honour Line”, seeks to encourage complaints about acts of bribery, harassment, and abuse. Additionally, its wesite has links related to PQRS (Questions, Complaints, Claims, and Requests), where individuals can file complaints about acts of corruption. This campaign aims to protect the resources of the country’s military sector. [1, 2] The Ministry of Defence has other mechanisms to encourage complaints about possible cases of corruption within the brigades and military units, in which the complainants can make their complaints and claims directly with the internal control office in person, by email, or via WhatsApp, according to Interviewee 3. If there are several complaints about the same event, the internal control office uses follow-up action, surveillance, and control. Likewise, all entities have their anti-corruption plans public, which involve corruption prevention strategies and the promotion of reporting of existing cases. [3] According to Interviewee 2, [4] the Colombian Army systematises and analyses the contents of complaints or acts of corruption through its transparency observatory, which allows for the identification of key issues of care and prevention. They collect information from each of the units that require improvement, and develop pedagogical tools and intervention strategies such as training, generation of informative documents, and guides on transparency and integrity processes. There is no evidence of processes for the protection of whistleblowers. In the case of the National Army, DANTE is in charge of promoting the application of transparency norms for all levels of the Army structure under the Second Command of the Army. [4] The internal strategy of “I am Dante” of the Armed Forces has been implemented, positioning the issue of transparency at all levels of the Army, and guaranteeing preventive support to each of the units that request DANTE membership. However, multiple acts of corruption have been alleged, and the units in charge of processing such actions and preventing them have failed to provide effective response. Complaints submitted through the Line of Honour have served to resolve issues related to minor incidents within the units and brigades, but regarding corruption issues where those involved are Colonels and Generals, these tools have not been effective. In fact, complaints by the media have been seen as more effective in those cases. [5, 6, 7]

In 2017, a bill to protect whistleblowers of acts of corruption was submitted to the Congress of the Republic, but was not approved. [1, 2] In the absence of legislation, there are no guarantees of protection to whistleblowers with regard to their security and identity. In an interview conducted at the Institute of Public Prosecution Studies (IEMP), they consider that in Colombia the process of complaints by civil society carries a high risk, given the context of armed conflict and the multiple actors who control territorial links and relationships. Generating complaints can lead to threats or even death for social leaders. [3] Complaints through the PQRS sections (Questions, Complaints, Complaints, and Requests) and through the Line of Honour, guarantee anonymity, so Interviewee 3 does believe that Colombia requires a specific regulation that protects whistleblowers, since these anonymous mechanisms already exist. [4] However, the measures implemented to make complaints do not guarantee protection against retaliation, and in fact there are known cases within the Military Forces of retaliation against whistleblowers. [5] Therefore, legislation is required to regulate the processes of reporting and protection and generate greater institutional trust.

Order No. 660, Article 67 is in place for whistleblowing and reporting of corruption and it applies, in theory, but not explicitly to public officials in the defence sector. The following protections for whistleblowers are not contained in Order No. 660, the reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation; waiver of liability for the whistleblower; no sanctions for misguided reporting; the right of a whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing. According to the UNCAC Implementation Review Group (June 2017), Article 67 of Order No. 660 of 2013 (Ordonnance 2013-660) provides for special protection measures for reporting persons, witnesses, experts, victims and their families. But Côte d’Ivoire is still in the process of developing a formal program for the protection of witnesses and reporting persons, and the law establishing that program is still in draft form (1).

Article 69 of Order No. 660 stipulates that the physical address of the police or the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG) can be used in lieu of the whistleblower’s address, to guarantee his/her protection. And Article 70 of Order No. 660 allows the court or public prosecutor to withhold the name of the whistleblower during a court appearance to guarantee his/her safety (1) and (2). Article 72 of Order No. 660 states that no sentence can be imposed solely based on statements given anonymously and Article 71 describes scenarios in which a protected identity can be disclosed, including where such disclosure is necessary to protect the rights of the defendant. In such cases, the protected person is informed of the decision to disclose his or her identity and is granted ten days to challenge and appeal against the decision in a court of appeal (1), (2). Further, Article 29 (Suite données aux déclarations de soupçons) of Act No. 2005-554 of December 2, 2005, on combating money-laundering contains measures to ensure that the identity of the whistleblower is protected (3). For Global Integrity (African Integrity Indicators 2018, AII 2018) the whistleblower legal protections in Order No. 660 are too generic and not explicitly protecting whistleblowers in the public sector (4).

Whistleblowing has not been especially encouraged by the government since the adoption of Order No. 660 of 2013 (Ordonnance 2013-660). There is no evidence of training or internal campaigns to encourage public officials, especially those at the MoD, to step forward and report cases of corruption. There is no independent unit like the Anti-Racketeering Unit that would specifically handle the claims submitted by whistleblowers in the defence sector. Though Order No. 660 affords whistleblowers (témoins, lanceurs d’alerte, dénonciateurs) a series of new protections that previously did not exist, this does not mean that the government actively encourages the anonymous reporting of corruption. For this sub-indicator, one should factor in that whistleblowing within the military establishment could be perceived by the government itself as politically destabilizing.

According to the 2018 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2018), the fight against corruption features more prominently on the agenda of the OUATTARA government than in previous governments. But despite Order No. 660 in 2013 and the setting up of the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG) in 2014, understaffing may reflect the low priority level of such anti-corruption legislation, including whistleblowing (1):

“A National Plan on Good Governance and the Fight Against Corruption was launched in 2013 together with a new institution, the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG, operating since 2014). The government had also planned to create a Special Tribunal for the Fight Against Corruption, a plan not implemented yet. The institutions meant to oversee the utilization of public funds (Inspecteur General des Finances, Cour des Comptes) are understaffed and thus not effective in preventing abuse and corruption” (1).

The HABG has held awareness-raising campaigns regarding the need for people to report cases of corruption to local authorities. One example is a publicity campaign that HABG carried out in the districts of Soubre, Gagnoa and Divo in September 2018. However, this HABG campaign did not prioritize such actions within the defence or police sector (2). None of the internal communications magazine (Magazine Défense) uploaded to the MoD website in 2016-2017 informed or raised awareness about the importance of whistleblowing and the protections afforded to them under Order No. 660. The topic was not discussed in articles addressing corruption (3), (4), (5), (6).

The legal processes to guarantee the whistleblower’s identity from being revealed are not comprehensive enough, as seen in 36A. Not only would a public official at the MoD doubt that his/her identity would be adequately protected from retaliation, but there are no precedents in Côte d’Ivoire’s defence establishment that could inspire confidence among the MoD personnel willing to report a case of corruption.

In a 2016-2018 progress report on corruption in Côte d’Ivoire, the Open Government Partnership recommended more comprehensive protections for whistleblowers in Côte d’Ivoire’s mining sector. If there is little trust in the legal protections for whistleblowers in mining, the situation for a public official at the MoD would be considerably more tenuous (1). According to Marthe Coulibaly, National Coordinator of the Ivorian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (CIDDH), individuals who report human rights abuses are often targeted by the authorities and arrested when they talk about issues of corruption. On the sidelines of a human rights conference in Abidjan in December 2017, the National Coordinator stated the following (2):

“It turns out that for some human rights defenders who work on issues that we consider sensitive, such as corruption, transparency, governance, and the issue of extractive industries, we often victims of certain arrests” … “What is expected of the government is better protection,” she added” (2).

There is no Danish legislation on whistleblowing – neither generally nor specifically concerning the defence [1]. A EU directive on whistle-blower protection of persons who report a violation of EU law was adopted by the European Council in October 2019. Research indicates that Denmark has not implemented the directive yet, which is due in December 2021 [2, 3]. Formal consultation process of the draft bill targeting key stakeholders started at the end of February 2021. [4]

Research indicates that efforts are being made to enhance whistle-blower mechanisms in the defence. The so-called Employee Hotline (“Medarbejderlinjen”) was strenghtened with an extra employee, and the hotline’s name changed to “Whistle-blower hotline” (Whistleblowerordningen).The hotline is available for all current and former defence personnel and external parties. The hotline is maintained by the Defence Internal Audit Office.
Whistleblowing notice can be submitted by phone, e-mail, regular mail and in person. At the moment, the hotline cannot guarantee full anonymity. The Defence Internal Audit Office can in general ensure anonymity for whistle-blowers who wants to be anonymous. The hotline can guarantee full anonymity if contacted by phone, letter or in person. It is not yet possible to ensure full anonymity in the case of an e-mail from the defences it-systems. Nor is it likely that full anonymity can be maintained through a lawsuit which requires a testimony from the whistle-blower.[1, 4]
A link to the information website of the Whistle-blower Hotline is available on all Defence websites. There is no evidence to suggest that this whistle-blower mechanism is anything but a hotline for reporting: there are included no guidelines or stipulations for the protection of whistle-blowers or their rights, nor information on potential consequences and considerations of whistleblowing etc. [1]. Following the extensive fraud case within the Ministry of Defence Estate Agency (which was revealed because of a whistle-blower outside the Defence), the Minister of Defence and other political parties have articulated an increased awareness about the need for a strengthened whistle-blower mechanism [2, 3].

It is stated on the MoD website that the Defence Internal Audit Office will attempt to conceal the identity of the whistle-blowers (if he/she may wish so) “to the extent that it is possible” [1]. Thus, anonymity cannot be guaranteed when there is little reason that officials and personnel would trust to be provided with adequate protection in this specific regard. Further, as research found no stipulations or guidelines that describe the whistleblowing mechanism within the Defence, nor provide insight into the degree or type of protection offered, there is no incentive for employees to trust in adequate protection [2]. Further, in 2016, the Ombudsman publicly criticized the Chief of Defence. During a talk at an airbase, the Chief of Defence had directly threatened the audience that he would fire anyone he found to be illoyal to the Danish Defence [3]. Disloyalty here meant expressing criticism of the Defence on social media. Afterwards, the media reported that employees in the Defence felt insecure as a consequence of this [4]. Episodes like this may indicate that employees in the Defence have reason not to expect adequate protection if exercising their right of free speech or whistleblowing.
In spite of all, there has been an increasing number of cases reported to the Whistle-blower hotline since the hotline was reenforced. In 2019 the hotline received 21 reports and in 2020 the hotline received 52 reports. [5].

Egypt has failed to pass any whistleblower protection legislation whether in the civilian or the defence sectors, except for a provision in the anti-trafficking law (1), but there is still no formal witness protection programme. ِArticle 30 of the Egyptian Penal Code punishes intimidating a witness or coercing them into changing their testimony (2), and the Criminal Procedure Law regulates the giving of testimonies but with no mention of preemptive witness protection (3).

According to our sources, whistleblowing is not encouraged in the armed forces, and there are no guidelines or even commitments to protect any witness or any reporting of corruption activities (1), (2), (3). Successive governments have been very reluctant in passing a whistleblower protection act despite pressure from civil society, UNCAC commitments, and discussing many drafts for standalone witness protection laws since at least 2013 (4) or incorporating provisions for whistleblower protection in other laws such as Criminal Procedures (5) or the anti-trafficking law. This reluctance is evidence of the fact that the protection of witnesses/whistleblowers is not encouraged or prioritized by the government.

Given the lack of legal protections for whistleblowers and the questionable independence of the justice system especially in the parallel military justice system, officials and personnel would have little trust in the ability of the system to protect them if they report corrupt activities. This would be even more the case if they were reporting a senior official, especially if reported by a low-ranking official. According to our sources, there are huge gaps and distrust among military personnel and their officers. Therefore, whistleblowing is weak and does not happen in the military (1), (2), (3).

Personal data in Estonia can only be processed with the consent of the data’s subject, unless otherwise stipulated by law, in accordance with the Personal Data Protection Act. [1] The Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate has very strictly emphasised that this makes the systematic support of whistleblowing impossible in Estonia. It would, according to their assessment, be against the current law. However, law firm Eversheds Sutherland (see the article in Äripäev) has criticised the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate for interpreting the law incorrectly. [2] According to the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate, creating a system which allows employees to report about wrongdoings and remain anonymous, is illegal. They base their assessment on the Personal Data Protection Act. Further, at the beginning of 2019, TI Estonia invited the Data Protection Inspectorate to participate in a workshop on whistleblowing with private companies – in order to ascertain their point of view on exactly the data protection vs investigating reports. In light of the soon-to-be-transposed EU directive on whistleblowing, the Inspectorate said that if the organization has previously conducted a legal analysis of why investigating reports is more important than the privacy of the person who is investigated, it can be justified on the basis of “legitimate interest”. [3] In general, the Inspectorate’s point of view is that this needs to be formalized through a legal document. [3]
On the other hand, the Employment Contracts Act stipulates that the employee is obliged, at the request of the employer, to notify the employer of all significant circumstances related to the employment relationship with regard to which the employer has a legitimate interest. [4] For example, when one employee finds out that another employee has committed an act that is harmful to the employer, then the employer has the right to be informed about this. Therefore, the interpretation of the law by the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate is too narrow.
In accordance with the new Anti-Corruption Law (from 2013), reporting of corrupt activities either in the private or the public sector is an obligation for any public official. [5] This act also ensures the confidentiality of the notifier, except for when the information provided is purposefully incorrect. The fact of notification may also be disclosed with the written consent of the notifier.

Public servants are obliged to report on violations of rules and the law. The emphasis in training is to teach civil servants to act according to the law and report illegal acts. Whistleblowing is hence covered in trainings. [1] Public servants are encouraged to notify violations of any rules, but also violations of ethical codes of conduct, to the General Inspectorate Service at the Estonian Defence Forces. [2]
Individuals working for the Defence Forces can speak to the Inspectorate without following the chain of command. They can speak about the problems they cannot share with their superiors. The Inspectorate is impartial, the specialists in law and the work environment are subordinated to the Inspectorate. However, the Inspectorate is not an external unit, but reports to the Commander of the Defence Forces. [3]

All civil servants have the obligation to report wrongdoings. There are ombudsmen in every military unit who they can turn to, as pointed out by an interviewee, a Member of the Defence Committee. [1] However, civil servants cannot be certain that their confidentiality will be guaranteed when they report about someone due to the hierarchic system of the Defence Forces.
According to another interviewee, a former military flag officer, in most cases, the information about the notifier will be leaked. [2] Whistleblowing is quite a stigmatised practice in the Defence Forces, it has negative connotations due to Estonia’s Soviet past. When a serviceman notifies of wrongdoing by his or her superior, there is a chance that there will be indirect consequences. On the other hand, the question at hand addresses corrupt activity, which is a criminal offence. In that case, the serviceman committing the act, would most probably be prosecuted and eliminated from the Defence Forces. The trust in Estonia’s legal system is high, in fact higher than in the European Union on average. [3] Therefore, servicemen reporting on corruption cases can presume to have some protection of anonymity.

The EU whistleblowing directive (2019/1937) came to force in October 2019. According to it, the member states must incorporate it to their national legislations by Dec 17, 2021. [1] In Finland, the Ministry of Justice established a working group on March 4, 2020 to prepare the national legislation. It will have finished its work by the end of March 2021. [2, 3] The legislation will apply to the defence administration as well. However, suspected crimes, including corruption crimes, can already be reported to the Police, but no special protection for whistleblowers is available. In addition, the Police do not accept anonymous reports. Due to these facts, it has been argued that the identity of the whistleblower will most likely be revealed at some point of the investigation, increasing the risk of counteractions. [4, 5]

In August 2019, it was reported in the media that the Defence Forces will establish a digital reporting/whisleblowing channel for the personnel. The trial was to be going on for six months in five units after a decision about its extension was made. [1] The Finnish Officers’ Union strongly opposed the channel e.g. on the basis that it would increase the number of baseless accusations and deteriorate work environment when these accusations would have to be dealt with. In addition, it doubted whether anonymity could be guaranteed and stated that reporting was already possible by sending an anonymous letter. [2] In September 2020, the Defence Forces provided a press release according to which it will carry out such a whistleblowing channel trial starting from Sept 15, 2020. After the trial, it will decide whether the reporting channel will be extended to all units. One of the reasons for the trial was mentioned to be the EU whistleblowing directive. [3] The trial ended in mid-March 2021 and during it four incidents were reported relating to office hours, parking lots, and nepotism. The kind of misuses feared prior to the trial did not take place. The Defence Forces will next decide whether the reporting channel becomes integrated in its operations. [4] Suspected crimes, including corruption crimes, can already be reported to the Police, but no special protection for whistleblowers is available. In addition, the Ministry of Justice has some guides on how to report corruption. [5, 6]

As the legislative process in on-going and the whistleblowing channel in the Defence Forces is only in its early trial phase, this indicator cannot be scored and is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

The Sapin 2 law of December 2016 focuses on transparency, anti-corruption, the modernisation of economic life and the protection of whistleblowers. [1] It explains in detail (page 3) the new protection status for military whistleblowers: obligation to warn the hierarchy, and possibility of directly warning the judicial and administrative authority if the military hierarchy doesn’t respond. However, the law forbids military whistleblowers from warning the public directly.
Article 15 of the law specifically addresses military personnel: [2] “No soldier may be penalised or discriminated against, directly or indirectly, for having reported an alert in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 and I of Article 8 of Law n°2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 on transparency, the fight against corruption and the modernisation of economic life. ”
Article 9 states the protection of the whistleblower’s identity. Articles 10, 11 and 12 deal with the protection against retribution and retaliation.
But no formal provisions concerning the reversal of the burden of proof regarding retaliation, a waiver of liability for the whistleblower, sanctions for misguided reporting, or the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing are mentioned in the law.

Whistleblowing, though now written in the law and protected by it, [1] is not encouraged by the government. Interviewees (staff of the ministry of Defence [2] [3]) confirmed that there is little training or information campaigns beyond occasional news updates on the Ministry intranet. [4]

In December 2020, the Ministry of the Armed Forces approved a code as part of a National Plan to Combat Corruption, which includes guidance on how to raise concerns and the whistleblowing process. [5] It also states that the identity of reporters remains confidential – where reports are raised in good faith – and covers non-retaliation. The Ministry’s website also contains information on the procedure for whistleblowers and provides guidance for those looking to make a report. [6] Although there is no explicit reference to a unit designated to handle ethics claims, the General Controller of the Armed Forces (also the ethics “referent” for the ministry) is listed as the point of contact for further information on making an alert.

Interviewees – among them staff of the ministry of armed forces [1] [2] – have cast doubt on whether whistleblowers are adequately protected. Whistleblowers must go first to their superior to report an alert, which is a problem in such a discrete and private institution as the army and Ministry of Defence, with the culture of “secret-défense” and the army being “the big mute”. The “Sapin 2” anti-corruption law protects military staff from retribution, but in practice many may still hesitate to go forward and expose the institution for fear of retribution. Military staff and officials of the Ministry of Defence would likely fear a form of ostracism for being the one shedding light on a secretive institution.
French law still incorporates the “outrage au drapeau ou à l’armée” [contempt to the flag or to the army] felony: in case of an insult or defamation to the French flag or to the army, military staff can face up to 5 years in prison. [3] The definition of “outrage” is vague enough in law to cast doubt about how it could be used against a whistleblower.
More recently, the Ministry has made some efforts to promote whistleblowing by including guidance in its new ethics code. [4] The code states that the identity of reporters remains confidential indicates that reports submitted in good faith will not be subject to dismissal or retaliation. A Ministry webpage on ethics restates this commitment to whistleblowing provisions. [5] As this code and new approach has only been in place since December 2020, it is too early to determine the effectiveness of the whistleblower protections. Therefore, there is not enough information to score this indicator.

Whistleblowers have some legal guarantees against arbitrary dismissal, however, there is no comprehensive whistleblower protection in Germany, nor is the term ‘whistleblower’ legally defined. The pending implementation of EU Directive 2019/1937 on the ‘Protection of Persons who Report Breaches of Union Law’ of 2019 promises to strengthen whistleblower protection [1]. Public officials must maintain secrecy about official matters that become known to them during or on the occasion of their official activity (see Section 37 of the Beamtenstatusgesetz – Civil Servants Status Act – BeamtStG) [2]. As an exception, they are allowed to report reasonable suspicion of corruption to the highest service authority or law enforcement agency under the Act on Federal Civil Servants [3].

When it comes to Germany, it is important to consider the concept of ‘Innere Führung’, which implies that military personnel are understood to be ‘citizens in uniform’ and are therefore not only expected to be obedient but also to report ethical breaches if they occur. While this concept originally related to problematic aspects regarding military-specific decisions, e.g. decisions during deployment, treatment of soldiers, etc., it has recently been discussed within the context of a newly emerging compliance culture and could therefore be increasingly relevant for corruption-related issues [4].

It should be noted that EU Directive 2019/1937 on the ‘Protection of Persons who Report Breaches of Union Law’ establishes an EU-wide minimum standard for the protection of persons who report or disclose breaches of Union Law in a professional context from legal and factual reprisals. It applies to both the private and public sectors. The Directive is currently being transposed into national law and will be available in Germany in the foreseeable future [5].

The administration-wide ‘Federal Government Directive Concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration’ applies to the Ministry of Defence. It requires the establishment of a contact point for corruption issues. Public servants can talk directly to thus contact point regardless of the official chain of command. The Directive encourages reporting [1].

Unit R III 1 (ES) at the Ministry of Defence serves as the contact point to which corruption cases and suspicions thereof can be reported, and also leads internal investigations. The process of reporting incidents of corruption is outlined in the above-mentioned Directive and its specific implementing provision for the Ministry of Defence [2,3,4].

Apart from these reporting channels, recent reports suggest that reporting grievances to external bodies (e.g. MPs) is somewhat discouraged. Specifically, military staff are encouraged to abstain from direct contact with MPs or at least inform the parliamentary liaison unit within the ministry beforehand. These instructions were circulated with a reference to an applicable legal provision (‘Geschäftsordnung der Wehrressorts’) [5,6,7].

The current protection for whisteblowers in Germany is considered weak [1]. While the Federal Corruption Prevention Provisions provide some protection for internal whistleblowing, there is a lack of adequate protection in cases of external whistleblowing [2,3]. TI Germany notes that the decisions made by the Federal Labour Court concerning individual cases indicate a preference for the protection of secrets or responsibility vis-à-vis employers. Generally, the role of the whistleblower has a negative perception in the context of the public administration [3].

There is limited information on the extent to which soldiers trust the corruption contact points. The Federal Police Statistics may serve as an indicator; they show that only 9% of corruption cases under investigation were intially reported by unwilling bribe-takers, while another 9% were reported by the agency in question [4].

As for complaints directed at the Armed Forces Ombudsman (‘Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces’) – which might not be related to corruption, as outlined above – as many as 2,534 soldiers submitted complaints in 2018, reflecting a solid level of trust in the institution [5].

Ghana’s legislation on whistleblowing, the Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720), applies to military, police, and intelligence personnel (1). Article. 12, explicitly mentions protection for whistleblowers in case of victimisation (including dismission, suspension, declaration of being redundant, denial of promotion, non-motivated transfer, harassment, intimidation, threats and intimidations).

Article. 17.1 states that whistleblowers can obtain police protection for themselves and their families if their life or property “is endangered or likely to be endangered as a result of the disclosure”. According to Article. 18, there are no sanctions for misguided reporting “unless it is proved that the whistleblower knew that the information contained in the disclosure is false and the disclosure was made with malicious intent”.

Furthermore, if after having blown the whistle the whistleblower is subject to adverse actions against them, they can make a complaint to the CHRAJ and obtain a reversal of the action. In this case, the order of the CHRAJ has the same legal effect as a High Court’s order. The whistleblower can also sue in court and obtain legal remedy for the adverse action (2). The CHRAJ can also award the whistleblower with a payment from the Whistleblower Reward Fund and, if the disclosure results in the recovery of an amount of money, the whistleblower may receive a part of it. In June 2018, Ghana’s Parliament passed the Witness Protection Act, 2018 (Act 975) (3). The new law sets out a framework for protecting individuals who serve as witnesses or cooperate with law enforcement agencies in the fight against crime and corruption. Among others, the Witness Protection Act also provides for the creation of a Witness Protection Agency for the administration of a witness protection programme to facilitate the protection of witnesses, experts and their relatives.

Training, information and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protection for whistleblowers are provided by CSOs and Ghanaian public institutions. For instance, in March 2018 a forum organised by the mobile Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALACs) to sensitise the public on reporting cases of corruption saw the participation of a senior CHRAJ’s official, a National Commission for Civic Education’s Officer and members of the local administration (1). In April 2018, the Social Enterprise Development Foundation of West Africa (SEND-Ghana) also organised a similar training that registered the participation of a senior CHRAJ’s official (2).

A whistleblower can disclose the information to several enforcement bodies, such as the Attorney-General, the police, the EOCO, CHRAJ and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) (3), but there is no strong evidence of demonstrative internal encouragement for whistleblowing.

According to the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GAAC), more protection should be provided to whistleblowers. Currently, the Whistleblower Amendment Act and the Witness Protection Bill are before Parliament for approval. According to the GAAC, their adoption would increase the protection of whistleblowers (1).

In fact, despite the existence of legislation, enforcement bodies where to report, and information campaigns Ghanaians are still reluctant to disclose and report information on cases of corruption (2). There is little trust and a lack of demonstrable evidence that whistleblowers in the armed forces will be given adequate protection if they bring issues of corruption to the public (3), (4). In 2016, the CHRAJ processed six cases of corruption following disclosures of information from whistleblowers (5).

To increase these numbers, the spokesperson of the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GAAC) called for the implementation of financial incentives, for whistleblowers that set in motion investigations (6).

Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists but is weak and is not clearly applicable to military personnel, who have a parallel duty of confidentiality [1].There are scattered provisions in the legal framework, mainly for public servants without supporting (judicial and administrative) structures and without reporting channels. In particular, Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that, in cases related to the criminal acts of active and passive bribery and related actions, the anti-corruption prosecutor has after the approval of the supervisor Deputy Prosecutor the right to qualify a witness as a whistle-blower when, without having any personal gain or involvement in criminal acts, he/she has contributed substantially to the prosecution of crimes related to corruption [1, 2]. The Ministry of Justice and the National Transparency Authority are currently working on the transposition of the EU Directive 2019/1937 on Whistle-blowers Protection, which needs to be implemented by December 2021. [3]

Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the Government. Consequently, there is no training or information campaigns for military personnel and there is no internal unit to handle claims [1] [2]

There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided with adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity. Consequently, Greece lacks such a tradition. There have been no known cases of whistleblowing in the field of defence [1].

The legal provisions are described by the CLXV/2015 Act on Whistleblowers [1]. Transparency International Hungary, issued a report on their concerns, with a detailed explanation on why the current legislation is insufficient to provide the necessary protection; however, no adaptation was made to the law [2]. However, there have been some positive developments since 2015. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) adopted an internal instruction (43/2017. (VIII. 17.) HM utasítás) on the development of internal controlling however we have not found any evidence on particular improvements on whistleblowing. Still, current legislation covers issues such as protection of identity, protection against retribution, waiver of liability for the whistleblower and no sanctions for misguided reporting.

There is a widespread assumption in the Hungarian Army that can be described as ” We don’t make it into our own nest”. Training includes anti-corruption to meet international standards, but according to our information, the issue of whistleblowing is not covered by this training [1]. Within the ministry, a Department on Controlling and Integrity Development was established, which directly reports to the minister [2].
The ministry has not received any mail or email to its addresses kept for whistleblowers for reporting cases. Most of the people reported had no information at all about the email and mailbox [3].

A whistleblower law is in place [1] and includes appropriate safeguards. However, personnel may not be confident that the system will protect them adequately. Indeed, interview sources 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, all suggested that the current system is not effective, and they have no trust in its operation [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].

Whistleblowing is neither explicitly encouraged nor discouraged by the government; legal provisions are in place to support and protect whistleblowers through the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 [1]. The defence and security sector come under its remit. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) also affords whistleblowers protection [2]. Prior to the aforementioned, the RTI Act, 2005, provided information to the public but no protections.

Whistle Blowers Protective (Amendment) Bill, 2015 was passed in the Lok Sabha. Amendments were aimed at safeguarding against disclosures affecting the sovereignty and the integrity of India. The amendments would address concerns relating to national security. Safeguards against disclosures which may prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of the country, security, strategic, scientific or economic interest of the State, relations with a foreign State or leads to incitement of an offence, would be strengthened. The salient features are:

– Amendments in section 4 prohibit disclosures prejudicially affecting the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, or lead to incitement to an offence, etc. These amendments have been modelled on the provisions of section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

– Amendment to section 5 provides that the Competent Authority shall not inquire into any public interest disclosure which involves information of the nature specified in the amended section 4.

– Amendment in section 8 provides that no person shall be required to furnish any information or answer any question or produce any document or render any other assistance in an inquiry under this Act, if the same is likely to result in the disclosure of any information of the nature specified in the amended section 4.

The said Bill has been sent to the Rajya Sabha and is presently pending in the Rajya Sabha [3][4]. There has been criticism that the Act has not yet been operationalised by the current government and as such, there is no provision of statutory protections to whistleblowers. There is additional criticism that the 2015 Amendment Bill attempts to dilute the Act, by removing immunity provided to whistleblowers from prosecution under the Official Secrets Act for disclosures which can lead to up to 14 years in prison; and disregarding information that has not been obtained under the RTI Act [5][6].

As alluded to above, whistleblower law applies to the defence sector. In 2016, the then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar gave the go-ahead to improve the complaints redressal system in the defence sector [1]. The Committee of Experts had noted that there was a lack of opportunity of personal hearing/interaction while deciding the representations and complaints of defence personnel and recommended the same. The complaints were found to be have been dealt with “by way of one-way file noting system”. The Committee also recommended that complaints by lower ranks should not be rejected on hyper-technical reasons such as non-adherence to formats and should be strictly decided within the time frame of a maximum of 6 months [2].

Given that the complaints redressal mechanism is still not conducive to personnel complaints being raised without retaliation and the climate surrounding whistleblowing in India in general seems to be hostile despite the presence of legal provisions, it can be deduced that there is not adequate will nor protection to/from recording corruption activity [3].

Under the current Whistle Blowers Act, 2014 and proposed amended Bill, the law empowers the competent authorities to accord whistleblowers protection and penalising those who victimise them [1]. There has been criticism that the Act has not yet been operationalised by the current government and as such, there is no provision of statutory protections to whistleblowers [2][3].

There has been criticism from civil society activists due to cases of intimidation and murder of civil society whistleblowers. The efficacy of the legal provisions in place can be questioned. Whistleblowers have been harassed, assaulted and murdered before and after the passing of the current Act and proposed amended Bill. According to Civicus, “India is a dangerous environment for human rights activists as they are often subjected to intimidation, harassment and attacks for defending the rights of others, including victims of human rights violations.” The report goes on to state that most of these acts are perpetrated by police, security forces, non-state actors, including state-sponsored vigilante groups, armed gangs, sections of communities and private sector interests have also violated the rights of human rights defenders [4].

In 2017, Roy Mathew an Indian Army soldier was found hanging from the ceiling of a room in an abandoned army barrack in Deolali cantonment in Nasik. The suicide was questioned by the soldier’s family and a fresh autopsy requested as they alleged there were marks of beating on his feet and blood had clotted in some parts. The soldier had gone missing after he supposedly featured in an expose by a news portal on the abuse in the orderly system in the Army [5].

Indonesia has a whistleblowing system for reporting corruption in general (WBS KPK). The WBS system is integrated with government goods/services procurement (WBS PBJP LKPP). The WBS must be implemented through the regulations of the ministries, government agencies, institutions and bodies to complete the integration of the WBS. According to the WBS PBJP website, the Ministry of Defence has become a part of the WBS, but the TNI has not yet. The arrangement and implementation of WBS is regulated in the Regulation of the Commander of the Indonesian National Defence Forces No. 17/2014 concerning Whistleblowing Systems in TNI. LKPP built a WBS application [1] that protects the whistleblower’s identity through the use of anonymity. Complaints are sent through secure communication channels whose servers are different from other servers. When submitting the complaint summary, the verifier is obliged to hide the whistleblower’s identity if there is a chance of it being revealed in the content of the complaint. The protection of the identity of the reporter (whistleblower) is regulated by to the Witness and Victim Protection Act [2], which grants whistleblowers the right to obtain protection, be free from entangling questions, give information without pressure and even obtain a new identity.

There is a mandate for Bureaucracy Reform, which is implemented through the issuance of the Chief of TNI’s Regulation regarding bribes, the Government Internal Control System (SPIP) and the whistleblowing system, as well as by handling conflicts of interest and building an integrity zone [1]. There are also skill-upgrading and training opportunities provided for military personnel and civil servants, organised by the KPK and TNI in cooperation with several agencies such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Supreme Audit Board (BPK) and the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK). However, the abovementioned regulations cannot be accessed by the public and the military’s WBS system is not yet integrated into the national system. Encouragement to use whistleblowing systems within the military is limited to awareness activities – in the form of a presentation or speech in front of an audience – which are also only publicised to a limited extent [2].

In 2017, the WBS was integrated with the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK) at 17 ministries and institutions in the TEGAS (Terintegrasi Antar Sistem/Integrated Inter-System) integration programme [1]. This has enabled a faster and easier system for handling any alleged bureaucratic errors or acts of corruption, with guaranteed anonymity for the reporter. The launch of WBS TEGAS was accompanied by a plan to intensify training for existing public auditors (APIP) within the K/L/I/B.

According to UNCAC Implementation review, “whistle-blower protection in the public sector is provided for in the Promotion of Administrative Integrity and Combating Corruption Act and provisions in by-laws and directives” [1]. The Law on the Promotion of Administrative Integrity and Combating Corruption Act applies to both civilian and military personnel of the public sector [2]. Reporting is encouraged in Article 26 [3].

Article 507 of the Islamic Penal Code also encourages reporting and offers some protections. “Anyone who is a member of corrupt groups or among those who act against national security, provided that he is not in a leading position and before being prosecuted, reports the plot and names of those engaged in the conspiracy and corruption to the officials, or cooperates effectively with the officials after he is prosecuted, shall be exempted from punishment; and if he has personally committed another crime, he shall be only sentenced for that crime” [4]. According to the UNCAC Implementation Review, “The Presidential Office for Administrative Integrity, tasked with addressing administrative offences, noted the application of several measures such as anonymity or protection from harassment, and that rewards could be given to encourage reporting” [1].

Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government. In an address to officials and military commanders in October 2018, the supreme leader said “[s]o in the matters of war, including military war, security issues, defence and foreign affairs, we should not be transparent. Nevertheless, in other affairs, general matters of the people, “I should not hide from you anything as secrets” [1, 2].

However, an armed forces disciplinary board was established in law in 2017, where employees can complain about illegal actions and actions of commanders, heads and managers. This is considered a matter of the disciplinary boards. The law sets out how they are to be formed. It was passed in a public session [3]. Furthermore, a booklet on the crime of bribery is advertised on the judicial armed forces website [4] but is not yet available for download.

At the moment, reports of corruption are being thrown at officials in all directions; however, those reporting it are provided little adequate protection. Although protections are in place, there are serious doubts about its effectiveness in action [1, 2, 3].

According to our sources, there is no legal framework that encourages whistleblowing in the military and defence sector. There is a general anti-corruption law (at national level) which, however, cannot be used by military personnel as a whistleblower, as the military has to inform commanders instead of anti-corruption commission (1,2).

There is little evidence of restored faith among various state ministers and officials that encourages whistleblower to step forward with sensitive intel. There have been no official plans or voiced commitment by defence or security officials toward introducing legislation that protects whistleblowers in military and defence institutions (1). It’s difficult to argue that the will for this even exists, given that it could cost certain ministers/high-ranking officials their posts, if they were found guilty of corruption, through tip-offs whistleblowers leak. One interviewee (2) explains that many are reluctant to speak up, out of fear of becoming scapegoats for the crimes untouchable figures in the state perpetrate.

Across the uniformed services, tailored-legislation or policies designed to protect whistleblowers are not in existence. As a former whistleblower told TI in an interview “security leaks have developed into a political phenomenon” the interviewee states (1). “It’s a common tool at the disposal of officials within close proximity to various ministries, even beyond defence, to expose de-classified data that exposes the crimes of the political establishment”. Attempts to criminalise the phenomena have inspired national outcry and fuelled greater mistrust between Iraq’s anti-corruption watchdogs and politicians (2). “Lack of oversight and control of security leaks may also encourage fraudulent whistleblowing as an extension of the primary aim of genuine whistleblowing” (1). No law that determines lawful disclosure from unlawful disclosure has been drafted. The biggest expression of mistrust rose in the latest spate of issue-based protests in the capital and other parts of the country after the government ordered an internet blackout. A local lawyer has filed a lawsuit against the Minister of Communications for the financial losses caused by the imposition of an internet blackout (3).

The Protection of Employees (Exposure of Offences of Unethical Conduct and Improper Administration) Law 5757-1997 prohibits a public or private employer from taking any adverse steps against an employee who reports allegation of corruption against a fellow employee or their superior/employer. Furthermore, in the public sector such prohibition regards employees who report allegations regarding immorality, unethical behavior and undue process as well. The law grants the Labor Court authority to issue orders for the protection of employees who report on said allegations (1). The State Comptroller Law 5718-1958, concurrently authorizes the State Comptroller to grant public sector employees similar protection (2).
The legislation on whistleblowing, mainly The Protection of Employees Law 5757-1997, contains explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers including protection against retribution (Article 2), reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation by the supervisor/employer (Article 3A). Article 3 of the Law stipulates that the Court can award compensation amounting to 50,000 NIS without the proof of damages and in certain cases of serious or repeated breaches of the Law, the Court can award up to 500,000 NIS in damages (1). However there is no mention of waiver of liability and no detail on sanctions for misguided reporting.
The Israeli Ministry of Justice, which oversees the enforcement of bribery and corruption prohibitions, demonstrably aims to protect whistleblowers that expose bribery or corruption allegations (3)(4). Further and specific to public bodies, Section 43.52 of the Government Service Regulations prohibits the employer of an employee who has exposed acts of corruption from taking any steps adversely affecting his or her employment conditions. If the employer takes such adverse steps, the employee can lodge a formal complaint to the Israeli State Comptroller. Under Section 45c of the State Comptroller Law 1958, the State Comptroller may issue orders for the protection of such employees, including the annulment of their dismissal or the grant of damages in the form of money or rights (2).

Whistleblowing is weakly encouraged by the government and defence institutions. There are very few (if any) guidance or information materials, and there is no training or information campaigns (1) (2). A unit may have been designated to handle claims but as of yet is not in place. The current President has tried to enhance the protection and prestige of whistleblowers. They were honored in a ceremony at the President’s residence in which they were awarded the Moral Integrity citation (3). As of yet, there does not appear to be a unit within the MoD that explicitly addresses whistleblowing issues.
However, the Office of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman do hold seminars for workers in the public sector. These seminars address, among other things, the variety of protections the Office offers to whistleblowers. In addition, the Office of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman has made available on its website its complete decisions regarding whistleblowers. Nevertheless, the website has not been updated since 2017 and does not appear to still be in use (4).

There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity. In general, whistleblowing has a bad reputation because it is considered as betraying some honor code. Maybe the Ganor and the 3000 corruption scandal affair will lead to a change (1). Additionally, there is the Movement for the Quality Government in Israel that aims to increase transparency and accountability and also encourages whistleblowing (2).
Regarding protection measures, the Ombudsman’s annual reports show an overall uptrend in the number of complaints submitted to the Ombudsman’s Office regarding measures taken against whistleblowers (3). While this could indicate increased trust in whisteblower protection frameworks, it remains too early to tell.

Art 1(51) of law n. 190/2012 introduced regulation of whistleblowing at national level [1]. However, due to its vagueness in protecting the public servant reporting illicit conduct, further regulation has been introduced. Legislative Decree 24 June 2014 n.90 inserts the possibility for the public servant to report illicit conduct not only to its own Administration, but also to the National Agency for Anti-corruption (Agenzia Nazionale Anti Corruzione, ANAC) [2]. Nonetheless, in 2015 the National Agency for Anticorruption evaluated legal dispositions as not sufficient to effectively protect the identity of whistle-blowers and proposed guidelines for a correct and effective execution of the legislation [3]. In 2017 the Parliament approved Law 30 November 2017, n. 179 [4] which provides some additional guarantees to the whistle-blower – including the reversed burden of proof (art 54bis co.7) – and sanctions to the administration and the supervisor that do not notify instances of whistleblowing [5]. In addition, the national anticorruption authority released a new regulation in July 2020, further delineating the procedures to follow, in case of whistleblowing [6]. No sanctions are foreseen in case of misguided reporting, unless it is done with intentional wrongdoing and serious misconduct.

In January 2019, ANAC introduced a new open-source software for public administrations, to let whistle-blowers denounce illegalities via this software, in order to ensure the protecion of their identities [7]. Finally, the Italian legislative system has to ensure the right and full application of EU Directive n. 1937/2019 by December 2021 that has to extend protection also to volunteers and fromer employees [8]. The application of the EU Directive will also provide further guarantees, particularly regarding indirect discrimination of whistle-blowers [9]. At the beginning of September 2020, a new ANAC regulation on the management of reporting entered into force [10]. Current legislation and regulation applies to the Ministry of Defence and its employees as well.

In the “Three-year Plan for the prevention of corruption and transparency” issued by the Ministry of Defence, section III.6.9 deals with measures to protect whistle-blowers. The three-year plan also provides for each organisational unit of the Ministry to conduct training and information sessions on the matter, which is reported also in the Code of Conduct for the personnel of the Ministry [1]. According to the 2020-2022 three year anticorruption plan, training and information sessions are performed regularly, so to have reached the target of 100% of personnel informed [2]. Section III.6.9 also states that once reportings are transmitted to the Anticorruption Supervisor, it is his duty to assign its management to a dedicated independent team. It is, however not possible to check the number and composition of the team. As attachment to the three-year plan it is possible to publicly access the model for reporting misconducts, but no further information on whistleblowing (apart from the related information in the three year anticorruption plan and code of conduct) is available.

Relevant to note is that the Ministry of Defence is in the process of adapting to Communication of 15 January 2019 from the National Anti-corruption Agency [3]. It is thus does not give its personnel the possibility to send notifications of illegalities to the open-source software promoted by ANAC. As a result of this delay, reports of whistleblowing are still sent through the dedicated email account (anticorruzione@difesa.it) or via reports on the ANAC website [4]. According to the 2019 report of the Anticorruption Supervisor, the person responsible for the supervision of the correct dealing with the process of whistleblowing, the implementation of the ANAC online software tool is in the finalisation process [5]. Lastly, coming to the internal campaign, apart from the indications present in the official documents, it is possible to find analysis on whistleblowing in Italy on the website of the Ministry of Defence [6].

According to the Three-year plan all activities concerning protection of whistleblowing are ongoing or accomplished, with the exception of the online software. [1] Nonetheless, relevant to note is that, apparently, personnel of the Ministry of Defence prefer to report whistleblowing to ANAC, than to the responsible person in the Ministry of Defence. Indeed, according to the annual report of the Anticorruption supervisor of the Ministry, no cases of whistleblowing were reported during the year, while, statistics from ANAC highlight that a part of reports of illegalities come from the armed forces and the military [2].

Japan has a law on whistleblowing that is applicable to national public employees and Self-Defence Force (SDF) personnel [1]. There are instructions for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and SDF based on the law [2] and procedures for dealing with whistleblowing based on the law are explained in booklets published by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance (IGO). [3] The Act states that “the purpose of this act is to protect whistleblowers.” [4] This includes protection of the whistleblower’s identity [5] and protection against retribution in the form of dismissal [6] and unsuitable work reassignment or disciplinary measures. [3] Reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation does not seem to be provided by the law or the instructions for the MOD. Whistleblowers have, however, been granted waiver of liability for revealing the content of internal documents from the MOD to provide evidence in court for their disclosures. [7] The legislation does not state that sanctions shall be applied for misguided reporting, although the Act states that the whistleblower must make efforts not to damage the legitimate interests of others and the public interest. [8] The instructions of the MOD state that a committee shall examine the veracity of the report of a whistleblower before proceeding, but instructions about how to handle misguided reporting are not provided. [9] A whistleblower report must be about actions that are against the law. [10] The right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing will therefore follow, as not to provide such a right would be against the law.

Personnel are given clear information on whistleblowing, although for a broader range of misconduct than corruption. Information on the protection of whistleblowers is provided. In the booklet on Compliance Guidance for personnel in general, which is distributed to all units of the Self-Defence Force, [1] there is a presentation of the topic, and a list of the details of offices to contact in the event one wishes to make a whistleblower report. [2] The parallel booklet for supervisors dedicates two pages to the system for whistleblowers and includes the item in a list of topics that one should be particularly aware of. [1] The provision of information is followed up by training and guidance. A former commanding officer of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) said at interview that personnel learn about whistleblowing through studying examples such as one where SDF personnel reported missing weapons to the military police. [1] He stated that information on whistleblowing is posted at a place where all personnel can see it. [3] The general affairs section of each service branch and major defence institution receives whistleblower reports. [1] Whistleblowers may also report to an independent unit staffed by lawyers. This unit provides oversight of the handling of reports. [4] According to the ministry’s instructions, personnel who handle whistleblower reports may request the assistance of other members of the MOD’s staff, [5] and if the report clearly deals with a crime, request the assistance of the police. [6] The IGO has a webpage dedicated to whistleblowing, with the contact details of a hotline. [7] In 2016, a Diet member asked a Question to the Minister under Article 74 of the Diet Law about whistleblowing in the Ground Self-Defence Force, and received a written answer in the name of the Prime Minister. [8] However, the Ministry does not have a focus period for personnel dedicated to whistleblowing, [1] and in an Internet search of the Ministry website, documents on campaigns to promote whistleblowing were not found. [9] Nor were any reports on such campaigns found in a search of the mainstream newspapers Asahi Shimbun [10] and Yomiuri Shimbun. [11] This indicates that, whereas whistleblowing is integrated into the regular training of personnel, there are few campaigns to promote this practice. Information on how the unit that handles whistleblower claims is organised has not been found. However, the existence of an independent legal unit that oversees the handling of whistleblower reports and the fact that those who handle whistleblower claims have the right to request the assistance of other MOD staff members provides some evidence that the unit that handles such claims is well-resourced and independent.

An editorial in the Japan Times discusses several cases where people doubt that whistleblowers in the Japanese private sector are adequately protected. [1] Only one allegation of lack of whistleblower protection in the MOD was identified, however. A newspaper reported that a Lt. Commander took internal documents out of the MOD in 2014. He used these documents to provide evidence in a trial in the Tokyo High Court that harassment had been a cause of the suicide of a sailor on an MSDF submarine. The MOD granted him a waiver of liability for revealing the content of internal documents, because they concluded that he had acted as a whistleblower. [2] However, in 2016, MP Teraya asked, in a Question to the Minister, why the Lt. Commander had not been promoted since the incident and had not received a pay rise since 2006. [3] A written answer to the question was provided in the name of Prime Minister Abe. It said that in order to ensure fair and harmonious personnel management, information will not be given about individual personnel decisions. However, decisions about promotion and related issues are based on the Self-Defence Forces Law, the Law Regarding the Salary of the Personnel of the MOD and instructions based on these laws (see Q39A and Q45). The written answer also said that “my understanding is that the person concerned did not receive unfavorable treatment because he was a whistleblower”. [4] No reports on the promotion and pay rise of this Lt. Commander or other cases of possible retaliation against of whistleblowers in the MOD were found in a search of the mainstream newspapers Asahi Shimbun [5] and Yomiuri Shimbun, [6] however. Furthermore, following another suicide by an MSDF crew member in 2018, investigators were made aware that the man was the victim of harassment after a whistleblower made a report. [7] Such reports indicate that some in the defence sector have enough confidence in whistleblower protection to make use of the institution. However, as few reports about the presence or lack of confidence in whistleblower protection in the defence sector have been found, one report of an MP asking a question that expresses lack of confidence does carry some weight.

According to Article 24 of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law of 2016, published in the Official Gazette, by the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, the commission pledges that it shall provide needed protection for whistleblowers, witnesses, informants and experts in corruption cases. However, this legislation, although it implicitly applies to the defence sector, does not explicitly extend this protection to the defence sector. In fact, the only mention of the military and public security is related to the commission’s potential request for delegation or secondment or assignment of any of the public security or military officers [1]. Despite the legal protection offered to whistleblowers, implementing this within defence is not straightforward, as there are many regulations and laws that would hinder potential whistleblowers within the defence. These include potential lawsuits against them for defamation, [2] utilising either the 1971 Protection of State Secrets and Classified Documents Law, the 1992 Defence Law, the 1998 Jordan Press Association Law, and the 1999 Press and Publications Law to persecute whistleblowers [3]. Regardless, there is evidence that unit commanders encourage personnel to report any case of corruption and pledge protection for these reporters [4,5,6]. Despite the existence of legislation on the protection of whistleblowers, this does not explicitly apply to the defence sector, and because of the existence of other legislations that could potentially be used against whistleblowers.

Whistleblowing is encouraged through training and guidance, and on different levels of personnel (Commissioned and noncommissioned officers) on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistleblowers. However, the culture of reporting as a whistleblower remains a tabboo in Jordanian culture. Although there is a law to encourage and protect whistleblowers, it is not enforced [1,2,3].

Despite the fact that legislation to protect whistleblowers exists [1], there are many other restrictions within Jordanian legislation that would lead officials and personnel to doubt the protection they may be offered. Fear and lack of trust might be present due to the existence of the 1971 Protection of State Secrets and Classified Documents Law, the 1992 Defence Law, the 1998 Jordan Press Association Law, and the 1999 Press and Publications Law. In general, whistleblowing is not common because of lack of trust and the fear of inability to provide evidence [3,4].

There no specific existing whistleblowing policy or legislation applicable to the Defence Sector. Defence and Security agencies are guided by various witness protection mechanisms, such as the Witness Protection Act, Act No. 16 of 2006, which provides for the protection of witnesses in criminal cases and other proceedings. [1]

The Bribery Act of 2016 which in part VI, section 21 (1) to (5) provides protection of whistle blowers and witnesses in corruption from harrasment and intimidation. [2] There are on-going efforts to enact the Whistleblower Protection Bill, 2018, which covers national security organs including the KDFand the National Intelligence Service. Some of the draft provisions of the Whistle Blower Protection Bill, 2018 include referring whistle blowers and witnesses to the Witness Protection Agency at their request. However, this bill is yet to be operationalized and whistle blowers and witnesses may not be fully protected when they come forward with sensitive information. [3, 4]

Whistle blowing in Kenya and specifically in the KDF is weakly encouraged. Whistle blowers are seen as individuals who dare to disrupt the status quo of corruption in an organization or institution. Individuals who have come forward with corruption-related information have often been harassed and vilified. Although there exists no specific examples of whistle blowing cases within the KDF, whistle blowing involves great personal risk, including dismissal, humiliation and physical abuse. [1]

There is little history about whistle blowing cases within the Kenya Defence Forces. The Defence Ministry including the Cabinet Secretary of Defence rarely address the issue of whistle blowing within the forces. The lack of such cases may be attributed to legal barriers prohibiting unauthorised disclosure of information. Besides, confidentiality clauses included in employment contracts would prevent whistle blowers from disclosing information that may be termed as a breach of confidentiality. A breach of confidence in such instances would result in prosecution. [1]

In late 2018, the Kosovo Assembly adopted the Law on Protection of Whistleblowers [1]. Its purpose is to enable the whistleblowing of violations in the public and private sectors and to protect whistleblowers accordingly [2]. This Law also includes public institutions, such as defence and military institutions [3]. This law stipulates that any whistleblower who reports or discloses information in compliance with this law cannot be subject to criminal or civil liability or disciplinary procedures [4]. However, the whistleblower is not obliged to prove the source or authenticity of the information provided. The law stipulates that the whistleblower will not be prejudiced against [4].

In order to prioritise and encourage whistleblowing by state institutions by not limiting scope, only superficial information is available in the 2018 Annual Report of the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), published on March 2019 [1]. The report states that the ACA wishes to address issues of whistleblowing in Kosovo as a priority; particularly the initial implementation of the Law No. 06/L-085 on Protection of Whistleblowers, which was adopted by the Kosovo Assembly on December 2018 [2]. Another priority for the ACA was to adopt two sub-legal acts that would contribute to the implementation of the law, including: i) Regulation for receiving, handling and signalling cases at a central level; and ii) Regulation for receiving and handling cases within the ACA [2]. Although the acting Minister of Justice promised in April 2019 that this secondary legislation would be drafted [3], this regulation has not yet been adopted by the Government. The ACA aims to improve the protection of whistle-blowers both on a professional and personal level [2]. However, guidance materials are not available on the Ministry of Justice’s website or the ACA’s website. The ACA is a legally independent body [4] that reports to the Assembly [5], and is independent from the Government.
In its 2019 Report for Kosovo, the European Commission suggested that Kosovo institutions focus on strengthening whistle-blowing mechanisms and protection measures to implement across the country [6]. According to the government reviewer, based on article 3 paragraph 1 under paragraph 1.10 of Law no. 06/L-085 on protection of whistleblowers, the MoD has appointed the official responsible for receiving and handling signals in the MoD/KSF. While the drafting of bylaws provided by this law is not within the competence of the MoD.

Although it is still early to measure whether officials and personnel are sufficiently informed of protections guaranteed by the 2018 Law on Protections of Whistleblowers, the Ministry of Defence responded that its personnel are aware of protections offered by this law [1]. Despite the information provided by the Ministry of Defence, this issue remains vague, given the uncertainty around the management of personal data and necessary protections in place for whistleblowers when reporting corruption claims.

There is legislation on whistleblowing and it does apply to the military, the police and the KNG. The legislation explicitly promises whistleblower protection from any kind of retribution but it is unclear on the issue of identity. Article 2 of the ACA’s law, the body tasked with fighting corruption, outlines the protections in place for the whistleblower including: legal protection, compensation for any damages, protection of identity . The article goes on to place some of the burden of proof on the whistleblowers, demanding whistleblowers to present “serious indications” to prove the veracity of the report (1).

The ACA website, however, explicitly says that the authorities would protect the identity of whistleblowers. It also says that they are willing to monitor their phones based on their personal requests and give them new lines, as well as homes, jobs and a security detail if necessary (2).

Whistleblowing is encouraged by the Government through the ACA’s media messages and the training courses it offers Government agencies, including the defence and security sector. The internal financial departments of the security agencies, which are responsible for safeguarding public funds, do not actively encourage whistleblowing. (1, 2, 3). Their campaigns are rare and half-hearted, mostly because they lack independence as they are under the direct control of the Defence and Interior Ministers, officials and activists said. (4, 5, 6)

On paper, the ACA media and training campaign is flawless, but in practice, it is ineffective. The body was created in 2016 and it has been unable to produce any positive results since it came into existence, and that is because employees are not responding to their efforts, mainly because they believe the ACA can help because they see the Ministry often ignore their requests and those of the SAB.

Earlier this year, the ACA launched a media campaign called “Take Initiative,” whose sole purpose was to reassure witnesses and whistleblowers that they would be protected if they come forward (5).

The campaign included workshops that were held in the military and KNG, according to officials (1 and 2), and also the Interior Ministry, according to a report from the Kuwaiti news outlet, al-Qabas (6).

Few believe that whistleblowers would be protected instead of punished and this is why no one comes forward, officials said (1, 2 and 3). Although the ACA promises protection, many do not believe they are capable of delivering it because their own auditors are often stonewalled by these agencies and the ACA does nothing (publicly or behind the scenes) to support them. As a result, most security and military employees view these efforts as part of a PR campaign, and not a serious crackdown on corruption.

This belief is based on the fact that these auditors failed to crack any of the cases aforementioned in the answer to Q 3A.

The Whistleblowing Law was adopted in 2018. [1] The status of whistleblower can be granted to persons who are in employment or providing services to the company or the institution where the offences are committed. It is anticipated that the new whistleblowing law will concern corruption, fraud, inactivity of officials, negligence or misuse of service, tax evasion, wasting of state money and property, public health, construction, environment, food, safety and public order, violations of human rights and violations in the field of public procurement and in the financial and capital markets sector. The bill stipulates that, from the moment the person has become a whistleblower, he and his relatives will be ensured anonymity. In order to protect against the adverse consequences of whistleblowing, such as dismissal or not granting a vacation, the bill provides for state-guaranteed legal assistance, exemption from costs, interim protection in civil proceedings and administrative proceedings in court, and the waiver of legal liability and appropriate reparation for material loss and moral damages. It is also foreseen that a person will be able to receive advice on the protection of his rights. [1] The MOD had already put in place some mechanisms contained in the whistleblowing law. A unified internal whistleblower system was created in the MOD, including an e-mail address. Information is available to very limited people in the ministry, thus protection is ensured. [2] Information about the introduced system is available on the home page of the MOD. [3]

Moreover, according to the government reviewer, information on the review and results of the screening of the whistleblower reports are publicly available at national level [4]. The MOD also publishes information on screening results of whistleblowers reports in the MOD Public Report (not published yet, will be available at www.mod.gov.lv). In 2019, the MOD received 3 whistleblowers reports.

According to the Whistleblowing law, ministries are obliged to introduce mechanisms of receiving information and protecting whistleblowers (section 6). [1] The contact point for the whistleblowers is the State Chancellery (section 8). [1] Associations and foundations, including trade unions, can also act as contact points and provide assistance to whistleblowers. [1] Training is not provided at the MOD on that issue. According to the government reviewer, the MOD staff, whistleblowers contact points, are trained on implementation and screening of whistleblower reports by State Chancellery. All MOD staff is informed about whistleblowers contact point (included in introductory briefing for new staff). Information on whistleblowing is available on-line. The specific e-mail address (trauksme@mod.gov.lv) is used for all related information. Very limited number of staff has access to that e-mail and reports.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the 2018 law.

In September 2018, the Lebanese Parliament approved a law to protect whistleblowers; it applies to all public administration employees (1). The law was originally submitted in 2010 and approved in 2015 by parliamentary committee (2). Nevertheless, it is problematic as it offers weak protection to individuals. The law required the establishment of the anti-corruption commission that ensures the confidentiality of the individual’s identity. However, the commission has not been established yet (3).

The government has halfheartedly encouraged whistleblowing. In September 2018, State Security with the Ministry of State for Combating Corruption launched a hotline for individuals to report corruption cases by government officials (1). An interviewee from the LTA has confirmed that whistleblowing is not particularly encouraged (2). Furthermore, the Anti-Corruption Commission that is to be responsible for handling the claims is yet to be established (3). The Ministry of State for Administrative Reform has set an anti-corruption strategy for 2018-2023 that includes anti-corruption training for public administration employees and improving oversight (4). The strategy has not been adopted by the government yet (5).

A study done by the LCPS suggests that citizens low trust in government are associated with the high perception of corruption (1). An interviewee confirmed a lack of trust in reporting corruption (2).

The Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers was adopted by Parliament only in November 2017, and came into force from 1 January 2019. This law is applicable to all government institutions, including the Ministry of Defence, military and other official personnel. According to the provisions of the law, whistleblowers are able to report all kinds of offences and law violations related to the public such as public safety, dangers and risks for the environment, human life or health, illicit enrichment, etc. The law foresees and provides explicit protection and rights to whistleblowers, such as the protection of identity, protection against retribution, a waiver of liability for the whistleblower, no sanctions for misguided reporting, the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing, the right to remuneration for valuable information and compensation and other rights described in the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers [1]. At the time of writing, the Law was not yet enforced. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence operates a hotline and e-mail contact management system, where any individual can report information about soldiers, national security system officials and personnel planned, intended or past offences. The Ministry of Defence guarantees confidentiality [2,3].

The Law on whistleblowers entered into force in 2019. According to the legislation, the main institution responsible for providing the investigation and implementation of the law is the Prosecutor’s Office [1]. The Prosecutor’s Office is an independent non-political institution. Additionally, the Special Investigations Service of the Republic of Lithuania is the main agency responsible for the investigation of civil service offences, which includes whistleblowing [2]. This a well resourced independent unit, based on its structure and extensive scope of its activities [3]. The MoD, the Special Investigations Service and the Prosecutor’s General’s Office have worked together in terms of encouraging whistleblowing in the MoD through training, information, and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistleblowers [4]. While internal campaigns to promote whistleblowing seem to exist, they appear to be sporadic in nature [5].

There is not sufficient evidence to score this indicator, as the Law on whistleblowers entered into force in January 2019 and it’s still too early to assess the effectiveness of the new system. According to the legislation, the main institution responsible for providing the investigation and implementation of the law is the Prosecutor’s Office [1]. Without this Law, citizens are not willing to report corruption issues. According to Global Corruption report, only 7 percent of the population report suspected corruption [2]. The Prosecutor General’s Office, as a central authority, has EUR 100,000 budget to compensate whisleblowers. Four persons claimed it, but nobody was granted a compensation. The first whisleblower who ‘tested’ the new law could not claim compensation, as she had disclosed corruption prior to the law came into force. (3).

The Whistleblower Protection Act 2010 [1] outlines protections for whistleblowers to encourage and facilitate corruption reporting in the public and private sector. The Act facilitates public reporting of acts of corruption or misconduct, includes provisions for confidentiality of the informer, and empowers enforcement agencies to investigate complaints. [2] However, the Act is seen to fall short in its abilities to provide protection. [3] Most importantly, it is unable to provide protection if such disclosure is specifically prohibited by any written law (Section 6(1)). [1] Although generally the Act encompasses all employees, including those from the defence sector, military and defence personnel are bound by the Official Secrets Act (OSA) which prohibits such disclosures [4] and thus they may not be able to harness the protection under the Whistleblower Protection Act.

Whistleblowing is encouraged in anti-corruption and integrity building training sessions and seminars. However, such training sessions are believed to be superficial, as officers interviewed feel weakly inclined to whistleblow. [1] [2] Nevertheless, there is an Integrity Unit established in the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) which is headed by an MACC officer and tasked to investigate any suspicion of corruption. The interviewee also insists that MINDEF takes seriously each and every surat layang (poison pen letter) which is sent to the Integrity Unit for investigation. [3] The Integrity Unit also emphasises its commitment to investigate any complaints or suspicion of corruption and claims that it receives many complaints, reflecting the willingness of officials to whistleblow. [4]

As noted above, officers interviewed do not feel strongly about whistleblowing, as they doubt that whistleblowers are adequately protected, despite the adoption of the Whistleblower Protection Act. However, a naval officer interviewed did not feel likewise. As there are mixed receptions towards the Act, it can be assumed that anti-corruption training may be superficial or there may have been vague or unclear language used by top officials that casts doubt about the process.

A US Department of State Report from 2013 determined that “[Malian] law provides no protection for public or private employees for lawfully disclosing evidence of illegality” 1. The 2014 Anti-Corruption law does not offer any protection for whistleblowers, regardless of whether they are members of the armed forces, civil servants or ordinary civilians.² Moreover, elements of the Penal Code make it difficult for whistleblowers to come forward without fearing legal reprisals. The code allows for the punishment of those deemed to share information unlawfully: Section 3, article 130 of the Penal Code states:
“Anyone who, by position or profession had secrets entrusted to them, that they then revealed shall be punished by imprisonment of six months to two years and, optionally, a fine of 20 000 to 150 000 francs.
The penalties will apply to members of all jurisdictions guilty of violating the code.
If the offender is a public officer or government official, he will be punished by three months to five years imprisonment and a fine from 20 000 to 240 000 francs. The culprit will become forbidden from any function or public employment for at least five to ten years.
Except as provided above, deletion or opening all correspondence addressed to third parties, in bad faith, shall incur the same penalties.
The attempt of the offence shall be punished as if the offence itself”.³
The article does however state that exemptions can be made when the defendant is obliged by the law to become an informer, although the possible threat of a large fine is likely to deter potential whistle-blowers.³

The lack of legal protections for whistle-blowers in the government’s anti-corruption bill in 2014, coupled with the detention of Oumar Keïta (see 36C), indicates the current administration’s lack of enthusiasm for encouraging whistle-blowing.¹ A Malian journalist told the assessor that there are no whistleblowers from within the system.⁴ Only when people lose their jobs do they start to denounce illicit practices. He added that “if you don’t comply with the deeply embedded illicit practices, you’ll get sacked and be replaced with someone more compliant”.⁴ Furthermore, the incentives are simply not there for people to report abuses: “Malian society judges you by what you have, not how you have obtained it. If you are in a position of power, many of your friends or family will expect you to take advantage of your post”.⁴ A 2015 study notes that “Mali does not have a culture of whistleblowing, and few cases have arisen in which citizens, officials or employees have brought public attention to corrupt practices or general or systematic misconduct in public or private institutions. The situations in which whistleblowing typically takes place do not often materialise in Mali”.² In 2015, UNODC trained 38 Malian officials within the criminal justice system on how to handle the testimonies of victims and witnesses of criminal acts, but there is no explicit indication it focused on people reporting cases of corruption.³

In 2018, the authorities arrested and detained a military sergeant, Oumar Keïta, after a video was posted online in which he made damaging allegations about senior army officials embezzling state funds.¹
A Malian journalist told the assessor that there are no whistleblowers from within system.³ Only when people lose their jobs do they start to denounce illicit practices. He added that “if you don’t comply with the deeply embedded illicit practices, you’ll get sacked and be replaced with someone more compliant”.³ Furthermore, the incentives are simply not there for people to report abuses: “Malian society judges you by what you have, not how you have obtained it. If you are in a position of power, many of your friends or family will expect you to take advantage of your post”.³
This view is supported by a 2015 study which notes that “Mali does not have a culture of whistleblowing, and few cases have arisen in which citizens, officials or employees have brought public attention to corrupt practices or general or systematic misconduct in public or private institutions. The situations in which whistleblowing typically takes place do not often materialise in Mali”.²

There are regulations regarding corruption complaints and it is applicable to all public officials, including those of national defence institutions. The General Law of Administrative Responsibilities states that complaints can be anonymous, and in this sense, the investigating authority must maintain the confidentiality of those who report the alleged infractions. [1]

Regarding the protection of whistleblowers, it is only stated that “Public Servants who report a serious administrative offense or offenses by individuals, or are witnesses in the procedure, may request reasonable protection measures. The request must be evaluated and attended to in a timely manner by the public entity where the complainant provides his services.” [2]

It is important to mention that since the approval of the General Responsibilities Law of the National Anticorruption System, the omission of protections for those public servants who denounce acts of corruption within their own institution was highlighted. In this regard, initiatives have emerged to issue the General Law for the Protection of Witnesses and Complainants of Corruption Acts, to facilitate and encourage complaints and establish the protection measures to which public and private servants who make them would have access to protection. [3] [4] [5]

By legal mandate it is the responsibility of the CIOs of each Secretariat to establish areas of easy access so that any interested party can file complaints for alleged administrative offenses. [1] Likewise, the SFP develops and publishes material so that public servants are informed about their responsibilities under the National Anticorruption System and instructs the Internal Control Bodies on the matter. [2]

Some journalistic reports make it known that reporting of acts of corruption is promoted within SEDENA through training on issues of integrity, ethics, and prevention of conflicts of interest; incorporation of transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption issues in the study plans; and distribution of materials on the procedures for dealing with and receiving complaints for non-compliance with the code of conduct, among others. [3] There is insufficient information to indicate whether the campaigns are permanent. [4]

Researchers were unable to find any data or research conducted on trust among officials or personnel within SEDENA. As such, this indicator is not scored and is marked ‘Not Enough Information.’

Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists. The Law on Prevention of Corruption regulates the rights of the whistleblowers and the process of reporting of corruption. [1] This law is applicable to military and official personnel. The law contains explicit reference to the protection of whistle-blowers, including protection of identity, [2] protection against retribution, [3] and reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation. [4] No waiver of liability for the whistle-blower is envisaged by the law. Only whistle-blowers with “good intentions” are protected by the law, while criteria for the assessment of intention are very vague. [5] All public servants are allowed to refuse participation in criminal acts while performing their duty, including army employees. [6]

Whistleblowing is only formally encouraged, therefore procedures exist, but concrete results are lacking, as well as training sessions and campaigns. [1] The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption lacks independence from the executive, [1] and has failed to protect important whistle-blowers reporting corruption, [2] including the former president of the Army Trade Union. [3]

According to the MoD reviewer, whistleblowing is encouraged through training, information, and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistle-blowers. The Ministry of Defence has appointed a person in the Inspection Department that deals with this issue. This person, within the jurisdiction and assistance of Integrity Department, acts upon reports of corruption and misconduct. Agency for Prevention of corruption has an organizational unit that has the necessary capacity to handle requests. This information could not be verified.

Cases of whistleblowing are extremely rare and whistle-blowers are not adequately protected. The President of the Army Trade Union publicly and repeatedly reported possible corruption [1][2][3] and he was sent into forced retirement by a decision of the Minister, [4][5] due to his discretionary right provided by the Law. [6]

In theory no legislation applicable to military and official personnel exists to facilitate corruption reporting or the protection of whistleblowers. The Regulations on General Discipline of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces make no mention of it, and no evidence of other official sources providing whistleblowers with protection was found. This lack of evidence can be explained by the secrecy surrounding the internal management of the Moroccan armed forces, as well as by the general context of regular corruption within the Moroccan authorities as denounced by NGOs, such as Transparency International, and interviewees (1)(2)(3).

The last publicly reported case of whistleblowing (Captain Adib Case) not only dates, but was also fraught with obstacles to whistleblowing, a serious lack of protection of the whistleblower and the lack of thorough and independent investigation into the alleged case of corruption highlighted by the whistleblower. As of 2018 the general accused (Bennani) has died of old age without being convicted or prosecuted, and the whistleblower has not been reintegrated into the army (1)(2).

No evidence of more recent cases were found. Given the general context, the outcomes of the Adib Captain case and the secrecy surrounding the armed forces it is likely that this lack of recent case indicate more a fear of potential whistleblowers to publicly speak than a decrease of corruption cases in the Moroccan armed forces. No more recent examples were found (3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8).

The last publicly reported case of whistleblowing (Captain Adib Case) is not only out-of-date, but was also fraught with obstacles to the whistleblowing, a serious lack of protection for the whistleblower and a lack of thorough and independent investigation into the alleged case of corruption highlighted by the whistleblower. The general accused (Bennani) has died of old age without being convicted or prosecuted, and the whistleblower has not been reintegrated into the army (1).

No evidence of more recent cases were found. Given the general context, the outcomes of the Adib Captain case and the secrecy surrounding the armed forces it is likely that this lack of recent case indicate more a fear of potential whistleblowers to publicly speak than a decrease of corruption cases in the Moroccan armed forces (2).

These elements point to a climate of lack of trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided with adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.

The Anti-Corruption Commission is preparing a Whistleblower Protection Bill [1,2]. The assessor could not ascertain whether such a law currently exists within the Tatmadaw or not.

According to U Aung Kyi, Chairperson of the ACC, preparations are under way for a Whistleblower Protection Bill and this proposed law will also provide incentives for people to report corruption [1].

Major Than Htike Aung was detained after releasing a social media post relating to corruption in military-owned businesses, under the rule that military personnel must not post social media content that could destroy the unity of the military [1]. Due to the aforementioned case and the fact that there is no whistleblower protection bill in place, military personnel have no confidence that they would receive adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.

Following several years of public debate, the Whistleblowers Authority Act came into force in 2016. The Act requires all organisations in the Netherlands (including those in the defence and security sector) with more than 50 employees to introduce an internal reporting procedure for reporting wrongdoing [1]. The Act has led to the establishment of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. Individuals may contact the Authority for free and confidential advice and to instigate an independent and objective investigation into reported issues, which can lead to factual and anonymous reports with recommendations for employers [2]. The Authority cannot punish employers for not protecting whistleblowers [3]. Over the past four years, the Authority’s performance has been heavily criticised, primarily through the Ruys Report, an independent investigation conducted in 2017 [4]. The Act ensures non-disclosure of the whistleblower’s identity (see Section 2 and Section 3j), protection from retaliation against employees who reported potential wrongdoing (see Section 18 and Section 18c), waiver of liability for the whistleblower and the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing [1,5].

However, the Act did not introduce a reversal of burden of proof and remains silent on whether there are repercussions for misguided reporting, thus creating legal uncertainty for those who believe they have witnessed wrongdoing but are mistaken [5]. Additionally, some of the above-mentioned assurances allowed for in the Act are flawed. For instance, the Dutch system uniquely mandates that whistleblowers first report alleged abuses internally and that reporters can only request assistance from the Authority when this initial process fails. A request to investigate can actually be rejected if the organisation in question is said to have dealt with the alleged abuse properly (Section 6) [1]. This somewhat negates the confidentiality guidelines provided for in the Act, as superiors are well aware of the identity of the reporting personnel. Anonymous reporting is also not available. Likewise, although protection from retaliation against whistleblowers is ensured, the types of retaliation from which whistleblowers are protected (for example, dismissal, denial of promotion, unfair treatment or threat of reprisal) is not specified [1,5]. It is also unclear whether the whistleblower is protected if procedure is not followed (for example, if reporters go to a third party, such as the media) [5].

Of the six legal provisions highlighted as important to the protection of whistleblowers, two are assured (waiver of liability and the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing), two are not accounted for (reversal of burden of proof and repercussions for misguided reporting) and two are assured but are flawed (protection of identity, protection against retribution). Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists and is applicable to military and official personnel, but only some of the protections are established in law.

Whistleblowing procedures are encouraged through integrity training workshops and information shared in ‘Code of Conduct’-type documents. In 2018, the Defence Integrity Reporting Centre (which is part of Central Defence Integrity Organisation (COID)) supervised 181 sessions for various groups and delivered a workshop or training event 100 times [1]. The sessions cover policy and regulations on integrity and military ethics, but it is not known whether the whistleblower process and protocol are discussed or encouraged. It is also unknown whether the training is sporadic or systematic. The whistleblower scheme is explained in circulated documents such as the ‘Implementation of Defence Integrity Policy’ [2]. Established in 2016, the Whistleblowers Authority (Dutch: Het Huis voor Klokkenluiders) is an independent and well-resourced unit that handles claims [3].

Despite there being adequate protections in theory, officials and personnel may doubt that whistleblowers are adequately protected in practice [1]. One respondent referenced the ‘Chromium 6’ scandal that erupted in 2018, noting that, within the organisation, there was a high degree of resistance to acting upon the knowledge that personnel were in contact with a carcinogenic chemical [2]. It was alleged that the Ministry of Defence was forced to respond, admit guilt, and compensate victims after media pressure generated by whistleblowers [1]. This suggests that personnel have the impression that whistleblowers must have stamina and can only achieve real results by involving third parties.

In another example, a respondent recalled how a whistleblower was reportedly vilified within the Air Force in 2009 for speaking out against safety concerns [1]. After reporting safety compliance issues to his superiors, his medical file was allegedly tampered with and it was falsely claimed that he had exhibited psychological issues during a consultation, though the whistleblower was actually on vacation at the time of the apparent consultation [3]. The Regional Disciplinary Court has considered the following in its judgment in this regard: “[T]he Commission notes that there has been no evidence of forgery in the sense of malice or intent on the part of the defendant, as the complainant claims.” [4] Though this is an older example, the way in which this particular whistleblower was allegedly discredited to fellow personnel may reflect the current culture with regard to speaking out within the Ministry of Defence [1]. Numerous other examples highlight the way in which the defence force ostracises internal whistleblowers or ignores the issues highlighted by those who speak out [5,6,7,8,9].

In 2018, a report by the Giebels Commission stated that failing to report an abuse was the most rational option for members of the defence force [5]. This shows that adequate protections are in place legally, but there are doubts about their effectiveness in action.

The Protected Disclosures Act 2000 provides protections to all whistleblowers who follow the processes of the act, both in the public and private sectors. The legislation requires agencies (including the NZDF and MoD) to have appropriate policies in place and to republish these regularly. According to the Serious Fraud Office, whistleblowers are provided legal protections “in certain situations under the Protected Disclosure Act, unless the information being disclosed is protected by legal professional privilege” [1.] The act explicitly references protection against retaliatory actions, immunity from civil and criminal proceedings, confidentiality (sections 17 to 19A), preservation of other protections (section 21), and victimisation (the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing under section 66 of the Human Rights Act 1993). If the employer sought to retaliate indirectly, reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation could be included under the employee’s right to a personal grievance process under the Employment Relations Act 2000 [2, 3, 4]. Protected disclosure does not apply for false allegations where that person knowingly falsely reports information or otherwise acts in bad faith [5].

Following public consultation in late 2018, Cabinet decided to strengthen the Protected Disclosures Act by replacing it with the Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistle-blowers) Bill. It had its first reading on 1 July 2020 [6]. The key changes proposed in this Bill are: a) extending the coverage of serious wrongdoing to include misuse of public funds or resources, whether in a public or private organisation; or of public authority by non-government organisations carrying out public functions; b) allowing serious wrongdoing to be reported directly to an external authority at any time; c) Strengthening protection for disclosers by outlining what those receiving disclosures should do; d) Clarifying the internal procedure requirements for public sector organisations and requiring them to state in their published internal procedures how support for disclosers, in the form of practical assistance and advice, will be provided; e) Referring to a list of ways in which retaliation against a discloser may occur; and f) Making it clearer for the whistleblowers who the appropriate authority is for making a disclosure by creating a new schedule to the act naming the most likely appropriate authorities for particular subject matter [7]. Additionally, the bill is now presented in a more accessible form. The bill is now before the Education and Workforce Select Committee and is expected to be reported back to the House in early 2021. The Public Service Commission will also investigate further amendments to the bill, including the potential for a one stop shop for disclosures, and test the feasibility and usefulness of establishing reporting and monitoring arrangements. The Public Service Commission is also continuing to build awareness of the bill and the existing standards and guidance for speaking up in the public services [8].

The MoD’s Speaking Up Policy sets out the ministry’s expectations for staff members on what to do if they suspect or see anything wrong or dishonest taking place [1]. There is also a Protected Disclosures Procedure for when an employee intends to make a protected disclosure as allowed by the Protected Disclosures Act [2]. Limited information is available as to the manner in which the ministry’s leadership team, which governs the policies and actions of the internal control and fraud control frameworks, is conducted. According to the MoD Statement of Intent 2020-2024, these policies are regularly reviewed [3]. The NZDF has issued a Directive which provides specific orders and instructions to members of the Defence Force pursuant to the Protected Disclosures Act 2000 [4]. The NZDF also established a 24/7 WrongDoing telephone “hotline” 0800 OURNZDF to enable personnel to report instances of suspected unethical behaviour, including fraud and corruption.

Reports of suspected fraud can be made to an individual’s Commanding Officer or directly to the Vice Chief of Defence Force. CDF Directive 41-2020 Management of Fraud in the NZDF requires the Provost Marshal and the Chief Internal Auditor to be notified of any suspected fraud. Key policies relating to fraud response include those covering Protected Disclosures, Armed Forces complaints system, and the management of fraud in the NZDF are promulgated in various orders and instructions to members of the Defence Force. All members of the Defence Force are regularly reminded of the numerous existing mechanisms that allow those serving and working within the NZDF to raise concerns about matters of wrongdoing, without fear of punishment or reprisal. In all instances of alleged criminal wrongdoing it is up to individuals to report to Military Police or to civilian authorities (such as the New Zealand Police) [5]. The NZDF retains an Internal Audit team which provides meaningful and insightful internal assurance services for the NZDF. During the Annual Internal Audit significant efforts are directed to stakeholder trust and confidence, under which whistleblowing is considered. Results of Audit Acceptance Criteria also shows that whistleblower policies and processes are deemed to be highly relevant to the audit work plan alignment and are currently under consideration. Preliminary results for the Principal Internal Audit Unit show that whistleblower policies and processes are estimated to require 340 audit hours with a residual risk rating of “low” [6]. The placement of whistleblowing in relation to the Internal Audit’s other principal audit assignments shows that the NZDF deems the matter to be a high priority. Despite the provision of a well-resources independent unit supported by detailed information, policies, and procedures, according to one NZDF source interviewed, in their experience, whistleblowing is encouraged but not directly in relation to anti-corruption as the system is mostly on anti-bullying and sexual harassment [7]. Meanwhile, a senior NZDF civilian employee had no recollection of any training or workshop activities relating to this matter [8].

The NZDF’s Operation Respect Action Plan is an ongoing effort to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviours in the NZDF and improve a culture of “dignity and respect” [1]. Matters directed to improving culture therefore also relate to anti-corruption activities, and whistleblowing overall. An independent review of Operation Respect was released in June 2020, and noted there exists a code of silence among many in the NZDF such that “many personnel will not raise a complaint or report serious issues such as sexual violence because they fear the repercussions and do not trust the NZDF processes and systems” [2]. The culture of military command impedes personnel from speaking out against their immediate managers and others in the hierarchy. The independent review also recommended an external and independent complaint channel through which personnel could raise concerns [3]. Though the report is focused on sexual harassment, discrimination, and bullying, the link to anti-corruption reporting are obvious. It should be acknowledged however that steps are being made by the NZDF and MoD, as noted in Q36B. Parliament is currently debating the introduction of a new Protected Disclosures Bill which seeks to strengthen and modernise legislation [4].

A 1992 law on illicit enrichment provides for the protection of witnesses but does not explicitly refer to “whistle-blowers” (1). As per Article 8, anyone who has permitted or facilitated the accomplishment of an offence of illicit enrichment shall be prosecuted as an accomplice. However, the person who, before an incident of illicit enrichment has revealed to the judicial authorities the facts constituting such an offence will not be prosecuted. The language of the article is vague and does not explicitly describe the reporting person as a “whistle-blower” (lanceur d’alerte). This can be explained by the fact that the concept of a “whistle-blower” is relatively recent, while the law on illicit enrichment dates back to 1992.
The Code of Military Justice is even vaguer in this respect (4). According to Article 48, in case of crime or offence, military personnel (at any level) may take all necessary measures to detect offences in military jurisdiction committed within military establishments.
The legal framework regarding the status of a person who accepts the bribe is also to be taken into consideration when analysing the effectiveness of whistleblowing institutions. Under Article 132 of the 2003 Public Penal Code (2), an individual who provokes or accepts the principles and conditions of corruption is punished the same way as the person who asks for a bribe. Therefore, some persons who could be involved in the process, but wish to report it, may fear prosecution (3). 
To conclude, if we take a broad definition of a “whistle-blower” as a person who reveals to judicial authorities facts that constitute an offence, art. 8 of 1992 the law on illicit enrichment could be interpreted as referencing “whistle-blowers”. However, the Code of Military Justice regarding “whistle-blowers” is vague (Art. 48 is not clear).

The assessor did not find any evidence that there is a specific policy regarding whistleblowing in security and defence institutions. However, on a broader level, the Nigerien government has policies to encourage it. For example, in 2011, it created a Bureau Informations-Reclamations, (BIR/LCTI) (1) – a mechanism of complaints where citizens involved in cases of possible corruption and an instituted telephone hotline to which instances of corruption could be reported. There are also other institutions like Mediateur de la République (2), Commission Nationale des Droits Humains (CNDH) (3), or HALCIA, which could encourage whistleblowing. However, the mandate of these institutions regarding whistleblowing in military and defence ministries is not clear.

In the absence of centralised statistics, it is difficult to assess how many incidents are reported to the institutions that could receive complaints (HALCIA, BIR/LCTI, IGSS, IGA). It is therefore difficult to determine the effectiveness of the penal chain, meaning how many reports or complaints lead to penalisation. Even though civil servants report cases of corruption to HALCIA, BIR/LCTI, police or gendarmerie, or, directly to the Prosecutor of the Republic, there is still little trust among civil servants working in defence and security and no guarantee of protection, should they report an incident. However, according to interviewees, informal and personnel relations based on confidence between some chiefs of the above-mentioned institutions and high-ranking security and defence officials may contribute to the faster resolution of problems that could be connected to cases of corruption, such as scarcity of fuel or late payment of allowances to soldiers. (1,2). Finally, according to interviewees, the media also play a role in highlighting corruption practices and can be used by citizens to ensure better protection from possible reprisals (3,1).

The Whistleblower Protection Bill was passed into law on the 19th of October 2017. It applies to persons and public officials, corporate bodies private bodies and private individuals. It protects against reprisals, harassment, and financial rewards for people who disclose information. It does not sanction anyone for misguided reporting. There is no explicit reference to military personnel, although they are covered by the wide definition, which includes public officials (1).

The Whistleblower Protection Bill was passed into law on the 19th of October 2017. Before that, the policy was promoted but there was not enough information about how the policy should operate in practice for it to be effective. For example, there was some delay to make financial rewards available to people who disclosed information (1). The law is new, so training on the law is not widely available within the service. However, the precise interplay with military law in terms of priority is yet to be resolved; disclosing information is still routinely criticized irrespective of the content and quality of information. For example, the identities of whistleblowers of human rights abuses or corruption, are not being protected against the risk of action under military law and procedure (2).

Beneficiaries have mostly left the country because they are not confident about the ability of the government to protect them if the information leads to the prosecution of highly connected persons. It is not clear that best practices have been followed in protecting the identity and data of people who disclose information. There is no clear structure on how the identity or life of a person who makes a disclosure will be protected against harm. While persons in the private sector may fear retaliation in the form of victimization and loss of employment, there are no safeguards to provide for protection from government intimidation in the public sector. The provisions allow for the concealment of identity, but there is no proper or effective safeguard for the identity of a person who makes a protected disclosure and who is subsequently identified (1).

The Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers, Article 8, 9 and 10 provides protection related to all six components mentioned in the rubric, with the exception of the protection of witnesses in the cases of necessities [2]. This right can be enforced only by decision of the Court. In the same vein, the Ministry of Defence created its own Rulebook on the Implementation of Procedures for Receipt of Applications from Whistleblowers to support and protect civilian and military personnel in the Ministry of Defence and Army [6]. In conjunction with the law, this Rulebook explicitly encourages and protects possible cases of whistleblowing in the sectors of the defence and the military.

Following a political scandal in 2015 which, thanks to whistleblowers, revealed extensive illegal wiretapping [1], a political deal was enforced to regulate the defence sector. In November 2015 the Macedonian Assembly enacted a national Law on Whistleblowing which entered into force in March 2016 [2]. The Law provides protection for whistleblowers for denouncing against any kind of infringement of the law according to international standards [3]. Following remarks during the Venice Commission outlining the risk of crimes and violations of human rights being concealed due to lack of protection of the potential informer [4], the National Assembly adopted in February 2018 the necessary relevant changes to the Law [5].

In the 2016 Integrity Plan, the Ministry of Defence explicitly aims to reduce the risks of corruption [1]. Moreover, the Plan follows the recommendations of the current State-wide Anti-Corruption Program for 2016-2019, led by the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption [2], focusing on the prevention of conflicts of interest, the implementation of the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers, the strengthening of the culture of integrity, and enabling free access to public information thus enhancing transparency. For this purpose the Ministry of Defence has gathered a pool of experts across this field and organises trainings for the Ministry of Defence and Army employees national education centres [1]. However, it was difficult to assess how regularly the Law on Whistleblowers was referred to in any findings [3]. That said, the execution of the Whistleblowers Project is well organised: the Ministry of Defence’s Inspectorate is an independent and well-resourced institution which reports directly to the Ministry of Defence State Secretary [4]. A contact person responsible for coordinating this reporting was appointed to share information regarding the law, refer to the relevant Ministry of Defence Rulebook, and to report cases of crime and corruption [5].

Since the enactment of the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers in 2016, no single application has been submitted by whistleblowers to the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption [1] nor to the Ministry of Defence [2]. Critics denounce the insufficient reinforcement of the Law and the lack of systematic and continuous training of authorised personnel within government institutions [3]. Some critics also pointed to the lack of political will to implement this Law; the lack of financial and structural independence of the institutions in charge; and, the limited public awareness regarding the purpose of the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers [4]. This suggest deep-seated mistrust between employees and officials when it comes to reporting criminal and corruptive cases.

The right to notify conditions worthy of criticism is codified in the Working Environment Act which applies to all employees, including the personnel of the defence sector [1]. There is also explicit reference to protection of identity, protection against retribution and reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation. The act also obligates employers to develop procedures for internal whistleblowing. The act does not mention waiver of liability for the whistleblower, nor sanctions for misguided reporting or the whistleblower’s right to refuse to participate in wrongdoing. Guidelines on whistleblowing in the defence sector integrate and support the Working Environment Act [2]. The 2016 OECD report classified Norway as a country with varying degrees of whistleblower protection, highlighting in particular a lack of guarantee of anonymity to public sector whistleblowers and a lack of incentives for whistleblowers to disclose wrongdoing [3]. Further, a 2018 report by TI classified Norway as a country with insufficient whistleblower protection [4]. In 2018 the government-appointed committee assessing the need for better laws and regulations surrounding whistleblowing recommended strengthening the protection of whistleblowers with an ombudsman who could provide advice and assistance in whistleblowing cases and forming a separate dispute commission to make it easier for people to speak out [5].

The Ministry of Defence and the subordinated agencies have their own whistleblowing channels [1, 2, 3, 4]. These include a telephone hotline, e-mail address and standard mail. It is also possible to report in person. In addition to the general information on reporting and protection of whistleblowers available on the official websites and intranet, the Ministry of Defence has published specific guidelines for whistleblowing in the defence sector [5]. The document consists of an internal instruction about procedures and includes provisions protecting classified information. The guidelines will be updated in 2020 [6]. There is an online portal enabling members of the public to submit notifications anonymously. Notifications can also be made directly to the Labour Inspection, the Ombudsman, the Office of Auditor General, or the police etc. However, the right to notify external institutions is restricted by the National Security Act [5]. The Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence is responsible for handling claims submitted to whistleblowing channels at the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Materiel Agency, the Defence Construction Agency and the Defence Research Establishment. The Chief of Defence’s own Internal Auditor Unit handles the whistleblowing channel for the Armed Forces [6]. The recent report from the Chief of Defence’s Internal Auditor Unit supposedly shows that the number of claims reported through whistleblowing channels increased by more than 30% last year [7]. In 2019 the Ministry of Defence launched a comprehensive campaign on whistleblowing for its personnel. Following the campaign, a training programme will commence in 2020. The programme will first be introduced for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and then gradually expanded to other agencies [6].

The Armed Forces argue that the increase in notifications submitted by whistleblowers in recent years proves that the system functions properly and that personnel are confident that adequate protection is provided [1]. The Minister of Defence has admitted, however, that the handling of whistleblowers (in particular claims related to sexual harassment) has not been satisfactory and that personnel may have some doubts about the effectiveness of the system [2]. According to the Parliamentary Ombudsman for the Armed Forces, there have been no formal appeals about whistleblowing channels in the defence sector [3]. Some individuals and groups have complained, however, of the turnaround time. The Ombudsman has addressed this issue in meetings with the Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence. In October 2019 the Norwegian media reported about a whistleblower from the Royal Norwegian Air Force whose claim had not been fully concluded within almost 2 years [4, 5]. The claim concerned serious irregularities, regular breaches of rules and mobbing. According to media reports, the whistleblower’s identity was disclosed by his employer and he experienced retaliation at his workplace. He decided to take leave from work at the Royal Norwegian Air Force and find another job. His decision to quit the workplace resulted in shelving the case since Norwegian law does not clearly obligate an employer to follow up claims from former employees.

There is no legislation on whistleblowing in Oman (1), (2). There are no legal provisions protecting military or official personnel exposing corruption. Whistleblowing programs and internal bribery policies are developing within private businesses (2), (3), (4). The State General Reserve introduced an internal whistleblowing policy, but there are no other examples of whistleblowing provisions within state institutions (5). There is no information on institutional websites regarding whistleblowing (6), (7), (8). According to our resources, there is no whistleblowing within any of the MoD agencies or the armed forces. Corruption is not seen as a pressing issue (9), (10).

There is no whistleblowing within any of the MoD agencies or the armed forces. Corruption is not seen as a pressing issue that needs prioritization or much attention (1), (2). There is no evidence to suggest government encouragement of whistleblowing. As outlined above, private businesses have developed inhouse internal whistleblowing procedures without state encouragement (3). The only state apparatus to issue an internal whistleblowing policy is the State General Reserve Fund, the largest sovereign wealth fund reporting to the Ministry of Finance (4). The SGRF, received compliance training according to Muscat Daily (4). No information was found of the state encouraging defence personnel to whistleblow. There is no evidence of considerations for a future unit designed to deal with whistleblowing in the defence sector. It is also important to note here that restrictions over freedom of expression in the country could deter potential whistleblowers from disclosing information in fear of accusations of defamation.

According to sources from within the armed forces, there is little trust between personnel and senior officers. Considering the competition between different tribes within the army, trust is very low when it comes to whistleblowing (1), (2).

There is general legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption (1). This legislation does not specify, practically, procedures on claims and investigation of corruption. It is weak on both issues, investigating the cases and protections for whistleblowers (2). There is no protection of whistleblowers, including protection of identity, protection against retribution, reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation, waiver of liability for the whistleblower, no sanctions for misguided reporting, the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing (3).

Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government. There are a few measures taken to encourage and provide information for armed forces (1). A unit is designated to handle claims with a hotline to receive complaints. This unit is part of the Anti-corruption Commission, and they had a website and a hotline to receive claims and reports on corruption cases (1). Their budget is part of the commission; however, the budget of the commission itself is not available.

There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity (1). There have been some incidents where whistleblowers were denied promotions or even fired for reporting corruption (2).

The Philippines does not have national legislation to protect whistleblowers. Both the Senate [1] and the House of Representatives [2] have proposed bills on this, but they are still pending in Congress. This means that whistleblowers are reluctant to step forward without an effective law to protect them.

The executive encourages individuals to report any irregularities committed by government officials and they are offered protection under the Witness Protection Programme of the Department of Justice (DOJ) [1]. Based on reports by the Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission and the Armed Forces, the President fired 20 military officials over ghost transactions and anomalous purchases of medical equipment [2]. Details of these corrupt activities were discovered through a whistleblower and reached the President first, who then ordered an investigation [3]. However, without national legislation, guidance materials are insufficient.

Wthout the benefit of a solid whistleblowing statute, there is little trust among officials and personnel that adequate protection would be provided in the event corrupt activity is reported. During a Senate investigation of a helicopter deal, the DOJ was requested to place under its Witness Protection Programme the whistleblower, who later filed a plunder case against former Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin [1, 2]. In response, Gazmin, who was cleared by the Defence Department of any charges along with other accused officials, filed three counts of libel against the whistleblower [3, 4]. In a media statement, the whistleblower’s representative expressed disappointment towards the Senate Blue Ribbon for the slow progress of the investigation and the alleged harassment towards the whistleblower by unknown assailants [3].

There is no applicable legislation on military and official personnel that exists to facilitate corruption reporting or protection of whistleblowing. The ombudsman asked the prime minister in 2016 to address the insufficient protection of whistleblowers in the military [1]. The MoND admits that “the current system of legal protection for whistle-blowers in military services is insufficient” [2].

Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government. There are no general laws in Poland concerning the protection of whistleblowers (only sectoral ones – e.g. in banking law). There are certain incentives to report cases of corruption to law enforcement agencies, e.g. to the Central Anticorruption Bureau. However, this office only provides operational protection of the source of information and the notification can be treated as a notification of crime.
As mentioned by the ombudsman, there are very weak mechanisms for whistleblower protection in the army [1]. Corruption reporting systems inside the institution (including the defence ministry) are not enough for a whistle-blower to feel safe. In 2018, the case of a military police officer was widely commented on in the media. The officer whistleblew about numerous irregularities in the military police, which led to persecution from this institution [2].

There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity. Furthermore, in general, whistleblowing is rare in Poland. It is discouraged by fear of the employer or peer retaliation, the lack of specific protection legislation as well as an ineffective judiciary, which leads to disproportionate risks for potential whistleblowers [1].

Portugal has yet to transpose the 2019/1937 EU Directive on Whistleblower Protection into national legislation [1]. While applicable to both military and civil personnel, whistleblower protection in Portugal is very weak [2, 3]. A report by Transparency International Portugal clarifies that, in addition to lack of clarity, protection mechanisms are poorly implemented [4]. A recent case involving manslaughter in an elite Portuguese Army unit involved allegations of a whistleblowing disavowal by the then-army chief [5].

Corruption prevention plans by the Secretariat-General of the Ministry of Defence (SGMoD) [1], the Directorate-General of Defence Policy (DGPD) [2], Directorate-General of Defence Resources (DGRD) [3], National Defence Institute (NDI) [4], the Portuguese Army Branch Chief Office [5] either mention whistleblowing in passing or fail to mention whistleblowing at all. Neither the Navy nor the Airforce branches disclose corruption prevention plans. The Inspectorate-General of National Defence (IGND) [6] maps whistleblowing risks as a process but does not discuss encouragement or training. There is no external commitment to whistleblower protection by the minister of defence, the joint chief of staff or branch chiefs. The Military Criminal Investigation Police is charged with investigating claims and discloses proper channels for whistleblowers [7], but there is no evidence of training or internal campaigns.

There is no survey on perceptions of whistleblower protection in defence institutions. Given prevailing notions of whistleblowing as “ratting out” [1] alleged negligence on whistleblowers’ claims [2, 3] and disputes over jurisdiction in military justice, particularly regarding the Tancos theft case [4], in addition to a lack of proper protection [5], effectiveness is not likely to be trusted.

Whistleblowing is encouraged in Qatar through the ACTA website, hotline and through advertisements. ACTA can receive calls regarding the military, but due to their lack of authority over the armed forces, these calls must be transferred to the MoD. There is no support for whistleblowing within the armed forces. [1,2]

Whistleblowing in the defence sector is not encouraged by the Government. The information that exists in relation to the protection of whistleblowers does not directly apply to defence institutions. Corruption cases received by the ACTA must be transferred to the MoD and not investigated by ACTA itself. [1,2,3] Research identified one campaign, titled ‘Qatar deserves to be protected from corruption’, launched in 2015, through which Qatar’s public prosecution office encouraged people to report and expose corruption.[4] A fraud hotline was setup by the Qatar Foundation, which allows people to report cases of suspected fraud and corruption. [5]

There are no legal provisions for the protection of witnesses or whistleblowers from within the defence sector. [1] Another source indicated the lack of trust between officials, as many of the armed personnel are not originally Qatari or from Qatari tribes. This means that mistrust can be high amongst the lower ranks. [2]

Article 9, Clause 4 of the federal law ‘On Anti-Corruption’ protects public officials who report corruption to their employer, the Prosecutor’s Office or other state agencies [1]. Article 5 of the federal law ‘On State Protection of Judges, Law Enforcement Officers and Controlling Agencies’ [2] and Article 6 of the federal law ‘On State Protection of Complainants, Witnesses and Other Participants of the Judicial Process’ [3] provide the following forms of protection for the afore-mentioned categories of officials: personal and property protection, provision of means of personal protection, temporary safe refuge, identity protection, transfer to another job, relocation, appearance modification and documents change.

Right now, there is a comprehensive piece of legislation on whistleblower protection under development [4], though it was first introduced back in 2017 [5].

It is important to note that Article 141 of the Criminal Procedural Code ‘On Crime Incident Reports’ [6] excludes the option of anonymously reporting crimes, while Article 306 of the Criminal Code ‘On Perjury’ [7] and Article 128.1 ‘On Defamation’ [8] stipulate that false testimony is punishable by imprisonment and fines. Experts claim that these provisions enable the use of criminal investigations as a tool to discredit and pressure corruption whistleblowers [9].

Within the MoD, there are not any training or information campaigns to encourage whistleblowing. The Ministry’s anti-corruption guidance materials and events focus on reviewing rather than submitting corruption reports [1,2,3]. The unit that handles corruption claims reports to the Minister of Defence [2]. A regular progress report on anti-corruption activities specifies the number of criminal procedures related to corruption crimes [4]. However, there are no publicly available statistics about whistleblowers’ claims [4].

While there is no information about trust regarding adequate protection for whistleblowers within the MoD, we can assume it is similar to the national attitude. The research by RANEPA recorded that a growing number of people consider helping the government in anti-corruption activities to be dangerous for themselves or their family [1].

Nazaha, Saudi Arabia’s main anti-corruption body, has produced regulations which in theory protect whistleblowers (1). However, these laws have in the past been characterized as providing insufficient protection to public and private employees making disclosures of illegality (2). In May 2018, King Salman ordered new protections for employees who report financial and administrative corruption as part of a wider anti-corruption push spearheaded by his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (3). No further details were provided relating to the nature of these protections. Furthermore, neither these nor the previous laws make specific reference to protections for military personnel. According to our sources, the current laws encourage military personnel to report corruption cases, and between 2017 and 2018, leaflets were distributed more than once to many units encouraging military personnel to report corruption. Despite mentioning the protection of identity, there is no more information provided in any sources (4), (5).

As above mentioned, Saudi authorities have, since at least November 2017, prioritized cracking down on corruption, although their methods have been criticized for lacking due process and impartiality. The government has started to actively encourage whistleblowing on administrative and financial corruption in the public and private sectors, including introducing new regulations to protect whistleblowers (1). In its inaugural session for the year in September 2018, the Shura Council discussed a new proposal for the protection of whistleblowers (2), (3). The Council approved the draft law the following month (4). In late February 2019, Saudi press sources reported that Nazaha would soon bring the law into effect. The law reportedly has 39 articles to combat crimes by “encouraging and facilitating information sharing and providing protection to informants, witnesses, experts, and victims from any attacks or threats, material or moral harm, or anything that may adversely affect the delivery of such information” (5).

There is no specialized unit to handle whistleblowing claims. However, Nazaha operates a whistleblowing hotline, which stated received at least 100 reports per day. Nazaha also reportedly provides guidance on how to submit a whistleblowing report, as well as bonuses for citizens reporting corruption (6), (7). It has also reportedly organized anti-corruption training courses and workshops, though little information exists regarding the substance of these courses and whether they explicitly address whistleblowing (8). In November 2016, the Austria-based International Anti-Corruption Academy provided a tailor-made anti-corruption training course to Nazaha employees, the themes of which included whistleblower protection (9). According to our sources, there has not been any kind of training on corruption issues within the military, only leaflets encouraging whistleblowing were distributed to different units, mainly financial and administrative units (10), (11).

There are a number of factors to consider with regards to whistleblowing. According to our sources, there is a high level of distrust between military personnel and their officers. Furthermore, in the pulic sector, there is often a high level of distrust between civil personnel and employees (particularly when they are migrant workers) and their managers (who are usually Saudi nationals), and therefore informing about corruption cases is tricky, and personnel of lower rank refrain from complaints about corruption fearing reprisals (1), (2). According to published material on the Nazaha website, whistleblowers can request that their data and identity remain anonymous when submitting a report (3). Recent policies from the Saudi government attempting to protect whistleblowers may have encouraged the practice more widely, despite a strong whistleblowing culture in both the private and public sectors in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, given the fact that there is very little information published relating to whistleblowing cases, it is not possible to ascertain how effective these protections are. The abovementioned royal order announced by King Salman in May 2018 directing authorities to provide more protection to whistleblowers reportedly followed reports that some individuals were mistreated after submitting corruption complaints (4). Likely, public officials do not feel entirely safe submitting whistleblowing reports highlighting corrupt activity, given that the abovementioned legislation was adopted relatively recently, and there is limited public awareness regarding legal protections for whistleblowers. However, recent actions taken by the Saudi authorities to encourage whistleblowing may have improved the general feeling of trust in the government’s apparent prioritization of these issues among members of the public. The local daily Saudi Gazette reported that in 2018, Nazaha received 15,591 whistleblower complaints, up from 10,402 in 2017. 74.3% of these reportedly related to financial and administrative corruption, while 28.9% of the complaints related to abuse of power (5). Neither Nazaha nor the Gazette and other local press sources specifies whether any of these complaints relate to the military and defence sectors. Given the information provided to TI DS by the interviewees, it seems unlikely that these high numbers of complaints correspond to the military.

The Law on Whistleblowers Protection was adopted by the National Assembly in December 2014 and came into force in June 2015 [1]. The law states that each institution should further regulate whistleblowing within its ranks with a bylaw, in December 2015, the MoD has adopted a Rulebook on whistleblowing procedure in MoD and SAF [2]. In accordance with the Rulebook, the MoD has designated a person authorised to receive information and conduct the whistleblowing procedure [3].
The Law on Whistleblowers protection is generally comprehensive and covers all the elements necessary for effective whistleblowers protection; however, it requires further clarifications and improvements in certain areas. The law contains provisions on the protection of personal data of whistleblowers (Art. 10), on the prohibition of retaliation by putting them in an unfavourable position (Art. 21).
For instance, an insufficiently clearly defined area, relevant for security and defence sector is the disclosure of classified data through a whistleblowing procedure. In that way, even though they might point at cases of misuse or unlawful acts masked by confidentiality, whistleblowers expose themselves to criminal liability by disclosing classified information. Hence, the protection of whistleblowers in these cases should be further enhanced and harmonized with the Law on Data Secrecy [4].

Encouragement of whistleblowing in the MoD and SAF is the legal obligation of the employer; they have to post the bylaw on a visible place and make it available to all employees [1]. The role of processing claims and conducting whistleblowing procedures belongs to one employee, appointed by the minister of defence [2].

Since November 2017, the authorized person has received nine claims and conducted six procedures. According to its response to the BCSP questionnaire, the MoD does not have systematized data on whistleblowing or the obligation of transferring information to successors; it failed to provide information on claims and procedures prior the appointment of the latest person in November 2017 [1].

There is no universal whistle-blower protection legislation in Singapore, although whistle-blowers of certain offences are protected under specific legislation [1, 2]. For example, Section 36 of the Prevention of Corruption Act ensures that the identity of a complainant as to a corruption offence will not be disclosed even during court proceedings, subject to exceptions such as a wilfully false statement [3].
At ministerial level, General Orders of MINDEF (GOM) 402-02-09 “Avenues For Servicemen Seeking Redress And Providing Confidential Disclosures” sets out the framework for servicemen to (a) seek redress for genuine problems and grievances; and (b) provide confidential disclosures when they observe wrongful practices in MINDEF/SAF that may have serious impact on the organisation and/or the public. [4].

There is an explicit assurance by the -MINDEF that personnel are assured of confidentiality when they raise concerns on serious issues, and that the SAF does not allow punishment of servicemen who do so [1]. Multiple channels of feedback exist, including the MINDEF Feedback Unit, safety hotlines, emails and websites, and through counsellors [2]. In 2019, the SAF set up the Inspector-General Office (IGO) to ensure that its open reporting system remains effective, although this appears to be focussed on training safety and not corruption [3]. The defence minister has publicly stated that anonymous reporting of serious concerns is encouraged [4].

There is no known open source survey on whistle-blowing confidence on the Singapore defence community, and the assessor was unable to secure interviews with SAF or civilian defence personnel on this matter.
There is still an existing public concern that protective measures may not be adequate and anonymous channels provide the best protection. [1, 3]
However, the government has gone on the record declaring that there will be no reprisals against whistle-blowers, which may be encouraging. [2]

Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists and applies to military and official personnel. Whistleblowers are protected by the following pieces of legislation:

The Constitution (specifically section 9.1 “everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”; section 16.1 (b) “everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom to receive or impart information or ideas”; section 23.1 “everyone has the right to fair labour practices” [1].

The Protected Disclosures Act of 2000 or ‘Whistleblowing Act’, which applies to both the public and private sectors and protects against occupational detriment in their work environment; applies whether or not the information is confidential, and extends to malpractice occurring overseas [2]. There are no details as to the protections provided. However, the Department of Defence maintains a ‘whistleblowing hotline’ and ‘click-and-blow’ intranet facility, to make confidential disclosures, as part of the Fraud Prevention Strategy [6].

Other relevant legislation includes: the Labour Relations Act of 1995, specifically sections 186 (2)(d) and 187(1)(h), which refer to unfair labour practice and unfair dismissal [3]; the Companies Act of 2008, specifically section 59 which protects against any civil, criminal or administrative liability for a disclosure made in terms of the Companies Act [4]; and the Protection Against Harassment Act of 2011 [5].

The Department of Defence (DoD) reported that the “DOD Whistleblowing Hotline continued to be provided and maintained during the FY2017/18 as part of the Fraud Prevention Strategy” [1]. That Fraud Prevention Strategy is publically promoted.

According to Interviewee 5, a senior officer in the South African National Defence Force, awareness campaigns for the whistleblowing hotline are sporadic and not comprehensive. There is also a perception that the process is not entirely anonymous and that whistleblowers might receive reprisals, discouraging reporting. Whistleblowing-related training may also be a part of ‘Corruption and Fraud Awareness and Prevention Training’ interventions held by the DoD [2]. A toll-free Whistleblowing Hotline and a Click-and-Blow intranet facility is available for DOD members to make confidential disclosures regarding alleged corruption and fraud. Whistleblowing reports received are evaluated by a committee, after which relevant action is taken.

The Department of Defence (DoD) reported that the “DOD Whistleblowing Hotline continued to be provided and maintained during the FY2017/18 as part of the Fraud Prevention Strategy” [1]. That Fraud Prevention Strategy is publically promoted.

According to Interviewee 5, a senior officer in the South African National Defence Force, awareness campaigns for the whistleblowing hotline are sporadic and not comprehensive. There is also a perception that the process is not entirely anonymous and that whistleblowers might receive reprisals, discouraging reporting. Whistleblowing-related training may also be a part of ‘Corruption and Fraud Awareness and Prevention Training’ interventions held by the DoD [2]. The Public Service Commission (PSC), also oversees several anti-corruption hotlines [3].

According to Interviewee 5, a senior officer in the South African National Defence Force, there is widespread distrust of the whistleblowing mechanisms to protect reporters and ensure they remain anonymous and face no reprisals [1]. There is evidence to suggest that implemented whistleblowing mechanisms (hotline and online submissions) are functional and being used: The DoD recorded 43 whistleblowing reports for investigation in FY2017/18, of which Directorate Anti-Corruption and Anti-Fraud completed 27 investigations. Eight investigations were subsequently handed over to the Military Police Division, three were referred to the Defence Legal Services Division, three were referred to Services/Divisions, and 13 were closed, due to no corruption/fraud detected [2].

Whistleblowing is legally protected in South Korea. There are two different legislations supporting whistle-blowers who contribute to the public interest. Articles 12 and 14 of the Protection of Public Interest Reporters Act contain the legal rights of whistle-blowers, including protection of identity, protection against retribution and reduction or exemption of liability. [1] The Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission includes the protection of confidential information for whistle-blowers and prohibition of discrimination in the workplace because of whistleblowing. [2] [3]
In recent years, there has been an attempt to enhance whistle-blower protection. Amended legislation that allows whistle-blowers to report anonymously through lawyers was implemented in October 2018. Under Article 8.2 of the Protection of Public Interest Reporters Act, the personal information of whistle-blowers is not disclosed when they report. [1]

Although whistleblowing is encouraged by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) with clear guidance, internal campaigns are not consistent. The Clean Portal, a website run by the ACRC, provides guidance on reporting corruption issues and protection for whistle-blowers. [1] However, it is difficult to find consistent campaigns to encourage whistleblowing, aimed at the military and defence sector. As the main role of the ACRC, an independent governmental organisation handling claims filed by citizens, it is well-resourced and managed independently. [2]

The effectiveness of legislation protecting whistle-blowers is highly questionable. During an interview, a defence academic said that those who report corruption issues are likely to be regarded as traitors within the military, rather than public interest reporters, due to the military culture. As the military follows top-down leadership and strong hierarchy, a whistle-blower may be seen as a person who has disobeyed orders or without discipline. [1] There is evidence showing the failure of adequate protections for whistle-blowers in practice. In 2018, a former lieutenant commander in the Navy who revealed corruption in procurement in the Navy through media interviews pointed out that the state has failed to provide comprehensive protections for whistle-blowers, and they have been exposed to a fear of retribution from the military. [2]

There is no whistle-blower protection legislation in South Sudan nor any legislation that enables the reporting of corrupt actions in the military. On South Sudanese social media platforms, there is are constant leaks of documents that purport to show malfeasance in government offices. Lack of protection for whistleblowers combined with lack of trust in the government’s ability to investigate or take action motivates these leakages.

There is no whistle-blower protection legislation in South Sudan. Therefore, there is no prioritisation on training as mentioned in this indicator.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’ because there is no legal framework regulating whistleblowing, nor any protections for whistleblowers in South Sudan. As such, effectiveness cannot be assessed.

As analysed by Transparency International [1], Spanish legislation includes the generic obligation to report criminal acts, but there is no legal regulation of national scope (only initiatives in certain autonomous communities) that offers adequate protection to workers and officials who, having had knowledge of a case of corruption or fraud, decide to report it. The Spanish legal system does not contemplate ‘stricto sensu’ the figure of the whistleblower, although others such as the figure of the “repentant” in criminal law are included. However, this figure of the repentant, unlike in the case of the whistleblower, supposes active or passive participation in the crime [1, 2, 3, 4]. The lack of protection for whistleblowers has been identified as a “problem” in the Spanish legislation, both military and civil [2].

Instruction 23/2020 of the Secretary of Defence, on the Ethical Code and Code of Conduct of Personnel Related to Purchasing, states in Section 5.3.b.1 that any professional “who observes a situation or conduct contrary to this instruction, must inform his/her hierarchical authority and the competent contracting body through the communication channel,” and later states that “under no circumstances will retaliation be taken or tolerated against those who have communicated a breach of the code of ethics and conduct, or have participated in any investigation procedure related to its compliance,” with no further on measures or sanctions regarding this protection [5].

However, the entire legal landscape on whistleblowing is said to have radically changed since Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 23 October 2019, on the protection of whistleblowers, entered into force on 17 December 2019 [6, 7]. While at the time of writing no new law has been approved so far on whistleblowing aiming at meeting the obligation from the EU, the existence of this directive represents a significant improvement, and entails certain obligations, requiring the Spanish government to adopt new legislation by 2021 [8].

Organic Law 8/2014, the reference document on discipline, qualifies in Art. 7.30 as a “grave offence” “to carry out, order or tolerate or not denounce acts that, in any way, violate privacy, personal dignity or at work or involve discrimination based on birth, racial or ethnic origin, gender or sex, sexual orientation and identity, religion, convictions, opinion, disability or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.“ But this is the only place where denouncing is referred to and cases of corruption are not mentioned [1].

Due to the visibility of a number of cases of political corruption in Spain where whistleblowers were not sufficiently protected and, in particular, due to the recent EU directive on whistleblowing, higher protection of whistleblowing will be contemplated in Spain by 2021 [2, 3]. Whilst there is no similar legal regulation expected in the Defence sector, a general law in Spain would apply to all public workers, including the military [2]. In fact, the Spanish Congress has begun work to pass a law to protect whistleblowers [4].

Spain has an Office of the Prosecutor against Corruption and Organised Crime. This office “investigates and is aware of processes of special importance, related to economic crimes or other crimes committed by public officials in the exercise of their positions related to the phenomenon of corruption.” [5]

There is the perception within the armed forces that obedience also includes silence in the face of corruption practices exercised by people at a higher level in the military ranks. There is very little trust among personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity [1, 2].

Citing sources that themselves ultimately reference Sudan’s criminal code, GAN Integrity reported in 2016 that whistleblowers in Sudan are protected when reporting corruption [1]. Having reviewed the law, protections for whistleblowers are not clearly spelled out as such. In any case, it is not clear that such protections apply to military and civilian defence personnel. Furthermore, the same Criminal Act (unofficial English translation, in PDF format) also criminalises the obtaining and disclosure of information and official documents relating to ‘secret matters’ and ‘military information’, and specifically mentions that public servants can be imprisoned [2]; since defence and security information in Sudan is highly secretive, it stands to reason that would-be whistleblowers in the defence sector are both explicitly protected and threatened by the same law. The law cites many additional crimes that can be used against a whistleblower based on, for example, what someone could construe to be the whistlieblower’s intent or the by-products of his/her disclosure.

Since the transitional government has yet to appoint a transitional legislature, no new legislation has been adopted to facilitate corruption reporting or protect whistleblowers. Nor is it clear that the transitional government’s executive officials would respect any such pre-existing legislation with regard to its relevance to defence and security activities. In a 2017 report for Transparency International, Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka notes that an ombudsman-like office called the Public Grievances Chamber of Sudan was established to accept complaints about government institutions, but there is little information available on the funding and structure of the Chamber. He writes that ‘older reports by Global Integrity and other sources, however, point out that the ombudsman office was poorly staffed and underfunded and that its reports were often outdated or unavailable to the public’ [3]. Global Integrity noted: ‘There is no independent body mandated to receive and investigate cases of alleged public sector corruption’ [4].

In a report on the Bashir regime, Global Integrity stated: ‘There is no independent body mandated to receive and investigate cases of alleged public sector corruption’ [1]. A review of the websites of the Ministries of Defence, Interior and Finance did not yield any guidance or information about how a whistleblower in the military forces or the Ministries of Defence or Interior might report evidence of corruption [2,3,4]. There is also no reference made on these websites or on any internet-based media to training or information campaigns to encourage whistleblowing, nor is there any mention of a unit intended to handle whistleblowers’ claims. The transitional government’s appointment of an Empowerment Removal and Anti-Corruption Committee to investigate crimes by former regime officials should not be interpreted as an invitation for whistleblowers in the military forces or the Ministries of Defence and Interior to come forward with claims against anyone who remains in power in these entities. During an interview, an expert on Sudan’s defence sector asserted that military figures from the former regime, while involved in the highly publicised investigation and purge of Islamic Brotherhood, NCP and Bashir loyalists and the confiscation of their looted assets, are not interested in allowing investigations of themselves or their forces’ activities [5]. A report published by the European Council on Foreign Relations summarises: ‘The civilian wing of the Sudanese state is bankrupt but unwilling to confront powerful generals, who control a sprawling network of companies and keep the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance on life support to gain political power’ [6].

Given the complicity of the military’s leadership in corruption, internal reports of corruption would only be tolerated (or possibly even be considered ‘corruption’ by those involved) if the corruption was occurring outside of the normal kreptocratic and patronage channels, without the leadership’s active or passive direction or knowledge [1,2] – in other words, if the corruption were extraordinary compared to the everyday corruption that defines normal operations in the defence sector. Corruption is what makes the system work and disrupting the system would draw enemies and likely retaliation. Additionally, Global Integrity’s 2019 Global Integrity Index for Sudan indicated a score of zero against the statement ‘In practice, the mechanism for citizens to report police misconduct or abuse of force is effective’ [3].

In 2016, a whistleblowing law was drafted for protecting employees (regardess of employment form) from reprisals and retaliations if they report serious misconduct [1] [2]. Swedish laws allow citizens to report wrongdoing, as civil servants are free to anonymously report to the media, and the government is not mandated to attempt to learn their identity. However, the new whistleblower law has been criticised for not protecting Swedish whistleblowers properly and for being unclear about the employees’ rights, since it forces them to first try to voice their criticism from within [3]. In 2019, the Swedish whistleblowing law was supplemented by a new EU regulation in the same area [4]. This EU regulation has too been criticised for potentially further watering down whistleblower rights [5].

Beyond the the 2017 whistleblowing law, this practice is weakly encouraged in the defence sector. As noted in the 2015 iteration of the GDI [1], the Defence Materiel Administration Agency (FMV) had introduced a whistleblowing policy and certain reporting mechanisms handled by a third party, but this function now appears to be gone. A 2016 report by the The Swedish Agency for Public Management [2] states that only 15% of the surveyed government agencies had implemented whistleblowing functions at the time. The Swedish Agency for Public Management concludes in the same report that it does not recommend the government to impose a nationwide whistleblowing function in all agencies, but that this should voluntary for each agency to consider.

Although formally covered by both the new Swedish law and EU regulation [1] [2], Swedish civil servants are afraid of reprisals and wary of blowing the whistle, not least since the law forces them to first try to voice their criticism from within the organisation, and since it is unclearly formulated concerning employees’ rights [3] [4].

There is a lack of whistleblowing legislation in Switzerland as far as the private sector is concerned. There is no specific whistleblowing law [1]. Several attempts to create such a law for the private sector failed over the last twelve years, with the most recent attempt failing in March 2020 [2]. This is also one of the main criticism of the 2018 OECD review [3]. Currently, the Federal Office for Justice (FOJ) has information on the ongoing process to remedy this situation on its website. The process began in 2008 [4]. However, Article 22a of the Federal Personnel Act (BPG) which applies to all federal employees, including the DDPS, creates an obligation for employees to report any illegal activity to their superiors, the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) or the criminal prosecutor (Article 22a 1 BPG). They have an obligation to report and can report irregularities to the SFAO directly (Article 22a 4 BPG). If they do so in good faith or if they are witnesses for such an investigation, there must not be any negative consequences for their work situation (Article 22a 5 BPG) [5]. Reports can be submitted anonymously and encrypted through a special external SFAO platform. Submission can be made on the basis of suspicion only, and evidence is not required [6]. Following the 2018 expenses scandal at the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS), the ministry moved the unit where whistleblower complaints had to be deposited from inside the ministry to the SFAO [7, 8]. A 2018 brochure on compliance for employees of the DDPS has a section on whistleblowing, reaffirms the obligation to report and encourages employees to do so [9].

Article 22a of the BPG creates an obligation for employees to report any illegal activity to their superiors, the Swiss Federal Audit Office or the criminal prosecutor (Article 22a 1 BPG). If they do so in good faith or if they are witnesses to such an investigation, there must not be any negative consequences for their work situation (Article 22a 5 BPG) [1]. A 2018 brochure on compliance for employees of the DDPS has a section on whistleblowing, reaffirms the obligation to report and encourages employees to do so [2]. The website of the Federal Office of Police (Fedpol) on corruption points to the different options for whistleblowers within the federal administration as well as for cantonal administrations. It suggests (and provides links to that purpose) to potential whistleblowers to use the whistleblowing online platform created for such cases, to deposit a criminal complaint with the Criminal complaints Office of the Attorney General or to contact Fedpol [3]. The secured, external platform for whistleblowing is easily accessible and maintained and run in four languages by the SFAO. It can be found via a regular search engine [4]. Article 1.1 of the Federal Audit Act states that the SFAO is “bound only by the Federal Constitution and the law” and Article 1.2 that it is “independent and autonomous.” The director of the SFAO is elected by the Federal Council for six years and has to be confirmed by the Federal Assembly (Article 2.2). The person holding the position can only be removed before the end of the term for “serious breach of his or her official duties” and this needs to be done in consultation with the parliaments Financial Committee (Article 2.2). The SFAO director has full autonomy on staffing (Article 2.1) [5]. Its budget is “advised by the parliament without the Federal Council getting involved” [6]. Technically the SFAO has to submit the budget to the government which is required by law to pass it on to parliament unaltered (Article 2 Federal Audit Act) [5].

The obligation to report has been in effect since 1 January 2011. Since then the SFAO has seen a steady increase in complaints. Over three years, between 2014 and 2016, only 15 complaints were filed. In 2017 there were 59 and in 2018 125. In 2018 46% of the reports were from federal employees (however, the submissions can be made anonymously, which was the case for 76% that year) [1]. The DDPS followed recommendations from two reports in the wake of the expenses scandal moved the unit where whistleblower complaints had to be deposited from inside the ministry to the SFAO [2, 3, 4, 5]. However, it is currently too early to assess the effectiveness of that measure.

The general protection mechanisms for whistle-blowers in Taiwan are yet to be devised and are currently being developed [1, 2, 3]. As suggested by the Minister of Justice, Tai-san Chiu (邱太三), the government should offer personal protection for whistle-blowers who are brave enough to come forward and reveal potential breaches of law [4].
However, legal provisions for encouraging and protecting whistleblowing are promulgated in various statutes and regulations, such as the “Anti-Corruption Act” (Article 18), “Anti-Corruption Information Rewards and Protection Regulation” (Article 12), “Witness Protection Act”. The “Direction of the MND and Subsidiary Dealing with Complaint”, and the “Regulation of Military Discipline Protection” form the internal legal framework on whistleblowing and reporting corruption for military and civilian personnel.
The acts and regulations protect witnesses and whistleblower’s life, body, freedom, property, and identification information. The “Regulation of Military Discipline Protection” protects military personnel who file a complaint from revenge. Each case shall be tracked for a year to ensure that whistle-blowers are not blamed or punished. Complaint processing is well regulated. [5,6,7,8,9,10,11]

Whistleblowing is encouraged through various platforms and events, including “Reporting Meeting of Ethics” [1], military integrity notification [2], internal hotlines (The MND 1985 Service Line and Force Commands 0800 Service Line) [3,4], educational training materials (as “Report Wrongdoing 1, 2, 3, and Punish Corruption Easily) [5], online [6] and integrity education [7]. [8,9]

The MND uses a slogan “Report Wrongdoing 1, 2, 3, and Punish Corruption Easily (檢舉熟記123，懲治貪污很簡單)” to promote the process of reporting corruption (1 is using real name, 2 is reporting to investigative or ethics agencies (Complaints Line: 02-8509-9555), and 3 is applying reward of accusation). [5] The protection of whistle-blowers is stated clearly on the military integrity notification (NO. 108001).[2]

The MND 1985 Service Line and Force Commands 0800 Service Line provide complaint procedures for military personnel and civilians. The protection of whistle-blowers is clearly regulated. The Complaint Lines are published [4].

Taking the case of the COVID-19 outbreak in Taiwan’s Navy Friendship Flotilla, as an example, something that is rarely seen in Taiwan’s Military, the Minister of National Defence, Teh-fa Yen, has promised to establish the “Whistleblower Scheme” as a protection mechanism for whistle-blowers [1, 2].

According to the “Military Personnel Assessing Anticorruption Progress in the Ministry of National Defense” in 2015, there were 56.5% of interviewees (military personnel) who thought the protection of whistleblowers was well regulated. 74.8% of interviewees answered that they will report corruption. In 2019, there were 68.1% of interviewees who agreed the protection of whistleblowers was well regulated and 84.8 % of interviewees expressed that they will report corruption. This may suggest an increasing proportion of military personnel haveconfidence that adequate protections are provided. [3]

However, no other cases of whistleblowing have been identified in Taiwan’s defence sector. Legislators are still questioning whether or not the “Whistleblower Scheme” will be able to provide effective protection to whistleblowers once it is implemented, since cases will be heavily dependent on individual prosecutors [4,5].

The Whisteblower and Witness Protection Act 2015 provides for protection of identity, and protection against retribution. There is no mention of a reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation, or waiver of liability for the whistleblower. If reports are made in good faith, there is protection against sanctions. [1]

There is not enough information to score this indicator. There is no evidence of internal whistleblowing campaigns in the defence sector being in place or not, though public campaigns against corruption are widespread.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Without broad access to a cross section of defence personnel, it is not possible to answer this.

The Regulations of the Ministry of Defence on the Investigations of the Office of the Inspector General B.E. 2552 (2009) state that the documents related to whistleblowing must be confidential and retained, especially the information related to the whistleblowers as the safety of the whistleblowers is the priority [1]. Nonetheless, according to the Military Disciplinary Act 1933, Section 23, military officers are not allowed to report cases of others, report cases with other military officers, start a petition or even hold a meeting to discuss whistleblowing [2]. After the infamous mass shooting in Korat, the opposition parties criticised the Act for its outdated and ineffective whistleblowing procedures in the military, which benefit high-ranking officers and threaten the human rights of the military officials who are often subject to improper disciplinary punishment [3]. But there is still no specific legislation applicable to military and official personnel in place to facilitate the reporting of corruption or the protection of whistleblowers; there is no legislation similar to the Military Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988 in the US, which allows military officers to file appeals directly to Members of Congress and Inspectors General, due to the current dispute over the 1933 Military Discipline Act in Thailand [4].

Since the adoption of the Military Disciplinary Act in 1933, there have been problems with the lack of appeal-making policies and procedures, which enables frequent improper disciplinary punishment and prevents whistleblowers from reporting the misconduct of higher-ranking officials [1]. According to the Military Disciplinary Act 1933, Section 23, military officers are not allowed to report cases of others, report cases with other military officers, start a petition or even hold a meeting to discuss whistleblowing; this Act is still in effect [2]. In 2014, the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters issued the ‘Guidelines for Whistleblowing’ and established the whistleblowing management centre within the one-stop service system of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters. These guidelines also emphasise the importance of confidentiality and safety of the whistleblowers [3]. Despite the improvements in the whistleblowing process and the after-effects of the Korat mass shooting, which led to General Apirat’s promise to open the direct whistleblowing channel, the case of a Thai army whistleblower facing court martial in 2020 once again sparked public concern about the military’s ineffective whistleblowing process [4,5].

Although the Commander-in-Chief ordered the establishment of a direct hotline to him as a part of the new whistleblowing policy, many interviewed military officials have expressed their distrust in the system, since it requires the disclosure of their names, titles and functions. Many did not believe that the army could keep their personal information confidential or were able to send their complaints directly to Commander-in-Chief [1].

Moreover, the case of a Thai military chief, Narongchai Intarakavee, shows that the whistleblowing process is ineffective. After he made a complaint about corruption within the military, he was mistreated and faced a disciplinary inquiry for allegedly undermining unity within the army and damaging his unit’s reputation. He also made a complaint through the recently established hotline, but the complaint was sent back again for internal investigation within the unit [2]. Many military officials revealed that after they had made complaints, they were denounced, forced to quit the army or mistreated [3]. Another example is the case of Pol Maj Gen Paween Pongsirin, a senior investigator into the trafficking of Rohingya Muslims, which was considered to be Thailand’s largest human trafficking case; before being granted asylum in Australia, Paween was subject to death threats and intimidation after exposing the crimes of senior military, police and government officials, such as former army adviser Lieutenant General Manas Kongpan [4].

Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists and applies to military and official personnel. The organic law n°10-2017, dated 7 march 2017, related to the denunciation of corruption and protection of whistleblowers, refers explicitly to the to protection of whistleblowers (1). This law grants the whistleblowers the right of protection of identity (2) and provides criminal sentences for those who disclose the whistleblower’s identity (3). This law provides for protection against retribution (personal protection, administrative protection, legal and psychological support, etc.) (4) The whistleblower enjoys protection from any form of retaliation, discrimination, intimidation or repression. He shall also be protected from any criminal, civil, or administrative measures, or any other measure that could damage him on the occasion of, or in connection with, the denunciation (5). The whistleblower is not required to prove the information he reports. (6) Only whistleblowers who deliberately submit a denunciation to unlawfully harm others are excluded from protection (7).

According to our sources, there are huge efforts by many institutions to encourage whistleblowers, central units, and NGOs, but there is little training and sporadic campaigns to encourage it (1,2). Whistleblowing is encouraged by the Anti-corruption Authority through several measures: organisation of training, workshops and information campaigns, (3) and a toll-free hotline has been set up to receive denunciations (4). According to article 7 of the law protecting whistleblowers, each public structure shall determine the appropriate administrative structure within it, to receive and investigate reports of corruption referred to it by the Anti-corruption Authority, hereafter referred to as the “appropriate administrative structure”. According to the Anti-corruption Authority 2017 report, the Ministry of Defence complied with this obligation (5). However, no evidence of direct communication about whistleblowing by the Ministry of Defence could be found.

The 2017’s INLUCC report shows that the Anti-corruption Authority received 22 denunciations of corruption related to the Ministry of Defence (1). This shows that people are willing to denounce corruption that occurs in the defence sector. However, the publication of the application decrees of the law protecting whistleblowers could leave doubt in the efficacy of the protection that would be given to officials. According to our sources, employees still have fears about reporting corruption practices. Besides that, there are many who feel that they would not be well enough protected in cases of reporting corruption against senior officers or commanders. Despite that, there has been a huge change in the last few years (2,3,4).

Whistleblowing is certainly very helpful in ensuring transparency. However,Interviewee 3 and 5 suggested that both the Turkish military and Ministry of Defence and the civilian procurement institution SSB lack any kind of whistleblowing mechanism. [1] [2] A review of laws and legislation could not any legislative framework regulating the practice of whistleblowing.

Interviewees 3, 5 and 6 unanimously suggested that whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government in the military and the Ministry of Defence [1,2,3]. Interviewee 6 suggested that there is very strong ‘esprit de corps’ in the Turkish military, meaning that even openly reporting or whistleblowing a criminal act or potential criminal act related to corruption or integrity issues is not welcomed by the institutional culture. The prevailing sentiment is that it is like ‘selling your brother out’ [3] and it is therefore highly risky for the whistleblower’s professional career. He emphasised that the culture of seeing whistleblowers as ‘traitors and ill-intentioned personnel killing team spirit’ within the military may easily make the whistleblower a target [3]. He said that ‘only professional military education can kill this cultural defect within the military’ [3].

Interviewee 5, agreeing with the comments made by Interviewee 6, suggested that, due to the strategic culture and established informal norms within the Turkish military, it is almost impossible to establish mechanisms which would either make whistleblowing easier or protect the whistleblower in both legal and administrative terms within the military [1]. Equating whistleblowing to ‘selling your comrade out’ in cultural terms, an issue that is spoiling morale and motivation within the military, is the primary factor preventing the creation of effective whistleblowing mechanisms [1]. It should also be noted that whistleblowing is often criminalised when it comes to the defence/security sector. This is demonstrated by the case of Reyhanlı and the trucks of MİT, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization [2,3].

There is a legislation called The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2010 . This law was meant to protect whistleblowers who report corrupt officials and their deals. The law provides for the procedures by which individuals in both the private and public sector may in the public interest disclose information that relates to corruption. The act provides for some of the protections outlined in the rubric: protection from victimisation, protection against court action, state protection, application to court for assistance, and void employment contracts[1]. In 2016, the Inspector General of Government (IGG) opened up investigations into a scam in which government lost more than Shs2 billion through the maintenance of a suspected ghost Russian pilot on its payroll over a period of 11 years. The spokesperson of the Inspectorate of Government, Ms Ali Munira, told Daily Monitor[2] that the investigation was precipitated by a complaint lodged by one Aron Bakunda, a private citizen. While this law is in place, its implementaion is very weak and no serious actions have taken to deal with the corrupt officials.

In theory, the government is committed in fighting corruption. The government set up the Inspectorate of Government which is an independent institution charged with the responsibility of eliminating corruption, abuse of authority and of public office. The powers as enshrined in the Constitution and IG Act include to; investigate or cause investigation, arrest or cause arrest, prosecute or cause prosecution, make orders and give directions during investigations; access and search – enter and inspect premises or property or search a person or bank account or safe deposit box among others. On its website[1], there is a provision on “Report corruption” in which IGG asserts that any information supplied in regards to corruption in any minsitry including defence would be treated with confidentiality. The IGG Office shall not disclose the identities of any individuals who report cases to this office. But in reality, the IGG has been weakned by patronage and selective punishment rendering it ineffective.

The Whistle Blowers Protection Act is meant to protect whistleblowers. It also provides the procedures by which individuals in both the private and public sector may in the public interest disclose information that relates to irregular, illegal or corrupt practices; to provide for the protection against victimisation of persons who make disclosures, and to provide for related matters. However, the same act says that “a person who makes an anonymous disclosure shall not be entitled to the protection conferred under this Act” [1]. This sounds contradictory. In the past, many whistleblowers have been arrested or lost their jobs [2, 3].

The Law On Prevention of Corruption provides the legal framework for whistleblowing which is also applicable to the defence and security personnel [1]. The law provides protection of identity for whistleblowers and protection against retribution, it reverses the burden of proof regarding retaliation [2, 3], provides a waiver of liability for the whistleblower [4], no sanctions for misguided reporting, and the right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing [5]. The MoD Draft Anti-corruption program for 2018-2020 also includes the organization of processing of reports on corruption and assistance to whistleblowers [6].

The MoD Anticorruption Program for 2015-2017 as well as the Draft Anticorruption Program for 2017-2020 set a task to create conditions for whistleblowing, develop briefing notes on whistleblowers protection as well as to provide them to the heads of all departments [1]. In parallel, there is no evidence for whistleblowing being encouraged by the MoD in the form of subject matter training or information campaigns at all. There are several hotlines in the MoD on various subjects. the different lines focus on issues of abuse by officials (theft, illegal obtaining, writing off or purchasing property, payments to servicemen, and remuneration to ATO participants, etc.) [3].

The Law On Prevention of Corruption, which sets the legal framework for whistleblowing [1], was only developed and adopted in 2014. Not much time has passed since then and one cannot say yet whether there is an established practice of whistleblowing in place in Ukraine. There is a lack of information about whistleblowers in the MoD and only a few widely known cases in Ukraine in general [2, 4]. The Law On Prevention of Corruption provides guarantees for whistleblowers. However these mechanisms have not been yet fully established and practised, proper training of officials has not been carried out to the appropriate extent. It is, therefore, possible that whistleblowers will not be able to obtain the guaranteed protection. Instead, to restore violated rights and receive the compensation they have to go to court [3, 4].
The highest level of whistleblowing was between 2014 and 2016 when men from six waves of mobilization served the country. They were the most intolerant to corruption and whistleblew often. Now the percentage of whistleblowing cases for corruption investigation has fallen to around 5% of cases in the MoD, according to an anonymous source.

In the UAE, there is a clear and enforced legal provision for the protection of whistleblowers at the federal level in the country. The general law applies to the military too. For example, Dubai Law 4/2016 on Financial Crimes has some provisions for the protection of whistleblowers concerning certain financial crimes, which is the same law applied in almost all the Emirates (1). At the federal level, the SAI runs a reporting portal through which people can anonymously report fraud or corruption; however, whether these complaints are followed through is questionable (2), (3).

Whistleblowing is encouraged in public and inside units. There are many placards inside the units and offices that encourage personnel to report any corruption and misbehaviour within the units. Although guidance materials and posters are available, training and internal campaigns to promote whistleblowing are nonexistent (1), (2).

There is little trust among officials that whistleblowers would be provided with the necessary protections. However, there are internal cases in which whistleblowers were provided promotions and financial rewards after reporting of corruption activities, such as smuggling activities in cooperation with armed forces, for example, the navy (1), (2). However most of these cases involved expatriate civilians (foreign employees) and not members of the military.

The main legal framework through which whistleblowing is addressed in the UK is the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA), however, it only applies to civilian personnel and explicitly excludes Armed Forces personnel. In relation to civilian personnel, the Act makes explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers, including protection of identity, reversed burden of proof, and protection against retribution [1].

Civil servants also have an additional route for raising concerns, in that they can take their concerns directly to the Civil Service Commission, but only if their concerns relate to another civil servant breaching the Civil Service Code [2]. Whilst military personnel are excluded from PIDA, the MoD seeks to replicate it through its own policy [2]. The Whistleblowing and Raising a Concern policy aims to honour the spirit of PIDA by recognising and adhering to the criteria for protected disclosures, and following specific procedures whether dealing with or making a qualified disclosure.

The policy outlines how concerns should be raised via line management as a first port of call. Should that not be possible, designated officers and senior MoD personnel in each department are trained to handle claims in confidence from other personnel.

Finally, there is also an authorised external route for whistleblowing to a regulatory body such as the Health and Safety Executive, or the Civil Service Commission [2]. Anonymity is not guaranteed in the process, and the policy encourages personnel to raise concerns in confidence. While personnel can raise concerns anonymously, the policy is clear that in such an event, claims will be harder to verify and the assurances offered by the policy won’t be extended to anonymous reports [2].

The UK Ministry of Defence’s Whistleblowing and Raising a Concern Policy makes a firm commitment to all defence workers, that if they raise a concern the department will ensure that they do not suffer any detriment as a result. The department’s commitment in policy forms part of the employment contracts of both Civil Service and Armed Forces personnel. Civilians within the UK Ministry of Defence have additional protection under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which protects whistleblowers from suffering detriment as a result of raising a concern.

The Ministry of Defence has a confidential hotline that can be used to raise concerns about fraud, damage to the environment, breaches of legal obligations or codes of conduct [1]. Information about how to raise a concern is easily accessible and The Defence Confidential Hotline is available to all personnel, including service, civilian, contractor and defence industry, as well as members of the public who are also encouraged to utilise the service [2]. However, there is no further publicly available information surrounding its resourcing and independence. According to the MoD, whistleblowing is actively encouraged through training, regular internal communication programmes and through awareness raising campaigns; and forms a part of the mandated online Fraud, Bribery and Corruption training which encourages use of the Hotline [5]. Equally, the Civil Service runs annaul Speak Up events to promote and encourage whistleblowing, which the MoD participates in. [3] Through its whistleblowing policy, the MoD also promotes the practice by outlining the procedures for making a complaint and encouraging staff to make use of reporting channels to raise concerns. [2] This is largely supported by an interviewee who outlined how internal campaigns to promote whistleblowing exist [4]. Whistleblowing is also included in the MOD’s Corporate Standards, which outlines the MOD’s stance on whistleblowing and provides details on how personnel can raise concerns, whislt dirceting them to the Whistleblowing Policy [6].

A recent report by the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) has expressed concern regarding PIDA’s capability to adequately protect whistleblowers [1]. Drawing upon the findings of recent academic research, the report describes organisations’ response to whistleblowing as overwhelmingly negative. A large number of the whistleblowers surveyed indicated they were confronted with victimisation and reprisal in various forms, including being confronted with disciplinary action, counter allegations, verbal harassment, suspension, relocation and dismissal [1, 2]. In 2016, a doctor alleged that his dismissal by the the Ministry of Defence was due to him blowing the whistle on improper medical practice [3]. However, the case was dismissed by a court in 2017 noticing it had “no connection with any alleged whistleblowing” [4].

The ‘Military Whistleblower Protection Act’ of 1988 is the main legislation on whistleblowing in the military, which was subsequently broadened and strengthened by the ‘Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012’, which provided protection for federal employees who disclose evidence of waste, fraud, abuse or corruption [1,2]. It is DoD policy that service members should be free from reprisal for making a ‘protected communication’ and no person may take or threaten to take unfavourable personal action against a service member who whistleblows. The Inspector General Act of 1978 restricts the DoDIG and military service IGs from disclosing a whistleblower’s identity without consent [3]. In 2013, amendments were made to the National Defense Authorisation Act, which guaranteed enhancements to protections for whistleblowers. However, these focus mainly on retaliatory actions. Military service members are protected from any significant change in duties or responsibilities as a result of whistleblowing [4]. The Government Acccountability Office (GAO) also released a report in March 2019 on the DoD’s whistleblowers protections, which stated that DoD guidance ‘does not specify key steps investigators should take to protect confidentiality’ [5].

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General is mandated to detect and deter fraud, waste and abuse in the DoD [1] and, as such, manages the DoD Hotline and Department of Defense Whistleblower Program [2,3]. According to the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator, the Coordinator is required to educate agency employees on retaliation and the rights of the whistleblower against such reprisal [4]. The DoDIG and Military Service IGs did not meet internal or statutory timeliness goals for reprisal investigations or misconduct cases in 2017 or 2018 [5]. The DoD OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinator is responsible for: educating DoD employees on reporting fraud, waste and abuse within the DoD; reprisal allegations; dispute resolution mechanisms; and the handling of disclosures. They also provide some limited educational materials [6]. No specific details could be found regarding training, and whistleblowing is not included in the ‘Standards of Conduct’, so it is presumed that it is not a topic covered in ethics training. The DoD OIG is a well-resourced independent unit, however, it is not clear what staff and resources are specifically allocated to the DoD Hotline and whistleblowing programmes beyond the singular role of Whistleblower Protection Coordinator.

The Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations (WRI) Directorate investigates allegations of whistleblower reprisals made by defence personnel and contractors [7]. The Semiannual Report to Congress outlines the work of the WRI and provides details on the cases investigated and closed, including reporting on whistleblower cases involving senior and high-level officials [8,9]. The report also provides details on training, for example, between 1 October 2019 and 31 March 2020, six ‘Basic Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations’ courses were held for DoD service components and agencies. Other training courses included hotline investigations and the contractor disclosure programme outreach [9]. It is not clear how many personnel are trained via these courses, nor how regularly they are run. Although these six-monthly reports provide details on whistleblowing, it is not clear that there are specific campaigns that raise awareness of these issues.

As mentioned, the GAO 2019 report on the DoD’s handling of whistleblower confidentiality deemed that the DoDIG did not have sufficient mechanisms in place to ensure confidentiality [1]. The same report surveyed federal employees and DoD personnel, and 36% of respondents reported not knowing whether or not DoDIG’s internal process for reporting misconduct protects confidentiality [1]. There is a specific investigations directorate which handles whistleblower reprisal investigations (i.e. for those personnel who believe they have experienced retaliation for whistleblowing) [2]. Regardless, there is evidence of a ‘culture of revenge’ against whistleblowers [3]. According to a DoD IG report, between FY 2013 and FY 2018, 350 DoD officials (including military personnel) retaliated against or sought to intimidate 195 whistleblowers [4].

In terms of denunciations, existing legislation is not explicitly aimed towards National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) officers. However, ordinary legislation includes the obligation for public officials to report, and the right of citizens to report irregularities in public administration [1, 2]. Although there is legislation on reporting, this does not include provisions regarding the protection of the complainant. The Law on the Protection of Victims, Witnesses and other Parties to Judicial Proceedings could be applied to subjects who, when faced with evidence of danger due to their participation in judicial proceedings, may benefit from special protection. However, this legislation does not offer preventive measures to create security for the complainant, and applies to cases for which judicial proceedings have already initiated [3]. The Anti-corruption Law discussed in the National Assembly (AN) proposes the inclusion of a chapter elaborating on the right to complaint and protection of the complainant [4].

While there are formal mechanisms for denunciations, this process is not encouraged by the government; no anti-corruption policies or campaigns are currently being implemented. Specifically in the defence sector, the Office of the Comptroller General of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CONGEFANB)’s citizen support office provides information for citizens and military officials to contact the offices to register cases and irregularities [1]. Information on how to file a complaint with this organisation can also be found on the website of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) website [2]. Information about reporting cases of corruption is occasionally found on the social media accounts of defence entities, in posts that are not part of any particular campaign [3, 4].

Given that there is no register or system to receive complaints, the citizen support services of the different entities require that the complainant must personally go to these entities to file denunciations [2]. Likewise, there are no official protocols on the pathways for reporting. Regarding mechanisms provided by the defence sector for lodging internal complaints within the FANB [5], the CONGEFANB’s citizen support office is a dependent entity of the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD), and therefore the independence of this unit is not guaranteed in cases that might compromise ministry officials.

Given the limitations and obstacles from entities responsible for receiving denunciations, social organisations have made efforts to promote whistleblowing in order to clarify the gaps in information regarding conduct that should be reported and the channels through which these complaints can be made [6, 7]. Meanwhile, the Anti-corruption Law debated by the AN proposes the creation of an automated register of complaints, procedures and sanctions [8].

Lack of protection for the complainant and politicisation within the FANB and the justice system [1] have generated a high level of mistrust that prevents the reporting of the involvement of military officials and civil servants in corruption practices.

According to Venezuelan law, complaints must be made in person and under no circumstances may they be anonymous [2]. Added to the lack of guarantees of protection, politically-motivated arbitrary arrests have recently been made of military personnel who submitted complaints or information implicating senior military and government officials [3]. Recently, soldiers who have defected and are now based in other countries have denounced persecution within military units, which precludes any incentive for denunciation [4].

There are no provisions for the protection of whistleblowers in the law, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (CPEA) [1]. The CPEA makes no mention of the protection of whistleblowers, and they are vulnerable to retaliation, reprisals, and attacks from people. For example, there was a whistleblower who suffered retaliation from the accused; they have now approached the Constitutional Court to compel the government to make provisions for the protection of whistleblowers [2].

Whistleblowing is encouraged through training, information, and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistleblowers. The Anti-Corruption Commission in Zimbabwe was established through the constitution, in part to investigate and expose corruption when it happens [1]. However, the commission has not managed to do so due, in part, to political interference, and especially when it relates to the military and defence sector [2]. The Defence Act does not have whistleblowing provisions, nor is there an internal unit within the Ministry of Defence dedicated to deal with tips from whistleblowers. The Anti-Corruption Commission has, however, held some campaigns on how to report corruption and installed some billboards at criminal courts. However, these are generic public campaigns not necessarily targeted at the defence sector and the military in particular [3].

There are no significant cases of whistleblowing in the defence sector; however, whistleblowers in Zimbabwe have been victimised after exposing corruption in either state-owned enterprises or government departments. The whistleblowers end up being victimised or even arrested. Reward Kangai a former CEO of the state-owned telecoms company, NETONE, wrote to the president and the Anti-Corruption Commission exposing the minister and a cartel capturing the sector and ended up in jail [1]. The same also applies to journalists who investigate and expose issues of corruption [2].