There is a system for the appointment of middle and high-level military personnel defined by the Constitution and several laws and regulations. The high-rank military officials (generals) are appointed by the president and the prime minister. On the proposal of the prime minister, the president appoints and dismisses the chief of general staff and, on the proposal of the minister of defence, appoints and dismisses commanders of the land, naval and air forces [1]. The prime minister appoints and dismisses all the other high-level officials that are not appointed by the president [2]. The minister of defence appoints and dismisses, upon the proposal of the chief of general staff, all active officers of the armed forces, except for officers holding high ranks (generals) (2). The minister of defence appoints and dismisses also the General Director of DISA (3).
To get an appointment, military officials have to have a rank which is compatible with that particular position and to gets promoted they have to advance in the military career system. The military career system is regulated by law [4], while the compatibility of ranks and job positions within the armed forces is regulated by a government decision [5]. The standard policies and procedures on the appointments in the armed forces are regulated by order of the minister of defence for all ranks including middle ranks [6].
The standard policies document provide for the involvement of the civil service in the design of the personnel management policies and its implementation, the implementation of the annual appointment programs, the implementation of the appointment standards (6, Article 5.1). Civilians sit also in the selection board (a legal representative) (6, Chapter D).
However, no specific selection and appointment criteria are provided for the appointment of the high-ranking officers (brigadier general and above) that are appointed following the Law on the Powers and Commanding Authorities [7].
As a result of the amendments made to the Law on military career [4], which increased of the age limit for every rank, but with a special emphasis on the field grade officers (major, lieutenant colonel, colonel), the progress in rank for company-grade officers has become more competitive and challenging. While it may be true that the modification of the formula that combines years in service with eligibility to obtain a higher rank in the law on military career may have created pressure on the lower ranks, as they have to wait longer to be promoted, appointment of military personnel at middle and top management is based on job descriptions and standardised assessment processes.

No provisions for external oversight of the appointment process exist in the legal and regulatory framework [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].

The procedures on the appointment process are publically available on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) website [8].

There are some formal regulations in the appointment system for the selection of military personnel. However, there are robust indications that the process is regularly undermined. Hachemaoui has noted for Algeria that informal rules are more important than formal rules (1).

The General Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 provides scarce information on appointments in the military. Art. 19 generally states that integration into the armed forces takes place at the first grade of the hierarchy at the time of appointment. According to Art. 15, appointments and promotions to the ranks of officers and non-commissioned officers shall be made within the limit of the number of open posts (2). Except for the president, who is a civilian, there is no other evidence that civil personnel are involved in the process. Also, no information could be found on the website of the Defence Ministry (3), the military magazine (4), and a guide on recruitment into the armed forces (5).

Researchers working on the Algerian political and military system have long explained the system of patronage, clientelism and nepotism (6), (7), (8). The military, along with the intelligence service and the government, has developed a system that promotes corruption and nepotism from which it highly profits (9). There are examples illustrating the analysis, recent reshuffles within the upper echelon of the armed forces were mainly discussed with regards to the presidential election in 2019. Yacine Boudhane wrote that Vice Defence Minister Salah undertook steps to sideline supporters of the presidential faction within the army aiming to consolidate power (10).

There is no evidence that there is external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management. The General Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 does not stipulate such action is necessary (1).

Appointments to middle and top management level are made either by the President of the Republic for the high-level members (2) or by a decree issued by the Ministry of Defence (3). There is no evidence in the decrees issued by both the president and the ministry that an external institution, such as the parliament, is involved in the process.

No information on the appointment process could be found. The General Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 only provides scarce information on appointments in the military, as outlined in 41A, and it does not provide any information on the appointment process (1).

The only information that could be found was the publishing of the actual appointment, which is made public in the Official Gazette. For example, the Commander of the 1st Military Region was appointed by a decree in August 2018 (2).

In July 2018, Parliament passed the Law on Military Careers in the Angolan Armed Forces (1). The law establishes rules and procedures for military careers in the Angolan Armed Forces and the Auxiliary Services of the President in the sectors of defence, intelligence and military security, as well as military justice (1). The final law is yet to be published in the official gazette.
According to the 2010 Constitution, the president has the power to appoint the general chief of staff of the Angolan Armed Forces and his deputy, the remaining commanders and chiefs of the respective branches of service, as well as senior officers of the armed forces, in consultation with the National Security Council (Art.122) (2).

There is no known external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at either the middle level or top management.

Little to no information is released about the appointment process.

The military appointment system is complex and at least three formal processes are normatively differentiated. The first is regarding the high command of the Armed Forces, which are the decision (appointment and removal) of the President in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Art.99 inc.13). Like the promotions of the superior personnel of the armed forces, they are granted by the Executive Power upon agreement of the Senate of the Nation. The second is regarding the promotions in the ranks of the Armed Forces, which since 2016 is the responsibility of the Chiefs of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence is in charge of the designation and retreats of senior military personnel and the corresponding auditors for each arm. [1] [2] [3] A third process is the one that emerges from the military career itself and that is regulated under the Law of the Military Personnel regarding hierarchies, antiquity, and categories. According to this law, the qualification of the aptitudes of the personnel for the purposes of their promotion and those of their elimination will occur in qualification meetings of each force. [4] [5]

The scrutiny of appointments in cases of high-level positions (except the Armed Forces Headquarters) is mainly internal, through the qualification boards of each Force and then passes to the approval of the specifications annually by the Senate of the Nation. [1] [2] [3] The scrutiny in many cases is carried out by human rights organisations, through mechanisms of challenge (judicial process), but these are complementary and subsequent to the process. In this sense, CELS participates as part of the mechanism for consultation of civil society by the Senate since 1994, but has a long history in the process of challenge since the transition to democracy in Argentina. [4] [5]

Information regarding the appointment process is not proactively available to the public on the websites of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] The publicity of the specifications and the possibility of presenting observations are stipulated in the regulations of the Senate, which establishes the citizen participation mechanism. [6] With respect to this, the hearings on documents sent by the EP are observed in the meetings of the Senate Agreements Committee. [7]

Appointments within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) are regulated through the Law on Military Service and the Law on Military Service and the Status of the Serviceman. Article 15 of the Law on Military Service regulates the appointment and promotion of the military personnel. Clause 3 of the law provides that a person can be appointed to the highest position provided he/she has at least three years of experience in the previous rank/position within armed forces (at least the rank of a Colonel). The same clause of the law provides that a person can be appointed to a senior position provided he/she has at least three years of experience in his/her previous position. A person can be appointed to a mid-level position provided he/she is a military serviceman of a lower level with tertiary education. Promotion of senior and middle command personnel is made through a testing system [1].
The promotion of contractors in the armed forces is regulated by the Law on Military Service and the Status of Servicemen. Clause 1 of Article 35 provides that a person can be appointed to military service if he/she qualifies for the position. Senior positions can be filled in in case the person previously held a position within a middle command for at least three years. Mid-level command positions can be filled in case the person previously held lower positions and has tertiary education. Article 36 provides the mechanisms for appointing for senior positions. This can be promoted based, competition or test-based, organizational-staffing measures [2].

There is no external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at mid-level and top-level management.

There is some evidence on appointments for the senior and mid-level command positions available to the public at the official website of the MoD [1]. A few announcements for vacant positions are made publicly through “Hay Zinvor”, the official newspaper of the MoD [2]. Information includes requirements and selection criteria for each rank (for instance, university degree, knowledge of legal acts, language proficiency, etc.), but it might be incomplete in some areas [1, 2].

The system for the selection of military personnel at the middle and top management level is formalised but independent scrutiny of promotion decisions does not appear to feature heavily. Because the formal guidelines for promotion in each service are not publicly accessible, describing the promotion process relies on secondary sources. Official, publicly available policy documents and legislative instruments provide little insight. The Military Personnel Policy Manual simply states, “Before a member is promoted to a higher rank, consideration must be given to whether the member is a fit and proper person to perform duties at the higher rank… Service Chiefs are to determine the administrative processes for the conduct of promotion boards including the eligibility requirements that must be met before a member can be considered for promotion” [1]. Defence Regulation 2016 similarly says: “Before a member is promoted to, or directed to act in, a higher rank, consideration must be given to whether the member is a fit and proper person to perform duties at the higher rank” [2]. The Australian Human Rights Commission issued a report in 2012 titled “Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force”, which recounted observations and details of mid- to senior-rank promotion boards in all three service branches [3]. The Commission reported that only one of the promotion boards had an “‘independent’ member,” [4] and that only the Army was thinking about “having civilian members on its promotion boards” to increase diversity [4] (the other branches did not have civilian or military members from outside the branch). The Air Force added “an external to Service member on all senior officer and other rank boards in 2014,” while Navy had an “‘external to Service’ (former Navy, now civilian) representative on all senior promotion boards in 2013,” and Army was including external observers/members in some promotion advisory committees [5]. However, the Commission did report that, “Much effort has gone into regulating these boards to ensure that they equitably and fairly assess those that they are examining” [6].

High-profile posts do not appear to be subject to external audits [1], nor does Parliament publicly scrutinise very high level Defence appointments, though the government of the day and their Members do. Very high level Defence appointments, including the Chief and Vice Chief of the Defence Force and Service Chiefs, are made by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Federal Executive Council [2]. The Federal Executive Council legally enacts decisions of the ruling government, who members of Parliament [3]. Therefore, it can be said that Parliament scrutinises decisions for very high level appointments, though not publicly and this does not include the opposition members. However, the selection of very high level appointments is traditionally considered non-partisan, and the selections are embraced by both of the major parties (for instance, when the appointment of Angus Campbell as Chief of Defence Force was announced in April 2018, opposition leader Bill Shorten expressed his “‘wholehearted'” support and said: “‘And it doesn’t matter if you are a private in the army or the chief of defence forces, Labor will always support the professionalism of our Australian defence forces. Angus Campbell will do, I think, a very distinguished role as his predecessor did'” [4]).

Information on the selection process is made available by service branch, and is compiled into Defence Instructions accessible on Defence intranet websites to all personnel; however, these Defence Instructions are not made publicly available. In the footnotes of the Australian Human Rights Commission review into the treatment of women in the Australian Defence Forces [1] are a list of the relevant Defence Instructions for mid- to senior-level officer appointment [2; 3; 4].

Military service in Azerbaijan is carried out per the Law on Military Duty and Military Service (1) and the Statute on Military Service (2). Article 31 (Military Ranking) of the law (1) states that the Supreme Officer Military Rankings are issued by the relevant executive authority (Article 31.1). Military ranks for other categories of servicemen and military personnel are given following the requirements of the Statute “On Military Service” and the “Disciplinary Charter of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan” (Article 31.2).
At the same time, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the “Conditions and Procedure of Committing to Actual Military Service by the Treaty” in 2015 (3). According to this rule, reserve servicemen (under 40) are called up for military service and serve for 3 years as military men (Article 2.10). It is published on the website of the Ministry of Defence (4).
There are no civilians in the Ministry of Defence or other military units at middle and higher levels. In recent years, the number of civilian personnel in the armed forces has increased. However, they are assigned support tasks (cooking, cleaning, secretarial services, etc.). Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov said, “up to 21,000 civilians have been recruited to provide support to the personnel in order to ensure their release from economic activities. This is one of the most important steps towards optimizing combat readiness” (5).
However, there is no independent, transparent, objective identification system for middle and senior management positions. There are no objective criteria for appointment. Loyalty and acquaintance, locality and relationships play a key role. According to several reports, middle and top management officials at the Defence Ministry and other structures (which are recognized as part of the Armed Forces) are appointed at the request of persons at the Presidential Administration (6, 7).

The appointment of middle and top officials in the Defence Ministry and other military units is not subject to any external scrutiny. The president’s administration manages this process unofficially, and in many cases appointments are agreed upon with the president’s administration (1). The parliament does not play any role in this process, and no investigation or scrutiny is carried out by the parliament (2).

According to interviewees, vacancies at the Ministry of Defence are not transparent. Vacancies are not officially reported to potential officers/candidates. There are serious problems with the careers of military servicemen. The promotion of highly trained officers is often impossible (1, 2). The Defence Ministry does not disclose vacant positions. There is no legitimate competition for vacancies in the army. The Defence Ministry website and other military organisations do not provide information on vacancies (2).

Appointments lack an accurate description, and the selection criterion is vague. The committees that are usually formed by the commanders lack objective standards when selecting medium and high-rank promotions. Further, promotions are not justified [1, 2, 3]. The committee provides the higher commanders with the proposed names, and the chief commander issues decrees of appointments/promotions for junior officers, while senior officers are issued by a committee headed by the chief commanders to the king who issues the decree.

There is no internal or external scrutiny of new appointments or promotions within the ranks of Bahrain’s Defence Force. This applies to both higher and medium ranking officers [1, 2, 3].

There is no information available on the promotion process. Names are only published when the promotions occur (mainly high-ranking officers) [1, 2, 3].

The guiding principle for promotion in the Bangladesh military is the spirit of independence and the Liberation War. In order to implement the policy of ‘selecting the right person for the right appointment’ [1], the Bangladesh military has introduced the TRACE (Tabulated Record and Comparative Evaluation) method for the promotion of mid-level to senior army officials [2]. The TRACE system provides a comparative evaluation of different aspects of professional competence, such as leadership qualities, patriotism, professional competence, field-level success, discipline, honesty and obedience. The Army Headquarters Selection Board is the highest authority when it comes to recommending promotions, endorsed by the Prime Minister, who is also the Minister of Defence. The selection board meeting is also attended by senior civil servants, such as the Principal Secretary, the Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary. The evaluation criteria include, among other things: educational qualifications, professional excellence and trustworthiness. The contributions of officers towards national life on various important occasions, which may include containing militancy, conducting anti-terrorism operations as well as maintaining constitutional continuity in the country, are also taken into consideration during the selection of candidates for promotion. In 2019, four female officers were made commanding officers following their promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel from Major [3]. In 2020, while in a coma lasting more than 7 years, an army official was promoted on the day he was due to retire [4].

The appointment of military personnel at middle and top management level is at the sole discretion of the Army Headquarters and there is therefore no scope for external scrutiny [1].

The official appointment process, including the criteria for selection, is advertised in newspapers and websites for entry-level positions, such as Second Lieutenant or Non-Commissioned Officer [1]. For senior-level appointments, neither the evaluation nor the selection criteria are publicly available. For promotion to the rank of Brigadier and above, the news is generally released by the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate [2].

The Royal decree on the position and advancement of career officers details promotion to the ranks of general and higher officers on the basis of seniority, but no other items for promotion are mentioned [1]. Job descriptions are drafted for all functions by DG HR. [2] New appointments are published online: composition of the board includes only active military service senior officers invited by the Minister of Defence.

The Royal decree on the position and advancement of career officers details promotion to the ranks of general and higher officers on the basis of seniority but provides very little details regarding senior staff or high positions appointments. High profile positions are decided by a board consisting of general officers in and out of the chain of command and transcending the grade of the candidate. The appointment of general is mainly based on consensus between the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence [2]. Audits on promotions may happen by the Federal Internal Audit [3].

The appointment of rank is stipulated in the Royal Decree of 7 April 1959 [1]. Promotions are then published through the ‘Moniteur Belge’ [2]. Information on the selection criteria regarding seniority are available, as well as the promotion procedures [3]. More specific details, however, are not publicly available [4].

The Rulebook on Promotion of Military Personnel in BiH Ministry of Defence and BiH Armed Forces defines clear professional and educational requirements for every position within the organisation of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) [1]. The minister of defence, in accordance with Article 34 of Rulebook, is entitled to appoint the members of a Promotion Commission, there is no place for introducing representatives from other branches [1]. The distribution of positions to representatives of all three constitutive people is defined in the Law on Defence. Article 21 of the law stipulates that “A maximum of two members of the highest military personnel directly subordinate to the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Joint Staff will be from the same constituent people. Other personnel are selected on the basis of the principles of professional expertise and adequate representation of the constituent peoples and the others, in accordance with the most recent 1991 census in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” This highlights that next to the defined requirements there is a requirement based on ethnicity [2].

According to the government reviewer, requirements for each position in the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of BiH are set out in the Personal Formation Books, and a new Order on the Designation of VES in the MoD and AFBiH is in the final phase of drafting, which will be published in the Official Gazette of BiH.

Although Parliamentary Assembly confirms the appointment of deputy chiefs of staff and deputy heads of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, the commander and deputy commander of the Operational Command of the AFBiH, commander and Chief of Staff deputy commanders of the Armed Forces Command and all officers with the rank of general, there are no real external scrutiny bodies entrusted with the power to scrutinize appointments of high-ranked military personnel [1]. Apart from the ability for senior military personnel to submit their complaints to a parliamentary military commissioner, no external oversight is required outside the defence sector when it comes to the appointment of military personnel at the mid-level [2].

Information on the appointments of high-ranking military personnel conducted through the parliamentary procedure is available on the Parliamentary Assembly’s website, but it is superficial with virtually no information about the appointment process [1].

There is a formal process for appointments as provided in terms of the BDF Act.
Section 4 provides for the Application of Other Ranks Regulations. To the extent that they are not inconsistent with these Regulations, the Other Ranks Regulations shall apply with any necessary modifications to a cadet officer as they apply concerning a member, as defined in the Other Ranks Regulations, who has been engaged for service on an initial engagement.
Section 5: Selection of cadet officers. Cadet officers shall be selected by a Selection Board, to be appointed by the Commander [1].
Section 6: Qualifications for selection.
(1) Where a candidate is seeking appointment as a cadet officer direct from civil life he must be not less than 18 years and not more than 24 years of age – provided that the Commander may, in the case of a candidate of special merit, waive the limit of 24 years of age.
(2) Where a candidate is already a member of the Regular Force, the upper age limit for engagement as a cadet officer shall, except in an exceptional case, be 30 years.
(3) The minimum educational requirements for a candidate shall be Cambridge School Certificate or an equivalent certificate [2]. However, there is no public information as to whether these appointments are subject to scrutiny.

There is no regular external scrutiny of appointments to the BDF. However, where necessary the Courts may take action with regards to the appointment in the BDF [1]. This was evidenced in MOKOKONYANE v. COMMANDER OF BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE and Another 2000 (2) BLR 102 (CA). The appellant, an officer in the Botswana Defence Force, was, in terms of regulation 4(5)(b) of the Defence Force (Regular Force) (Officers) (Amendment) Regulations 1996, given three months’ notice in writing by the Commander of the Defence Force that he was being compulsorily retired since there were no prospects for his promotion in the force. Regulation 4(4) of the Defence Force (Regular Force) (Officers) Regulations provides that the Commander may at his discretion require any officer below the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, who has attained the age of 45 years to retire from the force [2]. The compulsory retiring age in the force is 55. At the time when the notice was given to him, the appellant was 47 years old [2]. He was not given prior notice of the decision to retire him from the force and he was not given the opportunity to contest that decision [2]. Aggrieved by the decision of the Commander, the appellant applied to the High Court for an order to set aside the decision of the Commander [2]. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s application, and he then appealed to the Court of Appeal.

It is not clear how senior positions are filled. Responding to this lack of clarity, it was reported that “Botswana soldiers understand their unique situation in respect of rank, deployment and progression standard and process within the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) [1]. This was revealed by Minister of Defence, Justice and Security, Mr Shaw Kgathi when answering a question in Parliament on Thursday [1]. Mr Kgathi said that “there were currently soldiers, who have been in service for 10-20 years without a promotion, saying those who perform below par, were cognizant that they had to improve their performance within the set guidelines and mentorship” [2,3,4]

The criteria for appointments are based on objective job descriptions and standard assessment criteria. It is not possible to have a non-qualified officer appointed to a top management level, without clear and specific training for the role. In the Army, for instance, without the High Command and General Staff College course an officer would not be assigned as a unit commander. Some subjective criteria are applied in the selection process, based mainly on the evaluation of the officer’s career. The boards for selection may listen to previous commanders of the officer being considered to the selection, and each middle and top management level has a list of requirements for the post [1, 2]. In addition, the selection process at the Army’s very top level (e.g. promotion to general) is determined within the High Command and is not open to external scrutiny. With the Brazilian Navy, there is an overlap between the appointment and the promotion systems for high-ranking officials. In order to appoint a commander of a Military Organization (OM – which is an administrative unit within the single force), the Committee for Officials Promotions (CPO – Comissão de Promoção de Oficiais) checks all the information regarding vacancies and the files of possible candidates. According to the seniority criteria for promotions and appointments, the officials are evaluated by class – so there is a limited number of possible candidates. For other positions lower than director or sub-director of military organizations, the responsible department is the Department of Personnel, which also has powers to access intelligence information about possible candidates. Officials can informally indicate preferential positions, but it is not certain that they will be allocated where they asked to be [3]. The evaluation is based on both objective and subjective criteria, which can be political, but not necessarily. Each organization has a Personnel Chart, with key positions that need to be fulfilled, and these positions are of common knowledge of military personnel and the Department of Personnel. Similar processes are present in the other two forces but might have different names or structural configurations.

Parliament has no involvement in the appointments of high profile positions, although they can scrutinize the actions undertaken by these military officials. The appointments are made internally, with no participation or scrutiny of other institutions [1, 2].

The Army has a website with information about the process of appointment and promotion, focused on the military themselves, and not the general public [1].

According to Article 38 of Law N°038 (2016), “recruitment in the armed forces is performed through a call for contingent, a text or exceptionally” (1). Article 39 states, “any citizen of Burkina between18 and 30 years old may be authorized to engage freely or be called to serve in the national army” (1). Article 40 provides for the different hiring processes for officers, sub-officers and privates. Indeed, these differences are made through a decision of the minister of defence. After their recruitment, applicants are accepted into the armed forces with the approval of the minister of defence (1). Before these applicants are accepted into the armed forces they are screened through background checks (Article 44) (1). Thus, there is a formal process in place, for the recruitment and promotion of the defence personnel. Since corruption is widespread in all sectors, including the military the formal process is violated (2), (3), (5). The promotion board often gets pressured during promotion decisions. The Law N°038 (2016) does not apply to civilians working for the MoD.

The Defence and Security Committee (CODES) scrutizes issues regarding the military, such as budgets, military promotions and appointments as defined by law (1), (2), (3). Apart from the Parliamentary scrutiny, there is no additional external control to scrutinize promotions and appointments within the MoD (3). However, there is no evidence that the NA scrutinizes promotions and appointments for personnel at the middle and top management level.

The selection process for sensitive positions is mostly made at the discretion of the president of the republic (1). According to Article 55 of the Constitution (2012), “The President of Faso appoints to the offices of the high civil and military administration” (1), (2). According to Article 55 of the Constitution (2012), the “law determines the functions or offices for which the power of appointment of the President of Faso is exercised after [the] opinion of the Parliament as well as the modalities and effects of this consultation” (2). However, there is no evidence of parliamentary oversight for the appointments of the top military officers, rather the only consideration of the appointment of colonel Major Sadou was his native origin (4). Appointment announcements are available online on the website and are freely released outside formal mechanisms. But Information including the requirements and selection criteria for each rank are not available to the public (4), (5), (6), (7), (8).

There are no well-established mechanisms through which middle and upper management personnel are appointed. Appointments to these positions are based on the discretion of the President of the Republic, who is also chief of the armed forces [1] [2] [3] [4].

On August 13, 2015, Presidential Decree No. 2015/381 of 13 August 2015 promoted five Colonels to the rank of Brigadier General [1]. Similarly, on Friday 17 July, 2017, the President of the Republic of Cameroon on his discretion appointed 11 new generals through another presidential decree (Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon [1 – ?] [2 – ?].

Appointments are made by a Presidential decree and there is no oversight structure to scrutinise the choices of the President [1] [2] [3].

No information is given out on the choice of those selected in some of these positions. Selection is often guided by ethnic sentiments and loyalty to the regime in place [1] [2] [3].

There is a robust, clear and transparent system of appointing military personnel from the low to high ranks, through the use of merit review boards. As noted in an interview: “to decide the relative potential for advancement to higher rank and merit of an individual military member, merit review boards are convened annually at National Defence Headquarters. These merit review boards are made up exclusively of military officers. The merit review boards review Performance Evaluation Reports prepared for each military officer. These reports are prepared exclusively by the chain of command.” [1] The Performance Evaluations Assessments are conducted as laid out by the DAOD 5059-0 Performance Assessment of Canadian Forces Members as introduced in 2005 and modified in 2007. [2] However, the most senior positions and appointments (i.e. Chief of Defence Staff) are not subject to the same types of review and appointment processes as they are political apointees subject to internal scrutiny and adjudication as noted in Section 18 of the National Defence Act. (1, 3, 4). All merit boards have a board member of a different classification or trade from the files being reviewed. This individual is specifically appointed to the board to act as an honest broker. Used effectively, this individual asks questions and provides valuable input. Board members are either Officers or personnel serving in the ranks and they are generally a rank above that of the individuals being assessed. Board members receive training prior to starting board assessment. There is no civilian involvement. The support provided to the Boards comes from career managers and other support staff. Board members have access to personnel evaluations over a number of years and a focus of each merit board is the discussions of each board member. Selection of the right person for critical appointments, such as the Commanding Officer on a Frigate, Infantry Battalion, or Fighter Squadron, is essential in any military organisation. For the selection of the Chief of Defence Staff, the Prime Minister is generally involved. While there are a number of checks and balances built into the system, the challenge is to be both transparent and to protect the integrity of the appointment system.

The military career process begins with recruitment to the Canadian Forces. There are courses throughout one’s career that allow an ongoing assessment of military personnel which provide evaluation for career progression. [1] At the higher levels, under the powers provided in the National Defence Act, [2] “The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) decides on his own who is promoted at the Lieutenant-General level and submits his selection to the Minister of National Defence for approval…and the CDS alone decides who he appoints in the position of a) Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS); b) Commanders of the Navy, Army and Air Force; c) the Chief of Intelligence; d) the Chief of Military Personnel; e) the Deputy Commander NORAD and commanders of operational commands; and, f) the Military National Representative at NATO HQ.” [3] Parliamentary politics also come into play when making these high level appointments – especially with the CDS – as it can signal military priorities for the sitting Government. [4] The CDS is appointed by an order in council (OIC), [5] a process that is intended to vet qualifications and suitability, conflicts of interest, and overall fitness of the proposed appointee. However, there is no information specific to either the process involved, only information that applies to OIC appointments in general. While The Privy Council Office has a process to select and recommend candidates for senior government officials, reforms that bring greater transparency of the vetting process would increase public understanding of the selection criteria.

The criteria for selection is not published for public consumption prior to the decision being made. [1] [2] Appointments are eventually made public and some information such as the individual’s qualifications are made available. Additionally, Military personnel can file a grievance if they do not believe that their evaluation reflected the work done over the year. The Office of the National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman has issued a “Direction on promotions during Active Posting Season 2020 in response to COVID-19.” However, specific information relating to the procedures of Military Personnel Command Selection Boards are restricted to internal access (Defence Team Intranet). [3]

The system for appointments for mid-level and high ranking military personnel is regulated by the Organic Constitutional Law of the Armed Forces and the Statute of the Personnel of the Armed Forces. Regulations indicate that appointments, promotions and withdrawals of the officers will be made by supreme decrees issued through the Ministry of National Defence, at the proposal of the respective institutional commanders in chief (Ley 18.948, Art. 7) [1, 2]. The process works internally within the respective branches of the armed forces, and there is no evidence of external independent scrutiny being paid to the promotion of senior personnel. There is no evidence of how objective and standardised criteria are applied in practice. Furthermore, there is some evidence of politicisation in the selection of senior officials, induced by the corporatisation and self-regulation of the branches of the armed forces [3, 4, 5, 6]. For the appointment of civilian personnel, each institution has decentralised services of human resources or commands of personnel that take care of the administration and recruitment of civilians. In 2019, a new project for military careers involved changes to the duration times and promotions of military personnel. The measures included making the three branches of the armed forces have the same requirements, in terms of requiring a recommendation from a selection board to promote to colonels [7, 8].

There is no evidence of external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management other than internal control and audit offices in the respective institutions. While the Handbook for the Prevention of Offenses by Personnel of the Subsecretary for the Armed Forces, based on Law 20.818 to improve the mechanisms for prevention, detection, control, investigation and trial of the crime of money laundering, identifies a set of corruption-related offences in the hiring of public officials, there is no evidence that external bodies control the application of this norms in the appointment and promotion of military personnel [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Traditionally, Parliament has not scrutinised these processes either.

Information on the appointment process is available only in generic terms. Other than regulations on rank, seniority, and promotion mechanisms, it is difficult to picture how the system works in concrete cases [1]. The information does not include all the specific requirements at the same level that it does for civilian appointments in the public administration. Information requested through transparency mechanisms is also limited in cases that defence and military institutions consider the information to be sensitive and of national security. This has included information relative to personnel [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].

Formal processes exist, as explained in detail in the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Officers in Active Service (2000). [1] The civil service is not involved. Appointments are highly influenced by military officers within the chain of command and there is a long-standing problem of selling posts and promotions. [2,3]

There is no external scrutiny (parliamentary or other) in military appointments in the PLA.

Fragmented information on appointments is released only after they have been decided. Occasionally, entries in military and state-controlled media such as the PLA Daily and Caixin may appear presenting the names and positions of new appointees, but this is not a routine, standardised practice.

In accordance with Article 217 of the Political Constitution, Congress determines the replacements, promotions, rights and obligations of members of the Military Forces, as well as their special regime of career, benefits, and disciplinary regime. [1] Decree Law 1790 of 2000 regulates the special regime of the professional career of officers and sub-officers of the Military Forces, the objectives of each post, and the processes of promotion and hierarchies. [2] In accordance with Article 4 of this Decree, the National Government sets the placement of officers and sub-officers, and determines the appointment system based on the needs of the various Forces. Law 1104 of 2006 [3] amends the aforementioned Decree, clarifying elements related to the hierarchy and promotion of officers and sub-officers, as well as establishing some minimum requirements for the promotion of sub-officers, and for the exercise of command positions in the Air Force and Navy; and finally lays down some provisions with regard to the destinations, transfers, commissions, and duties within the Public Force. For its part, Law 1405 of 2010 [4] adds to previous legislation on minimum exercise times for each position, and some requirements for high-ranking promotions, such as Generals and insignia officers, such as the Brigadier General, Rear Admiral, or the Brigadier General of Air. In the case of the Colombian National Police, Decree Law 1791 of 2000 [5] regulates the professional career of officers, executive level, sub-level officials, and agents. With regard to the process of evaluation and classification of promotions, this is mainly done through the advisory board of the Ministry of Defence of the Military Forces in the cases of sub-officers and directly by the National Government in the case of officers. The President chooses the military to be promoted at that level, [1] and sends the curriculum vitae of the Officer to the Second Committee of the Congress, who evaluates the trajectory and suitability of the proposed official. [6] This process does not clearly demonstrate the participation of independent observers in the promotions and appointments of military personnel. For officers, and for the executive and sub-officer level of the Police, the Evaluation and Classification Board approves and authorises promotions. [5]

As evidenced by the rules governing promotions, external scrutiny in cases of high-level positions is not common, although Congress participates in this procedure. [1] The Senate has the power to review, evaluate, and approve the resumes of military members up for promotion. According to the State Council, quoting Decree 1790 of 2000: “The degrees of general officers and insignia officers conferred by the National Government, shall be submitted for approval by the Senate of the Republic. Upon such approval, the promotions will produce all their effects from the date indicated in the Decree that granted them.” [2] The procedure in Congress departs with Presidential Decrees and the process of reviewing resumes of officers in the Second Committee according to Interviewee 1. [3] Until a few years ago, this procedure in the Second Committee was based only on the acceptance of the Decrees and resumes of the Military. Only about two years ago did Congress assumed its role and power to influence the issue, debating more forcefully the suitability of the officers. Additionally, there is no evidence to say that any promotion has been denied. Therefore, for this Interviewee, the independence of the Senate remains in question. [4] That said, there is external control by the public through the dissemination of news and reports on the resumes of the officers to be promoted, calling into question the suitability and expediency of the promotion. [5, 6] There is also evidence that civil society organisations have played a role in calling for the rejection of some promotions, specifically when the officer had participated in a human rights violation. [7] However, this external control does not influence the final decision made by the Senate.

General information on promotions in the Armed Forces is made available on the entity websites and in the media. [2, 3, 4, 5] However, there is no information published related to selection requirements and criteria for each rank, despite the existence of laws that require this. This system of military personnel appointment has been strongly questioned by organisations such as Human Rights Watch, who claim that the selection process does not take into account ongoing investigations in the Attorney General’s Office on Colonels and Generals who have committed crimes against humanity, even though their actions are known to the Colombian government and denounced by social organisations. [6] José Miguel Vivanco, Director of the Americas within Human Rights Watch warns that “by appointing these generals, the government conveys to troops the worrying message that committing abuse may not be an obstacle to advancing the military career.” [7]

There is a formal process in place to appoint military personnel. Despite the established legal framework, however, the appointments may not always apply objective criteria and the promotion board (Commission d’Avancement) may have members influenced by the Executive. Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of February 16, 2016, contains provisions regarding the system for appointing military personnel and the special commissions that take part in the process. This Law repealed the previous Act No. 095-695 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of September 7, 1995. It should be seen within the context of military reforms after the post-election crisis of 2010-2011.

The provisions of Law No. 2016-1109 on the appointment of higher-ranking military personnel are contained in Chapter 4 (Nomination), Article 71.

Art. 71 – “The appointment to a rank within the military hierarchy is done as follows:
1. by Decree for marshals, generals and career or contract officers;
2. by order of the Minister of Defense for non-career commissioned officers, commissioned and volunteer officers, and commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers.
3. by General Order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces for non-commissioned members” (1).

The provisions for lower-ranking officers are contained in Chapter 2 (Recrutement) of Law No. 2016-1109, Section 2 (Dispositions applicables aux militaires de carriere), Articles 58 and 59.

Art. 58 – “Career officers are recruited:
1. – by entrance examination in the schools of cadets;
2. – by means of competitions reserved for the candidates governed by the particular statutes determined by decree.
Art. 59 – Non-commissioned career officers are recruited through a direct entrance examination to the active non-commissioned officer military schools. A non-commissioned officer may also be a member of a military service on a contract, having completed at least four years of effective military service…” (1).

In terms of the participation of commissions in the appointment process, Article 44 sets up four permanent consultative committees:

“Art. 44 – The following Permanent Consultative Bodies are established within the Armed Forces: (1)
– the Higher Council of the Military Function;
– the Promotion Commission;
– the Board of Inquiry;
– the Reform Commission.” (1).

As per Article 45, a High Council of the Military Service (Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire) can be consulted for issues of status of military personnel and as per Article 46, the Promotion Commission (Commission d’Avancement) can nominate candidates for promotion and, in exceptional circumstances, decide on a promotion.

Art. 45 – “The Supreme Council of the Military Service gives its opinion on the questions relating to the condition and status of military personnel.”
Art. 46 – “The Progress Commission has the power to nominate candidates for promotion. It may also decide on the promotion of an individual, but only on an exceptional basis” (1).

Law No. 2016-414 (Portant Organisation de la Défense et des Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire), which purportedly contains provisions regarding the appointment of military personnel, appears to be unavailable through open sources and I was unable to consult it online (2).

No evidence for parliamentary scrutiny in the formal process of appointing military personnel at the middle and top management levels (marshals, generals). However, there are provisions for permanent consultative committees that could be considered to play a formal role as audit bodies. Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of 16 February 2016, specifically Chapter 4 (Nomination), does not contain any provisions that provide for parliamentary scrutiny or the participation of external oversight body in the process. But Article 44 sets up four different permanent consultative bodies that are allowed to participate in the appointment and promotion process (1). As per Article 45, a Higher Council of the Military Service (Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire) can be consulted for issues of status of military personnel and as per Article 46, the Promotion Commission (Commission d’Avancement) can nominate candidates for promotion and, in exceptional circumstances, decide on a promotion (1).

Art. 45 – “The Higher Council of the Military Service gives its opinion on the questions relating to the condition and status of military personnel.”
Art. 46 – “The Promotion Commission has the power to nominate candidates for promotion. It may also decide on the promotion of an individual, but only on an exceptional basis” (1).

The information on the appointment of higher-ranked military officials (marshals, generals) is made available at a certain point after the appointments are decided behind closed doors by the Council of Ministers. However, this disclosure is not due to any formal procedure contained in Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire). Additionally, the information is incomplete without providing details as the criteria used for the appointment. Law No. 2016-1109 served to repeal a previous Law (Act No. 095-695, Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of September 7, 1995. Its provisions should be considered within the context of the post-election crisis of 2010-2011 and as an attempt to reform the personnel issues at the Ministry of Defence that led to the soldier uprisings in Bouaké and other towns in January and May 2017. In this transition environment, formal transparency in the appointment process could prove a liability. Instead, the evidence points to appointments strongly influenced by the president and the members of his government cabinet in the Council of Ministers. The appointment of higher-ranking marshals and generals can be said to be largely based on political alliances and personal loyalties.

For example, the government portal published a press release announcing the nomination by President Ouattara of a long list of high-ranking members of the armed forces and Gendarmerie Nationale on the 9th, 13th and 25th of January 2017. The nominations included information on the rank and name of the individual, as in the case of the Army Chief of Staff General Sékou Toure. No other information, such as the selection criteria, was provided by the government (1).

The Ivorian website aggregator Koaci.com later described the appointments of January 2017, including that of Army Commander and General (Général de Brigade) Sékou Toure, as ethnically based. The news aggregator accused the executive of favouring Ivorians from the northern half of the country (2). Another source commenting on the January 2017 military appointments was the Abidjan correspondent of Afrique sur 7. He described the appointment as an attempt to replace former Army Chief of Staff Soumaila Bakayokopar with Sékou Toure to contain the damage and insecurity caused by the soldier mutinies in Bouaké. The uprisings triggered the new appointments but had already been planned, according to Afrique sur 7, “these changes come after the recent mutinies that shook the army. It is true, however, that these different changes have been in the air for some time already” (3).

Research only found brief description of the selection process of military personnel at middle and top management level. The HR strategy states that all positions are filled by an open application proces where the local manager is in charge of the hiring process [1, 2]. However, some positions can still be filled by command in undefined “special circumstances”. For positions at the middle and top management level (from salary cap 37), the Ministry of Defence Personnel Agency, the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command will be involved in the hiring process. The Ministry of Defence Personnel Agency will, however, only have advisory capacity. No further information about the process could be found and neither separate description about the selection of the Chief of Defence [3], and so it must be assumed that the position of Chief of Defence is also filled by the open application system. The HR strategy states that “usually, all military and civilian positions are filled by application – no matter what level” [4]. However, during the review of this assessment, it was made clear that the selection process is a subject of deep frustration within the armed forces exactly because it lacks transparency. In theory, all positions can be applied for, in practice some attractive positions are filled by handpicking individuals either without an application process or with an application process that is only for show. The mix of the two systems creates confusion, lack of transparency and constitutes a hotbed of rumours within Danish Defence.

The Ministry of Defence launched a pilot project 1st January 2020 (Nyt Chefbemandingssystem), to test the new top management recruitment system at the colonel and commander levels. It is divided into two phases. An appointment council is established, where lieutenant colonels and commanders apply to be deemed suitable for appointment as colonel or captain, respectively. The council evaluates candidates twice a year. The council assessments are based on the described assessment parameters and tests, whether the individual is suitable to be appointed colonel or commander. In connection with the recruitment of posts, a pool of posts is posted twice a year. Suitable candidates are assessed and interviews are held, after which the recruiting chiefs sit down with the director of the Ministry of Defence’s Personnel Agency and the Chief of Defense and fill all positions in the pool.

In 2022, it will be considered whether the model with any adjustments should be rolled out to cover positions at the middle and top management level (from salary cap 37). The initial evaluation found that the new system is viewed as transparant and fair.[5]

As stated in the HR strategy, for positions at the middle and top management level (from salary cap 37), the Ministry of Defence Personnel Agency, the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command will be involved in the hiring process. The Ministry of Defence Personnel Agency will, however, only have advisory capacity [1, 2].

To ensure legitimacy and scrutiny in accordance with the recruiting system, an observer position has been established. The chairman of the officers’ union “HOD – Hovedorganisationen af Officerer I Danmark” holds this position. [3]

Appointment of certain senior officials (positions in salary cap 40 and above as well as certain positions in salary cap 38 and salary cap 39) must be submitted to the government’s appointments committee according to the guidelines issued by the Prime Minister’s Office. This applies to all recruitment processes within the government. [4]

As mentioned in Q41A, research only found brief description of the selection process of military personnel at middle and top management level. This is found in the HR strategy [1, 2]. Further, the use of and intended appointment of positions by command and by application appear non-transparent as explained in Q41A. The incumbent Chief of Defence Personnel Agency also stated in 2018 that the current hiring and promotion system is non-transparent and that this would be an action item [3]. A 2018 investigation by the attorneys to the state (Kammeradvokaten) of a possible incapacity violation within the Ministry of Defence gives evidence to the fact that the transparency of the hiring system is muddy [4]. The incumbent Minister of Defence has initiated a change in the appointment system of personnel in higher management positions [5]. The new system would set up a talent pool of the most suitable potential managers or officers who wish to pursue a career at the top level of the Defence. These would have to be accepted to the pool by application. From there, candidates would be able to apply for leadership positions which in turn would be filled for a limited time period of four years with the possibility of extension. However, research found no evidence that the system has been changed as of yet [6].

Law no. 232 (1959) sets out the appointment system for armed forces officers (1). Article 12, of the same law, sets the pools from which the officers are selected, and it is normally from military colleges or graduates of civilian colleges who have completed some formal military education. Graduating from a military college guarantees the graduate a career as an officer in the Armed Forces at least until becoming a colonel (‘aaqid). However, according to the same article, the minister of defence and commander-in-chief have some discretionary authority to appoint others (unspecified in the law) into the service. However, there are many cases where criteria and procedures are bypassed (2), (3), (4).

There is neither internal nor external oversight or scrutiny over any of the appointments of middle and top positions. The appointments of senior and sensitive positions are based on loyalty and capacity of obedience to the executives (1), (2), (3). Article 16 of Law no. 232 (1959) sets out the rules for appointing top senior positions, and gives the president of the republic the powers to appoint: a) the commander-in-chief (CIF) of the armed forces b) chiefs of staffs c) heads of armies. Positions B and C are proposed by the CIF to the president of the republic (4). Article 17 of the law sets out the rules for appointments of officers next in seniority. These officers are appointed by the CIF. In both systems, there is no external scrutiny, especially as the president of the republic almost always comes from a military background.

According to our sources, there is no published information about the process, procedures of appointments at top and middle level. There is the only announcement of the appointments without any further details (1), (2), (3). Presidential decrees and ministerial decrees are routinely published in the Official Gazette. This applies to the appointment of senior officers since the appointment happens through presidential or ministerial decrees. However, these decrees do not include appointments for all ranks or the selection requirements and criteria (4), (5).

The requirements for the appointment and promotion of military personnel in the Defence Forces and the Defence League are stipulated in detail in the Estonian Defence Forces Service Act. [1] The rank of an officer is granted by the President of the Republic at the proposal of the Commander of the Defence Forces. There is no board involved in the decision-making process. The law also stipulates the required education level and military training to be appointed. The only exception is the Commander of the Defence Forces, whose military rank is granted by the President at the proposal of the Minister of Defence. At least once a year the immediate commander of the military servicemen evaluates the compliance of military servicemen under his or her supervision with the peacetime post. These evaluations are considered when granting ranks.
In 2014 there was also a Career Progression Board formed as a test project to perform oversight of the evaluations, but it is unclear what the results were of this project. [2]
The granting of the ranks is coordinated by the Personnel Department of the Defence Forces and stipulated in the Statutes of the Personnel Department of the Headquarters of the Defence Forces. [3] However, according to a former flag officer, the appointment procedure is not always followed in detail. The appointment of top military personnel is highly politicised and good relationships influence decisions. [4]
There have been some steps taken to improve the situation. The Personnel Department of the Defence Forces checked the level of education of the officers in 2012. As a result, some military ranks were demoted. [5]

The supervision of the appointment system for the selection of military personnel is exercised by the Defence Resources Agency, which is a government agency under the purview of the Ministry of Defence. [1] Its budget is approved by the Minister of Defence. The Personnel Department under the Defence Resource Agency assists in personnel recruitment and selection, and organises the appointment procedure. [2] In addition, the Commander of the Defence Forces exercises supervision over the activities of the structural units and officials of the Defence Forces. And lastly, the Minister of Defence scrutinises the Defence Forces in general. The Commander of the Defence Forces is appointed tp and released from the post at the proposal of the Ministry of Defence, taking into account the position of the National Defence Committee of the Riigikogu. [3] Therefore, the auditing is only done by internal units and positions, the Riigikogu is only involved in top level appointments.

There is very limited information about the exact and clear recruitment procedure on the website of the Defence Forces [1] as well as on the website of the Defence Resource Agency, [2] with only some information about necessary courses that have to be passed for different ranks. [3] On the website of the Estonian National Defence College, there is a detailed description of the courses and ranks granted, but not in a straightforward format. [4] The most thorough and detailed overview of the ranks and the requirements is provided by the Military Service Act, which is made publicly available on the website of the Estonian legislation, Riigi Teataja. [5] Therefore, even if difficult to find, the information is publicly available – including the requirements for each rank.

According to a written response of the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, the Defence Forces has its own orders on personnel matters based on Act on the Defence Forces (551/2007), Decree on Defence Forces (1319/2007), Act on State Civil Servants (750/1994) and Decree on State Civil Servants (971/1994). According to the statement of the personnel department of the HQ, personnel practices and processes are as established, independent, open, and objective as they can be given the particular characteristics of the Defence Forces. [1]

Additionally, according to the Act on the Defence Forces, chpt 4, Section 40: The President of the Republic promotes, in the decision making order in matters of military order, persons to the ranks of second lieutenant and ensign, as well as to all ranks above them or corresponding to them on the presentation of the chief of staff. There are detailed descriptions of 11 different categories (each with sub-categories) that are evaluated for every promotion from Lt.Col upwards. The board includes a dozen generals from diffrent branches. The formal promotion at higher levels is then done by the President of Finland, who is also responsible for choosing the Chief of Defence. However, decision making regarding the ranks of brigadier, rear admiral and higher or corresponding ranks takes place on the presentation of Minister of Defence. [2]

Parliament does not have the authority to scrutinise the appointment of officers however, the promotion or appointment of senior staff to high seniority MoD positions or the position of General in the FDF (or other such sensitive positions, for example Commander of a Finnish unit based abroad), are formally reviewed by the President of Finland.

According to a written response of the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, the Defence Forces has its own orders on personnel matters based on Act on the Defence Forces (551/2007), [1] Decree on Defence Forces (1319/2007), [2] Act on State Civil Servants (750/1994) [3] and Decree on State Civil Servants (971/1994) [4]. According to the statement of the personnel department of the HQ, personnel practices and processes are as established, independent, open, and objective as they can be given the particular characteristics of the Defence Forces. [5]

Information on the promotion process publicly available are the laws referred to in response of the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, including Act on the Defence Forces (551/2007) [1], Decree on Defence Forces (1319/2007) [2], Act on State Civil Servants (750/1994) [3] and Decree on State Civil Servants (971/1994) [4]. However, legislation only provides the framework; it does not specify the exact processeses through which appointment takes place.

Middle-management military personnel are recruited through formal processes: each branch of the army has its own recruiting website with job postings online. [1] [2] [3] Applicants have to apply online, then they are chosen based on their profile, and tested on their motivation and physical aptitude, then through an interview with a jury. There are courses and an exam to pass to be able to apply to OF3 positions, there is a competitive exam to enter the war college, which is necessary to pass OF5, and the top-management general officiers are chosen by the meeting of all the OF8 and OF9 officers (Superior council or committee) of each armed service.

Middle-management civilian positions at the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MOAF) are recruited mostly via competitive exams. [4] Recruitment is also carried out without competition for certain bodies classified in category C. The examination of the candidacy files is entrusted to a selection committee, which draws up a list of aptitude in order of merit at the end of the hearing of those pre-selected.
There is also a way of recruitment without competition in the corps of the category C by a contract of public right giving tenure called PACT (course of access to the careers of the territorial public service, the public service hospitals and the public service of the state).
In-house promotion of civilian staff is decided mainly by professional examination.

In contrast, there doesn’t seem to be the same formal processes for senior positions, both military and civilian. Appointments do not follow objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes. In fact, no trace was found on the MOAF website of job openings for military personnel at top management level. Nominations of top management military personnel are discretionary [5] and left to the sole decision of the President of the Republic. Some of these nominations may be brought to the council of ministers for discussion, but the President decides alone, as “Chief of the Armies” (article 15 of 1958 Constitution). [6]
For instance, the Chief of the Etat Major of the armies is appointed by the President of the Republic, without any external scrutiny. Chief of Etat Major General Pierre de Villiers was dismissed in 2017 by the President without having to justify his decision, and replaced with General François Lecointre. [7]
The Minister of Defence tends – contrary to all the other ministers chosen by the Prime Minister – to be chosen by the President himself. [8]
The President also appoints the Generals of the armies. Names are generally suggested to the President by special advisors on defence and military issues.

Nominations of top management military personnel are discretionary [1] and left to the sole decision of the President of the Republic. Some of these nominations may be brought to the Council of Ministers for discussion or to a nomination committee, [2] but the President holds final decision-making authority as “Chief of the Armies” (article 15 of 1958 Constitution). [3] Beyond this, there is no external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management.
For instance, the Chief of Etat Major of the Armies is appointed by the President of the Republic, without any external scrutiny. Chief of Etat Major General Pierre de Villiers was dismissed in 2017 by the President, without him having to justify his decision, and replaced with General François Lecointre. [4]

Information on military appointments – including senior positions – can be found online in the text of decrees issued by the Council of Ministers and Ministry of the Armed Forces. [1] The Code de la défense includes some details about the process, for example the establishment of appointment committees, the use of rankings in the assessment, and the amount of time required in post. [2] However, it is not clear that this always includes all appointments at all levels, and no further information was found on public communications channels of the MOAF (its website) about the appointment process, when dealing with middle to top-management appointments. Besides this, the main source of information is the academic path to these high-ranking positions: Saint Cyr military schools. [3] Appointments at the end of the curriculum are said to be based on performances (ranking) and merit, but no evidence was found to back this claim.

The appointment process for middle and top-level personnel is prescribed in Central Service Regulation A-1340/46 (‘Auswahl von militärischem Personal für die Besetzung von Dienstposten’) [1]. Personnel are selected by the HR office at the Ministry of Defence (BMVg P II 2), which considers the criteria provided by the agency that put forward the request (‘Bedarfsträgerforderungen’) [2]. Thus, objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes are applied. According to the BMVg, all appointments and the corresponding promotions of military personnel at middle and top management, including very high-level ranks, involve scrutiny by representatives of the different military branches and the civil service [3].

The decision of whom is proposed to the Federal President for promotion to General (or a comparable rank; above B 6) is made by the Federal Minister of Defence on the basis of a recommendation made by the Head of HR at the Ministry of Defence. This is done on the basis of an overall assessment of the performance, qualifications and suitability of all possible candidates. Otherwise, appointments for upper management/leadership positions are not examined by Parliament [4].

One problem has emerged in recent years with the increasing employment of external consultants as top-level staff in the Ministry of Defence, where contracts have frequently been issued directly without a competitive procedure. Furthermore, there has been a frequent lack of appropriate justification for recruiting external expertise [5]. However, the irregularities in the context of this ‘consultancy scandal’ apply to temporary civilian staff in the Ministry of Defence, not military personnel, as requested by the indicator description.

The process is supervised by an advisory panel (‘Beteiligungsgremien’), which includes, for example, a representative of the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr (GenInspBw), as well as any inspectors/chiefs of unit concerned [1]. There is no further (external) participation and Parliament has no involvement whatsoever [2].

Information about the appointment/promotion of senior personnel is only circulated within the Armed Forces/Ministry of Defence [1].

Appointments of military personnel at high levels are made by the president in consultation with the Council of State. The appointments have immediate effect and are not subject to scrutiny other than that of the Council of State (1).

From the rank of lieutenant colonel and above, the Armed Forces Council, which is headed by the vice president, deals with promotions and it is at this high level that partisan politics plays a key role in determining certain appointments and postings (3), (4) (5).

For mid-level positions, appointments and promotions are done by the president based on the recommendation expressed by the Ghana Armed Forces Council (2).

Appointments are subject to scrutiny by the Council of State. However, the Council is also appointed by the president.

The Parliamentary Appointments Committee, despite its broad mandate, does not scrutinise the nominees in the defence and security institutions (1).

No information regarding the requirement and selection criteria of the appointment process is made publicly available by the MOD, GAF, or the Office of the President. Information about the candidate is disclosed to the media only when appointments have been already approved (1), (2).

The system for appointment of military personnel at middle and top management applies objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes, though there is little independent scrutiny being paid to the promotion of senior personnel [1]. Law 2439/1996 states that the leadership of the Armed Forces is selected by KYSEA: the Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence. The same law stipulates in detail the promotion processes for all military personnel [2].There are promotion boards consisting of senior officers without any independent observers.

There is no external or internal scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management since the relevant law does not require it [1, 2].

Information on the appointment process is only partially available on websites or to the public and/or may be incomplete with regards to selection criteria [1] [2].

The formal existing process is clearly defined by Ministerial decrees. The legal basis is set by the Act CCV of 2012 on the Legal status of Military Personnel [1] and the Ministry of Defence Order (MoD) on the HR Strategy of the Hungarian Army [2]. However the operation of the boards is superficial according to sources served in the military [3], high-level appointments are politicized and there is no oversight on the operation of the appointment system. (i.e. no independent observers).

Beyond hearings of the candidates for high-level positions (such as a minister, chief of general staff or head of the secret services) at the Defence Committee there is no additional external scrutiny of high-level appointees [1]. Top positions, such as generals are appointed by the president, based on the nomination of the minister; however, there is no information of the president ever denying an appointment.

Information is available, the MoD Order on the HR strategy of the Hungarian Army [1] provides information. However, there is little or no information on the operation of the evaluation boards. The promotion boards selection criteria are clear, but in the case of high-level positions requirements set by the strategy and orders (i.e minimum time to get promoted) are not always fully respected [2, 3, 4].

There is an established appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level.

Appointments to the level of Lieutenant General are made through promotion boards, with independent scrutiny representatives from other Armed Forces. These boards perform stringent scrutiny. Names of candidates are concealed to ensure objective decision-making [1]. The Appointment Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) oversees higher appointments and promotions. The Establishment Officers Division processes these proposals to the ACC [2][3].

The Ajay Vikram Singh Committee made recommendations encompassing a wide spectrum of service related issues to address the twin aspects of reducing the high age profile and improving cadre mobility of officers. Based on the recommendations of the Committee, a number of measures have been implemented as Cadre Review. These include time based promotion up to the rank of Lt Colonel; introduction of Colonel (Time Scale) rank; upgradation of 750 posts of Lt Colonel to Colonel; upgradation of 1896 posts in the ranks of Colonel, Brigadier, Major General and Lt General and their equivalents in Navy and Air Force [4][5].

A new Cadre Review is currently underway [6].

The government recently announced on Indian Independence Day that India will have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) [7].

Information on the appointment process is publicly available. There does not seem to be official scrutiny by Parliament of senior appointments. An expert states that there is unofficial legislative oversight [1]. There has been criticism at times regarding discrimination in promotions and the seniority versus merit debate that arose after the Cadre Review [2][3][4].

Appointments are released through formal and informal mechanisms. Specific selection criteria is not always publicly available. According to a government Press release in August 2017, “Bringing transparency in promotion policy is a continuous process and all necessary steps are taken from time to time” [1].

As alluded to in Q.37, in 2017, former Defence Minister, the late Manohar Parrikar formed a high-level committee consisting of Lt Gen G S Katoch and Lt Gen A K Ahuja to make promotion systems fair and transparent. They would give their recommendations to the government on the changes in promotion policy and the Quantified System of Selection (QSS) of the Indian Army [2].

Based on the law on the TNI [1], middle/high ranking military personnel (officers) are appointed by the President at the recommendation of the Chief of TNI. Usually, appointments are based on rank, but the final decision is the President’s. Meanwhile, the appointment and dismissal of positions other than the Chief of TNI and Chief of Staff of the Forces are governed by the decree of the Chief of TNI, through the approval of the rank council (Dewan Kepangkatan dan Jabatan Tinggi) of the TNI. Tours of duty of TNI personnel are regulated by TNI administrative instructions, one of which is stipulates the condition that the personnel member has held the same position for more than two years or in accordance with the TNI’s needs [2]. The promotion process is not published publicly, but the TNI Information Centre (Puspen TNI) does publicly announce a list of personnel names and the transfer of positions/promotions that have been decided upon by the Chief of TNI [3].

An external scrutiny process is only required for the appointment of the Chief of TNI, while the appointment of the Chief of Staff of the Forces is carried out by the President through the recommendation of the Chief of TNI. The position of the Chief of TNI is appointed by the President [1], following a process of assessment (fit and proper test) and approval conducted by the House of Representatives (DPR RI). The position of Chief of TNI can be held by an active high officer from one of the forces who is or has served as Chief of Staff of the Forces. The DPR RI’s fit and proper test in the process of selecting the Chief of TNI includes a publicly broadcasted administrative inquiry and interview focussing on the candidate’s vision and mission as Chief of TNI; it continues with a closed-door, in-depth interview [2]. The DPR RI then holds a closed meeting to decide whether or not to approve the candidate. However, there is no audit or external scrutiny for middle-management military personnel.

The information disclosed in announcements of transfers/promotions of personnel is limited to name and position, but not touching upon the appointment process that is considered as internal issue. The transfer/promotions announcements are published through the official Indonesian National Defence Forces (TNI) channel by the Information Centre (Puspen TNI) after the appointment has been completed [1]. The appointment process for TNI personnel is claimed to be based on professionalism and a merit system, implemented through the approval process of the Pre-Rank Council (Pra Dewan Kepangkapatan dan Jabatan Tinggi, Prawanjakti) and the Rank Council (Dewan Kepangkapatan dan Jabatan Tinggi, Wanjakti) [2]. However, as the Career Patterns of Soldiers (Pola Pengembangan Karir TNI) are directed in accordance with rank promotions, personnel must fulfil (or show signs of fulfilling) the criteria and expertise of each rank in order to be promoted to the next [3].

There is an established appointment process in place for military personnel. This is laid down in the Law on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’s Employment Regulations [1], and the Law of the Army of Iran [2]. Appointments to top management levels are undertaken by the Commander in Chief of Iran’s Armed Forces, which is the Supreme Leader [3, 4, 5]. The president appoints the minister of defence [6]. The Civil Service is not known to be involved. Article 17 of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Employment Regulations states as follows: The Central Selection Board in the Corps is composed of the Corps’s Commander-in-Chief or his deputy, the representative of the Valiye Faqih in the Corps or his deputy, the Chief of the Corps’s General Staff, the Corps’s officer of [the Organisation for] Protecting Intelligence and the aide to the Corps’s General Staff’s human resources as the secretary to the Board and the Minister or his deputy and will be organised with the duty of determining the Corps’s personnel selection policies within the framework of the law’s content, determining the agendas required, and supervising the activity of the Corps’s selection cells through the Corps’s Central Selection Board [1].

The Parliament oversees the appointment of the defence minister, but there is no evidence of any other external auditing [1, 2]

While appointments are announced, little or no information is released about the process. The Ministry of Defence does not have a website, and no relevant information was found of the Intelligence Ministry’s website [1].

There is evidence of a formal appointment system for the selection of military personnel. A detailed online search uncovered different systems that apply to different branches of the security apparatus. I was able to track systems of appointment for military personnel beneath the Iraqi Military Service Law (2010) and a system of salary allocations for police cadre dating back to 2016 (1). Based on the evidence available it is not entirely clear whether the formal appointment system has been upgraded. While the system on paper suggests that meritocratic principles dictate the process, appointments and promotions are widely influenced by quotas or Muhassassa.
Political appointments are governed according to the tenets that inform the country’s legal Muhassassa framework — sectarian apportionment — distributed based on perceived identities, a system that has been criticized as undemocratic (2) for giving rise to a landscape of fractional politics (2). Such practices in and of themselves, constitute “abuse of public office” (2) for failure to allocate appointments based on qualification/grade. As TI’s 2015 Iraq assessment spells out (3), parliamentary approval of middle and top-level military positions is absent.

An informed source expressed in an interview with TI that sectarian apportionment muddles checks and balances as far as appointments are concerned. In his recent analysis into the destabilizing effects of corruption on Iraq, professor Toby Dodge describes the system as one that “not only divides ministerial positions between senior members of the parties that win each national election but a subsidiary to the muhasasa ta’ifa”. This very system, he adds, grants politicians, under and outside of negotiations, “the power to appoint positions at the top of the civil service”. Parliamentarian Muzafer Ismael (1) raised concerns over favouritism within security/defence appointments. Called for the formation of an investigative committee to uncover whether meritocratic principles rank second to political favouritism, Ismael said regarding the unexplained promotion of countless officers/colonels in Basra for both the Ministry of Defence and Interior to ‘reconsider these promotions’. Such calls and the prevalence of ghost soldiers in the past few years suggest the lack of a sturdy system of parliamentary scrutiny.

Up to date information on Iraq’s appointment process is lacking while laws from previous years are available, as discussed in 41A. What is not clear if the same system remains firmly in place or whether it has undergone reform. A military affairs expert (1) with whom Transparency International spoke stated that “requirements and selection criteria exist but vary from one security branch to the next but musasa-informed appointments have resulted in cabinet delays and other high-ranking security posts” (1). The choices made at the top of security and defence institutions are rarely scrutinised. The system as professor Toby Dodge (2) elaborates in an in-depth article encourages “both personal and political corruption and government incoherence”. Overall, the choices made are not entirely transparent but tend to be picked up across local press coverage.

The selection process between candidates is done in accordance with the High Command Instruction 3.0228 “Commissioned Ranks – Principles of Promotion in IDF Ranks – Regular Service” (1), which was approved by the MOD and which determines principle for promotion in officer ranks. General Staff Directive 32.0202 “Principles of Promotion of Commissioned Ranks in the IDF – Regular Service” and the Manpower Directorate policy regulate the parameters for promotion in ranks (2). These parameters include academic education, seniority in service, security clearance, recommendations and references from commanders, and relevant courses and training. Promotion to certain positions may also require passing specific tests or courses. Almost all senior positions are filled by a procedure of “placement discussions” the results of which are published on the IDF website (3).
The head of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) is appointed by the minister of defence and security with the consent of the Israeli prime minister. As far as major ranking goes,the first in the chain of mid-level positions), there are specific conditions that one must pass to be considered (4). There are also details of the conditions for all the ranking promotions in the IDF (4). In short, the officer must qualify under certain requirements such as educations, specific courses, clean record in the army, duration of service, roles done in service, specific tests, but not only. The document above also says who is eligible to suggest an officer for promotions, as well as who is entitled to decline it and eventually who, or rather what ranking officer, is eligible to sign off on the promotion. A document (5) taken from the official website of the IDF specifies the appointment of lieutenant colonels, it shows how, in addition to all the requirements above, the officers proposed for promotion also must pass an evaluation center, statistics show about half of the applicants actually pass this and get rewarded with the new ranking of lieutenant colonel. These evaluation centers procedures apply for all ranking’s promotions, aside from head of the IDF. However there is no evidence that the recruitment process involves independent figures outside of the chian of command and IDF directives are not clear on this issue.

The army had procedures for promotion, and they are objective to some extent (1). The appointment of officers ranked colonel or higher must receive the approval of the Manpower Directorate – which is an independent body not sub-ordinate to any other military division (2). In placement discussions for positions ranked lower than colonel the Manpower Directorate serves as a supervising authority which can receive complaints regarding a certain decision and which has the authority to annul placement discussions held not according to orders. However, according to the High Command Instruction 3.0228 mentioned above, some positions require additional authorizations from external authorities: officers ranked colonel and above will only be appointed with the approval of the Minister of Defense; the military Chief of Staff will only be appointed with the approval of the Minister of Defense and the Government (3). Also, in accordance with Article 187 of the Military Justice Law 5715-1955 the appointment of military judges requires the approval of the Judicial Appointment Committee, headed by the Minister of Defense. The Judicial appointment committee also includes the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice (4). However, these mechanisms are internal to the defence sector and there is very weak external and independent scrutiny as the appointment of senior commanders is decided between the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Staff without external engagement (5). While parliament has, occasionally, debated such appointment in the past, this is not done systematically, nor does it have much bearing on the outcome (6).

Information on the appointment process is public available, either on the website or freely released outside formal mechanisms (1) (2) (3) (4). Information includes requirements and selection criteria, but it seems to be incomplete in some sensitive positions, particular for senior positions in the intelligence services.

The appointment system for the selection of middle and top management is defined by the Code of the Military System [1] and the Single text of the regulatory provisions of the military code (testo unico delle disposizioni regolamentari in materia di ordinamento militare) [2]. According to these documents, high-level appointments are decided by ad hoc high level commissions for each armed forces. Civil servants do not feature on these commissions. Meetings of the commissions are called by the Minister of Defence, following the proposal of the Chief of Defence Staff (art. 1035 Code of the Military System) [3]. According to art 1041 of the Code, composition of high level commissions is complemented by other members, according to the type of evaluation that has to be taken. In some cases specified in the article, the Secretary General, the Deputy Military Secretary General and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defence have to be consulted before taking decisions, but no civil servants feature in the commissions. There is no specific job description for military top management, since the attributions of the role are enlisted in both the Code of the military system and the single text of the regulatory provisions of the military code.

For civilian managers, the selection process is regulated by Ministerial Decree 22 March 2016. The job description, outlining the number of open positions and the criteria of selection, is published on the institutional website of the Ministry of Defence. For civilian managerial positions, evaluating commissions are not established. Based on the kind of position, general or non-general, the decision is internal to the Ministry of Defence or transmitted to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. [3]

Appointments to high-level positions are not subjected to external scrutiny processes nor audits. An external control might be considered a necessity for the personnel in any cases of incompatibility or exclusion of assignment (inconferibilità e incompatibilità degli incarichi) [1]. On this specific aspect, according to the 2019 report of the Anticorruption Supervisor, no breach of law occurred in the previous year (section 7) [2]. For some very high-level appointments, related to the extra defence activities in which the Ministry of Defence is involved, the Parliamentary Defence Committees may undertake a review. [3]

Information on the vacancy and on the appointment process per rank is made available on the website of the Ministry of Defence [1]. In the vacancy note it is possible to acknowledge the selection criteria that, in the vast majority of cases recall those listed in Legislative Decree, 30 March 2001 n. 165 [2].

The website of the Japan Ministry of Defence provides some announcements of vacant positions and access to legislation for the defence sector. [1] [2] The guiding legislation for the appointment of Self-Defence Force (SDF) personnel is article 31 of the Self-Defence Forces Act. [3] The text of the act is sparse, but details are given in ordinances. [4] Objective job descriptions were not found on the Ministry webpages for officer positions that were to be filled by internal promotion. [1] Documents available provided information about standardised assessment processes, however. A candidate must pass the recruitment examination for cadets to be eligible for appointment to positions at the level of Second Lieutenant rank and above. [5] An officer must pass the very competitive Command and General Staff Course entrance examination and complete the course, which lasts two years for the GSDF and one year for the other service branches, to be eligible for appointment to positions at Colonel rank and above. [6] There are courses to qualify for even higher positions as well. As a retired higher Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) officer stated at interview, promotions to Colonel and higher ranks are decided by the Minister of Defence, and to ranks below that by the Chief of Staff of the service branch. [7] This is also stated in the “Instructions on the right to appoint,” which explain in detail over twenty pages who has the right to appoint personnel to which positions, but does not mention promotion boards, although it gives instructions about how the appointer should receive and weigh opinions from above or below themselves in the chain of command when making appointment decisions. [8] Formal personnel assessment of ability and work performance, conducted at least annually, by a person in a supervisory role toward the person being assessed [9] is to be emphasised when selecting a person to appoint from among those who have completed the necessary courses and have the requisite skills and knowledge. [3] The former officer interviewed stated that the personnel department of the service branch involved drafts the proposal for promotion. Within the MSDF, all Vice-Admirals come together and scrutinise the promotion of personnel outside their chain of command. Furthermore, above a certain rank, commanders outside the chain of command conduct personnel assessment by answering a questionnaire, and this is used as a supplementary source when drafting a promotion proposal. [7] Information that persons outside the chain of command assess applicants for higher officer positions is not found in the SDF Act [3] or in four implementing documents on appointment, [4] [8] [10] [11] however. No evidence is found in these documents that promotion boards are established, although there are procedures for appointers to receive advice from outside the chain of command, as explained by the interviewee. Committees that assess exams to determine promotion to higher officer or sergeant rank may include SDF personnel in administrative positions from outside the service branch concerned, however. [12]

There is not enough information to score this indicator. A retired higher Maritime Self-Defence Force officer said at interview that the Cabinet Law determines that the Cabinet Personnel Bureau is to conduct certain administrative tasks with regard to personnel administration. However, to what extent the Cabinet Personnel Bureau scrutinises high level appointments of SDF officials is not certain. [1] The relevant articles in the Cabinet Law are 12 and 21. [2]

Rules regarding appointment for all SDF personnel, not only medium- or high-rank officers, are publicly available. [1] [2] Implementing guidelines that provide information on the assessment criteria for appointment, such as which courses a candidate must take to qualify [3] and what criteria personnel assessment is based on, [4] are available on the website of the MOD. However, a retired higher MSDF officer gave details about the procedures for the assessment of higher officers that are not found in written guidelines that can be freely accessed, and objective descriptions of jobs that are to be filled by promotion within the Ministry were not found on its website (see Q41A). Nevertheless, the Ministry announces appointments to higher officer positions on its website. [5]

There is a system for the appointment and the selection of military personnel at the middle and top management level [1]. The criteria for selection for senior positions within the intelligence in Jordan is unclear and similar to the intelligence services, senior military positions are granted through royal decrees. Many positions at senior and middle level ‘are primarily awarded, not according to meritocratic principles only, but based on kinship and personal relationships’, and the phenomenon of ‘wasta’ is widespread in the country [2,3,4].

There is generally no external scrutiny of the defence sector, and thus there is no external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management levels. As established in previous questions, the legislature does not have the power to scrutinise defence in general, as defence remains largely controlled by the King according to the constitution [1] and there is very little, if any, debate around defence that takes place within Parliament [2]. In addition to this, there is no evidence of any scrutiny over the defence sector by bodies that could be mandated to do so, such as Jordanian Audit Bureau and the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission [3]. Research into local media also shows that media has not, in the past years, questioned any appointments for middle and top management positions. This could be because, in 2016, the armed forces prohibited the publication of any news related to it [4,5,6]. This demonstrates that, as there is no external scrutiny over the defence in general, there is also no scrutiny over defence selection mechanisms for positions.

There is little to no information released about the appointment process for middle and top management military personnel. Formal and informal mechanisms are widely used to inform about the new appointments and selections. The informal mechanisms are through congratulations advertisements for the personnel by their tribes, as a show of power, or through the media [1,2]. It has been previously established that most of the defence information is classified, under Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. 50 [3]. In addition to that, there is very little information available about the defence sector in general in Jordan, and the fact that the defence sector has never been audited the Audit Bureau is also an indicator that there is a general lack of transparency [4]. Moreover, the official webpage of the armed forces only includes information in relation to the selection of soldiers and officers. Despite the brevity in this criterion, there is no mention of the appointment process for middle and top management military personnel [5].

Section 23 of the Kenya Defence Force Act gives the criteria and process of appointment of top State-Officer positions. The top management level is done by the President, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. These top level positions according to part II, section 9 of the Kenya Defence Forces Act, include the Chief of of the Defence Forces, the Vice Chief of the Defence Forces and the three Service Commanders. [1]

The President makes appointments guided by the advice of the Defence Council. While the President and Defence Council may follow an appointment system, this system is not divulged. The Act, under part II section 9 (4) only requires the President to ensure that appointments ‘reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya’ when making the above appointments. In addition, the Act under section 23 sets the requirements for top level appointees. [1] These include ensuring the appointees are senior in the military ranks, have acquired military and formal civil education (University degree from a recognized university in Kenya) and they have military and security experience.

Other non-State Officer mid-level positions are done by the Defence Council. Section 28 (2) of the Act indicates that the Defence Council is mandated to develop the criteria for the recruitment, promotion and transfer of these position in consultation with the Public Service Commission. However, there is no known published policy on how recruitment should operate.

Middle and top management positions in the military who are state-officers are publicly vetted by parliament in accordance to the Public Appointments (Parliamentary Aprroval) Act No. 33 of 2011. [1] However, the chief of defence forces, vice chief and three service commanders are all appointed solely by the President. [2]

Moreover, one of the main issues is whether the structure of Defence Council as currently constituted is independent enough to scrutinise internal appointments as currently consittuted. Other than the Cabinet Secretary and the Principle Secretary from the Ministry of Defence, other members are all military – that is, the Chief of Defence Forces, the three Service Commanders.

Although the Act has put in place appointment procedures and criteria, appointments to the top and middle level positions within the military especially shortlisting criteria used by the Defence Council is less known and made public. In addition, information on the appointment process is not made publicly available, and only the Defence Council has the exclusive task of nominating appointees to these positions [1].

The Regulation No. 03/2018 on Career Development for Members of the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) states that each position in the KSF has a unique job description [1], and applies to all relevant members of the Security Forces [1]. Each job description provides selection criteria to ensure the best candidates are selected [2]. Given the standardisation of the assessment process, Appointment and Promotion Board members are all informed of the selection criteria [3].
Depending on the rank of each appointment, the appointing authority within the Ministry of Defence or KSF nominates members to the Appointment and Promotion Board in line with the rank of the position to be filled [4, 5], and members should be at least a rank above the candidate; with the exception of candidates running for the positions of Sergeant Major or Sergeant Major First Class, where members can be of equal ranking. The board consists of three members with the ranks of Brigadier General and above, chaired by the Commander of the Security Forces [4]. The Regulation No. 03/2018 on Career Development of the KSF Members does not specifically address the involvement of civil service in the Appointment and Promotion Boards for very high level ranks. However, the appointing authority (the Minister of Defence or the Commander of the KSF) has the right to appoint observers from within the Ministry of Defence who do not have the right to vote, as well as international representatives who report directly to the Board [4]. Through decree, the President has the authority to appoint and promote high level ranks of the KSF which include Lieutenant General (OF-8), Major General (OF-7) and Brigadier General (OF-6) [5].
The Integrity Plan for 2019-2022 of the Ministry of Defence has suggested that the Boards involved in the processes of recruitment and promotion be better trained and organised [6].

In its Annual Audit Reports for the Ministry of Defence over the period 2015-2018, the National Audit Office (NAO) has not scrutinised in depth any candidates for high-profile positions or military staff within the Ministry of Defence or the Kosovo Security Forces [1-4]. There is no information available as to whether the Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Oversight of the Kosovo Security Forces (CIASOKSF) scrutinised these candidates either. Parliamentary oversight of the Security Forces is reported to have been insufficient in recent years.

According to the government reviewer, there is a career management regulation in place which defines all aspects of the career development process to include appointment system for selection of military personnel at middle and top management level. In every promotion board, there is a civilian oversight by the MoD (Human Rights Office), which ensures that the process is transparent and subject to regulation. This information could not be independently verified.

The Ministry of Defence publishes on its website open calls and results of the internal evaluation of candidates applying for positions within the Kosovo Security Force [1, 2], in the specific sub-section entitled “Job Vacancies” within the “Announcements” section [1]. The information published only relates to the final results of the interview and test procedures; the final announcement is not made public. Candidates are ranked by a points system based on the tests and interviews [1].
The staff who are newly appointed or promoted are made publicly available in the annual report of the Ministry of Defence [2]; however, the information provided in these annual reports remains superficial and does not provide detailed information on the appointment process [2].

There is no established appointment system for middle and top management that is transparent in the military, KNG or the police, and the civil service does not play a role in it whatsoever, state auditors said (1, 2 and 3). The criteria for appointments, set by the heads of these agencies, is only subject to the scrutiny of the SAB, according to article 12 of its law (4).

But at least in the police, there is a General Committee for Police Affairs, which is formed by the Minister, to evaluate, promote, demote and fire officers, according to article 8 of Law. 23 of 1967 for police affairs, and that provides the MOI with the semblance of internal oversight, which is missing in the military and the KNG (5, 6 and 7).

Only civilian appointments in these bodies are reviewed by the CSC because article 3 of its law exempts military personnel from its oversight (8).

These bodies do not need parliamentary approvals for high level appointments, but the Parliament can voice concern or stop an appointment if it wants by calling for a no-confidence vote on the Minister making the decision. This is not a common occurrence, of course, since Parliament is full of Government supporters (1), activists said (2 and 3).

The appointments are, however, subject to the oversight of the SAB. Article 12 of the SAB’s law says the bodies must reach an agreement over these appointments (4). If they don’t, they must seek the Prime Minister’s help.

This process is routinely undermined by undue influence from the executive branch. The security agencies do not provide the SAB with all the information it needs, and many auditors are either corrupt or too intimidated to press them on this, because the Emir did not sufficiently empower the SAB to carry out its mandate.

This lack of political will, as discussed before, also undermines the financial auditing process.

There is not established formal process for appointments with objective job descriptions and standardised assessments, officials said (1, 2 and 3). The Defence Minister, like the Interior Minister and the KNG head, makes these appointments either on his own or with a select group of senior officials in private.

They do notify the SAB of the decisions, but they do not always provide justification and the information they provide may be conflicted or unreliable, the officials said. The CSC has absolutely no role in these decisions because they are not civilian decisions.

The legal framework is overall clear and well-described. Formally, the recruitment of military peronnel at middle and top management level is regulated by the Personnel policy of the Ministry of Defence, the National Armed Forces and all institutions under their supervision. [1] It is also regulated by the Military Service Law (Articles 23 on “Appointment of Officers to Positions”, Article 24 on “Appointment to Positions of Non-commissioned Officers and Privates”, Article 25 on “Professional Evaluation and Certification of Soliders”). The Law requires that a Clarification Board be put in place for the appointment of every officer. The Commander of the National Armed forces is appointed by the same law (Article 14). The Commander is appointed based on a recommendation from the President to the parliament. [2]

In addition to the Clarification Board, the Ministry of Defence’s Audit and Inspection Department regularly conducts audits in this area in accordance with the Internal Audit Law, [1] as well as the approved Ministry of Defence’s Internal Audit Strategy and Internal Audit Plan. Scrutiny for high level positions takes place at parliamentary and ministerial level, including the Internal audit and Human Resource departments. [2]

Information on the appointment of officials is made public right after the procedure. There is no public deliberation on the appointment of high-ranking military officials; however, it is clear that the Clarification Board deals with the evaluation of the appropriateness of the candidate to a given position. Each candidate’s career path is also regulated by the Military Service Law. [1] Interview results suggest that on the lower levels of military hierarchy, rotation and competition exists; however, on the higher levels of the military hierarchy, the decisions are political. According to the government reviewer, however, the NAF appoints personnel based on service requirements, existing education, evaluation and other competences. The Highest Attestation Commision is responsible for candidate evaluation and appointment (MOD 7-REGL).

A formal appointment process exists; however, it is undermined by political and sectarian considerations. Section 3 of the National Defence Law lays out basic requirements for promotion. For instance, Section 3, Article 44 states that the “Promotion to the rank of Captain, Colonel, or Major General is by the selection, after the candidate has spent at least four years in the directly lower rank” (1). Furthermore, the LAF is working with partners such as the US DoD’s Institute for Security Governance (ISG) to set accurate job descriptions for senior, mid and junior appointments (2). At the same time, as a by-product of the post-war confessional system, the LAF maintains a 50:50 Christian Muslim parity in its officer corps. Key posts, deputy or second-order positions, and leaders of fighting units are split along sectarian lines (3).
An interviewee also confirmed that top, middle, and junior level posts are allocated based on merit and sectarian lines (4).

The LAF’s high-level appointments are divided along confessional lines and subject to sectarian political parties decisions. For instance, the Chief of Staff post is reserved for a person from the Druze religion whose name needs to have the green light of the Durzi leadership (1). An example of this took place when appointing main figures of the Military Council which is composed of 6 members, each belonging to a different sect that needs to the approval of its political leadership in (2). As indicated from before, appointments for posts higher to frontline units such as the deputy CoS, CoS, the Military Council and other flag officer posts undergo an intricate selection process and are horse-traded by competing sectarian political factions (3).
The Parliament does not scrutinize the appoints of military personnel in middle and top management. However, the president and the Council of Ministers scrutinize the appointment for sectarian related reasons (4).

The National Defence Law outlines the general criteria for the appointments of senior positions except for the sectarian component (1). The sectarian distribution requirements are unwritten rules agreed on by the military command and the political entities (2). However, the appointments are usually announced and published online after the decisions are taken and approved (3). A source indicated that usually, the command requests certain regular requirements such as the rank, the cohort, etc, from a small pool of candidates (4).

There is an established system based on pre-set criteria for appointing the military personnel. Military senior officers are appointed by the Defence Minister after he/she receives recommendations from the internal Commission. Military junior officers are appointed by the Chief of Defence after he/she receives recommendations from the internal Commission. NCOs and soldiers are appointed by Chief of Defence, Single Service Chiefs, Units commanders (depending on NCO or soldiers rank). There are three internal commissions (Senior officers commission, Junior officer commission, NCO and soldiers commission). Their composition is detailed in a special decree of the MoD or ChoD and is publicly available (3). Each candidate is considered according to specific criteria. However, the Minister of Defence might not promote a candidate due to lack of political trust in that person (even when all criteria and requirements are fulfilled) (1) (2). Military middle and top management positions do not have objective job descriptions or selection criteria specifically for middle and top management publicly available.

There is no evidence of external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and some top management. Only the Commander of the Armed Forces and the Head of the Security Service are appointed or let go with the agreement of Parliament [1].

Information on the appointment process is publicly available for free on the website of the Ministry of Defence and in the Law registry. The military career concept and the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service include the requirements, eligibility and selection criteria for each rank [1,2]. For example, the military personnel for higher ranks is selected, in principle, based on competition and selection criteria such as personal characteristics, individual needs and goals, recommendations from his/her superiors and his/her professional results.

Each military service has its own Board of Promotion chaired by the Chief of Service. Promotion is subject to an evaluation by the Services Promotion Board. [1] But for the appointment of the Armed Forces Chiefs, the Chief of Army, Navy, and Airforce, the Armed Forces Council, chaired by the Minister of Defence, is responsible for nominating a candidate. Other members include the Ministry’s Secretary General, and all chiefs of services. The council will then “advise” the Prime Minister on the selection. If the Prime Minister agrees, he will propose the name to Yang DiPertuan Agong for Royal Consent. It is an open secret and seems common practice that political interference does occur either during the selection at the board level or at the Prime Minister level. The process is stipulated under the Section 12 of the Armed Forces Council under Act 77: Akta Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (Malaysian Armed Forces Act) 1972. [2] Yet political connections do influence the promotion exercises. Up to the middle level, promotions are given on the basis of seniority. Beyond the position of Colonel in particular, it is not uncommon for promotions to be influenced by a mix of “military politics”, “party politics”, and “royalty politics”. It has been somewhat important for military personnel aiming to climb beyond Colonel or receive favourable appointments to acquire social and political capital by cultivating relationships with power brokers in government, important personnel who are already generals, and senior members of the royalty. These connections essentially allow for a mid-level leader to lobby for his promotion to a senior level. Indeed, Zukifli Zainal Abidin, the 19th Chief of Army, was made the scapegoat of the Lahad Datu intrusion because he was said to have been against appointing a company linked to Rosmah Mansor to supply the military with uniforms. [3][4] Appointments made to the head of the Military Intelligence are said to be influenced by highly political considerations. This is likely because Prime Ministers routinely use Military Intelligence for purposes relating to domestic or electoral/party politics. Additionally, for the most part, the Chief of Army appointments have gone to those from the Royal Malay Regiment, suggesting there to be a selection bias which privileges that contingent. [5] [6] The current developments under the new Pakatan Nasional hardly seem coincidental: the current Chief of Defence Forces, Affendi Buang, is the brother-in-law of the Agong (King). [7]

Parliament is not involved in the appointments and selections at the middle and top management level. [1] [2] These are regulated by the Armed Force Act 1972, which states that nominations and selections are discussed by the Armed Forces Council. Council decisions are made known to the Prime Minister, who subsequently “advises” the Yang Dipertuan Agong (the King). However, it is the prerogative of the King, under the Constitution and the Armed Forces Act, to accept the appointment. [3]

The process is not made public. According to the two sources interviewed, promotional circulars are not even issued for the exercise. [1] [2] All promotions to senior ranks are based on invitation by the head of department. For the promotion of Major and above, the military officer must have attended senior courses at the Staff College or National Defence College, or equivalent overseas training programs.

Formal processes are now in place for the appointment of senior military personnel. But political considerations continue to unduly influence the selection process. The President, the Minister of Defence and the Council of Ministers appear to be the only people involved in appointing officers.[8] In May 2017, parliament approved a new general statute for the military that outlined clear selection criteria for military appointments and promotions to various grades. For example, the statute stipulates that no person can rise to the level of General if they have not followed and completed a programme of higher military education, programmes focusing on the development of scientific and technical skills, and, finally, a postgraduate university degree.[8]
There are three categories of ranks within the Malian armed forces: Non-Commissioned ranks (Militaires de rang), Non-Commissioned Officers (Sous-Officiers) and Officers.[8]
Article 49 of the general statute clearly outlines the criteria for becoming an Officer. Firstly, the recruitment of officers is conducted via the military officer training schools.[8] Candidates must already hold the grade of Chief Warrant Officer or Major Chief Warrant Officer to be eligible to become an Officer. Other conditions that influence such decisions are, among others:
– age
– educational background
– performance on aptitude tests
– current grade and length of service
– time spent as a commander
– maintaining a balance between those who come through officer training school and those who come through other recruitment channels.[8]
Such appointments are made by decree by the minister responsible for the armed forces, i.e. the President of the Republic. Article 55 indicates that the seniority of officers is determined by their previous activities. Finally, article 50 points out that appointments and promotions relating to general officers are made by decree by the Council of Ministers and by the President for all other officers.[8]
Furthermore, article 46 stipulates that career progression within the armed forces functions by being promoted from one grade to the grade immediately superior. The only exceptions to this rule are for promotions from:
– Corporal to Sergeant
– Chief Warrant Officer to Second Lieutenant
– Colonel to Brigadier.[8]
However, the process of such appointments remains deeply politicised and informal, with candidates frequently gaining their post because of their connections in government or to serve wider political interests.
A World Bank report described the situation in detail in 2008. It said that appointments in the public sector in Mali, including the military, are seen as an asset which generates “flows of illicit incomes” (wages, bonuses, indemnities, state budget diversion, and corruption).¹ This system creates a “secondary market” in which those who have the power to hire or to promote negotiate their influence.¹ This secondary market has flourished because of the lack of internal controls, the lack of established career paths and deficiencies in human resources.¹ It says that military appointments are often made to serve private ends or political objectives. This analysis remains pertinent today: even the current defence minister admits this.
Tiéna Coulibaly was appointed Minister of Defence in April 2017. Within a month of his arrival at the MODV, Coulibaly publicly determined that the army’s main weakness is in recruitment. He said that during the recruitment process, various ministers, MPs and officers present their own lists as to who should be selected.[3] Rather than recruiting soldiers on merit, the current process favours those who are well-connected. As a result, these new soldiers, recruited without competition and “for whom strings have been pulled”, are unfit for fighting because they are simply in the armed forces to draw a salary.[3] Coulibaly has pledged to ensure that from now on soldiers are recruited through a fair and competitive process.[3]
Affiliation to a political party or a powerful individual can greatly assist with accessing key positions in the army. According to Le Monde, the alleged ‘Lobbo’s list’ is an example of this system occurring at the heart of political power.² Lobbo Traoré was the wife of the former interim president Dioncounda Traoré (2012-2013) who used her network to place her children’s friends in key positions.²
The most recent example of an overtly political appointment to a senior military post came in February 2018, when former chief of staff, Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé, was nominated as Inspector General of the Army. The appointment was made by the Council of Ministers, having accepted the nomination of the Minister of Defence.[7] Having been a key figure in Captain Amadou Sanogo’s military junta in 2012, the appointment was highly controversial. Moreover, Dembélé was appointed a mere 15 days after a court in Bamako had lifted his probation status.[5] Dembélé currently stands accused of ‘passive complicity’ in the assassination in 2012 of 21 members of the red berets, a rival unit to that of Sanogo’s green berets. The trial of Sanogo and several co-defendants opened in November 2016 and is ongoing.
FIDH, an international human rights group, stated that one had to see the appointment of Dembélé in the context of the 2018 presidential election.[5] It represents an attempt to reconcile rival factions, the army and to shore up national unity, with IBK seeking re-election. Indeed, Sanogo remains popular in Mali, with many viewing his robust intervention as necessary to rid the country of the corrupt and crumbling ATT government that had lost control of two-thirds of the country’s territory to jihadist groups. Dembélé’s appointment is thus designed to sow division between Sanogo and some of his key allies, but can also appear nationally as if IBK is offering an olive branch to Sanogo’s camp.[6]
A defence attaché working in Bamako opined that “many people at the higher echelons of the army are internationally schooled officers and are thus skilled, experienced individuals”.[10] But a Lieutenant Colonel within FAMA told him that corruption is so widespread that you must be corrupt to get promoted.[10] In the defence attaché’s view, illicit payments don’t necessarily skew the system, but they lubricate it. Many people are appointed because of their capabilities, but they still need to pay.
Furthermore, a senior security governance official told the assessor that the concepts of ‘cousinage, copinage and parrainage’ (ethnic kinship, cronyism and patronage) all retain a massive influence within the armed forces.[11] Selection and appointments within the military have also historically been conducted along ethnic and regional lines to satisfy political considerations rather than basing the appointments purely on merit (see Galy, p.6). Tuareg soldiers have been integrated into the army either individually or, following peace agreements, collectively. The Malian army thus incorporated many former Tuareg rebels into the army, provoking anger among other ethnic groups. One sees this dynamic and these disputes being replicated in the ongoing DDR process, which aims to incorporate members of armed groups and influential ethnic militia into the state’s security apparatus.[4]

The assessor found no evidence that the appointments of more senior military personnel are subject to external scrutiny. The process of such appointments is deeply politicised and informal, with candidates gaining their post largely because of their connections in government or to serve wider political interests.
A member of the CDSPC confirmed to the assessor that the committee does not play a role in scrutinising or vetting military appointments [7]. The source said that parliament has a role in constructing the framework within which promotions and appointments are made, but that it has no involvement in individual appointments and promotions [7].
Indeed, in May 2017, parliament approved a new general statute for the military that outlined clear criteria for promotions to various grades. Article 50 points out that nominations and promotions relating to general officers are made by decree by the Council of Ministers and by the President for all other officers [6]. But there is no provision in the general statute for parliament or the CDSPC to scrutinise such appointments [6]. There is similarly no mention of external oversight in the LOPM, the government’s major programme of military reform that was adopted into law in 2015 [7].
For example, in 2017, the government appointed a new chief of staff of the armed forces to replace the outgoing Didier Dacko, who was leaving to head up the regional G5 Sahel Force. However, none of the media coverage relating to the appointment of M’Bemba Moussa Keita made any reference to him having to appear before parliament’s Defence and Security Committee or his appointment being subject to debate within the National Assembly [2, 3].
Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that the controversial appointment of Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé in February 2018, as detailed above, was subject to any external scrutiny or parliamentary discussion [1, 4, 5].

While information is available about the legal framework for recruitment and appointment of military personnel, there is no evidence of processes in place to implement this at the working level. These have proven also highly undermined by political influence. In addition, there is no scrutiny by the CDSPC at any levels.
In May 2017, parliament approved a new general statute for the military that outlined clear selection criteria for military appointments and promotions to various grades. For example, the statute stipulates that no person can rise to the level of General if they have not followed and completed a programme of higher military education, programmes focusing on the development of scientific and technical skills, and, finally, a postgraduate university degree.¹⁹ There are three categories of ranks within the Malian armed forces: Non-Commissioned ranks (Militaires de rang), Non-Commissioned Officers (Sous-Officier) and Officers.¹⁹
Article 49 of the general statute clearly outlines the criteria for becoming an Officer. Firstly, the recruitment of officers is conducted via the military officer training schools.¹⁹ Candidates must already hold the grade of Chief Warrant Officer or Major Chief Warrant Officer to be eligible to become an Officer. Other conditions that influence such decisions are, among others:
– age
– educational background
– performance on aptitude tests
– current grade and length of service
– time spent as a commander
– maintaining a balance between those who come through officer training school and those who come through other recruitment channels.¹³
Such appointments are made by decree by the minister responsible for the armed forces, i.e. the President of the Republic. Article 55 indicates that the seniority of officers is determined by their previous activities. Finally, article 50 points out that appointments and promotions relating to general officers are made by decree by the Council of Ministers and by the President for all other officers.¹⁹
Furthermore, article 46 stipulates that career progression within the armed forces functions by being promoted from one grade to the immediately superior grade. The only exceptions to this rule are for promotions from:
– Corporal to Sergeant
– Chief Warrant Officer to Second Lieutenant
– Colonel to Brigadier.¹⁹
However, information relating to how or why certain people are selected for senior roles is scant. The appointment of Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé as Inspector General of the Army was made by the Council of Ministers, having accepted the nomination of the Minister of Defence,¹⁸ in accordance with the general statute (see Q42 for details). Similarly, there is little information available specifically detailing why M’Bemba Moussa Keita was appointed to become the armed forces’ new Chief of Staff in 2017.¹⁴ ¹⁵
Meanwhile, lower down the chain of command, there are signs of increased levels of transparency. As part of the government’s ongoing drive to rebuild the army (LOPM), it is recruiting an additional 5,000 soldiers in 2018. Eligibility criteria for candidates were clearly reported in the national press.¹⁰ For example, candidates had to be:
– between 18 and 22 years old on the 31 December 2017
– of Malian nationality
– single and without children
– subject to a character check
Candidates had to submit various documents to attest to their status regarding the requirements above, as well as a certificate to show their medical well-being.
In May 2017, the army’s director of public relations made an announcement that indicates a nascent and promising move towards transparency in the defence sector. As part of that year’s recruitment programme (also for 5,000 extra soldiers), he revealed that the armed forces had received 60,136 applications to serve in the military and provided a regional breakdown: Gao: 2,018; Koulikoro: 10,685; Mopti: 2,860; Ségou: 4,807; Sikasso: 7,656; Kayes: 2,617; Bamako: 3,706 and Tombouctou: 131.¹¹

Although there are objective descriptions of the jobs of middle and higher military personnel, the appointment of these corresponds to the Executive Branch. [1] Consequently, the degree of discretion can be high. Detailed information on each position is found in the SEDENA General Organisation Manuals. [2]

There is no external audit for high-level appointments. However, as part of its powers, the Senate ratifies the appointments of the Executive power. [1]

In fact, the Senate is considered as a control body within the State and “its participation in the approval and ratification of appointments that the President of the Republic makes of certain officials represents a further measure of legislative control vis-à-vis the Executive, supporting the administration’s stability.” [2] [3]

Information on appointments can be found, either through formal or reporting mechanisms. For example, the day of taking office is disclosed, as well as the most important academic degrees and previous positions. [1] [2] The requirements and selection criteria for each grade are not always included. In fact, the media has pointed out that at least in the two previous six-year terms, the Head of SEDENA has been appointed due to their proximity to the incumbent leadership. [3] [4]

According to the MoD, the Law on the Armed Forces stipulates the criteria for military personnel appointment. Therefore, officers and NCOs are assigned on the appropriate formation position, in accordance with the requirements of the service and depending on: specialization, rank, special knowledge, capabilities and terms that are determined for the formation position as well as the evaluation of that person. Furthermore, the Constitution of Montenegro stipulates that the Council for Defence and Security appoints the officers. The Law on the Armed Forces also prescribes that the Minister of Defence suggests the appointment of high ranking officers, including of the Chief of Defence (CHOD) to the Council for Defence and Security, and also appoints NCOs, proposed by the CHOD. [1][2][3]

Procedures for promotion to higher ranks are also prescribed by the Law [1] and bylaws. [2][3] According to those, the head of the military proposes candidates to promotion boards that provide their opinion to the Minister, while in extraordinary situations, promotion boards might be skipped. The Minister proposes promotion to the higher ranks to the Council for Defence and Security. [4] The Council is composed of the President of Montenegro, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament. [5]

However, in some cases, especially when it comes to appointments at higher positions, decisions were not based on objective criteria, but frequently undermined by political influences. [6]

Council for Defence and Security, composed of the President of Montenegro, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament, appoints the head of the military and promotes high ranking officials on the basis of proposals from the Minister of Defence. [1]

Each employee in the Ministry, including both civil and military personnel, is subject to assessment by the National Security Agency, [2][3] but this does not include process audits or a sample of individual promotions.
Parliament does not scrutinise decisions for high level appointments. [4] The Parlament Security and Defence Committee considers draft laws, other regulations and general acts, strategy and other issues in the field of security and defence of Montenegro and its citizens; exercises parliamentary control over the work of the police and the National Security Agency and other security bodies and services; considers the exercise of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen established by the Constitution in the application of the powers of the police and the National Security Agency and other security bodies and services; considers proposals for the appointment of the director of the police and the National Security Agency and gives an opinion on the proposal for the appointment, ie appointment of heads of military intelligence, counterintelligence and security affairs in the Ministry of Defence. [5,6,7]

Limited information is publicly released about the appointment process. The Government claims that information is available in its Newsletter, [1] but it does not include information about appointments. [2][3][4] Names of some top and middle officials are available on the website of the Army of Montenegro, but not the information about the appointment process.

Evidence was found of a transparent and public appointment process for military and civilian personnel at entry level, such as the military academy.
However, no evidence was found of a transparent and public appointment process for military and civilian personnel at senior levels (1).

Moreover Article 53 of the Constitution states that « the King is the Supreme Leader of the Armed Royal Forces. He appoints military personnel and can delegate that right ». Appointment of strategic personnel is therefore discretionary and does not obey a clear and transparent process (2).

As an example, the Secretary of State in charge of Armed forces, who oversees the military administration is nominated directly by the King and has been working in this capacity since at least 2010 (his official biography published by the government mentions that he « occupied various positions within the administration » beforehand, without detailing which)(3).

The memory of the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts and the monarchy’s subsequent reaction of quelling any dissent from senior military personnel also supports the idea that although there are some limited formal processes in place, they are regularly undermined by undue influence or inappropriate conduct in the promotion process.

No evidence was found that the civil service is involved in the appointment process.

In the limited evidence of a transparent and public appointment process for military and civilian personnel at entry level (such as the military academy), there is no evidence of any external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management levels (1).

Moreover Article 53 of the Constitution states that « the King is the Supreme Leader of the Armed Royal Forces. He appoints military personnel and can delegate that right ». Appointment of strategic personnel is therefore discretionary and does not obey a clear and transparent process (2).

As an example, the Secretary of State in charge of Armed forces, who oversees the military administration is nominated directly by the King and has been working in this capacity since at least 2010 (his official biography published by the government mentions that he « occupied various positions within the administration » beforehand, without detailing which)(3).

These elements, added to the memory of the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts and the monarchy’s subsequent reaction of quelling any dissent from senior military personnel, also supports the idea that there is no external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management levels in general.

No evidence was found in the local or foreign press that information is released about the appointment process (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9).

The press only refers to appointments of senior military personnel by the King, without mentioning the details of the appointment process, or the criteria based on which they were appointed, as the article in Jeune Afrique shows (10).

There is a formal selection process for military personnel at the top management level. However, the criteria and selection process for nominees is not publicly available and nominees are normally hand-picked by a group of top officials, including the Commander-in-Chief and Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force [1]. According to Article 232(c) of the 2008 Constitution, the Commander-in-Chief has the authority to nominate the list of Defence Services personnel, including the ministers of the Ministries of Defence, Border Affairs and Home Affairs [2].

Article 232(c) of the 2008 Constitution grants the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Parliament) the power to scrutinise the list of Defence Services personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief [1]. However, Parliament can only scrutinise the nominations of the three union ministers of the Ministries of Defence, Border Affairs and Home Affairs. Parliament has no authority to scrutinise the appointment of top officials within the Tatmadaw because Article 20(b) of the Constitution states that the Tatmadaw has the right to administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces independently [1].

As Myanmar’s military normally handles its affairs internally, the selection process is not publicly available. However, the press normally writes its news on military personnel appointments and position reshuffles based on informal reporting [1].

The system of appointment for top management positions of the military personnel occurs through laid out processes and is based on the General Military Civil Service Regulations (Algemeen Militair Ambtenarenreglement, AMAR ) regulations. These regulations contain provisions on transparency, the provision of information and advisory committees safeguarding integrity and independent oversight.

For middle-management roles and all other military roles, the personnel department (Division of Defence Personnel and Organisation) is responsible for finding applicants and appointing them [2]. After a vacancy is posted, a human resources officer will shortlist candidates based on qualifications and training. The evaluation and testing stage then begins, whereby the candidates undergo psychological, medical and fitness evaluations. Depending on the role, other content-related tests may be conducted (for example, tests on weapons if the vacancy is for a weapons specialist) [2]. For middle- and higher-level management positions, the Management Development Group, a division of the personnel department, is responsible for identifying, selecting, developing and guiding the most talented defence officers for the highest management positions within the organisation (soldiers from the rank of colonel, state trainees and personnel on Scale 14 or higher and civilian personnel on Scale 11 or higher who have been admitted to the training programme) [3]. The score reflects the lack of a promotion/appointment board in the appointment process.

For high-profile military positions, which fall under the TMG vacancy process, a Preselection Committee (VSC) monitors the objectivity of the preselection phase in accordance with the set selection criteria [1]. The VSC is chaired by a professional with extensive management development experience at the top level who is outside of national government [1]. Based on the advice of the VSC, the selection list of one or more candidates is sent to the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations [1]. The Council of Ministers (the executive) is involved in the very late stages of appointment, but does not have real decision-making power during the process [1]. Additionally, in order to become eligible for middle- and higher-level appointments, all military personnel and civil servants must undergo an assessment that is conducted by an external organisation [2]. There is a lack of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny.

Information on the appointment process for top management is available online [1,2]. However, this information only covers pay scales 15 to 18, which means that middle-management processes are not publicly available. In addition, the information on the top- and middle-management appointment processes does not include the selection criteria for each rank.

The appointment process in the NZDF requires the use of objective job descriptions, candidates’ current performance and future potential, and assessment processes for promotions and appointments. At the most senior level, the appointment of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Service Chiefs is a Public Services Commission process, aligned to the appointment processes for any chief executive across the public sector. The selection process itself is managed to ensure independence and transparency. The CDF is a panel member of the Service Chief process [1, 2]. The CDF appointment requires sign-off and lodgement by the Minister of Defence to the Cabinet Appointments and Honours Committee which signals the minister’s intent to seek approval from the Governor-General [3]. This effectively means that, in addition to the Senior Appointments Board, a preferred candidate’s selection must be reviewed by the Minister of Defence, a Cabinet committee, and the Governor-General. Officer promotions are handled by specially constituted Service Promotion Boards. Within each service, promotion decisions (for lower level ranks) and promotion clearance recommendations (for the middle and more senior ranks) are conducted by Promotion Boards. The results are endorsed by the relevant single Service Chief to ensure independence of decisions from the immediate chain of command. A clearance for promotion to the next rank provides assurance of the member’s likely performance at a higher rank based on their current performance and experience [4]. For appointments to middle and top management level roles, recommendations for promotion clearances to middle and senior ranks are presented for approval by the Senior Appointments Board (SAB), which is Chaired by CDF, and attended by the Single Service Chiefs, Commander Joint Forces NZ, Chief Joint Defence Service (CJDS), Warrant Officer of the Defence Force (WODF), Chief Finance Officer, Chief People Officer, and any other member appointed by the CDF. The SAB is to ensure independence from the single Service perspective considers appointments at all roles at senior levels, as well as any key service and/or representation roles at lower ranks levels [5, 6]. The promotion of an officer to a senior rank requires a vacancy or approved demand [7]. Appointments at the senior level are considered by the SAB from nominations sought from the Services through Service Chiefs, considering the person’s experience and aspiration and suitability for the position being considered. Nominees can be considered from those officers at the rank level required for the role, or officers at a lower rank who hold a current promotion clearance [8, 9].

Senior appointments, such as that of the CDF, are reviewed by the Minister of Defence, after recommendation from the SAB to the Public Services Commissioner, the appointment is subsequently lodged with the Cabinet Appointments and Honours Committee within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, before seeking approval from the Governor-General. [1, 2] Members of parliament scrutinise decisions, but only those who are members of Cabinet and/or the Cabinet Appointments and Honours Committee. Nonetheless, interested Members of Parliament from outside those two bodies may always enquire or demand questions about senior appointments in the public services.

Papers relating to the appointment of the CDF and Chiefs of Service are proactively released post-appointment. [5]. Details of the other appointments can be provided upon request, but they are not proactively published.
In line with the latest amendments of the Defence Act 1990, the Chief of Defence Force shall cause notice of all appointments and commissions to be promulgated by Defence Force Orders. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Consequently, the most relevant information is that contained within DFOs.

There is an established procedure (legal framework) in place to ensure the objective appointment of military personnel as per Ordonnance 2010-75 and Loi n° 2011-35. The security sector’s human resources management is characterised by clearly defined personnel regulations, competitive and transparent recruitment system, merit-based promotion and in-house training (1, 2). However, an online version of either the Ordonnance 2010-75 or Law No. 2011-35 is not available.
On 18 August 2011, Niger’s Council of Ministers amended Order No. 2010/75 (On the Status of Military Personnel in the Armed Forces) of 9 December 2010, which did not provide for the type of benefits that other military personnel (FAN, Gendarmerie Nationale) enjoy. The amended order (Loi n° 2011-35) was published on 28 October 2011 after adoption by the Assemblée Nationale (Lower House). Both Order No. 2010/75 and Law No. 2011/35 establish formal procedures for the recruitment of military personnel (5, 6).
In addition, the Constitution allows for a National Defence Council/Conseil supérieur de la défense nationale (Art. 63, 64 of the Constitution) and a National Security Council/ Conseil national de sécurité (Art. 63, 65 of the Constitution) as advisory units to the President, the Supreme Head of the Armed Forces. The Superior Council advises on the nomination of high-level military appointments and grade promotions of officers, alongside all other questions related to the military (Art. 64) (3). However, even if an established procedure guides the process of appointment, some officers may perceive it as not objective (4).

The National Assemblee does not provide external scrutiny on the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management (1, 2) .

There is some available information on the appointment process through informal mechanisms, based mostly on rumours but it is incomplete and often confusing. Personal connections within the army play an important role in the procedure for promotion, even though it can be also argued that because of extended kinships, family interconnections are most probable (1).
Results of nominations are publically available and diffused on a regular basis in the media. It was the case of one of the last nominations at the top management level in January 2018: following a retirement of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Brig. Gen. Seyni Garba and Commander of the Gendarmerie, Col. Mounkaila Issa, Brig. Gen. Ahmed Mohamed and Col.-Major Salifou Wakasso were nominated (2,3,4).

The Constitution under section 218(2) gives the president the power to appoint chiefs of all the armed forces and the Senate the power to confirm. However, appointments are subject to the policy of the Federal Character Principle (appointments are made based on political or ethnic considerations).

Media reports showcases or irregularities concerning the appointment process and system. For example, recently several senior officials were retired on insubstantial grounds in breach of due process protections (1).

There are promotion councils for each arm of the service; these are made up of senior members of the Armed Forces. Officers are appointed to a commission on the recommendation of a Board of Officers created by the relevant Service Chief (2). Although it is claimed that promotions are based on open competitive examinations, but appointments are made based on political or ethnic considerations (Federal Character Principle).

The Nigerian Senate plays a role in confirming top appointments. There is no external audit of such positions (1). Individuals aggrieved by decisions can petition the relevant Senate committee. However, appointments are subject to the policy of the Federal Character Principle (appointments are made based on political or ethnic considerations) (2).

The Constitution under section 218(2) gives the president the power to appoint chiefs of all the armed forces and the Senate the power to confirm (1). However, appointments are subject to the policy of the Federal Character Principle (appointments are made based on political or ethnic considerations). And also subject to considerable discretionary powers of the president. Senate confirmations are done behind closed doors (2), (3).

The appointment of the highest positions in the Army of the North Macedonia (officers with a general rank) is coordinated by the President of the North Macedonia, in accordance with Article 18 of the Law on Defence [1]. The general conditions for appointment (which is the same for mid-level personnel) are based on objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes regulated by the Law on Service in the Army of the North Macedonia [2]. Each time an officer is promoted to a higher rank, a board is established. The boards are composed of five members of the rank to which the candidate is being promoted, and the members span different military branches and services. These boards work independently from the command chain in the Army [3]. Each candidate dossier for a promotion to major or colonel is reviewed and submitted to the Minister of Defence while applications for promotion to the rank of captain is submitted to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, according to Article 66 [1]. As for the appointment of generals, these dossiers are submitted to the President of the North Macedonia by the Minister of Defence [4].

Formally, appointments to high profile positions are subject to external scrutiny. The Parliament, in accordance with the Law on Defence (Article 17) is also involved [1]. Since the Parliament oversees the defence sector, it can and should scrutinise decisions for these high level appointments. In addition, the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security (CDS) can oversee appointments of military personnel at high- and mid- level management [2]. This process, however, is not detailed and may be superficial. For instance, following the appointment of the new Chief of General Staff of the Army, General Major Vasko Kostojcinovski Gjurchinovski, which took place in August 2018 [3], there was no public evidence of any related debate in the Macedonian Parliament. Moreover, the review of the CDS minutes from 2016-2018 showed no evidence of debate during which Committee might have reviewed top- and mid- level management positions [4].

The formal requirements for any appointment are made public and outlined in the Law on Service in the Army [1] and the Rulebook on Promotion [1]. They provide detailed requirements and selection criteria for each rank. However, the appointment process itself is not made public. The process is carried out through the Council of Personnel within the units of the Army of the North Macedonia, and is applicable from battalion personal upward. After selection, promotions are published in the Official Gazette of the North Macedonia. For the highest-ranking promotions, information is published on the website of the Ministry of Defence and the Army of the North Macedonia [2].

The appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level is described in the Instruction for Personnel Management in the Ministry of Defence and Subordinate Agencies and the Instruction for the Selection of Military Personnel for High Level Ranks [1, 2]. A nomination board (Forsvarsjefens råd) makes a nomination for appointment in accordance with the Act on Military Service in the Armed Forces and the Regulation on Service for Military and Civil Personnel in the Ministry of Defence and the Subordinate Agencies [3, 4]. The nomination board is composed of 6 members and a chair. 3 members and the chair represent the employer. They are respectively the inspectors general from the 3 branches of the armed forces and the Head of Section in the Defence Staff. The remaining 3 members represent employee unions. All members have a vote (the chair has a double vote) and the nomination is submitted to the Chief of Defence for approval. The selection criteria for very high level ranks, including Chief of Defence of the Norwegian Armed Forces, Chief of the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, Head of Defence Staff, Chief of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, Chief of the Military mission to NATO, are prepared by the Ministry of Defence. Candidates for the position of Chief of Defence are interviewed by the Ministry of Defence. Candidates for the positions of Chief of the Norwegian Intelligence Service and Chief of the Military mission to NATO are interview both by the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff. Candidates for other top positions are interviewed only by the Defence Staff [2]. For very high level ranks, there is no nomination board, but inspectors general and representatives for employee unions may submit their recommendation to the Defence Staff. Following consultations with the Defence Staff, the Chief of Defence makes a nomination and submits it to the Ministry of Defence. The ministry presents it for the King-in-Council. For the position of Chief of Defence, a nomination is prepared by the Ministry of Defence. While the system establishes objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes, a research report of 2014 shows that a range of implicit criteria, for example informal networks and cultural values, also play a crucial role in appointment processes [5].

The Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence may scrutinise all appointments in the defence sector, through both process audits and a sample of individual promotions. The Internal Auditor Unit functions as an external unit for the subordinate agencies under the Ministry of Defence. The Office of the Auditor General may also scrutinise appointments in the defence sector [1]. This has not been a regular practice in recent years because the appointment system is not considered to be an area of corruption risk [2].Parliament is not involved in the recruitment of high level positions. Parliament does not normally scrutinise such appointments, but the Parliament in plenary may decide to initiate an investigation into the matter.

Information on the appointment process and formal selection criteria for each rank is available on the website of the Ministry of Defence [1, 2].

There is not a publicly available system for appointments for military personnel. However, our sources indicate that there is a formal process in place, but these processes are not always followed by the senior commanders, as the process can be influenced due to political and tribal connections (1), (2). There is a brief outline of the vacancy application process on the Ministry of Defence Office of the Secretary-General website, ‘automated’ service applications are sent directly to the relevant department within the ministry, no time limit is given, as it is contingent on the department (3). No further indications of a formal process in the appointment of military personnel at the management level are available on institutional websites (4), (5). Nepotism and wasta (favouritism) are widespread in Oman, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, decisions revolve exclusively around the sultan, including defence and security appointments (6). Apart from appointments announced through royal decrees such as the head of the Internal Security Services and the minister responsible for Defence Affairs, there is no public reference to management in the defence and security sector (4), (7).

The available information regarding the scrutiny involved in the appointment of military personnel at the middle or top management levels indicates that there is no internal nor external scrutiny over the process of appointment (1), (2). No external scrutiny procedures are set out on any institutional websites (3), (4), (5). No media reports were found indicating external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management levels (6), (7), (8). There is a lack of accountability regarding the employment of military personnel. It is important to note here that generally, the defence sector does not go through any scrutiny, as established throughout this assessment.

The government does not release any information about the appointment process. This data is considered confidential and not for the public. The structures of the middle and top management are not available; neither is the appointment process (1), (2). There is no evidence of media reports or civil society organizations comments on military personnel recruitment (3), (4).

Appointments for military personnel take place based on connections and loyalty to the executive (1). They may happen routinely or by a presidential or head of agency decision at any time during the year. According to many senior generals within the Presidential Guard, sometimes, new soldiers are appointed and receive salaries (1) but are not sent immediately to the military training course, and they attend at a later stage. The military academy can receive students at any time of the year with an order by a presidential decree or an admission order from the head of a security or military agency (2), (3), (4).

There is no external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management (1). The senior executive (president) is the one who appoints and promotes high and middle-level management personnel. No scrutiny, monitoring or questioning of such appointments (2). It is the task of the High Officers Committee to review decisions regarding appointments, but the procedures are not yet clear (3).

The appointment process is not transparent, and nothing is known about it at all, even though there is a clear mechanism of appointments and hiring (1). The process is co-opted by the president and his advisors(2).

There is a system and set of criteria in place for promotion to middle- or top-level management in the Defence Department: seniority, professionalism, education, performance review and aptitude [1]. The AFP Selection Board is tasked with screening personnel for top management positions [2, 3]. Likewise, the AFP Board of Generals is another panel that generates the list of prospective appointees and promotions [4]. Both are primarily composed of Generals, Flag Officers and Senior Officers who advance their own biases and interests; consequently, there is a high possibility of the selection processed becoming politicised. The “bata-bata” (favouritism) system and other non-meritocratic factors still contribute to shaping the appraisal process [5]. As provided in the 1987 Constitution, the bicameral Commission on Appointments (CA), composed of 12 members from each chamber chosen on the basis of proportional representation of the different political party and party-list organisations, confirms military appointments from the rank of colonel or naval captain [3, 6]. The mandated procedure of having to be confirmed has politicised the promotion process, allowing undue influence by politicians as well as their intrusion into the merit system [7].

Requirements have been established as part of scrutiny but appointments are superficially audited. Nomination may have been based on professional judgement by peers, but confirmation is strictly political. By law, Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth must be submitted upon assuming office [1,2]; however the Ombudsman has made it impossible for the public to access them, and has been accused of violating the Code of Conduct [3]. The Commission on Appointments, whose 12 members come from the Senate and House of Representatives, serves as the external oversight and is mandated to confirm appointments at middle and top management, but appointees have been confirmed despite having filed incorrect records [4]. With the CA, whose members are composed of a legislative that has been largely compliant with the executive’s perogatives, only limited scrutiny has taken place of these appointed officials [5].

Hearings are public but there are no official reports coming from the CA about the proceedings. Little information is released about the appointment process. According to an interviewee, members of the House who do not sit in the CA very often know what is going on in those hearings [1].

Formal rules of appointment and promotion are regulated by the Act of 2003 on the Military Service of Professional Soldiers [1] in Articles 40-43. Articles 44-45 refer to dismissal and discharge rules. The detailed procedures, including relevant educational requirements and professional qualifications, are established by the Regulation of the Minister of 2010 on the Appointment to Military Ranks [2, 3]. However, there are no appointment boards, nor observers. and the Civil service (head of the MoD Personnel Department and part of the department’s staff) is not included in the process. Appointment decisions are made individually by entitled decision-makers (minister, MoD director-general, commander). No genuine justification is required by law. The purpose of “armed forces interests,” as stated in legal acts, is ambiguous and enables discretionary decisions.

There is no evidence of external scrutiny for appointments made to high profile positions. Parliament does not scrutinise decisions for top-level appointments. The decisions are made based on consultations between the MoND and the president [1, 2].

The appointment process is not transparent. Despite the lack of hard evidence, there is an impression that in addition to the substantive criteria, that there are other criteria that influence nominations that are unknown to the public. The conflict between the president and the MoND in 2017 is a good example. The president did not accept the list of proposed candidates for military advancement, and in 2017 there were no nominations at all. This situation was characterised by a lot of speculation, often not backed up with substantive criteria [1, 2]. This conflict is an example of the lack of a clear separation of competences between the MoND and the president in the appointment process, which has been indicated for many years [3].

Middle and top management positions at the Ministry of Defence (MoD) [1], Joint Chief of Staff Office [2], single service chiefs and branches [3, 4, 5] are clearly defined. Top-level positions at the MoD are the object of competitive appointment [6] overseen by a Committee on Recruitment and Selection of the Public Administration, while recruitment and selection procedures for mid-level positions are arranged by the MoD itself [7]. Branch appointments are done at the discretion of the service chief [8] and require no promotion board. The CA’s mandate encompasses audits of appointments in public administration, but there is no evidence that such audits have been performed on staff involved in defence.

Parliament is not involved in scrutiny over the joint chief of staff, single service chief, top or mid-level management within the MoD or branches. However, high-level MoD applicants are selected from a pool of candidates by an external board; the MoD then decides who to hire [1]. The Committee on Recruitment and Selection of the Public Administration is known to have been ignored in recent years [2, 3], but no defence-related cases are known to have occurred. News reports suggest that appointments do not result from purely meritocratic processes [4].

All civilian and military appointments must follow the established procedure in law, as per Q41A. However, transparency depends on whether appointments are to the MoD or branches. With regards to the MoD, as top-level appointments run through an external board, selection criteria, including formal education, rank and experience are published [1]. With regards to branches, appointments are made at the discretion of branch chiefs and require no disclosure of selection criteria [2].

There is an internal appointment system within the armed forces and the MoD. However, it is not law, rather internal regulations which are updated and managed by the promotion committee within the Ministry and the armed forces. [1,2] Law No. 31 (2006), which applies to military conscription, does not include an established appointment system. [3] Article 8 of the same law states that the establishment of ranks and other operational decisions can only become effective when adopted by the Emir.

There is no external scrutiny of the appointment of military personnel at middle and top management levels, as there is no external scrutiny of the defence sector overall. [1] According to the constitution, the Emir is the Chief Commander of the armed forces, which means that he has the direct authority to oversee defence without scrutiny. [2,3] It has also been demonstrated that the majority of appointments, including those at top and middle management positions, take place through Emiri decrees, and the Emir is exempt from all forms of scrutiny. [4,5,6]

There is no official mechanism for publishing the names of promotions, appointments or the processes of appointment/ promotion. There is a lack of transparency in the process of promotions as it is mostly to reward loyalty and distribution of public goods. [1,2]

The Minister of Defence and his deputies are openly appointed by the president upon recommendation of the Prime Minister [1,2]. There is no evidence of any prescribed selection procedure governing their appointments [1,3]. Indeed, candidates for the role of Minister of Defence are not required to have any professional education or experience in the military sphere [4].

The Main Personnel Directorate reviews the shortlist of top management candidates and organises the assessment process [5]. It also reviews the candidates for top positions in accordance with the anti-corruption plan [6]. For example, it checks the candidates for risk of conflicts of interest, reviews their professional skills and experience and tests their physical and psychological health [6].

There are some journalist reports of unjustifiable appointments to top positions within the MoD. For example, a former head of the MoD subcontractor that failed to fulfill its contractual obligations in renovating military towns was appointed as head of the MoD building maintenance department [7].

The Minister of Defence and his deputies are openly appointed by the president upon recommendation of the Prime Minister and no external body can review the candidates or comment on the president’s decision [1,2]. Candidates for middle-management roles undergo a background check by FSB [3].

There is minimal information about the appointment process [1]. Those applying for contracted military service may send applications throughout the year by registering for personal account at the MOD website [2]. Those applying for recruited service must refer to the seasonal recruitment procedures at local recruitment stations. However, the results are not announced publicly [3].

As for civil personnel, there are publicly available announcements about open vacancies [4] and offers of employment [5]. The announcements about offers of employment only include the names of the finalists [6].

According to our sources, there is no public information available for citizens or even for soldiers on the official process of appointments. The usual process of appointment, which is known within the MoD, is a royal commission, with the major number of those coming from the royal family, who nominate and select the senior commanders and propose them to the king who issues a decree of appointment (1), (2). There is no publicly available information relating to the official processes surrounding appointment and promotion of military personnel at the middle and top management level. Military personnel appointments have traditionally been based on royal lineage and a balancing of powers between different branches of the royal family. For example, the Sultan branch historically had control over the defence establishment, with the late Sultan bin Abdulaziz serving as minister of defence for almost half a century between 1963 and his death in 2011. His son, Khaled, also held prominent positions in this respect including as assistant minister of defence and deputy minister of defence (3), (4).

The regularity and abruptness with which personnel shuffles occur, oftentimes replacing top military and defence personnel with no official explanation, indicates that there is no independent and established system for selecting middle and top-level management personnel in these sectors (5).

According to our sources, there is no formal and independent mechanism to scrutinize the appointment of top and middle-level military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Since MBS has taken power, decisions have become more authoritarian to the extent that committees are no longer able to nominate and propose individuals for senior positions (1), (2). There is also decreasing space for joint decision-making, or objective scrutiny even within the ruling establishment. Since the ascension of King Salman to the throne in 2015 and the increasing influence of his son, MBS, control over the defence and security establishments have been progressively centralised and under the purview of Mohammed bin Salman, who also heads security bodies including the Council of Political and Security Affairs (3).

There appear to be signs that the government is attempting to improve its processes surrounding personnel. After Mohammed bin Salman became defence minister in 2015, he reportedly awarded a contract to multinational consulting firm Boston Consulting Group to help improve the government’s handling of military personnel (4). Nevertheless, there is no indication that this contract related to middle and top-level personnel, which was likely off-limits due to the sensitivity and political significance surrounding such appointments in the kingdom.

There is no information released by the government about the appointment process. Appointments are only announced at a later stage and with no reference to the selection criteria or other reasons for appointment (1). In a May 2018 report, Gulf expert Neil Patrick noted that 800 new officer appointments were planned for the Saudi military and the MoD over the next eighteen months, including two assistant defence ministers and three undersecretaries. In May 2018, interviews for five assistant minister positions had already been conducted (2). Information on the selection criteria for these and other positions has not been publicized on the MoD website. According to our sources within the MoD, since 2016, the appointment process is not clear, and decisions are revealed to both public as well as ministry (3), (4).

Appointment of senior military personnel is regulated with a bylaw [1], whereas the Law on civil servants determines the criteria for appointing civilian personnel at the MoD [2]. There have been various circumventions of the legally determined appointment criteria. Most salient and publicly has been the delay in appointing the new chief of General Staff, after the then chief fulfilled legal conditions for retirement [3]. Even though according to the Law on the Serbian Armed Forces, General Ljubiša Diković should have been retired in May 2018, he continued carrying out his duty until the new chief of general staff was appointed in September 2018 [4].
A particular risk of corruption can be noticed in the field of appointing and recalling MoD civilian employees in higher positions. For instance, the appointment of assistant ministers without public calls (the previous acting assistant minister for defence policy has been in the position since March 2017 and a public call has been published only in January 2018) [5] or filling the civilian positions with staff in the acting status. The Law on civil servants recognises the acting status (Art. 67a), as a temporary solution, namely, the acting status can last up to nine months [2]. Rather than the exception, cases of civil servants working in roles in an ‘acting status’ in senior positions have become an established practice in many institutions, including the MoD. For instance, the current acting assistant minister for material resources in the MoD has been in the role since September 2015 [6]. Similarly, the inspector general of the military security services has had the acting status since December 2014 [7].
Senior civilian positions in the MoD are also susceptible to government reconstructions and changes. With the most recent switch, when the former minister of defence became the minister of labour in 2017, a state secretary and assistant minister for defence policy have also transferred to the same positions at the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Policy [8].

There is no oversight over the appointment of senior military and civilian personnel at the MoD and SAF outside of the chain of command [1, 2].

While all the decisions on the appointment of civilian personnel are publicly available on the government’s website, the process and criteria for the appointment of military officials and the formation of the positions are not entirely transparent. Most of the senior military personnel positions appointment criteria is classified. For instance, the appointment criteria and mandate length of the defence inspectorate director is not regulated within the law. In practice, that is a formation position for the rank of general, that is appointed by the president upon the defence minister’s proposal for an unlimited period [1].

There is a formal and mature system of appointments based on objective job descriptions and meritocratic criteria for selection, with academic credentials, training and on-the-job performance being assessed for promotions by the Armed Forces Council. The MINDEF Permanent Secretary, the most senior MINDEF civil servant, is one of the members of the council. [1]. Flag-level general officers are controlled by the executive with no provisions for independent or parliamentary oversight, although this is provided for civilian appointments [2].

The executive, namely the president and the prime minister, typically approves the selection of personnel to high-level appointments with the advice of the Armed Forces Council [1].
There is a kind of external oversight for the appointment of Service Chiefs and the Chief of Defence Force. These appointments have to be approved by the Prime Minister and the President – in consultation with the Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA), a body established to advise the President in the exercise of his or her custodial powers. The CPA is appointed and nominated by the President, Prime Minister, Chief Justice and Chairman, Public Service Commission. [2]. However, there is no evidence of external audits for these appointments.

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) appointments and advancement processes are not disclosed to the public, although retired senior officers have asserted that mechanisms like this are available internally, with details of senior positions are typically only released to a select group of candidates [1]. Civilian opportunities can often be accessed by the public via open job portals [2].

Interviewee 2 explained that there is an established and, on paper at least, an independent process at each level of selection. Service level appointments are done through consultation with the minister, the Chief of the SANDF, and president. This is not particularly transparent and is subject to political influence [1].

It appears that parliamentary committee members are briefed on senior appointments, but Parliament does not have any power to block senior military appointments. For example, the 2018  Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans report on the DoD budget vote contains detailed information, observations and recommendations pertaining to budget and planning, but does not at any point presume to examine military personnel appointments [1].

Appointment processes are sporadically explained or published via the DoD’s Corporate Communications Department, disseminated via press release (upon appointment completion) to the media, and generally made available. This information is often neither detailed in terms of the process followed nor reliably released on time [1, 2].

Article 9 of the Military Personnel Management Act states that appointment of officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers shall be based on academic achievement and qualification through an open competitive examination. If an appointment is to be made on the basis of actual proof of abilities, not through the examination, a screening process may be adopted for the appointment.
The open competitive examination or screening process shall be aimed at testing abilities required for performing duties. [1]

The Chairperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest rank within the military, is appointed by the President and is subject to personnel hearings by the National Assembly. However, external scrutiny is not required to appoint the Chairperson, except for the parliamentary hearing. [1] [2]

Information on appointments of military personnel at middle and top management level is published by the Ministry of National Defence via the ministry’s website when decisions are made. [1] [2] However, only limited information is available publicly because it does not include requirements and objective selection criteria for each rank. According to the press release on senior military appointments by the Ministry of National Defence in 2019, the selection criteria are ambiguous. It stated that; competencies and expertise of candidates have been considered the most alongside trustworthiness within the military and their personality;, rather than explaining clear job competencies and selection criteria. [1]

According to the SPLA Act 2009, the appointment of middle and top-level military officials by the President is supposed to be a consultative process involving the President, the Vice President, the government, and the Minister of Defence. For instance, the President can only appoint the Chief of Defence Staff, after a recommendation from the Minister of Defence and after consulting with the Vice President and the government. [1] Yet, senior appointments in the military originate from a presidential decree read out on prime time news on national television, suggesting that the decision is soley made by the President.

According to the SPLA Act 2009, the appointment of middle and top-level military officials by the President is supposed to be a consultative process involving the President, the Vice President, the government, and the Minister of Defence. For instance, the President can only appoint the Chief of Defence Staff, after a recommendation from the Minister of Defence and after consulting with the Vice President and the government. [1] Whether this actually happens in practice is still not yet well-established. What this “consultative” process suggests however, is that there is no external scrutiny by the Legislative Assembly nor the legislative committee tasked with defence and security matters. The media reporting on the appointment of the newly installed Chief of Defence Staff in May 2020 does not indicate any scrutiny by external sources. [2]

The appointment of top-level officials such as the Chief of Defence Staff is done via a presidential degree, usually read over the radio and on television. [1] No criteria for selection is disclosed to the public.

Formal processes are established; public employment is regulated by Law 7/2007 [1], the military career is regulated by Law 39/2007 [2], and Royal Decree 35/2010 set the regulation for “Entry, promotion and organization of training education in the Armed Forces”, detailing the criteria for the selection process in the military career [3]. Article 89 of Law 39/2007 states that the promotion to all positions above NATO’s OF-4 (colonel and generals) is through nomination [2, 4]. This nomination process is considered a “filter” in which the promotion of certain profiles are prevented (as outlined previously) [5]. Promotions to the category of “General” officers are granted by royal decree and agreed upon in the Council of Ministers, at the proposal of the Minister of Defence, “who will hear the Chief of Staff of the corresponding Army to carry it out” (Article 18.1) [4]. Finally, the Spanish armed forces consist of three different bodies that in practice work with their own established manners, instructions, and initiatives to provide the JEMAD (Chief of the Defence Staff) with additional power for unification purposes. They have faced significant reluctance in the three blocks [5]. The designation of the JEMAD is expected in practice to follow a shift rotary system between the army, the air force, and the navy, with some exceptions [5]. Problems with independent observers involved in the promotion processes are outlined in subsequent sections.

All positions above OF-4 are nominated [1]. The government of Spain appoints the rank of general, selecting from the lists provided by the Superior Council of each branch of the military. This selection is made based on the references available to the government [2]. The Parliament has no involvement in scrutinising decisions there is no mention in Law 39/2007 [3] and neither in RD 168/2009 [1] nor in RD 35/2010 [4]. The selection process is neither open nor public, so there is no evidence of independent scrutiny. The fact that colonels (OF-5) are nominated is considered a filter to determine who can become a general and who is “vetoed” [2]. There are references to certain Lt. Col. (OF-4) whose options to become a general are very low regardless of their perceived high performance and competencies, as they cannot rise to the rank of colonel, the rank before general [2].

The appointment process is regulated and publicly available. It includes the selection criteria for the selection of military personnel at middle and top level management. It is clearly stated that all positions above NATO OF-4’s are selected via nominations [1, 2].

A report published by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in November 2020 observes that, while ‘the Sudan Peace Agreement emphasises building a professional national army based on merits and guided by new doctrine, it isn’t clear how this doctrine will be developed. Nor is there a plan for remediating the educational gaps – at both the noncommissioned officer and officer levels – of the standing army or the members of the armed movements to be integrated’ [1]. The 2007 Armed Forces Act states only that the President shall appoint officers and that regulations describing appointment criteria and processes should be developed [2], but no further information could be found to suggest that such regulations have been adopted and promulgated. Given that the 2019 transitional government has replaced the President with the Sovereignty Council, it seems likely that, at least in the near future, the appointment of officers will be completed in a different way from what is defined by the Armed Forces Act. Prior to the establishment of the 2019 Constitution, military personnel were, in practice, appointed primarily on the basis of ethnic loyalties within each of the formal and informal armed forces that were, to varying degrees, directly responsive to command and control by former President Bashir. Commanders, especially those beyond the official SAF and police forces, had almost complete autonomy to rank and promote personnel by whatever standards they chose to apply or not to apply. ‘In Sudan, as the 30 years of Islamic party rule has supplanted traditional military professionalism with its own doctrine and ideology, the starting point for transforming the security sector will require some fundamental reorientation’ [1].

The Armed Forces Act of 2007 specifies only that the President shall appoint officers [1]. In such a case, even Parliament could only call an official in for questioning or to present information, and then recommend to the President that he consider terminating his appointment of an officer or, say, his Minister of Defence. However, since the transitional government still has not established a legislature and has replaced the office of the President with the Sovereignty Council, it is unclear how appointments will be made and it would seem that no government entity is empowered to formally scrutinise existing or future appointees – except for the politically motivated disempowerment committee that has been mandated to eradicate Bashir loyalists and seize any assets they may have accumulated in a corrupt fashion. An expert on Sudan’s defence sector, who was interviewed for this report, said that the military leaders who are the Head and Deputy Head of the Sovereignty Council still answer to nobody with respect to their decisions about how to run the army or the RSF, including who they put in command [2].

No information about appointment processes could be found on the websites of the Ministries of Defence and Interior [1,2]. The Armed Forces Act of 2007 says nothing about it beyond referring to regulations governing appointments for individual services or units – but no such regulations could be found on the ministry websites or elsewhere [3].

The Armed Forces in Sweden (SAF) enforce an independent and standardised appointment system for the selection of military personnel, as covered by the Law on Public Employment [1]. All positions in public office have objective job desciptions and particular specifications attached to them, and all appointments follow transparent assessment processes. Moreover, the SAF appointment system is interlinked with the formal education system, and in order for an individual to advance, he or she needs to go through the appropriate training and education [2]. For high-level positions, such as Supreme Commander, Major General, Rear Admiral, Colonel of the 1st Degree, or Commander of the 1st Degree as well as the civil Chief Legal Officer at the SAF HQ, the government handpicks candidates in accordance with the formal ordinance of the SAF [3].

The government handpicks candidates or all high-level civil and military positions in the SAF. As with all government agencies, the SAF’s decision to hire any individual can be retrospectively appealed to Kammarkollegiet [1], which forwards the complaint to the Administrative Services Agency [2]. Parliament is not involved in scrutinising the recruitment of high-level military personnel, however.

Information on the government’s appointment processes are incomplete and only partially available to the public. An appointment of SAF Supreme Commanders, for instance, is usually followed by a brief statement by the defence minister who summarises the appointment process, the government’s selection criteria, and suitability of the chosen candidate [1].

Given the nature of the Swiss conscription system, there needs to be a distinction between the military and civilian personnel. Ranks and special functions are defined in the Law on the Military and Military Administration (Militärgesetz, MG). The law defines the existing ranks (Article 102). The definition of rules and necessary qualifications for promotions is delegated to the Federal Council by this law (Article 103). The administration in charge can request information on criminal, financial, military or police records and ask for a security clearance (Article 103). The Ordinance of the on the Organization of the Military (Armeeorganissation, AO) requires the federal council to consider an appropriate representation of the militia as well as of the different linguistic groups of Switzerland for middle and top ranks (Article 4.3). The detailed conditions for promotions are given in the Ordinance on the Military Service (Verordnung über die Militärdienstpflicht, VMDP). The ordinance lays out rules on age limits, permissible timing, a minimal number of service days and assigns the power to promote to specific actors within the administration (Article 71.2). The ordinance defines the preconditions for a promotion (Article 72) as well as the necessary qualifications (Article 73) and where the right to propose a promotion lies (Article 74). Promotions to the most senior ranks are for staff officers with the “Defence Sector” (Gruppe Verteidigung) and above with the Federal Council (Article 39 and Annex 3). That means that it is the Swiss government as a whole that is charged with these promotions [3]. There is no evidence for the use of promotion boards. Civilians in the DDPS are appointed and hired with the same rules and process applying as for other ministries. The basis for all rules concerning personnel working for the federal administration can be found in the Federal Personnel Act (Bundespersonalgesetz, BPG) [4]. The Federal Council provides a framework ordinance for the BPG (Rahmenverordnung zum BPG). The Federal Personnel Ordinance (Bundespersonalverordnung, BPV) lays out the implementing provisions for the employees of the federal administration (including DDPS) [5]. The FDF Ordinance on the BPV (Verordnung des EFD zur Bundespersonalverordnung, VBPV) specifies the provisions of the BPV further, namely issues like salaries, evaluations, work hours and expenses [6]. The respective parlimiamentarian commissions have indepedent oversight functions for appointements, civilian and military and they have exercised it in the past. [7, 8]

Ranks and special functions are defined in the law on the military and military administration (Militärgesetz) (MG). The law defines the existing ranks (Article 102). The definition of rules and necessary qualifications for promotions is delegated to the Federal Council by this law (Article 103). The administration in charge can request information on criminal, financial, military or police records and ask for a security clearance (Article 103). The Ordinance on the Organization of the Military (Armeeorganissation) (AO) requires the federal council to consider an appropriate representation of the militia as well as of the different linguistic groups of Switzerland for middle and top ranks (Article 4.3) [2]. The detailed conditions for promotions are given in the Ordinance on the Military Service (Verordnung über die Militärdienstpflicht) (VMDP). The ordinance lays out rules on age limits, permissible timing, the minimal number of service days and assigns the power to promote to specific actors within the administration (Article 71.2). The ordinance defines the preconditions for a promotion (Article 72) as well as the necessary qualifications (Article 73) and where the right to propose a promotion lies (Article 74). Promotions to the most senior ranks are through the Federal Council (Article 39 and Annex 3) [3]. There is little public information available on the procedures for appointments for middle and top management level. A study from outside the reporting period (2013) found that the lack of transparency in promotions as one of the primary reasons for a wave of resignations at the time [4]. The respective parlimiamentarian commissions have oversight functions for appointements, civilian and military and they have exercised it in the past. Within the DDPS for the rules of the most senior positions have been clarified over the recent years and the process has been rendered more transparent based on suggestions of the Control Committee of the National Council, a process that was set in motion by a report by the Control Committee of the Federal Assembly in 2013. In this post control on the recommendations, the committee found that the process has improved [5, 6]. For the most recent replacement of the Chief of Armed Forces, the Federal Council created a search committee that included cantonal civilian representatives [7].

Ranks and special functions are defined in the law on the military and military administration (Militärgesetz) (MG) [1]. The law defines the existing ranks (Article 102). The definition of rules and necessary qualifications for promotions is delegated to the Federal Council by this law (Article 103). The administration in charge can request information on criminal, financial, military or police records and ask for a security clearance (Article 103). The detailed conditions for promotions are given in the Ordinance on the Military Service (Verordnung über die Militärdienstpflicht, VMDP) [2]. The ordinance lays out rules on age limits, permissible timing, the minimal number of service days and assigns the power to promote to specific actors within the administration (Article 71.2). The ordinance defines the preconditions for a promotion (Article 72) as well as the necessary qualifications (Article 73) and where the right to propose a promotion lies (Article 74). Promotion to the most senior ranks is via the Federal Council (Article 39 and annex 3). The text of the two laws is publicly accessible. Promotions to Stabsadjutant (“Warrant Officer” or NATO designation OR-9) and higher are announced in a press release [3]. Within the DDPS for the rules of the most senior positions have been clarified over recent years and the process has been rendered more transparent based on suggestions of the Control Committee of the National Council, a process that was set in motion by a report by the Control Committee of the Federal Assembly in 2013. In this post control on the recommendations, the committee found that the process has improved, including recommendations on transparency. Vacancies on top management positions have to be publicised, and the Federal Council receives a report on the process and candidates. However, this information is not available publicly [4]. For the most recent replacement of the chief of armed forces, the Federal Council created a search committee that included cantonal civilian representatives [5].

Personnel managements of Taiwan’s armed forces are regulated by laws, especially by the “Act of Military Service for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces” [1]. The mechanisms of the “Personnel Reviewing Board” are illustrated in the “Enforcement Rules of Military Service for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces” and are applied in screening processes to ensure fair, unbiased, and independent selections [2]. However, the composition of the Personnel Reviewing Board and the final decisions based on its suggestions are still subject to commanding officers’ discretionary powers [1].

The MND’s Personnel Review Committee may include members of the civil service; however, the regulations of the “Enforcement Rules of Military Service for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces” do not provide any mechanism of independent observeration for the Personnel Review Board [2]. This is because the selection processes for top management are heavily impacted and influenced by the Minister of National Defence and the President.

By law, the LY does not have parliamentary powers of personnel selection and appointment for either civilian officials or military officers [1, 2]. However, experts have speculated that legislators exercise their power by trying to alter the selection processes [3, 4, 5, 6].

The Control Yuan may, in the exercise of its power of control, request the Executive Yuan and its Ministries and Commissions to submit to it (for review) the original orders issued by them and all other relevant documents. The Control Yuan had investigated the military personnel appointment scandal in 2009 and, also, censured the MND for implementing some promotions without following the relevant laws in 2010. There has been no personnel appointment scandals in recent years [7,8,9,10].

Selections and appointments of high ranking military officers are under the direct authority of the Minister of National Defence and the President [1, 2, 3, 4]. The guidelines of selection process are made public; however, the selection criteria are often not aligned with the selection results. When it comes to selecting the top management of Taiwan’s military, the personal preferences of the Minister of National Defence and the President play an important role.

Procedures for appointments and promotions are laid out at a high level in the National Defence Act 1966, and in detail in the National Defence Regulations. The act is a public document, but the supporting regulations are not publicly available. Therefore the exact procedures used could not verified.

There is no publicly known external scrutiny for middle and top positions within the military. [1] However, a vetting process has to be conducted by the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service. This is enshrined in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977, article 148, 2a-2c: the power to appoint the top and some middle position military officers is vested to the commander in chief who is the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. [1] [2]

Very limited information is available about the appointment process. According to the National Defence Act 1966, the President appoints the Chief of Defence Forces, while command posts of Lieutenant Colonel and above are made by the President in consultation with the Chief of Defence Forces. Command posts below that rank are made by the Chief of Defence Forces. [1]

The criteria for the selection of military personnel are defined in the Regulations of Ministry of Defence on Appointment and Promotion of Military Officers 1998 and the Ministerial Regulations on Criteria and Procedures for Military Appointment and Payment 2014; these regulations apply to military personnel at all levels [1,2]. According to the Military Service Act 2008, Section 7, the evaluation of performance, knowledge and skills for the purposes of promotion must be conducted in accordance with the regulations of the MoD [3]. However, the problem of ‘too many generals’ in Thailand results from the tradition of promoting officers before their retirement and the connections gained from military academies or a coup d’état [4,5]. According to Interviewee 3, a high-ranking military officer, due to the patronage issues, the appointment of personnel is undermined, relatively speaking, but most of the time, officers are still selected based on their knowledge and skills since they must pass the aptitude tests and interviews and have a good portfolio [6].

According to the Regulations of Ministry of Defence on Appointment and Promotion of Military Officers 1998, Section 16, the appointment and promotion of military personnel, including those at middle- and top-management levels, is determined by the committee formulated within the MoD [1]. Traditionally, the promotion, demotion and reassignment of individuals and factions across the armed forces is endorsed by the Prime Minister and King. A 2008 amendment to the Defence Act indicates that the appointment of top generals must be determined through a vote by a committee composed of the three service commanders, the Thai armed forces commander and the Minister of Defence. Reshuffles and appointments at senior levels in the armed forces also increasingly extend networks favoured by and loyal to the new monarch [2].

Little to no information is released about the appointment process since the decision is made internally by the committee formulated within the MoD [1]. The only information provided publicly is the result of each appointment, which is published via the Royal Gazette with the King’s order to promote military personnel [2,3,4].

There is an established system for the appointment of military personnel. Decree n° 72-380, dated 6 December 1972, on particular status of military and the Ministerial Order, dated 8 November 1973 (Article 4), give the mandatory conditions for the selection of officers and commissioned officers (1). Several articles of this decree (9, 9 (bis), 14) include conditions relating to promotion to the rank of colonel or general. Appointments of officers and commissioned officers are published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Tunisia (article 40 law n° 67-20, dated 31 May 1967, on the General Status of the Military) (2). Senior military positions are appointed by the President of the Republic (Article 78 of the CRT January 2014) (3).

According to our sources, there is no external scrutiny over medium and senior personnel appointment within MoD (1,2). No evidence of external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management could be found (3,4,5).

According to our sources, there is a shortage of complete information available to the public on the appointments of medium and senior positions within the MoD (1,2). Information on the appointment process in some low positions is available on the website of the Ministry of Defence (3). The same information is not available for middle and top management positions.

The Supreme Military Council (YAS), which is headed by the President and convenes twice a year, once in the first week of August and again in the last week of December, is in charge of all appointments/promotions of colonels and generals in the TAF [1]. The members of the council are the President, the Vice President, the Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs, Treasury and Finance, Education and Foreign Affairs, the Chief of General Staff and the Commanders of the forces. This council has no independent observers.

According to Article 8 of Law No. 1612 regulating the YAS’s role and responsiblities [2], the decisions of the council are not open to legal scrutiny; the contents of discussions are matters of ‘national security’ and therefore ‘secret.’ The same article also stipulates that only the decisions of the council are shared transparently with the public, without detailing the selection criteria or grounds for selection [3]. In his scholarly article, lawyer Bilal Can asserts that ‘The fact that the decisions of the Supreme Military Council are outside judicial review, in terms of the rule of law, has been constantly subject to criticism. Under the amendments made in the Constitution in 2010, decisions are included in judicial review. However, under that amendment, some decisions are still outside judicial review. Essentially, decisions that are outside judicial review are decisions that cannot be sued and some of these decisions are related to discretion’ [4].

The system for appointing military personnel to middle- and top-management roles uses objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes, though there is little independent scrutiny conducted over the promotion of senior personnel, e.g., promotion boards may not have independent observers. However, as demonstrated by the demotion of the Chief of Staff of the Turkish navy, Admiral Cihat Yayci, in May 2020 [2], there are signs of political interference and politicisation of the appointment/promotion system within the TAF under Erdogan’s super presidency [5].

The lack of independent scrunity is not the only problem. The formal rules are laid down through presidental decrees. Under the new decree of 2018, the President decides on the promotion of top officers, including colonels, brigadier generals, rear admirals, generals and admirals in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). In August 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed new military generals and admirals to the land, naval and air force commands through a presidential decree published in the Official Gazette.

Some 72 commanders in the land forces, 25 in the naval forces and 27 in the air forces command have been appointed through this presidential decree, in the context of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) decisions that were made at the shortest ever YAŞ meeting on August 1 without any consultation or oversight.

As explained in 41A, appointing personnel within the Turkish military is purely an executive-related task, the decisions are not open to legal scrutiny, discussions are ‘secret’ and there is an independent observer mechanism monitoring the whole promotion process. In addition, parliament has no involvement whatsoever in the promotion process or in the conduct and decisions of the Supreme Military Council. There is not an independent observer mechanism for the promotion process.

Only the promotion list is announced after the council meetings, which are traditionally held in the first week of August every year. For instance, see the full list of promotions from the 2019 August Summit of the YAS [1], which was shared with the media by the Presidency’s Communication Department after the Supreme Military Council Meeting. This list only includes names and surnames, ranks, service affiliations and posts of the promoted generals and colonels. There is no further explanation about selection criteria, the voting process or any other factors impacting the selection on the list.

Promotions in the UPDF are supposed to be regulated by the UPDF Act and Regulations- Conditions of Service for officers (CS-O). Regulation 25 (1) of the CS-O notes that: “the promotion of an officer shall be recommended by the commanding officer, and the recommendations shall be considered by the Commissions and Promotions Board on three different occasions and shall be within service brackets…” Under this regulation, an officer can only become a Lieutenant after twelve months of commissioned service, a captain after five to six years, a major after eleven to thirteen years, a lieutenant colonel after eighteen to twenty years, colonel, after twenty-one to twenty-three years. Sub regulation (2), however, notes that exceptional circumstances may be considered [1]. However, these requirements have been abused at times by the army leadership [2]. For example, according to many sources, the top positions in the military have been dominated by the Banyankole, Museveni’s ethnic group. For instance, ten of the fifteen lifelong members of the Defense Forces Council and five of the six members of the High Command, the army’s highest organ, are Banyankole [2]. For more than twenty-five years of Museveni’s presidency, all five full generals—including President Museveni and his younger brother, General Salim Saleh—have been Banyankole [3]. In 2019, two more Banyankole were promoted to the rank of general [4]. Section 20 (2) of the UPDF Act [5] deals with the commission’s board which is charged with among others with recommending officers to undertake promotions examinations after successful completion of the requisite courses and to advise the president on the promotion of officers to different ranks in the defence forces. Section 21 [6] of the same act advises the chief of defence forces on matters of promotions of militants up to the rank of warrant officer.

According to the UPDF Act, there are clear provisions for promotions in the army [1]. The UPDF Act does not provide any provisions for external scrutiny. All the appointments in the army are conducted and confirmed by the army leadership. Unlike other security organs like police and prisons, the appointed army officers are not subject to parliamentary approvals. When it comes to appointments, it is the choice of the commander-in-chief who decides on when and who to appoint.

There is no clear information available to the public about the appointment process. Sometimes, appointments are made as a form of reward for what that person has done in suppressing a demonstration or an opposition uprising [1, 2].

Servicemen are appointed by the minister of defence and by officials according to the nomenclature of positions for the appointment of servicemen, approved by the minister of defence [1]. Chief of general staff, single service chiefs and chief of the Military Reconnaissance Unit are appointed by the president [1, 2]. First deputy minister of defence, deputy ministers of defence of Ukraine – by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine following the proposal of the PM of Ukraine following the proposals of the minister of defence, agreed with the president [1]. There is a standardised assessment process carried out by the MoD High Appraisal Commission [3] or the Appraisal Commissions of the lower levels [1]. However, those seem to have only advisory powers and de-facto exactly corresponding military commanders make a decisive choice [3, 4]. The relevant legislation also provides requirements for corresponding positions [1].

Officers (including mid-level officers) are promoted according to MoD Order No. 170 [1]. The document provides that there shall be a “career reserve” consisting of those officers who have the relevant knowledge, experience, competence, personal qualities and can attain certain qualification requirements to be appointed for corresponding positions or to get additional training. This reserve is formed by the certification commissions. Сontracted servicemen are examined by certification commissions headed by their direct commander. According to the certification process HR-bodies draft promotion plan. Nevertheless, commanders can promote servicemen extraordinarily. No selection board and independent selection process are in place.

The President of Ukraine appoints and dismisses the high command personnel of the AFU and other military units [1]. The minister of defence submits to the president a proposal on appointments and dismissals of senior officers of the AFU. The Chief of the General Staff appoints and dismisses from the office servicemen of the AFU [2]. The Chief of the General Staff is appointed by the president, and the VRU does not scrutinise this decision as well as decisions on appointment to lower positions. There is no external scrutiny for military appointments although there is the MoD High Appraisal Commission in place which has advisory functions and considers appointments of senior officers of the AFU [3].

There is no evidence that the top and mid-level military personnel openings follow published job descriptions of any kind. There is no evidence of a de facto or standardised assessment process either. However, the results of appointments of the Chief of the General Staff of the AFU [1], single service chiefs [2], operational command chiefs [3], Chief of the Joint Forces Command Headquarters [4] are made publicly available once appointed.
Approved by the minister of defence in 2017, “The Concept of Military Personnel Policy in the Armed Forces” formally proclaims “implementation into the military personnel policy of principles and approaches adopted in the NATO states” [5]. This envisages AFU carrier management`s transition to an independent rating system of personnel assessment with clear indicators including leadership, professional skills, moral, physical condition, etc. This system includes a transparent centralized database where each officer or NCO has his/her score. It gives military personnel who scored the most a higher chance of career advancement regardless of whether the senior position has been vacated.
However, the concept does not include the creation of an independent rating system for staff assessment and an adopted centralized career management system implementation. Distributed between C2 levels career management system is fully dependent on the appropriate commander`s personal decision, not personnel`s ratings, approved by the minister of defence instead [5]. Assessment criteria formally exist, but they are too general as well as not mandatory for the assignment process counting. This system is non-transparent because nobody knows who is assigned to a specific senior position up to the level of a minister, chief or general staff positions. It is a very bureaucratized process [6]. These facts demotivate the military personnel, particularly those who have extensive combat experience, and leads to their retirement [7, 8].

There is a formal process in place concerning the appointment system for the selection of military personnel at almost all levels in the UAE. However, senior and middle-level personnel are appointed by royal decrees. Federal Law No. 6 of 2004 covers the human resources framework for military personnel. Articles 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 19 set out the processes for the appointment, promotion, and movement of senior military personnel within the defence sector (1). According to Article 12 of Federal Law No. 6 of 2004, promotions and appointments of military personnel are expected to take place through recommendations by an officers committee, which is likely to serve as the supreme body supervising military staff (1). The civilian employees within the armed forces are appointed through strict rules and systems as they are mostly foreigners and not nationals. Even though there are formal processes in place for the appointments and promotions of military personnel, which considers merits, this is expected to be undermined by undue influence. Nepotism and neo-patrimonialism exist in the UAE as a balance of power and influence between different tribes and the maintenance of power in the royal family (2), (3).

There is limited scrutiny over the appointment of senior and middle personnel. The fact that senior and middle-level personnel are appointed by a royal decree negates any possibility of external scrutiny (1), (2).

Federal Law No. 6 of 2004, which sets out the appointment system for the selection of military personnel at the middle and top management level in UAE, is publicly available (1). However, full details of the appointment systems are not revealed, which makes information about it inconsistent and confusing. There is no evidence of there being a ‘fair’ and transparent process concerning recruitment within the defence sector, particularly due to practices of nepotism and favouritism (2). Although there are no formal restrictions concerning UAE citizens’ access to employment, education and public services, there are still practices that favour the distribution of high-level positions based on tribal affiliation and loyalty to the royal families (3), (4).

Section 10 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 requires the selection of people for appointment to the Civil Service to be ‘on merit on the basis of fair and open competition’ [1]. Section 11 requires the independent Civil Service Commission to produce ‘Recruitment Principles’, explaining and interpreting the requirement [2].

The Promotions and Appointments Warrant 2009 is a Royal Warrant relating to promotions, appointments, rewards and awards to officers and other ranks for all members of Her Majesty’s regular and reserve forces [3]. For civilian appointments, the appointment process is underpinned by a fair and open competition and is merit based. Moreover, this process is governed by a government-wide civil service policy, which is publicly accessible [2]. Both civilian and military appointments are well regulated and clear processes for selection are published.

Some high-level appointments at the MoD are subject to pre-appointment scrutiny by the House of Commons [1]. The People Committee was established to provide oversight and assurance of senior appointments processes [2]. However, it is not clear whether external scrutiny (other than legislative scrutiny) takes place, and to what extent this is a regular practice.

Information on the appointment process is publicly available and includes the selection criteria for each rank [1, 2].

With regard to top management, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate. The requirements for the position are dictated in the Military Law [1]. The President also appoints the Chief of Staff for each service (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, National Guard) [2,3,4,5,6]. While the requirements are set out for each role, the legislation also states that the President can also waive these stipulations if they determine it is necessary.

With regards to middle management, which is pay grade O-5 and O-6 (NATO OF-4, OF-5), officers are considered for promotion at specific times in their career, due in part to the requirement of ‘time in grade’ necessary before promotion to a higher grade [7,8]. Middle management does not appear to be selected from candidates external to the military.

Additional promotion criteria is set out in Title 10 of the US Code [9]. Selection boards for promotions are composed of five or more officers of the same armed forces as the force in question [10]. No external personnel or civil service are invited. There is criticism that the centralised promotion system within each service is overly subjective and dependent on the chain of command [11].

Throughout the military, there is a statutory ‘up or out’ requirement as set by the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) [12]. However, this is currently under congressional review and the reforms aim to make promotions emphasise merit and performance rather than ‘time in grade’ [13].

The top management positions mentioned above are selected by the President with the consent of the Senate [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. There is no evidence that process audits or external scrutiny, beyond hearings at the Senate by the Armed Services Committees, take place for either top or middle management [7].

Given that top management roles are nominated by the President first before going through congressional hearings, information on the nomination is made public through the DoD public announcements page [1], usually a month before the hearing takes place [2]. Details on appointment criteria (as outlined in 41A) are publicly available through the General Military Law.

For middle management roles in the military, all officers eligible for promotion are given written notice 30 days in advance of the selection board convening and additional details [3]. The Human Resources page for each service provides information on upcoming promotions boards [4].

The Organic Law of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (LOFANB) grants the president the power to appoint military officers to public administration agencies by means of a resolution of the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD); command posts and management positions within the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) are likewise appointed by order of the president [1]. The Civil Service Status Law establishes a procedure for appointments; however, the majority of management and command positions are freely appointed and removable [2]. For these latter positions, there is no system of appointments assessing knowledge and suitability for office established in laws or regulations other than the provisions of this law.

According to academic analysis, the appointment of military officers has increased considerably, extending to different sectors that are not directly related to the defence and security of the nation, and without justification, procedures, or even evidence of experience in the relevant area on the part of the commissioned officer [3, 4]. Experts and academics have criticised the way that appointments are made by the regime as compensation in exchange for the officers’ loyalty. For example, 13 of 32 ministries are managed by military personnel, as are numerous state-owned companies – both military and historically civil ones, such as Petroleum of Venezuela (PDVSA) [5].

Since the adoption of the new constitution in 1999, the promotion and appointment of military personnel has experienced no civil oversight, since the legislative’s role in authorising them was abolished. Given the closed-off nature of the defence sector, in which both fiscal and legislative external audits have been blocked [1], military appointments to management and public administration positions are not supervised through external checks and remain at the discretion of the executive [2].

Following the Supreme Court decision that overrode the National Assembly, it has been unable to exercise any oversight of or challenge to the executive’s decisions, including appointments of military personnel to the different ministries and state-owned companies [3]. Moreover, in cases where evidence has been gathered of corruption malpractices in the management of military-run companies run, as well as of management and efficiency problems, external auditing measures have been blocked [4].

Military appointments are published in the Official Gazette. However, given that there is no formal process for these appointments to management and public administration positions [1, 2], these publications only fulfil the formalisation of the appointment without offering any information on their rationale [3, 4].

The Constitution of Zimbabwe details the appointments of commanders of the Zimbabwe National Army and the Airforce of Zimbabwe. The powers to appoint the commanders are left to the president after they consult the minister of defence. The procedure of appointment and promotion of middle-rank officers is found in the Defence Act; it follows the recommendations from the command of the service then the president makes the promotions or appointments [1, 2]. There have been several reports of political bias in these promotions, the procedure provided in the statutes provides no role for the public service [3].

The process of appointments for senior officers provided in the Constitution of Zimbabwe gives no role for Parliament, nor does it allow any scrutiny or auditing of the process. The power to appoint officers, even in terms of the Defence Act are the purview of the president, who only consults the minister of defence. The president sometimes gets recommendations from the commanders of military service branches [1, 2].

There is no information officially published on the process of promotion and appointment of senior army commanders beyond anecdotal media reports containing the president’s remarks during a promotion ceremony and the full list of promoted individuals [1, 2]. The Defence Act highlights that the promotions are based on merit; other than that, no further information is provided on the promotion procedures [3].