In Benin, the external audit of ministries and public institutions, including defence and security institutions, is mainly carried out by the Court of Auditors [1]. This institution is responsible for monitoring the management of public finances, evaluating the performance of public administrations and ensuring the regularity, legality and efficiency of public spending. The Court of Auditors is the highest court of the State in terms of public audit. It audits the accounts and controls the management of public companies and bodies with financial participation or benefiting from public funds. It is the supreme audit institution of public finances. The Court of Auditors ensures the proper use of public funds [2]. It may, upon referral to the National Assembly, carry out all inquiries and studies relating to the use of appropriations and the use of public funds [3]. The Court of Auditors carries out its checks on the budget implementation documents sent by the Public Treasury and on the accounting documents sent by the public accountants. It carries out its audits annually [4].

The Court of Auditors is an institution of the Republic created by the Constitution [1]. It is independent of the executive and legislative powers. It is led by magistrates who are irremovable [2]. It has financial autonomy that allows it to carry out its activities. Its budget is submitted each year to the National Assembly to be voted on and included in the general budget of the State [3]. The court has a clear legal framework that establishes principles and rules that protect the court against political interference. This creates an environment where decisions are made based on technical and objective criteria. Also, the appointment of its members ensures independence, in the sense that the fixed mandates enjoyed by the members prevent arbitrary changes due to political pressure. The same goes for the autonomy enjoyed by the court, because it does not depend on other institutions or government.

The Court of Auditors shall produce an annual report in which it sets out the main observations it has made, the conclusions it has drawn and the recommendations it has made [1]. The Court of Auditors’ full annual report is published in the Official Journal and on its website [2]. The Court of Auditors was created on the occasion of the 2019 constitutional revision. Its gradual operationalization took shape over the following years. Its first annual report is therefore that of 2022. This was published on the official website of the Court of Auditors[3] in 2024, but on July 2025, it has been removed from the website and no annual report is available on the website [3].

Benin’s Ministry of Defence regularly takes into account the recommendations of the Court of Auditors [1]. The Ministerial Committee for Risk Management (CMMR) and the Ministerial Committee for Internal Audit (CMAI) monitor the implementation of audit recommendations and reforms to ensure continuous improvement of ministerial processes [2]. These committees are responsible for closely monitoring the implementation of recommendations resulting from audits carried out by the Court of Auditors. For example, if an audit reveals deficiencies in the management of supply contracts, the CMMR and the CMAI may recommend revisions to contract award procedures to ensure greater transparency and fairness. Additionally, these committees can provide specific training for staff to strengthen their skills in financial management and compliance with ethical standards.

At the end of each year, the Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes in French) evaluates the expenditure in the different sectors of the life of the State. However, in the Defence sector, it is not able to go in depth to do a real audit of the expenditure.The agents of the Court of Auditors are always told that these are expenditures that concern national security and that they cannot therefore be revealed to civil servants. [1] [2]

In practice, there is no evidence of external audit of defence expenditure, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. External control bodies such as the Court of Auditors exist but there is no evidence that they have extended their activities to the Defence sector. Every time an investigation is attempted,try audito find out more, they are met with the argument of defence secrecy [1] [2].In reality, it’s mainly to protect the undue interests of the powerful that these bodies are not authorised to carry out in-depth audits [2].

In practice, there is no evidence of external audit of defence expenditure, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable .
The reports of the Cour de la Compte des Comptes are published online on a regular basis [1], but they are not informative about the state of transparency in the Defence and security sector, simply because the Cour des Comptes is not authorized to audit this sector on a consistent basis.[2].

In practice, there is no evidence of external audit of defence expenditure, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable.
The Cour des Comptes has repeatedly called on the Ministry of Defence to allow it in-depth access, but this has always been refused .The first change we’ve been waiting for, but which still hasn’t happened, should be to open the door to the Court so that it can do its job properly [1][2].

The Court of Auditors of the Supreme Court, under Section 7 of Law No. 2003/005, has the authority to audit the budgets and expenditures of public administrations and state-owned enterprises to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. It provides advisory services, conducts external audits, monitors activities, and performspublic information duties. There is no indication that the institution lacks a mandate to review the defence sector. The 2022 annual report makes no mention of an audit of the Ministry of Defence expenditure.

To date, a proper defence audit has not yet been carried out by the Court of Auditors [1] . In practice, there is no effective and transparent external audit of military defence expenditure in Cameroon. Although this should exist, the reality is quite different. The presidentialisation of security reinforces the authority of the person holding the executive power.[2][3]

There is no effective external audit of Defence Ministry expenditure; this indicator is marked as Not Applicable. External audit reports are published; the last one was from 2022, but there is no mention of the Ministry of Defence in it.[1]

There is no external audit of defence ministry expenditure, so this indicator is marked as Not Applicable.[1] [2]

In Côte d’Ivoire, the Ministry of Defence’s expenditure is subject to external audits carried out by the Court of Auditors, an independent institution responsible for monitoring the use of public funds [1]. The Court of Auditors is governed by Articles 152 et seq. of the Constitution and by Organic Law No. 2018-979 of 27 December 2018 defining the powers, composition, organisation and functioning of the Court of Auditors [2]. There is no document attesting to the existence of an audit specifically carried out on the Ministry of Defence, but the Court of Auditors conducts audits of budget execution and publishes reports on budget execution that include defence expenditure [3][4].

The Court of Auditors of Côte d’Ivoire is legally independent from the Ministry of Defence and the executive branch [1]. It has its own budget, adopted by Parliament [2]. In addition, the Court of Auditors’ budget benefits from strong legal safeguards, imposing limits, transparency, traceability and formal approval by the legislature for any changes. [3]

There is no documentation attesting to the existence of a specific audit of the Ministry of Defence, but the Court of Auditors conducts budget performance audits and publishes reports on budget execution that include defence expenditure [1][2].

Some recommendations are taken into account by the government in general, but there is no information indicating that recommendations made on defence spending have been implemented by the Ministry of Defence [1].

Sections 84 and 85 of the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) provides for external auditing of public sector organisations including the Ministry of Defence through the Auditor General. Section 84 notes that the Auditor-General shall, within six months after the end of each financial year, examine and audit the public accounts submitted under this Act in accordance with Article 187 of the Constitution and the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584). These audits are primarily financial, although Section 13(e) allows for some performance audits (1)(2). The 2024 report by the Auditor General’s Department suggests that there are regular audits of military expenditure. The report notes in section 1811 of the report of over-expenditure to the tune of GH¢11,794 on two payment vouchers for the supply of stationery and construction materials. The report in section 1814 noted non-competitive procurement, which resulted in an expenditure of GH¢105,577.86 without alternative quotations to ensure value for money as mandated by Section 20 of the Public Procurement Act, 2016 (Act 914). (3)

Under the leadership of the Auditor General, the Audit Service operates independent of the Defence Ministry with a budget approved by Parliament similar to other public sector organisations. Although the President appoints the Auditor-General per Article 70(1)(b) of the 1992 Constitution, Article 187 (5) mandates the Auditor General to Report to Parliament thus guaranteeing its independence. (1) (2) In pursuance to Article 187 (11) and (14), the office of the Auditor General’s operational budget and expenditure are legally guaranteed under the consolidated fund, ensuring that it does not rely on discretionary government allocations, safeguarding its independence from executive control, and making it impossible to be altered during the budget year. (3)

The Audit Service publishes reports relating to key audit assignments on its website. (1) Public Access to Information from its Audit Activities are also subject to the Right to Information Act., 2019 (Act 989). (2) The reports are proactively published; however, the details are not explicitly explained with just a summarised version, as can be inferred from the Report of the Auditor-General on the Public Accounts of Ghana—Ministries, Departments, and Other Agencies for the year ended December 31, 2022. (3)

The Ministry of Defence like other public sector organisations is subject to the oversight responsibilities of the Public Accounts Committee. (1) The Ministry therefore tries to address audit findings in its practices. Section 85 (1) (b) of the Public Financial Management Act, 2016. (Act 921) makes this mandatory, as it requires the Principal Spending Officer to on an annual basis submit a report on the status of implementation of recommendations made by Parliament to the Minister and the Auditor General. (2) The 2024 report of the Auditor General raising concerns over the unearned salary paid to a beneficiary to the tune of GH¢3,957.34 tracked through the Electronic Salary Payment Voucher (ESPV) by the internal audit service recommended the recovery of the money with interest at the prevailing rate of the Bank of Ghana. The recommendation was responded to by the management of the MOD, indicating a notice served to the beneficiary for a refund. This therefore suggests that the MOD responds to some of the recommendations issued by the audit service. The report had other recommendations based on its findings, yet there was no indication from the report to affirm whether such issues were addressed or not from the report. (3)

The Auditor-General is mandated by the Constitution of Kenya, under Article 229, to audit and report on the use of public resources by all entities funded from public funds. Article 229(6) requires the Auditor-General to confirm whether public resources have been applied lawfully and effectively. The auditor is mandated to perform both performance and financial audit [1]. The mandate of the Auditor-General is further defined by the Public Audit Act, 2015. Article 229(7) of the Constitution requires the Auditor-General to audit and submit reports to Parliament [2]. The OAG should unfetter access to all government institutions. When the OAG is denied access to institutions, they write back to parliament for authority. The Ministry of Defence can also institute forensic audit [3]. While there are legal frameworks permitting such external audit activity, this has not been necessarily the case. Interview with KDF Officer in the internal audit department revealed that notwithstanding the legal powers of the OAG, this does not occur regularly. That is to say, there are regular deviation from the formalised processes [4].

While an independent audit office exists through the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG), it faces challenges in securing adequate and protected funding, particularly during periods of austerity [1]. The absence of legal safeguards that ring fences its budget, leaves it vulnerable to cuts, potentially compromising its independence and effectiveness [1]. Current fiscal constraints in the country have led to across-the-board budget reductions, impacting the OAG’s operations despite its supposed autonomy [2]. This delicate balance between fiscal responsibility and maintaining the integrity of independent oversight institutions continues to pose a significant challenge for Kenya’s governance framework [2], an issue that persists and explains the backlog in parliament, effectively impacting wider accountability.

Article 229(7) of the Constitution requires the Auditor-General to “submit to the National Assembly a report on the accounts of the National Government, and the accounts of any other public entity” within six months after each financial year. While the law mandates report debates, delays in the parliamentary process have created backlogs in addressing key findings. These legal provisions, though designed to strengthen Parliament’s oversight role and enhance public sector accountability, face challenges from bureaucratic delays and resource constraints [1].
The Auditor General’s reports, available online for public scrutiny, are also submitted to Parliament for discussion and action. While Section 172 of the Internal Audit Regulations mandates internal auditors to enforce audit recommendations, implementation remains a challenge in some cases [2].
For instance, the Kenya Ordinance Factories Corporation received qualified opinions for both June 2021 and June 2022 financial years, with the Auditor General highlighting issues such as unexplained inconsistencies in financial statements, inadequate budgetary control and performance, and unresolved matters from previous years. Similarly, the Space Agency audit report revealed several governance concerns, including the absence of an internal audit function, expired terms of service for Board Members, and delayed staff recruitment despite existing approvals [3].

Evidence from the Auditor General suggests that the Ministry does not always address audit recommendations. For example, the Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation received qualified opinions for both the June 2021 and June 2022 financial years. The Auditor General noted unresolved matters from previous years, indicating these issues had not been addressed [1, 2].

The General Auditing Commission (GAC) is external and mandated to conduct financial audits of MACs. Compared to internal audit, these external audits are designed to monitor the approved budget, match it against expenditure, and how such spending is consistent with public financial management laws. This process is carried out in a formal, in-depth manner to check for infractions and their relationship to performance. In essence, the GAC audit investigates expenditure where infractions of the law are observed. Although reports coming out of these audits have been observed to be transparent, the recommendations advanced have not been implemented because of low political will.[1][2][3] Furthermore, according to the Open Budget Index, the GAC provides adequate budget oversight with a score of 61/100.[4]

The external audit undertaken by the GAC is independent and protected by law.[1] As a matter of procedure, it reports to the Legislature with the Office of the President in copy.[2] Specifically, the audit report is submitted to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). As an independent Commission, its budgetary allocation is separate and protected by law.[3]

The GAC conducts audit by first investigating government consolidated accounts. This account is where all government transactions are generated. It later goes to individual MACs’ accounts for careful scrutiny and to be matched with the consolidated accounts. After successful external audit, the reports are presented to the relevant authority and then shared online.[1] The objective is to disseminate the report findings beyond Monrovia’s educated elites to the grassroot communities across the country. Though these reports are available, the main challenge has been the political will to implement the recommendations, some of which require prosecution of senior level government officials. [2] For full access to these audit reports, open this link for access: https://gac.gov.lr/audit-reports/ [3]. The audit report have been received by the Public Account Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. According to the Law, after review of by the Public Accounts, the reports are supposed to be forwarded tot he judiciary for action.
Despite transparency in audit reports, according to the Open Budget Index 2023, these reports should be published online within 18 months of the end of the corresponding fiscal year. Between the fiscal years addressed 2021-2023, the audit reports have been published late[4].

The findings of the GAC audit are often systematic, particularly in terms of breaches of the public financial management law.[1] However, due to the lack of prosecution, sanctions, or fines by the state against officials of the government responsible for violating the public financial management law, the breaches persist. In pursuit of one of the audit findings, an arrest warrant has been issued to a former Minister.[2] The political party to which the former minister is affiliated issues a statement of political will to implement audit reports.[3][4]
In the defence sector, the GAC has conducted audits revealing significant financial irregularities within the MoD.[5] Despite these findings, there is no indication that the MoD has taken substantive steps to implement the GAC’s recommendations. The absence of internal audit reports from the MoD and the lack of proactive engagement by parliamentary oversight committees further underscore the MoD’s failure to address audit findings.

The audit of the use of the defense budget can be carried out by the Court of Auditors, the Directorate of the Financial Investigation and Audit Brigade of the Public Treasury (DBIFA), the General State Inspectorate (IGE), the Budgetary and Financial Disciplinary Council (CDBF) and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (PAC) [1]. Several sectors have been the subject of sectoral evaluation by the Court of Auditors but the defense sector is not included [2].

External audit units report to the judicial authority. In the name of the principle of separation of power, the Court of Auditors is therefore independent of the executive power. It is therefore independent of the Ministry of Defense. It has its own budget defined by the executive but adopted by Parliament [1] [2]. Of course, his budget is not protected but generally it does not change.

The Court of Auditors publishes its reports online and are publicly available but there is no information from this audit regarding the defence sector. [1].Moreover, the annual report is published late. In 2024, only reports from previous years 2023 are available [2]. Unavailable reports are not always provided upon request

The reports are published but often late, sometimes by several years [1]. This implies that the Ministry of Defense cannot always take into account the conclusions of the reports. For the ministry, it is difficult to adopt the audit conclusions because by the time the reports are published, the context changes and the ministry considers that the recommendations are no longer relevant [2].

Two institutions are responsible for external auditing of defence expenditure: the Accounts Section of the Supreme Court (Section des comptes de la Cour Suprême or SCCS) and the Office of the Auditor General (Bureau du Vérificateur General, or BVG). The BVG, established in 2003, contribute to strengthening the control of public management by carrying out verification and evaluation missions of public policies. It makes findings relating to shortcomings, dysfunctions and irregularities, formulates related recommendations and refers facts likely to constitute offences under criminal law and budgetary and financial legislation to the judicial authorities.[1][2] Its work revolves around financial or compliance verification missions, performance evaluations, follow-up on recommendations, and public policy evaluation. Furthermore, the SCCS is responsible for reviewing the budget and settlement law (projet de loi de règlement) as received from the legislature.[3] However, in practice, neither supreme court nor the auditor seems to fully fulfill the missions conferred on them by law. No report on the defence and security sector has been published by the control and audit bodies [4][5].

Based on articles 16, 23 and 31 of Law 2021-069 on the office of the Auditor General (Bureau Du verificateur General or BVG), the auditor’s budget is not directly discussed with parliament but with the Ministry of Finance and it can only go and audit the Ministry of Defense at the request of the government and for a very specific case. The BGV has management autonomy, not financial autonomy. Its draft budget is sent to the Ministry of Finance, which approves it before incorporating it into the general State budget submitted to and voted by Parliament[1]. The auditor General is appointed and dismissed by the executive.What’smore, the BVG is not likely to conduct investigations into matters relating to national defence secrets (the scope of which is unclear); so ultimately, if the government does not activate the BVG on a particular matter relating to security spending, it cannot take matters into its own hands or investigate them. Moreoever, the Supreme Court also appears not to be independent since although being a judicial body the executive is able to remove the President of the Court without parliamentary approval, and its budget must be approved by the Ministry of Economics and Finance [4].

There is almost never an external audit of the defence and security sectors and when this is the case the reports are neither intended for the public nor made public.[1][2][3][4]

There is almost never an external audit of the defence and security sectors, and when such audits do occur, the reports are neither intended for the public nor made public,[1][2][3] with the exception of rare cases, notably the audit of arms purchases and the presidential plane.[4] In this rare case, the ministry can indeed respond to the recommendations and possibly integrate them. It has already had to do so with the orientation laws and the national RSS strategy and that of defence and security which is waiting to be validated. For the examples cited, it is a question of discussion initiated with the parliament or the actors concerned.

In Mozambique, external auditing of the Armed Forces is extremely limited. There is no supreme audit institution with a dedicated mandate over the defence sector, and the oversight carried out by the Parliamentary Committee for Defence, Security and Public Order, as well as by some civil-society organisations, remains shallow due to limited expertise and a narrow focus on defence spending rather than full performance or compliance reviews [1][2].

There is no supreme institution that carries out external audits of defence expenditure [1, 2]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There is no supreme institution that carries out external audits of defence expenditure [1, 2]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There is no supreme institution that carries out external audits of defence expenditure [1, 2]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes) serves as Niger’s highest financial oversight institution, established under Article 141 of the 2010 Constitution and governed by Law No. 2020-035 (July 30, 2020). It exercises both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional control over public finances and serves a consultative function. The Court’s principal publication—the General Public Report—audits a range of state expenditures, theoretically including defence budgets. However, in practice, systematic auditing of military expenditures remains unclear. For instance, the 2022 General Public Report provided broad insights into public finance management but did not clearly specify whether defence-related expenditures were thoroughly reviewed [1][2]. Following the July 26, 2023 military coup, the Court of Accounts was dissolved, reflecting the broader dismantling of constitutional institutions. Although it was re-established on January 2, 2025, through an ordinance formalizing its organization and powers [3], concerns about its independence remain acute. Critically, Ordinance 2024-05, adopted by the transitional authorities, exempted all defence and security expenditures from external oversight mechanisms [5]. This ordinance legally shields military budgets from audits by the Court of Accounts, the State Inspectorate General, or any other external body. As a result, even with the Court’s formal restoration, its ability to scrutinize defence spending is effectively nullified.
Prior to the coup, Niger had already shown vulnerabilities in defence financial governance. In 2020, an internal audit by the Inspector General of the Armed Forces uncovered the embezzlement of €116 million (76 billion CFA francs) in defence procurement contracts between 2014 and 2019 [4]. Yet since the coup, the situation has deteriorated significantly. Political interference, intimidation of oversight officials, and the deliberate removal of transparency mechanisms have made independent and effective auditing practically impossible. This reality is corroborated by Zhelyazkova (2024), who emphasizes that a year after the coup, Niger’s defence sector has become a “black box” characterized by corruption, opacity, and impunity [6] Moreover, SIPRI’s 2023 military expenditure data (Tian et al., 2024) shows a continued increase in Niger’s defence spending post-coup, even as transparency and accountability mechanisms have collapsed [7].

Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, both the National Audit Office (Cour des Comptes) and the State Inspectorate General (Inspection Générale d’État) operated independently from the Ministry of Defense, at least in theory. However, their actual degree of autonomy varied significantly, with structural limitations affecting their ability to conduct unbiased and effective audits of defense expenditures. The National Audit Office (Cour des Comptes) is Niger’s highest court for auditing public finances, established under Article 141 of the Constitution (2010). While it had a jurisdictional, oversight, and advisory role, there was no explicit mention of its independence in the Constitution [1][2]. The absence of a constitutional guarantee of independence raised concerns about its susceptibility to political influence and executive pressure. Despite these concerns, the Court had a degree of operational autonomy. It had its own budget [3], which theoretically provides some financial independence.Under Article 115 of the Constitution, the National Assembly (NA) had the authority to request audits of government expenditures, including defense spending. This legislative oversight mechanism could have bolstered the Court’s independence, provided it was actively used. Historically, the Court of Accounts’ reports have highlighted financial irregularities, but these findings did not always lead to accountability, suggesting limitations in enforcement power.
Following the coup of July 26, 2023, executive interference increased. On January 2, 2025, the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP) announced the restoration of the Court of Accounts after its dissolution in 2023 [4]. However, this move came with significant limitations. The Ordinance No. 2023-02 (July 28, 2023) granted the President of the CNSP direct authority over the Court’s mandate, significantly compromising its independence [4]. Given that the CNSP now controls the institutional framework, any audits of military expenditures will likely lack transparency and impartiality. In the context of the military rule, the State Inspectorate General (IGE) is likely dependent on the executive branch as well.

Despite the presence of formal oversight institutions, structural and political barriers continue to undermine the transparency and effectiveness of external audits on military expenditures. Given that existing external audit mechanisms do not directly address military spending, this indicator could be considered not applicable. However, even if such reports were produced and exposed financial scandals, it is highly likely that they would not be openly published.
A key example of this lack of transparency is the Inspector General of the Armed Forces’ report, which revealed €116 million (76 billion CFA francs) in embezzled defense funds between 2014 and 2019. This report was released unintentionally, rather than as part of a deliberate government effort to promote transparency, further highlighting the opacity surrounding military expenditures [1][2].

The Ministry of Defense in Niger has historically failed to effectively address audit findings, either ignoring them or implementing only minor procedural adjustments without substantive reforms. The 2020 audit by the Inspector General of the Armed Forces uncovered €116 million (76 billion CFA francs) in embezzled defense funds between 2014 and 2019, involving 12 companies, 48 billion CFA francs in overbilling, and 28 billion CFA francs in undelivered equipment [1]. Despite these revelations, no significant reforms were implemented, and those implicated in the scandal largely avoided prosecution [2]. Since the July 26, 2023, coup, the situation has further deteriorated. In February 2024, the transitional authorities exempted all defense-related expenditures from public procurement laws and financial oversight. This decision eliminates any requirement to respond to audit findings, effectively institutionalizing a lack of accountability [3] [4]. The reinstatement of the Court of Accounts in 2025, under CNSP control, does not restore genuine oversight, as the military regime now directly dictates the Court’s mandate, further limiting its ability to enforce corrective actions [5] . The combination of historical negligence, recent legal exemptions, and increasing political influence over auditing institutions confirms that audit findings have little to no impact on defense sector practices.

The Nigerian constitution grants the Auditor-General of the Federation (OAuGF) the mandate to audit public accounts, ministries, departments, agencies, and commissions [1]. This includes the Ministry of Defence (MOD). However, recent findings reveal that these audits are rarely conducted with the regularity and depth required, largely due to the limited cooperation of MDAs with the OAuGF [2]. When such is conducted, the Office often discover violations of the international Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS34). For instance, the OAuGF indicted about 256 MDAs for violating extant laws and spending billions of naira that were not appropriated in 2020 budget. The MDAs, including the Airforce Institute of Technology among others reportedly engaged in extra-budgetary expenditure amounting to N284bn in 2020 [3].

External audits of the MoD are performed by the Office of the Auditor-General for the Federation, which submits its reports directly to the Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly. The Auditor-General is, by law, independent and has secured tenure guaranteed by the constitution [1]. However, the OAuGF in Nigeria faces numerous challenges, including manpower shortage, inadequate funding, political interference, and limited enforcement powers [1, 2]. As a result, their effectiveness in ensuring accountability and transparency is compromised, undermining public trust and confidence in the governance system. Also, there are no legal protections in place for the OAuGF budget not to be altered during the budget year. As recently remarked by Hon. Oluwole Oke, Chairman, House of Representatives’ Committee on Public Accounts, “It is very unfortunate that we have not noticed the concerted efforts, determination to undermine the office of the auditor-general of the federation through the recent budgetary downplaying of the 2023 budgetary appropriation for the office of the auditor-general” [3]. In addition, the Office of the Auditor General of the Federation (OAuGF), are critical to integrate into executive and legislative branch discussions about defence and security oversight. They also enhance how audit reports are used by the legislative and executive branches in defence and security oversight. Currently, Auditor General reports are often submitted late, are inconsistently used in parliamentary examination of defence and security issues or are not passed swiftly to the executive branch for implementation [4]. It is also worthy of note that off-budget allocations of the defence sector create heightened risks for the mismanagement of funds which may be difficult to handle.

External auditing of MDAs is not conducted in a timely and regular manner. Although the eventual reports are published online, they are not made available within a reasonable timeline. The Nigerian government maintains a practice of auditing the accounts of its MDAs very late and publishing the audit reports years after the end of the fiscal year. The most recent Auditor General’s report is for the 2020 fiscal year which was submitted to the National Assembly in February 2024 [2]. About six months after, this is yet to be hosted on the website of the OAuGF [3].

When audit reports are not completed timely and made publicly available, performance monitoring is encumbered and implementation of suggested changes hindered. With this practice, it is almost impossible to make timely interventions on financial impropriety, corruption, misappropriation, and outright theft, as either case for concern would have gone cold, or perpetrators and their enablers would have exited the system [1]. Given the usual delay in the production of the audit report, it is safe to conclude that the ministry rarely addresses audit findings in its practices, or only incorporates minor changes. Weak auditing systems at the national security adviser’s office, the defence ministry and armed services headquarters often mean funds are diverted to private or non-military purposes [3].

Under Senegal’s Law No. 2012‑23 of December 27, 2012, which defines the organization and functions of the Cour des Comptes (Court of Auditors), the Court is responsible for the control and verification of all public accounts — this legally includes the Ministry of Armed Forces (Ministère des Forces Armées) and its allocated resources. The Cour des Comptes does review the executiion of the budget which includes defence spending but there are no report specifically on the Ministry of Defence. [1] [2]

The Cour des Comptes is independent from the Ministry of Defense, but it reports to the President who appoints its members. The Court has an annual budget allocated by Parliament as part of the national budget process, not directly controlled by the executive government. There are no explicit legal provisions clearly preventing Parliament or the executive from modifying or reducing the Court’s budget during the fiscal year. [1] [2]

Within Senegal’s police, there’s a National Economic and Financial Crime Squad (BNLCEF). Its primary mandate is fighting economic crime and financial corruption involving public officials, including defence and security forces if necessary. [1] Moreover, the Provost brigade is a specialised unit within the Gendarmerie Nationale tasked with military policing functions over military personnel, It is responsible for conducting investigations, gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses. This brigade also investigates defence services, the army etc . The Brigade prevotal (Provost Brigade) exists and operates as the internal military police, tasked with law enforcement and discipline. [2]

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. The MoD implementing recommendations of the Court des Comptes. By law, public administrations, including the Ministry of Defence, are required to respond to audit reports issued by the Cour des Comptes. [1] However, there is little evidence of policy change or enforcement based on audit findings.

The Auditor-General conducts an annual audit of the Department of Defence covering both financial and performance aspects. This includes compliance with expenditure management requirements and procurement processes as well as performance both in terms of value-for-money and the achievement of departmental performance targets [1]. The 2023/24 consolidated report by the AGSA includes explicit findings on Defence’s financial controls and programme effectiveness, showing deep and routine scrutiny [2].

The Auditor-General of South Africa is established in chapter 9 of the Constitution [1] with its independence confirmed under the Public Audit Act as subject only to the Constitution and legal framework. [2] The Act prohibits any person or organ of state from interfering with the functioning of the Auditor-General and accounts to Parliament, securing its independence from the executive. In terms of funding, the Public Audit Act allows for Auditor-General to charge for its services and as a result is entirely self-funding and in a secure financial position.

External audit reports are proactively published in departmental annual reports including detailed findings across various focus areas [1] and audit findings are reported to the relevant parliamentary committee. [2] Final audit reports are published within six months of the end of the financial year in line with legislative requirements.

The Auditor-General of South Africa has frequently expressed concern with the Department of Defence’s the slow progress in addressing and in resolving audit findings, stating that the department does not have an effective system of following up on audit findings and employees accountable. The Auditor-General found that action plans developed to address prior year audit findings were both inadequate and ineffectively implemented, resulting in recurring audit findings. [1] While Audit Action Plans are drawn up annually to address audit findings with the intent change practices, these are seemingly ineffectively implemented [2].

South Sudan has formal policies that require external auditing of public procurement and in the case of defence and security establishment. The Defence Committee of the National Legislative Assembly, National Audit Chamber, and the army inspector general’s office having such mandate in line with the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018. [1] For example, the National Audit office conducts military and defence spending audit on a formal basis but not regularly. Importantly, these audits are mostly focused on financial and compliance audits. For example in 2020, the National Audit Office flagged irregular expenditure of salary payment [2].

Although the National Audit Chamber (NAC) is constitutionally established as an independent Supreme Audit Institution under Article 186 of the Transitional Constitution [1] and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act (2011) [2], it formally reports administratively to the President and functionally to the National Legislative Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee rather than operating autonomously from the executive. Its funding is not provided through a dedicated parliamentary appropriation but folded into the executive’s overall budget, with no specific line item that the legislature must independently approve, and there are no explicit legal safeguards preventing mid year reductions or re allocation of its resources [3]. In practice, this structural reliance on executive controlled budget processes, combined with recruitment handled by the Ministry of Public Service, has left the NAC under resourced and vulnerable to political influence, thereby compromising its ability to audit sensitive defence expenditures effectively [4].

There are audit reports published online from the National Audit Chambers. These reports also include auditing done on the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs. However, the information contained is not sufficient to conclude that a thorough audit was conducted. For example, in the 2023-2024 audit plan conducted by the National Audit Chamber, only procurement of food rations by the Ministries of Interior and Defence were included [1]. This does show some effort towards transparency, but very little information is covered. The security sector in South Sudan is also facing a lot of challenges due to the ongoing conflict and sanctions [3]. These taken into consideration informs the award of 2 in this section since the National Audit Chamber has the powers to conduct and publish the audit.

The findings of external audit are not available publicly [1] and the ones that are available hardly contain any thorough audit [2]. This is further made difficult with provisions of the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011 which allow for classified audits. Section 24 (6) states that “the audit of the classified expenditures shall be done by the Auditor-General, and the classified audit report shall be reviewed by the Chairperson of the Standing Specialized Committee on Economy, Development & Finance and approved by the Speaker of the Assembly and the President.” In that case, it is difficult to determine if the audit queries are addressed in any way.

While these institutions, Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs, are mandated to ensure accountability, they are often hampered by information constraints and political interference. The parliamentary committee, despite its oversight responsibilities, struggles to access crucial data, limiting its ability to effectively scrutinise MoDVA activities. Similarly, the OAG, while constitutionally empowered to audit all government institutions, encounters obstacles due to political pressures and the opaque nature of the budget of the MoDVA[1][2]. These factors contribute to a limited transparency environment, where defence budgets and expenditures remain largely shielded from public scrutiny.

The challenges to transparency are multifaceted, encompassing the classification of information, limited disclosure, and difficulty in accessing documents. The classification of sensitive data, while sometimes necessary for national security, is often used excessively, hindering public and parliamentary oversight. Moreover, the lack of standardised definitions and the incompleteness or unreliability of expenditure records further complicate the audit process. These factors create a situation where even when audits are conducted, the findings may be incomplete or inconclusive [3].

Regarding the nature of the external audit review, it primarily consists of financial and compliance audits. The mandate of the OAG focuses on verifying the accuracy and legality of financial transactions, ensuring that expenditures are in line with approved budgets and legal frameworks. This includes checking for compliance with procurement regulations, financial management guidelines, and other relevant laws. While operational audits, which assess the efficiency and effectiveness of programmes are also within the purview of the OAG, the constraints imposed by classified information and limited access often restrict the scope of these operational reviews. Therefore, the external audit review, while attempting to be comprehensive, is largely concentrated on financial and compliance aspects due to the inherent limitations imposed by the opacity of the defence sector[4].

The Office of the Auditor General operates as a truly independent external audit authority. Under Article 163 of the 1995 Constitution and the National Audit Act (2008), its mandate and tenure are constitutionally protected, and it “shall not be under the direction or control of any person or authority” [1][2].
Its budget (successfully defended by Parliament) is also charged to the Consolidated Fund, meaning it is approved independently and protected from executive tampering during the fiscal year [2]. A recent budget cut of Shs32 billion to its operational funds triggered parliamentary scrutiny and restoration efforts, illustrating active legal protection by enabling oversight bodies [3].

The annual audit report is published online by the Auditor General. As disclosed under Note 8, a total of UGX.728Bn relates to classified expenditure. In compliance with Section 24 of the Public Finance Management Act, 2015 (Classified Expenditure), this expenditure is audited separately and a separate audit report issued [1].
Findings of the audit are made public but there are challenges with timeliness within which these are released to enable meaningful citizen engagement. The lateness results into conversations that are more of a postmortem, too late to result into much change. Also, while the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) has been successful in producing and presenting the annual reports to Parliament, the late reports often result into the recommendations made in the reports being poorly implemented.

The implementation of OAG recommendations remains a challenge across government institutions, including the defence sector. Despite formal processes in place, the extent to which audit findings translate into meaningful reforms is inconsistent. Reports indicate that many recommendations, including those related to financial management and procurement, are either partially implemented or not addressed at all, limiting the overall impact of external audits[.1]

The military defence sector financial and audits are subjected to the Auditor General Zimbabwe as is required by the Public Finance Management Act, under section 81 of the same Act [1]. This is done every year, and the findings are presented to the parliament [1]. But the auditor general office has some limitations when it comes to deal with the defence sectors, as it is a sensitive security sector [2]. The limitations include not able to access some of the information which pertains to the budget expenditures as some budget items are classified as security sensitive [2]. The audits include both financial and compliance [2].

The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) is an independent constitutional unit, established under Section 309 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, and is mandated to audit the accounts of all government ministries, public entities, and security institutions. The Auditor General’s reports are presented directly to Parliament, not the executive, ensuring that the findings are available for legislative scrutiny and public accountability [1].
The OAG also has its own budget, which is appropriated by Parliament through the national budget process rather than being controlled by the executive. Constitutional provisions and the Public Finance Management Act (2010) provide legal protections preventing the executive from arbitrarily altering the OAG’s budget during the fiscal year, further reinforcing its institutional independence [2].

However, in practice, the Auditor General faces significant challenges when auditing the defence sector. Much of the information received from the Ministry of Defence and security forces is highly aggregated, with minimal itemisation of expenditure. Requests for additional detail are often denied on the grounds of classification, making it difficult for the Auditor General to conduct a fully independent and comprehensive audit of the sector [3].
While the OAG continues to produce independent reports on most state-owned entities and ministries, the defence sector remains a major exception because the limited access and information provided prevents effective oversight.

While the Auditor General has the mandate to publish all the information pertaining to the annual audit of all state-owned institutions, and present them to parliament [1], it is difficult to publish all information with regards to the military defence because this is considered security sensitive. Presentation on the military audit is difficult to understand because some information is not provided by the defence forces because of its sensitivity [2].

The defence sector has a responsibility to respond and adhere to recommendation done by the Auditor General [1], however, this does not easily happen because military commanders resist and challenges such recommendations especially if they are deemed to speak to operational issues and expenditures which are considered a national security issue [1] [2]. The Audit Report 2021 highlights relevant issues that the MoD was unable to address: “In my 2019 audit report, I mentioned that the Ministry had not established a Procurement Management Unit (PMU) as required by Section 67(2) of the Public Finance Management. During the year under review, the PMU had not been established”, and “The Ministry did not carry out risk assessment and provide the risk profile report for audit
despite that these are annual requirements”. These examples show that the MoD fails to address audit findings or only incorporate minor changes.