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Q18.

Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

18a. Legal framework

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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18b. Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice

Score

SCORE: 25/100

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18c. Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice

Score

SCORE: 25/100

Assessor Explanation

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18d. Transparency

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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18e. Scrutiny

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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Relevant comparisons

A review of the legislation on armed forces and of the legislation that regulates various natural resource sectors shows that there are no specific restrictions or prohibitions for defence and security institutions regarding the exploitation of natural resources [1, 2, 3].
Some laws govern various resource sectors such as the hydrocarbons, mineral sector, water resources, by defining ministerial responsibilities [4, 5], but there is no overarching legislation that guarantees the exclusion of the MoD from the involvement in natural resource exploitation. The areas of responsibility the ministries have are defined by the Council of Ministers when new governments are formed [6, 7], while the definition in the laws of “responsible ministry” means that the government has the formal authority to decide the allocation of responsibilities to the MoD.

Although there is no explicit legal ban, there are no cases of the defence and security institutions being involved in businesses related to the exploitation of Albania’s natural resources [1, 2]. Except for a brief period in the late 1980s, when the defence sector was involved in the exploitation of chromium ore and medicinal plants, this has not been the case in Albania, the practice lasted for only two to three years and was terminated with the collapse of communism [1]. As a result, there is no body of legislation or practice on the scrutiny and control of this type of activity by the defence and security sector.

There is no evidence that proves the engagement of individual defence personnel in businesses related to the country’s natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. There are no cases of the defence and security institutions being involved in businesses related to the exploitation of Albania’s natural resources [1, 2].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. There are no cases of the defence and security institutions being involved in businesses related to the exploitation of Albania’s natural resources [1, 2].

There is evidence that individuals of the armed forces are prohibited from having control over or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural exploitation. However, the legal restriction refers to businesses in general and not natural resources specifically. Art. 34 of the Statute of Military Personnel states that it is prohibited for military members to engage in any private gainful activity in any capacity and of any kind (1).

The armed forces are formally involved in the energy policy of the country. The Minister of Defence is present at the National Energy Council, which is the supreme body on energy strategy and headed by the President of the Republic (2). Even though it should meet periodically, the Council has not been active for years (3).

Defence institutions are likely to have financial and controlling interests in businesses associated with Algeria’s natural resources and considering the answer to question 18A, it seems to be illicit (see the country’s last assessment, 5). Algeria is rich in oil and gas reserves, which are vital to the state. For example, revenues of the biggest African oil company Sonatrach amounts to 95% of Algeria’s external revenues and 60% of the budget. The company, therefore, belongs to the pillars of power (1). It is very difficult to find information on this issue and to distinguish between institutional and individual interests. Reports suggest that the DRS influences the appointment process of Sonatrach (2) (5). In the past (2009 and 2010), corruption scandals linked to Sonatrach also were interpreted as turf battles between official and the intelligence services (4, p. 3), suggesting that the intelligence service has a controlling interest in the company. Moreover, Algeria’s elite, including the military, reportedly profits from incomes of the energy sector. The former Vice-President of Sonatrach wrote that at least 5 to 6 billion dollars (some even speak of 10) of the energy sector, go into the pockets of the members of the nomenklatura annually (3).

As has been outlined in the country’s last assessment (4) and in the answers to question 18A and 18B, financial and controlling interests of individual defence personnel are likely widespread and illicit. It is however very difficult to find information about it. The national intelligence agency is reportedly involved in the appointment process of the state energy company Sonatrach (1). The current CEO of the company is considered to be a protégé of the DRS (2). Former Vice-President of Sonatrach Hocine Malti noted that at least 5 to 6 billion dollars, maybe even 10 billion dollars, of the energy sector go into the pockets of the members of the nomenklatura annually (3).

No evidence could be found that interests of the defence institution and individuals are publicly declared and transparent. Information found on the economic activities of the armed forces did not include the energy sector (1). An article published by the armed forces on energy issues did not mention any interests (2).

No evidence could be found that either parliament (1) (2) or the Court of Auditors (3) scrutinize these interests.

There do not appear to be formal restrictions for defence institutions to engage in or benefit from private businesses. The Public Probity Law prohibits individual public servants from engaging in private business activities that may constitute a conflict of interest, though the involvement of senior officials of the military and the presidency (SBP) in private businesses have been the norm. These businesses include exploration of natural resources, such as diamonds and oil, and presumably other natural resources (such as timber, gold and other precious metals) (1), (2), (3).

There is little evidence of direct involvement of defence institutions in natural resource exploration; however, that does not mean it does not exist. A 2017 Maka Angola report states, “the State Intelligence and Security Service (SINSE) sent the head of state information on illegal mining activities in the Cosse areas on the banks of the Luembe River, in the Nzagi district of Lunda Norte province, which involves the Military Intelligence and Security (SISM). For some time now, General Zé Maria has dedicated efforts to the creation of a cooperative for the exploitation of diamonds, in order to generate income parallel to the General State Budget for the SISM working capital. In Cabinda, General Zé Maria has engaged the SISM in the wood exploitation as part of its business efforts to maintain the said working capital without recourse to the OGE” (1).

There is evidence, though, of the involvement of individual senior military officials in natural resources exploration businesses. The involvement of senior military officials in diamond exploration has been well-documented since the 1990s. A recent example, according to Maka Angola, António José Maria, aka “Zé Maria”, the former head of the Military Intelligence and Security Services (SISM), who was forced to retire by President Lourenço in November 2017, had introduced SISM to timber and diamond exploration to give the services more financial autonomy (1), (2), (3), (4).

The involvement of individual senior officials from the Angolan military and the presidency in businesses relating to the country’s oil exploration has been well documented since the civil war and was confirmed again in recent investigative work on the Panama Papers (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

Private business interests of senior officials are rarely publicly declared and commonly
concealed using little known employees or family members who appear in the business ownership declaration in the official gazette, or shell companies [1]. Ironically, in an unprecedented ruling in May, the Supreme Court ruled that Pedro Januário Macamba, an acquaintance of the former chief of the President’s Civil Bureau José Leitão, was the legitimate owner of the GEMA group, a powerful Angolan business holding company. Pedro Januário Macamba had filed a lawsuit against the group, claiming his signature had been falsified in company documents [1].

Private business interests of senior military officials have been subject to public scrutiny mainly by Angolan investigative journalists, though until recently without a response from the judiciary. Parliamentary scrutiny has been weak, due to its limited powers and its domination by the ruling party (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

The country’s defence institutions do not hold controlling or financial interests in businesses related to the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. The Constitution refers to an integral conception of natural resources, which provides for a balance of powers and capacities between the Nation and the provinces. [1] In turn, national regulation is by subject. For example, the hydrocarbons law and the Mining Code. [2] [3] In them, the domain of the State (and therefore the decision on its exploration and exploitation) of all deposits of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, as well as certain mines is enshrined. With regard to the Armed Forces, the Executive Branch through Decree 27/2018, which included a package of rules, formally repealed Law No. 14,147 of 1952. This rule guaranteed autonomy to the Army to administer, lease, and self-supply with their lands, and promoted their own industrial production. The new regulations establish that the Army will continue to maintain control of the properties “that are only used for their specific purposes.” [4] It should be noted that in accordance with recent Decrees 683/2018 and 703/2018, the function of the Armed Forces was enshrined in the surveillance and effective control over geographic spaces with strategic resource reserves. In this regard, the Ministry of Defence announced in 2018 the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force (FDR) for the three Armed Forces in order to have rapid action at borders or areas of conflict where they put natural resources at risk. [5] This falls within the field of strategy, articulating the defence of natural resources within the objectives of the Armed Forces against an eventual external aggression. This does not imply capacity to alienate resources or eventually use them to finance defence resources. There are no laws at the moment that generate taxes on natural resources that can be transferred to the Armed Forces or security forces.

There is no evidence that defence institutions are involved in businesses related to the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. It is observed that the land is one of the natural resources that the Armed Forces have throughout Argentina, but the property is of the National State and is coordinated by the State Property Administration Agency (AABE). [1] Its sale is authorised by Decree of the EP. Some of these lands have been converted or are in the process of becoming natural reserves. [2] [3] Although, based on the new regulations, functions on natural resources are granted to the Armed Forces, they are limited to exercising effective surveillance and control over geographical spaces with strategic resource reserves. [4] [5] [6]

There is no evidence from 2016 on in the media, nor in complaints made by the Anti-Corruption Office, regarding people belonging to the defence jurisdiction that are involved in businesses related to the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. [1]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of the existence of financial interests of the institutions of the defence jurisdiction regarding the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. However, in the case of land under the jurisdiction of the defence area, it is noted that those lands subject to auction or sale belonging to the Armed Forces are made public through the COMPR.AR and AABE platforms. The income goes to the National Treasury and a percentage to the agency with ownership. Although there is some information in this regard, it is not possible to access operations in real time and in a complete manner. [1] [2] [3] [4]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of the existence of financial interests of the institutions of the jurisdiction of defence in the exploitation of the natural resources of the country. However, it should be added that the scrutiny regarding “conflict of interest” in the activities of public officials, which includes the defence jurisdiction, is one of the functions of the Anti-Corruption Office. In the last management report of 2018 there is no reference to the personnel of the defence jurisdiction. [1] Also, from the PL there is, for example, a project to regulate the sale of land from the defence jurisdiction and that this is authorised by the National Congress. [2]

Currently, there is no evidence that Armenia’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1]. The Law on Defence does not provide restrictions on defence institutions to have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [2]. From 2001 to 2010 the Ministry of Defence (MoD) controlled the shares of “Dzorahek” water-power plant, which was illegally privatized [3].

Currently, there is no evidence that Armenia’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1]. However, from 2001 to 2010 the MoD controlled the shares of “Dzorahek” water-power plant, which was illegally privatized [2].

There is no evidence that individual defence personnel have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1]. According to the Law on the Military Service and the Status of Servicemen (Article 8, clause 7), servicemen cannot personally engage in entrepreneurial activity [2].

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. There is no evidence that Armenia’s defence institutions or personnel have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. There is no evidence that Armenia’s defence institutions or personnel have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].

While Australia’s defence institutions would have little incentive to participate in businesses relating to natural resource exploitation due to policy restrictions on competition with the private sector under the Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality Policy [1], there appears to be no strict statutory or constitutional bar on defence owning businesses associated with natural resource exploitation [2].

There is no evidence in media reports [1] or in expert opinion [2] that defence institutions have financial interests associated with natural resource exploitation. The Defence Annual Report lists income and assets and no such interests are indicated [3].

Individual reserve and active-duty defence personnel face strict limits to their ability to be involved in work outside of defence service, and must declare conflicts of interest. These regulations, which do not specifically address natural resource exploitation, appear to be effective, with no evidence of defence personnel involvement in natural resource exploitation. The Military Personnel Policy Manual, Part 7 Chapter 4 describes how defence personnel must seek permission to engage in employment in off-duty hours, and the broad circumstances under which defence personnel should or may be denied permission to engage in off-duty employment [1]. Additionally, Defence Instructions PERS 25-6 describes the steps defence officials should take to avoid perceived or actual conflicts of interests, both financial and personal [2]. It is unclear whether a small number of defence personnel may hold legitimate or illicit financial or employment interests in natural resource exploitation, but there is no evidence of this in media reports [3] or in expert opinion [4].

This indicator has been scored ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence that Australia’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been scored ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence that Australia’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation.

There are legal restrictions on defence institutions and individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses. According to the Law on the Status of Military Servants (Article 23.v), military servants are prohibited from engaging in private entrepreneurial activity, salaried staff positions in cooperatives engaged in production and mediation activities (1).
According to experts, the current legislation in the country prohibits officials from engaging in business. Lawyer Alimammad Nuriyev told Sputnik Azerbaijan that an official cannot deal in business, because of the country’s legislation, it is forbidden (2). However, in practice, many security and defence officials engage in business activities through people who are either close to them or their family members and there is no safeguard provision in the legislation which can prevent the officials from engaging in business activities (3). Various types of control and management systems used in the oil and gas industry are also produced at enterprises operating within the Ministry of Defence’s umbrella (4).

There is not enough informtion to score this indicator. Azerbaijan’s natural resources, and its protection, play an important role in the development of several military institutions in the country. For example, the State Border Service has grown significantly in recent years and has been reinforced in terms of staffing and technical support. The reason for this is the protection of oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Sea (2). State Border Service and the Navy’s military personnel sometimes conducting military training in the Caspian Sea.However, this training or similar ones are undertaken as part of their duties and are unconnected to having financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. This is because it’s currently difficult to ascertain whether there are MoD personnel involved in natural resource exploitation activities. Years ago the media occasionally published articles on the participation of senior officials of the Defence Ministry and other military structures in various businesses. But in recently, information on this topic has dropped considerably. The main reason for this is increased pressure on media and limited research opportunities (1).
For this reason it is difficult to directly ascertain whether there are defence personnel involved in natural resource exploitation activities; there are widespread reports about corruption issues, but there is a lack of reporting about military involvement or business interest in natural resource exploitation. There may or may not be isolated cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation.

According to the law, officials from the Defence Institutions cannot engage in business activities (1). At the same time, there is no transparency in this direction. Military structures have not made any statement on this issue. However, the public is well aware of the fact that most of the people in the defence institutions are engaged in business activities (2). At the same time, there is no information on the involvement of state bodies in business activities related to the exploitation of natural resources (3).

The issue of “involvement of defence agencies in the businesses relating to the country‘s natural resource exploitation” is not discussed either by the parliament or by the public (1). This topic is very closed and it is almost impossible to get information about it. The parliament has not yet carried out any investigations or scrutiny on this issue (2).

Based on the available information, Bahrain’s defence sector receives 25% of the country’s wealth from natural resources [1]. Sources state the rentier country depends solely on its natural resources for the defence sector [2]. The army has no direct control of the natural resources; however, the king’s office directs 25% of these revenues to the army. The army has no effective control over natural resources; rather it receives a contribution from it. However, there is no legal framework that could prevent them from having control (as an institution) over natural resources.

The business activities of the defence sector (which is under the king’s control) is considered legal [1, 2]. However, there is no information about the involvement of the army and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in businesses in general. Business activities by the army (if they exist) would be legal. However, the royal family’s exploitation of land which has natural resources provide examples of the royal family’s business and financial interests, who are the head of the military and security apparatus in the country [3].

According to interviewees, only loyalists and royal family members have the capacity and ability to run businesses and have a financial interest in Bahrain’s natural resources with major financial revenues. Individuals’ involvement in financial interest in natural resources is limited to the close allies and members of the royal family. However, these interests are not declared and not publicly available [1, 2, 3].

There is interest from loyal figures and royal family members who work in the defence sector in the natural resources of Bahrain, and they have an active business-related to natural resources, these interests are not made public [1, 2]. Online and offline searches found nothing publicly available on these interests.

As the personnel are loyalists and royal family members, there is no scrutiny over these types of businesses. There is no legal framework to scrutinize these kinds of companies in the majority of cases as they benefit from royal status protection [1, 2].

The assessor could not, through research, identify any legal restrictions on the Bangladesh Army with regard to its involvement in business interests associated with natural resource exploitation. Senior military officials are entitled to receive permits from the Ministry of Forest allowing them to buy up to 300 cft of wood logs at a cheaper price for building furniture or making houses. These permits are then sold to illegal traders for profit [1]. Allegations of land grabbing in forest areas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts by influential military officials, including the Army Welfare Trust, abound [2]. The military also receives land for training purposes or for intensive agriculture production and dairy farming. According to a study by TI Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Army receives an approx. 58% share of the total forest area allotted to different organisations by the Forest Department [3].

The Army’s involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation appears to be considered legal. Recently, the government approved the leasing of indigenous areas to a private company and allowed the Army Welfare Trust in Chimbuk Hills to build a five-star hotel, sparking protest from the indigenous Mro community, who will be affected by this ‘development project’ [1]. The Bangladesh Military website has a section entitled ‘Nation Building’, which includes the subsections ‘Development Work’, ‘Construction Work’ and ‘In Aid to Civil Power’ [2]. This is in addition to more than 20 business entities under the Army Welfare Trust [3], which have a combined turnover of over USD 700 million. The government has awarded contracts to Military Engineer Services to develop various roads and bridges. For example, Special Works Organization of Bangladesh Army (SWO) has built an approach road and service area for the Padma Multipurpose Bridge [4]. The SWO is also involved in the construction of a 300-feet road in Purbachal. The Hatirjheel Combined Development Project, which includes Begunbari Canal, was also implemented by 17 Engineer Construction Battalion of the Bangladesh Army [5].

With regard to the exploitation of land in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other housing projects, the nexus between the military, private businesspeople and officials is fully evident from media reports.

A number of individual defence personnel have formed private companies to exploit land resources in the name of housing development in urban areas [1]. There is a pattern of land capture by elites who engage gangs, corrupt public servants and the military to coerce small producers into relinquishing their entitlements on their increasingly valuable lands in and near urban areas [2]. Indigenous people are also affected as these powerful defence personnel have been building resorts and hotels on forest land in hilly areas [3].

Sena Kalyan Sangstha (SKS) (Army Welfare Trust) was formed in 1998 to promote the welfare of serving and ex-army personnel [1]. It has more than 20 businesses, of which 9 are industrial, 5 are commercial and 7 are real estates. It received a tax card in 2020 from the National Board of Revenue for paying regular taxes. Information about its operating profit is unknown and an annual report could not be found on its website. It can therefore be concluded that these interests are non-transparent.

There is no evidence to suggest that these interests are subject to any form of scrutiny; no clear information on this sujbect could be found.

There are no specific statutory or constituional restrictions in Belgium on the defence sector’s involvement in natural resource exploitation [1]. There is are, however, frameworks on conflicts of interest [2, 3]

There is no evidence of defence institutions having financial interests in business associated with Belgium’s natural resource exploitation [1].

There is no evidence of defence personnel individual involvment in businesses relating to the country’s natural resources. Belgium does have state-to-state partnership with former colonies in terms of development and natural resources, but this does not directly involve Belgian defence institutions with natural resource extraction [1, 2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions or personnel having financial interests relating to natural resource exploitation in Belgium [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions or personnel having financial interests relating to natural resource exploitation in Belgium [1].

Article 13 of the Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina prescribes all the competences of the Ministry of Defence and accordingly to the listed Article, no provisions authorise the MoD to have any kind of control or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2].

Article 13 of the Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina prescribes all the competences of the Ministry of Defence and accordingly to the listed Article, no provisions authorise the MoD to have any kind of control or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2].
There are no known cases of defence institutions engaging in businesses relating to natural resource exploitation.

As explained in 18A, there is no legal basis for military personnel to be involved in any kind of control or exploitation of natural resources [1]. As such, military personnel cannot be active within the field of control or exploitation of natural resources in any capacity. There are also no known cases of individual defence personnel to be involved in businesses relating to natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. Article 13 of the Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina prescribes all the competences of the Ministry of Defence and accordingly to the listed Article, no provisions authorise the MoD to have any kind of control or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. Article 13 of the Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina prescribes all the competences of the Ministry of Defence and accordingly to the listed Article, no provisions authorise the MoD to have any kind of control or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2].

There are no legal restrictions that prohibit the BDF from engaging in business involving the natural resources of Botswana [1,2]. There is no legal framework and as such there are no sources to that effect. This was confirmed by a search of government websites and media sources.

There is no evidence to the effect that the BDF is involved in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1,2].

There is no evidence to the effect that the BDF officials are involved in businesses that relate to natural resources [1,2]. Officers are prohibited from engagement in trade or business for profit without the consent of the commander by Article 74 of the BDF Subsidiary Legislation [3].

There is no evidence that such interests exists, as such this indicator is marked Not Applicable. No such declarations have been made [1] and Botswana has an Act to make provision for the declaration of interests, income, assets and liabilities of certain categories of persons; to monitor the interests, income, assets and liabilities of those persons for the purposes of preventing and detecting corruption, money laundering and the acquisition of property from proceeds of any other offence, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto [2].

There is no evidence that these interests are declared if at all they exist. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’. The Declaration of Assets and Liability 12 of 2019, which came into effect on 22 October 2019, makes provision for the declaration of interests, income, assets and liabilities of certain categories of persons; to monitor the interests, income, assets and liabilities of those persons to prevent and detect corruption, money laundering and the acquisition of property from proceeds of any other offence, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto [1]. With the new law, it will be possible to scrutinise the declarations from any form of impropriety [2].

There is no explicit prohibition of defence institutions controlling financial or business-related to natural resource exploitation. However, there is no evidence that any defence institution has participated in this sort of economic activity. All companies with links to the armed forces were created with very specific and strict objectives – such as technological development related to the national defence strategic projects [1]. The Army’s website lists three entities that are linked to the Army, and among them, the only company that has profit as a goal is Brazil’s Industry of Military Equipment (IMBEL), which is a portable arms and munition producer [2]. However, and according to additional data provided by one of the reviewers, financial interests can be indirect as well: army engineers have been involved in projects that are related to resource exploitation (e.g. in paving roads in the Amazon) and were able to use this mission to justify the purchase of new equipment [3, 4]. According to the other reviewer, it is important to note that the Brazilian Nuclear Programme, which is under Brazilian Navy management alongside with civilian companies, is related to the uranium exploitation in the country (and its enrichment a posteriori). Constitutionally, only the public company Industrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB), can explore uranium in the country. In April 2019 the minister of mines and energy (who is an admiral), proposed an amendment to the Constitution to open the exploitation to private companies, a proposition which has not been voted by the Congress yet [5, 6].

There are few references in the media to royalties or financial interests of the armed forces in natural resources [1, 2]. However, draft bills that link oil and gas royalties to military funds can be found in the news from 2011 – that states that the Navy already receives the royalties from this sector (this proposal was rejected by the legislature) [3]. However, receiving royalties cannot exactly be characterized as involvement with the business, since the royalties go first to the federal government and only after that, they are directed to the fund. Most companies with links to the armed forces were created with very specific and strict objectives – such as technological development related to the national defence strategic projects [4]. According to the Army’s website, they list three entities that are linked to the Army, and among them, the only company that has profit as its goals is IMBEL, which is a portable arms and munition producer [5].

The assessor found no evidence of involvement of military officials acting in companies that explore natural resources [1, 2].

The assessor found very limited evidence of involvement of military officials acting in companies that explore natural resources. Their interests are related to having access to the royalties collected by the government, and the Navy is the only military institution that accesses a part of this income. All transfers are registered by the National Agency for Oil and Gas (ANP), and numbers are monthly available on their website [1].

In order for any military institution to have access to these royalties, the Parliament must approve it, and they denied access to the Army in 2011. The money goes to the Navy, and its use is evaluated by the Court of Auditors (TCU) together with other spending issues [1, 2]. The assessor found no evidence of potential for impropriety in the analyzed scrutiny processes.

Defence institutions are by law prohibited from having a controlling or financial interest in business associated with natural resource exploitation. According to Article 33 of the Law N° 038 (2016) does not allow personnel to have interests in a private enterprise, nor hold a position or a private lucrative activity whatsoever for themselves or through people with other denomination. Also, Article 40 and 156 of the Law N° 081 (2015) prohibits holding any commercial interest in private companies.

There is no evidence connecting the country’s defence institutions to financial interests in businesses related to the country’s natural resources exploitation. However, given the high level of corruption in the country and the long-serving past regime, chances are great that some defence institution had some degree of control and financial interests in business associated with the exploitation of the natural resources of the country. Burkina Faso is known for being the fourth gold exporter country, after Ghana, South Africa and Mali (1), with about “US$2.5 billion worth of goods around the globe in 2016” (2). In the absence of evidence, this widespread gold exploitation could have driven defence institutions’ controlling and financial interest in business associated with the exploitation of natural resources. In addition to gold, the other natural resources of the country constitute zinc in exploitation at Perkoa, and manganese at Tambao. To mitigate the risk of widespread corruption the country acquire status with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since 2018. ITIE is known as an internal standard of good governance in extractive industries; it monitors the revenues that the government collects with each of existing gold companies across the territory (3).

The law prohibits any involvement of individual defence personnel in business relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation (1), (2). Complying with the military code of conduct and discipline is required in the defence institutions; any violation causes serious sanctions (3). Controlling or having financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation, is incompatible with the military, which is, by nature impartial, seeking common interests instead. As such, there is no evidence of involvement of defence personnel in businesses related to the country’s natural resource exploitation, and it would be considered illegal according to the law.

If there are some isolated cases of interests of the defence personnel in the country’s natural resource exploitation, these interests are not publicly declared, as they generate from illicit activities. The law on the status of the defence personnel prevents personnel from engaging in any commercial activity. Any personnel found guilty are immediately prosecuted and sent to prison and/or subject to payment of a considerable fine. When prosecution results in a penal sanction, it could result in a dismissal from the armed forces, if the sentence is more than 45 days (1). According to Burkina Faso’s penal code, funds resulting from illicit activities are not transparent and are more likely to nurture money laundry. Since defence personnel’s interests in natural resources exploitation do not comply with the law, the funds generated from having an interest in natural resource exploitation consequently become non-transparent (2), (3), (4).

There evidence found for scrutinizing the MoD or its personnel for involvement in the natural resource business. The Constitution grants power and legitimacy to the Court of Accounts and the Higher State Supervisory Authority/Fight Again Corruption (ASCE-LC) to scrutinize the national budget allocated to government institutions for their activities (1), (2). Therefore, interests resulting from businesses related to natural resource exploitation do not fall under any work of scrutiny. Further, as law enforcement institutions, the Court of Accounts and the ASCE-LC, would more likely apply sanctions for having such interests gained out of any legitimacy rather than seeking to scrutinize them (1),(3), (4), (5).

There is no evidence of any law that prohibits defence institutions from getting involved in any business transaction.

According to the Japan Times, “The local press says the Cameroonian elite — including generals, colonels, lawmakers, ministers and a nephew of President Paul Biya — hold mining permits, but it is impossible to confirm the information … ‘The army protects the Chinese at all their mining sites to the detriment of nearby communities and it participates in intimidating them and racketeering,’ said one activist, who asked not to be named” [1].

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative states that “Cameroon published its beneficial ownership roadmap on 22 November 2016. Of the 17 companies in its 2015 EITI Report, six were either state-owned or publicly listed. Of the remaining eleven companies, five disclosed comprehensive information on their beneficial owners” [2] [3] [4].

According to the Japan Times, “The local press says the Cameroonian elite — including generals, colonels, lawmakers, ministers and a nephew of President Paul Biya — hold mining permits, but it is impossible to confirm the information … ‘The army protects the Chinese at all their mining sites to the detriment of nearby communities and it participates in intimidating them and racketeering,’ said one activist, who asked not to be named” [1].

According to the Japan Times, “The local press says the Cameroonian elite — including generals, colonels, lawmakers, ministers and a nephew of President Paul Biya — hold mining permits, but it is impossible to confirm the information” [1], meaning mining ownership is not transparent.

There are no mechanisms put in place to scrutinise such interests [1] [2].

There are no restrictions on defence institutions, or other government ministries, having interests in natural resource businesses. [1] [2]

Defence institutions have no such interests in practice. However, the holdings of the Canadian Armed Forces Pension Plan currently include 4% natural resources related businesses. [1] However, this fund is subject to conflict of interest regulation designed to prevent stakeholders in the pension from influencing public policy broadly (although not with respect specifically to natural resources). [2] There is evidence of public pensions, though not CAF pensions specifically, investing in oil heavily. [3] In 2016, the administration of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) pension plans was transitioned to Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC). The Public Service Pension Plan, including the Public Service, Canadian Armed Forces and the Military Reserve Force operates separately from the Government of Canada, as does Public Sector Pension Investment Board. Senior military or defence officials are not involved in any decisions related to investments held by the plan. [4]

Individuals are required to declare, and in some circumstances divest from, any financial interests that might conflict with their roles as members of the CAF/public servants. [1] As a result, there have been no reported cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resources. However, the opacity of Canadian laws around disclosure of ownership mean that it is impossible to know the ownership or investors of a given business. [2]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence that, beyond the pension plan with 4% of holdings in natural resources, Canadian defence institutions or individuals hold significant interests in natural resource extraction businesses. [1] [2] [3]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of such interests. [1] [2] [3]

Neither the Organic Law that Regulates the Armed Forces (Law 18.948) nor the Military Justice Code [1] establishes restrictions on the defence institutions that have control or financial interests in businesses related to the nation’s natural resources. The Armed Forces do have control over state enterprises [2], specifically the army’s factories (Famae), the navy’ssShipyards (Asmar) and the National Aeronautics Company (Enaer), but these are not concerned with the exploitation of natural resources. However, the institutions of the armed forces maintain an indirect financial interest in the main state-owned mining company, Codelco, its profits are linked through the Restricted Law of Copper (13.196) to the provision of funds for military equipment and war materials [3, 4].

Although defence institutions do not have control over businesses related to the country’s natural resource exploitation, there is an indirect financial interest linked to economic profits generated by the state-owned mining company, Codelco. This interest comes from the fact that, since 1958, the Restricted Law of Copper (13.196) has stipulated that a share of Codelco’s export sales (10 per cent) were to be transferred to the armed forces. Each budget year, Codelco must deposit the earmarked resources in three secret accounts (for the army, the air force, and the navy) at the Central Bank, maintaining those accounts outside of the national treasury accounts and parliamentary oversight [1]. In practice, the system constituted a tax to Codelco, similar to the royalties from oil exports that fed the Ecuadorean military budgets [2]. Therefore, it linked the resources for acquisition and maintenance of army systems to the profits earned by the state company, resources that fluctuate according to the international price of copper. The law establishes an expected minimum contribution–an economic floor of US$180 million annually (adjusted by the U.S. Producer Price Index), which should be provided by the National Treasury in case that profits from Codelco were not sufficient [3]. Although indirect, a financial interest exists, and it is institutionalised and regulated. Authors agree that this system has not only been suboptimal from an economic point of view, but it has also involved problems of accountability, democratic control, and transparency [4, 5]. It must be noted that, in September 2019, legislation with a new funding mechanism for the strategic capabilities in the defence sector was passed [6], derogating the reserved fund associated with the Copper Law. The new mechanism establishes a Multiannual Fund of Strategic Capabilities, to give stability to the investments of the defence sector, particularly for the financing of war material, infrastructure, and maintenance expenses. The legislation will enter into force in 2020, and it remains to be assessed in follow-up evaluations.

Although there were institutionalised financial interests that linked resources for military maintenance and acquisitions in the armed forces with the profits of the state-owned mining industry Codelco, there has been no evidence of systematic participation of defence personnel in businesses related to natural resource exploitation. While during the last few years, a series of corruption scandals arose in the armed forces, irregularities were not tied to natural resource businesses but with fraud in the processes of acquisition and procurement [1, 2]. This fact does not mean that Codelco has been free from corruption. There have been investigations of embezzlement and fraud within the company, but not related to individuals of the defence sector [3].

Despite several attempts at increasing transparency, details of operations and resource expenditures related to the military remain secret and are expected to continue this way for the foreseeable future. There is no evidence of the implementation of transparency norms [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].

There exists some parliamentary and public scrutiny of financial interests in the armed forces, but these instances have not been systematic, and they have been limited to specific areas of the defence budget. First, regulatory mechanisms still guarantee important areas of secrecy in financial interest issues. Although there is public and parliamentary scrutiny of resources that belong to the Public Budget Law, resources that came from the Restricted Law of Copper, which was only made public in 2016 [1] and ended in September 2019, remained outside of the public oversight and control. Audits and other mechanisms of oversight were not made public [2], and these resources were reported to the General Comptroller only through certificates of “good investment”, in a reserved and general way. These certificates are used as a formal procedure and do not constitute a mechanism of control by themselves. Second, there has been an institutional culture based on the secrecy and the autonomy of the armed forces in dealing with institutional, financial, and budgetary issues [3]. Third, although Congress has been able to create Special Investigatory Commissions to dig into different controversies associated with malfeasance and fraud [4, 5], these instances have worked only after media investigations uncovered the existence of irregularities [6]. All in all, these cases have not been directly linked to business in natural resources.

China’s Military has undergone two major rounds of divestiture, one in the late 1990s and one in the late 2010s. Until the late 1990s, the PLA controlled natural resources, for instance the Daqing oil fields in Xinjiang. However, as the private businesses of the PLA became a major source of corruption (including oil smuggling), in 1998 the Chinese government implemented a divestiture of the Chinese military from businesses, which has been characterised as generally successful as the PLA lost control of approximately 6,000 out of 10,000 businesses (Shambaugh, 2002; Bickford, 2006). The remaining businesses under military control did not include (at least not formally) direct control over natural resources. The second divestiture round that was initiated in 2015 will phase out all remaining business interests of the PLA (Malvenon, 2016: 1-3, PLA, 2018). It should be noted however that State Owned Enterpises (SOEs) in the defence sector have business interests in natural resources (Interview 2; Bloomberg Company Profiles)

It appears that after two divestitures the PLA has no direct controlling or financial interests related to natural resource exploitation. As noted in the previous section, SOEs in the defence sector continue to have such interests in practice. However, given the complete lack of transparency regarding the degree of the PLA’s actual control of these SOEs, the existence of strong indirect links with such businesses cannot be ruled out. There is not enough evidence here to provide a score, so this indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

It appears that after two divestitures the PLA has no direct controlling or financial interests related to natural resource exploitation. As noted in the previous section, SOEs in the defence sector continue to have such interests in practice. However, given the complete lack of transparency regarding the degree of the PLA’s actual control of these SOEs, the existence of strong indirect links with such businesses cannot be ruled out. There is not enough evidence here to provide a score, so this indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

Although there is no evidence that such interests exist currently, there is clear evidence that they existed in the past (for instance in the case of Daqing Oil fields) and that they have been a source of corruption. [1] SOEs in the defence sector are also known to maintain interests in natural resource exploitation. [2] There is complete lack of transparency in the evaluation of how much control the PLA has over these SOEs.

In China’s authoritarian political system, there is no such thing as independent scrutiny. The CCP has the ability and mechanisms (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) to scrutinise such interests but this would be a process entirely controlled by the Party.

The Colombian State has the role of controlling and planning the management and/or use of natural resources. The State is the owner of the subsoil. Law 685 of 2001, the Mining Code, [1] regulates the exploitation of natural resources by the Colombian State and the private sector. The Security and Defence Policy of 2019 [2] notes the threat represented by the convergence of illicit economies related to natural resource exploitation and organised armed groups. Because of this, the armed forces play a role in the defence and protection of natural resources. With regard to the protection of maritime resources, the Maritime General Directorate (DIMAR) is responsible for enforcing the regulations on the exploitation and preservation of the maritime environment. [3] In practice, defence entities are not generally responsible for the exploitation of natural resources. However, there does not seem to be any express statutory limitation related to the armed forces’ involvement in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation. Defence institutions are not mentioned in the key natural resources legislation. At the same time, there are mixed-economy and state-corporations related to the defence system. For instance, Decree 1512 of 2000, on the Structure of the Ministry of Defence, states that there are three state enterprises that are linked to the Ministry of Defence (Industria Militar, Caja Promotora de Vivienda Militar, and Servicio Aéreo a Territorios Nacionles, SATENA). [4] Likewise, there are three mixed economy corporations with Ministry of Defence participation (Corporación de la Industria Aeronáutica Colombiana SA (CIACSA), Hotel San Diego SA, and Hotel Tequendama). It is therefore legally possible to potentially involve the military in this sector, even if they are not currently involved.

The defence sector consists of 18 decentralized entities that make up the Social and Business Group of the Defence (GSED). [1] None of them carry out productive activities based on the exploitation or control of natural resources. According to the report from Memories to Congress (2016), [2] these entities had assets of more than 11.8 billion pesos. The companies have a range of services including transport, recreation, housing, and production of equipment and elements for military and civil use. None are businesses related to the exploitation of natural resources. The GSED entities have eight public establishments, three mixed-economy companies, a private non-profit entity, an entity that is a unit of the Ministry of Defence, two state industrial and commercial enterprises, two indirect decentralized entities, and a Superintendency with legal status. However, in the context of armed conflict and in the post-conflict period after the signing of the Peace Agreement, the territories have been consistently transformed through the consolidation of the presence of illegal armed groups seeking territorial control, as a result of drug trafficking routes, and due to the exploitation of natural resources. The participation of the public security forces, drug trafficking groups, organised armed groups (GAO) and guerrillas, has generated confrontation in certain rural areas over who can exercise military, political, and economic control. [3] This is particularly the case in the movement to control illegal economic activities. [4] According to Interviewee 6, [5] links remain in Colombia between illegal armed groups, law enforcement officers, and businesspeople, who seek to protect legal and illegal business in the territories. Threats, intimidation, and murders of social leaders that work on the defence of natural resources, the non-exploitation of minerals, diversification of production, opposition to megaprojects etc. have occurred at the hands of illegal armed groups in areas where the public security force has failed to assume its role of defence in the territory. According to the same Interviewee, it is presumed that the public forces support an economic agenda in which certain groups and individuals who are against processes such as the land restitution and comprehensive rural reform stipulated in the Peace Agreement are beneficiaries. Thus they seek to consolidate local and regional legal and illegal economies in the territories. However, there is no data to reaffirm the links between Armed Forces, paramilitary groups, and entrepreneurs in the territory for the control of legal and illegal economies. However, there is no firm evidence to reaffirm the links between FFAA, paramilitary groups and entrepreneurs in the territory for the control of legal and illegal economies.

In the context of the armed conflict and the post-conflict process, possible links and relations between the military forces and police groups are seen in the Special Justice for Peace (JEP), which is a part of the Colombian State’s strategy to gain territorial control in areas with guerrilla presence, as well as areas with natural resources that can be exploitated. [1, 2] There are various reports of violations by the Military Forces in the conflict provided by human rights advocacy organisations to the JEP. The seven reports submitted between May and June allege responsibility and participation of the Military Forces in specific events of the armed conflict, such as systemic and widespread practices based on orders of senior army officials. [3] Likewise, the reports of the National Center for Historical Memory, “Licensed to Displace” and “Petroleras y Mineras fund the Public Force and the Prosecutor’s Office” by the League Against Silence (La Liga Contra El Silencio) and Conflict Routes (Rutas de Conflicto), [4, 5] highlight the structure designed by these entrepreneurs and the Ministry of Defence for the generation of cooperation agreements between the two sectors in order to ensure security and pursue crimes in mining and energy territories, where communities have denounced persecutions and abuses of power by the army regarding environmental safeguards. These communities are places with high rates of conflict and presence of illegal groups such as guerrillas and paramilitary groups. According to reports of the JEP in its advanced processes, it is evident that some members of the armed forces participate in illicit business or businesses related to the exploitation of illicit resources, such as Colonel Elkin Alfonso Argote. [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]

Details of the budget implementation for the defence sector are published quarterly on the website of the Ministry of Defence. [1] This publication includes the decentralised entities of the sector, minus the Industrial and Commercial Enterprises of the State (EICE) belonging to the defence sector, which include INDUMIL, SATENA, CIAC, and Hotel Tequendama since the resources of these entities are approved by the Fiscal Policy Council (CONFIS), a body attached to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, responsible for directing fiscal policy and coordinating the Budget System. On the other hand, the budget of the Military and Police Housing Promotion Fund (Caja Promotora de Vivienda Militar y de Policía) is approved by the Superintendence of Finance. The published details of the budget implementation also does not include the budgets of the autonomous entities of the defence sector, whose budgets are approved by each entity since they have legal personry. [2, 3] On the other hand, the economic transparency portal of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit consistently publishes an up-to-date budget execution for the defence sector. And finally, in the report to Congress, the budget relationship between expenditure and revenue for all entities in the defence sector is also generally public. Operations, interests, and expenditure in territories are not published in detail, nor are there official reports by the Military Forces and Police related to the violation of human rights, nor the relationship between the Military, illegal armed gangs, and entrepreneurs in the context of the armed conflict. According to Interviewee 6, [4] access to this type of information is not constant, and access to it poses a risk to social organisations and to persons interested in making public the irregularities related to the financial and economic interests of this sector, given the links that military forces could have with illegal armed groups in the territories.

The defence sector has the ‘Line of Honor’ strategy in order to receive complaints and allegations from all entities in the sector. [1] The Comptroller carries out fiscal control through audits to the defence sector, selecting the entities to be audited and the topics of the audits. This process generates an improvement plan that entities must undertake in order to improve their procedures. The General Prosecutor’s Office of the Nation conducts investigations into the actions of public servants. The Second Committee of the Congress is responsible for identifying actions and political responsibility for acts of officials within the Ministry of Defence and its entities as well as the Minister of Defence. As for civil society entities, they carry out citizen control over the use of natural resources, such as the Natural Resource Governce Institute, which through the natural resource governance index evaluates the policies and practices employed by the authorities to govern their oil, gas, and mining industries. Colombia obtained a rating of 71 or satisfactory, recognizing that the country has strong governance policies and practices but that some areas required improvements. [2] However, in the territories where the presence of natural resources and land restitution processes are located, there are social organisations which can carry out the action of control and citizen surveillance, but those processes pose a great risk to CSOs. Interview 6 argues that in territories where land restitution, megaprojects, mining, and illegal economies are presented, there is a high presence of illegal and legal armed groups, which partake in intimidation of social leaders, threats, murders, and displacements, benefiting particular interests over the interests of communities, and for this reason it is difficult to carry out scrutiny and control. [3]

There is no evidence of any legal prohibition against defence institutions (MoD structures) or individuals having financial interests in natural resources or extractive industries.

Illicit trafficking in natural resources and commodities (minerals, coffee/cocoa, timber, cotton, cashews and petroleum) is being carried out by former rebel leaders of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) and is completely non-transparent. However, this does not mean that defence institutions themselves have controlling or financial interests in such trafficking flows. It is individual members of the armed forces, including some residing in Abidjan, who have such controlling stakes.

According to a September 2017 report by the French-based OFPRA (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides), UN experts calculated that up to 10% of the cocoa production around the towns of Man, Séguél and Vavoua were exported through Togo and sold to multinationals via the Port of Lomé. This production was controlled by local warlords. After the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011, the COMZONES switched from trafficking in cocoa to trafficking in gold and diamonds (1). Citing a later UN expert study on natural resources trafficking in Côte d’Ivoire, the OFPRA report states that the chain of command in the illicit trade of gold, diamonds and cocoa (and of their involvement in artisanal mining) led to high-ranking members of the armed forces who were not only local warlords but also residing in the economic capital of Abidjan (1). In its April 2015 report, the UN Panel of Experts noted that trafficking in gold, diamonds and cocoa has remained active since the end of the crisis. The UN Panel has gathered information from multiple reliable sources indicating that the chain of command authorizing the artisanal and illegal mining of gold leads to important members of the security forces of Côte d’Ivoire in Abidjan. These individuals or their associates have set up a gold trade mechanism that includes the concession of land allotments for the purpose of the exploitation and sale of gold.

It is important to point out that defence institutions (MoD) are not directly involved in this kind of illicit activity. The government is attempting to put an end to this practice, in part via juicy early retirement schemes destined to high-ranking military officers foreseen by the current Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM 2016-2020). According to the September 2017 report by the French-based OFPRA, half of the reforms that Côte d’Ivoire committed to in the process known as the Réformes du Secteur de Sécurité (RSS, DDR), which began in 2013, have not been honoured, including the reintegration of former rebels. Many of them are involved in illicit commodity trade that provides them and their troops with significant annuities. The OFPRA report names the COMZONES and the areas under their control. (1)
They include the following high-ranking officers: Morou Ouattra (known as Atchengué), Hervé Toure (known as Vetchio), Ousmane Cherif, Tuo Fozie, Messamba Kone, Zoumana Ouattara, Issiaka Ouattara (known as Wattao), Losséni Fofana, Daouda Doumbia, Ousmane Coulibaly, Gaoussou Kone, Martin Fofie and Zakaria Kone.

The natural resources controlled locally by COMZONES not only provide a supplementary income but also allow the former rebel leaders to perpetuate internal conflict, as occurred in January and May 2017 with the soldier uprisings in Bouaké and other towns. The sale of minerals (gold, diamonds) and the local management of trade in cocoa and coffee beans, as well as cotton and timber, even extends to the petroleum sector:

“Since the beginning of the political-military crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the control of raw materials – and in particular the management of the coffee and cocoa sectors – has served to finance armed groups and militias of the rebellion as well as the central government. The same level of opacity exists for revenues from the exploitation of oil. The rebel leaders enriched themselves considerably during the ten years of crisis. They benefited from the exploitation of cocoa, coffee, wood, cotton, gold and diamonds. They also took over control of companies, collected high taxes on road networks and via utilities, and they admit to having done these things.”

A March 2016 IFRI report by Aline Leboeuf addresses the trafficking practices of Issiaka Ouattara (known as Wattao) in the region of Séguéla:

“While few COMZONES have been sanctioned by the UN Security Council, and none are currently being pursued by the International Criminal Court, the reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire established in application of § 27 of Resolution 2153 (2014) exposed the types of informal parallel economy that some COMZONES managed to put in place in order to exploit the Ivorian resources to their ends…The last report, issued on 13 April 2015 by the Security Council, stresses that “the influence that some former zone commanders exert on the state security apparatus remains problematic”, and again highlights the involvement of Wattao in the trafficking of gold and diamonds and in the illegal taxation of the transportation network” (2).

Jeune Afrique has also carried regular news pieces about regional military warlords and the non-central government income they receive from operating an illicit parallel economy (3).

The interests of the COMZONES in the illicit trafficking of commodities and natural resources are not publicly declared and are entirely non-transparent. The government has sought to filter out the former rebel leaders via early retirement and retraining schemes. According to Jeune Afrique, the reason for tolerating the illicit trafficking by COMZONES is the threat they pose to political stability. Though they are pointed out by international media as guilty of trafficking in gold, coffee/cocoa, as well as of money laundering activities, they are perceived as judicially immune by the public and the MoD. Jeune Afrique cites the case of Martin Fofie in the northern region of Savanes (1). “Master of the capital of Savannah until January 2017, [FOFIE] has since been transferred to Daloa but continues to visit his stronghold of the North on a regular basis. This has led experts to suspect him of laundering money from the gold traffic in the region” (1).

In a separate article, Jeune Afrique cites the case of Issaka Outtara (known as Wattao and with 1,500 troops under his command), who was sent to Morocco for training at the Royal Military Academy of Meknes in 2018 to earn a certificate in security studies in a government attempt to neutralize him (2). “For the second time in less than three years, Wattao has been sent to Morocco, where, in the calm of the prestigious Royal Military Academy in Meknes, he is doing a six-month internship and from where he will return in late May with a degree in security and defense policy. Is it a punitive measure to keep him far away or a rewarding opportunity for training? A bit of both” (2).

Details that prove the opacity of the financial interests of COMZONES in natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire can be obtained from the OFPRA report (3).

The interests of former rebel leaders (COMZONES) in commodities and natural resources are not subject to any kind of public scrutiny due to political sensitivity and the power wielded by local warlords at the regional level. Though their involvement in illicit trafficking and money laundering activities has been reported by international institutions and media, intimidation and the threat of violence stand in the way of heightened public scrutiny of the COMZONES (1), (2), (3), (4).

There is no law that prohibits Defence institutions’ association with natural resource exploitation.The exploitation of the country’s natural resources is regulated by the law on raw material (“Råstofloven”) and the law on the exploitation of Denmark’s subsurface (“Undergrundsloven”) [1, 2]. Licenses are granted by the relevant authorities, namely the Danish Environmental Agency and the Minister for Climate, Energy and Utilities [3, 4].

Research found no evidence of the defence institutions being involved in business related to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2]. The only instances where the Defence was found to have a role was in hearing testimonies in relation to the issuing of resource exploitation licences in areas where the Defence may have a relevant interest (in this specific case the Defence was concerned about the security risk posed by possible ammunition remnants in the area under review) [3]. Revenues of natural resource exploitation would be included in the defence budget as in the Finance Act [4].

Research shows no indications of active defence personnel being involved in business relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. However, a test sample showed one incidence of a natural resource exploitation company’s board members being previously employed in/by Danish Defence [1, 2].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that Denmark’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.

Our sources have confirmed that the army has an extraordinary monopoly over many of the country’s economic and natural resources. From land, oil, to the sea (fishing) and the use of natural resources (investment in the natural resources) (1), (2), (3). The land is the natural resource where the army has complete control over and widely exploits to their economic and financial benefit. First, the Ministry of Defence can claim any “public” land by declaring it a military or strategic zone (4), (5). In the last few years, there have been many instances where land was granted at no cost to the Armed Forces for commercial purposes. For example, Presidential Decree no. 114 of 2018 allocated about two million square metres in the Fayoum governorate to the military’s National Service Project Organization (NSPO) to be used for animal production (7). Additionally, Prime Minister Decree no. 2428 of 2017 (8) allocated 6000 square metres in the Sohag governorate to the MOD to establish a Wataniya fuelling station. Moreover, Presidential Decree no. 424 of 2017 allocated 8000 feddans to the Armed Forces’ Land Projects Authority (AFLPA) to build modern greenhouses for agricultural purposes (6). These examples are believed to have been pervasive in the last few years despite the lack of aggregate figures on how much land has been given for MOD commercial activities. Other than land the Military also has companies working in the exploitation of bentonite, glass sand, talcum powder, marble, gypsum, sand cauline, limestone, and black sand (9).

The involvement of the armed forces in business activities related to natural resource exploitation, namely land, is pervasive but usually happens legally from laws and decrees issued by the president, prime minister and the minister of defence (1). However, these laws and decrees have mostly been established and issued by military-controlled governments and parliaments, and its “legality” could be considered a clear sign of the capture of state institutions rather than the respect of law (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7).

The armed forces as an institution is highly involved in businesses related to natural resource exploitation, there is no evidence, however that defence personnel have financial or controlling interests in their personal capacity as individuals.

According to our sources, the economic interests of the army and its personnel in the natural resources of the country are not usually declared officially (some are). None of the interests are clear. The interests of the army and its personnel are usually declared if there is public attention, but other people (relatives) are used as shadow managers/owners while the real owner is the military or the intelligence services (1), (2), (3), (4). Some of these interests are publicly declared on the websites of the relevant authorities, or through land allocation decrees like those mentioned in 18A, there is little to no information available about their operations, size and profits. The lack of information regarding the degree of involvement of the armed forces in business activity in general and natural resource exploitation, in particular, increases speculation regarding the size of such involvement.

The interests of the military in the economy and natural resources of the country are not subject to any mechanisms of scrutiny or oversight. The head of state, who is the head of the army has the authority to undermine, along with the senior members of the army, any kind of scrutiny or oversight (1), (2), (3), (4). The government, including the current president, have repeatedly asserted that all military economic activity is subject to scrutiny by the supreme audit institution the CAA. The reports and findings of the CAA are not made available to the public. However, in 2014 al-Sisi passed a law to allow himself to remove the directors of supervisory authorities including that of the CAA. Many commentators believed the law was passed specifically to “handle” the then CAA director Hisham Geneina. Geneina was removed from his post after speaking in the media about the size and scale of government corruption and began facing trial for “spreading false news” (5), (6). He also faces a military trial for “defaming the Armed Forces” after supporting the presidential candidacy of Sami Anan against al-Sisi. After Anan was arrested, Geniena threatened to expose top-secrets about the military’s involvement in causing social unrest following the 2011 revolution (7).

In sum, even if formal mechanisms and institutions exist, the type of scrutiny exercised by them is deemed ineffective given the broad mandate and powers of the president and the military courts to restrict these institutions and hunt down their officials. As for the Parliament, it is formally entrusted with “exercising oversight over the actions of the executive power” according to Article 101 of the Constitution, these formal powers are restricted by law which gives the defence sector extensive autonomy in managing its own affairs. The National Defence Council (NDC), for example, led by the president and senior military and security officials must be “consulted” on any law that is related to the Armed Forces or national security, and they are the entity mandated to discuss and develop defence policies, which could be interpreted to include the Armed Forces’ commercial activities (8).

There is no law that specifically states that having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation is prohibited. The topic is not covered in Estonia at all. One of the reasons could be that the number of state-owned companies is relatively low in Estonia – the state had shares in only 29 companies in 2018, none of them under the Ministry of Defence. [1] There is only one law that overlaps environment with the defence sector: according to the Nature Conservation Act, [2] it is prohibited to engage in economic activities and start new construction works in conservation zones. However, this law has exceptions for the defence sector. For “national defence purposes” construction of a road, utility works or non-production construction works are allowed. The same act stipulates another exception for the defence sector: the building ban near shores and riverbanks do not apply to construction works for national defence. With some exceptions for defence, exploitation of natural resources is an illegal activity under the Constitution. According to the State Assets Act, state assets must be administered sustainably and prudently. An administrator of state assets must carry out any transactions with state assets in conformity with the legislation and in a transparent and verifiable manner. [3]

According to an expert’s analysis (Merili Vipper has both worked in as well as written her thesis on the field), the biggest risk to Estonia’s natural resources from the Defence Forces is their activities in the exercise fields. If the environmental requirements are not strictly followed, their activities can cause pollution, destroy vegetation and contaminate soil and groundwater. [1]
On the other hand, Estonia’s defence sector does not have financial or controlling interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. In 2017 there were no companies that belonged to the Ministry of Defence. As exceptions, there were two foundations: Riigikaitse Edendamise SA and SA Rahvusvaheline Kaitseuuringute Keskus. The first supplies defence institutions with information technology and know-how, the second is a leading think-tank. [2] The latest example of a company operating under the Ministry of Defence was OÜ E-Arsenal, closed in 2013. It was created as a defence industry export organisation. [3]
Based on the analysis of different Ministry of Defence’s ownerships, it can be concluded that there is no exploitation of natural resources. Reports on state ownership identify no such cases either. [4]

Until July 2018 active public servants were not allowed to conduct business activities in Estonia. [1] However, the situation is different with the Defence League, because this military organisation’s membership is voluntary. This means that the members come with different backgrounds and interests, including business. At the same time, the members’ names are not made public, so it is not possible to determine whether they have financial or controlling interests in natural resource exploitation. [2]
In terms of natural resources, for example, chopping wood in exercise fields is one of the grey areas, but the legislation makes exceptions for defence personnel when it comes to wood, and thus, cutting wood in the exercise fields is a legal act. [3] Finally, there is no evidence of the defence personnel having any financial or controlling interests when it comes to natural resources. [4]
There have been no court cases involving military or ex-military personnel and the exploitation of natural resources in the past three years. [5]
The use of natural resources is being scrutinised by the environmental department at the Centre for Defence Investment under the Ministry of Defence and the Environmental Inspectorate under the Ministry of Environment. [6]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. As there have not been any cases identified, this question does not apply to Estonia’s current situation.

This indicator has been scored “Not Applicable” as there are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses related to natural resources exploitation.

If such interests were to appear, there is an oversight procedure in place. The Ministry of Finance exercises oversight of state assets. [1] General principles of managing state assets are regulated by the State Assets Act, [2] which stipulates that each year, reports must be submitted to the Ministry of Finance concerning attainment of the aims set to the foundation and the exercise of the founder’s rights. In addition, the Ministry of Finance is entitled to request information and documents concerning acquisition of assets and acceptance of assets for state use, and concerning administration of state assets. The government is allowed to conduct on-site inspections in order to check the accuracy of the information. When infringements are discovered, the Ministry of Finance can make recommendations concerning elimination of those infringements or the performance of other necessary operations. However, environmental issues and overseeing that the correct procedure is in place when it comes to environment protection seem to be less important in the defence field. In 2016, the environmental protection specialist position was eliminated from the Estonian Defence Forces. [3]

The Constitution, other legislation and other regulation on both the Defence Forces and the Ministry of Defence clearly define the roles, tasks, mandates, powers, organisation, raison d’être, and so forth of the defence institutions and exclude all other activities, including activities related to the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. [1,2,3,4]

The defence institutions have neither business ownerships nor influence over natural resources exploitation. For example, the operational mines and their ownership are listed on a website maintained by the industry. [1] Forestry business and utilisation of water, wind, turf and aggregate operate on a commercial basis as well.

As private individuals, members of the defence establishment may e.g. own shares in corporations. However, the higher the rank and the more important position the person holds within the establishment, the tighter the scrutiny becomes. For example, in order to be appointed as Chief of Staff, the person must provide in advance a declaration on his/her business activities, shares or other ownership in corporations, other assets, other activities not related to the position, sidelines and other commitments that may influence his/her work. In addition, any changes in the aforementioned information must be provided. [1]

In general, when appointing a person to a position the authority must take into consideration the person’s integrity and ensure that he or she does not have commitments that would endanger his or her appropriate conduct in the position. In addition, the authority must ensure that the person can carry out his or her duty independently and in a trustworthy manner. [2]

There is indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of defence institutions’ interests in controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.

There is indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of defence institutions’ interests in controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. As private individuals, members of the defence establishment may e.g. own shares in corporations. However, the higher the rank and the more important position the person holds within the establishment, the tighter the scrutiny becomes. For example, in order to be appointed as Chief of Staff, the person must provide in advance a declaration on his/her business activities, shares or other ownership in corporations, other assets, other activities not related to the position, sidelines and other commitments that may influence his/her work. In addition, any changes in the aforementioned information must be provided. [1]

Defence institutions do not “own” anything; they have the usufruct of what the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and the State, have at their disposal.
Having any controlling or financial interest in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation would be against Sapin 2 law of 2016 on transparency and anti-corruption, [1] forbidding all conflicts of interest. Public agents, French or foreign, corrupted or corrupting, can face up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to one million Euros (or double the amount gained in the transaction).

No cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation were found.
An expert of the economy of the Ministry of Defence confirmed at interview [1] that the question of France’s defence institutions having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation is not a relevant one.

There are isolated cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses related to natural resource exploitation [1]. This activity is illicit.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because there is no evidence that France’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation. In some cases, the land owned by the Ministry of the Armed Forces can be considered a resource (wood exploitation on site for instance, for the benefit of the Ministry and not in relation with any external business), but it is very random and anecdotal, and no general policy can be drawn from this. [1]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because there is no evidence that France’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation.

Defence institutions are, by statutory or constitutional means, entirely prohibited from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. State institutions are not allowed to establish or acquire a holding in a company purely on the basis of financial interests. According to Section 65(1) No. 1 of the Federal Budget Code (‘Bundeshaushaltsordnung’ – BHO), one prerequisite for the Federation to establish or acquire a holding in a company founded under private law is that there must be an important interest in doing so on the part of the Federation [1]. An important federal interest is generally a specific policy interest and is deemed to exist if the company is intended to fulfil important federal tasks, as defined in the allocation of competencies under the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). This prerequisite is not deemed to be fulfilled if, for example, a) the task in question is exclusively the responsibility of the Länder or local authorities, b) the sole purpose is to generate revenue or c) the purpose of the holding relates solely to a need for information on the part of the public administration [2].

The FBG (Fernleitungsbetriebsgesellschaft) operates the (NATO) pipeline systems that run in Germany and are used to transport aviation fuel for military and civilian use, but is not involved in the production of oil, the refining of oil, etc. [3]. No evidence could be found to suggest that the country’s defence institutions have any controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. There is also no evidence to that effect in the external audit findings published in the annual ‘Beteiligungsbericht’ (Equity Holdings Report) [4], which contains the results of independent scrutiny of military-owned businesses by private audit companies according to international standards, as well as those of the Federal Audit Office. Legislative scrutiny is regulated by Article 69 of the ‘Bundeshaushaltsordnung’ [1]. The current Defence Policy Guidelines, written in 2011, highlight the importance of natural resources [5] and one can see that the Ministry of Defence and other ministries in Germany have put more emphasis on potential security problems relating to resource scarcity [6].

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. No evidence could be found to suggest that the country’s defence institutions have any controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. There is also no evidence to that effect in the external audit findings published in the ‘Beteiligunsgbericht des Bundes’ (Equity Holdings Report) [1], which contains the results of independent scrutiny of military-owned businesses by private audit companies according to international standards, as well as those of the Federal Audit Office. Legislative scrutiny is regulated by Article 69 of the ‘Bundeshaushaltsordnung’ (Federal Budget Code – BHO) [2].

The current Defence Policy Guidelines (2011) emphasise the importance of natural resources [3]. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence and other ministries in Germany have put more emphasis on potential security problems relating to resource scarcity [4].

There are no cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1,2,3].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence that such interests exist [1,2,3].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1,2,3].

There are no restrictions on defence institutions having control or interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1), (2), (3). Art. 210 (3) of the Constitution allows the armed forces to perform “other functions for the development of Ghana as the President may determine” (4).

There is no evidence that defence institutions have financial stakes in natural resource extraction. They protect mining sites within the framework of military operating procedures. These sites are considered areas of strategic national importance, and therefore often have military, as well as private, protection.

Defence institutions are involved in several other businesses through the “Industry of Defence Industries Holding Company (DIHOC) Limited,” but none of these activities are related to the country’s natural resource exploitation (1), (2).

Following research into the mainstream Ghanaian media (Modern Ghana, Myjoyonline, GhanaWeb, Ghana News Agency, Graphic Online) no evidence of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation was found. To reduce risks of corruption in the natural resource exploitation industry, Ghana established the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). The PIAC is an independent body mandated to promote transparency and accountability in the management of petroleum revenues in Ghana. The PIAC did not denounce, in its annual reports, defence personnel’s involvement in businesses relating to Ghana’s natural resource exploitation (1).

However, there are unverified suspicions that some military personnel assigned to protect mining sites are involved in natural resource exploitation for illegal or unofficial pecuniary benefits, which involves both individual commanders and to some extent the institution (2), (3), (4), (5).

There is no evidence of the involvement of the armed forces in the country’s natural resource exploitation (1), (2), (3), (4). As a result, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Defence institutions’ involvement in businesses is channelled through the DIHOC, which publicly declares its areas of intervention. However, detail on sources of income, operations, and expenditures are not publicly available. For instance, the DIHOC has a website (5), but it does not contain this information nor is it frequently updated.

The PSCDI has broad powers of scrutiny over the defence sector (the committee “shall examine all questions relating to defence and internal affairs”) including investigating the potential for impropriety within the defence sector (1). The EOCO, CHRAJ, BNI and other entities involved in fighting corruption in Ghana can also scrutinise cases of impropriety in the defence institutions (2), (3), (4).

In accordance with Law 4433/1964 all related natural resources exploitation is conducted under the authority of Ministry of Environment and Energy [1]. MoD has no financial interests in businesses dealing with the exploitation of natural resources.

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to Greece’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2].

There are no cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1,2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions’ interests in controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2].

Hungary does not have these resources (the country has very limited natural resources that can be exploited), but the law prohibits any such business action executed by public or defence officials. The Law on the Status of the Defence Forces Personnel (Law CCV./2012) prescribes that defence forces personnel can conduct any business-related activities only with the permission of their superiors [1]. The law specifically states that permission will not be granted if the given business activity would endanger the professionalism, neutrality and impartiality of the defence forces. High-ranking military leaders and Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials are categorically prohibited from conducting these activities. Consequently, armed forces personnel are legally prohibited from conducting any business activities related to the country’s natural resources.

Due to the reasons above no single case was revealed in the modern history of the country. The Law on the Status of the Defence Forces Personnel (Law CCV./2012) states that defence forces personnel can conduct any business-related activities only with the permission of their superiors [1]. The law specifically prescribes that no permission can be granted if the given business activity would endanger the professionalism, neutrality and impartiality of the defence forces. High-ranking military leaders and MoD officials are categorically prohibited from conducting any such activities. Consequently, armed forces personnel are legally prohibited from conducting any business activities related to the country’s natural resources.

No case has been found, as the country has almost no natural resources.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as no evidence of such interests has been found. Top officials and military leaders have to declare their wealth on an annual basis [1], that is public and subject of internal and public scrutiny. However, it is not related to natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as no evidence of such interests has been found. Public institutions have the right to investigate the income of members of the armed forces. The State Audit Office is the legitimate body to investigate the income of the leaders of the ministry [1]. Watchdog institutions have access to the personal wealth declarations, prepared on an annual basis [2].

There is no evidence that defence institutions are, by statutory or constitutional means, removed from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].

Research did not identify evidence of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to natural resource exploitation. Interests seems to be purely strategic, as illustrated by the Indian Navy example. As natural resources are connected with national security, Indian defence institutions have interests in monitoring and safeguarding them [1]. A prime example is India’s maritime strategy. India’s dependency on the seas for its external trade and sustaining its energy needs has increased [2]. The pivot to Asia further bolsters this imperative. Since the 1980s, India has had Ecological Task Force (ETF) Battalions. The ETFs consist of Army veterans and are tasked with restoration of fragile ecosystems through ecological restoration, biodiversity protection and conservation. They are funded by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF& CC) and/or by respective State Governments [3][4].

There is no recent evidence of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. However, there has in the past been incidences of misuse of defence land [1][2][3].

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that such interests exist. Overarching interest in natural resources seems to be strategic and not business related [1][2].

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that such interests exist. As mentioned above, overarching interest in natural resources seems to be strategic and not business related [1]. Any impropriety would be scrutinised by CAG [2].

Law No. 34/2004 concerning the Indonesian National Defence Forces prohibits TNI soldiers from engaging in business activities [1]. In addition, the TNI law stipulates that the government must take over all business activities that were previously owned and managed by the TNI, either directly or indirectly. To accelerate the takeover of TNI business activities, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 43/2009 concerning the Takeover of the Indonesian National Defence Forces Business Activities [2]. It regulates the types of TNI business activities that are taken over, namely business activities that are owned and managed directly by the TNI (taken over), cooperatives and foundations within the TNI environment (structured) and the use of State Property within the TNI environment (structured). To follow up on Presidential Regulation Number 43/2009, the Ministry of Defence issued Minister of Defence Regulation Number 22/2009 concerning Implementation of Takeover of Business Activities of the Indonesian National Defence Forces [3]. This regulation emphasises the contents of Presidential Regulation No. 43/2009 relating to the types of business activities for which the acquisition was carried out. For business activities that are managed directly by the TNI, shares and equity participation by the TNI are taken over by the government. As for cooperatives and foundations, arrangements are made in accordance with the Law on Cooperatives and the Law on Foundations, which include the arrangement of organisational structure, business activities and equity participation in other business fields. In order to carry out the arrangement of the utilisation of State Property in the TNI, the Ministry of Finance issued Minister of Finance Regulation No. 23/PMK.06/2010 concerning Arrangement of the Utilisation of State-Owned Goods in the Indonesian National Defence Forces [4]. Although, in theory, the military is somewhat prohibited from participating in business associated with exploiting natural resources, in practice, this is not easy to confirm.

Before the Reformation, military business activities were prevalent. The role of the TNI in business activities took various forms: ownership of business units through TNI cooperatives and foundations, collaboration with the private sector through the provision of security services and land or building rental contracts and involvement in networks of illegal activities such as illegal logging [1]. After the 2009 deadline, the TNI stated that it was no longer directly involved in business activities. However, there have been allegations of informal business activities still occurring, such as the leasing of land and provision of security services to private companies, as well as the indirect ownership of shares through foundations and cooperatives [2]. As stipulated in a number of regulations related to the takeover of TNI business activities (Law No. 34/2004, Presidential Regulation No. 43/2009, Minister of Defence Regulation No. 22/2009), it is almost exclusively business activities managed directly by the TNI that have been completely taken over by the government. Meanwhile, cooperatives and foundations within the TNI environment, through which a number of TNI business activities are carried out, have only been structured or restructured. Therefore, although they are not as prevalent as before the Reformation, a number of TNI business activities are still observed to be carried out through foundations and cooperatives. From mid-2015 to 2018, for example, there was a conflict between the iron ore mining company PT Sebuku Iron Lateritic Ores (SILO) and the palm oil plantation company PT Multi Sarana Agro Mandiri (MSAM) in South Kalimantan. Both companies used security services provided by different agencies; SILO’s security services were provided by the police, while MSAM’s were provided by the military. Three TNI cooperatives were also said to have been involved in business activities at MSAM [3]. In addition, the Hatama Cooperative within the TNI’s Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) is suspected of being involved in managing gold mining operations in Bolaang Mongondow District, North Sulawesi [4].

The laws and regulations issued after the Reformation clearly prohibit the military from engaging in business activities, both as an institution and individually. However, there is a strong suspicion that there are still active TNI officers indirectly involved in business activities. Indonesian law requires companies, including those in the coal mining sector, to disclose the legal owner of the company as registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. However, the beneficial owner can still hide their involvement. This gap is allegedly also exploited by defence institutions. The extractive sector, especially coal mining, is known to be one of the industries in which many traces of involvement of retired military officers have been found [1]. The report compiled by Greenpeace, ICW, Jatam and Auriga in 2018 examines the involvement of politically exposed persons (PEP), including a number of retired generals, in coal mining business activities in East Kalimantan [2]. The report also mentions the special treatment and protection granted by local government officials to coal mining companies owned by military officers, both retired and active [2]. Legally, the involvement of retired employees in business activities does not violate the rules. However, there have been allegations of involvement by active military oligarchy networks in these activities. Another common form of active military involvement is cooperation between capital owners and active military family members for the benefit of business operations [1]. In addition to military involvement in the extractive sector, there are also reports of retired generals who hold commissioner positions in a number of companies. In terms of regulation, since 2009, there has been no intervention by the government to address the military business networking issue. This may be because the government considers military involvement in business activities – either as an institution or by individual members of the TNI who are still active – to be over [3]. However, it may also be due to impunity as a result of corruption, especially in the extractive sector [2].

The alleged involvement of the TNI in the business activities of the natural resource extraction sector is not institutional. Law No. 34/2004 concerning the Indonesian National Defence Forces and one of its derivative regulations, Regulation of the Minister of Defence No. 22/2009 concerning Implementation of the Takeover of the Indonesian National Defence Forces Business Activities, regulate the takeover of business activities that are owned and managed directly and indirectly by the TNI. However, following the structuring process, cooperatives within the TNI were not structurally within the TNI organisation [1]. As cooperative entities, in accordance with Law No. 25/1992 concerning Cooperatives, the management of cooperatives within the TNI is not obliged to disclose financial reports or to be accountable for carrying out tasks, except to members of the cooperative [2]. As for the security services provided by the TNI to businesses associated with the exploitation of natural resources, some can be reported and accounted for as part of military operations other than war, in this case the security of vital objects. Financial reports for these activities can be included in the Ministry of Defence Financial Statements and then included in the Central Government Financial Statements.

Legally, the parliamentary oversight function for TNI business activities is carried out by the Commission in the DPR whose scope of duties includes tasks relating to the defence sector, namely Commission I. However, work meetings between Commission I and its partners in the Ministry of Defence and TNI Headquarters or Forces Headquarters are often held in private (closed meetings). Even so, it should be assumed that the issue of the indirect involvement of defence personnel in business activities is almost never a topic of discussion in formal government spaces [1]. There is a similar trend in academic research. A considerable amount of research was conducted on the subject towards the end of the 2000s, but in the last few years, almost nothing has been found on TNI business [2]. This is very much in line with the stagnation of the development of literature on security sector governance and military reform in Indonesia. Difficulty in accessing data is also a problem. Meanwhile, public scrutiny of TNI business activities is mostly conducted through mass media channels [3,4,5]. Public criticism through mass media is usually expressed in the context of concerns over the increasing prospect of returning non-defence roles to the TNI. Public scrutiny in this context is more sporadic.

While defence institutions are, not by statutory or constitutional means, removed from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation, reportedly Khamenei issued an edict in January 2018 requesting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to reduce their controversial role in the “economy” [1].

In a January 20 interview with the government-owned daily, Iran, Defence Minister General Amir Hatami said, “[b]ased on ayatollah Khamenei’s edict, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic has been assigned to pave the way for giving up those economic entities controlled by the Armed Forces that are not related to their mission” [2]. However, a few days later, that issuing of the edict was denied by the IRGC deputy for parliamentary affairs [3]. The supreme leader reportedly renewed the order later in the year [4].

Defence institutions’ involvement in relation to the country’s natural resource exploitation is widespread but considered legal. It takes place on a macro-economic scale. The legality of it stems from the origins of the IRGC in the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war when they were tasked with setting up “defensive emplacements, providing technological know-how, building, roads and bridges for tactical operations and developing weapons industries”. This role continued after the war when the president at that time said that the Revolutionary Guards should enter construction activities in order to accelerate the country’s modernization [1, 2, 3].

Individual defence personnel involvement in businesses relating to Iran’s natural resource exploitation is common in areas with major revenue streams. However, it is unknown if the government is trying to tackle the issue as numerous former and current defence officials remain involved in business activities associated with Iran’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2].

They are not publicly declared in a formal declaration, but they are publicly known. Some companies are listed in the official gazette. On occasion, details of companies projects are listed on company websites [1, 2].

There is little evidence of defence institutions financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources exploitation being subject to any form of parliamentary or public scrutiny.
Of late, there has been some reporting in local media about the government’s push against the IRGC’s role in the economy, but it’s not specific to the natural resource sector. For example, there were some reports when the IRGC sold its share in October 2018 in Tose’s Etemad Mobin, a consortium that owns the Telecommunication Company of Iran and its subsidiary, Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran. That acquisition took place in 2009 and was reportedly the largest transactions ever to take place on Tehran’s stock exchange. The sale of that share came, after calls by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani that Iran’s armed forces must withdraw from the Iranian economy. On the whole, such scrutiny is rarely conducted [1, 2, 3].

A thorough look at legislation and constitutional law show an overemphasis on the exploitation of oil (1). It stipulates that Iraq’s oil belongs to its people and should be invested in, to “the highest benefit of the Iraqi people” (Article 112). While its obligations are clear, Baghdad has over-promised and under-delivered (2), (3), (4), (5). The petroleum law passed by parliament in 2018 (6) echoes similar concerns over oil management. Another relevant law which encourages the active participation of the MoD in natural resource management is Law No. 27 for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment (7). In Article 3, the framework calls for the establishment of an inter-ministerial committee to scrutinise cases and laws associated with natural resources, but it lacks force over the matter of defence-linked businesses associated with highly marketable commodities, beyond oil and gas. The potential sale of hydrocarbon resources has been debated in recent years, but as media searches make clear, discussions thus far have emphasised a foreign investment framework while comparatively little has been said about the financial or controlling interests of security actors or associated business that exploit Iraq’s natural resources. The lack of consensus among fractious lawmakers over Iraq’s hydrocarbon law has stood in the way of the establishment of a legal framework that criminalises businesses tied to exploitative enterprises/businesses. Evidence, across press and business reports, points to devastating mismanagement of oil owing to corruption and miss optimization of resource-generated revenues. Malfeasance is highly probable within this sector. Evidence of this was difficult to track but an important example concerning Iraq’s long-neglected mining sector. One report found that the GoI is offering [Iranian] companies a 10-year tax break “with the possibility of this being extended to 15 years” which an Iraqi lawyer interviewed for this assessment described as “a scam that will harm Iraq’s economy under the guise of joint project development” (8). In direct response to the question, Iraq has yet to formulate laws that lay insistence on the prohibition of defence-tied business/and individuals associated with natural resource exploitation.

While verifiable information is hard to find, allegations circulating online offer evidence that state-back armed forces in the paramilitary and officials are benefitting from illicit oil sales and kickbacks. A recent article discusses evidence that identifies militia groups as participants in oil-smuggling rings (1). Militias are accessing oil fields in eastern Kirkuk, in absence of official ministerial approval. The sale of this oil is unlawful by these militia groups whose connection to unrivalled power political factions grants them immunity from the law (1). Reinforcing these reports was the response of a source interviewed by Transparency International. “There are militias connected to Al Hakim [Ammar al Hakim] that are trucking oil out of Qurna oil fields, to Umm Qasr and load it onto terminals they have confiscated within Umm Qasr port” (2). Other sources have stressed that militias’ backed by the military has illicit business activities in the natural resources of Iraq (3,4).

There are weak legal constraints against natural resource exploitation. However, media coverage lacks details, but a critical article reported on the exploitation of oil supplies cheaply sold as aviation fuel to foreign airlines (1). Our sources confirm that Individual defence personnel involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation is widespread and mostly illicit (2,3).

These interests are not publicly declared and as one interviewee noted; “you won’t find much as the case involves powerful actors such as Ameri. No one can talk comfortably about the redirection of Iraqi fuel or any of Iraq’s natural resource exploitation for that matter” (1). The influence of militia groups under the state-sanctioned PMF-umbrella force and outside it has grown steadily, filling the security vacuum in areas formerly occupied by the ISG, often without any pushback (2).

Scrutiny of businesses associated with natural resource exploitation (from oil to hydrocarbons) falls under the Law on Combating the Smuggling of Oil and Natural Resources No. 41 of 2008. In the absence of official authorization for the Ministry of Oil or the respective regional authority, the law stipulates that the without ministerial authorisation, it is illegal to transport oil or its derivatives “by land, sea or river” (1). The state reserves the right to seize illicitly extracted resources, yet the ability of top officials to evade prosecution limits opportunities for scrutiny. The law address oil smuggling but says nothing about controlling financial interests/businesses. There is no evidence of cases in which oil smugglers tied to security institutions have been prosecuted under Law No. 41. Important trade routes through which oil could be smuggled are guarded and patrolled by Iraqi Police Forces and border guards who are widely accused of corruption, which can hinder counter-smuggling efforts (2,3).

Defence institutions are, by statutory or constitutional means removed from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1) (2).The Basic Law, as well as the conflict of interest regulations of the IDF ensure that such activities are unlikely to be condoned (1) (2).There is no evidence that Israel’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. EcoPeace provides several reports in this field (3). However, it should be noted that there have been numerous reports of Israeli and international companies being involved in natural resource extraction activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (4) (5) (6) (7). Though these companies are not connected to the military, military laws and economic policies have been used to facilitate their extractive activities (5).

There is no clear evidence of defence institutions involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation in Israel. However, it should be noted that there have been numerous reports of Israeli and international companies being involved in natural resource extraction activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (1) (2) (3) (4). Though these companies are not connected to the military, military laws and economic policies have been used to facilitate their extractive activities (2).

There may be isolated cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation, but activity is illicit (1). It should be noted that there have been numerous reports of Israeli and international companies being involved in natural resource extraction activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2) (3) (4) (5). Though these companies are not connected to the military, military laws and economic policies have been used to facilitate their extractive activities (3).

This indicator is scored Not Applicable, as there is no clear evidence of defence institutions involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation.

This indicator is scored Not Applicable, as there is no clear evidence of defence institutions involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation.

According to law 56/2012 [1] in implementation of legislative decree 21/2012 [2], the government can exercise special powers to safeguard enterprises operating in strategic sectors [3] and applies to the defence sector too. In its annual report to the Parliament, the government highlights any changes occurred in the control of the enterprises. According to the last available report [4] there is no evidence of control of the Ministry of Defence over businesses associated with national natural resources exploitation. Nonetheless, it is relevant to mention that the government, as represented by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, does hold a share of some enterprises both in the energy [5] and in the defence [6] sector.
As regulated by art. 2 of legislative decree 21/2012 [7], in order to activate protection clauses over the energy sector, it is the Council of Ministers that adopt decrees following the proposition of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, of the Ministry of Economic Development, or of the Ministry of Transports and Infrastructures.

There is no evidence on public media and sources of defence institutions involvement in financing or controlling interests related to national natural resources. [1]

There is no evidence on public media and sources of individual defence personnel involvement in business related to natural resources [1].

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’. This is because the Ministry of Defence does not have control or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’. This is because the Ministry of Defence does not have control or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].

A comprehensive and extensive book on the Japanese legal system by Jones and Ravitch from 2020 does not describe any statutory or constitutional instruments that explicitly prohibit Japanese defence institutions from having interests in natural resource exploitation. [1] The text of the Constitution was searched, but no articles that prohibit the defence institutions from having such interests were found. [2] In the above mentioned book, Jones and Ravitch advise those who seek information on the right to conduct commercial activity in Japan to examine the regulations enforced by the regulatory body for the field concerned. [3] They state that “the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) acts as a regulator for almost all aspects of Japan’s energy and natural resource policies including mining, fuel imports, power generation and transmission.” [4] However, no information dealing with the right of the Self-Defence Forces to be involved in natural resource exploitation was found on the agency’s homepages. [5] Neither did a search of the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun for the timeframe of this research turn up any information on such rights. [6] [7] The main laws that apply to the Self-Defence Forces were also searched, but no articles that explicitly prohibit defence institutions from having interests in natural resource exploitation were found. The item in the Self-Defence Forces Law that seems most related to the exploitation of natural resources deals with the duty of dispatched forces to submit a report and replant trees if they have felled trees as an emergency measure in order to build fortifications and similar. [8] According to the item in the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Law that seems most related to natural resource exploitation, Ministry staff at Deputy Director-General level and above must include timber income in their annual financial disclosure report to the Minister. [9]

There is no evidence that Japanese defence institutions are involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. No reports of such exploitation were found on the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun, [1] and Yomiuri Shimbun. [2]

There is no indication that SDF personnel are involved in illegal businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. In a search of the mainstream newspapers Asahi Shimbun [1] and Yomiuri Shimbun [2] no articles were found about SDF personnel having side jobs in businesses within natural resource exploitation. Chapter 2 of the SDF Code of Conduct includes rules about the duty of Self-Defence Force (SDF) personnel to report gifts they have received and stocks they own. [3] Under article 62.2 of the SDF Law, the MOD must annually report to the Diet on how many SDF personnel have left the organisation to take a job in a private company within 2 years of leaving. No personnel that found employment in companies dealing primarily with natural resource exploitation were identified in the report from 2016, which is the latest on the MOD website. [4] Japan is a country with few natural resources, and there is therefore little natural resource exploitation in the country. Japan depends on imports for almost all oil and natural gas energy resources and almost all copper and iron ore mining resources. [5] In 2017, 87.4% of energy production came from natural gas, coal or crude oil, for which the import dependency was respectively 97.5%, 99.3%, and 99.7% in 2018. Non-hydro renewables increased their share of energy production from 4.4% in 2010 to 7.6% in 2017, and might become a major source of energy in the future. [6]

The homepages of the Ministry of Defence [1] and the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy [2] as well as of the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun [3] and Yomiuri Shimbun [4] were searched for evidence of interests in natural resource exploitation. No evidence of such interests was found, and this indicator has therefore been marked ‘Not Applicable’.

The homepages of the Ministry of Defence [1] and the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy [2] as well as of the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun [3] and Yomiuri Shimbun [4] were searched for evidence of interests in natural resource exploitation. No evidence of such interests was found, and this indicator has therefore been marked ‘Not Applicable’.

There are no restrictions on defence institutions having financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources. According to the official website of the Jordanian Armed Forces, under the Developmental Role section, the Armed Forces lists several entities and companies that provide income to the defence sector in Jordan, and those include business related to natural resources [1]. The Armed Forces have a vested business interest in King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) and King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre (KASOTC) [2], which were built by the US on land donated by King Abdullah. Operating under the umbrella of KADDB Investment Group, KADDB owns several other companies, which are also associated with the country’s natural resources such as JLVM, JORDANAMCO, JMSS, JADARA, JORAMMO, and ARM [1, 3, 4]. Furthermore, there are no laws restricting the armed forces’ involvement in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources.

There are no legal restrictions on the Armed Forces or the Defence Sector’s involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resources, and the Jordanian Government, not limited to the defence sector, is involved in many businesses related to the countries natural resources [1]. The fact that such interest and involvement in businesses by the Defence Sector in Jordan is somewhat declared on the Armed Forces official webpage, demonstrates that it is not only legal but also commonly acceptable. The fact that the land was granted by King Abdullah II to build the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau is evidence that these activities are considered legal [2,3].

There are interest and exploitation of natural resources with huge revenues such as the dead sea chemics, however the government has taken no action [1]. There are no controls at all in relation to the defence sector’s involvement in businesses associated with Jordan’s natural resources (including personnel). Based on our sources, there are no restrictions on military personnel owning bussiness [2].

The Jordanian defence sector is transparent only in relation to declaring business and investment interests in the country’s natural resources [1], however, none of the expenditures, profit, or operations details of these ventures are declared [2,3,4].

Despite the fact that the Jordanian Armed Forces partially declares the investments and businesses it runs [1], none of these enterprises have been audited by Audit Bureau, as they do not appear on the list of audited entities [2]. Desk-based research into these enterprises in Arabic and English, particularly those listed on the Armed Forces official webpage, shows that none of them has come under public scrutiny in the past three years. There were some accusations around corruption in handling the retired military personnel fund managed by the Armed Forces, to which the Armed Forces issued a response denying such accusations [3]. Following that, there were no further investigations or interrogations, which demonstrated that entities affiliated to the Armed Forces do not receive much scrutiny.

The Kenya Defence Force, according to the Constitution of Kenya, is a statutory security organ established as a national security institution with the sole mandate of the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, assist in emergency situations, and restore peace in the country. [1] There is no legal framework in the Constitution or the Kenya Defence Force Act No. 25 of 2012 that allows KDF to own, control or manage any natural resources in the country.

According to section 285 of the Act, funds of the KDF only consist of three areas, money allocated by Parliament, assests accrued to the KDF, and money from sources provided for or donated to KDF. The latter funds are required to be accounted for according to managment of public funds. In the last financial audit, all monies recieved by KDF came from reimbursment from UN/AMISOM Mission and receipts from the Exchequer account. [2] There is no evidence to indicate that defence institutions exploit, control or manage any natural resources in Kenya.

There are no known cases where Kenyan defence institutions are involved in exploitation of natural resources. According to section 285 of the Kenya Defence Force Act No. 25 of 2012 all funds of the KDF only come from three sources: first are monies allocated by Parliament; assets accrued to the KDF in the course of exercise of its powers or the performance of its functions under the ACT; and monies from sources provided for or donated to KDF. There are no functions in the Act that allow KDF to exploit natural resources in the country. [1]

There are no cases of defence personnel being involved in natural resource exploitation. All funds allocated to KDF are either from the government or through donations. [1]

KDF is not involved in exploitation of natural resources and hence there is no precedent. The law requires that all funds allocated to KDF be properly audited and accounted for. In the last financial audit, all monies recieved by KDF came from reimbursment from UN/AMISOM Mission and receipts from the Exchequer account. All these funds were accounted for by the Office of the Auditor General and the report was published by parliament. [1]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Due to the lack of involvement of defence in exploitation of resources, there is no precedence of oversight.

Legislation in Kosovo regarding the Ministry of Defence [1] and the Kosovo Security Forces [2, 3] does not specify any legal provision for controlling financial interests in businesses associated with Kosovo’s natural resource exploitation. However, in a state of emergency or special situations, the Kosovo Security Forces has the authority to use state and private assets to fulfil its constitutional and legal duties [2], although natural resources are not mentioned in this regard [2].

There is no evidence that defence institutions in Kosovo (namely the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces) have been involved in businesses related to natural resource exploitation within the country [1].

There is no evidence that personnel within defence institutions in Kosovo (namely the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces) have been involved in businesses related to natural resource exploitation within the country [1].

There is no evidence that defence institutions in Kosovo (namely the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces) have been involved in businesses related to natural resource exploitation within the country [1].

There is no evidence that defence institutions in Kosovo (namely the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces) have been involved in businesses related to natural resource exploitation within the country [1].

Both the constitution and the laws of the police and Defence Ministry (1, 2 and 3) lack articles that forbid these institutions from having controlling shares in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources, but officials and activists say that these institutions are not involved in such activities (4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). There are no media reports to suggest otherwise but, as discussed earlier, the laws of the police and the Defence Ministry allow them to do whatever they please with the funds of the institutions and the SAB and the Finance Ministry do not breakdown all their revenues and spending, so these institutions may be secretly involved in these activities. But the fact that the institutions are not involved in these activities is irrelevant as the question is about the legal framework, which is in this case quite defficient.

Article 14 of the military law (3) and 15 of the police law (2) forbids officers from getting involved in any kind of commerce or profiteering from their work in any way. The KNG’s law does not include a similar article but military law applies to them, according to article 9 of Law no. 136 of 1992 (10).

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses that exploit the country’s natural resources, but the defence minister, Sheikh Nasser Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, is also the head of Kuwait’s Northern International Economic Zone’s board of trustees (1), so he is officially involved in business. But, so far, no evidence has emerged to suggest that he involved the Ministry in any business activity related to this.

There are no cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses that exploit the country’s natural resources, officials, analysts and journalists said. (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7). There are no media reports suggesting otherwise.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there appears to be no such activities or interests to be transparent about.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there appears to be no such activities or interests to be subjected to scrutiny.

The Ministry of Defence must comply with all laws regarding natural resources exploitation and nature protection [1] [2]. None of the relevant laws has any exception regarding defence and security. The MOD does not have any business asssociated with the expoitation of natural resourses except maintainance of its real estate properties.

There is no specific legal framework defining Latvia’s defence institutions’ right to have controlling or financial interests associated with natural resource exploitation, because there are no such cases.[3] There is no need of a law if there are no pre-conditions for the emergence of such a situation. Latvia has no considerable natural resources except for forests, water, peat, etc.
Institutions of the defence sector are not allowed to engage in commercial activity [4] [5] [6].

There are no cases of defence institutions involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].

There is no evidence of individual defence personnel involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. It must be noted that there are no pre-conditions for the emergence of such a situation, as Latvia has no considerable natural resources except for forests, water, peat, etc. Further, defence institutions are also not allowed to engage in commercial activity [1] [2] [3].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there are no natural resources in the country of interest to defence industry.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there are no natural resources in the country of interest to defence industry.

No evidence was found on the restrictions on defence institutions or individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1).

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation (1). An interviewed source disregarded, in general, the existence of businesses linked to the defence sector (2). Furthermore, LAF naval forces are being trained and strengthened to protect the countries’ maritime borders and secure oil and gas exploration (3).

No evidence was found of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation (1).

No evidence was found of defense sector interest in natural resource exploitation, thus this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicablee (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because no evidence of defence sector interest in natural resource exploitation was found. In this regard, scrutiny of interests will not apply. (1).

There is no regulation or policy which regulates, allows or forbids national security system institutions to participate in the exploitation of natural resources. Moreover, there is no publicly available information or evidence that national security system institutions are engaged in the exploitation of natural resources [1,2,3].

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in business related to the country’s exploitation of natural resources. What is more, defence institutions are not indebted to nor do they control any companies. There is one exception where the Ministry of Defence, at the beginning of 2018, acquired ownership rights and obligations of the business company “Infostruktūra” (the owner of the company is the Lithuanian state). “Infostruktūra” is responsible for ensuring appropriate and safe national data transfers between institutions [1]. This company does not deal with the country’s exploitation of natural resources.

There is no evidence or publicly known cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s exploitation of natural resources [1,2,3]. As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

There is no evidence or publicly known cases of defence institutions and individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s exploitation of natural resources [1,2,3]. As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

There is no evidence or publicly known cases of defence institutions and individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s exploitation of natural resources [1,2,3]. As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

It is outlined in Regulation 5(1)(a) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulation 1993 that public officials may not, directly or indirectly, participate in the management of any part of commercial, industrial or agricultural activities without the approval from their heads of department. [1] Furthermore, conflicts of interests are deterred by several other laws such as those set out in Regulation 4(2) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulation 1993, [2] Section 23 of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 (Act 694), [3] and Treasury Instruction No 197. [4] As defined by the government, GLCs are companies that have a primary commercial objective, but where the Malaysian government has a controlling stake in major decisions, such as appointment of management positions, contract awards, strategy, restructuring and financing, acquisition and divestments. Government funding for GLCs are allocated through government-linked investment companies (GLICs). There are seven notable GLIC in Malaysia, [5] of which one, the Armed Forces Fund Board (Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, LTAT), is linked to MINDEF. The LTAT, in turn, holds investments in a range of sectors including agriculture and palm oil plantations. [6] Members of the LTAT are required to observe the abovementioned laws.

The only defence institution with evident involvement in businesses associated with Malaysia’s natural resource exploitation is the Armed Forces Fund Board (Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, LTAT) which owns 1.25% of FGV Holdings Bhd and Boustead Holdings Bhd, both palm oil companies. [1, 2] However, its involvement is highly regulated by the abovementioned laws and regulations.

The researcher was unable to find any reported cases of individual defence personnel involved in businesses relating to the exploitation of natural resources in Malaysia through a review of open source information. An interview with a member of MND confirmed that there are no known cases of individual defence personnel involved in businesses relating to the exploitation of natural resources in Malaysia. [1]

Details on LTAT activities are reflected in its annual reports, which detail sources of income, operations, and expenditure. The reports are made public through the website. [1]

LTAT is subject to annual external audits by the Attorney-General’s Office which are tabled in Parliament for adoption. [1] Furthermore, the national anti-corruption agencies such as MACC, GIACC, GIAPC have an over-arching jurisdiction over all governmental institutions and have demonstrated a willingness to actively investigate discrepancies and suspicions of corruption. [2]

The assessor finds no legislation that explicitly outlaws military personnel from holding financial interests in natural resources exploitation. However, the 1961 Penal Code (amended in 2001) provides for conflict of interest and mentions all civil service employees (including military personnel) in Article 130.¹ Mali is Africa’s third largest gold producer, after South Africa and Ghana. Gold is by far Mali’s most important export, comprising nearly 70% of total exports in 2016.² Yet, there is no mention of military personnel being prohibited from participating in the sector in the Mining Code.³ As a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the Malian authorities are working towards the full disclosure (scheduled for 2020) of the beneficial owners of companies active in the country’s extractives industries.⁵

There is evidence that the armed forces generate revenues from commercial activities, but these do not include the exploitation of natural resources.¹ The armed and security forces have a statutory duty to participate in public works as part of their contribution to the economic and social development of the country. The armed forces undertake their developmental mission through activities requested by the government, public administrations or territorial collectives. These activities take place mainly in sectors that are not considered to be cost-effective for profit-driven private companies; nonetheless, they serve as revenue-generating ventures for the military.
Furthermore, there is no mention of military involvement in the extractives sector in EITI’s latest annual report in December 2017.²
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that, in 2012, French aviation giant Airbus purchased shares in the Kodieran gold mine. The company bought the stake by moving EUR15 million from an internal fund through a series of entities in the British Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Germany. The company later sold the shares at a substantial loss in 2014, two years before the company delivered two helicopters to the Malian army.³
While there is no evidence suggesting that military officials have controlling or financial interests in firms operating in the extractives sector, there are no identifiable laws governing such interests.
Although there is no evidence of cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation, there is no unit within the national police force to deal with corruption within the armed forces, including natural resource exploitation-related issues. This may explain the lack of investigations and therefore, lack of evidence.

The assessor finds no legislation that explicitly outlaws military personnel from holding financial interests in natural resources exploitation. There is no mention of military personnel being prohibited from participating in the sector in the mining code or in the general statutes of the police and army.³ ⁴
Although there is no evidence of cases of personnel in defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation, there is no unit within the national police force to deal with corruption within the armed forces, including natural resource exploitation-related issues. This may explain the lack of investigations and therefore, lack of evidence.

The absence of any legal framework relating to the potential financial involvement of defence institutions or security personnel in the extractives sector renders any such interests wholly non-transparent.

The absence of any legal framework relating to the potential financial involvement of defence institutions or security personnel in the extractives sector means that any such interests are not subject to any scrutiny.

Although it is not outright prohibited, the Political Constitution of Mexico restricts the exploitation of the country’s natural resources, which are legally considered public property, and can only be granted via concessions granted by the Federal Executive. [1]

Since 2017, Mexico has been part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which is an instrument that promotes transparency about the origin and destination of flows generated by the extraction of natural resources. [2] As of 2018 there was no record of any involvement in the exploitation of natural resources by defence institutions.

There is no evidence of the participation of defence institutions in the exploitation of resources, either officially or through journalistic notes or indications by academics or CSOs. [1]

Although there is no information to demonstrate the military’s participation in illicit business in hydrocarbon extraction itself, there is information on the theft of hydrocarbons. For example, the case of a General and other military men accused of ‘huachicol’ (fuel theft) once they served in strategic areas of PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos). [1] [2] [3]

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of defence institutions participating in the exploitation of natural resources. [1]

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of defence institutions participating in the exploitation of natural resources. [1]

There are no restrictions on defence institutions or individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. [1][2]

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. [1][2][3][4][5]

No cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation were recorded in major media outlets. [1][2][3][4][5]

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. [1][2][3][4][5] As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. [1][2][3][4][5] As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

There are no legal restrictions on defence institutions or individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)

In particular, Articles from 248 to 256 Section IV of the Moroccan Penal Code entitled Corruption and Influence Meddling (De la corruption et du traffic d’influence) that refer to acts of corruption and influence meddling committed by public agents do not refer in particular to military personnel and/or controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.

The Moroccan armed forces have been stationed in Western Sahara since the beginning of the war in 1974 (1)This region is rich in phosphates (particularly around in the Boucraâ-Laâyoune area), which represents – along with other minerals – 25% of Morocco’s exports (2).

The extraction, management and export of phosphates is supervised solely by the Cherriff’s Office of Phosphates – OCP (Office Chérifien des Phosphates) (3).The OCP is a public limited company, with 95% owned by the Moroccan state. Its board is composed of the Interior Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister, the Economy and Finance Minister, the Industry and Trade Minister, the Energy and Environment Minister, the Governance Minister and the Agriculture Minister (4). Both interviewees claimed that some cases of some military men’s illicit involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation had been reported to them, but were not able or willing to provide detailed information about it (5)(6). No other specific natural resources were found in relation to the armed forces.

Due to the absence of the Ministry of Defence among the members of the OCP board and the tight control of the state over phosphates resources, it is unlikely that the involvement of defence institutions is widespread. If there is any involvement, it occurs with the explicit or implicit authorization of civil high-ranking individuals within the government or the palace.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

These interests are not mentioned in the 2018 Budget law (1)(2). These interests are not taken into account by auditing and accounting public bodies such as the National Audit Office and the Royal Treasury. There interests were not reported as being publically declareed by the national and international press, nor by CSOs. (3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13).

Therefore it appears that these interests are not publicly declared and are wholly opaque.

These interests are not subject to scrutiny by auditing and accounting public bodies such as the National Audit Office and the Royal Treasury (1)(2). These interests are not subject to scrutiny by the legislature (3). These interests are not subject to scrutiny by civil society (4)(5)(6).

Based on these elements it appears that these interests are subject to no form of scrutiny.

Defence institutions are, by statutory means, prohibited from having interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation. Under Article 168 of the Myanmar Penal Code, public servants are entirely prohibited from engaging in revenue-generating activities [1]. However, Myanmar has two military-run conglomerates: MEHL and MEC. According to Major General Myint Swe, MEHL was established under the 1950 Special Company Act and was transformed into a public company in March 2016. However, the company’s shares were not sold to the public but transferred to the veteran’s organisation [2]. MEC was established in 1997 as an MoD-owned economic corporation. MEHL was the Tatmadaw’s very first legitimate business in the post-1988 period and its capital was 10 billion kyats, which was taken from the National Treasury [3]. The Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar identified 106 MEHL- and MEC-owned businesses across various sectors of the economy – from construction and gem extraction to manufacturing and so on [4].

The Tatmadaw’s economic interest in jade and ruby mining in Shan and Kachin States is related to its military strategy and objectives. By controlling the natural resources, the Tatmadaw was able to cut off the revenue of insurgent groups [1]. According to MP U Soe Htay, the Tatadaw’s regiments have to buy a share in MEHL as a regiment fund [2]. MEHL and MEC, which are run by the military, are now public companies [3] and so there is clear evidence that defence institutions are directly involved in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation. The Constitution and the laws relating to natural resources, such as the Mining Law (1994), Environmental Conservation Law (2012), Virgin, Fallow and Vacant Law (2012) and Forest Law (2018), do not state whether or not military involvement in natural resource exploitation is legal. So, there are no legal provisions that prohibit defence personnel from engaging in businesses relating to natural resources. And the military is not under civilian control, according to the Constitution [4].

According to MP U Soe Htay, both military personnel and retired personnel can buy a share in MEHL [1]. MEHL’s patron group includes seven of the most senior members of the Tatmadaw: the Commander-in-Chief, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Adjutant General, the Joint Chief-of-Staff and the Quartermaster General [2]. According to Global Witness’ 2015 report, the families of retired generals of former military junta, such as the Than Shwe family, the Ohn Myint family and the Maung Maung Thein family, were profiting from the jade industry [3]. According to Article 168 of the Myanmar Penal Code, public servants are prohibited from engaging in trade and this act is punishable by one year’s imprisonment [4].

MEHL and MEC rarely release information about their ownership, management or finances [1]. MP U Khin Aye, Chairman of the Pyithu Hluttaw Economic and Financial Development Committee, said that MEHL lacks transparency and has not paid tax in the past [2]. According to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM), neither MEHL nor MEC have ever made their financial reports public. Both holding companies were exempt from income and commercial tax between 1998 and 2011 (see page 20) [3]. Previous privileges ended when the political paradigm shifted. MEC was the eleventh largest tax payer in Myanmar in 2017-2018, MEHL was the third largest and MEHL subsidiary, Myawaddy Bank, the second largest (see page 22) [3]. The Independent Fact-Finding Mission identified 106 MEHL and MEC owned businesses across various sectors of the economy – from construction and gem extraction to manufacturing and so on [3].

Public scrutiny is not possible because MEHL and MEC do not release information about their financial status [1]. Myanmar became a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2014 [2]. The EITI advocates the public disclosure of extractive industry information. Both MEHL and MEC participated in the 4th EITI report as reporting extractive companies, but there were unreconciled differences between the companies’ and the government’s data [3].

The Dutch government is not prohibited from having controlling or financial interests in the exploitation of natural resources, including natural gas, which is the country’s most economically significant resource. According to assets listed in the government balance sheet, the government owned over 18.6 billion euros’ worth of gas and oil reserves in 2018 (the comparable figure for 2019 is over 7.7 billion euros, but the 2019 data is provisional and so far unconfirmed) [1]. Though the extraction of natural resources is legislated in the Mining Act, the latter’s provisions do not exclude government involvement in businesses engaged in natural resource exploitation [2]. That being said, stakes in natural resource exploitation are managed and administered by the Ministries of Finance, Economic Affairs and Infrastructure & Environment [3]. There is no explicit legal exclusion of Dutch defence institutions – or the government more broadly – from natural resource exploitation.

There is evidence that the Ministry of Defence has controlling or financial interests in natural resource exploitation in the Netherlands. On a broader government level, the Dutch state is intricately linked to the extraction, transportation, processing and sale of oil and natural gas, making natural resources a major source of revenue for the Dutch state [1,2]. This is due to the (partial) state ownership of companies that invest in, transport and sell gas and oil. For example, in 2019, the Ministry of Finance reported 1.2 billion euros in revenues from Gasunie, a gas transportation company whose sole shareholder is the Dutch state [3]. As another example, a state-owned company administered by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, Energie Beheer Nederland, invests in oil and gas production on the government’s behalf and, subsequently, the state receives returns on their investments [2,4]. In addition, the port of Rotterdam is a hub for the fossil fuel industry and is also publicly owned [4]. In regard to defence institutions specifically, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for the Defence Pipelines Organisation, which owns 550 kilometres of the European NATO oil pipeline throughout the Netherlands [5]. The Defence Pipelines Organisation supplies half of Schiphol International Airport’s fuel, in addition to fuelling military bases, as well as foreign airports in Belgium and Germany [2,5]. The Defence Pipelines Organisation does not disclose revenues. The Ministry of Defence’s involvement in natural resource exploitation is prevalent and legal.

There is no evidence to suggest the involvement of defence personnel in the natural resource industry. The Code of Conduct for Defence stipulates that personnel should be careful when having contact with the business community, cannot use their (previous) contact with the MoD for business advantages and should not perform ancillary work that is not congruent with their role at the MoD [1]. The Code also states that side activities of personnel must be discussed with supervisors to determine whether there is (the appearance of) a conflict of interest [1]. Furthermore, Chapter 11a of the General Military Personnel Code (‘Integrity’) includes provisions on (financial) conflicts of interest [2].

Government interests in natural resource exploitation are publicly declared through the Ministry of Finance’s Annual Report on the ‘Management of State Participations’, which details the (financial) interests and stakes of all the ministries in the private sector and contains details of the State’s involvement with businesses in the natural resource sector [1]. For each company the government has stakes in, including Gasunie, GasTerra and Energie Beheer Nederland, the report lists the revenue received by the government, financial summaries, details of the company’s activities within and outside the Netherlands, corporate governance explanations, company control structures and transparency benchmark scores [2]. However, information on the Defence Pipelines Organisation is not included in the 2019 iteration of the report. Information on state holdings is also provided to the public online through factsheets, datasheets and webpages.

The annual report on the ‘Management of State Participations’ is presented to the House of Representatives for debate alongside a letter from the Minister of Finance [1]. State holdings and their activities are actively and regularly scrutinised by Parliament [2,3,4]. Parliament reviews the annual report on the ‘Management of State Participations’ and submits questions, which are then answered by the Ministry of Finance in writing [5].

Any work or activity by the Crown must comply with the Resource Management Act 1991, although the Minister of Defence may exempt certain activities for reasons of national security [1]. According to the Government, defence institutions do not hold such financial interests, as if they did they would need to be reported in the Annual Reports because controlling interest must be disclosed in financial statements to comply with the Public Benefit Entity International Public Sector Accounting Standard 38 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities [2, 3]. According to the Public Finance Act 1989, there are only three mixed ownership companies in New Zealand, all of them in the Energy sector [4]. There are a handful of state enterprises, however only the Minister of Finance or the responsible minister may, on behalf of the Crown, hold shares and/or equity bonds in those companies named in the State-Owned Enterprise Act 1986 and they are not permitted to sell or otherwise dispose of any shares [5]. The Minister of Defence is not responsible for any of the named companies, and would therefore be excluded from holding shares or bonds in those state enterprises. Moreover, the Defence Act 1990, Section 5 only allows the raising of armed forces for certain purposes, and which do not include the running of businesses. This indirectly results in the prohibition of Defence institutions having a controlling or financial interest associated with the country’s natural resources [6].

Moreover, the Treaty of Waitangi is widely accepted to be a constitutional document that establishes and guides the relationship between the Crown in New Zealand (embodied by our government) and Māori. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 outlines that the key Treaty principles include; Māori retain rangatiratanga (‘absolute sovereignty’) over their resources and taonga (‘an object or natural resource which is highly prized’) and have all the rights and privileges of citizenship. In addition, the Treaty states that the Crown has a duty to consult with Māori and to actively protect Māori interests. This creates a natural constitutional barrier that is unique to New Zealand, which recognises the rights of the indigenous population of New Zealand with regard to natural resources.[7].

While the MoD is technically permitted to be exempt from the Resource Management Act 1991, in practice this seems rare. Indeed, according to the source interviewed, who has in-depth knowledge of Defence financial controls and systems, the Defence Ministry is not allowed to charge more than the marginal cost of goods and services provided [1]. Moreover, the audited Annual Reports for the MoD and NZDF confirm they have no financial interests [2, 3].

There are no restrictions on defence personnel participating in business activity relating to natural resources. However, DFOs specify that anything holding a potential for a conflict of interest must be disclosed [1]. This includes any business with former members of the NZDF who were involved in procurement, purchasing, disposal or tendering [2].

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions participating in the exploitation of natural resources [1,2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no evidence of defence institutions’ interests in controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation

Niger is currently the world’s fourth-largest uranium-producing country (1), with gold and oil being other important exports (2). No instrument directly prevents defence institutions from also controlling interests in the country’s natural resources. The Niger Miner Code does not provide for any explicit provisions regarding the matter (3). At the same time, the 2010 Constitution asks for full transparency with contracts for the exploration and extraction of natural resources (Article 150). It also provides for the sharing of revenues from mineral resources between the central government and local authorities (Article 152).
However, despite these provisions, the activity of defence institutions related to natural resource exploitation is not regulated. Art. 150 of the Constitution states that all revenues from the exploitation of natural resources should be transferred to the State and that companies must fully disclose such revenues. But, it does not explicitly exclude defence institutions from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resources.
One peer reviewer provides a different interpretation of Articles 150 and 152 of the Constitution, by stating that “de jure it prevents defence institutions from controlling businesses involved in extractive industries (petroleum, uranium, gold and other minerals)”. However, such interpretation seems problematic: Art. 150 is mainly about the transparency of contracts and their publication in the Official Journal; whereas, Art. 152 addresses equal division of resources between the central government and local authorities. As mentioned above, nothing is explicitly stated about defence institutions in these articles.

The assessor found no cases of defence institutions involved with companies working in natural resource exploitation (1, 2). It should be noted that an absence of evidence does not imply the absence of activity. Additional investigative work beyond the scope of this research project would be required to establish that there is no illicit activity.

Based on interviews and media analysis, the assessor found no cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. However, according to the Small Arms Survey report, some military and security personnel may be occasionally involved in the gold-mining industry in the north of Niger, in two principal goldfields, Djado (closed since 2017) (1), and Tchibarakaten (2). According to the study, some soldiers hire locals to search for gold or to impose “taxes” on minors through ransoming back seized equipment (2); others ensure the safe passage of convoys between Agadez and army bases in the region in Dirkou and Tchibarakaten (for example, protecting water trucks) (2). However, these cases were not confirmed by the original research and require further investigation.

Since there is no legal framework for defence and security institutions regarding declaration of interests in extractive industries, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Since there is no legal framework for defence and security institutions regarding declaration of interests in extractive industries, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Although defence institutions are not expressly excluded from having an interest in natural resources exploitation, the legal rules surrounding the ownership and control of the exploitation process makes it impossible for the defence institutions to be legally and directly involved in the exploitation process (1). However, in the Niger Delta region, military officials have been identified partaking in illegal oil ‘bunkering’ and aiding in the theft and sale of oil. There are strategic exit points from the oil region, and these have significant numbers of security checkpoints. It is alleged that the military uses these checkpoints to extract revenue from the illegal sale of oil because the oil “bunkerers” cannot facilitate the theft, and export of oil resources without the connivance of military officials given their strategic control of the region (2).

Corruption is systemic and nationwide (1). However, there is no evidence that the army, navy, air force have institutional interests in natural resource exploitation; though individual military personnel may have. Legislators often manipulate the appropriation process at the National Assembly to serve private business interests rather than benefit the armed forces as an institution (2).

Corruption is systemic and nationwide (1). However, there is no evidence that the army, navy, air force have institutional interests in natural resource exploitation; though individual military personnel may have. For example The legal and regulatory framework does not make it possible for military officials or institutions to have a direct interest in the extractive sector (1). However, hidden ownership do exist. For example, the Eagle online states “former presidents, top military officers, politicians and businessmen of northern origin own not less than 83 per cent of Nigeria’s oil blocks” says “the Chairman, Senate Committee on Rules and Business, Senator Ita Enang, disclosed this on Wednesday during the debate by the Senate on the controversial Petroleum Industry Bill” (2), (3). Many of the arrangements are also informal as military personnel provide security cover for oil bunkering activities (4).

The legal and regulatory framework does not make it possible for military officials or institutions to have a direct interest in the extractive sector [1]. However, hidden ownership do exist. For example The eagle online states “Former presidents, top military officers, politicians and businessmen of northern origin own not less than 83 per cent of Nigeria’s oil blocks” says “The Chairman, Senate Committee on Rules and Business, Senator Ita Enang, disclosed this on Wednesday during the debate by the Senate on the controversial Petroleum Industry Bill” [2,3]. Many of the arrangements are also informal as military personel provide security cover for oil bunkering activities [4].

As this is illegal activity, there is no form of scrutiny which takes place. The operations are shrouded in secrecy (1), (2).

Article 56 of the Constitution [1] and Articles 225, 226 and 234 of the Criminal Code [2] set the legal framework for the protection of nature and natural resources. In line with this, Article 20 of the Defence Law [3] tasks the Ministry of Defence with developing a Defence Plan to protect certain natural resources (oil, gold, cultural heritage) in case of war. According this Law, it is not possible for the MOD or any other defence institution to have any financial business associated with the exploitation of national resources. The use of natural resources for economic purpose is specifically regulated by the provisions of the Law on the Protection of Nature [4]. Relevant subjects for this purpose can be different private or public entities (article 135) or, in the case of natural parks, public agencies formed by the Government of the North Macedonia (article 136). The public agencies responsible for the management of the three main national parks (“Pelister,” “Mavrovo” and “Galicica”) were formed by the Government in 2006 [3].

Except for a small camping site (St. Naum) which is part of the Galicica national park, cases of the involvement of defence institutions in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation are not publicly known. The Ministry of Defence’s annual financial balance sheet discloses income from activities, such as the named camping site, but no other activities related to natural resources exploitation are named or illustrated in the balance sheet [1].

There is not enough information to score this indicator. There may or may not be cases of individual defence personnel involved in natural resource exploitation, but there is not sufficient evidence to establish such activity. It is worth noting that there are no restrictions on individuals in the defence sector having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of defence institutions having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of defence institutions having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.

There are no specific statutory or constitutional restrictions in Norway on the defence sector’s involvement in natural resource exploitation [1]. However, defence institutions are prohibited from having any financial interest in private enterprise in general. [2]

All Norwegian private and public limited liability companies and savings banks with equity certificates must submit an annual shareholder register statement [1]. This information is available for the public through a shareholder register compiled by Dagens Næringsliv, a Norwegian newspaper specialising in business news [2]. There is no evidence of Norwegian defence institutions being involved in business relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. Online media research confirms that there is no indication to suggest the contrary.

The Ethical Guidelines for the Public Service specify that public officials may not hold securities in a company if these may lead to a conflict of interest [1]. Therefore, as long as there is no conflict of interests, there are for example no restrictions for individual defence personnel to hold securities in a company associated with the country’s natural resources exploitation. Employees are obliged to provide their employer with any relevant information in this regard. The same rules concern also any extra jobs, second jobs, board jobs, or other paid work that are incompatible with the employer’s legitimate interests or liable to weaken trust in public administration. The Employee Handbook for the Norwegian Armed Forces (in particular Part F) highlights specific rules of impartiality for the personnel but does not provide any evidence of involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [2]. There is no available data on this area, so it is impossible to state if there are any cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resources exploitation. There is no indication of any illicit activity.

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. There is no evidence of Norwegian defence institutions involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation.. Concerning individual defence personnel, Norwegian defence institutions are not obligated to publicly declare detailed information on their involvement in business relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. The relevant information is available to the public via a shareholder register compiled by Dagens Næringsliv (DN), a Norwegian newspaper specialising in business news [1]. The data comes from the Norwegian Tax Administration which, however, does not provide a searchable database like DN. The shareholder register is updated annually and provides data from the Norwegian Tax Administration as for 31 December. It is still only a temporary measure and Norwegian media organisations and CSOs have advocated for a permanent solution with a shareholder register containing more accurate and regularly updated information [2, 3]. The beneficial ownership register for corporate and other legal entities, another register set up in 2019, provides only information on shareholders controlling 25% or more of the shares [4].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of the Norwegian defence institutions being involved in business relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation, neither media, CSOs nor the Norwegian Parliament have called for scrutiny in this regard. The existing shareholder register, even if not complete, has been instrumental in revealing breaches of ethical guidelines by public officials and politicians and potential conflicts of interests [1]. However, there is no evidence of any controversial cases of individual defence personnel being involved in business relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation.

Anti-corruption legislation lays out the consequences of bribery of government officials with up to ten years imprisonment (1). However according to GAN, a business anti-corruption portal: “Exemptions from public tenders are provided for all of Oman’s defence procurement, and military procurement contracts with suppliers do not include anti-corruption requirements” (2). There appears an exemption of restrictions for the defence sector. Over the last five years, there have been several high profile cases against corruption in the petroleum sector, the latest in 2016 involving former officials at the top of Al Maha Petroleum Company (3). 2014 saw two high profile ministers charged with corruption relating to natural resources due to efforts by the State Audit Institute (3). Inferences are made on Oman News to widespread corruption in this sector, “corruption in energy sector hard nut to crack: Oman Minister of Oil and Gas” (4). No minister or official prosecuted has any stated links to the defence or security sector, which is expected because the State Audit Institute does not appear to have the right to scrutinise the Ministry of Defence (5). Therefore, although anti-corruption legislation exists to restrict officials financial interests in natural resources, there exists no clear legislation restricting defence institutions or individuals controlling or financing interests in businesses associated with natural resources exploitation.

No information is available setting out the links between the ministry of defence and natural resource extraction on the Ministry of Defence website (1). The sole example of defence investment in the natural resources sector comes from the MoD, the Ministry of Defence Pension Funds have a 4.3% share in the Oman Oil Marketing Company (2). The Oman News Agency website underlines, “the challenges facing investments of the MoD Pension Fund from oil price decline and how to benefit from the economic policies of the banks” (3), highlighting links between the MoD Pension Fund and oil shares. Apart from the two examples highlighted, there is a lack of transparency by the state about potential links between the two sectors as reported by Reuters, “the government does not disclose how much each fund is worth but each has extensive investments across the local stock market and in local real estate projects” (4). Reuters also reports that Omani ministries refused to comment on pension funds investments and shares (4). Though there is a real lack of transparency in defence investments and shares in this industry no legislation exists to curtail investments; one can assume it is “legal” (5), (6).

There are very few cases where individual defense personnel with very high-rank positions are involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. These are common in areas of border areas / harbours or even regional network of natural resources, such as oil.

As discussed in sub-indicator 18B, the MoD routinely refuses to comment on shares and investments in the petroleum sector (1). Although the Oman News Agency referred to MoD’s reliance on oil prices (2), no direct link is made to MoD’s investment in oil companies. No mention is made on the Ministry of Defence website concerning defence investment in oil or natural resources (3). The Oman Oil Marketing company, which the MoD Pension Funds has shares in, mentions a Royal Air Force of Oman tender that was won in 2004, otherwise, no mention is made about the MoD or MoD pension funds on the website (4). On the Petroleum Development Oman website, recent trips to new development energy sites by MoD officials alongside members of the al-Shura, and MoD officials participation in workshops by the institute, demonstrating co-operation between the MoD and Petroleum Development Oman institutions (5), (6), (7). However, no explicit information detailing of Ministry of Defence interests in natural resources exploitation is publicly available.

As laid out in sub-indicators 13, 16 and 17, there is no internal or external auditing around defence expenditure or investment. The State Audit Institute lacks the mandate to oversee the Ministry of Defence (1). The al-Shura Council, the legislative body of government, also lacks the power to scrutinise defence and security issues (2). As stated in sub-indicators 4 and 15C public scrutiny is severely restrained, translating into a lack of accountability from the state. In the Oman Daily Observer, an article announces an internal review by the MoD pension fund, including the minister, in which an external audit was approved and financial statements reviewed (3). However, no details concerning the shares and investment in the petroleum industry, the date of the external audit, or the contents of the financial statements were released to the public. Though it is promising to see some form of an internal review, thorough scrutiny is lacking particularly concerning defence institutions’ investments in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the West Bank’s natural resources are under Israeli occupation, which prohibits PA personnel of agency involvement. Access to water also requires military permission from Israel (1), (2).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the West Bank’s natural resources are under Israeli occupation, which prohibits PA personnel of agency involvement.

Neither the security agencies nor national forces are engaged in any financial interests related to natural resources (1). The natural resources of Palestine are under Israeli control (2).

As there is no business linked to the defence sector, there is no involvement of individuals from the national forces in businesses related to natural resources (1).

As there is no business linked to the defence sector, there is no related information available about natural resources and private bussinesses owned by the government or the PA (1).Thus, this sub-indicator is not applicable.

As there is no business linked to natural resources in Palestine, there are no enterprises owned or linked to the government (1). Thus, this sub-indicator is not applicable.

There is no prohibition against military involvment in natural resource extraction. The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) for instance is a development corporation vested with corporate powers under Republic Act 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 and its amended version RA 9400 [1,2]. BCDA is mandated to convert military reservations into alternative productive uses to help finance the modernization of the Armed Forces [2] as well as subsidize the pension fund of the veterans and retirees [3]. The Philippine government defines military reservation as forest lands which have been reserved by the President for military purposes [4]. Republic Act No. 10349, otherwise known as the Revised AFP Modernisation Act, also states that the AFP Modernisation Act Trust Fund may be sourced from the proceeds of the sale, lease or joint development of military reservations, as may be authorized by the President [5]. However this is the only known instance of such involvement.

The Defence Department is involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resources, but activity is regulated [1,2]. As noted in 18A, the BCDA has been mandated to convert military reservations (defined as forest lands reserved by the executive for military purposes) into alternative productive uses [1,2,3]. These lands have been turned into parks, residential and commercial properties. Revenues generated from these financial interests will go to the AFP Modernisation Programme [4].

The current Environment and Natural Resources Secretary is a retired military officer who has been criticised for protecting big mining companies [1]. Although this revolving door is assumed to be an advantage for private corporations (logging and mining companies) to carry out illegal practices in their operations, there is no evidence that the secretary has been involved in such activities [2, 3]. However, members of some paramilitary groups have been involved in illegal activies [4, 5].

The interests of the defence institution are publicly declared such as the list of properties that are available for lease and some information on income and expenditures from BCDA transactions are also published in its annual report [1,2]. However individual interests are not as explicitly transparent although media outlets have reported on these activities [3, 4, 5].

Using a 2017 Commission on Audit report and a statement by the Chair of the AFP’s Joint Chiefs [1], a member of Congress filed Resolution 520 proposing a Senate-led audit of the proceeds from BCDA’s operations following the AFP’s claims that it failed to remit at least P13.2 billion to the military [2]. The resolution is still pending in the Senate’s Finance Committee, but in October 2020, the President has ordered a Department of Justice-led inter-agency task force to investigate corruption in the entire government [3]. Some lawmakers have questioned the independence of the corruption-probe as the President is known to absolve people even before an investigation has started [4].

Under the Constitution of Poland, all public institutions operate within the law. As a result, all activities which are not explicitly enabled by the law are prohibited. There are no provisions in any legal acts that empower defence institutions to control or to have financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation; consequently, it is prohibited.
Additionally, there are direct prohibitions for individual defence personnel. Article 56 of the Professional Soldiers’ Military Service Act of 2003, generally forbids meaningful employment of the military personnel in private enterprises, as long as they remain on duty [1, 2].

There is no evidence that defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses connected with the natural resources industry. Two of Poland’s most important resources are coal and gas, and there are no reports of the armed forces being involved in their exploitation [1]. Control mechanisms, including independent institutions (Supreme Audit Office), are used to prevent such situations [2].

Theoretically, there may be isolated cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. The Professional Soldiers’ Military Service Act of 2003, Article 56, generally forbids meaningful employment for the military personnel in private enterprises, as long as they remain on duty [1]. Though military personnel can hold additional posts if these do not conflict with the performance of their duties and provided that permission has been granted by the commanding officer of the unit [2, 3]. To summarize, there is no evidence nor reported cases of individual defence personnel being involved in the business of Poland’s natural resource exploitation.

There is no evidence that defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses connected with the natural resources industry, as such this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

There is no evidence that defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses connected with the natural resources industry, as such this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

There is no clear guidance on controlling interests by defence institutions in natural resource exploitation in the Portuguese Constitution [1], the National Defence Act [2] or the Armed Forces Organisation Act [3].

EMPORDEF is a public holding company in the defence sector and has no history of participation in natural resource exploitation [1]; furthermore, neither the National Defence Committee (NDC) nor the Environmental Directive for National Defence suggests any interest in natural resource exploitation [2]; the Portuguese Technological and Industrial Defence Base shows no evidence of any private or public enterprise operating in natural resource exploitation [3].

There is no evidence of defence personnel engaging in private involvement with businesses engaged in natural resource exploitation. Existing audit reports and risk assessments across the defence perimeter do not list financial or ownership interests in resource exploitation as a risk [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no evidence of such interests. Neither the National Defence Committee (NDC) nor the Environmental Directive for National Defence suggest any interest in natural resource exploitation [1]; the Portuguese Technological and Industrial Defence Base shows no evidence of any private or public enterprise operating in natural resource exploitation [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of defence institutions’ interests in controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. Neither the NDC nor the Environmental Directive for National Defence suggests they have any interest in natural resource exploitation [1]; the Portuguese Technological and Industrial Defence Base shows no evidence of any private or public enterprise operating in natural resource exploitation [2].

The Qatari Constitution does not prevent members from the armed forces or the institutions of the armed forces to invest or have interests in the country’s natural resources [1]. As the Head of State and the Chief commander is the Emir himself, he has a monopoly on power. He, therefore, issues decrees that legally authorise military investment in any sector. [2,3,4]

The involvement of defence institutions in business concerning Qatar’s natural resource exploitation is minimal and regulated. According to our sources, there are instances where the armed forces and military institutions have invested and controlled some of the natural resources of the country, however, these activities are not illegal. They are regulated by Emiri decree and approved by the appropriate institutions [1,2,3].

There are few cases where individuals from the defence sector are involved in business related to the country’s natural resources, but these businesses are regulated and legal. If the individual follows the laws and regulations, they are permitted to have their own business. In many cases, such businesses are registered under the names of family members, but the real owners are military personnel. In general, there is control over such instances. [1,2,3].

There is a total lack of transparency. The interests of military personnel are not publicly declared, and information about such interests is not openly published. The Ministry of Defence and the armed forces have investments in businesses, but those are not declared by the government [1,2].

Defence institutions and personnel interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources are not subject to any form of scrutiny. This is because matters concerning security and defence are above the authority of independent scrutiny bodies such as the State’s Audit Bureau, and the ACTA [1,2,3].

It is mainly the Ministry of Natural Resources that manages natural resources in Russia. The MoD is excluded from controlling the extractive industries, but it does, however, have the legal power and authority to ‘apply, within its authorities, proprietary rights over the land, forests, waters and other natural resources given to the Military Forces’ [1].

According to the order by the Ministry of Natural Resources and MoD, the former administers control over 899,535.15‬ ha of land [2]. The regulation of forest management allows the military forestry management to provide the forest under its control for temporary use on a contract base [3]. Comment: according to Interviewee 1, the MoD does not own any oil or gas businesses [4].

Major oil, gas, mineral and metal companies are either state-owned, vertically-oriented or personally related to the inner circle of President Putin [1,2]. One therefore cannot deny that the federal governement, including the MoD, will be involved whenever necessary in protecting such businesses [3]. There are no cases yet, however, that document the MoD’s direct involvement in such businesses, but its ‘protection’ of oil-gas transportation routes is widely known and approved [4]. The MoD has the legal power and authority to ‘apply, within its authorities, proprietary rights over the land, forests, waters and other natural resources given to the Military Forces’ [5].

In accordance with the national anti-corruption strategy, signed by the president on April 13, 2010 [1] and the federal law ‘On Anti-Corruption’, signed on December 30, 2008 [2], the MoD regularly defines its anti-corruption plan, which expressly prohibits any conflicts of interest for the MoD employees [3]. In addition, all personnel report their family income on an annual basis and the MoD publishes the reports on its official website [4]. Comment: Interviewee 1 said he knows of no such cases (conflicts of interest) [5]. Only one incident was found in the media where the MoD officer was involved with the oil business. The MoD official has been under investigation since 2018 [6].

Although the MoD would, if neccessary, like other federal agencies, intervene in cases where the state-controlled mining industry is jeopardised [1,2], the direct control of or financial interest in the mining industry is neither officially stated nor transparent [3].

Although there is random information about MoD involvement in protecting natural resources, and therefore mining [1,2], there is no information indicating that such cases undergo any kind of scrutiny.

According to our sources, there is no restriction or any legal framework that prohibits the military or the army from holding control over financial interest in businesses associated with the natural resources of the country (1), (2), (3). Another source, confirms that many of the royal family’s members who work in the army have financial assets and interest in many businesses within the sector of natural resources (4).

According to our sources, there are many individuals (i.e. royal family) who hold financial interests in the natural resources of the country (1),(2). However, these activities are considered legal as there is no legal framework that restricts such activities (1). According to a gulf-affairs expert, two parts of the government (defence institutions and natural resource exploitation businesses) have traditionally been kept separate (3).

According to our resources, senior commanders who are members of the royal family have a high level of involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource. In other words, exploitation is common in areas with major revenue streams such as oil and gas (1), (2).

Interests of individual defence personnel or institutions in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation are not publicly stated. Royal family members and government officials are not required to publicly disclose their assets, although these have become subject to more scrutiny than under previous administrations from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has sought to curtail the personal expenditure of royal family members in a bid to centralize power and authority and shore up state resources (1). According to a Gulf affairs expert, “should these interests exist, they would certainly not be transparent or subject to any form of official scrutiny” (2). According to other sources, such interests are not publicly available as the amounts of revenue s are huge and do not go to the general budget, rather to royal family members (3), (4).

The financial interests of defence establishment individuals in enterprises relating to natural resource exploitation are not subject to any form of scrutiny in Saudi Arabia (1). There is a higher level of central government control and scrutiny of the finances of Saudi royal family members and senior officials in general. However, there is no indication that this scrutiny is focused on defence officials’ interests in such enterprises. According to a Gulf affairs expert, “should these interests exist, they would certainly not be transparent or subject to any form of official scrutiny” (2).

There are no provisions within the existing legislation that would prohibit defence institutions from natural resource exploitation [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].

The Ministry of Defence owns hunting grounds and natural parks that can be regarded as “natural resource exploitation”. Namely MoD has ownership over the hunting grounds Karadjordjevo, organized as a military institution “Morovic” [1], as well as a military institution Tara, a tourist resort situated in the Tara National Park [2]. The storyline around hunting ground and land in Karađorđevo has caused controversy in the public. Namely, in 2013 Serbia and the United Arab Emirates signed an agreement, through which the Serbian government and the company Al Rawafed Serbia signed the contract on joint investment in the agricultural land in the northwestern part of Serbia, that entails, land belonging to the military institution Morović. The land was leased through an agreement under favourable conditions, without ensuring fixed compensation, which leaves the military dependent on the profit earned by the company [3].

There is no evidence of individual personnel being involved in business relating to Serbia’s natural resource exploitation.

There is generally no public information on relevant activities, plans and other topics related to natural resources. The Ministry of Defence does not perceive natural resources as a topic of particular public interest. These are resources that are under the jurisdiction of a military facility, and have a special protected status, and therefore the information is confidential. For example, the Ministry of Defence has failed to provide information on the execution and details of the contract with Al-Rawafed company to journalists for a long time [1]. In 2017, the minister of defence stated at a press conference that the MoD had not received any money for the use of the land in Morovic [2]. Namely, the state profit from the land lease is currently six times lower than before the investor’s arrival [3].

There is no special interest of the public and the parliament for the issues of monitoring the work of military facilities that are related to the use of natural resources. As an exception, scrutiny over the controversial case cited in 18D came down to a group of interested journalists that followed the case. In the National Assembly, opposition MPs have attempted to form an inquiry committee to investigate the case several times, without any success [1]. Additionally, when the contract details were questioned on some of the DIAC sittings, the public remained deprived of a comprehensive answer [2].

The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is directly financed by the government’s consolidated fund. There are also clear provisions in regulations and legislation that prevent the SAF from maintaining financial interests in businesses [1, 2]. There is no evidence to suggest that both organisations receive income from business activities.

Singapore is an island state with little to no natural resources for exploitation. Therefore it largely relies on human capital, trade, and services for growth [1]. There is no evidence that defence institutions are operating businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation, as there is no such appreciable activity in Singapore due to the scarcity of land and natural resources.

There are no known natural resource exploitation activities in Singapore. There are strict laws against civil servants and defence personnel engaging in private businesses, and all personnel must declare any conflicts of interest on a regular and consistent basis [1].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that Singapore’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that Singapore’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation.

The Department of Defence (DoD) does not own any commercial businesses or interest however, the Public Finance Management Act does not explicitly prohibit the DoD or Armed Forces from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the natural resource exploitation [1].

The DoD does not own any commercial businesses or interests. The Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) is a state-owned company (SOC) established by the Armscor Act, responsible for meeting the defence matériel acquisition/disposal & defence technology research, development, analysis, and test & evaluation needs of the DoD. It is not contained within the DoD, but reports to the minister of defence and military veterans and the relevant parliamentary committees as a separate entity. As with other SOCs, it is listed as a schedule 2 public entity in terms of the Public Finance Management Act (Act 1 of 1999) and regulated as per that Act’s requirements and those of the Companies Act, 2008 [1]. All public entities and government enterprises associated with the state are listed in the Public Finance Management Act [2].

Denel SOC reports to the Department of Public Enterprises and the associated parliamentary committees, without any reporting lines to the DoD or minister of defence and military veterans [3]. The state does control several SOCs that are involved with resource exploitation, namely Alexkor [4], South African Forestry Company (SAFCOL) [5], and PetroSA [6], but there is no evidence of their involvement in the defence sector or with the DoD in particular.

There are no reported cases of individual defence personnel having involvement in businesses related to natural resource exploitation.

The DoD does not own any commercial businesses or interests. As noted in 18A, there is no evidence of defence institutions having involvement in businesses related to natural resource exploitation. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.

The DoD does not own any commercial businesses or interests. As noted in 18A, there is no evidence of defence institutions having involvement in businesses related to natural resource exploitation. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.

South Korea is poor in natural resources and is heavily dependent on importing fossil fuels from the Middle East. [1] Coal, tungsten, graphite, molybdenum, lead and hydropower potential are found within the South Korean territory, while North Korea is affluent in terms of natural resources. [2] Due to this geographical condition, relevant legislation explicitly prohibiting having a controlling or financial interest in businesses associated with South Korea’s resource exploitation does not exist.

There is no evidence in the MND’s 2018 Defence Statistic Annual Report and Public Finance of Korea 2019, which contains the defence income and spending, to suggest that the MND has controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with South Korea’s resource exploitation. [1] [2] A review of media sources suggests that cases related to resource exploitation have not been identified. Given that few natural resources exist in South Korea, cases of defence institutions being involved in the resource exploitation are unlikely to occur. [3]

A review of media sources and interviews with defence experts suggest that there are no cases of individual defence personnel involved in businesses relating to South Korea’s natural resource exploitation. [1] [2] [3] Given that few natural resources exist in South Korea, cases of defence institutions being involved in the resource exploitation are unlikely to occur. [1]

This indicator has been marked not applicable as there is no evidence that South Korea’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation. [1] [2] [3]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that_x000D_ South Korea’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. [1] [2] [3]

The SPLA Act 2009 does not mention or authorise the Defence Ministry to be involved in business. Nevertheless, the organisational structure of the Ministry shows a unit called the Directorate of Military Production. [1] This basically allows the Ministry to be involved in business dealings. In a report by The Sentry, a general in the Ministry is quoted as saying that by law the Ministry is not allowed to conduct business, hence the fact that businesses in the minining sector that belong to the Ministry are registered in the names of individual generals. [2]

The Defence Ministry is involved in natural resource exploitation. The UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan has unearthed the participation of the army’s seventh division in illegal logging in Eastern Equatoria. The division provides escort services to logging companies, helps loggers negotiate deals with local authorities and provides security. [1] Where it gets this mandate from is not articulated in any of the legal policies relating to the Ministry, such as the SPLA Act 2009. [2] Nevertheless, the existence of a “production unit” in the Ministry indicates that the military’s involvement in mining is could be legitimate (and production units are not unheard of in other militaries).

The involvement of individuals in the defence sector has been widely documented by organisations working on policy issues relating to South Sudan and the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan. [1] [2] Whilst the full extent of the involvment of individuals in the military and defence sector in natural resource exploitation has not been fully established and requires more research, it is clear that such activities are widespread and illicit. [3] [4]

The history of elite corruption in South Sudan indicates that the involvement of top generals in the minerals/natural resource sector is a red flag for transparency. [1] This involvement is wholly non-transparent and only made public through investigations; there has never been an audit into these practices. [2]

There is insufficient evidence to indicate whether these interests are subject to parliamentary scrutiny, according to the available research on the issue. [1] [2] As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

Organic Law 9/2011, of 27 July, on the rights and duties of members of the Armed Forces prohibits defence organisations, in its article 33.5, from engaging in revenue-generating activities [1]. This also applies to natural resource exploitation [2].

There is no evidence of cases of defence intstitutions having interest in country’s natural resource exploitation. However, it is common practice in the Minstry of Defence to use Military Operations abroad to secure acces to resources, such as the EUNAVFOR ATALANTA mission against piracy in Somalia as a consequence of assaults on Spanish companies’ fishing ships [1] in response to the mandate coming from the National Security Strategy 2017 [2].

There is no evidence of individual defence personnel with business interests in Spain’s natural resource exploitation [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions having financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation in Spain.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions having financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation in Spain.

A review of the Armed Forces Act (2007) found that it does not prohibit defence institutions or individuals from having controlling or financial interests in any kind of company [1].

In his report on Sudan’s political marketplace, Sudan expert Alex de Waal explains that the off-books sale of gold, mercenary services and (to a now decreased extent) oil is the main source of political finance for Sudan’s defence and security leaders/commanders and their forces. He writes that, since 2013, ‘officially-sanctioned off-the-books exports by companies associated with the [former Bashir] regime and the RSF’ almost certainly explain why official gold reserve and export figures do not reflect the bulk of gold production in Sudan [1]. The BBC and others have reported that, since 2017, the RSF, in cooperation with the Al Gunade corporation – which is owned by the RSF Commander’s family – has been the leading extractor and exporter of gold [2]. The RSF Commander is also the deputy head of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council and also holds – or held until recently – a seat on Al Gunade’s board of directors; De Waal writes that the Commander’s close relatives run the RSF’s ‘special operations wing’ that established the Al Gunade corporation, which ‘includes companies engaged in mining, housing, road construction, transportation and a host of other activities’ [1]. According to Global Witness, the RSF took over the largest gold mine in Darfur in 2017 and also executes extraction activities in RSF-controlled areas of Darfur and in the state of Southern Kordofan state [3]. De Waal also explains that some Popular Defence Forces (PDF) units have foreign Islamist sponsors, while paramilitaries, including the Border Intelligence Units in Darfur and the Central Reserve Police, are supported by a mixture of government security budgets and ‘self-financing’ [1].

The involvement of individual defence personnel in business relating to gold (and, formerly, more frequently oil) exploitation is widespread and sometimes illicit – but, in practice, it is not only explicitly or tacitly condoned or tolerated by the country’s political leadership, but also most egregiously practised by leaders themselves (namely President Bashir and the officials and commanders of armed forces aligned with the regime, especially the RSF Commander, who has now concurrently become the deputy head of the Sovereignty Council). A report published by The Guardian during Sudan’s political transition included the testimony of a gold trader in Khartoum, who said that gold companies associated with security services other than the RSF have been pushed out of the sector by new efforts to ‘overhaul the gold trade’ by ‘dissolving mining companies involved with the former regime’s security services’ [1]. An investigative report by Reuters found that former President Bashir ‘sometimes allowed’ the RSF Commander to circumvent the law requiring Sudan’s central bank to oversee all gold exports [2]. The Commander’s family owns the dominant Sudanese company in the gold sector, while the RSF itself oversees extraction and other related business processes in Sudan. An investigative report by Global Witness maintains that the RSF Commander – indisputably the most powerful person in Sudan since Bashir’s ouster – actually sits on the board of the company and effectively oversees a system in which Al Gunade and the RSF collaboratively extract, transport and sell gold to a customer in the UAE (which, according to Global Witness, imported more than 99% of Sudan’s gold exports in 2018), and the UAE in turn subcontracts RSF forces to fight in Yemen and Libya [3]. Reuters reports that, in the interviews it conducted during the investigation, some officials said that, during the three months that it circumvented the central bank, the Al Gunade corporation turned over some of the gold sales revenue to the state for fuel and wheat purchases, but another senior official said that the revenue was used to buy weapons and vehicles for the RSF and for the President. An Al Gunade spokesman denies a link between the corporation and the RSF – which, according to Reuters, ‘is deployed across the country to protect gold mines and strategic buildings’ [2].

The fact that each of the reports by Global Witness, Reuters and The Guardian on security forces’ involvement in Sudan’s gold sector is investigative in nature, that little could be learned from publicly available sources or government pronouncements and that most sources quoted in the reports were unnamed [1,2,3], is an indicator of the intended secrecy with which security and defence institutions and affiliated individuals involve themselves in the gold business. Global Witness even relied partially on satellite imagery to verify that the UAE sold nearly 1,000 vehicles to RSF forces – and Global Witness also believes it has strong evidence to suggest that these forces and vehicles were central to the brutal crackdown on protesters during the early days of Sudan’s transition and specifically to the killing of more than 100 people in Khartoum, many of whose bodies were thrown into the river or disposed of in unknown locations [1]. Global Witness also conducted extensive reviews of leaked documents and IP addresses, as well as interviews, to verify that the RSF used front companies in the UAE. This would not be necessary if the RSF Commander and his family’s company were not going to great lengths to hide their activities – but at the same time, when the RSF proved rich enough to contribute $1 billion to help stabilise the Central Bank after Bashir was ousted in 2019, the Commander sought publicity for the ‘donation’ and freely stated that some of the money came from ‘our gold investments, money from gold and other investments’ [1].

Compared to the investigative reporting by foreign entities such as Global Witness, Reuters and The Guardian [1,2,3] on the involvement of Sudan’s defence and security forces and leaders in the dominance of Sudan’s gold business sector, scrutiny of these activities by domestic media and civil society organisations has been relatively muted. This could be because the carnage caused by RSF forces attacking protesters in Khartoum in June 2019, as well as the long history of brutality and intimidation at the hands of various security and defence forces, are still fresh in civilians’ minds.

Defence institutions are largely, but not entirely, prohibited by statutory means [1] from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. The Law on Natural Resource Exploitation [1] states that environmental sustainability should always be the central priority for Sweden’s resource exploitation, however, the defence organisation and SAF are not explicitly banned from exploiting natural resources and may purchase and make use of e.g. certain land areas if needed. That being said, the defence establishment is currently not involved natural resource exploitation. Rather, agencies in the defence sector are supposed to ‘cooperate to ensure that Sweden’s defence practices shall have as little negative impact on the environment as possible’ [2]. The Armed Forces have, in addition, developed an environmental policy and campaign in recent years called ‘A sustainable defence’ which aims to, among other things, reduce energy usage, increase recycling, and promote sustainable consumption within the SAF [3].

No evidence can be found that defence institutions are involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].

No evidence can be found of cases of defence institutions or individual personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1] [2] [3].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence can be found of cases of defence institutions or individual personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence can be found of cases of defence institutions or individual personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].

Switzerland does not have any natural resources to speak of. The only exceptions are not very lucrative resources like wood and water. Both are protected by the Swiss Constitution. On top of that Article 76.4 gives the power to manage water resources exclusively to the cantons. Article 77 lays out that forests are protected by the Confederation and their use regulated [1]. However, there is no explicit prohibition for defence institutions.

Switzerland does not have any natural resources to speak of and those it does possess are protected by the Swiss Constitution. On top of that Article 76.4 gives the power to manage water resources exclusively to the cantons. Article 77 lays out that forests are protected by the Confederation and their use regulated [1]. There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to natural resource exploitation.

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to natural resource exploitation. Switzerland does not have any natural resources to speak of. The only exceptions are not very lucrative resources like wood and water. Both are protected by the Swiss Constitution. On top of that Article 76.4 gives the power to manage water resources exclusively to the cantons. Article 77 lays out that forests are protected by the Confederation and their use regulated [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of Swiss defence institutions have financial or controlling interests in businesses associated with natural resource extraction. Wether the Federal financial statements nor a web based search for the reporting period indicate any such interests. [1]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of Swiss defence institutions have financial or controlling interests in businesses associated with natural resource extraction. Wether the Federal financial statements nor a web based search for the reporting period indicate any such interests. [1]

The “National Defence Act”, “Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defence”, and “Organization Law of the General Staff Headquarters of the Ministry of National Defence”, all of which empower the functions, authorities, organisations, and structures for Taiwan’s military, have clear definitions and explanations of the aims of Taiwan’s armed forces. For the MND, natural resource exploitation is out of the question [1, 2, 3].

Defence institutions involved in businesses relating to Taiwan’s natural resource exploitation will be regarded as violating the three laws that are the National Defence Act, Organisation Act of the Ministry of National Defence, and the Organisation Law of the General Staff Headquarters of the Ministry of National Defence [1, 2, 3]. These strict regulations have led to no known cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the Taiwan’s natural resource exploitation.

Military personnel or civilian officials involved in businesses relating to Taiwan’s natural resource exploitation would be in violation of three laws: “National Defence Act”, “Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defence”, and “Organization Law of the General Staff Headquarters of the Ministry of National Defence” [1, 2, 3]. These activities would be illegal and the people concerned would be subject to prosecution according to the Criminal Code of the Republic of China (Taiwan) [4]. No cases have been identified or reported concerning military personnel or civilian officials of the MND being involved in businesses relating to the Taiwan’s natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence that Taiwan’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation.

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence that Taiwan’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation.

No legal restrictions on defence institutions having controlling or financial interests could be identified in the public domain. The army’s commercial wing, SUMAJKT, was established in 1982, under the Corporations Sole (Establishment) Act 1974, an act to facilitate public bodies’ commercial activities. [1] [2]

The army’s commercial wing, SUMAJKT, has interests in quarrying, agriculture, livestock, as well as other non-natural resources sectors and is completely legal. [1]

There are no known cases in the public domain of military involvement in businesses related to natural resource exploitation in Tanzania.

Interests are usually publicly declared but details are hard to come by. Most commercial activities come under the SUMAJKT corporation, but SUMAJKT does not publish annual reports. Overall income was submitted to parliament last year, through the standing committee’s report and the minister’s budget speech, but it is not enough to provide any useful insight into the corporation’s activities as it is not disaggregated by different activities. [1] [2]

The amount of information given to parliament through the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Security, and the minister’s annual budget speech is not sufficient to allow for effective scrutiny of interests in natural resources. [1] [2] The lack of information provided means that parliamentarians are only able to scrutinise these interests superficially.

According to Section 100 of the Organic Act on Anti-Corruption 2018, all state officials are prohibited from having an interest in a private business as a member, advisor, representative, staff member or employee. They are also prohibited from receiving or holding concessions that benefit the private business in a way that may be contrary or contradictory to the public interest [1]. In the Guidelines for the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest, issued by each subdistrict-based anti-corruption agency in Thailand, the prohibition of concessions and any exploitation of public interests mentioned in the Organic Act also includes the prohibition of the exploitation of the natural resources [2]. It can therefore be assumed that, legally, defence officers are prohibited from having or controlling financial interests in businesses associated with the exploitation of the country’s natural resources, but this may not apply to defence institutions as a whole. For example, even though there are some restrictions, as mentioned above, since Gen Prayut adopted the forest reclaiming policy and the new national park law, more environmentally destructive mega-projects, which serve big business, are allowed to go ahead in the forest fortresses with the military’s permission [3].

Despite the existence of the Organic Act on Anti-Corruption 1999, the result of the 2014 coup allowed the military to extend its power and control far into social, economic and political areas, including its claim to resolve disputes over national forest areas. Apparently, the NCPO has benefited big companies, as it provides assistance to large-scale business groups that have projects in national forest areas as well as land possessed by the military itself [1]. This top-down exploitation of natural resources is common, but ever since the military seized power after the military coup of 2014, environmentally destructive mega-projects to serve big business have increased and continue to increase to this day [2].

There are many cases of forest trespassing, both illegally and by policy, which demonstrate the involvement of defence personnel in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. For instance, in June 2019, there was a case of national forest trespassing, which involved the land under the Third Army Area’s control and was carried out for the purpose of constructing resorts for high-ranking local governmental officials [1]. Just four months earlier, there was a case of illegal forest trespassing in the same province, Phetchabun province, which was committed by a former general [2]. More recently, in May 2020, the Anti-Global Warming Association of Thailand announced its opposition to a request made by the Thai Royal Navy to the Department of Forestry to use about 7.36 square kilometers of national forest to construct an aerial protection project in the Eastern Special Development Zone (also known as Eastern Economic Corridor or ‘EEC’) [3]. This project attempted by the military is generally considered unnecessary and the EEC itself has been questioned for its environmental and social impacts [4].

In the case of the potential misuse of land by the Thai Royal Navy, after the Department of Forestry announced the military’s intention to trespass in national forests for its own interest, the Navy eventually had to make a public statement about the issue, which included a special remark denoucing the Department of Forestry for its disclosure of ‘confidential military information’ [1]. In addition, the after-effect of the mass shooting in February 2020 forced the military to make a public statement about business involving the military, as well as its promise to manage its commercial activities with the Treasury Department through an MOU. However, the opposition parties argued that this MOU was only signed in order to increase confidence in the military. They claimed that the MOU was not transparent, since the public and even parliament had not been informed about the details of the MOU [2].

Even though the Organic Act on Anti-Corruption 1999 forbids state officials, including military officers, from having an interest in a private business that contradicts the public interest, the NCPO and the current junta government have benefited big companies by allowing business to be conducted in national forest areas, as well as land owned by the military, with a lack of scrutiny [1]. One example of this is the permission granted to the Siam Cement Group to operate mining in vulnerable areas, which was illegal under the National Forests Act, Section 64 [2]. It should be noted that the Ministry of Defence is allowed to be subject solely to internal audit, which means that its involvement and interests in private business are hardly scrutinised, even by the parliamentary panel [3]. In 2020, the parliamentary censure debate involved the criticisim of Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan’s alleged use of land owned by the Five Provinces Bordering Forest Preservation Foundation; however, the debate ended with the premier and other Cabinet members earning votes of confidence by huge margins, so the case against Men Prawit was not continued or explicitly analysed any further [4].

Defence institutions are, by constitutional means, prohibited from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1,2). Armed forces must remain apart from the exploitation of natural resources. Article 18 of the Constitution specifies that the army undertakes the duty of defending the nation, its independence, and its territorial integrity. It must remain entirely impartial. Article 13 stipulates the ownership of natural resources: ‘Natural resources belong to the people of Tunisia. The state exercises sovereignty over them in the name of the people. Investment contracts related to these resources shall be presented to the competent committee in the Assembly of the Representatives of the People. The agreements concluded shall be submitted to the Assembly for approval.’ (3).

According to our sources, there has been no case where the MoD or the armed forces have had any business or commercial interest in any of the country’s natural resources (1,2). Exploitation in natural resources is totally prohibited and illegal. (2) There is no other publicly available evidence that defence institutions or individual personnel within these institutions, have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (3).

According to our sources, there could be rare cases of high profile officers who may own businesses and have financial interests, but these are illicit activities and usually are registered under another person’s name (e.g a relative)(1,2). There is no publicly available evidence that defence institutions or individual personnel within these institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there are no financial interests and commercial enterprises managed and owned by the MoD or the armed forces ( except sports clubs, which are semi-independent) there is no data available for the public (1,2).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there are no declared financial interests of the MoD, and so there is no public scrutiny of it (1,2).

There are some military-affiliated business entities, such as the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV) and the Turkish Military’s Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK), but there are not currently any military-affiliated business entities in the fields of natural resources, mining, petro-chemicals or energy. [1] It should also be noted that there is no legislation permitting or prohibiting resource exploitation by the military for revenue generation.

Based on open-source research and in-depth interviews, it can be suggested that there are not any military-affiliated companies operating in the fields of energy, natural resource, mining or petro-chemicals [1,2]. No reports were found through open-source research proving that the military has been heavily involved in resource exploitation for revenue generation. The only heavy industrial activity is conducted by OYAK’s Iskenderun steel factory, which manufactures industrial steels and controls 20% of the domestic market [3]. However, as explained above, OYAK is not a military-owned company, but rather a foundation/holding that abides by the rules/financial regulations of all private companies in the business.

There is no evidence of defence personnel being involved in businesses associated with natural resources in Turkey. Article 28 of Law No. 657 on Civil Servants (the Law) prohibits civil servants (and therefore all actively serving military personnel) from being involved in any commercial activity. Therefore, throughout their employment with the government, civil servants can neither be employed by nor provide consultancy services to any private entity [1]. Open-source research did not reveal any instances of such involvement suggesting that the defence institutions and military personnel do all obey the requirements of the law detailed above.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions having financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. The Law 65 prohibits all military and civilian personnel serving in the military and the Ministry of Defence from undertaking commercial activities [1]. There is no evidence that such conflicts of interest or open-source documentation exist.

Thsi indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions having financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. In theory, the budget of the Ministry of National Defence, which is a part of the national budget, is open to legal inspection and audit. However, in practice, the AKP-dominated parliament and its relevant commissions are not able to supervise or determine the defence budget. Instead, the AKP prefers to work in harmony with the military rather than confront it and ensuring that military interests are kept out of the public eye. As for OYAK, there is a special supervisory board that oversees its activities, which is composed of three individuals, one of whom is a military officer. The supervisory board is made up of three members: one member is elected by the General Assembly from five (military) candidates nominated by the Ministry of National Defence; one member is elected by the head of the Public Oversight Delegation; one member is elected by the President of the Administrative Delegation of the Turkish Union of Banks. In addition, since 2001, a private auditing firm has carried out an additional financial audit of OYAK’s activities [1].The OYAK audits are not made public and subject not to parliamentary and/or public debate. [2]

There are no known prohibitions on defence institutions having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. Section 209 of the Constitution of Uganda (as ammended) [1] describe the functions of the defence forces. Subsection (d) allows the army/defence to engage in productive activities for the development of Uganda. In practice too, defence forces are regularly deployed to manage natural resources. In January 2017, President Museveni established the Fisheries Protection Unit (FPU) to crackdown on illegal fishing on Lake Victoria, which was blamed for the dwindling fish stocks. However, soldiers under the FPU of Uganda People’s Defence Forces vowed not to withdraw from various lakes as directed by Parliament until they get a final order from President Museveni. In December 2019, Parliament passed a motion calling for immediate withdraw of UPDF soldiers from the lakes, accusing them of torturing fishermen suspected of engaging in illegal fishing[2]. Many local fishermen alleged that the the army had turned this operation into an opportunity of making money. Then on 5th December 2020, while speaking to NRM delegates from the districts of Kamuli and Buyende , Museveni said that he deployed FPU to clean up the lake. Mr Museveni asserted that reports had revealed how FPU personnel had turned into fish mongers thereby undermining the aims of the operation which required them to desist from engaging in the fish trade as it would entice them into corruption so as to protect their interests on the lakes[3].

According to many sources, residents in various villages, especially in Hoima and Buliisa districts, alleged that suspected security agents had been threatening landowners to take what the government had offered them and leave the area. This intimidation and the fear instilled by it was made worse by the fact that the oil fields were guarded by the Special Forces Command, which from 2012 to 2017 were headed by the president’s son, Major General Muhoozi Kainerugaba [1, 2, 3]. According to the Albertine Watchdog [4] at the beginning of 2012, the two multinational oil companies Total of France and CNOOC of China allegedly signed an agreement with the Government of Uganda through the Uganda Police force demanding total government protection and support for oil companies from the community and civil society interference. The Albertine Watchdog further claims that because their [oil companies] plan was to get the oil and gas in any way, the oil companies paid the government to start a new police unit concerned with oil and gas in the Albertine region. This police unit would be responsible for the protection of companies, spying on environmental activists, other human rights defenders, journalists, funders, and monitoring and conduct digital and physical mass surveillance in the Albertine region of Uganda. They further claim that in the agreement, it was agreed that oil and gas police units would be set up to help control the influence of civil society, journalists and other human rights defenders and also to provide security for both the Tilenga, Kingfisher, and the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) projects. Albertine Watchdog further observed that:
“In fulfilling its mandate of the agreement, the office of the president Yoweri Kaguta Museveni instructed the former inspector general of Police Kale Kayihura to initiate a new Oil and Gas police unit to protect the oil and gas project. In the process of the operations of the Oil and gas protection police units, the police have turned the Albertine region which was once very peaceful into a high and sophisticated militarised region in Uganda resulting in forced evictions, human rights violation, restriction of civil society operations, threats, attacks, and intimidation of Environmental defenders and other human rights activists, digital and physical surveillance, land grabbing, extrajudicial killings rape, torture, lootings on lake Albert, and attacks on communities who are at large indigenous and minority tribes. The Uganda People Defence Forces (UPDF) have been pushing for a bigger base in the Albertine region. It has a Special Oil Protection Unit, which behaves like political intelligence, and security arm. They collect intelligence at every local level and monitor local leadership who defend people’s land rights. They also disperse CSOs that are suspected to awaken peoples land rights ideals through community sensitisation”.
It concludes that “both Total and CNOOC are partnering with Oil and Gas Protection Police units and the Uganda People’s Defence Force to aid massive land grabs, forced evictions, indiscriminate killings, looting on Lake Albert, murder and beating of community members in the Oil-rich region of Uganda”. There is no law or legislation which regulates the financial or controlling interests save for the excuse of guarding “vital national assets”.

The Daily Monitor reported that the State House Anticorruption Unit and CID were investigating a case where officers of the Police Mineral Protection Unit are accused of chasing an investor from a gold mine and taking it over for a year. The officers are accused of abuse of office and frustrating Kisita Mining Company that had been licensed to operate the gold mine in Kasanda District [1]. Particulars of the complaint filed in the Anti-Corruption Unit in 2018, state that under the disguise of carrying out investigations, police officers barred the company team from accessing the gold mine and took over it as a scene of crime “The police has instead granted access to the mine to more than 500 local miners led by Johnny Nsasirwe and others who have no shareholding or interest in Kisita Mining Company,” reads the complaint lodged by Horizon Energy, principal owners of the subsidiary Kisita Mining Company, based in the United Arab Emirates. The complainants also alleged that the illegal miners appointed have not only destroyed the company’s machinery but are also actively extracting gold without paying taxes. It is further alleged that the police officers had also resorted to threatening the management team with arrest on trumped-up charges[1]. In December 2019, Parliament passed a motion to inquire into alleged misconduct of UPDF soldiers in civil matters, artisanal miners in Busia district and appealed to Parliament to halt military deployment in the gold mines, accusing it for defending interests of a foreign investor. The Small scale gold miners told legislators on the Committee of Natural Resources that the army is shielding a Turkish investor identified only as Mustafa, who manipulated one of the local miners associations to enter into agreements which were breached seeing over 100 miners evicted by the army [2]. In 2016, The Daily Monitor[3] reported that a senior army officer was on the spot for allegedly kidnapping employees of a private company and ransacking its premises after a gold transaction went bad. The three employees of Matrich Holdings Limited, a company which deals in minerals, were detained by police with 600 grammes of gold worth Shs70m, office equipment worth $20,000 and two vehicles after a transaction involving a business lady identified as Brenda Murungi and an unidentified Congolese gold dealer hit a snag. At the centre of the dubious gold transaction was Col Felix Kulayigye, the UPDF chief political commissar and MP, whom Mr Richard Kamugisha, the managing director of the Ntinda-based company, has reported to the army leadership for what his lawyers claim was kidnap of employees and theft of properties. In the latest scam, the Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID) has charged two police deserters accused of conning $6m (about Shs 21.9 billion) out of an American national, Anastasios Belesis in a gold scam[4]. Daily Monitor reported that in 2019, Uganda helped Venezuela to export its gold to international markets becuase Venezuela is under international sanctions[5]. This can not happen without the full knowledge of security personnel.

These interests are not publicly declared and are wholly non-transparent. Most of these activities are done on an individual basis, so the proceeds cannot be declared publically. Some of these individuals have “godfathers” in the ministry [1, 2].

Parliament scrutinises these interests whenever it receives complaints and petitions, making scrutiny irregular and sometimes superficial. So it is not easy to determine whether it does this monthly, twice a year or every year because they rely on public goodwill. For instance, In playing its oversight role, the Natural Resources Committee of Parliament [1] had a two-day visit to the Eastern region of Uganda and met the aggrieved miners in December 2019. The meeting followed an outcry from artisanal miners accusing security operatives of torture, extortion of money and unfair issuance of licenses from the Ministry of Energy and Minerals Development. Artisanal miners were aggrieved that the Turkish businessman allegedly connived with the former Busia Resident District Commissioner Hussein Matanda to obtain licenses in fields already licensed to local miners. The miners also complained about the heavy deployment of the army in the area. It was also observed by the local Police Minerals Protection Unit that the army was deployed without consultation with the Police. However, scrutiny is taken up by Parliament when they are either informed via the media or by the area MP of that particular area. Their effectiveness in addressing the problem depends on the interests at play in that particular minerals resource area.

Defence institutions are not prohibited from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with Ukraine’s natural resource exploitation. For instance, the MoD is one of the biggest landowners in Ukraine, controlling over 533 thousand hectares of land (this makes the MoD the third biggest landowner in Ukraine [2]). The MoD also has enterprises, some of them extract sand and gravel and conduct the wholesale of wood [3].

There are instances of the MoD being involved in businesses related to country`s national resource exploitation, but these are MOD legal activities with the enterprises having been legally transferred to the MoD following the CMU decision [1]. For instance, the MoD controls the state enterprise “Druzhbiievskyi quarry of non-metallic minerals “quartz” which extracts sand and gravel, mines building stone, and recycles it into rubble. It also controls the state enterprise “Kharkiv factory of reinforced concrete products” which conducts inter alia wholesale of wood [2].

Defence personnel are prohibited (except for servicemen of regular military service and cadets) from engaging in other paid (except for teaching, scientific and creative activity, medical practice, instructor and judge practice in sports) or entrepreneurial activities [1]. There are cases of defence personnel being accused of corruption, but there is no information on cases related to the country`s national resource exploitation [2, 3].

According to a publicly available list [1] of all enterprises owned by the state, the MoD runs 118 enterprises, including those on the temporarily occupied Crimea, as of April 2018 including those related to Ukraine’s national resource exploitation. Additionally, some of the information is piecemeal and scattered throughout different pieces of legislation and releases [2, 3, 4]. However, there is no publicly available data on the revenues, operations and expenditures of those enterprises. Defence personnel are prohibited from engaging in other paid or entrepreneurial activities [5]. However, they are subject to the submission of e-declarations and have to declare their incomes and interests each year, indicating sources of income and amounts [6].

MoD enterprises, including those related to Ukraine’s national resource exploitation, are subject to public scrutiny [1]. There is no evidence of parliamentary scrutiny of these activities.

Research reveals that there are no restrictions on defence institutions or individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation, including oil and gas. There are legal provisions within the constitution that restrict institutions and individuals’ investments in the country’s natural resources; however, these do not apply to the defence sector and the federal armed forces. Article 120 of the Constitution states, “the UAE has exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the following matters: Defence and the federal armed forces” (1). This means that the Constitution and other regulations and laws do not apply to defence and military institutions, but do apply to individuals within the sector. For example, Federal Law No. 6 of 2004 (the Federal Armed Forces Law) involves the service of officers in the armed forces. The law contains certain express provisions relating to the conduct of armed forces personnel with regards to conflicts of interest and gifts. Article 47 of the Federal Armed Forces Law prohibits officers from undertaking work for third parties under any circumstances without the permission of the Chief of Staff. Article 48 of the Federal Armed Forces Law prohibits officers from having any interests, whether personal or through an intermediary, in any works or contracts related to the armed forces, except for the leasing of property owned by him or her (4).

There is no legislation or any regulations that prohibit defence institutions from involvement in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1). There is also no indication that defence involvement in businesses is illegal.

Desk-based research shows that the Emirates Defence Industries Company (EDIC) is an umbrella company for many other companies (2), such as Mubadala Development, which focuses on natural resources including petroleum. The Chairman of Mubadala is H.H. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, who is the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and the Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE’s Armed Forces (3).

Individual personnel, rather than institutions, need approval from the commander in chief to set up any kind of business in the country’s natural resources. The involvement of senior commanders is legal and widespread at different levels (of bussinesses) (1), (2).

The interests are not declared publicly. There are no details of sources of income, operations, expenditures, or full disclosure of activities (1), (2).

The military and defence sector do not publicly declare their financial interest in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources. The FNC (1), the consultative semi-legislative body in the UAE, has no power to scrutinise the financial interests of defence and military institutions in the country’s natural resource businesses. Additionally, there is no evidence of any media reporting or public debate scrutinising these interests or investments. Despite the availability of the audit report for the country’s major state-owned enterprise, which is also involved in the country’s natural resource exploitation, no evidence is available at all concerning the public or the media shedding a negative light on such interests (2).

There is no evidence that there are legal restrictions on defence institutions or individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1]. However, defence institutions and personnel are removed from having such interests through other means. For instance, the MOD’s detailed Conflicts of Interest rules would likely prohibit such involvement in practice, [2] and the MOD’s Corporate Standards clearly outline the strict restrictions on private and business interests for defence personnel [3]. Equally, the MOD’s strategic asset management plan underscores the lack of involvement in such businesses in practice [4].

There is no evidence in the MoD’s annual report and accounts to suggest the MoD has controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the UK’s resource exploitation [1]. Such evidence could also not be found in parliamentary reports, audit reports, media articles and civil society publications.

There is no evidence of any cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation [1, 2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that such interests exist [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that such interests exist [1].

There is no legislation that prohibits defence institutions from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.The Department of Defense Natural Resources Programe (NR Program) provides policy, guidance and oversight for the management of natural resources on 25 million acres of military land, air and water resources owned by the DoD [1]. As a resource management programme, it does not include details on resource exploitation.

Five major federal agencies administer land and resources, of which the DoD manages the smallest area [1]. This land is used for military bases and training ranges, with its stated principal purpose being ‘to support mission-related activities’ [1]. There is a DoD Instruction outlining natural resource conservation [2]. There have not been any cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses related to the country’s natural resource exploitation.

No information could be found regarding cases of defence personnel being involved in businesses related to natural resource exploitation in the United States.

There is no outstanding evidence that the Department of Defense, or other defence institutions, have financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1,2]. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.

There is no outstanding evidence that the Department of Defense, or other defence institutions, have financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1,2]. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.

Venezuelan law does not prohibit the participation of military officials in the financial management of the country’s hydrocarbons and minerals. Indeed, since 2016 the defence sector’s power over the exploitation and marketing of oil and other minerals has increased significantly [1].

The Organic Law on Hydrocarbons gives the executive the power to create companies and other legal forms it considers necessary for the administration and management of hydrocarbon resources [2]. This law does not limit or impose any restrictions on the creation of companies. In terms of appointments, the Organic Law of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (LOFANB) likewise does not preclude members of the armed forces from holding public administration positions in any sector [3]. These findings are applicable to both military officials and defence institutions. Decree 2.231 of 2016 is particularly noteworthy, creating the Military Company of Mining, Oil, and Gas (CAMIMPEG), attached to the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD). The decree itself states that “it is the duty of the state to strengthen and promote the developmet of projects in priority areas that allow the consolidation and expansion of the mining sector, with the National Bolivarian Armed Forces having the duty to strenghten their own doctrine and technology… to enhance and deepen the development of the nation, preserving and consolidating sovereignty over oil and other strategic natural resources” [7].

The participation of the defence sector in the exploitation of hydrocarbons and minerals has progressively increased, to the point of its total control of the state oil company and the existence of private military companies with unique and exclusive functions in the exploitation of oil and other minerals [1].

Oil exploitation has been managed by the state-owned company Petroleum of Venezuela (PDVSA); however, the management of this company has gradually been militarised following the arrest and death of former PDVSA president Nelson Martínez and subsequent appointment of National Guard (GNB) Major General Manuel Quevedo as company president in 2017 [2]. Since then, the latest restructuring of the company board of directors took place in 2018, leading to more than one military official in positions of deputy minister or area manager [3].

Meanwhile, the MPPD-affiliated company CAMIMPEG was created by presidential decree and ratified by the Supreme Court in 2016. According to the decree, this company has as its object “all matters relating to the lawful activities of oil, gas, and mining services in general, without implying any limitation whatsover” [4]. In other words, this company takes over PDVSA’s functions and is managed and controlled by the MPPD alone [5]. The private military companies also include CanCorFANB (Joint Construction Corporation of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces), which is authorised to control mining exploitation [6].

Although the laws regulating the armed forces and the exploitation of hydrocarbons do not expressly prohibit the participation of the defence sector in resource exploration, some civil society organisations consider these actions to contravene the law as they are not related to defence and security objectives and are not subject to parliamentary debate [7].

Individual involvement of military officers in businesses related to the exploitation of natural resources is extensive, with control of the main extractive companies granted to the top ranks of military high command. Although such participation is not prohibited by law, there are recorded allegations of military involvement in illegal activities related to the extraction and trafficking of resources.

Both the minister of defence and military officers who have been part of the Strategic Operational Command of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CEOFANB) hold positions on the boards of state extractive companies [1]. Of the two state-owned oil companies, the PDVSA is of a civilian nature and is run by military personnel while the CAMIMPEG is a company of a military nature in which the Minister of Defence directly participates. [2]

No information could be found on any of these interests, and this information simply appears to not be public. However, given that there is no policy of transparency and that it is impossible for Venezuelans to access public information, it is likely that these interests are wholly opaque.

The defence sector’s participation in the exploitation of oil and other minerals is only subject to scrutiny by the internal controls of the defence sector, without the possibility of external controls – such as legislative control, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, or civil organisations – exercising any kind of oversight [1].

The Supreme Court decision to grant oversight of the defence sector exclusively to the Office of the Comptroller General of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CONGEFANB) was related to the creation of CAMIMPEG, blocking external fiscal controls over this company [2]. Likewise, the suspension of the National Assembly (AN) by the Supreme Court prevents this body from perform any kind of monitoring over CAMIMPEG [3]. According to experts, the inclusion of the military in the management of the oil sector has further deteriorated the opacity of the Venezuelan state, since the defence sector lack any kind of supervision other than the internal supervision for which there is no access to information [4].

The Constitution of Zimbabwe does not explicitly prohibit defence institutions from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation, and there are no laws or statutes that refer to this either [1, 2, 3].

The Zimbabwe Defence Forces are involved in several mining ventures; the ventures are arguably illicit in that they are not provided for in any legal instruments, nor are they part of the functions of the defence forces outlined in the Zimbabwean Constitution [1, 2]. It is in the extractive industry where over 15 billion US dollars were reported to have gone missing, primarily from the Marange diamonds, where the military was involved in joint ventures with some multi-national corporations in the exploration of the gems [3].

There are numerous reported cases of individual defence personnel involved in the exploitation of natural resources, for instance, related to the Marange diamond mine where soldiers are involved in diamond extraction [1]. These activities are largely illicit but occur with the consent of top military and political officials. Ex-military personnel also have interests in natural resource exploitation, and they usually head or are involved in diamond mining companies controlled by the military [2, 3].

Though interests are not publicly declared, their existence is not hidden. It is a case of authorised illegality in which the Military’s conflation with the State makes it difficult to separate the intricacy between the Military as a sub-division of the State and the State itself. Arguments put forward are that the Coup of 2017 established a full-blown military regime even in the absence of a public declaration of military interests in natural resources, the president finds it comfortable to talk about military investment in the natural resource sector [1, 2].

In principle, Parliament through the Portfolio Committee responsible for mining oversight can scrutinise all mining activity; however, research has proved that the conflation between ZANU-PF, the majority party in Parliament, the military and the executive has left Parliament without much authority to scrutinise military interests in the natural resources sector [1]. In addition to Parliament, the Office of the Auditor General Zimbabwe (OAG) can scrutinise the books of the military, primarily to determine revenue earned and its proper use or abuse in terms of the Public Finance Management Act. However, evidence is that this information is not generally available to the OAG [2, 3, 4].

Country Sort by Country 18a. Legal framework Sort By Subindicator 18b. Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice Sort By Subindicator 18c. Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice Sort By Subindicator 18d. Transparency Sort By Subindicator 18e. Scrutiny Sort By Subindicator
Albania 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Algeria 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Argentina 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Armenia 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Australia 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Azerbaijan 100 / 100 NEI NEI 0 / 100 0 / 100
Bahrain 0 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Bangladesh 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Belgium 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Bosnia and Herzegovina 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Botswana 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Brazil 0 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Burkina Faso 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Canada 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Chile 0 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
China 25 / 100 NEI NEI 0 / 100 0 / 100
Colombia 0 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Denmark 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Egypt 0 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Finland 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
France 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA NA
Germany 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Ghana 0 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA 50 / 100
Greece 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Hungary 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
India 0 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA NA
Indonesia 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Iran 0 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Israel 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA NA
Italy 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Japan 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Jordan 0 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Kenya 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Kosovo 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Kuwait 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Latvia 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Lebanon 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Lithuania 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Malaysia 50 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mexico 50 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA NA
Montenegro 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Morocco 0 / 100 50 / 100 NEI 0 / 100 0 / 100
Myanmar 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Netherlands 0 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100
New Zealand 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Niger 0 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA NA
Nigeria 50 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
North Macedonia 100 / 100 100 / 100 NEI NA NA
Norway 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Oman 0 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine NA 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Philippines 25 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Poland 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Portugal 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Qatar 0 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Russia 50 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Serbia 0 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Singapore 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
South Africa 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
South Korea 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
South Sudan 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Spain 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Sudan 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Sweden 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Switzerland 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Taiwan 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Tanzania 0 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Thailand 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA NA
Turkey 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Uganda 0 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Ukraine 0 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
United Kingdom 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
United States 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Venezuela 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Zimbabwe 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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