The GDI Indicators

The GDI is composed of 77 distinct questions, each split into a number of indicators, totalling in over 200 data points for each country assessment. The filter below allows the user to view any or all of the indicators, without any data, to get a better understand of the Index subject matter. Navigate the indicators by risk area or use the search function to identify which indicators correspond to the themes below.

For further details on how exactly the GDI questionnaire was designed and implemented, please refer to the Methodology page and the Methods Paper.

 

Risk Areas
Laws & Practice
Entities
Tags

Q1 - Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

1A - Formal rights

Parliament has formal powers (in law) to approve or veto laws on security, and to reject or amend defence policy. It also has the right to review budgets, major arms procurements and defence decisions.

Political de jure Parliament Oversight Budget

1B - Effectiveness

Parliament regularly approves or vetoes laws on security, exercises budgetary power, and reviews or approves major arms procurements and decisions. Parliament can also reject or amend defence policy.

Political de facto Parliament Oversight Effectiveness Budget

1C - Independent legislature scrutiny

Neither the executive nor the military coerce or unduly influence parliament to vote in their favour.

Political de facto Parliament Oversight Undue influence

Q2 - Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?

2A - Formal rights

There is a defence committee or similar institutions with extensive formal rights. The committee (or similar such organisation) has the power to scrutinise any aspect of performance of defence ministry or agencies, e.g., budgets, personnel management, policy planning, arms acquisition, and demand information on these areas. The committee is in a position to require expert witnesses to appear in front of it.

Political de jure Parliament Defence Committee Oversight Budget

2B - Expertise

The committee is comprised of members with expertise in the defence sector who are able to influence decisions.

Political de facto Parliament Defence Committee Oversight Expertise

2C - Responsive policymaking

The committee reviews major defence policies and decisions every 5 years or earlier if new threats arise.

Political de facto Parliament Defence Committee Oversight Effectiveness

2D - Short-term oversight

The committee meets at least once a month, and issues budget amendments and recommendations. It also requires ministries to consider, and respond to, recommendations within specific time frames.

Political de facto Parliament Defence Committee Oversight Effectiveness Budget

2E - Long-term oversight

The committee conducts long-term investigations on current activities, including operations, or it can commission an external body to do it.

Political de facto Parliament Defence Committee Oversight Effectiveness

2F - Institutional outcomes

Ministries regularly incorporate recommendations into practice.

Political de facto Defence Committee Effectiveness

Q3 - Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?

3A - Scope of involvement

The defence policy or security strategy is debated by the executive, legislature, and the public. Public debate involves the media (interviews, op-eds, articles).

Political de facto Civil society Openness

3B - Scope of debate

Discussion is in-depth and addresses all of the following issues: (1) clear articulation of the security threats that the country is facing, (2) procurement decisions (5 year plan) and level of defence spending, (3) link between threats and decisions on procurement, personnel, and budget, (4) use of defence capability (operations).

Political de facto Civil society Budget

3C - Public consultations

There are formal, regular public consultations on defence policy or the security strategy. The defence policy or the security strategy incorporate subsequent findings.

Political de facto Civil society Effectiveness Openness

3D - Transparency

The public can easily access documents and regularly updated information on all aspects of the defence policy or security strategy. Documents are released at least four weeks before decisions are made to allow for public scrutiny.

Political de facto Civil society Transparency

Q4 - Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?

4A - Policy of openness

There is a policy that requires defence and security institutions to be open towards CSOs and the establishment of mechanisms to that end (e.g. consultation and sharing of information).

Political de jure Civil society Openness

4B - CSO protections

CSOs enjoy a range of protections (e.g. rights to freedom of expression or freedom of association) from government interference, and are able to operate openly and without intimidation from the government.

Political de jure Civil society Openness

4C - Practice of openness

Defence and security institutions have specifically worked with CSOs on corruption issues on a regular and/or in depth basis. This includes not only civilian representative of government (head of internal audit, PR person), but also military representatives.

Political de facto Civil society Effectiveness Openness

Q5 - Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?

5A - Signatory and Ratification status

The country is not a significant defence exporter, and it has signed up and ratified at least the UNCAC Convention. The country is a significant defence exporter, and it has signed up and ratified at least the OECD Convention.

Political de jure External

5B - Compliance

The country has complied with most of its obligations in priority areas covered by the relevant convention/s it has ratified.

Political de facto Outcomes External

Q6 - Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

6A - Public debate

Outside government, there is regular public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues. Debate persists on high priority issues over a period of time, rather than being superficially addressed.

Political de facto Civil society Expertise

6B - Government engagement in public discourse

The government engages in regular debate with academia, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues in collaborative ways. The government co-organises discussions with independent think tanks or civil society organisations, or through joint media briefings.

Political de facto Civil society Effectiveness Expertise Openness

Q7 - Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

7A - Anti-corruption policy

There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy that applies to the defence sector.

Political de jure

7B - Effective implementation

The action plan at the ministry level reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system, and implementation has progressed according to the estimated timeline.

Political de facto Effectiveness

Q8 - Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

8A - Mandate and resources

There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, and they are suitably staffed and funded.

Political de jure and de facto Expertise Funding

8B - Independence

The institutions/ units are not in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions which they oversee. They report directly to a senior member of the Ministry of Defence (e.g. Chief of Staff).

Political de jure Independence

8C - Effectiveness

Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions. They are able to address risks independently and to ensure that other departments or units handle risks appropriately. Actions to handle risks may include training, oversight, or policy recommendations.

Political de facto Independence Expertise

Q9 - Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

9 -

The public view is that there is a clear commitment from the defence establishment that bribery and corruption are not acceptable and must be prosecuted, and that their efforts to tackle the problem are sincere and effective.

Political de facto Civil society

Q10 - Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?

10A - Risk assessments

Corruption risks are clearly identified. Individual departments conduct their own risk assessments in a process that reflects a culture of corruption risk assessment.

Political de facto Effectiveness Independence Expertise

10B - Regularity

Risk assessments are conducted on an annual basis or more frequently.

Political de facto Effectiveness

10C - Inputs to anti-corruption policy

Risk assessment findings are used to develop and regularly update the anti-corruption policy and institutional action plans.

Political de facto Effectiveness

Q11 - Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

11A - Acquisition planning process

There is a clear process for the entire acquisition planning cycle in place, with formally separate internal acquisition planning functions, e.g., budget, commercial, and finance. Connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit.

Political de jure

11B - Transparency

The public has access to information about the entire process itself so that information can be obtained as needed. Information that is proactively published includes justification of purchases, lines of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms, and outcomes.

Political de facto Transparency

11C - External oversight

There are strong external oversight functions that assess the country's long-term acquisition plans, their legitimacy and likelihood that plans are going to function properly. Parliament is also involved in oversight of acquisition planning.

Political de facto Parliament Oversight Effectiveness

Q12 - Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?

12A - Comprehensiveness

The defence budget contains comprehensive and disaggregated information on expenditure across functions. Information includes personnel (salaries, allowances), military R&D, training, construction, procurement/acquisitions, maintenance of equipment, disposal of assets, and administrative expenses (Ministry of Defence or other services).

Political de jure Budget Transparency

12B - Timeliness

The legislature receives an accurate defence budget proposal between 2-4 months before the start of the budget year.

Political de facto Parliament Budget Transparency

Q13 - Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?

13A - Formal rights

There is a defence committee with extensive formal rights of scrutiny of the defence budget. The committee has the power to scrutinise any aspect of budget and expenditures. The committee is in a position to require expert witnesses to appear in front of it.

Political de jure Defence Committee Oversight Budget

13B - Influence on decision-making

The committee has introduced amendments to the budget and there is evidence that in some instances these have resulted in changes to the budget. The committee engages in mid-year expenditure review and can strike out expenditures before they are incurred.

Political de facto Defence Committee Oversight Effectiveness Budget

Q14 - Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

14A - Proactive publication

The approved defence budget is proactively published for the public in disaggregated form. It is accompanied by an explanation of the budget intended for experts, as well as a concise summary with clear language for non-experts.

Political de facto Effectiveness Budget Transparency

14B - Comprehensiveness

The vast majority of the approved defence budget is fully disclosed to the media and civil society actors. There may be exceptions made for legitimate sensitive areas, but there is clear and robust oversight of the full budget by other suitable authorities.

Political de facto Oversight Budget Transparency

14C - Response to information requests

Information requested by citizens, media, and civil society about the defence budget is provided in a timely fashion, without systematic and unjustifiable delays. There are few instances where information is unduly refused or redacted for national security reasons.

Political de facto Civil society Effectiveness Budget Transparency

Q15 - Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

15A - Transparency

There is full publication of all sources of income, the amounts received, and the allocation of this income.

Political de facto Effectiveness Budget Transparency

15B - Institutional scrutiny

Mechanisms of scrutiny are in place and administered by a central government department, i.e., supreme audit institution, and the internal audit office within the defence ministry.

Political de facto Audit body Oversight Budget

15C - Public scrutiny

There is considerable and consistent scrutiny by the public, including media and CSOs.

Political de facto Oversight Outcomes Budget

Q16 - Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

16A - Activity

The internal audit unit engages in ongoing reviews of defence ministry expenditures and has the flexibility to build its own work programme for the year. Staff expertise is appropriate (e.g. there is low staff turnover rate). Its findings are valued by the defence minister.

Political de facto Audit body Oversight Effectiveness Independence Expertise Budget

16B - Enabling oversight

Oversight occurs for sensitive or critical issues. Enabling oversight bodies (e.g. parliamentary committees) are provided with non-redacted reports.

Political de facto Audit body Parliament Oversight Effectiveness Budget

16C - External scrutiny

Internal audit reports are proactively released to legitimate external audit bodies (e.g. anti-corruption organisations). The internal audit process is subject to regular and in depth reviews by external audit bodies.

Political de facto Audit body Oversight Effectiveness Budget Transparency

16D - Institutional outcomes

The ministry regularly addresses audit findings in its practices.

Political de facto Audit body Oversight Effectiveness Budget

Q17 - Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

17A - Activity

The external audit unit has the mandate to review the defence sector, and regularly audits military defence spending in a formal, in-depth process. Both financial audits and performance audits (value for money) of defence spending are conducted.

Political de jure and de facto Audit body Effectiveness Budget

17B - Independence

The external audit unit is independent of the executive. It has its own budget (e.g. passed by parliament rather than government), and there are legal protections in place for this budget not to be altered during the budget year.

Political de jure Audit body Independence Budget

17C - Transparency

External audit information is published online proactively (in accordance with existing FoIA regulations), within a reasonable timeline and in detail (e.g. including analysis on audited accounts, oral briefings, expert advice, investigative work).

Political de facto Audit body Effectiveness Budget Transparency

17D - Institutional outcomes

The ministry regularly addresses audit findings in its practices.

Political de facto Audit body Effectiveness Budget

Q18 - Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

18A - Legal framework

Defence institutions are, by statutory or constitutional means, entirely prohibited from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation

Political de jure

18B - Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation.

Political de facto

18C - Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice

There are no cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation, OR there may be isolated cases, but activity is legal.

Political de facto

18D - Transparency

These interests are publicly declared, with details of sources of income, operations, and expenditures being transparent, fully disclosed, and with standards of governance equivalent to publicly owned commercial enterprises.

Political de facto Transparency

18E - Scrutiny

These interests are subject to public and/ or parliamentary scrutiny that explicitly analyses the potential for impropriety.

Political de facto Parliament Civil society Oversight

Q19 - Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

19A - Penetration of organised crime

There is very low likelihood of military involvement in sectors in which organised crime operates.

Political de facto Outcomes

19B - Government response

The government is aware of the possibility of organised crime in the defence and security sector, and is taking action, or would be in a position to take action quickly should organised criminal activity take place. If there is a likelihood of organised criminal action taking place, the issue is included in the anti-corruption policy, and military leaders have publicly acknowledged the clear risk on this issue.

Political de facto Effectiveness

Q20 - Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

20A - Existence of policing function

There is a unit within the national police force that deals with organised crime and corruption in the defence services, or there is a unit within the military police with the same mandate.

Political de jure Police

20B - Independence

These policing functions operate independently of the bodies that they investigate, and their budget is ring-fenced.

Political de facto Police Independence

20C - Effectiveness

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence.

Political de facto Police Effectiveness

Q21 - Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?

21A - Independence

A parliamentary committee or independent body (e.g., appointed by PM) is designated to scrutinise the intelligence service’s policies, administration, and budgets. It functions without undue influence from the executive or the military. Its mandate is matched by the body’s powers and resources.

Political de jure and de facto Oversight Undue influence Expertise

21B - Effectiveness

The oversight function has access to classified information and meets at least every 2 months to review budget and expenditures, personnel issues, and policies of the intelligence services. Though meetings are held behind closed doors, a summary of findings is published.

Political de facto Oversight Effectiveness Transparency

Q22 - Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

22A - Objective selection criteria

Senior positions within the intelligence services are subject to objective selection criteria.

Political de jure and de facto Effectiveness HR

22B - Selection bias

There is no opportunity for intervention by third parties that may result in selection bias or undue influence in the selection of candidates.

Political de facto Effectiveness Undue influence HR

22C - Vetting process

There is full investigation of candidates’ suitability through vetting by external party. This includes a hiring panel with security clearance, and the right to call witnesses and demand information.

Political de facto Effectiveness HR

Q23 - Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

23A - Ratification

The country has both signed up to and ratified the ATT.

Political de jure Outcomes External

23B - Compliance

The country has complied with each of the three ATT articles.

Political de facto Outcomes External

23C - Parliamentary scrutiny

Upcoming arms exports are subject to robust parliamentary approval and debate.

Political de facto Parliament Oversight External

Q24 - How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

24A - Controls

There is a clear policy or regulatory process, and there is an internal unit responsible for advising or overseeing the procedures, e.g., internal audit. There is a coordinating body within ministry that is responsible for aggregating disposal database reports.

Financial de jure Budget

24B - Transparency of disposal process

Planned disposals are known in advance and are published publicly on the ministry's website, before a buyer has been identified. Comprehensive information is published, including specific details on the items that are being sold (location, timing, type of item, etc.)

Financial de facto Effectiveness Budget Transparency

24C - Transparency of financial results of disposals

The financial results of disposals are regularly publicly available and they are disaggregated.

Financial de facto Effectiveness Budget Transparency

Q25 - Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

25A - Scrutiny

Asset disposals are regularly scrutinised by an audit body, either the Supreme Audit Institution or Parliament. Scrutiny is thorough and formalised.

Financial de facto Audit body Parliament Oversight Budget

25B - Independence

Neither the executive nor the military unduly influence scrutiny by the audit body regarding asset disposals.

Financial de facto Audit body Parliament Undue influence Budget

25C - Transparency

Comprehensive audit reports are available to the public within a reasonable time frame.

Financial de facto Effectiveness Budget Transparency

Q26 - What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

26 -

One per cent or less of expenditure is dedicated to secret items.

Financial de facto Budget Secret items

Q27 - Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

27 -

The appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature are provided with extensive information on all spending on secret items, which includes detailed, line item descriptions of all expenditures, and disaggregated data.

Financial de facto Parliament Budget Secret items

Q28 - Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military and intelligence services) subject to parliamentary debate?

28A - Comprehensiveness

Legislators are provided with detailed audit reports related to the security sector and other secret programmes. Audit reports examine all expenditures (major and minor),

Financial de facto Audit body Parliament Oversight Budget Secret items

28B - Parliamentary scrutiny

Parliament or the appropriate committee regularly requires documentation or testimony from the military and/or intelligence services regarding the findings of the audit report. It also highlights any shortcomings in the audit process.

Financial de facto Audit body Parliament Oversight Effectiveness Budget Secret items

Q29 - In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled? In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

29A - Permitted exceptions

Off-budget expenditures are not permitted by law

Financial de jure Budget Secret items

29B - Recording mechanisms

All off-budget expenditures are recorded in the respective budgets.

Financial de facto Budget Secret items

29C - Prevalence

Off-budget military expenditures are rare.

Financial de facto Outcomes Budget Secret items

Q30 - Are mechanisms for accessing information from the defence sector effective?

30A - Legal framework

There is legislation and implementing guidelines that clearly stipulate: 1) how the public can access defence information; 2) what information is and is not available 3) how classified information is categorised 4) how the public can appeal those decisions 5) that there is an active, accessible, independent, external appeal or review body to review access to information decisions.

Financial de jure Transparency

30B - Classification of information

The government operates a system of classification of information under a clear legal framework to ensure that information is adequately protected.

Financial de jure Transparency

30C - Effectiveness

The public is able to access information regularly, within a reasonable timeline, and in detail.

Financial de facto Outcomes Transparency

Q31 - Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

31A - Extent of commercial ventures

Defence and security institutions do not own commercial businesses of any significant scale. (Equivalent to 1% of the defence budget or less.)

Financial de facto Outcomes

31B - Transparency

Any ownership of commercial businesses is publicly declared, with details of their operations and finances being transparent, fully disclosed, and with standards of governance equivalent to publicly owned commercial enterprises.

Financial de facto Transparency

Q32 - Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

32A - Independent scrutiny

There are no military-owned businesses, or where military-owned businesses exist they subject their financial statements to an independent external audit, based on relevant international auditing standards.

Financial de facto Audit body Private sector Oversight Outcomes

32B - Transparency

Full audit details are available to the public.

Financial de facto Audit body Private sector Transparency

Q33 - Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government’s reaction to such enterprise?

33A - Prohibition

The government strictly outlaws any unauthorised private enterprise, with appropriate sanctions in place to deal with offenders.

Financial de jure Private sector

33B - Prevalence

Unauthorised private enterprise does not occur.

Financial de facto Private sector Outcomes

Q34 - Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit, through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates, to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

34A - Chiefs/Ministers: Internal communications

There is a clear commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry, as declared by the Defence Minister, the Chief of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs. Internal commitment is demonstrated through proactive anti-corruption measures, and regular communications about integrity from top level officers in service publications. There is a consistency of message, speaking to current violations and evidence that the integrity system is being implemented.

Personnel de facto

34B - Chiefs/Ministers: Public commitment

Public commitment is demonstrated through interviews with journalists and CSOs, and statements at events and conferences. Anti-corruption is part of public talking points for top level officers, with explicit reference to integrity and good defence governance, and management of corruption risks.

Personnel de facto

34C - Unit commanders and leaders

This commitment is reflected throughout the defence ministry and armed forces by similar statements from senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers, at unit parades, graduation ceremonies, and in writing through service publications. There is explicit reference to integrity and good defence governance, and management of corruption risks.

Personnel de facto

Q35 - Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there evidence that these measures are being carried out?

35A - Sanctions

There are a range of clearly defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector. These offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.

Personnel de jure Military Civilian personnel

35B - Enforcement

Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes and without undue political influence.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness

Q36 - Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

36A - Legal provisions

Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists and is applicable to military and official personnel. There is explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers, including: protection of identity, protection against retribution, reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation, waiver of liability for the whistleblower, no sanctions for misguided reporting, right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing.

Personnel de jure

36B - Prioritisation

Whistleblowing is actively encouraged through training, information, and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistleblowers. There is a well-resourced independent unit that handles claims, and institution-wide campaigns about whistleblowing that covers personnel at all levels.

Personnel de facto Expertise Funding Training

36C - Effectiveness

Officials and personnel are confident that adequate protections (and protection of identity) are provided for whistleblowers and individuals reporting corruption claims.

Personnel de facto Effectiveness

Q37 - Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

37A - Coverage of sensitive (higher-risk) positions

Special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, i.e., individuals with significant autonomy over personnel, resources, and the policies/plans that determine them. This includes decision-making power in procurement, recruitment, contracting, financial and commercial management.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel HR

37B - Selection process

There are specific procedures in place which limits conflicts of interest for these sensitive positions. This includes revolving door limitations and stringent vetting. Standard appointment/recruitment processes are followed for particular technical competencies.

Personnel de jure and de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness HR

37C - Oversight

There is internal oversight in the ministry of defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions. Higher risk and sensitive positions are also subject to external scrutiny.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Oversight Effectiveness HR

Q38 - Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

38A - Accuracy

The number of civilian and military personnel is updated on at least a quarterly basis. There are established processes for publishing and verifying statistics on the composition of the armed forces.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness

38B - Transparency

Information on the number of civilian and military personnel is made available publicly by the Ministry of Defence, disaggregated by rank bracket.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Transparency

38C - Ghost soldiers

The military has not been presented with the problem of ghost soldiers in the last five years.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Outcomes

Q39 - Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

39A - Pay rates

Pay rates for all civilian and military personnel are published in service publications, disaggregated by rank. Summarised information is made available to the general public, e.g., on the ministry website.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Transparency

39B - Allowances

Allowances for all civilian and military personnel are openly published, including criteria for eligibility and calculation methods.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Transparency

Q40 - Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

40A - Timeliness

Personnel receive pay on time.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness

40B - Accuracy

Personnel receive the correct pay.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness

40C - Transparency

The payment and allowances system is openly published. It includes all of the following, at a minimum: - Pay brackets for all ranks, disaggregated by seniority. - Details on how individual pay is calculated, including time starting in post / away from post - A list of all permitted allowances and expenses, the entitlement criteria, and caps on entitlement - Separated administrative, unit and audit responsibilities

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Transparency

Q41 - Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

41A - Formal process

The system for appointment of military personnel at middle and top management applies objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes. Promotion boards are open and representatives from other branches of the armed forces are invited and regularly sit on the board. The civil service is involved for very high level ranks.

Personnel de jure and de facto Military Effectiveness Undue influence

41B - Scrutiny

Appointments are subject to external scrutiny for high profile positions, which includes both process audits and a sample of individual promotions. Parliament also scrutinises decisions for very high level appointments.

Personnel de facto Military Parliament Oversight Effectiveness

41C - Transparency

Information on the appointment process is publicly available and includes the selection criteria for each rank.

Personnel de facto Military Effectiveness Transparency

Q42 - Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

42A - Formal process

Personnel promotions are conducted through formal appraisal processes and promotions boards for all personnel. Promotions to senior ranks are open to scrutiny by independent personnel that are outside the chain of command. Service members from separate branches sit on the boards as independent observers.

Personnel de jure and de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Undue influence

42B - Exceptions

If a force permits any other means of awarding rank, such as acting rank or battlefield promotion, there are regulations that clearly limit the possible circumstances and place specific requirements on further progression.

Personnel de jure Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Undue influence

42C - Comprehensiveness

The following information is publicly declared for all officers above OF-4: - Name, - rank, - new post - effective date Equivalent information is available on request for civil service counterparts.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Transparency

42D - Frequency

Details of postings and promotions are published regularly (at least annually) within the system, and in advance of their effective date.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Transparency

Q43 - Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

43A - Policy

There is a policy and strict rules addressing bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription that clearly apply to all parties engaging in this. Bribery offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty.

Personnel de jure Military

43B - Sanctions

Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.

Personnel de jure Military

43C - Enforcement

Appropriate sanctions or punishments are applied when bribery occurs.

Personnel de facto Military Effectiveness

Q44 - is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

44A - Policy

There is a policy and strict rules relating to bribery for soliciting preferred postings. Bribery offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty.

Personnel de jure Military

44B - Sanctions

Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.

Personnel de jure Military

44C - Enforcement

Appropriate sanctions or punishments are regularly applied when bribery occurs.

Personnel de facto Military Effectiveness

Q45 - Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

45 -

Chains of command are strictly separated from chains of payment throughout the ministry and armed forces.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Independence

Q46 - Is there a Code of Conduct for all military personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities? Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed?

46A - Code of conduct

There is a code of conduct, as a simple, readily understandable guide, for all military personnel, which comprehensively explains bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities. It provides specific guidance on how to proceed in the face of these events.

Personnel de jure Military

46B - Transparency

The code of conduct is available to the public and effectively distributed to all military personnel.

Personnel de facto Military Transparency

46C - Enforcement

Breaches of the code of conduct are regularly investigated, even if the oversight mechanism is confidential. Cases are pursued where there is evidence of criminal behavior.

Personnel de facto Military

46D - Training

Guidance on the code of conduct is included in induction training for all military personnel.

Personnel de facto Military Training

Q47 - Is there a Code of Conduct for all civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities? Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed?

47A - Code of conduct

There is a code of conduct, as a simple, readily understandable guide, for all civilian personnel, which comprehensively explains bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities. It provides specific guidance on how to proceed in the face of these events.

Personnel de jure Civilian personnel

47B - Transparency

The code of conduct is available to the public and effectively distributed to all civilian personnel.

Personnel de facto Civilian personnel Transparency

47C - Enforcement

Breaches of the code of conduct are regularly investigated, even if the oversight mechanism is confidential. Cases are pursued where there is evidence of criminal behavior.

Personnel de facto Civilian personnel

47D - Training

Guidance on the code of conduct is included in induction training for all civilian personnel.

Personnel de facto Civilian personnel Training

Q48 - Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

48A - Comprehensiveness

Anti-corruption training addresses the connection between corruption and the following topics: organisational values and standards, impact of the organisation, military effectiveness; identification and reporting of corruption, and risk management.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Training

48B - Regularity

Anti-corruption training is delivered upon induction, once a year and upon entry to high risk positions and environments, and once a year for high risk personnel. It is also woven into promotion courses at all levels.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Training

48C - Coverage of personnel

Anti-corruption training is delivered to personnel at each rank bracket of the military and the equivalent for civilian personnel.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Training

Q49 - Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

49A - Policy

There is a formal policy of the defence institution to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available.

Personnel de jure Military Civilian personnel Transparency

49B - Transparency

Both the charges and results of prosecutions are made publicly available. For court martials above a certain rank, information is released to public as matter of course. This includes the date, location and details of the charge, and information on the hearing.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Transparency

49C - Effectiveness

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence.

Personnel de facto Military Civilian personnel Effectiveness Undue influence

Q50 - Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

50A - Legal framework

Facilitation payments are strictly and clearly illegal.

Personnel de jure

50B - Enforcement

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes. There is little substantive concern expressed from independent commentators over undue political influence.

Personnel de facto Effectiveness Undue influence

50C - Prevalence

Facilitation payments in the defence and security sector are very rare.

Personnel de facto Outcomes

Q51 - Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

51A - Military doctrine

The country has a comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels. The doctrine recognises that international actors can contribute to increasing corruption risks and offers guidance on mitigating these risks. Issues addressed by the doctrine include support for political actors, contracting, interaction with local population, partnering with local forces, and security sector reform in operational contexts. The doctrine also details the practicalities of implementation.

Operational de jure Military

51B - Transparency

The doctrine is made publicly available.

Operational de facto Military Transparency

Q52 - Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment?

52 -

There is comprehensive training in corruption issues that is required for commanders at all levels. Training is delivered as part of military education e.g., at military academies, and in pre-deployment training for specific missions.

Operational de facto Military Effectiveness Expertise Training

Q53 - Is corruption as a strategic issue considered in the forward planning of operations? If so, is there evidence that commanders at all levels apply this knowledge in the field?

53A - Forward planning

Corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account in the forward planning of operations.

Operational de facto Military

53B - Application

Corruption is taken into account in planning for operations, and in execution of some actions during operations (e.g. procurement). Larger operations have independent evaluations conducted by an Inspector General or similar body.

Operational de facto Military Oversight Effectiveness

Q54 - Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

54A - Corruption monitoring

Expert personnel capable of monitoring corruption are regularly deployed and report on the status of corruption within mission at least once every six months. Reports contain assessments of the most significant corruption risks, the manner in which corruption can affect the goals of the mission, and the effectiveness of mitigation measures being employed.

Operational de facto Military Effectiveness Expertise

54B - M&E policy

M&E guidance for the mission clearly specifies how to monitor corruption risks, and establishes the procedural basis for personnel to monitor corruption.

Operational de jure Military

54C - Transparency

Reports are made available to the public and the relevant oversight bodies such as the parliament. Any content that is withheld is legitimately justified.

Operational de facto Military Effectiveness Transparency

Q55 - Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

55A - Comprehensiveness

Guidelines exist specifically for operations (e.g. standard operating procedures at the level of contracting). The guidelines address the following risks in contracting in operations: asset disposals, local power brokers, contract delivery monitoring, security of equipment and personnel.

Operational de jure Military

55B - Training

Staff are specifically trained on the types of corruption risks in contracting that are prevalent during operations or peacekeeping missions. These risks include: asset disposals, local power brokers, contract delivery monitoring, security of equipment and personnel.

Operational de facto Military Expertise Training

Q56 - Are private military contractors employed and if so, are they subject to a similar level of scrutiny as for the armed forces?

56A - Policies

The use of private military contractors is forbidden by law or the law may allow them to be employed in extremely limited circumstances which do not expose them to risk of corruption. The legal standard applicable to PMCs does not vary widely from standards applied to state representatives in the same roles, and it criminalises corruption-related offences for PMCs.

Operational de jure Private sector

56B - Scrutiny

Laws of the contracting state contain clear provisions for oversight of PMCs. Active scrutiny is conducted by the relevant oversight bodies such as the parliament.

Operational de jure and de facto Private sector Parliament Oversight Effectiveness

56C - Enforcement

Policies and laws on the use of PMCs are rarely violated, and when they are, sanctions are regularly applied.

Operational de facto Private sector Outcomes

Q57 - Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement with clauses specific to corruption risks, and are any items exempt from these laws?

57A - Legal framework

The country has clear and comprehensive legislation that covers all defence and national security purchases with no exemptions.

Procurement de jure Secret items

57B - Corruption risks

The legislation recognises the risks of corruption and makes clear and comprehensive provisions to mitigate these risks.

Procurement de jure

57C - Effectiveness

The legislation on defence procurement is thoroughly implemented and followed for all defence procurement.

Procurement de facto Effectiveness

Q58 - Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

58A - Formal procedures

The entire defence procurement cycle, from: 1) assessment of needs; 2) contract implementation and sign-off, and 3) asset disposal, is fully formalised.

Procurement de jure

58B - Transparency

Detailed procedures for the entire defence procurement cycle are disclosed, with clear explanation and in disaggregated form. This includes assessment of needs, contract implementation and sign-off, asset disposal; process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation.

Procurement de jure Effectiveness Transparency

58C - Implementation

There are detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle and there is evidence that these are followed in practice.

Procurement de facto Effectiveness

Q59 - Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

59A - Independence

Procurement oversight mechanisms are independent, formalised processes. Parliament, the military, business, or politically well-connected individuals have no undue influence on their performance.

Procurement de facto Oversight Effectiveness Undue influence

59B - Effectiveness

Procurement oversight mechanisms are highly active in summoning witness and documents, demanding explanations, issuing recommendations or conclusions that are being followed or implemented, and they can exercise their ability to cancel projects.

Procurement de facto Oversight Effectiveness

59C - Transparency

Comprehensive evidence of activity (e.g. reports, announcements in the press of the cancellation of procurement programmes, the release of financial information) is made available to the public by the relevant procurement oversight institutions (e.g. parliamentary committee, a national audit function or bureau of public procurement).

Procurement de facto Audit body Oversight Effectiveness Transparency

Q60 - Are potential defence purchases made public?

60A - Policies

The Government publishes comprehensive forward planning for potential purchases which extends 10-15 years in advance, e.g. through a strategic defence review, white paper or similar.

Procurement de facto Effectiveness Transparency

60B - Notice of planned purchases

The government publishes the plans for defence purchases in detail for at least the next 4 years. The adequate and timely information (e.g. elements of the defence equipment plan, itemized budget proposals) is sufficient to enable prospective suppliers to prepare and seek further information, and enough for oversight agencies and civil society to debate the necessity of the proposed purchases (e.g. the average procurement duration, justification of exceptions, and specific overview records by type of bidding procedure).

Procurement de facto Oversight Effectiveness Budget Transparency

Q61 - Are actual defence purchases made public?

61A - Comprehensiveness

Defence purchases are made public in detail, with almost no exceptions. Very little data from the tender/contract is redacted for national security reasons. For both confidential and non-confidential purchases, there is disclosure of the tender and the contract award. For the contract, there is a description of the item purchased, the winning bidder, the beneficial owners, price paid, whole of lifecycle costs, cost of servicing, costs of parts, and delivery/completion date.

Procurement de facto Effectiveness Budget Transparency

61B - Accessible data

Data is almost always released in an accessible format (e.g. excel file) which allows for useful comparisons (e.g. how many tenders a company has won).

Procurement de facto Effectiveness Budget Transparency

Q62 - What procedures and standards are companies required to have – such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes – in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

62A - Formal policies

There are laws and procedures detailing how the government discriminates in its selection of suppliers and sub-contractors on the basis of their integrity. For example, suppliers and sub-contractors are required to show that they have a formal and publicly declared anti-corruption programme in place that adheres to minimum standards established and specified by the procurement authority. The substance of the programme and standards are included in the main contract as well as subcontracts throughout the supply chain.

Procurement de jure Private sector Transparency

62B - Consistent implementation

There is evidence that these policies and laws are consistently implemented, including for strategically important suppliers.

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness

Q63 - Are procurement requirements derived from a national defence and security strategy, and are procurement decisions well-audited? Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

63A - Procurement requirements

Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy, and there is logical flow down from strategy to individual procurement with no exceptions.

Procurement de facto Effectiveness

63B - Scrutiny

There is active scrutiny conducted by a number of legally or constitutionally mandated oversight mechanisms (e.g. the parliamentary oversight committee, the inspector general, or the national audit office) to confirm that procurement is in line with national security strategy or that work is undertaken to quantify the need for purchases.

Procurement de facto Audit body Oversight Effectiveness

63C - Purchases

The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces systematically base all purchases on clearly identified and quantified requirements.

Procurement de facto Outcomes

Q64 - Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

64A - Open competition

The vast majority (90%+) of defence procurements are conducted as an open competition, except in clearly defined and limited circumstances. There is a relatively small component (less than 10%) of single-sourcing.

Procurement de facto Private sector Outcomes

64B - Scrutiny of single/restricted competition procedures

All single source and restricted competition procedure contracts must be justified and subject to external scrutiny (such as parliament or the external audit office), who have the power to reject the competition procedure selected.

Procurement de jure Private sector Oversight

Q65 - Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

65A - Conflicts of interest

Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest. Procurement officials are subject to restrictions on professional activity (e.g., shareholders of contracting firms, board member, advisor, or company officer of private firm, post-employment, etc.) and are required to file financial disclosure reports to demonstrate that neither the official nor his or her family have financial conflicts of interest in their work. Annual training is provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest.

Procurement de jure and de facto Effectiveness Undue influence Expertise Training

65B - Audit Trail

There is a comprehensive audit trail of which officials were involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification. There is also an audit trail of which officials (including politicians) are involved in tender award decisions.

Procurement de facto Audit body Oversight Effectiveness Transparency

65C - Transparency

Tender boards regulations and codes of conduct are fully transparent

Procurement de facto Effectiveness Transparency

65D - Scrutiny

There is robust external verification that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate.

Procurement de facto Audit body Oversight Effectiveness

Q66 - Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

66A - Legal framework

Laws are in place that prohibit collusion within the defence sector, where collusion is defined as between an official and a bidder or between bidders.

Procurement de jure Private sector Effectiveness

66B - Sanctions

There is clear legislation and implementing guidelines empowering procurement officials to exclude companies and senior company officials where there is a conviction or reasonable evidence of bribery & corruption related offences. An offence can result in prosecution, debarment from current and future competitions, or other sanctions, including heavy fines or imprisonment.

Procurement de jure Private sector

66C - Enforcement

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without third-party interference (e.g. undue political influence).

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness

66D - Training

Procurement officials are trained to identify collusion patterns and report potential malpractice.

Procurement de facto Private sector Expertise Training

Q67 - Are there mechanisms and procedures that ensure that contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

67A - Reporting policies & procedures

There are formal policies and procedures that outline how to monitor, assess and report upon a supplier's service and or delivery obligations. These include resolution or sanctioning procedures for incomplete or inadequate service delivery.

Procurement de jure Private sector

67B - Transparency

All contracts are publicly available including modifications post award (such as change of sub-contractor, change of beneficial owner, additional costs, such as a consultant) are publicly available alongside the original contract award enabling scrutiny and oversight of changes. Oversight agencies receive information on and scrutinise quality of product and service delivery.

Procurement de facto Private sector Oversight Effectiveness Transparency

67C - Monitoring

Officials regularly produce contract monitoring and completion reports. These include supplier and subcontractors performance appraisals, which is separately verified. If the contract was not sufficiently completed, action is taken for breach of contract.

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness

67D - Enforcement

All breaches of contract are adequately acted upon. Issues are either dealt with internally, or raised with higher management in the ministry. If not resolved, issues are referred for further external scrutiny e.g. to the national audit office and defence committee.

Procurement de facto Private sector Audit body Oversight Effectiveness

Q68 - Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

68A - Complaints mechanisms

Formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. This may include both a court process and an internal complaints mechanism.

Procurement de jure Private sector

68B - Effectiveness and Accessibility

The complaints mechanisms available to companies are efficient and reasonably priced, and are regularly used.

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness

68C - Retaliation

For genuine (non-malicious) complaints, companies believe that they will not be discriminated against in future procurements.

Procurement de facto Private sector Outcomes

Q69 - What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

69A - Sanctions

There is clear legislation and implementing guidelines empowering procurement officials to exclude companies and senior company officials where there is a conviction or credible evidence of bribery & corruption related offences.

Procurement de jure Private sector

69B - Undue influence

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence.

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness Undue influence

69C - Application of sanctions

An offence can result in prosecution, exclusion from current and future competitions, or other sanctions, including heavy fines or imprisonment.

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness

Q70 - When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing anti-corruption due diligence on contractors and third parties?

70A - Legal framework

The government prohibits offset contracts by law.

Procurement de jure Private sector

70B - Due diligence

The government imposes stringent anti-corruption due diligence on contractors and third parties during offset contract negotiations

Procurement de jure Private sector

Q71 - How does the government monitor offset contracts?

71A - Policies & procedures

There are formal policies and procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts. This includes procedures for reporting on completed work, for addressing inadequate work, for sanctioning, and for following the chain of command.

Procurement de jure Private sector

71B - Transparency

The government makes public a list of the contracts (including details of the investments and the supplying companies), details of the current performance of offset programmes, and copies of the contracts themselves. It also makes public the details of planned offsets contracts to enable public and civil society comment before contract award

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness Transparency

71C - Monitoring

Officials regularly produce a completion report with supplier performance appraisals, which is separately verified.

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness

71D - Enforcement

If the contract is not sufficiently completed, action is always taken for breach of contract.

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness

Q72 - What level of competition are offset contracts subject to?

72 -

Offset contracts are conducted as open competition, except in clearly defined circumstances. All single source contracts are justified and subject to external scrutiny (such as parliament or the external audit office), who have the power to reject the purchase.

Procurement de facto Private sector Oversight Effectiveness

Q73 - How strongly does the government control the company’s use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

73A - Policies

The use of agents and intermediaries is either prohibited by law or regulated by a strict and clear policy which requires as a minimum that anti-corruption clauses are included in contracts with agents, companies register agents and declare all forms of remuneration, agents receive payments into local accounts and company contracts outline the right to audit agent financial accounts by government agencies.

Procurement de jure Private sector Audit body Transparency

73B - Enforcement

Sanctions are usually applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.

Procurement de facto Private sector Effectiveness

Q74 - Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

74 -

Principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals are comprehensively detailed and made publicly available after the signing of the contracts. This information includes payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements.

Procurement de facto Private sector Transparency

Q75 - How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

75A - Prevalence: selling nations

Almost no acquisitions are granted as a result of political influence by selling nations.

Procurement de facto Outcomes Undue influence External

75B - Justification

The government cites clear and justifiable military need for purchases and from particular supplier.

Procurement de facto Effectiveness Undue influence External

75C - Prevalence: domestic pressures

Almost no acquisitions are granted as a result of domestic political pressures.

Procurement de facto Outcomes Undue influence External

Q76 - Does the country regulate lobbying of defence institutions?

76A - Legal framework

The country has a robust framework for regulating lobbying activity: it ensures comprehensive coverage of the lobbying community through broad but clear definitions of lobbyists and their activities. Lobbying legislation applies to the defence sector.

Political de jure

76B - Disclosure: Public officials

Public officials in defence institutions are required to regularly publish and update records of lobbying meetings by specifying the details and frequency of interactions with lobbyists. They are also required to publish any conflicts of interest risks that have been identified and the mitigating actions taken.

Political de jure Transparency

76C - Lobbyist registration system

The country has a mandatory registration system that allows public disclosure of a lobbyist’s identity, their clients, issue areas, targets, activities and financial information. Public officials may agree to meet a lobbyist only after checking whether the lobbyist has been entered in the register of lobbyists.

Political de jure Transparency

76D - Oversight & enforcement

There is a well-resourced oversight entity with a clear and strong mandate for oversight of lobbying. Sanctions for misconduct include criminal offences for serious breaches of policies and procedures and are regularly enforced.

Political de jure and de facto Oversight Effectiveness

Q77 - Is comprehensive data on actual spending on defence published during the budget year?

77A - Proactive publication

Details of actual spending on defence and security are proactively published in disaggregated form. They are accompanied by an explanation intended for experts, as well as concise summaries with clear language for non-experts.

Financial de facto Effectiveness Budget Transparency

77B - Comprehensiveness

The vast majority of actual defence spending is fully disclosed. There may be exceptions made for legitimate sensitive areas, but there is clear and robust oversight of the full budget by other suitable authorities.

Financial de facto Effectiveness Budget Transparency

77C - Timeliness

Details of actual spending are published within six months of the end of the financial year.

Financial de facto Budget Transparency

77D - Comparison against budget

Variances between the published budget and actual spend are detailed and explained.

Financial de facto Budget Transparency