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Q20.

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

20a. Existence of policing function

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

20b. Independence

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

20c. Effectiveness

Score

SCORE: NA/100

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The Military Police is the main organization for the investigation of crime and corruption. The Law on Military Police establishes the Military Criminal Police as a specialist police force within the armed forces for the prevention, detection, prosecution of criminal activity and for the arrest of persons who have committed or are prepared to commit criminal acts [1]. The Military Police can use special measures of investigation and has the powers of judicial police to collect evidence that can be presented in the court. The Defence Intelligence and Security Agency (DISA) also, according to the law, can investigate organized crime [2].

According to legislation, the Military Police and DISA have the powers to investigate cases of corruption and organized crime [1, 2].
However, they don’t have financial independence as their budget is allocated within the overall MoD budget [3]. On the other hand, there is evidence of political influence over these institutions as evidenced by the initiation of anti-corruption actions by ministers rather than from the agencies or the regular turnover of the directors and senior staffs when there are government rotations [4].
After the 2013 government rotation, several top officials, including the Director of DISA, were removed from the post as soon as a new government took over on charges of illegal wiretapping and arms trafficking [5, 6]. Another 13 Military Police officials were also fired [7].
The promotion to the rank of brigadier general and appointment to the position of the Chief of Defence of Colonel Bardhyl Kollcaku, while there were two higher-ranking officers (major generals) already serving in the Albanian military [8], indicates the political preferences in the dismissals and appointments of high-level positions. However, the existence of nominal independence considerably curtails the discretion of the executive that in any way has to perform the influence by formally abiding by the legislation in place.

There are no official reports on the performance of the Military Police and DISA to be able to assess their effectiveness through figures.
However, some conclusions can be drawn from the statistical data produced by the prosecutor general and the Ministry of Justice of cases prosecuted.
During 2015, there were 45 criminal proceedings involving military personnel by the prosecution, 19 criminal proceedings during 2016 and 19 penal proceedings in 2017 [1, 2, 3].
In 2011 there were 58 military personnel put on trial, 30 in 2012, 11 in 2013, 38 in 2014. In 2015, there were 16 cases tried under the Criminal Military Code, the court ruled that 13 were guilty, two of them were acquited, and one case was dismissed. In 2016, there were 30 cases tried under the Criminal Military Code. The court ruled that 29 of them were guilty, and one was found not guilty. In 2017, there were 11 cases tried under the Criminal Military Code. There were five guilty verdicts and six not guilty verdicts, while one case was dismissed [4, 5].
The statistical evidence shows that cases are being investigated, prosecuted and trialled following the Albanian criminal justice system model that separates judicial police from prosecution and courts, and that empowers the prosecutors to head of the pre-trial investigation [6].

There is some evidence that there is policing to investigate corruption and organized crimes within the defence services.

According to the Military Code of Justice, the military judicial police is responsible for detecting offences of military personnel (Art. 43, 1). The Code only broadly refers to crimes and from the Code, it is not clear if there is a unit within the military police that is charged with working on corruption and organized crime in the defence sector. According to newspaper reports the Military Judicial Police is responsible for the fight against terrorism as well as espionage and treason cases (2). However, Chérif Drif wrote that the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police has broad powers to investigate cases of misappropriation, embezzlement and corruption (3). According to a newspaper report, the military judiciary was involved in monitoring military officers accused of illicit enrichment (4).

According to Art. 44 of the Military Panel Code, the Military Judiciary Police falls under the authority of the Minister of Defence, which does not guarantee that the officers of the Military Judiciary Police can act independently (1). In 2019, the Military Judiciary Police was involved in the arrest of high-ranking regime members, including the brother of former president Bouteflika. According to one newspaper report the arrest was ordered by a Domestic Security Agency acting under the Defence Ministry (2). Since their work is secret, no evidence could be found on whether the Minister of Defence has actively influenced the work of the Military Judiciary Police.

It is difficult to find information that allows for the assessment of the effectiveness of the legal provisions. There is a case of five high-ranking military members reportedly accused of corruption in 2018. It is still pending which does not allow for an assessment to be made (1). No other examples of military personnel being prosecuted for bribery or corruption were found since 2016. Newspaper articles reporting on the case compared the five generals to General Beloucif who embezzled money from the Ministry of National Defence in the 1990s (2).

The question can therefore only be answered, if at all, by referring to cases involving civilians, for example, the former Minister of Energy, Chekib Kheli, was accused of being involved in a complex international money-laundering system. In a court case in Italy, it was exposed that he had received bribes of nearly 200 million euros. Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia announced in November 2017, that the case would be closed (3) indicating that an obvious case had not been prosecuted. However, there have been jail sentences in corruption cases in connection to the state hydrocarbon company Sonatrach in 2016 (4). Generally, Freedom House notes that the judiciary is vulnerable to government pressure. For example, the president appoints all judges and prosecutors (5).

The Criminal Investigation Police (SIC), under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, has an organized crime department. In March, a new directorate to combat crimes of corruption was integrated into the SIC (Law 78/18 of March 15) (1). The effectiveness of the new structure has yet to be proven. The fact that SIC itself has routinely used torture on suspects and has engaged in extrajudicial killings hasn’t contributed to its credibility. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether SIC has jurisdiction over the whole defence and security sector, considering the special budget regime of and direct presidential supervision over some security-related public services.

The corruption charges against the former general chief of staff of the armed forces, General Sachipengo Nunda, brought by and publicly announced by the attorney general in March 2018, and later dropped by the Supreme Court of Angola, appear to be politically motivated, rather than indicating an anti-corruption move in the defence sector (2), (3), (4).

Neither the Criminal Investigation Police (SIC) nor the General Inspectorate of the State Administration (IGAE), or the inspector general of national defence are independent entities. While the IGAE is an auxiliary organ of the presidency, SIC is subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, and the inspector general of national defence is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (1), (2). According to the 2010 constitution, minsters are auxiliary bodies of the president, who is the head of the executive. Therefore, either action or inaction of any of those institutions ultimately depends on the presidency.

In 2018, under President Lourenço, investigations and prosecutions of senior public servants on corruption charges reached an unprecedented level. Previously, successive amnesty laws undermined ongoing or potential criminal corruption investigations, such as a 2016 amnesty law, or the 2017 shelving of all the state administration inspector general’s investigations opened since January 2013 (see above) (1). However, in May, President Lourenço declared a controversial law for the repatriation of capital, which allows with impunity voluntary capital repatriation to Angola within a preset timeframe – independently of its potential criminal origin (3).

In May 2018, the journalists Rafael Marques de Morais and Mariano Brás were brought to trial under charges of defamation and outrage against an organ of sovereignty (a “crime against the security of the state”), for having exposed the alleged corrupt business practices of the former attorney general (2). In July, a Luanda court acquitted the journalists of all charges (4).

Within the jurisdiction of the Defence, the General Directorate of Integrity, Transparency, and Institutional Strengthening has as its objective the design and implementation of transparency and anti-corruption policies, but its functions do not follow the investigation of cases of organised crime and corruption. [1] Since 2008, the military has been considered by ordinary justice, eliminating what until then configured military procedures in times of peace (Military Justice Code). [2] This implies that the police power to investigate criminal matters is the power of the judiciary in their respective jurisdictions. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the Anti-Corruption Office, which has among its functions that of receiving complaints and investigating irregularities and acts of corruption; can make criminal complaints against crimes against the Public Administration. In some of those cases, this occurs through the role of complainants in criminal cases. [3] In the case of the Security Forces, at the end of 2017, the Ministry of Security created the Investigation Unit against Corruption, but its scope is limited to the Security Forces of the nation (the Federal Police, Gendarmerie, Airport Security Police, and the Argentine Naval Prefecture). [4] [5] According to the information provided by that Ministry, the highest percentage of complaints is related to fraud, followed by embezzlement and bribery. [6]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable.There is no police power within the defence jurisdiction capable of conducting investigations into corruption and organised crime. [1] The Anti-Corruption Unit exists in the sphere of the Ministry of Security and its functions are limited to the forces regulated by the Internal Security Law only, being unable to conduct any investigation into the Military Forces. [2] [3] [4]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable.There is no internal unit of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces with the specific task of investigating acts of corruption. According to the latest management report of the Anti-Corruption Office, that body has submitted complaints to the judiciary regarding the area of defence and security relating to alleged irregularities in contracting and embezzlement of public funds within the scope of the Ministry of Security; Irregularities and overpricing in hiring by the Argentine Company of Soluciones Satelitales SA (ARSAT); Non-compliance with the Law on Administrative Procedures, irregular payments and contracts of the Ministry of Defence during the years 2013, 2014, and 2015, for its participation in the different editions of the TECNÓPOLIS fair; Alleged irregularities in contracting for the Antarctic Campaign 2016/2017; Possible illicit enrichment by the Chief Commissioner of the Argentine Federal Police; Alleged illicit enrichment in the Argentine Army; Alleged request for bribes from civilian personnel in the field of the General Staff of the Air Force – Office of the Aeronautical Attaché at the Argentine Embassy; Possible commission of crime in the Department of Contracts for the Argentine Air Force in Cordoba – Cordoba Aeronautical Hospital. [1] [2]

Generally, the Police of the Republic of Armenia is authorized to combat organized crime in the country. Simultaneously, the Military Police (MP) of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is authorized to deal with the crimes in the armed forces. The MP investigates crimes and misbehaviour in the armed forces, prevents accidents, and complies with the rules of procedures in the armed forces [1]. Article 4 of the Law on Military Police frames the scope of the activities of the latter. In particular, investigation in the armed forces on military offences, and the ones that were conducted in military units. Clause 2 of the same Article provides that the Military Police supports the order and discipline in the armed forces, is alert on the moral and psychological environment in the military units [2]. The Military Police explicitly targets corruption reporting annually on the cases of disclosure and the reduction of corruption risks in the armed forces [3].

The Military Police is an agency within the MoD (Article 1 of the Law on Military Police) that operates through the state budget (Article 19 of the Law on Military Police) [1].

According to the procedures, the MP functions well and investigates cases under its scope [1]. However, the information is scarce to judge whether there is any political influence. Besides, there is no data to compare the duties of the Police of RA and the MP. After the change of the government, the new authorities have launched an effective campaign to uproot corruption. It has shown its effectiveness. Zero tolerance towards corruption has become the driving formula for the government. In July 2018, the minister of defence gave clear instructions to the MP to strengthen their cooperation with other law enforcement agencies in identifying corruption cases and reducing its risks [2]. In 2018, 182 cases of corruption crimes were recorded in military units of the armed forces and other troops, which is 56.9% more than in 2017. In all cases, by the Prosecutor’s Office supervised the process, and 173 criminal cases were initiated, mainly related to fraud, embezzlement, bribery, abuse of office or abuse of official powers, abuse of authority or official position, the passage of authority or official authority, etc. to eliminate the circumstances contributing to the commission of corruption crimes, the subdivisions of the armed forces continue their measures to increase the effectiveness of controlling the acquisition, maintenance and use of material resources [3]. According to the Government reviewer, the existence of the law regulating the activity of the Military Police and other legal regulations allow it to be proven that it operates through officially approved processes. The activities of the Military Police are also under public scrutiny and, when necessary, the Staff of the RA Human Rights Defender and CSO representatives visit the Military Police departments.

The Australian Federal Police has a Fraud and Anti-Corruption business unit which hosts a Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre, a multi-agency initiative which counts the Department of Defence as a member [1]. Additionally, the Department of Defence has a Fraud Control and Investigations Branch under its Audit and Fraud Control Division [2]. It is unclear if the Fraud Control Plan has incorporated an Anti-Corruption component, as many Government departments have done with their Fraud Control Plans, and whether the Fraud Control and Investigations Branch investigators have a specific anti-corruption mandate outlined in the Fraud Control Plan, since the Defence Fraud Control Plan is no longer publicly available (see Q7A). The Joint Military Police Unit, which oversees to the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service, has jurisdiction over a number of areas that relate to but do not specifically include organised crime or corruption (but do, again, include fraud) [3]. The Australian Criminal Intelligence Organisation facilitates information-sharing about organised crime across different law enforcement entities, but it does not provide a law enforcement function as such [4].

The Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre (FACC), hosted by the Australian Federal Police [1], appears to be independent of the Department of Defence, though it is unclear what protections there are in place for its budget. The budget of the FACC can apparently be adjusted based on policy decisions of Ministers. This occurred in 2016, when the government led by Liberal politician Malcolm Turnbull announced a $15 million boost to the budget of FACC, creating new positions and anti-bribery task forces in response to allegations raised by the Panama Papers and a major corporate bribery case in the news at the time [2]. The Department of Defence Fraud Control and Investigations Branch reports to the Secretary Department of Defence, so it cannot be said to be independent [3]. The Commander of the Joint Military Police Unit (JMPU) concurrently serves as the Provost Marshal of the Australian Defence Force, meaning the JMPU are also not independent of defence [4].

Though organised crime is generally well-monitored by defence institutions (see Q20A), there has been some criticism of the volume of bribery and corruption cases and prosecutions that the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and other relevant bodies bring. In recent years law enforcement have made a concerted effort to increase this volume, and there doesn’t appear to be any political interference in this process. The OECD, in its 2018 Phase 4 report on Australia’s implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention, praised Australia’s progress towards enhancing anti-bribery prevention and enforcement, leading to its first bribery conviction in September 2017 [1]. However, the amount of bribery investigations and prosecutions was not as high as would be expected given the size and risk profile of Australia’s export market [1, p6]. The Senate Standing Committee on Economics issued a final report on its inquiry into law enforcement’s handling of foreign bribery cases in March 2018, in which it said that “more needs to be done” [2]. A media search revealed no concerns that have been publicly aired regarding political interference in bribery and corruption cases [3]. An expert commented that AFP Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre does not have adequate resources to investigate serious defence industry or sector fraud [4].

There is a Department of Struggle Against Organized Crime” at the Ministry of Internal Affairs (1). Its major duties include combating organized crime, suppression of terrorism, hostage-taking, extortion, counterfeited currency and means of payment, human trafficking, as well as tackling other forms of organized transnational crime, prevention, exposure and investigation of criminal offences of this type. Under national law, it can identify and tackle the issue in any Ministry. However, there is little evidence that without a high executive order, they could independently conduct an investigation of organized crime within the MoD.
According to experts, if the authorities desire, in the future it is possible to strengthen the activities of other structures to tackle this issue. These include Military Police at the MoD – where there is limited information about its activities. The Defence Ministry’s Legal Department Chief Rauf Kishiyev said in 2015 (2) that the powers of the Military Police Institute will be determined by legislation. The authority of officials of this institute have also been confirmed in the updated Charter of Garrison & Armed Forces of Azerbaijan. For many years this authority has been defined only by the internal act. It should be noted that since the announcement, there has been no change in the authorities of the Military Police.
According to the official from MoD, there was established Investigation Units within MoD. According to the Chief of the Legal Department of MoD Rauf Kishiyev (2014), the establishment of investigative bodies in the Defence Ministry system was a completely correct step. “The work is underway to improve the activities of the investigative bodies. For example, in May of this year (2014), according to the decision of the defence minister, a new decision was made to regulate the conduct of investigative bodies and the conduct of service investigations, which determines the mutual activities the investigation authorities and military units” (3). There is no information about the activities of these investigative bodies within MoD for the last four years. According to one defence expert (Alakbar Mammadov), the organization of these bodies is only formal (4).

Under the national law, the Department of Struggle Against Organized Crime can identify and tackle the organised crimes (outlined in 20A) in any Ministry. However, there is little evidence that without a high-level executive order, they could independently conduct an investigation of organized crime within the MoD.

According to experts, if the authorities desire, in the future it is possible to strengthen the activities of other structures to tackle this issue. These include Military Police at the MoD – where there is limited information about its activities. The Defence Ministry’s Legal Department Chief Rauf Kishiyev said in 2015 (2) that the powers of the Military Police Institute will be determined by legislation. The authority of officials of this Institute organization have also been confirmed in the updated Charter of Garrison & Armed Forces of Azerbaijan. For many years this authority has been defined only by the internal act. It should be noted that since the announcement, there has been no change in the authorities of the Military Police.

There is not enough information covering the GDI 2020 research period to score this indicator. According to an official from MoD, there was established Investigation Units within MoD. According to the Chief of the Legal Department of MoD Rauf Kishiyev (2014), the establishment of investigative bodies in the Defence Ministry system was the correct move. “The work is underway to improve the activities of the investigative bodies. For example, in May of this year (2014), according to the decision of the defence minister, a new decision was made to regulate the conduct of investigative bodies and the conduct of service investigations, which determines the mutual activities the investigation authorities and military units” (1).

According to sources, there is no specialized unit within the military or any institute that have the authority to conduct investigations on crime and corruption allegations. Another source confirms in cases that require investigations a royal decree designs a temporary (one time) committee for investigation, for that specific reason [1, 2]. A committee like this was established in 2012 after the uprisings in Bahrain, and the killing of Bahraini protesters, but no results and actions were taken.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no relevant policing function [1, 2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no relevant policing function [1, 2].

No policing function is exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime. The recent Al Jazeera documentary provides a glaring example of the present government’s indifference to allegations of corruption made against the Bangladesh military [1]. The standard policy of dismissing corruption allegations as ‘smear campaigns’ has given rise to a culture of impunity with regard to corruption and organised crime by a certain section of defence personnel [2,3].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, given that there is no evidence that such policing function exists within the military.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, given that there is no evidence that such policing function exists within the military.

Within the Federal Police, the ‘Police judiciaire fédérale’ focuses on “supra-local” organised crime and destabilisisation, as well as corruption. There is no direct reference to the Ministry of Defence [1, 2, 3]

Additionally, the OCRC (Office Central pour la Répression de la Corruption, ‘Central Office for the repression of corruption’) has the power to investigate and support the investigation of offences against the interests of the state, as well as complex and serious corruption offences. In these instances, corruption is dealt with according to the Penal Law. On a military level specifically, the Military Police Group is a unit of about 100 men and is responsible for maintaining and possibly restoring military order, controlling military road traffic and carrying out security and escort missions [4].

It is also deployed on operations to ensure the security of camps, as is the case in Afghanistan. The military police does not have a mandate for corruption and organised crime.

The federal judiciary police is characterised as autonomous body which falls under the authority of both the minister of interior and the minister of justice [1]. By way of example, for the execution of judicial police missions the police services are placed under the authority of the Minister of Justice. She or he can give them the general directives necessary for the accomplishment of these tasks.

Orders and instructions relating to a specific judicial investigation or inquiry may only be given at the request of the competent judicial authority. For the accomplishment of its administrative police missions, on the other hand, the federal police is placed under the authority of the Minister of the Interior. She or he may give it the necessary orders, instructions and directives to this effect.

Orders and instructions relating to a specific judicial investigation or inquiry may only be given at the request of the competent judicial authority. Federal judiciary police also plays a role in regards to organised crimes through the ‘Central Directorate for the Fight against Serious and Organised Crime’ (DJSOC) which is responsible for the execution of specialised judicial police missions and the support of these missions with regard to serious and organised crime. The budget of the Federal police is disaggregated and there is no evidence that there is undue external influence on the budget process [2, 3].

Cases appear to be generally investigated. There is no evidence of undue political influence in the prosecution of cases related to organised crime [1].

The role of the military police includes the suppression of organized crime and corruption; however, they are primarily in charge of maintenance of internal order and discipline and security [1, 2]. The work of the military police is coordinated by the department that is a part of the Joint Forces Command [3, 4]. The structure of three infantry brigades (4th, 5th and 6th brigades of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina) includes a military police platoon, while one military police battalion is directly under the control of the Command of the Tactical Support Brigade. The tasks of the military police battalion are primarily tactical support, and not criminal investigative work [2].

Since the units authorized to combat organized crime and corruption in the defence sector are incorporated in the organisational structure of the 4th, 5th and 6th brigades of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they do not have their budget framework, and they are subject to the supreme command of top military officials [1].

According to the government reviewer, in accordance with the Law on GI Defence and the Inspectorate System in the AFBiH as an integral part of the MoD, in 2019 it received 424 requests for action and conducted procedures for establishing facts about allegations of irregularities in the MoD and AFBiH. It was found that 48% of the requests for action were established from closed cases, from which 189 recommendations for action were issued to the competent authorities in the MoD and AFBiH. By March 11, 2020, 120 recommendations were implemented and the implementation of the other 69 recommendations is monitored by the MoI. Moreover, the MoD and the responsible persons (parties) in the chain of command conduct procedures determining the responsibility of the perpetrators of irregularities following the Law on Service (3) and Rulebook on Military discipline in the MoD and AFBiH (4), from which disciplinary sanctions are imposed. Additionally, the MoJ submits reports to the relevant prosecutor’s office, bear in mind that the allegations of irregularities were related to offences from the Criminal Code of BiH. These examples, according to the government reviewer, show that there are mechanisms in place for the processing of irregularities in the MoD. Measures are imposed and implemented to eliminate and adopt systemic solutions and sanction the perpetrators of identified irregularities. The structure of the AFBiH also includes a military police battalion, which also has authorized military police officials and investigators who have the authority and cooperate with prosecutors in conducting investigations into suspected criminal offences. Also, in case of need for additional funds not secured regularly, per the Instruction on Emergency Procurement in MoD and AFBiH of 09/2018, commanders of units of battalions and higher rank units may procure goods and services in the amount of 500-6000 KM (Logistics Command of the AF BiH) necessary for the accomplishment of the assigned missions.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Report on Assessment of the Needs of the Judiciary in the Corruption Processes through Monitoring of Criminal Proceedings issued findings concerning the evidence collection processes showing that there are some shortcomings in the conduction of investigation of corruption cases. The recognised shortcomings are:
1) in some cases the indictment was filed on the basis of incomplete evidence, which further required the submission of additional evidence by the Prosecution during the trial;
2) In a large number of cases, insufficient evidence has been submitted to quantify the economic damages or benefits that constituted the alleged consequence of criminal conduct;
3) in a significant number of cases, the prosecution has invested little or no evidence as to the subjective element of the criminal offence, i.e. the intentions of the accused to commit the criminal offence [1].

According to the government reviewer, the following examples outline the results of the work of the MoI in the activities of this MoD institution in the prevention and fight against corruption. In accordance with the Law on GI Defence and the Inspectorate System in the AFBiH as an integral part of the MoD, in 2019 it received 424 requests for action and conducted procedures for establishing facts about allegations of irregularities in the MoD and AFBiH. It was found that 48% of the requests for action were established from closed cases, from which 189 recommendations for action were issued to the competent authorities in the MoD and AFBiH.

By March 11, 2020, 120 recommendations were implemented and the implementation of the other 69 recommendations are being monitored by the MoI as specified in the Instruction Manual of Inspectors in the MoD and AFBiH. As a result of the established facts, the MoD and the responsible persons in the chain of command conducted procedures for determining the responsibility of the perpetrators of irregularities, on the basis of which disciplinary sanctions were imposed. In addition to the above, the MoJ also submitted reports to the relevant prosecutor’s office for several cases, bearing in mind that the allegations of irregularities were related to the offences from the Criminal Code. These examples, according to the government reviewer, show that there are mechanisms in place for processing irregularities in the MoD and that measures are imposed and implemented to eliminate and adopt systemic solutions and sanction the perpetrators of identified irregularities.

The Botswana Police Force has a unit that deals with organised crime [1]. At one event, it was stated that “Botswana Police deputy commissioner, operations, Ms Dinah Marathe, has urged officers to take advantage of INTERPOL initiatives to fight transnational organised crime. Addressing participants of a Basic Criminal Intelligence Analysis workshop on February 11, she said environmental crime, human trafficking and smuggling, drug trafficking, money laundering and related crimes continued to rob economies and disrupt peace. She said ICPO-INTERPOL’s ENACT came at an opportune time as the initiative was aimed at enhancing Africa’s response to transnational organised crimes [2]. The Botswana Police Force does not have the mandate to investigates organised crime within the defence services.

These institutions are independent as far as the work of investigating organised crime is concerned [1]. Botswana recognises the need for increased cooperation between regional and international law enforcement agencies [1]. To this end, the Botswana Police Service is a member of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Organisation (SARPCCO) at the regional level and a member of Interpol at the international. On the other hand, Botswana is affiliated with several regional and intentional organs through its various organs of government [2]. The amount of money spent on the preparedness of combating corruption and organised crime within the defence forces by other internal organs of the BDF is not disclosed publicly. The focus is on the Defence Services and not the Botswana Police Forces. As explained, independence is key to these policing functions. Organised crime within the defence forces is investigated by the Defence Services themselves. The Botswana Police Services does not have the legal mandate.

At a domestic level, the policing and institutional structure is provided for in terms of the following legislation: the national legal framework against corruption includes, principally, the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (as amended) (CECA), Proceeds and Instruments of Crime Act (as amended) (PICA), Financial Intelligence Act (FI Act), Public Service Act, Electoral Act, Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), Penal Code, Whistleblowing Act, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA), and related government regulations, orders, circulars and instructions. At an international and regional level, Botswana is a member of Interpol and SARPCCO [1,2]. Allegations of transfer of funds from Botswana by the senior officials from the previous administration to other countries have been reported in the media but no official investigation has been initiated.[3] For example, AllAfrica (online newspaper) has reported inter alia that Investigator, Jako Hubona, with the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime — an intelligence unit that probes state graft — accused Khama, former intelligence chief Isaac Kgosi and another senior intelligence officer, Weleminah Maswabi, of transferring some of the funds to HSBC Bank in Hong Kong and leading South African banks. The rest was pumped into offshore accounts as well as South African bank accounts. He claimed in an affidavit deposed in a recent high profile court case against Maswabi. No official investigations have been initiated.[4,5] The above remain as allegations. Cases are investigated but not often prosecuted although there is no clear undue influence in the decision making process.

According to an interviewee, The Federal Police and even the state civilian police can investigate any relationship between organized crime and the armed forces, and also cases of corruption [1], and some news articles present evidence that it really occurs [2, 3, 4, 5]. Investigations can be held with the aim of the civilian and the federal polices, when they do not fall under the Act 13.491 of 2017 [6]. This law determines that felonious crimes committed by military personnel should be brought to military justice, and not federal civilian courts, as it was before.

The Brazilian Federal Police is not subordinate to nor dependent on military institutions. It is under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security [1]. Its budgetary and functional independence is often debated in the legislative branch [2], but no changes were made by the Parliament until December 2019 [3]. Nevertheless, the current presidential administration has repeatedly and extensively sought to interfere with the Federal Police’s operations. President Bolsonaro removed the head of the Police in 2019 despite his succesful efforts to tackle corruption, including by opening investigations into the President’s brother who is a senator [4]. The new police chief, appointed in 2020 is a close ally of the Bolsonaro family [5].

The assessor found no evidence of undue political influence in the media [1]. However, according to an interviewee, investigations are not always undertaken because of power relationships [2]. Moreover, the executive’s growing influence over the Federal Police could undermine its pursuit of corruption investigations, although it remains too early to assess to what extent this is the case.

There is no policing function within the defence services that is exercised over the defence to investigate corruption and organized crime. But, there is a national security strategy which entered into force in 2010, that applies to any kinds of security threats, including organised crime (1). This national security policy is complemented by other security-related policies including the recent national Social and Economic Development Plan (2); and the National Defence Policy of Burkina Faso, adopted on April 19, 2004 (3). Yet, the actual National Defence Policy addresses defence issues instead. It, therefore, does not seek to address organised crimes taking place within the defence sector. The question may be asked whether it is because organised crime rarely occurs in the defence sector that the military has not yet thought about making policy on the subject. In any case, the attack perpetrated by the former members of the RSP on the Yemdi arms store (4), (5), sounds like a strong signal for the necessity of policymaking, to address such offences within the defence sector. Lastly, the Gendarmerie, a special defence service, occasionally investigates corruption and organised crime, but it is only entitled to exercise policing functions over the defence service to investigate corruption and organised crime.

Because there is no policing function to investigate organised crime, this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

Because there is no policing function to investigate organised crime, this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

Both the military and the police have units charged with the investigation of organised crime [1]. Law No. 2017/012 of 12 July 2017 lays down the Code of Military Justice [2]. Crimes and offences committed by military personnel are handled under what is termed ‘military justice’ (articles 8 and 11 of the Code) [2]. Its jurisdiction falls under the Military Justice Directorate. This Directorate reports to the President of the Republic.This Directorate has authority over all of the armed forces, including the gendarmerie. However, the Military Security Division, which acts as the military police, brings in personnel from all services. This unit handles all types of offences ranging from corruption to organised crime and, depending on the nature of the crimes, it refers them to either a civilian or a military court [2].

The policing units in the defence and security sectors are not independent, as they fall under the authority of tthe Ministry of Defence and the executive [1]. According to a U.S. State Department 2017 Human Rights Report, “The Ministry of Defence — which includes the gendarmerie, army, and the army’s military security unit — reports to an office of the Presidency, resulting in strong presidential control of security forces” [1].

According to the US State Department Human Rights report (2017), some steps have been taken to hold police officers accountable for corruption and abuse of power, but enforcement mechanisms remain weak and few details are known about investigations and subsequent actions. Also, cases may be investigated but not often prosecuted, or only certain types of cases are prosecuted [1].

The US State Department Human Rights report (2017) states, “The government took some steps to hold police accountable for abuses of power. Police remained ineffective, poorly trained, and corrupt. Impunity continued to be a problem. Some officers convicted of corruption were relieved of their duties but continued to be paid due to weak oversight, accountability, and enforcement mechanisms for internal disciplining. Civilian authorities maintained some control over the police and gendarmerie, and the government had some mechanisms in place to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. The DGSN and gendarmerie investigated reports of abuse and forwarded cases to the courts. Lesser sanctions were handled internally. The DGSN, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice claimed members of security forces were sanctioned during the year for committing abuses, but few details were known about investigations or any subsequent accountability” [1].

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) National Divison is responsible for investigating corruption and organised crime within government agencies broadly, not just in defence. [1] The Canadian Forces National Investigative Service (CFNIS) is responsible for anti-corruption and organised crime investigations, among others, for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and all who fall under the military’s disciplinary code. They are a sub-organisation of the military police with an independent reporting structure. [2]

The RCMP is entirely independent, both institutionally and practically (as it reports to the Minister of Public Safety), from the CAF and DND. The National Investigative Service (NIS) has been independent of the military chain of command by design since its inception. [1] [2] They are very respectful of each other’s jurisdictions and are able to cooperate effectively. [3] [4] The NIS was created as an investigations body independent of the military chain of command. Oversight is provided by the Military Police Complaints Commission, [5] whose members are Order in Council appointees. The independence of the NIS was demonstrated when the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was investigated by it [6] weeks after the former CDS was placed under NIS investigation, [7] and before allegations were made public. This shows the independence of the work of the NIS from the military chain of command in practice, but not the ADM (National Defence) to which it reports directly. Still, there have been calls for the government to further increase the independence of miltary investigations. [8]

An internal investigation into the integrity of the CAF court-martial system found the system to require more study to determine its effectiveness and integrity compared with other similar national forces. [1] However, political interference in the prosecution of the Norman case, and the court-martial of the top military judge presided over by a close friend, have undermined confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of court-martials where political factors are involved. [2] [3] The Admiral Norman case, in which the second most senior officer in the Canadian Armed Forces was relieved of his duties and charged with breach-of-trust, damaged public trust in the CAF in 2018-19. Norman was accused of leaking documents related to ship procurement, although eventually independent prosecutors concluded there was no basis for a case, and there is currently an investigation into the attempt within the DND to suppress evidence that might have exonerated Admiral Norman. The documents which Norman was accused of leaking related to politicised procurement policies linked to the electoral interests of the party in power. [4]

There is no evidence of a specific unit within the national police force or the military police that deals with organised crime and corruption in the defence sector. Within the Ministry of National Defence (MDN), the sub-secretary of the armed forces is required to implement a system of prevention of money laundering, administrative offences, and financing of terrorism. However, this system has a preventive rather than a policing function [1]. The Military Police acts in support of military operations, protection of personnel and materials, and administration of the military authority. However, according to the doctrine of the Military Police, this organism has no attributions in policing organised crime and corruption within the defence services [2].

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of a specific unit within the national police force or the military police that deals with organised crime and corruption in the defence sector [1].

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of a specific unit within the national police force or the military police that deals with organised crime and corruption in the defence sector [1].

The Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (中央军委纪律检查委员会) is in charge of investigating corruption and wrongdoing in the PLA and enforcing discipline, but it is politically and organisationally controlled by the CCP. It is supported in its work by the CMC Audit Office. [1,2] There appears to be no separate policing unit that investigates crime (for instance a military police as in Western armies).

The system of internal policing is different to the Armed Forces of other countries, as it answers to the Chinese Communist Party. The Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) of the Central Military Commission (中央军委纪律检查委员会) is in charge of fighting corruption and wrongdoing in the PLA and enforcing discipline, but it is politically and organisationally controlled by the CCP. As such, although it carries out policing functions, it is not politically independent. In 2016, the CMC released the “Opinion on Deepening the Reform of National Defence and the Armed Forces”, which introduced reforms that elevated the status of the CDI and centralised its control by the CMC (CMC 1-1-2016). However, this was an effort to enhance its ability to carry out investigations without interference by military actors, while strengthening the CCP’s control over the CDI (Julienne, 2016; Heath 2019:4-5)

Cases are investigated and suspects are prosecuted. The 2019 White Paper on China’s Defence provides evidence of the implementation of the anticorruption policing, noting that in the last 7 years “over 39,000 units and 13,000 PLA and PAP officers in positions of leadership at and above regiment level” have been audited. [1] Between 2013 and 2019 more than 13,000 PLA officers and 100 generals have been investigated and punished for corruption. [2] There is no specific reference to organised crime penetration and relevant cases in the CMC/PLA. Given the organisation of the PLA and its policing function, there is also clear political influence in the decision making process.

The Military Forces have a group of norms and institutions whose objective is the investigation of crimes committed in service. Decree 1797 of 2000, which issues the disciplinary regulations for the military forces, identifies disciplinary offenses as very serious offenses, serious offenses, and minor offenses. Among the breaches are actions of corruption such as violating customs legal provisions, weapons manufacturing or marketing, requesting or accepting commissions, giving money for the acquisition of goods and/or services for the Public Forces, and using property owned or at the service of the defence sector for personal gain, etc. The General Inspection and Personnel Office of the respective Forces and the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation are responsible for carrying out investigations into serious or very serious offenses (Colombia, Presidency of the Republic 2000, art. 164). Within the National Police, the General Police Inspection is responsible for advising the institutional command regarding ethical behavior of public servants, and for developing policies and prevention and control programs around police integrity within the service. [1] Law 1765 of 2015, [3] which structures the Military and Police criminal justice system, defines a series of new bodies such as the Military and Police Criminal Prosecutor’s Office and a technical body for Military and Police investigation. The latter is in charge of carrying out investigations related to the provisions of the Military Criminal Code, punishable conduct, human rights violations, and guaranteeing the chain of custody of test material and physical evidence. The National Police have seven units responsible for investigating and monitoring organised crime, the Directorate of Citizen Security, who has the mission of reducing crimes with the greatest impact in cities; Police and Rural Security Directorate, which aims to protect territories from illegal mining, illegal extraction of hydrocarbons, and protect the inhabitants who are in the process of land restitution in consolidation zones (territories where the FARC-EP was present), natural reserve areas, and border and productive areas; the Criminal Investigation Directorate and INTERPOL, which carries out judicial and criminal investigations, and supports the investigation processes for all crimes; the Police Intelligence Directorate, which generates strategic and operational intelligence to prevent threats; the Antinarcotics Directorate, which implements the policy to counter drug trafficking in narcotics; the Directorate of Protection and Special Services, which develops actions to protect children and adolescents, the environment and natural resources in the urban environment, tourism, the nation’s archaeological, cultural and religious heritage, high risk populations, vulnerable or vital assets, and infrastructure in the country’s oil sector; and the Anti-Kidnapping and Extortion Department which seeks to prevent, investigate, and reduce crimes against humanity. [2] Thus there is a clear institutional framework to carry out actions against organised crime and to evaluate corruption in defence services.

The Inspection Offices of the different Armed Forces are independent, neutral, and impartial to the disciplinary investigations and audits they conduct. This is explicitly stated the General Regulation of Inspections of the Army, where it states that for internal audits, auditors should be independent of those operationally responsible for the entity being audited. Auditors must maintain objectivity throughout the audit process to ensure that the audit findings and conclusions are based only on the audit evidence. [1] The Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, as a supervisory body, has the independence to initiate, advance, and adjudicate on investigations related to the disciplinary failures of public servants. The Office is required to work hand in hand with the General Inspection Offices and advance prevention processes through the provision of training and education to personnel. [2, 3] Despite the alleged independence of investigation processes within the Military Forces and Police, magazines such as Semana have denounced the passivity and ineffability of investigations. In their Live Week program, they argue that many of the corruption scandals within the Military Forces and Police that have been in the Prosecutor’s Office in previous years have not been resolved, nor has any action been taken on them. [4] Interviewee 6 argues that the legal corpus does not allow actions such as corruption or violations of human rights to be exposed to oversight bodies and public opinion, making it more difficult to generate investigations independently and effectively. [5]

In Colombia there is debate about the competence of Military Criminal Justice and ordinary justice, since it is not yet clear the scope of intervention and investigative responsibility for certain crimes carried out by military personnel in the framework of its functions. Situations can arise in which the events that occurred have characteristics of crimes typified in the criminal code, such as crimes related to the application of human rights and with regards to International Humanitarian Law. Investigative competence could fall to ordinary justice, ignoring the role of Military Criminal Justice since acts to investigate military personnel would fall under the framework of service. Since this framework of serious crimes during the armed conflict was unclear, there is a legal vacuum on who can investigate and judge these crimes. [1] Faced with this situation in 2015, Military Criminal Justice is being restructured, granting clearer investigative and judging powers through the generation of bodies such as the Military and Police Criminal Prosecutor’s Office and a Military and Police Investigation Technical Corps. [2] This new regulation generated some contradiction since it is understood that the Military ends up being a judge and party, generating an administration of justice parallel to that established by the Constitution through the creation of bodies to be judged under their own rules and risking the reversal of the burden of proof, which could allow impunity for crimes in the context of armed conflict. For this reason, there is the belief that the responsibility of Military and Police investigations should fall exclusively to the ordinary jurisdiction. [3] For Interviewee 6, [4] the system of trial for the Military allows for impunity, which is evident in the requests to classify services or discharge the Military officer involved in acts of corruption and violations of human rights, sending a contradictory message since these measures do not properly deal with crimes themselves. Regarding allegations of corruption and passivity in investigations, the Week Magazine (Semana) has denounced the Military for not relegating investigated members from its posts, but instead promoting them. [5]

In theory, several quasi-policing mechanisms could carry out investigations into grand corruption and organized crime in the defence services. However, there is no single unit within the national police that is solely dedicated to this type of activity.

The Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières de Côte d’Ivoire (CENTIF-CI), a financial intelligence unit, has operated since March 2008. It is tasked with processing reports of suspicious activities from banking institutions and forwarding them to a court of law (1). However, though CENTIF-CI is a member of the Egmont Group of international financial intelligence units, it is considered ineffective by anti-corruption CSOs (2).

The Inspection Générale des Finances within the Brigade de Lutte contre la Corruption (BLC) was set up in 2012 to carry out investigations about grand corruption, which in theory would include the penetration of organized crime in the public sector. But according to Global Integrity (AII 2018), its mandate is largely restricted to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, thus limiting the scope of its investigations (3).

In terms of policing mechanisms, the Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance (HABG, est. 2013 and operational since 2014) is tasked with monitoring anti-corruption, mainly through asset disclosure schemes that apply to about 4,600 senior politicians in Côte d’Ivoire, including those at MoD. However, it too is perceived as largely ineffective in investigating corruption and organized crime (3).

The Unité de Lutte Contre le Racket (ULCR) was set up in 2014 in an attempt to end the bribery practices of police officers at roadblocks, particularly in rural areas. This unit is specifically focused on petty corruption of low-ranking police officers at roadblocks rather than in investigating organized crime (4).

The Cour des Comptes (Audit Court) is an overarching government accountability mechanism tasked with the scrutiny of public finances. As per Articles 152-154 of the 2016 Constitution, the Cour des Comptes can investigate the accounts at all ministries, including the MoD (5). However, despite its broad mandate, it rarely publishes audit reports and, according to the 2018 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2018), public audits in Côte d’Ivoire have been historically ineffective in exposing financial malpractice (6).

Finally, on January 26, 2017, Côte d’Ivoire published Law No. 2016-992 (November 14, 2016) related to the fight against money laundering and terrorist finance (Relative à la lutte contre le blanchissement des capitaux et lefinancement du terrorisme) in the Official Journal. Law No. 2016-992 seeks to bolster the legal framework and empower the country’s anti-corruption bodies in the fight against money laundering and terrorist finance. Under Section 1 (Definitions), No. 15, the Law explicitly cites organized crime and racketeering as “participation in an organized criminal group and participation in a racketeering network” (7).

Most of the policing mechanisms are nominally independent and are vulnerable to political interference by the executive as well as by high-ranking members of the government, including military officials.

The 2018 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2018) and the 2018 country profile of Côte d’Ivoire by Freedom House highlight the lack of independence of the Judiciary system. As evidence, they point to the fact that military leaders who sided with Laurent Gbagbo were put on trial and convicted, while those who sided with Alassane Outtara had not been tried. This has tarnished the perception of impartiality of the judicial system (1). “The judiciary is not independent, and judges are highly susceptible to external interference and bribes. Processes governing the assignment of cases to judges are opaque…Concerns about impunity, victor’s justice, and reconciliation have persisted after the close of the 2010–11 crisis. To date, only a handful of individuals have been put on trial for crimes committed during that period” (2).

As for the HABG and the Cour des Comptes, Global Integrity’s AII 2018 concluded that it is questionable whether these institutions truly have the independence and capacity to investigate abuses presumably linked to senior office holders and high-ranking military officials (3).
“Nevertheless, the HABG, which is the main body, is it truly independent? The evidence indicates it is not because it is strongly dependent on the executive power in particular” (3).

The policing mechanisms tasked with investigating corruption and organized crime can be described as largely ineffective because they lack independence, are understaffed and lack the power to impose penalties. The result is that some cases are investigated, but seldom are they prosecuted or have any judicial follow-up.

For the 2018 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2018), the policing mechanisms tasked with oversight of public finance (CENTIF-CI, HABG, Cour des Comptes) are ineffectual because they lack the qualified staff to prevent corruption. For example, the HABG can carry out investigations and publish reports, but it is not part of the Judiciary and is therefore powerless when it comes to penalties (1). Global Integrity (AII 2018) reported that there are few cases in which senior officials have been prosecuted for corruption as a result of HABG investigations. HABG has also been criticized by local reporters for its lack of independence related to asset declaration schemes. The asset declarations are confidential and do not extend to family members. As of May 2017, the HABG announced that only 65 of 255 members of parliament had submitted declarations for the previous year (2).
Citing an anonymous source, AII 2018 concludes that though the HABG can forward its reports of alleged corruption to the public prosecutor (Procureur de la République), there is no way of knowing the number of cases that have resulted in prosecution because reports of HABG investigations are not made public:

“In practice, the HABG registers all cases of complaints of corruption and can inform the Public Prosecutor, although it should be specified that most of its reports and the results of these investigations are not made public… According to an anonymous expert, a journalist and civil servant, it [the HABG] “remains a purely administrative vehicle and does not seem to be equipped to carry out its mandate on the ground.” Furthermore, the expert states that there is no “link between the Court of Auditors, which is supposed to judge cases, and the HABG, which is tasked with oversight” (2).

The Ministry of Defence Military Prosecution Service has the prosecuting authority of all cases of violation of the civil and military penal code. Cases of organised crime and corruption also fall into this category [1]. MDMPS may be assisted by the Defence or national police, if cases require [2].

The Ministry of Defence Military Prosecution Service is an independent authority under the Ministry of Defence. It is independent from the Defence and the military chain of command [1]. The budget of the MDMPS exists as a separate subaccount of the Ministry of Defence [2].

The cases of the Ministry of Defence Military Prosecution Service are investigated and/or prosecuted through formal procedures [1]. The cases are investigated by the Prosecution Service’s police-trained investigators who are recruitted from the national police [2]. The annual reports of the MDMPS indicate that the authority is effective in investigating and prosecuting cases of violations of the civil and military penal code [3]. Research found no evidence of political interference or undue political influence [4].

There is a unit within the MoD designated, the Military Police, which is responsible for dealing with corruption cases and crimes within the armed forces and other security agencies. This agency works closely with military intelligence (1), (2), (3). According to Article 204 of the Constitution, investigating corruption and all other crimes committed by officers and personnel is the exclusive right of the military justice system which consists of military prosecution and military courts (4). As for investigating the conduct of officers, this is the task of the military intelligence (which also work to ensure the loyalty of the officers) in collaboration with the Military Police (1). There is also the public funds’ investigations unit within the national police, but given that the military justice system has exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by military personnel, it is very rare that military personnel will be investigated by such national police unit.

The Military Police reports to the MoD and the executive. The independence of both the Military Police, the military judicial system, and courts is compromised (1), (2), (3). All these police and justice institution are subordinate to the MoD, including military intelligence, military courts and the Military Police and are considered “administrative units” of the ministry (4). Thus, its independence is largely compromised as they naturally come under the influence of top military executives like the minister of defence (5). However, according to Article 204 of the Constitution “members of the Military Court shall be independent and shall be immune to dismissal. They shall have all the guarantees, rights and duties stipulated for the members of other judicial bodies” (5).

There is no extra military authority that is entrusted or has the power to investigate or prosecute cases of corruption in the defence sector because investigating and prosecuting these calls falls under the jurisdiction of military courts (1), (2), (3).

There are two police units to deal with corruption in Estonia. In accordance with the Anti-Corruption Act [1], the Estonian Internal Security Service [2,3] deals with corruption cases involving officials, which includes the middle- and top-level management in Defence Forces. In the rest of the cases, the Police and Border Guard Board and the Central Criminal Police is involved. The latter also deals with tackling organised crime. [4]

The Police, the Border Guard Board as well as the Estonian Internal Security Service [1] fall under the Ministry of Interior Affairs, different from the defence sector, which is under the Ministry of Defence. [2] Therefore, their budgets are separate. Moreover, the Estonian Internal Security Service has its own budget, as stipulated by the Statutes of the Estonian Internal Security Service. [3] The Agency’s budget is approved and amended and its implementation is scrutinised by the Minister of Interior Affairs.
The Anti-Corruption Strategy that includes analysing and studying corruption in the public sector is coordinated by the Ministry of Justice. [4]
In 2018, the Security Authorities Surveillance Select Committee as well as the Ministry of Defence proposed to give the Intelligence Centre of the Estonian Defence Forces more possibilities to do in-depth investigation about them. In short, this means that the Defence Forces would have more power and would somewhat cover the responsibilities of the Estonian Internal Security Service. Indirectly, this is a criticisme of the Internal Security Service, which took years to discover a spy in the Defence Forces. There is a certain conflict between these two instittions, which somewhat shows that they work independently and are able to criticise and keep each other in check. [5]

A report by the Security Authorities Surveillance Select Committee, based on oversight, concludes that the Estonian Internal Security Service is doing its job with full responsibility and in accordance with the law when discovering corruption cases. [1] The structure and the responsibilities of the police unit are listed by the Statutes of the Estonian Internal Security Service.
Moreover, the Estonian Internal Security Service publishes an overview of their activities annually. [2] These overviews are very detailed, thorough, and well-known in Estonia. They also include corruption cases and in some instances even explanations as to why corruption should be avoided. There is no evidence of political influence in dealing with corruption cases by police units.

In the national police, there is no unit specialising in crimes within the Defence Forces, but the units that investigate organised crime and corruption in general can investigate those phenomena within the Defence Forces as well. The police functions under the Ministry of Interior and so, by default, is independent from the MoD and FDF in terms of both budget and influence.

Further, the Decree on the Defence Forces, chpt 1, section 5 states: “Legality of the actions of and within the Defence Forces, as well as the administration of military justice, is guided and supervised by the Assessor of the Defence Forces. [1] He / she is the head of legal section operating in the Headquarters.” The main task of this unit is to ensure rule of law and due process in all situations: It monitors and guides the administration of military justice, carries out the pre-trial investigation in severe military offences, administers the participation of the Defence Forces in the preparation of legislation, and oversees the interest of the Defence Forces in courts and administrative processing. [2]

If the suspected criminal act is against another soldier or the Defence Forces, pre-trial investigations are carried out as stated in the Act on Military Discipline and Crime Prevention in the Defence Forces section 5 and actions taken on the basis of the pre-trial investigations in section 6. [3] Furthermore, the Act on Pre-Trial Investigation is followed and the Police may support and collaborate in the investigation. [4,5]

If impartiality of the investigation or gravity of the crime so require, pre-trial investigation shall be moved to the competence of the Police. This can be done also because of the quality of the matter and the Police may, of its own accord, start a parallel pre-trial investigation for a justified reason. [6] If the suspected criminal act is against a civilian person or organisation without involving the Defence Forces, the normal, civilian investatory and judicial processes are followed.

The police functions are under the Ministry of Interior and so, by default, is independent from the MoD and FDF in terms of both budget and influence. Little information is available about the allocation of money within the administrative branch of the Ministry of Defence. The legal section operates independenty and, moreover, when/ if e.g. the pre-trial investigation is moved to the competence of the Police, top military officers or the executive have no say over the matter [1,2,3,4,5,6].

There is no evidence of undue political influence or its attempts in the investigatory processes. However, the former Commander of the Air Force, Sampo Eskelinen, has been investigated and prosecuted for military offence, as it was suspected that he had on purpose delayed the beginning of an investigation into the activities of a fellow air force commander in another military offence case in 2017. [1,2] The Helsinki Court of Appeal convicted Eskelinen to financial penalty, but the plaintiff took the case to the Supreme Court which began its proceedings in December 2019. [3,4] The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment [5].

As we have seen before, the Contrôle Général des Armées (CGA) is not involved in investigating corruption or organised crime within the defence sector. [1] Also, there is no military police or military justice body per se, [2] but there is an internal intelligence service, Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DRSD), whose tasks as defined in the Defence Code [3] include fighting organised crime within the army.
The policing body within the internal security forces, the General Inspection of National Police (IGPN), cannot exercise its mandate over the defence services.
A policing function can, however, be exercised on the Defence sector through investigations led by civil judiciary police. The “Brigade Centrale de Lutte conte la Corruption” (Central Brigade for the Fight against Corruption, BCLC), [4] which is part of the judiciary police, has special investigative powers with regards to corruption offenses and organised crime involving public officials, including those from the Ministry of Defence. It can act on its own or in collaboration with the Police or the Gendarmerie.
Special judges (“juges d’instruction”) have extended powers to investigate cases of corruption and organised crime, regardless of whether military personnel are involved or not. The only limit to their reach is, once again, the “secrecy of defence” label. [5]

The French police and judicial system (and their budgets) are completely separated and independent from the executive and military. The BCLC and judges can investigate independently. The example of the Balard investigation shows that they are able to investigate and prosecute freely, [1] but the Ministry of the Armed Forces’ own intelligence body, DRSD, which states in its mission that it fights organised crime within the army, is not independent and has not communicated on any effective investigations.

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, but once again, the “secrecy of defence” label can censor investigations.
In the context of a judicial inquiry, a judge can request the lifting of the “secret-défense” from a Ministry, the President or the Prime Minister. The Ministry concerned then consults the Advisory Committee on the Secret of National Defense (CCSDN) for an opinion. The latter may propose a total or partial declassification, or it can decide to keep the classification, within a period of two months after the referral. [1] It is up to the Minister concerned to follow this advice or not. Since its creation, the CCSDN has issued 158 opinions, of which three quarters favour declassification. Nine times out of ten, the administrative authorities followed them.
It is notable that the CCSDN has five members, three of them directly appointed by the President of the Republic. Judicial investigations on defence issues therefore aren’t free from the executive’s influence.
In the Karachi scandal, judge Marc Trevidic was faced with a refusal to declassify “secret-défense” information on several occasions. [2]

As mentioned in Q8, there is a special investigations branch (Unit R II 1) in the Legal Affairs Directorate, consisting of 30 investigators and former military prosecutors. Unit R II 1 investigates corrupt practices and activities within the Bundeswehr, working with various law enforcement agencies, drafting guidelines and supervising the latter’s implementation and training. The annual report on corruption prevention and the Federal Situation Report on Corruption, which provide information on the respective number of corruption cases, can be used for effective action [1,2,3,4,5].

These policing functions operate independently of the bodies that they investigate, and their budget is ring-fenced [1]. Furthermore, the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) has the authority to investigate criminal cases in defence institutions [2].

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence. Corruption allegations within the Ministry of Defence lead to further investigation and a legal trial. The investigation of these cases is initiated by Unit R II 1 of the Legal Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defence, before being turned over to external prosecutors. The process of investigating corruption is defined in the ‘Federal Government Directive Concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration’ and the provision for the latter’s implementation within the Ministry of Defence. This Directive also defines specific reporting obligations for suspicious cases within Bundeswehr agencies [1,2,3,4]. Corruption investigations in the defence sector are also carried out by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which has a broad mandate to investigate corruption and has initiated high-profile investigations in the past, including into corruption allegations surrounding the renovation of the Gorch Fock training vessel [5].

The Ghana Police Service has the Police Intelligence and Professional Standards (PIPs) Bureau that is mandated with dealing with issues of corruption and crimes that occur within the institution (1). There is no state policing unit under the Ghana Police Service charged with investigating corruption and organised crime in the military (2), (3), (4), (5).

The Ghana Military Police (GMP) is tasked with fighting corruption, crime, and misconduct. The GMP reports to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) which, under the control and direction of the Armed Forces Council, is responsible for the administration, operational control and command of the armed forces (6).

Outside defence and security institutions, the Economic Organised Crime Office (EOCO) monitors and investigates economic and organised crime in all public offices, including the defence services. The EOCO is a specialised agency and operates under the authority of the Attorney –General (7).

The policing functions within the defence and security sector do not operate independently of the bodies that they investigate as they respond to their respective chains of command. Therefore, they are likely to be subject to influence from top military officials (1), (2).

The EOCO operates independently from the defence and security services; however, it has been criticised for being unduly influenced by the executive (3).

Prosecutions against corruption are rare, and there is no evidence of prosecutions for corruption against the upper echelons of the armed forces (1), (2).

The PIPs Bureau is struggling to build integrity within the Ghana Police Service, and episodes of corruption and misconduct are often exposed by the media. At present, the police are perceived as the most corrupt institution in Ghana (3), (4).

The Organised Crime Service and the Counter-Terrorism Service of the Greek Police have in the past been involved in cases involving the Armed Forces, but only occasionally [1, 2]. As such, it would appear as though their mandate does cover the defence sector although it is not a major area of focus.
External assistance from the National Intelligence Agency may also be provided. [3].

There is not enough information to score this indicator. There is no independent unit within the MoD and the armed services investigating corruption or organised crime. The Organised Crime Service and the Counter-Terrorism Service are part of the police force and are supervised by the Ministry of Citizen’s Protection. [1] There is no evidence of considerable and regular political influence regarding their limited involvement in investigating corruption in the armed forces. However, the cases they are involved with are so infrequent that this is difficult to assess.

Though the Organised Crime Service and the Counter-Terrorism Service occasionally investigate cases in the defence sector, this is not regular [1]. There is no evidence of considerable and regular political influence regarding their limited involvement in investigating corruption in the armed forces.

While technically policing of the military is assigned to the Military HDF vitéz Szurmay Sándor Budapest Garrison Brigade [1], it has a limited investigative capacity for complicated criminal cases, and is suited for investigating small scale corruption cases. The functioning institution to prevent these crimes or to investigate them (including corruption-related crime) is the Military National Security Service [2] that cooperates closely with Counter-terrorism Centre [3] and the Counter-Terrorism Information and Criminal Analyses centre (TIBEK) [4].

The Military HDF vitéz Szurmay Sándor Budapest Garrison Brigade has no independent budget [1], it has a limited investigative capacity for complicated corruption cases. The Military National Security Service [2] has a separate budget line in the Annual Budget [5] of Hungary under the chapter of Ministry of Defence, while Counter-terrorism Centre [3] and the Counter-Terrorism Information and Criminal Analyses centre (TIBEK) [4] operates separately under the main chapter dedicated for the Interior Ministry. These institutions are autonomous from the MoD or HDF, but politics can derail the process and they have limited or no impact on large scale corruption cases.

While investigations are seemingly unbiased, the office of military prosecutor is supervised by the Prosecutor General of Hungary, that is perceived as a corrupt institution [1]. Two of high-ranking sources shared concerns on politically motivated prosecutions following government change in 2010 that has undermined trust. However the sentence of the so-called “General Trial” questions this opinion [2, 3]. The court found thirteen high-level general’s guilty of corruption activities and operating a corruption scheme that was built in blackmailing defence contractors to pay them to continue to work with the units they were leading, while the former state secretary who was holding the position that time (nominated by a current opposition party) was found innocent, that proves that military court is independent [4]. It should be noted that even the decision of the court had to deal with the accusations the prosecutor general was mismanaging the case (that is interpreted by many as political motivation).

There exists a law enforcement agency in the Army called the Corps of Military Police (CMP). The CMP has a broad mandate which includes assisting in the maintenance of good order and discipline; and investigating cases in the Army [1]. Organised crime and corruption falls within its scope. Oversight of the defence services is entrusted to Comptroller Auditor General of Accounts (CAG), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Standing Committee on Defence. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) monitor any illegal activities which encompass corruption and organised crime respectively [2][3].

CAG, PAC, CVC and CBI have autonomy and in theory cannot be influenced by the executive or military officials. The CMP is a branch of the Indian Army so is not independent [1]. As of this month, May 2019, members of the CMP will be a part of the Indian Army’s new Vigilance Investigation Unit which has been set up to independently investigate cases [2].

Though there is no public material on CMP investigations, there is evidence to suggest that the function of policing through joint vigillance activities with CAG, PAC, CVC, CBI and state law enforcement have had an effect. Cases are investigated and can lead to prosecution [1][2][3]. It is possible that groundwork laid by the CPM can lead to further CBI and CVC investigations into illegal and corrupt practices. It is noted that no CPM equivalent exists in the other Forces but activities of CAG, PAC, CVC, CBI and state law enforcement do lead to investigations and prosecutions [4][5][6].

The function of policing defence services in general is regulated through Law No. 31/1997 concerning Military Court [1]. It stipulates that the military court is an executor of judicial authority within the TNI, tasked with enforcing law and justice by taking into account interests of national security. Investigations into alleged violations of law committed by TNI soldiers may only be carried out by ‘Those Who Have the Right to Punish’, namely Military Police Officials and Military Judge Advocates (Oditur). The duties and functions of military police in the TNI, namely law enforcement, discipline and order, are carried out at the level of TNI Headquarters and Forces Headquarters by TNI Military Police (POM TNI), Army Military Police (POMAD), Navy Military Police (POMAL) and Air Force Military Police (POMAU). The military police centre in each force is led by a two-star high-ranking officer. At the TNI Headquarters level, the POM TNI is led by the Commander of the POM TNI, who is positioned below and responsible to the Chief of TNI [2]. But when carrying out daily tasks, the Commander of the POM TI is under the coordination of the Chief of the TNI General Staff. In other words, although there is no specific unit with such tasks, the mandate to address organised crime and corruption in defence sector is carried out by the military police and court as part of their functions to investigate crimes within the defence sector. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the main state agency tasked with eradicating criminal acts of corruption, has the authority to coordinate and control investigations and prosecutions of corruption offences committed jointly by people who are subject to military and general court. In other words, the KPK does not have the authority to handle cases of suspected corruption or organised crime within the TNI that do not involve non-military individuals and nor does the Directorate of Corruption in the National Police [3]. According to the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission, KPK investigators (penyidik and penyelidik) can come from the police which has its own directorate for corruption eradication. Investigators from the police are appointed by the KPK leaders and carry out their functions as KPK investigators in accordance with applicable regulations.

According to Presidential Regulation No. 10/2010 concerning the Organisational Structure of the Indonesian National Defence Forces and its amendments, the Military Police (POM) is one element of the Central Executing Agency at the TNI Headquarters level and each of the Forces Headquarters [1,2,3]. The TNI POM Commander is positioned below and responsible to the Chief of TNI. The Army POM Commander, the Navy POM Commander and the Air Force POM Commander are positioned below and accountable to their respective Chiefs of Staff. The position of the Military Police within the hierarchy and structure of military command makes it difficult for it to be independent. A study conducted by a high judge of the army concluded that, up to now, the independence of the military court system has been hindered by military interests related to the TNI’s main task of maintaining state sovereignty [4]. In addition, many objections have been raised about the placement of civilian personnel in military court because it is considered unfavourable for military units. Further, the processes of military court, from determining a suspect to convicting them, are often closed and not open to the public [5]. Based on the Appendix Details of the Central Government Expenditures, there is separate budget for the administration of the Military Police in each service [6]. The position of the Military Police within the hierarchy and structure of military command also makes it difficult for it to use the budget independently.

Efforts to eradicate corruption in defence agencies, especially the TNI, have so far not been effective. Efforts to eradicate corruption are often stalled because they conflict with regulations regarding military secrecy. The process of revising the Military Court Law has still not been completed, which also hinders the process of resolving corruption cases within defence agencies, particularly the TNI. In addition, there is reason to suspect that efforts to tackle corruption within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI are being constrained by institutional interests, i.e. in the interest of protecting the good name of the agency or unit. It is difficult, for example, to expect a superior in the military, in their capacity as a ‘Supervisory Boss with Rights to Punish’, to take the initiative to begin the process of investigating allegations of corruption offences committed by his subordinates. Since mid-2017, the KPK, in coordination with TNI POM, has been investigating allegations of corruption in the procurement of Agusta Westland AW 101 helicopters by the Air Force. A number of high and middle TNI officers are suspected of being involved in this case. The KPK’s move to summon a number of TNI officers as witnesses for civilian suspects has been met with resistance from the TNI [1]. The investigation process for this case is still ongoing. The KPK is also investigating allegations of abuse of authority in the procurement process within the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla). Bakamla has named four civil suspects. Meanwhile, in the military court environment itself, a high-ranking officer has been sentenced to life imprisonment by the High Military Court for his involvement in budget misuse within the Ministry of Defence. There are allegations of other corrupt practices occurring in addition to the cases mentioned here. However, there are very strict rules in place regarding military secrets, meaning that public access to relevant information is kept to a minimum [2]. Meanwhile, the capacity of the KPK to enter the military sphere is limited. The KPK can therefore only conduct efforts to eradicate corruption in defence environments that involve civilians. Specifically, former Chief of TNI General (ret.) Moeldoko once revealed that the weapons procurement case cannot be opened to the public. He even said that if the KPK came to the TNI, it would make the TNI a dishonourable organisation [2].

There is a counter-intelligence group within the Law Enforcement Force of Iran, which is responsible for identifying foreign spies and corrupt police. However, it is not clear whether it is authorised to work on issues in the defence sector [1].

These policing functions are subject to considerable and regular undue influence from top military officials or the executive. Undue influence from the Supreme Leader, in the decision-making process, may be that only certain types of cases are prosecuted [1].

It would seem that cases are only occasionally investigated [1]. There is evidence of undue influence from the Supreme Leader in the decision-making process, and it may be that only certain types of cases are prosecuted [2]. Evidence of both prosecutions and undue influence is limited, as the process is not transparent.

There is not a single department inside the MoI whose functions include the detection and prevention of corruption. Unethical activities, particularly giving or receiving bribes, is a phenomenon plagues the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) (1), (2), (3), (4). A MoI officer revealed in a recent interview that sums as high as $50,000 are paid in dues by police officers to secure specific detachments (5). Other common bribes involving IPS officers are said to include payouts to access MoI controlled roads and routes (5). Another study argues that “the highest rates of bribery are incurred by citizens that interact with the police”, among other bureaucratic organs of the state including the office for land registry and tax revenue. Others underline the frequency of arbitrary tariffs are imposed on truck drivers passing through IPS held-routes and checkpoints and active bribery within temporary MoI administered prisons by families hoping to secure the release of a family member or to guards take better care of them (5). As the US State Department uncovers, the problem of prison overcrowding has exacerbated corruption within the IPS, among officers and administrators “to reduce or drop charges, cut sentences, or release prisoners early” (1). The phenomenon is particularly rife within Al-Nasriyah prison. Similar patterns of behaviour are also exercised by PMF recruits. The US State Department report identifies a Ninewa Governorate official as having said that PMF officers release arrestees and detainees suspected of having ISIS “once bribes are paid”.

Structural gaps (1) remain and continue to be exploited throughout the police, from local forces, border police and the national police force. The Badr organisation’s oversight of the organisation has meant that the police structure is vulnerable to infiltration by militiamen and thugs. The government’s efforts to uproot crime have been limited to ISG operatives. At stated in the NYT (2), the US Congress allocated $3.6 bn to professionalize security forces and provide training. The emphasis was on border security to prevent similar security breaches which culminated in Mosul’s fall. It also provided training to federal police and a “special-Baghdad police force”. A retired US intelligence officer (3) argues that the police now derive strength from UN “intelligence, weapons and equipment” accessible to them. Furthermore, as local analysts and activists have reported, unidentified snipers infiltrated security forces opened and opened fire on protesters. Police forces, one report underlined, did not intervene or make arrests in any “of the reported cases of sniper fire” (4).

Investigations led by police may appear in one-line citations across local press, but the details of these are not made public. Given that corruption pervades police ranks, high and low, this has only lead to greater budgetary allocations to ensure necessary legal action is taken (1).

There is a unit within the national police force that deals with organised crime and corruption in the defence services. It is called “Lahav 433” (or Lahav Unit) – (the Israeli FBI) – and exists since 2008. It is a crime-fighting umbrella organization within the Israeli police and investigates very significant and complicated corruption cases that involve a member of the central government or a high ranking member of local government. (1). There is also the Economic Department which is specialised in handling white collar offenses. They mainly work in government corruption cases and economic crime that affect the main bodies in the economy and the national infrastructures. They work together with the Israel Police against white collar offenders while using combined enforcement measures including criminal, administrative, disciplinary and civil, with the aim of providing a response to the entire range of aspects arising from a violation of the law (2).

Lahav 433 is responsible for fighting corruption in the public and defence sectors, among others (1). For instance, they investigated former Israeli prime minister Mr. Ehud Olmert and other cases that are related to public institutions (2) (3). This unit operates independently of the bodies that it investigates andcooperates with other ministries and departments such as the Economic Department (4). Though there is little publicly available information on the unit’s budget, recent media investigations have raised concens around Lahav’s funding. According to reports, political pressure is diverting resources away from anti-corruption investigations and Lahav’s budget is being rolled back (5), despite its succesful investigation of significant corruption cases. These reports raise concern around political interference with the unit’s funding that could jeopardise future investigations.

Generally, cases that are related to corruption or other criminal activities are investigated and prosecuted through formal processes and without political influence (1) (2) (3). Lahav 433 has proved effective at conducting corruption investigations involving senior political figures and the courts have shown a willingness to prosecute officials for corruption-related offences (4). The ongoing trial of former Prime Minister Netanyahu (5), the case against former Vice Minister Faina Kirschenbaum (6), the cases against former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (7) and numerous cases filed against mayors and lower-level political figures (8) all point to an effective investigation and prosecution process for officials involved in corruption. In all these cases, Lahav 433 has spearheaded investigations. However, according to some reports, the Public Security Ministry and the Head of the Investigations Branch are deliberately slowing down largescale anti-corruption investigations and diverting resources away from Lahav 433 in order to put anti-corruption investigations on the back burner (9). Moreover, senior investigators who worked on high-profile cases, such as the one linked to Benjamin Netanyahu have been moved to peripheral jobs or missed out on promotions as a result of their work (9).

All police forces operating on the national territory have the power to investigate on corruption and criminality on the entire territory and in all public administrations, including the armed forces [1]. In addition, the Carabinieri also performs a military policing role, in order to prevent violations of laws and to carry out investigations of war crimes both in the country and abroad, and the role of military judiciary police [2].

Being a separate body, the national police is independent from the armed forces and its budget is separate from that of the ministry of defence [1]. For what concerns the military policing role performed by the Carabinieri, it is relevant to recall that in the performance of military policying duties in the country they are dependant from the Chief of Defence Staff, ex. art 6 of legislative decree 297/2000, while they follow the instructions of the military judicial system in the performance of the military judiciary police role, ex. art 9 of legislative decree 297/2000 [2]. The budget for the Carabinieri is included in the budget of the Ministry of Defence [3]

Cases are investigated and prosecuted according to the gravity of the crime and can lead to imprisonment [1]. By comparing the number of illicit cases identified in the report of the Anticorruption Supervisor and the number of final judgements in the same year reported to the Parliament, one can see that there is an almost complete correspondence. For example, the Anticorruption Supervisor identified 18 embezzelment cases, and 13 have been the number of final sentences pronounced in the same year for that type of crime in the defence sector [2] [3].

The military police (警務) exist in all service branches of the Self-Defence Force (SDF). They have the mandate to operate as police as described in the Criminal Procedure Code [1] with regard to crimes listed in article 96 of the Self Defence Forces Law. This article specifies that they have the right to investigate and arrest suspects of crimes committed by SDF personnel, crimes committed against SDF personnel performing official duties, and crimes committed on the premises of the SDF. [2] The military police must turn arrested suspects over to the Public Prosecutor for detention and possible prosecution. Outside of these premises, they will cooperate with the ordinary police in arrests. Further details on the mandate of the military police are found in service regulations for the SDF about the investigation of crimes. The military police are to report to their commander and investigate according to the instructions they receive the following types of crimes: disclosing secrets related to the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the US, serious crimes involving foreign nationals, violations of SDF discipline or against information protection law and crimes indicated by the Minister of Defence in separate instructions. [3] A circular for the GSDF lists 19 categories of crimes about which the military police in that service are to report to their commander and subsequently investigate. One of them is crimes with regard to accounting and procurement and one is the crimes listed in Chapter 9 of the Self-Defence Forces Law, some of which deal with forms of corruption. [4] Organised crime is, however, not explicitly mentioned in the above-mentioned service regulations for the SDF or GSDF circular. However, as the military police have police authority, they have the mandate to investigate and arrest suspects of such crimes involving the SDF or conducted on their premises. [5] The National Police Agency (警察庁) investigates organised crime in Japan. The Public Prosecutor deals with issues of corruption, with the Special Investigation Unit of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor playing a major role in investigation and prosecution of corruption at high levels of government and public institutions. [6] A search of the webpages of the National Police Agency, [7] and of the mainstream newspapers Asahi, [8] and Yomiuri, [9] did not uncover any recent reference to the investigation of organised crime in the Ministry of Defence. Nor was any reporting found of any high-level corruption cases in the MOD or the SDF handled by the Special Investigative Unit of the Public Prosecutor. Evidence of corruption at a smaller scale was found, however (see 20C).

The military police force is under the direct command of the Minister of Defence, and therefore has a degree of independence vis-à-vis the SDF. [1] The ordinary police force is also organised in a way that promotes its independence. The National Police Agency is a special institution within the National Public Safety Commission, which reports directly to the Prime Minister. [2] A search of the Internet and of the mainstream newspapers Asahi [3] and Yomiuri [4] did not provide any information on the independence of the budget of the Military Police or the National Police Agency. However, the fact that these institutions are under the direct command of, respectively, the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister, would be expected to give them protection against capricious budgetary reductions.

In a search of the webpages of the mainstream newspapers Asahi and Yomiuri, several cases of corruption were found, but none involving the highest levels of the MOD or the SDF. [1] [2] The pattern in these cases was that the military police, either as result of its own investigation or of whistleblowing, would arrest an SDF (or in some cases MOD) employee on charges of corruption, and the employee would thereafter receive disciplinary punishment by the SDF (or MOD). The military police, who don’t have the mandate to prosecute, would thereafter send the documents of the case to the Public Prosecutor, who would sometimes decide to prosecute the arrested employee and sometimes decide not to. The mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun were also searched for the timeframe of this research for reports of undue political influence with regard to disciplinary measures taken by the SDF / MOD or decisions taken by the Public Prosecutor in cases involving SDF / MOD personnel, but no such reports were found. [3] [4] In addition, altogether 21 newspaper articles from the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun dealing with the process of taking disciplinary measures against SDF / MOD personnel were examined in detail, but this did not uncover any evidence of undue political influence either. These articles included reports of disciplinary measures taken by the SDF without information about whether the documents of the case were sent to the Public Prosecutor, [5] reports of arrest by the military police, subsequent charge by the Public Prosecutor, and sentence following a trial [6] and cases of “suspended” prosecution. [7] Under the Public Prosecutor’s Office Law, the Minister of Justice can instruct only the Prosecutor General to take specific action in a case. [8] These powers “are only known to have been used once, in 1954, resulting in the indefinite suspension of the arrest for bribery of the politician Eisaku Sato.” [9] This is considered a very salient event in Japanese political history. [10] Therefore, it is safe to assume that political intervention in the decisions of the prosecutor, as well as in disciplinary measures taken by the SDF or MOD, which can be followed up with prosecution, would be reported by the press. T

There are several entities that could, potentially if mandated, act in a policing function to investigate organised crimes and corruption within the defence sector in Jordan. These include the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Audit Bureau, and the Public Security Directorate [1, 2, 3]. However, none of these exercise policing, nor can they launch investigations into the Armed Forces, who have prohibited the publication of any information related to it [4]. The Army, Navy and Air Forces are considered to be under the leadership of the King, who is the Supreme Commander, according to Article 32 of the Constitution [5]. Jordan has made great advances and exerted major efforts to comply with the UNCAC, in relation to countering corruption, including the establishment of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission and the amendment of laws [6]. Despite these changes, it is still unclear whether these legally apply to the Armed Forces and there is no evidence to show the existence of policing within the defence sector in relation to organised crime and corruption.

There is also a military police unit with the mandate to investigate violations of the code of conduct and any crimes committed by members of the armed forces. This unit is under direct command of the Commader in Chief and MoD, but it is not clear that it deals with organised crime [7,8].

This sub-indicator has been marked as not applicable, as explained in the previous sub-indicator there is no policing function to investigate corruption and organised crime within the Armed Forces, and thus it is not possible to asses this function’s independence as it is non-existent [1,2].

This sub-indicator has been marked as not applicable, as explained in the previous sub-indicator there is no policing function to investigate corruption and organised crime within the Armed Forces, and thus it is not possible to asses this function’s independence as it is non-existent [1,2].

There is a directorate of counter-violent extremism and organised crime within the National Policing Service. [1] While this unit is authorised to work on issues all over the country including issues in the defence sector, there are limits in the Kenya Defence Forces Act that may limit investigation as well as arrests of members of KDF. [2] This is largely because KDF has its own Directorate of Military Prosecutions and military police who are mandated by the Act to investigate, report and enforce legal processes and arrests within defence as well as procedures of trial under the court martial system.

The military police can, under section 150 of the Defence Forces Act, report and investigate offences under Part VI of the act which includes corruption related offences. [2] However, according to section 124 sub-section (2) of the Defence Forces Act all corruption related offences, are only convicted under the Anti-Corruption Act and any other laws such as public procurement and disposal of public property. These offences are only triable in civil courts. There is however limited evidence where the military police or the civilian police have investigated corruption or organised crime related activities in the defence sector.

The Kenya Defence Force has an independent Director of Military Prosecution (DMP) established under section 213 of by the Kenya Defence Force Act. [1] The DMP is appointed by the Defence Council and is established within the Defence Forces. The DMP has the power to direct military police to investigate any information or allegation of criminal conduct and prosecute without consent of any person or authority. These powers can, according to the act be exercised without direction or control of any person or authority. There is limited information, however, of the financial independence of the DMP considering that it is within the Defence Forces.

There is no evidence that can be used to determine the effectiveness of the Director of Military Prosecution (DMP) on investigating corruption and organised crime within the defence services. Past instances indicate that the DMP has not initiated any investigations into known cases of corruption in the defence sector. For instance, in the 2016/17 financial year the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) probed irregularities in one of MOD’s restricted tender award for single accommodation in one of its Garrison that had been flagged in Auditor General’s audit report. [1]

The PAC observed MOD’s use of restricted tendering, despited being defended by MOD was irregular and went against provisions of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005. In the report PAC recommended further investigations by DCI and EACC and prosecutions, if anyone was found culpable. It was not clear why despite allegations of corruption being raised by PAC why DMP did not initiate any investigations on the allegations in the first place. [1] There have been recent allegations that have been made by members of parliament through the media of corruption.

The Kosovo Parliament has a Directorate for the Investigation of Economic Crimes and Corruption which is mandated to fight organised crime and corruption in the country. This police directorate covers a wide scope, including the defence sector [1]. However, there is no specialised directorate or unit in Parliament which is responsible for investigating corruption and organised crime within the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces [2].
Meanwhile, the Kosovo Security Forces Police within the Ministry of Defence is tasked with detecting and preventing offences and criminal activities within the Kosovo Security Forces and the Ministry of Defence [3]. Its authority extends to members and civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces, as well as to other personnel in the Defence sector [4]. This Police implements requests from courts relating to the members of the Kosovo Security Forces [5]. It also supports the Parliament on investigations involving members of the Ministry of Defence of the Kosovo Security Forces [6]. However, other investigations are conducted by the Parliament and, if necessary, with the support of the Police [5].

From 2018 to the present, opposition parties in Kosovo have expressed criticism through media articles towards the management of the Parliament’s Directorate for the Investigation of Economic Crimes and Corruption, claiming that this Directorate itself has been involved in corruption and organised crime [1]. Moreover, there is criticism that the relevant police directory is under political influence of ruling political parties in Kosovo and the acting Government itself [2, 3]. Furthermore, Civil Society Organisations have also criticised Parliament and justice institutions for being politically influenced in fighting corruption and organised crime in Kosovo [4]. Therefore, research reports from Civil Society Organisations suggest that the Parliament should undergo a thorough vetting process [4].

There is no proof that police mechanisms, including the Parliament’s Directorate for the Investigation of Economic Crimes and Corruption, is politically influenced when investigating any case of corruption or organised crime in the defence sector in Kosovo [1]. However, some of Kosovo’s high profile politicians, including the previous Prime Minister of Kosovo [2], the former Speaker of the Kosovo Assembly [3], the Chief State Prosecutor [4] and others majorly criticised a prosecutor investigating the case known as “Veterans” for the registration process of the 1999 War Veterans of the Kosovo Liberation Army [5]. In his resignation letter, the prosecutor mentioned that he came under pressure and was being threatened directly by the Chief State Prosecutor [6]. Investigations of this case are ongoing, and in June 2019, the Basic Court in Prishtina indicted the acting Minister of Defence, the former Deputy Minister of Defence, as well as other figures [5].

There is no unit in the military or the police whose sole job is to fight organised crime or corruption within these institutions, both officials and an activist who lectures at these ministries often said (1, 2, 3 and 4). These institutions simply rely on the performance evaluation reports each supervisor writes about his subordinates (as ordained by article 55 of Law. 32 of 1967 for military affairs (5) and 52 of Law. 23 of 1968 for police affairs (6)) and on tips from whistleblowers, coming in independently or through the ACA. The problem is there is no clear criteria that decides which violation requires the involvement of the military courts.

These organisations depend on military prosecutors to investigate when such allegations of misconduct arise (7). The fact that there is not a specific unit for these crimes should not be seen as a shortcoming in this case for one reason: Kuwait has a fairly low crime rate, so it is not suprising that these organisations have not created a unit to fight a problem that does not truly exist. The fact that they have annual reviews, an internal reporting system, prosecution and courts for all kinds of misconduct, which legally covers organised crime, is enough to say that there is institutional awareness of the risk of organised crime and corruption penetrating their bodies.

The military prosecution, as a department, works separately, so its officers are not likely to personally know the officers whose conduct they will be investigating (unless those officers are from the same department) but they are not independent since they are carried out by the military prosecution, whose leaders are appointed by the Defence Minister and whose budget is also controlled by the Minister (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). Article 27 of the military law (6) and 24 of the police law (7) give these ministers complete control over the funds of the organisation and his commands cannot be challenged by anyone or any group within the organisation, so the top leadership can interfere with their budget.

The Defence Minister is also usually someone from the royal family, which makes this agency particularly likely to be politically influenced by the Emir and other important executive officials (2, 3, 4 and 5).

There is the KNG (8), another security agency which is meant to aid the police and the military and falls under the control of the SDC, which is headed by the Prime Minister, according to Law. no 2 of 1967 for the KNG. The head of the KNG sets the rules of the organisation, but they usually tend to copy the procedures in the military law. The law of the organisation is not available to the public, media or researchers. There appears to be no investigations or prosecutions in the KNG.

Cases of corruption are investigated but they almost never result in prosecutions, and the investigation is always superficial, officials and activists said (1, 2, 3 and 4). Investigators either do not demand or do not receive data needed for convictions, and hearings often get postponed until the case loses public attention and is subsequently closed without resolution. Cases of organised crime within the institution are rare and so are investigations into such matters.

With regards to the KNG, as mentioned above, the law of the organisation is not available to the public, media or researchers and there appears to be no investigations or prosecutions in the KNG.

The KNAB or the CCPB is the main government institution charged with investigating serious crimes, which it has done with success recognised in international anti-corruption circles. [1] It is responsible for investigating corruption in the public sector including defence. The Defence Intelligence and Security Service partially covers issues related to organised crime in the sector. The Division of Economic crime prevention under the State police Main Criminal police section is in charge of combating organised crime. There is cooperation between different state security institutions, including the Military police, Security police and others. [2] There is also strong inter-departmental and inter-institutional cooperation and information is transmitted between them. [3]

KNAB is an independent public administration institution under the supervision of the Cabinet of Ministers. The supervision is executed by the Prime Minister. It is limited to the control of lawfulness of decisions. KNAB is also a pre-trial investigatory body and has traditional police powers. [1] At the same time, the mentioned functions are carried out by the MOD Audit and Inspection Department General Inspectorate and the National Armed Forces Military Police, whose activities are appreciated. [2]

The KNAB or the CCPB is the main government institution charged with investigating serious crimes, which it has done with success recognised in international anti-corruption circles. [1]

The LAF’s Military Police is responsible for internal policing. It is tasked with controlling and reporting violations in addition to providing support for combat units and the military judiciary (1). Though research found no specific unit solely responsible for anti-corruption and organized crime within the LAF, the Military Police monitors law violations committed by military personnel including corruption (2). Article 105 of the Code of Military Justice categorizes bribery as a criminal offence (3). For example, State Commissioner to the Military Court Judge Peter Germanos, issued a warrant for the Military Police and other investigative units in other security institutions to inform him of any bribes paid for military or security personnel on the subject of drilling artesian wells. (4) The LAF’s Directorate of Orientation confirmed the Military Police’s internal role in investigating violations, including corruption (5).

The Military Police operates under the instructions of the LAF Command and the military prosecution. Thus, the Military Police’s findings will be reported back to the military judiciary (1). However, the government feels that Military Intelligence plays an effective role against corruption and organized crime inside the military as well as countrywide. The Military Police is not an independent body, they report to military prosecutors who are designated civilian judges, who are expected to act independently from the LAF administration (2).

Military Police activities, outside the defence sector, are mentioned in the news (1). Announcements of the prosecutions’ results are eventually published (2). Nevertheless, the research found no information about undue political influence. It is also not possible to check the proportion of the cases that are investigated are eventually prosecuted due to a lack of information (3). However, a source indicated that the Military Police investigate violations efficiently (4).

The policing function to investigate corruption and organised crime exists. The Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau has five investigation boards for serious criminal offences and organised crime [1]. The General Prosecutor’s Office established the Division of Fight against Organised Crime [2] and the Special Investigation Services of the Republic of Lithuania [3] to carry out operational activities, and detect and disclose corruption-related offences. All those institutions are capable and do investigate corruption in different sectors, including in the defence sector. The Special Investigation Service has investigated and analysed corruption-related issues in defence sector and provided recommendations for the Ministry of Defence [4]. Based on article 249 of the Criminal Code, the General Prosecutor’s Office started one pre-trial investigations in 2017 and two in 2018 [5]. Courts analysed eight criminal cases of this kind in 2017 and five in 2018 (5). There is no specific information about cases relating to defence sector, however there is no evidence that the defence sector is excluded from these investigations.

The Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau is a specialised institution of the Lithuanian Police Department under the Ministry of the Interior. The Police Department is established, reorganised and liquidated by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania [1]. The General Prosecutor’s Office and the Special Investigation Services (key policing institutions with regard to the defence system) are accountable to the Lithuanian Parliament, but their functions are independent and are not directly influenced by military officials or the executive. All of them are capable and do investigate corruption in different sectors, including in the defence sector.

Generally, cases investigated by the institutions mentioned in question 20A undergo formal procedures. However, there was alleged influence to take certain decisions amongst the personnel of those institutions. For example, last year, one former official of the Special Investigations Services claimed that he was demanded by his head of office not to start criminal investigation for one of the cases [1,2]. The chief editor of the news portal in question was investigated by the Special Investigation Service for influence in a major political corruption case [3]. Therefore, the information provided might not always be impartial.

There is a military police unit within the armed forces, although its functions beyond providing training and maintaining discipline are unclear and even the military website is not updated. [1] There is, however, an Integrity Unit which is headed by a Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) officer established in each ministry, including the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), [2] as an anti-corruption mechanism. The jurisdiction of the MACC, which has a policing function, [3] the Special Branch of the Royal Malaysian Police Force and the Crime Prevention Board extends over all sectors of the government, including defence with mandates to combat corruption and organised crime.

The MACC, [1] the Special Branch of the Royal Malaysian Police Force [2] and the Crime Prevention Board are all independent bodies and are not related to MINDEF. They are able to operate independently without external interference.

There has been no evidence of organised crime penetration in the defence sector, therefore the effectiveness of the Special Branch of the Royal Malaysian Police or the Crime Prevention Board cannot be ascertained. However, the Crime Prevention Board is seen to be proactive in investigating organised crime. On corruption, the MACC has demonstrated effective policing in numerous cases such as the reopening of the Scorpene case, [1] the investigation of numerous land swap deals, [2] or the arrests of naval officers for falsifying claims [3] [4] [5] to name a few. In fact, after the establishment of the new government, the MACC has become more effective in tackling large-scale corruption. [6] [7]

There is no unit within the national police force that deals with organised crime and corruption within defence services. The Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection comprises four main branches: the National Police, Civil Protection, National Gendarmerie, and the National Guard. The Gendarmerie and National Guard are military organisations that also come under the Ministry of Defence, severely compromising their ability to investigate the defence services. Law enforcement is the responsibility of the National Police. Police responsibilities are concentrated exclusively in urban areas, while the Gendarmerie is primarily responsible for rural areas. According to OSAC, police are poorly trained, poorly paid, and lack resources to combat crime effectively.¹
There is evidence indicating that some elements of the Malian force are undergoing training to help combat organised crime. In March 2015, 50 security officers from various regions of Mali received specialised training from UN police officers on detection techniques to counter illicit drug trafficking and transnational organised crime.² The event was hosted at the National Police Academy in Bamako. However, there is no evidence that the police can investigate the armed forces. For instance, in 2011, a colonel was arrested for allegedly embezzling approximately EUR457,000 of military funds. But it was the army rather than police that made the arrest.³ Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that the DGSE, the Malian intelligence service, have the authority to investigate and detain army officials suspected of corruption. In 2016, the DGSE arrested four senior members of the armed forces for allegedly embezzling CFA700 million of military allowances.⁴
A senior security governance professional told the assessor that the Inspector General of the armed forces has a constitutional mandate to conduct audits of irregularities within defence sector.⁷ However, the Inspector General does not publish any reports, making it very difficult to tell how effective the system of oversight is. The source told the assessor that the Inspector General reports to the Minister of Defence through the Secretary General, who himself was formerly Inspector General.⁷
The current Inspector General, Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé, was appointed in February 2018. The appointment was made by the Council of Ministers, having accepted the nomination of the Minister of Defence.⁵ ⁶ Having been a key figure in Captain Amadou Sanogo’s military junta in 2012, the appointment was highly controversial. Moreover, Dembélé was appointed a mere 15 days after a court in Bamako had lifted his probation status.⁵ ⁶ Dembélé currently stands accused of ‘passive complicity’ in the assassination in 2012 of 21 members of the red berets, a rival unit to that of Sanogo’s green berets. The trial of Sanogo and several co-defendants opened in November 2016 and is ongoing.
A defence attaché working at a foreign embassy in Bamako confirmed that there is a military judicial system.⁸ The source said he had seen soldiers arrested and tried for offences such as theft, robbery and murder, but had not come across any cases of corruption being tried.⁸ In any case, he noted that results of such investigations are rarely made public, raising questions about whether offenders have been sanctioned or not.⁸ So, both the Inspector General and the DGSE have responsibilities to police corruption within the security forces, but neither of these bodies falls within the national police force.

As indicated in 20A, there is no evidence to indicate that there is a unit within the national police force to deal with corruption within the armed forces. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.
A senior security governance professional told the assessor that the Inspector General of the armed forces has a constitutional mandate to conduct audits of irregularities within the defence sector.⁷ However, the Inspector General does not publish any reports, making it very difficult to tell how effective the system of oversight is. The source told the assessor that the Inspector General reports to the Minister of Defence through the Secretary General, who himself was formerly Inspector General.⁷
The current Inspector General, Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé, was appointed in February 2018. The appointment was made by the Council of Ministers, having accepted the nomination of the Minister of Defence.⁵ ⁷ Dembelé having been a key figure in Captain Amadou Sanogo’s military junta in 2012, the appointment was highly controversial. Moreover, Dembélé was appointed a mere 15 days after a court in Bamako had lifted his probation status.⁵ ⁷ Dembélé currently stands accused of ‘passive complicity’ in the assassination in 2012 of 21 members of the red berets, a rival unit to that of Sanogo’s green berets. The trial of Sanogo and several co-defendants opened in November 2016 and is ongoing. Making such a controversial appointment can be better understood when one considers that the president faces re-election in July/August 2018. With IBK being in a fairly weak position, the appointment of Dembélé was designed to secure the president votes from supporters of Sanogo and Dembélé.⁷ The overt political calculations in this appointment and the very sudden lifting of Dembélé’s probation status indicates how deeply politicised and non-independent the Inspector General is.

As indicated in 20A, there is no evidence to indicate that there is a unit within the national police force to deal with corruption within the armed forces. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.
A senior security governance professional told the assessor that the Inspector General of the armed forces has a constitutional mandate to conduct audits of irregularities within the defence sector.⁷ However, the Inspector General does not publish any reports, making it very difficult to tell how effective the system of oversight is. The source told the assessor that the Inspector General reports to the Minister of Defence through the Secretary General, who himself was formerly Inspector General.⁷
The current Inspector General, Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé, was appointed in February 2018. The appointment was made by the Council of Ministers, having accepted the nomination of the Minister of Defence.⁵ ⁷ Dembelé having been a key figure in Captain Amadou Sanogo’s military junta in 2012, the appointment was highly controversial. Moreover, Dembélé was appointed a mere 15 days after a court in Bamako had lifted his probation status.⁵ ⁷ Dembélé currently stands accused of ‘passive complicity’ in the assassination in 2012 of 21 members of the red berets, a rival unit to that of Sanogo’s green berets. The trial of Sanogo and several co-defendants opened in November 2016 and is ongoing. Making such a controversial appointment can be better understood when one considers that the president faces re-election in July/August 2018. With IBK being in a fairly weak position, the appointment of Dembélé was designed to secure the president votes from supporters of Sanogo and Dembélé.⁷ The overt political calculations in this appointment and the very sudden lifting of Dembélé’s probation status indicates how deeply politicised and non-independent the Inspector General is.

The newly created National Guard is an institution that is in charge of public security and is attached to the Ministry of Citizen Security and Protection. [1] It has units that deal with organised crime such as the General Intelligence Directorate [2] and the General Investigation Directorate. [3] Likewise, through the Inter-institutional Operational Coordination (a permanent and collegiate body, integrated into the National Guard and made up of representatives of SEDENA and SEMAR) optimises the functions between these and the other dependencies of the Federal Public Administration in relation to national and public security in the country. [4]

The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic has among its powers to investigate and sanction corruption and organised crime related issues of a federal nature, including those in the defence sector. [5]

The newly created National Guard and Office of the Attorney General of the Republic are autonomous entities, legally independent and possessing their own budgets. [1] [2] There are international and civil society organisations present in Mexico that exist to campaign for these entities to be functioning and independent institutions with the capacity for impartial investigation [3] without undue political influences. [4] [5] [6] However, in practice, political influence is possible and the Attorney General’s office has in the past proven highly vulnerable to political interference [7].

The ASF has indicated that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, currently the FGR, did not guarantee an effective, impartial, and transparent law enforcement due to the lag of a large number of inquiries and the prevalence of non-prosecution. [1] Specialists point out that the procurement of justice in previous Presidency was inoperative and selective. There are even reports of cases involving serious human rights violations. [2] [3]

In the case of the National Guard, its effectiveness cannot yet be assessed due to its very recent creation, however, specialists on the subject point out that the degree of penetration of corruption in the country’s security forces is high, and that more time is required to fully evaluate the performance of this new body. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Considering the above, indicating the existance of undue political influence, particuarly in cases involving the defence sector, there is significant evidence to suggest the system is not effectively investigating crimes committed by the military, and that corruption is widespread, with many investigations ending up as inconclusive.

There is a unit within the national police force that deals with organised crime and corruption, including in the defence sector. [1]

According to article 207 of the Law on the Armed Forces of Montenegro, the military police is responsible for the prevention and investigation of criminal offences in the Armed Forces. [2]

Policing functions operate independently of the defence institutions and their budget is decided by the Government, [1] while the Military Police is part of the Ministry of Defence. [2]

The Law on the Armed Forces of Montenegro prescribes the competence of the military police to carry out the activities of preventing the commission and detection of criminal offenses in the Army, finding and apprehending offenders in the Armed Forces and bringing them to the competent authorities. The Law on Military Intelligence and Security Affairs stipulates all the necessary procedures and authorities of Intelligence Directorate in the investigation process, including the obligation to cooperate with the Prosecution. [3][4][5]

Montenegro is repeatedly criticized for a lack of results in the fight against corruption and organised crime. [1] The new deputy police director and head of unit responsible for investigating organised crime and corruption is himself accused of having links with organised crime but was not prosecuted. [2] Cases are superficially investigated or not investigated at all, and even if they are prosecuted, defendants are not punished, even in the face of clear evidence. [3] The most prominent cases that failed are related to narcotics smuggling, but they did not involve the defence sector. [1][2][3][4][5][6] An investigation is ongoing for a case related to cocaine smuggling using an army ship. [7]

According to our sources, some army premises are not properly monitored and might be misused by organised crime structures. [4] However, no assessments in this area are publicly available.

No information about the effectiveness of the military police is available.

Interviewees referred to the ‘fifth office’ (5e bureau), an internal body within the military tasked with preventing  ‘influence of foreign forces’ on the Moroccan armed forces. However its mission in relation to organised crime and corruption was unclear, as was its political independence and its effectiveness (1)(2)

In the case of Mustapha Adib, the officer accused of illegally trafficking army fuel for his own benefit was initially sentenced to 18 months in prison, but did not serve his full term and was subsequently reintegrated into his functions (3)(4).

No further information was found about the scope of action and effectiveness of this Fifth Office (5)(6)(7). There is no official policing function to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services. The Fifth Office is essentially an internal military spying agency and is responsible for collecting internal military intelligence. There is no evidence that suggests that the office could be dealing with corruption or organised crime cases within the defence services. Recently, the General Directorate for National Security (DGSN) has started an internal review, which resulted in many officers being persecuted. It is not clear however if the situation is the same in the military.

Interviewees noted that, in some cases, individual involvement in trafficking conducted by military personnel was overlooked by the military and civil authorities because of the close ties between the involved persons and the King (1)(2). However, no concrete proof was provided.

In the case of Mustapha Adib – the officer accused of illegally trafficking army fuel for his own benefit – he was initially sentenced to 18 months in prison but did not serve his term and was subsequently reintegrated into his various functions (3). Observers and Mustapha Adib himself argued that the proximity between the general in charge of the region in which he was serving (general Bennani) and the King skewed the ruling, and suggests that this closeness was a reason for Mustapha Adib’s treatment being more lenient.

Interviewees noted that in some cases, individual involvement in trafficking conducted by military personnel was overlooked by the military and civil authorities because of the close ties between the individuals involved and the King (1)(2). However, no concrete proof was provided.

In the case of Mustapha Adib – the officer accused of illegally trafficking army fuel for his own benefit – he was initially sentenced to 18 months in prison but did not serve his term and was subsequently reintegrated into his various functions (3). Observers and Mustapha Adib himself argued that the proximity between the general in charge of the region in which he was serving (general Bennani) and the King skewed the ruling, and suggests that this closeness was a reason for Mustapha Adib’s treatment being more lenient. No further case was found.

According to Vice President U Myint Swe, a Transnational Crime Department was added to the Myanmar Police Force in 2005 [1]. The Bureau of Special Investigation is responsible for tackling corruption and financial crimes [2]. However, the defence sector enjoys immunity from the Anti-Corruption Law because of the 2008 Constitution [3]. There is a crime unit under the Office of the Provost Marshal. According to Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun, the Myanmar military tackles its corruption internally [4]. Theoretically, the Myanmar Police Force is responsible to the Minister of the Home Affairs and the latter is nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the military [5]. So, the Transnational Crime Department effectively does not handle organised crimes relating to the military.

Theoretically, the Myanmar Police Force is under the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs is a senior officer from the military [1]. The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services is the Supreme Commander of all armed forces [2]. Therefore, the Myanmar Police is under the command of the military. So it is very difficult for the Transnational Crime Department of the Myanmar Police Force to stand independently from the military.

Police in Yangon seized methamphetamine tablets with an estimated value of more than $100m (£64m) in an abandoned truck in 2015 [1]. Myanmar police confirmed that they seized that amount of methamphetamines, methyl fentanyl and ‘a range of other drugs, key precursor chemicals and several major illicit drug laboratories and staging areas’ [2]. The drug bust was the result of a joint operation between the Myanmar police and the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military.The operation resulted in the arrest of 33 people, including individuals from outside Myanmar [2]. Although there are performances (drugs seizure operations, trials for drug dealers, and destroying seized drugs), critics have accused elements of Myanmar’s government and the military of profiting from the trade themselves. Pro-government militias and paramilitaries are involved in the drugs trade [4]. On January 14, 2021, the Border Guard Force (BGF) in Karen State, which is under the command of the military, gave a resignation letter to the military because Major General Zaw Min Tun publicly stated that the leaders of the BGF are involved in the illegal business. However, the military and the BGF negotiated and the BGF did not resign. There was also no investigation into or prosecution against the BGF [5]. So the effectiveness is questionable.

The Royal Dutch Military Police (KMAR) investigates all reports of organised crime and corruption in the defence services and works with the Public Prosecution Service in cases of prosecution [1]. In accordance with Article 4 of the Police Act, which states the mandate of the KMAR, the KMAR must monitor ‘the performance of the police tasks for the benefit of Dutch and other armed forces, as well as international military headquarters, and with regard to persons belonging to those armed forces and headquarters’ [2]. Ministry of Defence policy documents highlight the role of the KMAR in specifically targeting integrity transgressions [3]. The KMAR registers reports in the police systems and reports directly to the Secretary General of Defence and annually to the Central Defence Integrity Organisation (COID) [3].

The Royal Dutch Military Police (KMAR) is part of the Netherlands armed forces and therefore the Secretary of Defence is responsible for its management. However, the authority over the KMAR lies with various ministries, including the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Ministry of Defence [1,2]. Therefore, though the KMAR falls under the Ministry of Defence, it operates independently from other defence services. The KMAR has tasks and mandates that, in law, are defined separately from other defence units [3]. Its budget is determined on a yearly basis and is independent from the budget allocated to the army, navy, air force and other units [4]. Following debate and amendments, the budget is adopted by Parliament as an act of law [5].

There are numerous recent examples of the military police (KMAR) formally investigating cases of alleged misconduct or accidents in the armed forces [1,2,3]. Though the intricacies of the investigation processes are not public, the KMAR conducts investigations, registers reports in police systems and passes on reports to the Public Prosecution Service for (possible) legal action [4]. Structurally, the KMAR reports directly to the Secretary General of Defence and annually to the Central Defence Integrity Organisation (COID) [5]. There is no evidence to suggest undue process or political influence over investigations. The Code of Conduct for Defence states that all officers (including in the KMAR) should not have direct contact with the media or politicians and that all communications with journalists and politicians must be pre-approved or immediately reported to superiors [6].

According to the NZDF Military Police, it maintains policing and investigative functions, including the ability to investigate criminal offending and allegations of improper behaviour. In addition, if there was an allegation of corruption or organised crime involvement in the Defence Force then this would be investigated by the Serious Fraud Office [1]. Unless the matter is referred for investigation by an external authority, the NZDF Military Police are the lead for fraud investigations for members of the Armed Forces (Investigations of fraud in respect of members of the Civil Staff or civilian contractors are referred to external investigation authorities.) The NZDF Chief Internal Auditor (CIA) is also formally tasked with providing and organising any necessary forensic support for investigations, through the newly established Audit Intelligence Unit, which is formally tasked with providing and organising any necessary forensic support for investigations. NZDF response protocols require instances of confirmed or suspected fraud to be documented and reported through appropriate channels. For example, these may include internal governance committees, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), Audit New Zealand, the Serious Fraud Office and/or the New Zealand Police, and the Public Service Commission. External agencies are engaged where necessary [2]. The Serious Fraud Office investigates corruption and treats all suspicions of corruption, whether in the private or the public sector, as matters of high priority. The National Organised Crime Group (formerly the Organised and Financial Crime Agency of New Zealand) also investigates serious and organised crime where it is alleged to have occurred.

Given the scarcity of corruption and bribery in New Zealand, and the small size of the Defence Force, there seems little reason and resources for the NZDF to maintain a policing unit solely to investigate corruption and organised crime. Information provided by the NZDF Military Police is contrasted with details provided by the source interviewed for this assessment. The source acknowledged that there is no unit within NZ Police dealing with corruption in the military, however there are units that deal with this in a general sense. Military personnel alleged to have committed offences against the Crimes Act can be investigated by NZDF Military Police or NZ Police, it is not only the legislation that determines who has jurisdiction or who should properly investigate, there are a number of factors that contribute to this decision. [3]. Within Intelligence, the New Zealand Intelligence Community has a team internally that is mandated to investigate staff to monitor the possibility of an insider threat [4, 5].

When the NZ Police investigate cases of NZDF personnel in breach of the Crimes Act, their policy relating to conflict of interests is applied [1]. The NZ Police operate within a separate appropriations sector (Justice), Minister, and Vote to that of Defence [2, 3].
Likewise, NZDF Military Police must comply with the Code of Ethics at a minimum [4]. The Provost Marshal (PM) is responsible to the Vice Chief of Defence Force for leading the organisation’s response to suspected fraudulent activity. This means the initial internal triage process to respond to the fraud. The PM must report any suspected fraud to the Serious Fraud Office or the NZ Police, as circumstances demand.[5].

According to HQ NZDF, there have been no NZDF personnel or employees investigated or prosecuted for corruption [1]. However the revelation that a number of NZDF staff were facing drug charges in 2019 does raise suspicion as supply of illicit drugs in New Zealand is often through organised crime channels, either directly or indirectly [2]. No members of Ministry of Defence staff have been prosecuted for corruption and/or had links to organised crime during the relevant period of this assessment [3]. Overall, there has been low numbers of cases in New Zealand in recent years which indicates low levels of corruption and organised crime. Where cases are raised, however, they are investigated and dealt with appropriately [4].

Internal oversight bodies of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior represent institutions that generally have the mandate to conduct audit missions that could reveal corrupt practices within security and defence forces. The Defence Ministry’s internal oversight body is called the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA/Inspection Générale des Armées) (1). It is responsible for ensuring that all relevant administrative, financial and budgetary rules and standards are applied and respected and that public resources are managed in a transparent, efficient and cost-effective manner. In turn, the Ministry of Interior has a General Inspection of Security Services (IGSS) whose mission is to control security services: the National Police, National Guard and the Civil Protection through “skills enhancement and respect for ethics” (2). The mandate of the IGSS goes beyond simple administrative control (3) (see questions 8 and 16 for details). The 2003 Military Penal Code (4) addresses corruption in article 228, which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary military police that reports to the Ministry of Defence (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up on all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (Article 48) (4).
On a broader level, to fight against organised crime and terrorism, authorities have used the High Authority for the Fight against Corruption and Assimilated Offences – HALCIA, Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT), National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF), the National Commission on the Fight against Human Trafficking (CNCLTP) (5) or the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI). However, according to the mandate of these institutions, it is unclear if they can investigate directly within security and defence institutions. It would be plausible to assume that if their findings identified the involvement of military or security personnel, they would be able to refer them to the competent authorities.
In sum, the institutional framework aimed specifically at the investigation of corruption and organised crime within the defence sector is limited. Regardless of the existence of such institutions as CENTIF and CNCLTP, it is not clear how they engage in the investigative process of organised crime within the defence sector.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which the policing functions of the SCLCT or CENTIF are subject to undue influence from top military officials or the executive. The SCLCT responds to the General Director of the National Police (Directeur général de la Police Nationale) (1). The CENTIF is an Independent administrative authority under the authority of the Minister of Finance. It has financial autonomy and the power of autonomous decision-making on matters that fall within its competence (2). The CENTIF appears to be more independent than SCLCT, yet it is unclear how independent they are from top military officials or the executive. 

Even if there may be cases of involvement of security and defence forces in corruption or organised crime investigated, they are not disclosed publicly (1). However, the 2018 interview with the Ministry of Interior revealed that recently 7 or 8 gendarmes were dismissed because of their involvement in migrant trafficking in the Agadez region. Furthermore, he underlined that under the 2015 law (2) around 200 persons were arrested and 72 were sentenced while others are still awaiting trial (3) . 
Another example reveals a case dating back to 2014. That year police officers in the passport service of the National Police had been arrested and detained at the Niamey civil prison for their involvement in passport fraud. The director of Direction de Surveillance du Territoire (DST) and his deputy were both arrested (4).
The results of the activity of institutions fighting against organised crime are visible, even though they do not reveal cases involving security and defence forces. For example, according to its annual report, in 2016, the CENTIF recorded 29 suspicious transaction reports. The processing of reports for that year, including some of those for previous years, allowed the transmission of 27 reports to the Public Prosecutor at the end of 2016 (5). According to 2016 OCRTIS statistics, there were seizes of the following: 1086 cannabis bricks, 379,226 grams of cannabis and 660 cannabis horns; 106 grams of cocaine; 248 grams of Ephedrine; 2,773,125 tablets of Diazepam; 8,157,732 tablets of Tramadol; and, 21 grams of crack cocaine. In addition to these products, OCRTIS seized 331,650 kilograms of counterfeit pharmaceuticals (6). Recently, in June 2018, the OCRTIS managed to dismantle an important network of drug traffickers which led to the seizure of two and a half tones of cannabis resin with a value of more than 4 750 000 Euros (7).
The evidence above demonstrates that the authorities are countering organised crime, but not necessarily within the defence services. In some cases (as in Agadez) the implication of security and defence personnel is revealed and cases are investigated. However, such cases are not systematically prosecuted and disclosed to the public, which may undermine the confidence of the population in the security and defence forces.   

There are systems and structures in place to deal with the infiltration of organised crime and corruption within the defence and security services. The military police investigate crimes committed by military officers. Ad hoc committees are also created to deal with issues of corruption and crimes. Following the 2015 election, a special committee was set up by the Buhari administration to investigate corruption within the defence sector. The primary responsibility for investigating financial crimes rests outside the police force it resides with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (1). EFCC is an independent agency with a mandate to investigate all financial crimes, including those which are committed by military officials. The Independent and Corrupt Practices Commission also has the mandate to investigate corrupt practices within the civil service (2).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

While evidence exists of investigations into some allegations against officers appointed by the previous administration, investigations into officers appointed by the Buhari administration have been inconclusive and has given rise to allegations of bias or partiality on the part of the Buhari administration (1). The types of cases investigated tend to involve officers appointed under a previous administration (2). When allegations arise against officers appointed by the Buhari administration, the investigating agency such as the Code of Conduct Bureau is quick to absolve individuals before any investigation takes place (1), (3).

The Ministry of the Interior and the national police are tasked with fighting organised crime and corruption in the defence sector. The Law on Internal Affairs [1], the Law on Police [2] and the Criminal Code [3] shape the legal, institutional and criminal procedures for fighting these types of crime. Within this framework, a special investigative unit was established to carry out investigations: the Organised Crime Department (OCD) of the Ministry of the Interior. This unit also covers possible cases of organised crime and corruption in the defence sector. In addition, the Military Service for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security may undertake activities to detect and prevent criminal acts in the Army, including incidences of natural resource exploitation [4]. The 2018 SDR stipulates that „The Military Police Battalion will perform all required policing tasks, including law enforcement and crime prevention within the Army and the provision of tactical military police (MP) support to Army operations at home and abroad (page 36). [5]

The Organised Crime Department acts within the institutional framework of the Ministry of the Interior. It is placed in the Central Police Services and operates under direct control of the Bureau of Public Security (BPC) and its acting Director [1]. As an institution, the MoI is independent from defence sector officials. The Department’s budget is also part of the overall Ministry of the Interior. and BPC budget [2]. There are no specific budgetary allocations for the Organised Crime Department, which questions its financial and practical independence.
Moreover, the 2018 SDR stipulates that „The Military Police Battalion will perform all required policing tasks, including law enforcement and crime prevention within the Army and the provision of tactical military police (MP) support to Army operations at home and abroad. [3]

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. Prior to 2015, a few high-profile corruption cases in the Ministry of Defence were investigated by the Organised Crime Department. The 2001 case of the Minister of Defence Ljuben Paunovski and the ‘Army of the North Macedonia Helicopters’ was investigated and effectively prosecuted. However, the case of the former Prime Minister and former Minister of Defence Vlado Buckovski was not so simply resolved. Both men were prosecuted but both were eventually acquitted. On 01 July 2013, a court in re-trial convicted the ex-politician of abuse of office [1]. Thus, only in 2013 after did the Court confirm Buckovski’s verdict. Yet, in 2016 the Supreme court annulled the verdict and the case was again returned to the retrial court [2]. Following 2015, there are no new such criminal cases, nor evidence of such crimes.

There is no specialised police unit that deals exclusively with organised crime and corruption in the defence services. The Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM) is responsible for investigating and prosecuting economic crime, including issues in the defence sector [1]. Local police units also have the capability to investigate economic crime for smaller cases. Larger or more serious cases are typically taken on by ØKOKRIM. The National Criminal Investigation Service (KRIPOS) is a national unit responsible for organised and serious crime. [2] Its role is also to assist police districts, with a special focus on technical and tactical investigation. It coordinates international police cooperation, including participation in Interpol and Europol.

ØKOKRIM is administratively governed by the National Police Directorate. Concerning prosecution of criminal offences ØKOKRIM is under authority of the Director of public prosecution [1]. As part of the “Higher Prosecuting Authority” (Den høyere påtalemyndighet), ØKOKRIM is funded by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security [2]. The budget of ØKOKRIM is thus independent of both top military officials and the Ministry of Defence.

ØKOKRIM is both a police unit and a prosecution authority. According to Section 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act prosecution authorities shall act objectively in all of their actions, including the investigation phase, when a decision to prosecute is made and a case is tried [1]. The law is aimed at forestalling undue political influence. However, there have been no recent incidents of undue influence.

Military justice in Oman falls under the senior officers of the armed forces who oversee military courts, whose jurisdiction includes defence and security sectors (1). According to Article 62 of Oman’s Basic Law, “the jurisdiction of the military courts shall be exclusively confined to military offences committed by members of the armed and security forces” (2). Military prosecutors prosecute cases against military and police officers, and the inspector general has the right to discharge police below the rank of officer, although the inspector general is not mandated to discharge soldiers below the rank of officer in the military, a power the sultan alone holds (1). According to the US State Department report on Oman’s Human Rights Practices in 2017, “there were no reports of judicial impunity involving the security forces during the year” (3). According to our resources, no police unit investigates corruption cases within the military. The only unit responsible for that is the military judiciary and the military general prosecutor (4). However, there appears to be no police capacity to investigate corruption or organised crime, in particular in the defence services.

Due to the absence of police functions, this sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as no policing functions are assessing their independence is irrelevant in this context.

As explained in sub-indicator 20A, there is no police function which oversees defence services. Rather, the defence sector oversees the police. No cases of military justice are reported on the Ministry of Defence or Royal Oman Police websites (1), (2). As highlighted above; however, top defence figures oversee the military judiciary (3), (4).

In the absence of policing functions, this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

As highlighted in sub-indicator 20A, there is no policing unit tasked within investigating corruption and organised crime within the defence sector. Information found indicates scrutiny between defence and security lies with the military judiciary led by the armed forces (1), (2), (3), (4).

There is security apparatus named “Al istkhbarat Al Askariya,”(The Military Intelligence), which is mandated to deal with crimes and corruption cases within the national forces, police and other security agencies. This institution was established in 1994 by a presidential decree issued by Arafat. In 2004, President Abbas issued an order making the institution responsible for judicial issues within military/ security. It monitors and prosecutes military personnel under the revolution law (1).

The PMI operations are subject to considerable and regular undue influence from top military officials or the executive(1). A majority of senior security officers are from Fatah party, there usually protected by their head of agencies. Moreover, different security agencies compete for resources and reputations that they may not allow investigations by PMI and rather avoid that by exerting efforts that hinder such investigations(1).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

There is no evidence that this unit has investigated cases of organised crime.

There is a Provost Marshall unit in each of the services within the AFP tasked with investigating complaints linked to administrative cases [1]. Complaints involving graft and corrupt practices are managed by the Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability of the AFP. The AFP endorses such complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, which has jurisdiction over criminal and administrative cases involving graft and corruption in the defence sector [2]. However there are cases wherein the Department of National Defence (DND) conducts its own investigations along with the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission under the Office of the President [3].

The 1987 Constitution made the Office of the Ombudsman a fiscally autonomous body [1] but, in its 2020 proposed budget, the office’s anti-corruption enforcement programme suffered the biggest cut in funds [2]. Its policing functions cannot be construed as independent since the Ombudsman is appointed by the executive and the current one has been accused of aligning himself with the interests of present and previous administrations [3, 4, 5]. Meanwhile, the Provost Marshal is not functionally independent from the military hierarchy as it is under the jurisdiction of the G1 under the Army Commanding General [6].

Undue political influence from the executive fast-tracks the investigation of cases. For example, upon receipt of a complaint from the Office of the President, the Intelligence Service of the AFP conducted a “discreet investigation” that led to the firing of military officials and trial by court martial of the Ombudsman for the military [1, 2]. Yet no formal charges have been filed in many of these cases, and some have been transferred or reappointed to other offices [3, 4].

The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau operating in Poland since 2006 is tasked with combating corruption in public and economic sector as well as combating activity against the economic interests of the state [1]. Its mandate covers all public sectors, including the defence sector. Other institutions tasked with handling military corruption and organised crime include the Military Prosecutor’s Office, the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Military Police [2, 3].

The Military Police is directly subordinate to the defence minister and has the highest level of autonomy as the service operating inside the defence sector. However, subordination does not prevent undue influence from the minister or top civilian decision-makers. The defence minister decides the budget and structure of the Military Police and can influence the number of and how resources are used for combating corruption. There were cases when Military Police operations were considered political [1, 2].
The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau is an agency directly subordinate to the prime minister and fully independent from defence decision-makers and the military. There are no reports or news articles on the undue influence of defence decision-makers or the military on its activities.

In 2017 the Military Police continued 27 criminal investigations and began 49 new corruption cases against military and civilian personnel. Fourteen indictments were filed with the court [1]. In the same year, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau started four criminal investigations in corruption cases in the defence and security sector [2]. The report does not provide sector-specific data on how many indictments were filed with the court.
Official statistics on convictions in corruption cases do not provide sector-specific data. Some convictions have been reported by the media [3]. A study of military court judgments for the years 2010 – 2015 indicates that 66% (208 out of 297) of defendants in corruption cases were convicted. However, only two (1%) of them were sentenced with a prison term, the others got either suspended prison sentence or non-prison sentence, i.e. a fine [4]. When looking at Polish courts as a whole, the number of prison sentences in cases of corruption was 9% in 2016-2017 [1].
There are no reports of undue political influence on cases at the lower or medium levels. In some high profile cases (such as corruption charges against an assistant of a former defence minister) the media speculated that his arrest was possible only after his political protector was dismissed (There are no traces of involvement of the former minister in the corrupt activities of his assistant) [5].

The Polícia Judiciária (Criminal Investigation Police) polices all non-military defence institutions and personnel [1]. It operates a Corruption Fighting National Unit as part of its structure [2]. Corruption is specified in the Penal Code and multiple legal bills [3]. Military personnel are bound by a Military Justice Code with specific provisions on corruption [4], and the Polícia Judiciária Militar (Military Criminal Investigation Police) has sole jurisdiction over those under the aegis of the Military Discipline Code (MDC) [5].

Recent years have shown stagnation in corruption-related criminal investigations [1]. According to the Ministry of Justice, the Criminal Investigation Police budget and staff have kept their levels or rose as well [2], but there is disagreement on this [3]. The police’s budget is approved as part of the Portuguese State Budget. However, the Tancos storehouse case led to the arrest of the director of the Military Criminal Investigation Police [4], and the current minister of defence was on record suggesting that the public reputation of the agency suffered as a result of the case [5]. As an organisational unit with administrative autonomy, it operates under the authority of the minister of defence. During the ongoing trial, the former director of the Military Criminal Investigation Police alleged that questions by the president left him “constrained” [6] while the president himself stated that he had never spoken to the director himself [7]. A witness during the court trial made further allegations on the role of the president [8], and an investigator went on record to state that he was ordered to commit perjury during the investigation on Tancos [8].

Corruption-related cases are notorious in Portugal for their apparent extension and long-windedness [1]. The Tancos storehouse case is the most relevant recent case involving defence institutions, having had some international coverage, [2] and questions on the viability and capacity of the Criminal Investigation Police and its military counterpart have been raised [3, 4, 5].

There is a unit within the Amir Guards that deals with, and has authority over, the armed forces. Furthermore, there is a specialized unit within the army (Military Police) responsible for investigating, arresting, and working with military personnel [1,2]. However, as there has not been any case of corruption within the military, there is no real evidence to support that the unit has the authority to arrest and investigate.

The governmental departments (e.g. the Military Police Unit) that could potentially investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence sector, are prevented from doing so through both: (1) the Armed Forces being under the control of the Emir (who has the ability to dissolve any governmental department), and (2) the mandates of potential policing units. Generally, such units are not independent [1,2].

Whilst there is no evidence of either corruption or organised crime within the defence sector, there has been a complete failure to investigate or prosecute defence personnel and institutions, as there are no policing functions in place. It has previously been established that there is little information available on the defence sector, and most of its affairs are treated as confidential, which would inevitably prevent the investigation of suspected crimes or corruption [1,2].

In the defence sector, there is a military police department that has full powers to fight all crimes in the army, including those related to corruption [1].

Another agency – the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office – is the most effective policing body that targets crime and corruption in the defence sector [2], but it formally belongs to a separate governmental body, i.e. the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation. While it operates within the defence services and is (to a significant degree) funded by the MoD, it is not part of the MoD.

If we consider the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office as the main policing body that investigates corruption and organised crime within the defence services, we may state it is independent from the MoD [1]. Military prosecutors only report to the Prosecutor’s Office. However, the Prosecutor’s Office relies on the MoD for financial-material provisions, as detailed in Articles 49 and 50 of the federal law ‘On Prosecutor’s Office’ [1].

Every year, each of the four territorial units of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office provides a report about the work done within its territorial scope [1,2]. The reports include the numbers of uncovered law violations, initiated criminal investigations and proposed legal amendments to the anti-corruption policy and other policies [1]. The Chief Military Prosecutor states that his department has succeeded in reducing the corruption level in the army, though he admits there are still lots of grand corruption cases [3]. The cases uncovered by military prosecutors are duly investigated, including those involving high-ranking officials [4]. Outside of official statistics there is neither data about the number of convicts nor about related prosecution process. The Chief Military Prosecutor reported that five generals were given criminal punishment for corruption crimes in 2016-2017, while in the first 9 months of 2017 over 2 000 corruption crimes were uncoverd and, consequently, 200 companies and individuals were charged with administrative penalty [3]. There is no evidence that there is some political pressure over the Prosecutor, but the numbers of the convicted are suspicially small.

According to our sources, there are no units that specifically investigate corruption crimes within the armed forces. However, there are religious units that preach for ethical manners within the armed forces. A regional consultant who has worked with the Saudi defence sector stated that “there is no specialized or independent policing unit dedicated to investigating corruption or organized crime within the defence services” (1). The previously mentioned, anti-corruption committee formed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in November 2017 to spearhead his wider anti-corruption campaign is the only example of scrutiny of the defence sector (2), (3) it has led to several corruption-related arrests within the country’s armed forces (4).

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no policing function that is exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime.

There are no policing function or units that are independent and well-functioning within the armed forces (1), (2).

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no policing function that is exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime.

There is no corruption investigation unit, as such, there is a complete failure to investigate (by any agency or unit) corruption even in the face of clear evidence (1), (2).

The Military Security Agency (MSA) is tasked with investigating and collecting evidence in corruption and organised crime offences [1]. Moreover, the Military Police (MP) also has a relevant role in addressing criminal aspects of corruption [2].

The MSA and the MIA are administrative bodies within the MoD, directly accountable to the minister of defence, hence their independence is disputed. The minister of defence also prescribes the execution of MP tasks and jobs, personnel authorized as MP, and the method of implementation of their competences [1].

The effectiveness of the MSA and the MP in tackling corruption and organised crime is difficult to assess due to the limited publicly available data. Media reports provide certain information on the activities of these bodies regarding the fight against corruption. Most recently, there were two joint actions by the MSA, MP and MoI, attempting to tackle corruption cases in a military hospital in Nis, as well as the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade [1, 2]. In January 2018, a colonel was arrested for abuse of office and influence-peddling [3]. These individual cases do present evidence of fight against corruption; however, do not provide a comprehensive picture of its effectiveness in the entire defence system. Moreover, in the preceding period, there is no evidence of investigating high profile corruption cases. According to their response to BCSP questionnaire, the MoD does not keep the central register on criminal complaints about offences against the official duty among the MoD and SAF representatives [4].

Internally, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) relies on its Military Police to uphold and enforce military law, order and discipline within its ranks [1]. The well-regarded Singapore Police Force (SPF) also maintains specialised units that address organised crime as well as other serious criminal activities [2]. Although Military Police operations are not disclosed publicly, there is occasional evidence made public by the government or media to suggest that the Military Police is actively enforcing SAF regulations [3]. The Military Police also maintains a dedicated unit to investigate a range of crimes, including white collar and cybercrime [4]. Whilst the military police enforces SAF regulations, servicemen arrested for criminal offences by SPF are charged in court in accordance with criminal law.
Moreover, another internal body overseeing corruption-related activities within the organisation is the MINDEF Anti-Corruption Committee (MACC), which was set up in 1997 to oversee the anti-corruption policy, framework and measures in MINDEF/SAF. The Secretariat of the MACC reports straight to Deputy Secretary (Administration), and does not have to report through the entities that it is policing. The Secretariat does its policing function by sieving out suspected cases of corruption when it conducts its screening of officers in corruption-prone appointments. Such cases, once uncovered, will be referred to CPIB for independent investigation.[5].
CPIB is formally the only agency authorised to investigate corruption offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act [6].

The Singapore Armed Forces Act has explicit provision for the enforcement of law and discipline by the Military Police [1]. However, neither its operating budget nor its funding structure has been disclosed to the public. It is not possible to acquire budget allocations for specific SAF or MINDEF organisations and units.
Regarding CPIB, which is formally the only agency authorised to investigate corruption offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, and deals with corruption cases in defence, it is fully independent form military and defence establishments. [2].

The SAF is expected to treat every member of its service personnel fairly and equally under the military justice system, regardless of race, rank or vocation, and without political interference [1, 2]. Perpetrators, including senior officers, have been put on trial and punished by the judiciary without interference [3, 4].

The South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF) Military Police Division provides a range of internal policing services, predominantly focused on security matters (VIP protection for instance). The Directorate Anti-Corruption and Anti-Fraud (DACAF) serves as a Department of Defence (DoD) investigate node that performs, among other investigative duties, forensic auditing. It provides corruption and fraud evidence to the Military Police Division. The Military Police have worked in conjunction with the Police Service Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation on corruption and crime involving (directed at) SANDF personnel.

Following the 2016 theft of weapons and materiel from the Navy Armament Depot (SANAD) in Simon’s Town. Western Cape, Military Police working alongside the Police Service Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation arrested two suspects. The 2017 armed robbery at 9 South African Infantry Battalion Base in Khayelitsha, Western Cape was similarly followed by joint Military Police and Police Service DPCI (colloquially, the ‘Hawks’) investigations leading to at least one arrest [1].

In 2017, the Military Police hosted a two-day anti-criminality seminar for the Department of Defence and Military Veterans (DoDMV), attended by 50 MPs and officers. Attendees were addressed by SANDF legal officers and private sector legal experts on aspects of financial management, compliance, good governance, accountability, and information technology controls [2].

In 2016, Military Police, working with Police Service and Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation officers arrested three officers at two bases, on charges of corruption and fraud related to maintenance and construction contract fraud [3].

Both the Military Police (and DACAF), and SAPS DPCI face budgetary constraints stemming from national budgetary difficulties. There is no clear evidence of undue political interference in military-related investigations, although the South African Government has a history of incidences of political interference on legal matters [1].

The Chief of the SANDF, General Solly Shoke, has made the “elimination” of corruption one of his stated objectives [1]. In 2018, the DACAF was responsible for the conviction of 13 general officer-rank members for corruption-related activities [2]. There is no evidence regarding undue political influence in the investigation of corruption-related crimes. It is not known if political influence has derrailed a prosecution.

The South Korean Army, Navy and Air Force each have a military police force. They are responsible for investigating crimes and corruption related to soldiers within the military system. [1]
The Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) is responsible for investigating organized crimes including drugs and cyber crime [1].

The independence of military policing functions is questionable. The military police units belong to the Army, Navy and Air Force and are commanded by them respectively. Their budgets are also allocated by each respective branch of the armed forces. [1] [2] [3] For this reason, the independence of military police has been questioned by the media because top military officials or commanders have power over military police. [4]

The effectiveness of the military policing system has been criticised by the media due to the possibility of undue influence in the decision-making process. Through multiple media reports, the Ministry of National Defence admitted that a senior soldier or commander can easily influence ongoing investigations if his or her subordinate is in charge of the case. This is because military police units belong to military operation units, which require obedience to higher authorities, under the current military police system. [1] [2] There is evidence of the undue influence that undermines the effectiveness of investigations. In December 2018, a high-ranking defence official was found guilty of unfairly excluding from the investigation a military police officer who was investigating a case involving public opinion manipulation around the 2012 South Korean presidential election. [3]

The Police Act, 2009 does not clearly state whether the police have jurisdiction to investigate corruption cases in the defence services. [1] There is also no evidence or precedence that shows the police investigating corruption in the defence sector. Further, a search of popular news websites shows no evidence of the police investigating corruption charges brought against top military commanders in the last few years. [2] For instance, the allegations against the current chief of defence forces in 2016 was not investigated by a police function in the military. [3]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicble’, because there is no policing function exercised over the defence services. The Police Act, 2009 does not clearly state whether the police have jurisdiction to investigate corruption cases in the defence services. [1] There is also no evidence or precedence that shows the police investigating corruption in the defence sector. Further, a search of popular news websites shows no evidence of the police investigating corruption charges brought against top military commanders in the last few years. [2] For instance, the allegations against the current chief of defence forces in 2016 was not investigated by a police function in the military. [3]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicble’, because there is no policing function exercised over the defence services. The Police Act, 2009 does not clearly state whether the police have jurisdiction to investigate corruption cases in the defence services. [1] There is also no evidence or precedence that shows the police investigating corruption in the defence sector. Further, a search of popular news websites shows no evidence of the police investigating corruption charges brought against top military commanders in the last few years. [2] For instance, the allegations against the current chief of defence forces in 2016 was not investigated by a police function in the military. [3]

There is no specific anticorruption policy for the defence sector in Spain. However, as mentioned previously, the special prosecutor against corruption and organised crime develops investigations on economic crimes or other crimes committed by public officials in the exercise of their positions related to the phenomenon of corruption [1], which includes those in the defence sector. In addition, the Organic Law 12/1995 includes the assumptions constituting the crime of smuggling the export of defence material or dual-use material [2] that were already considered contraband by virtue of the provisions of Organic Law 3/1992 [3]. There is also a specialised judicial police force working specifically on anticorruption [4].

Policing functions on anticorruption are partially independent. This is because although the special prosecutor against corruption and organised crime, which includes the defence sector, is independent, the Code for the Fight against Fraud and Corruption in Defence refers to the General Defence Intervention and the General Sub-Directorate of Accounting of the Ministry of Defence, which depend on the General Intervention of the State Administration (IGAE), but organically from the Ministry of Defence [1]. It is headed by a military official [2] and is therefore not fully independent.

There are no cases of involvement in organised crime in the defence sector. However, it has been affected over the last few years by various cases of corruption of greater or lesser magnitude that have been investigated and prosecuted. In recent years, among the various cases in the defence sector that have come to light on this issue, the DEFEX case stands out for its scope and volume in which the semi-public company, was accused of corruption in the sale of arms to Angola, Cameroon, and Saudi Arabia [1, 2].

Of lesser repercussion is the case against Lieutenant Segura, which led to his subsequent departure from the military. It involved the possible existence of a parallel accounting in the Spanish Army [3]. Another instance was the case of the sale of arms to the extreme right of a colonel of the Civil Guard [4].

The Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office and specialised units of the security forces in organised crime and internal affairs are leading the investigations in the main cases mentioned about the legitimacy of some of the Spanish arms exports in recent years, reaching King Emeritus Juan Carlos, recently accused of corruption for his intermediation in public contracts between the governments of Spain and Saudi Arabia [5, 6, 7, 8]. There are some media investigations about the former Minister of Defence Pedro Morenés and the contracts received by arms companies where he had responsibilities before being appointed minister [9, 10].

All the cases have been prosecuted [11, 12, 13]. Even in the case of the former head of state, since the loss of the inviolability of the King Emeritus, it is the Supreme Court of Spain that investigates possible criminal actions in which the monarch has allegedly participated in his role as an intermediary with senior leaders of other countries in the achievement of contracts for Spanish companies [14]. The government’s response in the case of the media investigation about contracts to former companies of Pedro Morenés has come after a parliamentarian’s question [15].

No policing function investigates corruption or organised crime in the defence services. An expert on Sudan’s defence sector pointed out that most Sudanese would not see ‘corruption’ or ‘organised crime’ in the defence sector as being corrupt or criminal, but simply ‘how things get done’ [1]. This only becomes a social and political problem when ‘corruption’ and ‘crime’ disproportionately harm a tribal, political or other demographic group that decides it won’t tolerate ‘how things get done’ anymore or takes action to ensure that it gets better access to the benefits of the activities. Groups or individuals who are not powerful enough to stand up for themselves will not rock the boat by ‘policing’ or in some way reporting malfeasance in the defence sector, given the risk of drawing retaliation upon themselves and their group. While the National Audit Chamber is mandated to address issues in all units of all branches of government, there is no evidence that it has engaged defence and security sector entities in its efforts to execute its mission during the last five years [2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as no such policing function exists. The influence of top military officials, including those who are members of Sudan’s transitional Sovereignty Council, is a key reason why it is unlikely that policing functions will be established to investigate corruption and organised crime in the defence services in the near future (other than the ongoing politically motivated efforts to investigate and disempower Bashir loyalists who have been ousted along with the former president). Since the establishment of the transitional Sovereignty Council, the deputy head of the Council is, and will continue to serve as, the Commander of the RSF, ‘at the center of a web of patronage, secret security deals, and political payoffs’ that he (and other powerholders who benefit from his patronage network) will prevent any policing function under the transitional government from investigating and disrupting [1]. While the National Audit Chamber is mandated to address issues in all units of all branches of government, there is no evidence that it has engaged defence and security sector entities in its efforts to execute its mission during the last five years [2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as no such policing function exists. The fact that there is no policing function over defence services’ involvement in organised crime and corruption is also related to the fact that there is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute corruption and crimes. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that numerous investigative journalism reports have now been written in globally mainstream news publications [1,2,3], citing evidence of corruption within Sudan’s gold industry, which involves and even relies on networks of commercial, armed and organised crime entities engaging in corrupt and illicit transactions and activities – and yet, no part of the Sudanese government has investigated or prosecuted cases related to this.

The ‘national anti-corruption group’ within the police [1] works towards preventing bribery and corruption, and investigates corruption offences across all government agencies. The police group consists of both civil servants and police officers, and they work through traditional methods such as information collection, interviews and analysis. Moreover, the Military Police [2] is tasked with detecting crime within the Armed Forces, and although not mentioned explicitly in their ordinance letter [3], this would include both corruption and organised crime.

Whereas the Police’s national anti-corruption group is nominally independent, the Military Police is tasked by the Armed Forces [1] [2]. Since it is a part of the military command chain, their work and/or budgets could theoretically be interfered with by the executive, although no evidence could be found that this has in occurred in practice.

Cases investigated by the Police and Military Police are prosecuted through formal processes in accordance with the Swedish Penal Code [1]. To increase accountablity, the Military Police do not have their own preliminary investigators or prosectutors, but these functions remain within the civilian police organisation and judicial system [2]. The Military Police also have their own union to protect from undue influence from the executive [3]. No cases of undue political influence over the Militry Police have been reported during the studied time period.

In the Swiss Federal system, policing is the main responsibility of the cantons. There is only a small Federal Police Force that focuses on serious and complex crime like organized crime, international criminal enterprises or terrorism. It also provides policing infrastructure [1]. The Federal Office of Police (Fedpol) does not have a specialized department to deal with organized crime and corruption in the military. However, it does work on corruption and specifically points out the relevant interlocutors and the whistleblowing platform with regards to corruption in the federal administration [2]. The military penal code also contains corruption specific rules on active and passive bribery and unfaithful business management (Section 9) [3]. There is a unit within the military police that investigates infractions of the military penal code [4]. However, organized crime remains the responsibility of the Fedpol.

Fedpol is part of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP). It is therefore independent of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) in terms of budget and structure should it investigate cases related to organized crime within the defence department [1]. The military justice system is also set up to be independent. That it follows the conscription model [2] is a contributing factor to its independence. The Office of the Attorney General is financially and administratively independent (Article 16, StBOG) [3]. However, the independence of a separate military justice system has been regularly disputed and is increasingly less common in neighbouring European states [4].

In its strategy for 2015 to 2019, as well as for the strategy 2020-2023, Fedpol listed organized crime as its first priority out of four [1, 2]. Fedpol’s Federal Criminal Police Division (Bundeskriminalpolizei) conducts criminal investigations for the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland acting as judicial police [3]. The Office of the Attorney General’s is guaranteed by law. It organizes itself and is also financially independent (Article 16 of the Strafbehördenorganisationsgesetz, StBOG) [4]. The federal structure with policing as a cantonal duty with only a few exceptions on the federal level [5] also provides an additional layer of protection from undue political influence.

For legal issues, the Military Police Command is under the jurisdiction authority of civilian prosecutors from the Local Procuratorate to investigate corruption and organised crime.

To achieve the goal of independence of investigation from military tribalism, civilian prosecutors from the Local Procuratorate, which is under the authority of the Ministry of Justice instead of the MND, coordinate agencies from both the MND and the Ministry of Justice to police corruption and organised crimes within Taiwan’s military; MND has no executive or budgetary authority over Local Procuratorates [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
The Military Police Command has its own command system, personnel, and logistics. [7] However, it operates under the command-chain of MND and dual direction of Local Procuratorates, while they work on cases involving civilian & military interactions, has led to speculations on independence and neutrality of policing [6].

For corruption and organised crime within Taiwan’s military, civilian prosecutors from the Local Procuratorate take the lead in coordinating agencies from both the MND and the Ministry of Justice to implement effective policing [1, 2].

Cases of organised crime and corruptions happening in Taiwan’s military will be prosecuted through independent legal processes after thorough legal investigations by the Investigation Bureau or the Agency Against Corruption of the Ministry of Justice [1, 2].

The joint efforts of the Investigation Bureau and the Agency Against Corruption and independent prosecutions by the Ministry of Justice without undue political influence from military chain-of-command serve as effective mechanisms to counter corruption and organised crime in Taiwan’s Armed Forces [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].

According to a senior police officer, there is a department within the national police force that deals with organised crime but not corruption. [1] The department is known as the Terrorism, Organised Crime and Extremism department, situated in the office of the Director of Criminal Investigation (DCI) at the police force headquarters. The department is also decentralised in police zones and regional offices where the heads of department are zonal crime officers and regional crime officers respectively. These departments have the authority to work on issues of organised crime in the defence sector if it occurs. This is supported by the Economic and Organized Crime Control Act 1984. [2]

The police operate independently of the bodies that they investigate and their budget is within the Ministry of home affairs, according to a senior police officer, but this could not be verified. According to the senior officer interviewed, up to now there has been no such case of organised crime in the department that connected directly to military or defence force. [1] The policing function is fully protected by law as explained above. [2] However, it is not possible to verify whether they are completely independent in practice.

A senior police officer interviewed stated that political influence cannot occur due to the ‘formal processes’ involved. This cannot be confirmed. [1] We have come across no examples of organised crime in the reporting period, a period characterised by a considerable clampdown on the media in Tanzania, so this is not surprising. [2] Tanzania has fallen precipitously on the press freedom ranking compiled by Reporters without Borders. In 2015 it was 75 out of 180 countries. In 2020 it had fallen to 124/180. [2] It therefore is very plausible that this may not be reported by the media.

In Thailand, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) is a special police force responsible for preventing, suppressing and investigating criminal cases that require special methods of investigation, including corruption or organised crime within the defence sector [1]. It was founded under the Ministry of Justice pursuant to the Ministries, Bureaus and Departments Restructuring Act, B.E.2545 (2002) in order to prevent, suppress and control serious and complex crime that causes huge damage, both economically and socially, to national security [2]. Fundamentally, the DSI was designed to be responsible for investigating special criminal cases, such as complex offences, as well as those associated with organised crime and influential people, including figures in the defence sector, and especially offences related to money laundering [3]. Examples of DSI operations on cases in the defence sector include the purchase of GT200 bomb detectors scandal [4,5] and the investigation of 2010 temple deaths during the crackdown in Bangkok on red-shirt protesters [6].

Currently, the DSI is subject to considerable undue influence from the junta leader. In 2019, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha announced that he would be directly supervising the Department of Special Investigation (DSI). His justification was that, as Prime Minister, he would oversee the handling of criminal cases by DSI officials in order to enable the DSI to perform its duties more efficiently, more quickly and with better coordination with other agencies. The Prime Minister also supervises the Royal Thai Police, with more than 230,000 law enforcement officers scattered throughout the country [1]. Prayut said he decided to supervise the National Police Force and head up the Police Commission in lieu of his deputy, General Prawit Wongsuwan, because he has concerns over Prawit’s health. He noted that he would screen promotions of both senior military and police officers that were nominated by their agencies in order to ensure suitability [2]. This decision-making clearly shows his attempts to interfere with DSI operations.

In 2018, the DSI alleged that distributors deceived government agencies into buying GT200 bomb detectors but made no mention of whether any government officials were involved, even though the scandal was heavily questioned by the acting deputy spokesman of the Pheu Thai party due to the procurement of overpriced detectors, which were found to be useless [1,2]. Another example is the case of the 2010 temple deaths. After Phayao Akahart, who lost her daughter Kamolkate (a volunteer nurse killed by military fire while helping wounded people at the monastery), followed up the case in 2018, the DSI insisted that the case had not been closed [3]. However, the case was dismissed in 2019 citing a lack of witnesses, even though Phayao insisted that there is sufficient evidence, such as numerous witnesses, video recordings, photos and military-issued bullet casings found at the scene, which she said prove that soldiers carried out the attack [4].

According to our sources, there is a specialised unit within the armed forces, under the general inspector supervision that has the capacity to investigate corruption and ethical crimes within the armed forces (1,2). The Ministry of Defence contains a General Inspectorate which reports breaches of general discipline and carries out all surveys or special assignments expressly entrusted to it (Article 8 decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the organisation of the Ministry of Defence). The General Inspectorate can investigate corruption cases (3). There is no mention of a specific unit tasked with investigating corruption within the defence services.

According to our sources, these units are not financially independent and are headed by the executive of the MoD (Minister). Therefore, it is possible that there is political interference in the work of the General Inspector and his unit (1,2). The General Inspectorate is placed under the authority of the Minister of Defence (3), so its independence is questionable. However, there are no media reports or NGO reports mentioning any undue influence over the work of this entity (4).

According to our sources, there are superficial hearings and investigations yet, there is a low likelihood of cases within the armed forces leading to prosecution even in the face of evidence. There are rare cases that have been seriously investigated that could attract public attention (e.g. smuggling crimes.) (1,2)

The Turkish military has a City Military Police Command directly attached to the Garrison Commander, the most senior commander in any given city. The primary purpose of the military police is to assist law enforcement forces and civilian prosecutors/judges in their crime-related investigations and to maintain military discipline in that particular city. According to Interviewee 5, the Turkish military police is a strong institution working to keep military personnel clean in criminal terms, with a strong influence on policing functions within the military [1]. According to Articles 91, 92, 93 and 94 of the Turkish Military Interior Service Act [2], military police units have a mandate to exercise policing authority over defence forces in a very limited fashion, merely as law enforcement units, to help the prosecutors and judges. These units have no independent legal investigation and trial system. This means that military police units are not authorised to focus on issues of corruption/fraud/waste, etc. within the defence forces by themselves.

As noted in 20A, although a policing function exists, they have no mandate over defence institutions, as such this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Interviewee 5 noted that the Turkish General Staff has a Legal Consultancy and Prosecution Office, which works very closely with the Military Police and the civilian law enforcement forces and courts [1]. As stated in Article 91 of the Turkish Military Interior Service Act, the military police HQ in every city in Turkey is directly attached to the highest command in that particular city [2], meaning that the military police force in the Turkish military operates under a strict chain of command and has no professional independence and has no independent role in law-enforcement and legal investigations. With regards to the Military Police’s budget, it is an item within the general defense budget, meaning that the military police budget cannot be amended by the executive or government if they wanted to exert their influence.

As noted in 20A, although a policing function exists, they have no mandate over defence institutions, as such this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. The articles between 91 and 98 in the Turkish Military Internal Service Act [1] define the roles, responsibilities of the military police. According to these articles, the military police is unable to investigate corruption and integrity related cases and that investigation and prosecutions lie with civilian authorities. It should be noted that the civilian prosecution offices and courts are in charge of the legal processes of the military personnel and that the military police therefore only plays the role of a law enforcement force to maintain discipline and order in military facilities and units, meaning that the military police is unable to investigate such cases and that investigation and prosecutions lie with civilian authorities.

No unit investigates corruption in the military police, soldiers and other members in the defence and security sector. The Police Professional Standards Unit (PSU) exists, but it is only for police officers. The unit recorded more than 4,558 cases against police officers between 2018 and 2019. At least 2,175 cases were registered last year, while 2,383 incidents were recorded in 2018. The PSU is a police unit that investigates disciplinary cases committed by police officers in the country. The unit forwards the cases to different government institutions for action [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no policing function exercised over the defence sector to investigate corruption or organised crime. The police unit does not have mandate to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no policing function exercised over the defence sector to investigate corruption or organised crime. The police unit does not have mandate to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services.

There are three authorities authorised to combat corruption and organized crime within the defence service: the Military Law-Enforcement Service [1], Security Service of Ukraine [2] and the NABU [3, 4].

There are reasons to doubt the independence of the Security Service of Ukraine [1] since the Security Service of Ukraine is under the control of the president and the president appoints as well as dismisses the head of the service [2]. The direct management of the Military Law-Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces is carried out by the Main Directorate of the Law Enforcement Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine [3] and not by the chief of general staff or the minister of defence. However, there is a lack of evidence of its de-facto dependence. At the same time, there is evidence of NABU’s independence due to its institutional independence, no subordination to the government (NABU is accountable to the VRU) as well as the special procedure for the competitive selection of the director of the NABU [4]. The Security Service of Ukraine and the NABU are funded independently (they have separate lines in the state budget), but the Military Law-Enforcement Service is funded from the funds allocated to the MOD [5, 3].
The State Bureau of Investigation was launched in November 2018 [7]. It is partially involved in the counteraction of corruption in defence as only a small amount of individuals fall under its scrutiny according to the law [8]. The SBI already started several investigations concerning the State Border Guard Service [9] and AFU officers [10]. As of March 2019, the State Bureau of Investigation had submitted to the court 510 proceedings with 14 individuals being convicted [11].

There is no strong evidence of undue political influence on the NABU; it investigates cases of high ranking military officers being involved in corruption [1]. The SAPO prosecutes those cases, but its head was recently accused of corruption [2]. There are also reasons to doubt the effectiveness of the Prosecutor’s Office (prosecuting all cases including corruption cases which are not under NABU and SAPO competence) and Security Service of Ukraine since there is evidence of them being under undue political influence [3, 4]. There is no strong evidence of the Military Law-Enforcement Service being under undue political influence, but there are reports that the Military Law-Enforcement Service lacks powers to effectively carry out its duties [5]. At the same time, there is a draft law under consideration aiming at turning the Military Law-Enforcement Service to the Military Police with sufficient powers [6].

There are no policing functions to investigate organised crime within the defence sector. As previously explained, the defence sector has its jurisdiction and regulations according to Article 120 of the Emirati Constitution (1). Additionally, there have been some official statements about the government’s intention to establish an anti-corruption unit, which would be part of the Ministry of Defence, which would investigate corruption. It also aims to addresses deficiencies within the legislative framework to strengthen the defence sector and lead to a reduction in the number of corruption-related crimes (2), (3).

There are no police functions that oversee the defence services. Due to the absence of police functions, this sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable. (1)

There are no police functions that oversee the defence services. Due to the absence of police functions, this sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable. (1)

The mandate of the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) includes dealing with organised crime and corruption in the defence services. One the ‘core capabilities’ that the MDP is required to maintain is ‘Core Capability 4: the prevention, investigation and detection of fraud and corruption and the theft of or criminal damage to key defence equipment and assets’ [1, 2]. Single Service policing agencies also exist and perform the same function.

In its enforcement of the criminal law and to maintain the peace, the MDP operates ‘independently of political or departmental control’ [1]. Furthermore, ‘the MoD Police Committee is appointed by the Secretary of State for Defence and provides an independent scrutiny that the MDP is delivering policing services in accordance with the MDP Act’ [1].

For FY20/21, the MDP’s budget is £156.6 million for policing the UK Defence Estate and the MDP receives its funding as part of the MOD budget [2]. There is no evidence of the MDP’s budget being interferred with during the financial year, however, there are some concerns that the Government Spending Review could lead to budget cuts for policing services. [3]

MOD Police have jurisdiction over Service and civilian MoD employed personnel, and conduct prosecutions through the civilian justice system, all subject to the usual rigour in terms of political influence [1]. 

MoD Police Committee Annual Reports include the number of “corrupt practice” complaint allegations it receives [2]. These are usually less than five, and often zero. There is no other public reporting on fraud or corruption in the MOD police committee report. There is at least one recent high profile example of prosecution, showing that prosecutions do take place [3]. Court martial and prosecution outcomes are public [4]. Finally, the Government’s Counter Fraud Function publishes information on reported levels of fraud per ministry, which can shed light on the effectiveness of counter-fraud measures and policing. In 2019-20, the MoD had the highest figure of detected fraud, amounting to £172.4m [5].

The Defense Criminal Investigative Service is the civilian federal law enforcement agency mandated to investigate matters relating to the DoD, including public corruption [1].

Each branch of the Armed Forces also has its own police force. Within the Army Criminal Investigation Command, there is the Major Procurement Fraud Unit, which investigates fraud and corruption within the Army’s major acquisition programmes [2]. In the Marines, the Criminal Investigation Division does not include corruption in its mission statement [3].The Naval Criminal Investigation Service does not mention corruption, but it does touch on bribery and conflicts of interest [4]. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigates corruption relating to the contracting process [5]. None of the aforementioned units, however, are mandated to address organised crime.

The DCIS website and various media articles show a variety of cases undertaken by the DCIS and the respective service police forces [1,2,3,4]. DoD Instruction 5505.03 states that ‘Commanders not assigned to the DCIOs shall not impede or interfere with investigations or investigative techniques deemed appropriate by the DCIOs’, thus ensuring the independence of any Defense Criminal Investigation Organisation (DCIO) [5]. Given that the DCIS is a programme of the Office of Inspector General, which as a statutory IG is protected by law, it would seem that the DCIS budget would be protected from interference and its activities protected from undue influence [6].

Between FY 2015 and FY 2019, the DCIS closed 304 cases related to public corruption [1]. In FY 2017, for example, the DCIS conducted public corruption investigations which resulted in 31 criminal charges and 30 convictions. These investigations resulted in the total recovery of over $16 million and the debarment of 29 entites from government contracting [2]. The DCIS was similarly effective in FY 2018, with 32 criminal charges, the recovery of $25.4 million and the debarment of 29 entities from government contracting [3].

Within the armed forces, there is no policing body in charge of investigating corruption cases or the involvement of military officers in organised crime activities. Similarly, there is no body within law enforcement to investigate corrupt conduct within the police forces. The internal controls of the police and the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) are the only entities that could exercise policing functions in the event of allegations of the involvement of officers in organised crime activities or corruption practices. However, these bodies are not constituted as independent police bodies with the specific function of investigating corruption and organised crime within the security services [1, 2].

The Police Performance Control Inspectorate, the Police Deviations Investigations Office, and the Police Disciplinary Council monitor and punish behaviour including corruption and involvement in crime on the part of officers, according to the Police Service Statute Law [3]. The Police Performance Control Inspectorate has no autonomous functions in the investigation and prevention of corruption within the police, but it is assigned the function of receiving complaints which may activate the investigative bodies, which in turn determine whether the official should be punished. The FANB is regulated by the Military Discipline Law and the Organic Code of Military Justice, which establish internal procedures for punishing officials who engage in activities related to corruption and organised crime [4]. In cases of allegations of military involvement in organised crime, disciplinary councils and military courts would be the bodies responsible for investigating and punishing such conduct.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. The internal control agencies that do have some policing functions with which to investigate cases of corruption, and the involvement of military and police personnel, are not independent. There is no policing function exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime.

Within the FANB, the opening of an investigative council depends on the executive and on military officials [1]. Civil organisations have criticized the dependence of internal controls and military justice on the executive, as well as the closed-off nature of these controls, which are limited to military officials without any external control. [2] As for the police forces, the Police Performance Control Inspectorates are attached to and directly dependent on the Ministry of the People’s Power for Interior Relations, Justice and Peace (MPPRIJP), which is part of the executive branch of power. For the most part, these internal control bodies are composed of officers and staff of the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD) [3].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. There is no policing function exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime. The internal controls of the FANB and police forces are inefficient in investigating cases of corruption within these security services. Given that these are not military or civilian bodies with the exclusive function of pursuing and investigating the involvement of FANB officials and police in these kinds of actions, these organisms have a limited range and are heavily influenced by the interests of the executive and of military commanders. As such, despite the evident involvement of both military and police officers in organised crime activities, which has been condemned by civil organisations [1, 2], these internal controls have not carried out actions that effectively address this problem [3].

While there is evidence of investigations against military and police officials initiated by the Office of the Public Prosecutor, there is no information available on the details of the investigations or their prosecutions [4].

The Zimbabwe Republic Police has specialised units to combat different kinds of crimes; collaboration between the units can cover most forms of organised crimes. However, due to the political influence of the military, the police may only be able to deal with organised crime in cases not involving top military commanders [1]. Zimbabwe has military police that is responsible for dealing with all sorts of offences. However, there is no specialised unit dealing with organised crime in the defence forces. Most crimes are dealt with on the ordinary criminal justice system or the military court-martial system, which deals with the rest of the crimes within the defence forces [2].

The military police unit exercises its functions relatively independently of other units within the military. However, their reach cannot extend to senior officers and the military command, given their political power and influence [1]. The military command influences cases that are brought before the courts, and they can exercise undue influence on the determination or prosecution of cases via court-martial [2].

This indicator is marked “Not Applicable” as there is no policing function in the defence sector addressing corruption and organised crime. The outcomes of cases that are internally investigated are influenced by favouritism, bribery and personal relations [1]. For example, an individual who is supposed to be expelled from service can end up getting a month’s salary docked as a fine or a lesser sanction [2].

Country Sort by Country 20a. Existence of policing function Sort By Subindicator 20b. Independence Sort By Subindicator 20c. Effectiveness Sort By Subindicator
Albania 100 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Algeria 50 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Angola 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Argentina 0 / 100 NA NA
Armenia 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Australia 75 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Azerbaijan 50 / 100 25 / 100 NEI
Bahrain 0 / 100 NA NA
Bangladesh 0 / 100 NA NA
Belgium 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Botswana 100 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Brazil 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 NA NA
Cameroon 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Canada 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Chile 0 / 100 NA NA
China 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Colombia 100 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Denmark 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Egypt 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Finland 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
France 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Germany 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Ghana 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Greece 50 / 100 NEI 50 / 100
Hungary 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
India 75 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Indonesia 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Iran 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Israel 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Italy 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Japan 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 NA NA
Kenya 100 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Kosovo 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Kuwait 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Latvia 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Lebanon 100 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Lithuania 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Malaysia 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 NA NA
Mexico 50 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Montenegro 100 / 100 75 / 100 25 / 100
Morocco 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Myanmar 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Netherlands 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
New Zealand 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Niger 50 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Nigeria 75 / 100 NEI 50 / 100
North Macedonia 100 / 100 75 / 100 NEI
Norway 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 NA NA
Palestine 25 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Philippines 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Poland 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Portugal 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Qatar 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Russia 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA NA
Serbia 100 / 100 25 / 100 75 / 100
Singapore 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100
South Africa 75 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
South Korea 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
South Sudan 0 / 100 NA NA
Spain 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Sudan 0 / 100 NA NA
Sweden 75 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100
Switzerland 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Taiwan 75 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Tanzania 75 / 100 75 / 100 25 / 100
Thailand 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Turkey 0 / 100 NA NA
Uganda 0 / 100 NA NA
Ukraine 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA NA
United Kingdom 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
United States 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Venezuela 0 / 100 NA NA
Zimbabwe 0 / 100 0 / 100 NA

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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