Article 9 of the Public Procurement Code specifies that “the control and regulation functions shall be exercised independently” [1]. The Code then created a National Directorate for the Control of Public Procurement (DNCMP) with this power. This directorate is placed under the supervision of the Minister of Finance [2], but its power extends over the entire public administration, including the armed forces. The law provides for the creation of a public procurement control unit in each contracting authority [3]. Hence, procurement oversight mechanisms are independent, formalised processes. However, they may be subject to occasional undue influence from military or politically well-connected individuals [4]. In addition to this principle of independence, it must be added that the law provides that no member of a control body or of the regulatory council can be a person responsible for public procurement or a member of an ad hoc opening and devaluation. To this end, the appointment of the person responsible for public procurement is done on the basis of competence among the administration agents. The person responsible for public procurement is designated from among executives with specific training and/or proven experience in the field of public procurement. For state institutions, it is done by the president of the institution; for ministerial departments, it is done by the minister; for prefectures, it is done by the prefect. This appointment based on competence avoids possible influence in the process. Even if the interview specifies that he can have influences occasionally, it could be challenging to evidence these occasional cases. Furthermore, the signing and approval of public procurements follows an independent process in the sense that it is not the person responsible for public contracts who approves all contracts. Indeed, for public contracts, which come under the national public procurement control department, they are approved by the minister responsible for finance; for those passed by the municipalities, by the mayors concerned [5].

Any contract whose value exceeds the thresholds set by decree (100 million CFA for infrastructures, 70 million CFA for supplies and services, 50 million for intellectual services entrusted to firms and 20 million for intellectual services of individuals) [1] is controlled a priori by the National Directorate for the Control of Public Procurement (DNCMP) [2]. A priori control involves the verification of the public procurement plan validated by the contracting authorities before its publication, the validation of the tender documents, the validation of the comparative analysis reports of the tenders and the provisional award reports, and the legal and technical examination of the contract documents before their approval [3]. In this process, the DNCMP has the possibility of cancelling public procurement procedures but we were not able to confirm if there was this kind of case in defense and security sector [2]. Secondly, the DNCMP carries out a post-clearance audit of contracts whose amounts are below those amounts [4] [2]. At this level, the DNCMP verifies the authorizations of the actors in charge of conducting procurement operations, verifies the compliance of procurement processes, verifies the proper management of contract performance, and makes recommendations for the improvement of procurement governance [5]. The DNCMP can summon witness and documents from public instituions, including the MOD [3].

A website has been created to centralise all information related to public procurement [1]. On the site, public calls for tenders are published. A space is officially provided for the publication of the DNCMP’s reports. But for the moment, no report has been published on the site [2]. In general, the public procurement site provides information on calls for tender. Apart from the provisional award report, there is actually no report available.

Bodies such as Parliament, the Anti-Corruption Unit and the Court of Auditors have the formal power to control the awarding of public contracts in Burundi’s state services in general, including the army. However, they do not have the power to carry out controls in the defence sector [1] [2] [3]. They always come up against the pretext of safeguarding defence secrecy, but it’s more a question of preventing the undue interests of certain individuals within the State from coming to light [3]. This is the case, for example, when parliamentarians want to know what Burundi stands to gain from the involvement of its soldiers in peacekeeping missions in Somalia [2].

The control mechanisms are very inactive . Despite the powers conferred on them by the various laws, the reality is that they are unable to carry out their duties properly [1] [2].

What little work is done by bodies such as the Brigade anti-corruption or the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Defence remains non-transparent . It is carried out in obscure conditions so that its results cannot be revealed [1] [2].

The institutions (Direction des équipements et du budget – Department of Budget and Equipement and budget; Direction du matériels interarmées – Department of Joint Military Equipment; Cabinet du ministre de la Défense – Cabinet of the Defence Minister) responsible for monitoring the execution of public contracts at the MINDEF are influenced by politics in general, particularly by the Presidency of the Republic. This influence is evident through the dominant presidential institution in the area of defence and public procurement.[1][2][3] MINDEF and the Ministry of Public Procurement are ministries delegated to the Presidency of the Republic, and as a result, the oversight of public contract execution primarily falls under the authority of the President of the Republic.[4]Defence procurement contracts are usually considered “special” due to their complexity and the lack of strict oversight. The Procurement Commission of the Ministry of Defence has awarded a limited number of contracts, notably for small office equipment.[5]

The monitoring mechanisms are active and operate internally, particularly through the Commission responsible for the award, execution and monitoring of public contracts of within MINDEF. It consists solely of military personnel linked to the beneficiary structure of the procurement. However, the Commission does not accept witnesses or non-military persons. Recommendations or decisions are followed up and implemented under the diligence of its members. These members have the authority to cancel certain procurements in the defence sector, subject to specific conditions on which more information could not be found.[1][2]

Defence procurement monitoring mechanisms lack transparency. The absence of calls for tenders shows that the process lacks transparency. In addition, the functioning of the internal control mechanisms (controle général des armées – general control of the armed forces) is not well known and the results of their actions are rarely made public. External control (parliamentary oversight, establishment of a joint committee) could facilitate the process and promote transparency.[1] It is also very important to mention articles 30 and 31 of the 2004 law on public procurement (Code des marchés publics du Cameroun), which organises “special public procurements” and state that defence procurements fall into this category of special public procurements and are therefore not subject to normal regulation. According to article 30, “Les marchés spéciaux sont des marchés qui ne répondent pas, pour tout ou partie, aux dispositions relatives aux marchés sur appel d’offres ou aux marchés de gré à gré. Ils comprennent essentiellement les marchés relatifs à la défense nationale, à la sécurité aux intérêts stratégiques de l’Etat” (Special procurements are procurements not entirely or partly subject to the rules of the public procurement code regarding procurement by call for tenders or over-the-counter procurements). According to Art.31.- “1- special procurements have secret provisitions due to national security interests and are therefore not subjected to the Commission of public procurement established by the current public procurement code. 2- Special procurements are those related to National defence, security and strategic interests of the State”.[2][3][4]

In theory, the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces (IGA) could carry out inspections relating to public procurement [1]. The IGA’s primary mission is to monitor and investigate suspicions, but it is under the authority of the Minister of Defence [2]. In addition, within the Ministry of Defence, the General Control of Defence Administration and Finance (CGAFD) is responsible for auditing and inspecting financial operations, procurement processes and administrative management, but no information is available on the reality of this control [2]. Finally, the Ivorian Parliament can also monitor the government’s actions and can therefore request missions, investigations or even hearings on these issues, but the President’s control over public procurement and the concept of defence secrecy make this impossible in practice. [3, 4].

In reality, there is no indication that any of these institutions exercise control over public procurement in the defence sector. No activity reports are published [1, 2].

No information is available. The mechanisms are opaque because the issue remains sensitive [1, 2].

The involvement of key oversight bodies, such as the Public Procurement Authority (1), the Auditor General (2), and the Controller and Accountant General (3), provides a framework for scrutinizing procurement activities. This includes the disposal of assets, which is intended to ensure accountability and proper management of public resources.
At other levels, the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI) and the Public Accounts Committee via the scrutiny of the Auditor General’s Report can also provide some scrutiny over procurement activities. The latter however acts retroactively. The PSCDI is composed of parliamentarians who may have personal interest or may lobby on behalf a particular entity there by exerting some form of influence on the oversight process (1).

The Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI) exercises oversight responsibility over the defence sector and may sanction major procurements for the GAF through its annual reports. (1) The implementation of compliance and enforcement responsibility for procurement laws is sanctioned by the Public Procurement Authority. The PSCDI is empowered to summon heads of various institutions to answer questions regarding the breach of procurement laws. (2) There is also the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), responsible for scrutinising the annual report of the Auditor General that may include breaches of procurement rules. (3)
Despite the formalised procurement oversight process, they are subject to undue influence by politicians and some members of the military command. While this information is known among some senior officers in the military, because they involve senior commanders and politicians, they are hardly discussed. (4) The Airbus scandal is an example of the use of political interference in the defence procurement process. Airbus, which is an European aerospace manufacturer, admitted to having hired the services of Samuel Adam Mahama, who is the brother of former president of Ghana John Dramani Mahama, who at the time of the incident was the vice president of Ghana in the sale of three military aircraft. The Office of the Special Prosecutor’s investigation cleared Samuel Mahama and John Mahama of any misconduct, despite allegations that the company paid bribes to influence the process (5).

Oversight mechanisms in defence procurement are somewhat transparent. The Auditor General’s report on the Ministry of Defence is accessible (1), and the activities of the Public Accounts Committee are generally open to the public. Except for procurement records restricted under Section 32 of the Public Procurement Act, certain reports from the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and the Interior are also available (2). However, despite these oversight measures, there is evidence of some irregular activities in defence procurement. In the infamous Airbus Scandal for instance, Airbus authorities reportedly accepted culpability in bribing some middleman related to top decision makers in Ghana. Although the brother of President Mahama denied such bribery and rather alluded to his role as a legitimate consultant and business partner to Airbus, (3) the denial doesn’t address issues of conflict of interest associated with his role and the familial relationship he had with the president at the time (4)(5).

Procurement oversight mechanisms within the Ministry of Defence are independent and formalised. Multiple layers of oversight ensure accountability, including internal audits, scrutiny by the Auditor General, and parliamentary oversight. Bidders can file complaints directly with the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board or report concerns to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission [1].
The Public Procurement Administrative Review Board, established under Section 27(1) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, serves as an independent appeals body for procurement disputes. It ensures fair access to its services across Kenya and it is mandated to review, hear, and determine tendering and asset disposal disputes. Additionally, it performs any other functions assigned by the PPADA, its regulations, or other relevant laws [2].
The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority also plays a critical role by conducting independent assessments, contract audits, and publishing reports on non-compliance. In cases where complainants are dissatisfied with the Review Board’s decisions, they can seek judicial review in court. Notably, in two instances, the courts upheld the Review Board’s decisions:
• Republic Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 Others Ex Parte Rongo University [2018] eKLR
• Republic Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & Another Ex Parte Intertek Testing Services (EA) Pty Limited & Authentix Inc.; Accounting Officer, Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority & Another [2022] eKLR [3].

In 2021, the Turkish company Katmerciler secured a KES 7.7 billion ($69 million) contract to supply 118 Hizir armored vehicles between 2022 and 2023 [1]. The procurement board approved this acquisition following a Department of Defence meeting, which sanctioned the single-source procurement of the Hizir Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) after they met the User Specification Requirements (USR) set by the Kenya Army [2].
The PPRA regularly publishes lists of non-compliant entities. In the 2023/2024 financial year, the MoD was listed among non-compliant procuring entities, with the PPRA citing violations of Sections 43(1) and 176(1)(a) of the PPADA, 2015 [4]. Additionally, in 2022, the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) directed the Auditor General to conduct a special audit on MoD’s food procurement from 2014 onward. The audit revealed instances of restricted tendering without proper justification, highlighting irregularities in the procurement process [5].

While there is a fully-fledged procurement oversight mechanism, it may no be fully effective. According to the Auditor General’s findings on foodstuff procurement, M/s. Jackwright lodged a review request (application number SOLZOTS dated 28 September 2015) with the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board. The vendor challenged the tender award for supplying fresh meat (beef on bone) to Nanyuki-based units, citing the Ministry of Defence’s failure to apply the required 15% preference for tenderers from Nanyuki and its environs, as stipulated in clause 2.25.1 of the tender document.
The PPARB Secretary notified the Principal Secretary (PS) of the Ministry of Defence about this review request through letter reference PPOA/ARB/111/2015 (3) on 28 September 2015, requesting a response. However, instead of responding to the Review Board, the Ministry of Defence proceeded to sign a contract with M/s. Habibani Enterprises Ltd on 07 October 2015. This action violated Section 94 of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005 and Section 74(4) of the Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations of 2006, which mandate the suspension of procurement proceedings during a review [3].
This is despite having a review board that serves as an independent appeals body, separate from the PPRA Board. It has the authority to oversee, make decisions, and cancel rulings when appeals are made. The board’s composition, detailed in Section 27 of the PPADA, consists entirely of non-public sector professionals, with no government representation. This structure ensures that bidders’ pleas are typically upheld and properly addressed, though improperly handled cases may go undisclosed [1]. According to PPRA’s annual report for 2021/2022, its complaints management and investigation handled 256 complaints, resolved 128 and another 128 were pending. The complaints ranged from flaws in tender evaluation and specifications, request for review of procurement processes, alleged corruption during procurement proceedings and delayed payments. PPRA undertook investigation in 10 of the cases.
To sum up, there is independence of the oversight bodies in structure and the PPARB has legal powers to cancel tenders and summon explanations. However, MoD ignored a PPARB suspension order and went ahead with contract award. There is an active oversight mechanism, but enforcement is not consistent, and powerful institutions such as the MoD can bypass its rulings.

The review board publishes all its appeals and decisions on the PPRA website [1]. In the 2022/2023 annual report, the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board reviewed 134 appeals in the fiscal year, down from 166 previously. Decisions were made within 21 days, signed, filed, and posted on www.ppra.go.ke [2]. However, the PPRA does not publish all the material related to Defence. Based on available data on the PPRA website on Administrative Review Board Decisions from 2020-2024, none of the decisions was MoD-related [2].

There are formal oversight mechanisms in place regarding public procurement, the PPCC is the centralised mechanism responsible for processing procurement. The subsection 3 of the PPCC granting dispensation can be often exploited.
The defence sector can be backed by the President or influential figures within the legislature or in the national security council of Liberia. For instance, recently President Boakai appointed five individuals to the Complaints, Appeal, and Review Panel (CARP) of the PPCC involving “significant procedural and legal breach” in the+ appointment process [4]. Such executive interventions suggest that political interference can override formal procurement oversight, particularly in the defence context. [1][2][3]
Regarding oversight mechanisms, instances have reported misuse of private and public actors influence to obstruct the work of Liberia’s anti-graft bodies and thereby protect themselves and their colleagues [5].

The procurement process is reinforced by the respective oversight institutions. The Internal Audit Agency (IAA), an autonomous integrity institution, is mandated to ensure the MACs have a strong internal control system. Likewise, the GAC is an external audit commission mandated to improve transparency in the management of public resources. And the Public Accounts Committees are the legislature’s review of the GAC audit report to recommend judicial action where necessary. However, these oversight mechanisms are selective in the exercise of critical functions. While it has the right to summon witnesses and demand sufficient documentation and explanation, after which recommendations are issued, it is less rigorous when dealing with the defence sector. Undue influence impacts the extent to which the process enforces all the elements listed in score 4.[1][2][3][4][5]

On the one hand, the GAC Audit process has been robust and transparent. The GAC is a public exercise, and the outcome is made available for all to see and engage with. Since the end of the war, MACs have been consistently audited, and reports submitted to the Public Accounts Committees of the legislature. Although audit reports are published, they are often aggregated and do not include specific, disaggregated details about defence procurement contracts, suppliers, values, or procurement decisions. All the audit reports release to the public are accessible through this URL link: https://gac.gov.lr .[1][2][3]
On the other hand, the legislative oversight role is weak, as there is little evidence that recommendations or findings from the GAC’s defence-related audits are followed by meaningful corrective actions or public legislative scrutiny.[4]

At the Ministry of Defence there is a supervision mechanism for defence procurement. Concerning the supply of weapons and ammunition, special forms exist and are regularly updated through formalized and independent processes. This mechanism is apolitical and takes place even in the event of a change in government [1]. The Strategic Equipment and Materials Acquisition Monitoring Service, which depends on the Reform Department, sets up systems adapted to the monitoring of strategic equipment and materials acquired by the Ministry of National Defence. It centralizes data relating to the equipment needs of the Armed Forces and ensures that they are taken into account in the strategic and operational documents developed [2]. But as in other sectors, companies or individuals close to political leaders can still exert influence on the functioning of this mechanism, sometimes in a persistent manner [3].

The Court of Auditors exercises control over the use of public funds, including defense procurement. It establishes reports but it is rare that the defence sector is the subject of a thematic study [1]. Court of Auditors’s public reports have never mentioned the defence sector, and haven’t since 2022.
Another institution exists regarding the control of public markets. This is the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) whose operation and organization are defined by Decree 2005-215 of May 3, 2005. The ARMP is responsible for:
-Design public procurement policy, ensure its execution and implementation strategies,
-Develop texts and documents relating to public procurement,
-Observe and evaluate public purchasing bodies,
-Analyze public markets,
-Produce the annual report on the Malagasy public procurement system,
-Collect and centralize all documentation, information and statistics on public markets with a view to establishing a database,
-Carry out or have specific audits, surveys and investigations carried out on the public procurement system,
-Provide training and technical assistance to all public or private stakeholders in public procurement [2].
The ARMP can also terminate a project under the conditions stipulated by the specifications. In its article 76, Law No. 2016-055 on the Public Procurement Code stipulates that public procurement may be subject to termination at the initiative of the Person Responsible for Public Procurement (i) due to serious misconduct of the contract holder or (ii) a failure of the holder to perform his contract after formal notice or (iii) the liquidation of the holder company, or (iv) for reasons of general interest [3].

The official audit reports of the Court of Auditors are accessible to the public but they do not include details and even less regarding the defence sector [1]. On the other hand, the ARMP reports are very detailed with financial information or even public contracts having been cancelled [2].

There are institutions responsible for procurement oversight but it is unclear if they can do so in the defence sector. According to Article 117 of the Public Procurement Code “All public contracts are subject to supervision, control, monitoring and surveillance of their technical, administrative, and financial execution. These missions are carried out jointly by the contracting authority and the body responsible for monitoring public procurement and public service delegations.The various specifications set out the conditions and procedures for supervision, control, monitoring and surveillance of the execution of public contracts.”[1] The Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement and Service Delegations (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics et des Délégations de Service Public or ARMDS) is thus the institution in charge of regulating public sector contracts, which would mean that its mandate extends to defence contracts.[2] However, the 2023 decree placing outside the scope of the public procurement code the contracts for works, supplies, and services in the defence sector, likely removes most of defence contracts out of scrutiny.[3] The influence may be there in the facts, but it is difficult to provide proof. Nonetheless, the various cases in which the military are involved and cited above are illustrative cases.

Since most defence sector contracts are removed from public procurement law since 2023, there is no evidence that scrutiny mechanisms are in place. However, in practice, no contract can be considered valid if it does not have the visa of the financial controller who is responsible for verifying and ensuring that the contract complies with the legislation.[1][2][3]

The various reports of the control bodies do not mention the conduct of a supervision or control mission of the defence and security sector since 2020.[1][2] And even when this is the case, the conclusions, even in the form of summaries, have not been made public since this period.

The mechanisms for supervising acquisitions are formalised by the Government’s Five-Year Plan [1] and the Economic and Social Plan [2, 3], which contain the military programming and regulations on equipment and armament for the Defence and Security Forces [4]. The acquisitions of defence products are defined by the military programming [5], which is implemented by the military and government officials, where general aspects are presented in the Economic and Social Plan, while operational aspects are classified in accordance with military secrets, as provided for in the State Secrets Law [6, 7].
The acquisition supervision mechanisms are processes formally established by the law on Programming and Acquisition of Defence and Security Products, but they can be negatively influenced more by the military and high-ranking politicians than by parliament, which has a minor role, as everything is handled at the level of the government and the Defence and Security Forces and the information is classified.

Procurement oversight mechanisms are active, where witnesses are summoned and documents requested. Requests explained and recommendations or guidelines are issued that must be followed or broken by the internal mechanisms of the National Defence Inspectorate according to the powers conferred by law [1, 2]. However, they have limitations in terms of staff and technical capacity [3] and their reports are classified under military and state secrets legislation, making it impossible to effectively monitor their activity, role and performance [4, 5]. Even with mechanisms for supervising acquisitions, summoning witnesses, requesting documents, demanding explanations and issuing recommendations or conclusions, most acquisitions of defence products are made within the framework of direct adjustment in accordance with paragraph F of Article 97 of Decree No. 79/2022, of December 30, which approves the Regulation for the Contracting of Public Works Contracts, Supply of Goods and Provision of Services to the State. Paragraph F also establishes that “confidential military works, uniforms and their complements, acquisitions, accessories and maintenance of military equipment and for the exclusive use of the Armed Forces and Police” do not need to go through a public tender and are subject to classification by the legislation on military and state secrets, facts that contribute to reduced effectiveness [6].

The oversight mechanisms for defence procurement are established by law and include the National Defence Inspectorate and the Parliamentary Committee for Defence, Security, and Public Order. However, their effectiveness and transparency are restricted by legislation under the Military and State Secrets [1, 2, 3].
Although defence procurements are formally based on the Military Programming and Defence Budget [4], access to relevant information is highly restricted. The National Defence Inspectorate rarely publishes evidence of its oversight activities, particularly for acquisitions related to operational areas, citing military secrecy. Likewise, there is a consensus among three defence and security researchers/practitioners that when CSOs and academics request information about military investments and acquisitions, they are consistently told that such information is classified under the State Secrets Law. These limitations make it difficult to assess the actual capacity, effectiveness, and operability of the institutions responsible for procurement oversight [5, 6, 7].

The procurement oversight mechanism in Niger is legally formalised under the 2013 decree on public procurement for defence and security. Article 71 of the decree establishes a biannual inspection process, requiring the Inspector General of the Army (Inspecteur Général des Armées) or equivalent officials from other security branches to conduct semester inspections of defense procurement contracts. These inspections are accompanied by a detailed and confidential report submitted to both the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister [1]. Additionally, the State Inspectorate General (Inspection Générale d’État) retains broad control powers, with the legal authority to conduct oversight of defence procurement when necessary. However, the specific role of this body in defence procurement oversight remains unclear in legal provisions [1]. Despite the formal existence of oversight structures, the adoption of Ordinance No. 2024-05 on February 23, 2024, significantly altered the legal framework by exempting defence-related expenditures from procurement and financial oversight mechanisms. This decree effectively weakens or eliminates prior oversight measures by granting broad discretionary powers to the executive in awarding defense contracts without competitive bidding or standard controls [2].

Despite the existence of formal oversight mechanisms for defence procurement in Niger, there is substantial evidence that these mechanisms are either highly inactive or not functioning at all in practice. The 2013 decree on public procurement for defence and security legally mandates biannual inspections conducted by the Inspector General of the Army (Inspecteur Général des Armées) or equivalent counterparts, with confidential reports submitted to the President and the Prime Minister [1]. However, there is no evidence that these inspections have led to concrete enforcement actions, procurement reforms, or accountability measures. The 2020 corruption scandal involving 71.8 billion FCFA (approximately $120 million) in fraudulent defence contracts exposed severe lapses in oversight. Investigations revealed the use of fictitious tenders, offshore shell companies, fake invoices, and significant contract mismanagement. Despite these findings, many of those implicated in the scandal were never prosecuted or held accountable, indicating a failure of procurement oversight mechanisms to enforce compliance and prevent financial misconduct [2].Furthermore, the adoption of Ordinance No. 2024-05 on February 23, 2024, further weakened the effectiveness of oversight by eliminating key controls over defence expenditures. By exempting defence contracts from competitive bidding and prior financial controls, the ordinance institutionalized the lack of enforcement, making it even more difficult for oversight bodies to function effectively [3].

Procurement oversight mechanisms in Niger operate with complete opacity, with no public disclosure of their activities, findings, or enforcement actions. While Article 71 of the 2013 decree on public procurement for defence and security mandates biannual inspections of defence procurement contracts, these reviews are classified and only reported confidentially to the President and the Prime Minister [1]. There is no publicly available information on the outcomes of these inspections, the extent of compliance with procurement laws, or any corrective measures taken in response to violations. Furthermore, the 2020 defense procurement scandal, which revealed the embezzlement of 71.8 billion FCFA ($120 million) through fraudulent contracts, was not publicly uncovered by official oversight bodies but rather through investigative journalism [2]. Despite the scale of the corruption, there was no public reporting from the State Inspectorate General or the Inspector General of the Army regarding their role in investigating or addressing these procurement irregularities.
The adoption of Ordinance No. 2024-05 on February 23, 2024, has further eroded transparency by legally exempting defense expenditures from financial and procurement oversight mechanisms [3]. With no public reports, audits, or official disclosures on procurement oversight activities, there is no transparency in how defence procurement is monitored or regulated.

Defence procurement oversight mechanisms in Nigeria include relevant committees of the National Assembly [1]; Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP); Auditor General’s Office; as well as Anticorruption agencies such as the ICPC and EFCC. While these oversight mechanisms are formally in place, they often have limited access to detailed information about defence procurement due to national security exemptions. This restricts their ability to scrutinise procurement activities thoroughly. Besides, the National Assembly has generally been too absorbed with constituency projects—even inflating the expected revenue without a strong basis— to focus on budget scrutiny and play its oversight role in challenging the executive on the budget parameters [2]. In view of this, an Abuja-based think tank, Agora Policy, has argued that “the practice of routine audit and public accounts oversight has not maximally benefitted the country” [3].

There is some evidence that legislative control of the security sector in Nigeria has progressively improved. The standing committees of the NASS have become more assertive in holding security sector agencies and actors to account. The scope of the activities of these committees has included monitoring the funds the government has budgeted for the sector [1]. However, it appears as though the legislature is still lagging behind in its oversight responsibility of ensuring accountability in the use of allocated funds and personnel. According to a report by BudgiT that highlighted the importance of transparency and accountability in the use of public funds for the period of July – December 2023, “the Ministry of Defence received the highest payments of N663bn with 954 transactions. While insecurity continues to grow in the country, the Ministry of Defence’s current expenses have not yielded so much evidence in contrast with its current spending” [2]. Worsening insecurity in the country has raised questions on the how the security and defence funds in the country are spent. Analysts are of the view that weak legislative oversights, among other factors, remains a stumbling block in strengthening the security workforce and positioning it for effective performance [3]. With defence sector spending shrouded with secrecy, procurement oversight mechanisms such as the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) are unable to easily detect procurement fraud, summon witness, and demand explanations, given that “the public procurement Act exempts sensitive acquisitions relating to defence and security form its purview unless otherwise stated by the president, often making huge part of defence expenditure unscrutinised” [4].

The transparency of defence procurement oversight is severely constrained. Many aspects of the oversight process, such as the findings of the National Assembly committees or the details of audits conducted by the Auditor-General, are not publicly disclosed in full due to the sensitive nature of defence matters. Yet some aspects of audit report made public in the recent past has indicted MDAs, including agencies under the MOD for expending unaccounted fund [1]. The invocation of national security to justify secrecy around defence procurement is common, limiting the public’s and even some oversight bodies’ access to information [2].

ARCOP (ex-ARMP) is an independent administrative authority with financial and management autonomy. Its mission is to regulate the system for awarding public contracts and public service delegation agreements. As such, it is responsible for transmitting to the President, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Court of Auditors, an annual report on the effectiveness and reliability of the system for awarding, executing and controlling public contracts and public service delegations, together with any recommendations likely to improve it. [1] . This supervisory body as well as others such as OFNAC and IGE are independent. However, the President of the Republic has been accused of deliberately not to publish reports of the state auditing bodies because some of his supporters were pinpointed by these reports [2] .
As part of the prevention of fraud, corruption, illicit enrichment, similar practices and related offences, OFNAC’s specific missions are to: – carry out information, education and communication activities on the fight against fraud, corruption and illicit enrichment, – recommend any legislative, regulatory or administrative reform aimed at promoting good governance, etc. In the performance of their duties, the members of the OFNAC Assembly do not receive instructions from any authority. In addition, they benefit from criminal protection and may not be sought, arrested, detained or tried for the opinions they express or for acts or decisions they take in the performance of their duties (Art. 9). In addition, their term of office may only be terminated prematurely in the event of resignation, death, gross misconduct, absenteeism or impediment duly recorded by a majority of the members.(Art 6). [3]
State contracts awarded to suppliers and to national or foreign businessmen and entrepreneurs, which are supposed to be awarded essentially by invitation to tender, are sometimes awarded in Senegal by private treaty, after direct discussion between the authority responsible for awarding the contract and the supplier it has chosen, without following the established rules. [2] .

OFNAC has published its 2023 report. In the document, it is emphasised that “during 2023, 42 orders to open investigations were signed by the President and notified to the Investigations Department for execution’. Serigne Bassirou Guèye and his colleagues report that ‘as at 31 December 2023, 40 investigation reports had been sent to several judicial authorities responsible for prosecutions’. The document also states that ‘this brings the total number of investigation orders signed since 2014 to 614. They also state that ‘in cases where the complainant does not provide sufficient information to help identify the protagonists, the Office opts to report the matter to the competent authorities’ [1] . The Procurement Unit is responsible for ensuring the quality of procurement files and the smooth running of the Procurement Committee. To this end, it is responsible for drawing up quarterly reports on the awarding and execution of contracts for the relevant authorities, for transmission to the Direction Centrale des Marchés Publics and the Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics. [2]
The role of the Central Public Procurement Department is to ensure a priori control of the procedures for awarding public procurement contracts; to issue opinions on decisions concerning the award of contracts and to grant, at the request of the contracting authorities, the necessary authorisations and waivers where these are provided for by the regulations in force; to provide, in conjunction with the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, training, information and advice to all those involved in public procurement on the applicable regulations and procedures; to contribute, in conjunction with the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, to the collection and analysis of data and the compilation of statistics on public procurement; to carry out a legal and technical review of draft public procurement contracts prior to their approval; to monitor the performance of public procurement contracts [3] . In Senegal, the public procurement oversight bodies mainly comprise the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) and the Central Public Procurement Directorate (DCMP). The ARMP is an ex post oversight body, while the DCMP provides ex ante oversight. The two oversight bodies are responsible for regulating the public procurement system and public service delegation agreements, ensuring ex post control of public contracts, i.e. after the contract has been awarded and executed, to initiate investigations in the event of irregularities and refer them to the competent authorities, to make suggestions to the President of the Republic for improving the public procurement system, to verify the compliance of public procurement procedures before their execution, and to work to ensure that contracting authorities adopt best practices in public procurement. [4]

ARCOP (ex-ARMP) gives opinions such as Opinion No. 002/2022/ARCOP (ex-ARMP)/CRD of 15 June 2022 of the Dispute Resolution Committee on the risk of conflict of interest relating to the recruitment of the Consultant selected for the accounting and financial audit of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project, for the financial years ending 31 December 2021, 2022 and 2023 on the referral of the coordinator of the procurement unit of the Ministry of Finance and Budget. It takes decisions such as Decision No. 018/2023/ARCOP (ex-ARMP)/CRD/DEF of 15 February 2023 of the Dispute Settlement Committee ruling in disputes commission on the referral of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad requesting authorisation to extend, for one year, the rider renewing No. 2 of the health insurance contract for expatriate staff and families of the said Ministry, after the unfavourable opinion of the Central Directorate of Public Procurement (DCMP). [1] .The public market regulation authority orders the suspension of the procedure for the award of the public service delegation relating to the call for tenders for operation and maintenance services for the AIBD-Mbour and AIBD-Thiès-Touba motorway sections, as well as the Foundiougne toll bridge. Foundiougne toll bridge, until the ARCOP (ex-ARMP) Dispute Settlement Committee’s decision is handed down. [2]

The Auditor-General of South Africa is a key oversight mechanism for defence procurement and is independent and well-respected. The Department of Defence and Armscor regularly receive findings from the Auditor-General related to procurement [1]. The Standing Committee on Public Accounts likewise has oversight powers related to acquisitions and during the infamous “Arms Deal” showed a level of independence in investigating allegations of irregularity [2]. In September 2022, AGSA informed the Defence Parliamentary Committee of widespread irregular procurement-related expenditure and noted that internal audit support was limited to only 11 of 73 centres [3]. By November 2024, SCOPA intervened due to persistent adverse audit findings and ineffective consequence management in defence procurement, summoning the Minister to respond [4]. This demonstrates an independence of the procurement oversight mechanisms.

The Auditor-General has expressed opinions over procurement irregularities such as in relation to the procurement of unregistered medication during the COVID pandemic, but has previously highlighted challenges with departmental compliance with audit findings. [1] The Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture likewise revealed significant shortcomings in parliamentary oversight arising from a political culture within the then ruling party that suppressed legislative oversight through its members in parliamentary committees. [2] While relevant parliamentary committees have the power to summon witnesses and make recommendations, these powers are not fully exercised in practice and as a result, oversight is more limited.

Findings of the Auditor-General are made public in Department’s Annual Reports [1] and consolidated reports on national and provincial audit outcomes [2]. They both address procurement irregularities in defence and recommendations, and extensively discussed in parliamentary committees which can be reviewed by the public. [2]

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018 formally establishes the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDAA), which is intended to function as an independent authority with the power to oversee government ministries and departments. [1] However, the close interconnection between the government, the ruling party (SPLM), and the individuals appointed to lead both independent authorities and parliamentary committees raises concerns about the actual level of independence [2]. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs has engaged the services of a private consultant, M/s Executive Ventures Ltd, to perform crucial functions such as valuation and shortlisting of service providers. There is a conspicuous lack of public information regarding the nature and extent of this engagement, as neither the private company’s website nor the ministry’s platforms provide transparency on these details.

South Sudan is in a unique position because its audit mechanisms are not only supposed to adhere to domestic mechanisms but also international set rules. The current arms embargo imposed on South Sudan serves as a double-edged sword. While the sanctions mandate that the government report any weapons procurement to the UN Security Council, they have also inadvertently created opportunities for smuggling and illicit arms trade. For instance, a 184-page report by a United Nations Panel of Experts on South Sudan disclosed that the country had violated the arms embargo, acquiring new weapons without adhering to the prescribed procedures [1]. This situation raises serious questions about the effectiveness of existing oversight mechanisms and the government’s commitment to transparency, both within its domestic framework and in compliance with international norms. Perhaps the repeated extension of the arms embargo on South Sudan are a testament of the ineffectiveness of the existing mechanisms [2].

There is no publicly available information in the form of reports, press statements, or financial disclosures regarding defence procurement in South Sudan. Those monitoring arms acquisitions, such as the United Nations Panel of Experts on South Sudan [1], have only been able to observe the possession of certain weapons through direct physical inspection. For example, the panel identified an “MP5A5 submachine gun with a retractable buttstock and a three-round burst trigger group” in the possession of a security detail for the Governor of Upper Nile State on 11 December 2023, and a “Micro Tavor X95 submachine gun” held by a bodyguard for government dignitaries in Terekeka County, near Juba, on 6 January 2024 [2]. These findings underscore the significant lack of transparency in the acquisition of arms in South Sudan.

There are formalised independent oversight bodies which oversee procurement activities in the Ministry of Defence. These include the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA), an institution that is responsible for overseeing public procurement and defence procurement. The Parliament’s Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs is responsible for overseeing the defence sector, including procurement [1][2]. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority has powers to stop any procurement which is deemed not to have followed the outlined procedures as stipulated in the PPDA Act of 2003. The annual report is submitted to Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee, or Defence and Internal Security Committee for further scrutiny and actions based on the Auditor General recommendations. Despite the availability of regulations, irregularities persist. For example, President Museveni has tasked several individuals, including former Electoral Commission chairman Badru Kiggundu, to investigate a Shs76b procurement scandal that has rattled the army and the Ministry of Defence. This follows reports of investigations into procurement problems and shoddy work on the army’s Kaweweta Recruit Training School. This involved little-known businessman Eria Mubiru and his companies J2E Investment Corporation and Roester Construction Corporation through collusion with some Ministry of Defence and Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) officials [3].

The PPDA Act (Cap. 205) establishes PPDA as the principal regulator, issuing rules and overseeing compliance across MDAs, including MoDVA. PPDA continues to update guidance to strengthen controls and participation frameworks, evidence that regulatory oversight is active. That said, defence procurements can involve security/classified elements which, while not outside PPDA’s remit, do constrain public visibility and external challenge mechanisms [1]
The Auditor General confirms a mandate to audit classified expenditure and reports annually to Parliament. The 2024 Consolidated Report reiterates that the OAG conducts these audits under Article 163/National Audit Act. Parliamentary summaries indicate that MoDVA’s budget includes a very large classified component (about UGX 1.99 trillion in FY 2023/24), underscoring why OAG’s classified-audit function is central to any meaningful defence oversight. However, across government, only 31% of parliamentary recommendations from audit follow-ups were fully implemented, with 34% not implemented [2]

Furthermore, The department responsible for sourcing and acquiring military equipment within the Ugandan Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) plays a critical role in supporting the armed forces’ operational capabilities. This involves procuring a wide array of essential supplies, including weapons, vehicles, and ammunition, from both domestic and international sources. However, the defence procurement cycle in Uganda operates within a framework that is only partially disclosed to the public. This limited transparency stems from the inherent nature of defence procurement, which often involves classified information and considerations of national security. While some information is accessible, limitations and exemptions restrict full public disclosure [3]
The legal framework governing defence procurement includes the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets law, which guides the MoDVA, and the UPDF Act, which stipulates that procurement for all services shall be conducted by the chief of staff of the defence forces in liaison with the MoDVA. The assessment of needs, critical for determining procurement requirements, is often conducted through internal processes that may not be fully transparent. Contract implementation and sign-off, while subject to legal oversight, may involve confidential negotiations and agreements. Asset disposal, while governed by regulations, can also be subject to limitations due to national security concerns. This partial formalisation, combined with the need to protect classified information, contributes to the limited public disclosure of the defence procurement cycle in Uganda [3, 4].
Clear legal mandates; active regulator (PPDA) and auditor (OAG) including classified-expenditure audits; functioning parliamentary and IGG mechanisms; continual regulatory updates. However, high level of classified spending in MoDVA; constrained public disclosure; low implementation rates of parliamentary recommendations, suggest limitations in the procurement oversight.

Oversight of defence procurement in Uganda is carried out by multiple institutions — the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA), the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), the Inspectorate of Government (IGG), and Parliament’s Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs (CDIA) and Public Accounts Committee (PAC). While each has a mandate that includes the defence sector, transparency of their activities and outputs relating specifically to the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) is limited due to the large proportion of procurement classified for national security reasons.
The PPDA conducts procurement audits and compliance checks across ministries, including the MoDVA. However, its publicly available audit reports generally present aggregated data [3].
The OAG audits MoDVA expenditure, including classified procurement, under the National Audit Act. While the OAG’s annual public reports confirm that such audits are conducted, the findings for classified items are not included [4].

The procurement oversight, scrutiny, and transparency in the UPDF are limited despite some mechanisms being in place. The UPDF procurement records and documents are restricted. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) is responsible for overseeing public procurement in Uganda. While the PPDA publishes procurement audit reports, these reports often provide aggregated data without detailed insights into specific defence procurement activities. There are cases of collusion among UPDF officials, suppliers and contractors.[1][2]

The Defence forces have the Defence Procurement Board which is established through the Defence Procurement Act [1]. The Board recommends all procurement to the commander and the Minister of Defence. The Director of Procurement housed in the Directorate of Procurement reports to the Commander who then lease with the board and the Minister of Defence who then submit the documentation to the Parliament through the Defence and Security and Home Affairs, for any recommendation to parliament [3]. This is in accordance with the Public Procurement and Disposal Act [2]. However, the independence of the Defence Procurement is questionable because of its links with the ruling party ZANU-PF [3].

The law provides that Parliament has the authority and powers to scrutinise the defence procurement if the procedure was followed or not [1]. Parliament can do this by inviting or summoning the army commanders or Defence Minister through the Committee on Defence, Security and Home Affairs [2]. However, if invited by parliament to explain specific issues related to defence procurement, the military does not heed the request [2].
The requests made by the Portfolio Committee on Defence, Home Affairs and Security Services to the defence forces are not made public. In any event if the military does not come to parliament to response to questions which the parliamentary portfolio committee on defence, such information is not made public.

Parliament has not been debated on procurement issues which pertains to the Defence sector [1]. Even if the Report of the Auditor General is available online, the Auditor General has not included defence procurement information in her annual reports [2].