There is no evidence of military involvement in areas where organized crime operates [1]. No media investigation or prosecution report provides evidence of such involvement [2]. The government seems vigilant about this risk [3].

The government is aware of the possibility of organised crime in the defence and security sector [1]. To prevent this, soldiers first undergo a morality check before taking up their duties. The Armed Forces Commissariat also monitors any possible criminal involvement [2]. The government also offers capacity building to personnel involved in the fight against organized crime. This process may include a workshop on criminal intelligence and investigations in the Republic of Benin. The objective is to strengthen national capacity to effectively combat organised crime through mock trials on strategies for investigation, prosecution and trial. In 2023, for example, Beninese actors were entitled to this training [3].

United Nations reports have already highlighted the collaboration between Burundi’s defence and security forces and rebel movements operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the trafficking of arms and minerals. The Burundian Defence and security forces supply armies to rebel movements operating on DRC soil, such as the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR, and in return, the latter facilitate access for the Burundian political and military authorities to minerals such as gold, cobalt and coltan [1] [2]. The Global Organised Crime Index highlights that state security apparatus is involved in violence and criminal activities. For example, military authorities can facilitate the trafficking of arms, gold, or other minerals. [3]

The Burundian government has always refused to comment on allegations that its army and police are involved in organizsed crime. Evidence suggest that no effort is being made at state level to stop such crimes, simply because those who should be intervening are involved in committing them. [1] [2]

In Cameroon, organised crime has somewhat infiltrated the defence sector.[1] Some officers, including soldiers, gendarmes and police forces cooperate with bandits and gangs. In several cases were groups of bandits where eventually arrested, investigations show that they had the support of a security officer connected to the army, police or gendarmerie. The security forces are also involved in arms, drugs, and human trafficking. One of such case is the interception of weapons at the Port of Douala in 2012, when arms from the U.SA. were being transferred through Cameroon to Nigeria, were intercepted at the Port of Douala in 2012. Both military and police officers were involved in facilitating this trafficking.[2] Arms trafficking to Cameroon is increasing in the political capital Yaoundé, and in the South-West, North-West, and Far North regions, which are plagued by separatist conflict and Boko Haram attacks.[3] Corruption fosters criminality that weakens the State, encourages the fluidity of bandits, and creates grey zones in Africa. The formation of a network of transactions leads to deviant behaviour involving bribes and the misappropriation of public resources.[4]

The government has been taking some actions to address the involvement of soldiers, gendarmerie, and policemen in organised crime. However, the fight against organised crime is not included in an anti-corruption policy.[1] For example, concerning the involvement of security forces in arms trafficking at the Autonomous Port of Douala, the government took disciplinary actions. A senior police inspector, a gendarme, and a commander of the Special Rapid Intervention Teams (ESIR) were dismissed due to their involvement in arms trafficking at the Autonomous Port of Douala. The then Port Commissioner was also downgraded. Small arms trafficking remains a problem in Cameroon. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union Commission noted that at least 120,000 small arms and light weapons are in illegal circulation in Cameroon, including revolvers, pistols, rifles, assault rifles and machine guns. To combat arms trafficking, the country passed a law in 2016 stating that potential gun owners could face three months to two years’ imprisonment or a fine for illegal possession of a firearm [2]. Although not all organised crimes are linked to corruption, there are cases involving soldiers in banditry, which is not classified as corruption. The fight against organised criminal activity is not included in an anti-corruption policy. According to the government newspaper Cameroon Tribune, an operation carried out from 17 to 18 October 2024 in the Adamaoua customs sector resulted in the interception of 3144 rounds of ammunition from weapons of war in a public transport bus bound for Yaoundé: 3,000 rounds of M-21 ammunition, 119 rounds of Kalashnikov ammunition, and 25 rounds of automatic pistol ammunition. A soldier suspected of being the trafficker was arrested and taken to Military Security in Yaoundé.[3][4]

In Côte d’Ivoire, cases of members of the armed forces, more specifically the gendarmerie, have been reported for their involvement in drug trafficking [1] [2]. Some reports also mention the involvement of government forces with security agents known to rent their weapons to unauthorised users and facilitate cross-border movements of weapons. [3]

The government has taken the full measure of these criminal activities and the possible collusion of the security forces in the face of such trafficking. Zero tolerance has been declared. To this end, in conjunction with the actions of the Pôle Pénal Économique et Financier (PPEF), the Abidjan Military Court is punishing all military personnel complicit in organised crime. In 2023 alone, 886 complaints and denunciations were recorded at its headquarters in Cocody-Angré. A third of these have been dealt with in full, while some are still under investigation and others have been shelved. The others have been referred to the ordinary courts for jurisdiction [1] [2] [3] .However the issue is not included in the anti corruption policy.

Notwithstanding the general perception of the GAF’s professionalism, there are instances in which criminal elements infiltrate the force. One example is the alleged conflict between Ghana’s military and other security forces around the smuggling of a few bags of cocoa beans from the country. (1) In addition, the Accra Circuit Court issued arrest warrants for a military commander accused of participating in a security services recruitment scam on July 5, 2024. According to the news source, the concerned officer gathered GHc 120,000 in order to recruit the alleged victims. (2) In a differently case, five people, including a military officer and a police officer, were accused of taking part in the theft of a black stool and other royal goods from the Anum traditional area. Following their refusal to appear in court at prior hearings, the Koforidua Circuit Court B ordered the Attorney General to formally request the release of the aforementioned officers for criminal prosecution from the Ghana Police Service and the Ghana Armed Forces on August 12, 2024. (3)
According to the Organised Crime Index 2023, Ghana has a moderate criminality score of 5.03/10, with state-embedded actors scoring 5.5/10 — indicating occasional infiltration of public institutions, including the security sector, by organised criminal networks: ” State-embedded actors within security and intelligence services, including immigration, tax, and customs administrations, and some elements of the Ghana Police Service, are reportedly implicated in facilitating drug and arms trafficking, illicit mining, and other organized criminal activities.”(4)
Although not widespread, the penetration of organised crime into the sector is corroborated by evidence. This suggests a moderate, but significant, vulnerability within the defence establishment.

Ghana has not been known for military involvement in organised crime, and the professionalism of the military has been cited as a key factor in maintaining this reputation. While the possibility of military engagement in organised crime cannot be entirely ruled out, the government’s approach appears to emphasise this improbability. Current perspectives focus primarily on addressing corruption through institutions like the Inspector General’s Department and other state institution like EOCO and the Office of the Special Prosecutor among others. However, beyond these measures, there are no clearly defined safeguards specifically aimed at preventing potential military involvement in organised crime. (1) (2) (3)

There is moderate likelihood of military involvement in sectors in which organised crime operates. There are standalone cases of KDF officers implicated in crime. In September 2023, a KDF officer was arrested for suspicion of rape and robbery [1].
There are several arrests that have been undertaken of con artists posing as KDF officials either for soliciting bribes for recruitment purposes or for sale of arms. These arrests have demonstrated the awareness of the KDF of these risks [2, 3].
Reports such as the Organized Crime Index – East Africa suggest organised crime structures—particularly in trafficking, cybercrime, and banditry—pose broader national security threats, but no clear link to institutional corruption or defence sector infiltration is made [5].

The Defence Strategy as well as the country’s leadership have acknowledged terrorism risks but have not adequately addressed the threat of organised crime penetrating the defence sector [1]. This assessment is based on historical terror threats being deemed higher risk than criminal infiltration of the security/defence sector. These threats are generally viewed as external rather than internal to the defence sector.
National defence strategies and Presidential speeches (e.g., President Ruto in 2023) emphasise responding to terrorism, transnational organised crime, cyber threats, and climate-driven insecurity [2, 3]. However, these documents frame the threats as external challenges, not as evidence of criminal infiltration into the KDF or defence procurement mechanisms.

No documented cases exist of KDF members engaging in or facilitating organised crime; neither are there policy efforts aimed at internal detection or prevention of such infiltration [4].

In 2023, the Liberia Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA), jointly with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, seized 520 kg of cocaine, valued at approximately US$100 million, the largest drug bust in Liberia’s history. The accused were arraigned but later released on technical grounds. This episode suggests potential involvement of government officials in organised crime.[1][2]
The 2023 Organised Crime Index notes Liberia’s vulnerability due to porous borders, weak institutions, and limited enforcement capacity, which makes the country a key transit point for drugs and other illicit commodities. However, there is no specific evidence linking the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) or other defence institutions to organised crime.[3]
Oversight reports and resilience assessments highlight that the primary risks stem from under-resourced enforcement bodies, such as the Liberia Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA) and customs authorities, rather than direct collusion within defence structures.[4]
Therefore, there’s no evidence of direct defence penetration, but the systemic vulnerabilities (drug transit role, weak justice, historical precedents) mean the risk isn’t “very low.

The government of Liberia launched an investigation into how drugs arrived in Liberia. In the meantime, the Ministry of Justice expressed disappointment in the non-guilty verdict delivered by the criminal court in favour of the defendants. The newspaper reports are suspicious about the role of the defence and security sector in the cocaine bust that occurred a few years ago.[1][2]
Beyond this case, Liberia recognises organised crime as a national threat (especially drug transit).[3] Still, there is no publicly available, defence-specific policy or directive that acknowledges or tackles potential collusion between organised crime and the Armed Forces of Liberia.[3]
UNODC reporting likewise highlights West Africa’s growing role in cocaine transit, reinforcing the scale of the problem the government faces. At the same time, Liberia participates in multilateral review processes (e.g., UNTOC review since 2021). These speak to general counter-crime efforts rather than targeted defence-sector safeguards.[4]

Certain elements of the armed forces are involved in highway bandit networks by renting out their service weapons. Bandits use these weapons to carry out their misdeeds. [1] Perhaps to generate additional income, some military personnel do not hesitate to rent out their weapons. This is a private initiative, not one run by the institution.[2].

Overall, the armed forces are aware of the existence of a certain level of delinquency committed by the military and have expressed their willingness to combat it but they have struggled to do so in practice[1]. The government has shown its willingness to establish internal control and risk-management systems within the armed forces, explicitly to prevent, report, and investigate misconduct but no direct mention of organised crime. [2]

There is a high probability of organised crime penetrating the area, and this has been confirmed to be the case. Indeed, accusations of involvement of members of the intelligence services in arms or drug trafficking have at times come to light. Accusations of involvement in robberies, kidnappings and other crimes have also been noted. Some cases are pending before the courts.[1][2]

The government is likely aware of and even possibly accommodates criminal penetration into the defence and security sector for various reasons. Depending on the context, certain actors of organised crime may be considered as allies of the State, and the economic and social power that they derive from their criminal activities may be one of the elements making them a useful partner for countering other actors deemed hostile to the state. Despite the government’s knowledge of the situation, it probably chooses not to address it because it considers, depending on the context, that not acting is the best option. Furthermore, there are multiple ways political corruption favours the illicit economy, including politicians involved in organised crime, security forces ordering and soldiers supplying weapons for trafficking, the failure to enforce the law, maintain order, and ensure security, or even coordination with armed groups. [1][2]

The 1st and 2nd National Survey on Governance and Corruption in the public and private sector carried out on a national scale, in all provinces and districts, and studies on the subject have shown that there is very low likelihood of military involvement in sectors in which organised crime operates [1, 2]. Unlike the Armed Forces, the Police of the Republic of Mozambique is more prone to organised crime, especially in cases related to kidnappings and hostage taking, corruption and other crimes, using firearms [3, 4]. In May 2024, in the city of Chimoio, in the Province of Manica, for the first time, this fact was recognised within the Police, by the General Commander of the Mozambican Police, who gave instructions to the special units and the various branches of the police force to discuss the causes and find solutions [4].

The government is aware of the possibility of organised crime in the defence and security sector and is in a position to take action quickly should organised criminal activity take place [1, 2]. In the city of Chimoio, in May 2024, the General Commander of the Police admitted the involvement of Mozambican agents in kidnappings, robberies and other types of organised crimes involving the use of firearms [3]. The organised crime issue is included in the anti-corruption policy, and military leaders have publicly acknowledged the risks involved [4]. There have been cases of trials of former Defence and Security Forces officers involved in criminal and corruption cases, such as the “Hidden Debts” Trial, and the case documents can be found in the Public Integrity Centre – CIP Database [5].

The extent to which organized crime has penetrated the Nigerien defense and security sector is challenging to assess. However, the scale of trafficking activities across the country suggests a likely complicity of some security and defense forces. Networks involved in smuggling migrants, human trafficking, and the illicit trade of arms and drugs, particularly along Niger’s northern borders, pose significant challenges. Analysts have identified corruption as a key facilitating factor in these activities [1]. Additionally, the growing insecurity and the persistence of trafficking networks underscore the role of corruption among security officials as a critical enabler [2]. Based on the available evidence, there is a moderate likelihood of organized crime penetration in the defense and security sector and while there is no direct confirmation, the context of widespread trafficking and corruption suggests significant vulnerabilities within the sector.

Niger faces significant challenges from transnational organizsed crime due to its strategic location at the crossroads of trafficking routes for drugs, weapons, and migrants, particularly in areas like Agadez. These activities undermine the state’s ability to uphold the rule of law, erode trust in state institutions, and fuel instability by financing armed groups and exacerbating corruption. Despite these challenges, Niger has taken steps to counter organizsed crime, albeit with varying effectiveness. Over the years, Nigerien authorities have focused on managing illicit activities rather than eradicating them entirely. The government has employed informal conflict management systems, particularly in Agadez, to mediate disputes between traffickers and prevent violence. However, similar efforts are lacking in regions like Kawar, where unresolved tensions between ethnic groups and competition for resources remain problematic [1]. The government has also previously enacted legal and institutional measures, such as the 2015 anti-migrant smuggling law, introduced under European pressure, and more recent projects, like the ECI CT Niger (Joint Investigation Team Against Terrorism in Niger) in 2022 [2]. Funded by the European Union and supported by French and Spanish security agencies, this program aims to enhance the operational capacity of Niger’s security forces to combat terrorism and cross-border organissed crime. However, while Niger’s initiatives demonstrate some progress, challenges persist. Organised crime networks continue to generate significant revenue through drug, gold, and human trafficking, often involving collaboration with corrupt officials or even state institutions [3]. Traffickers have leveraged their wealth to infiltrate politics and state structures, further complicating efforts to counter their influence. International organizations, including the UNODC, have emphasized the need for Niger and its partners to address the structural drivers of organized crime, such as poverty, unemployment, and weak governance, while avoiding measures that could exacerbate existing tensions [3].
Following the military coup on July 26, 2024, Niger’s security situation has significantly deteriorated [4], highlighting the ineffectiveness of the government’s response in maintaining stability and addressing escalating security challenges. This deterioration also reflects the growth of organizsed crime and its potential penetration into security circles.

There are some media reports indicating a degree of connivance, complicity and collusion of defence and security personnel in organised crime. For instance, a retired military official who headed a presidential investigative taskforce alleged the involvement of top military brass in terrorism financing in Nigeria. As he puts it: A syndicate, which had an extensive network in the country as well as being affiliated to an international criminal network, was at the centre of moving finances for terrorism for other criminal activities. The most worrisome aspect was that some of the individuals involved in terrorism financing of Boko Haram terrorists, and who were also involved in the procurement and movement of arms and ammunition for Boko Haram and other criminal organisations, had links with the military [1]. In the recent past, military and police officers have been arrested for supplying information, ammunition and uniforms to terrorists, bandits, and kidnappers [2,3, 4]. The former National Security Adviser, Babagana Monguno, observed that the theft of oil has grown in sophistication. For instance, the vessel MT PRAISEL was recently intercepted carrying an estimated 8,100 barrels of suspected stolen crude while being escorted out of Nigeria’s territorial waters by a naval gunboat. The naval authorities later issued a statement describing it as a misrepresentation of the facts to suggest that crude oil thieves had the backing of the agency [5]. Hence multiple allegations and proven cases of individuals’ engagement in criminal activities by members of the armed forces do suggest the penetration by organised crime into the defence and security sector.

The government is aware of the complicity of some military men with organised crime groups, and it is taking some action to curb the problem. Some of the issues are included the anti-corruption policy of the government and military leaders are making efforts to publicly address some of these challenges. At least 16 soldiers and one officer were put through the court-martial at the 3rd Amoured Division in February 2024 for various offences, ranging from armed robbery, murder, unlawful possession of arms and ammunition, and selling same, contrary to their operational mandate. Recently, the Nigerian Army sentenced a warrant officer, Danladi Shaggy, to 28 years imprisonment for stealing 3,870 rounds of 7.26 mm rounds of ammunition and an AK-47 rifle [2]. Furthermore, the Senate recently promised to embark on a constitutional amendment that would further empower the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to investigate and prosecute military officers accused of corruption and other financial crimes. This is because there are situations where a court rules that a military man cannot be investigated and prosecuted, unless he goes to a court-martial certainly runs counter to the EFCC Act [3]. The call for amendment only goes a long way to confirm that there are setbacks in government responses to the prosecution of military personnel.

There is no broad, systemic military involvement in organised crime sectors in Senegal. However, localised abuses have occurred—especially in Casamance, where soldiers may have facilitated illegal timber trade.The southern region of Casamance has long suffered from illegal rosewood trafficking, which finances both armed rebel factions (MFDC) and organized criminal network. Some Senegalese soldiers deployed in Casamance may be complicit, assisting illicit timber transit across borders—specifically through The Gambia into international market. [1] [2]

There is a commitement to fight organised crime although not speficially within the armed forces. The government is committed to tackling organised crime and progress has been made in the fight against specific criminal activities, such as timber trafficking. [1] Moroever, the government has put in place a national strategy to combat organised crime for the period 2025-2029, focusing on prevention, protection, prosecution and partnership. The strategy also incorporates gender and human rights dimensions and aims to strengthen cross-border operational cooperation and combat transnational organised crime. [2] However, military leaders have not publicly addressed the issue.

While there is evidence of high-level corruption related to fraud and procurement irregularities within the Department of Defence, there is little indication of the defence sector’s involvement in organised crime. [1] However, the Chief of Defence has indicated that the military faces challenges with individual members who engage in criminal activities and that white-collar crime has become more prevalent within the Department. [2] Concerns have been raised in the past over the theft of military weapons and their use in committing crimes. [3] Likewise, the penetration of corrupt networks in the state-owned Denel arms manufacturing during the period of state capture raises concerns over the integrity of the defence sector.

The government is somewhat aware of risks related to organised criminal activity within the military related to fraud and corruption as well as in relation to the theft and use of military weapons in the perpetration of criminal activity. [1] However, the response is limited and, particularly, regarding corrupt networks related to procurement, the response is inadequate as documented by audit findings on the deficiencies of the internal control environment particularly related to supply-chain management. [2]

There have been several investigations into corruption and resource mismanagement in South Sudan, conducted by different organisations such as The Sentry [1], Global Witness [2] and the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan [3]. While these reports do not explicitly mention that crimes such as corruption, arms trafficking and misappropriation of resources are part of a defined organised crime groups. The findings suggest that there is indeed some level of organised criminal activity, which enables perpetrators to avoid being prosecuted or adequate scrutiny to be conducted.

There is substantial evidence that organised crime has infiltrated South Sudan’s defence and security sectors, with limited government preparedness to address the threat. According to the ENACT Organized Crime Index, state-embedded actors—including senior military and political officials—are actively involved in illicit activities such as arms trafficking, illegal taxation at checkpoints, and resource smuggling, often using their official positions to facilitate and protect criminal enterprises [1]. Heavy military-grade weapons have been channelled to local militias through these networks, further blurring the line between state authority and organized crime [2]. Despite the scale of this penetration, government responses remain weak and fragmented; law enforcement efforts are sporadic and undermined by systemic corruption, lack of resources, and political interference. While institutions such as military courts and ceasefire monitoring bodies exist, they lack the independence and mandate to investigate or prosecute criminal influence within the security sector. This has fostered a culture of impunity, with little to no accountability for officials engaged in criminal conduct.[1]

Largely due to fears of security and public tensions, organised crime is something that cannot easily be publicised even if it is taking place. However, the government is always alert and ready to crack down on any forms of crime among military and police personnel [1]. There is a large body of evidence pointing to the penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector. Investigations found that senior army and police officers are involved with racketeering and gold scams, and using their positions and weapons to intimidate detectives and frame innocent individuals as criminals. [2] [3] Similarly, a shadowy network of security-linked individuals has been involved in illegal timber smuggling from the Congo Basin [4], while UPDF officers have been arrested for illicit activities, including ivory trafficking in Kenya [5], and even aggravated trafficking in children.
These incidents highlight the growing concern over the involvement of some security personnel in organised crime. The use of official power and military resources to facilitate smuggling operations, such as timber, gold, and ivory, raises serious questions about accountability within the defence sector. The 2021 assassination attempt on Gen. Katumba Wamala, a high-ranking security official, further underscored the risks associated with criminal networks operating within and around state institutions [6].
While the Ugandan government asserts its commitment to combating crime within security forces, enforcement remains inconsistent. The ability of implicated officers to evade justice by leveraging their positions remains a key challenge. Without stronger oversight and independent investigations, organised crime within the security sector is likely to persist, undermining public trust and national security.

The government and military leaders have admitted that they are aware of the problems of organised crime in defence institutions. According to the Minister of Internal Affairs, the criminality among officers at the level of superintendents and inspectors is alarming and there is a need for stringent measures to monitor them.[1] According to the Global Organised Crime Index “Uganda’s military is highly involved in organised crime, with military officials reportedly facilitating the smuggling of illicit goods throughout the region”. [2] The government has, to some extent, taken action to address this and other security related issues, as the same Index argues in its findings: “Despite being a regional arms trafficking hub, Uganda has taken measures to address the problem, such as an amnesty programme and voluntary surrender of arms, as well as awareness-raising campaigns in the medias” [2]. However, despite the existence of anti-corruption institutions, efforts are hindered by a lack of political will and implementation is lacking [1].

The military, especially the junior officers have been involved in organised crime activities, which include robberies [1]. Those who are caught are arrested and arraigned before the civilian courts [1]. The soldiers are also convicted and sentenced for long to prison for bank robbery, cash heist and stealing pistols and guns used in the robberies [2].

Despite the arrests of junior officers done by the army itself and the police [1], the government has reiterated that it has its own internal processes to resolve indiscipline. The military has instructed the military intelligence and military police manning the barrack gates to search all other soldiers leaving the barracks so that they do not leave the barracks with guns and ammunition [2]. However, while the army commander has publicly expressed a commitment to addressing crime within the military, it is important to note that arrests primarily target junior soldiers involved in petty crimes. In contrast, senior officers, who are often implicated in organised crimes, face little to no accountability [3].