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Q49.

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

49a. Policy

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SCORE: 0/100

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49b. Transparency

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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49c. Effectiveness

Score

SCORE: 50/100

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The Prosecutor General’s Office regularly publishes in its annual reports to the parliament the statistics on prosecutions, including the prosecution of Ministry of Defence (MoD) and military officials and staffs. The statistics provide the overall number of criminal proceedings, the type of violation and the outcome of the prosecution process. However, no data are provided on the content of cases [1, 2, 3]. The referral by the MoD to the Prosecution Office of the former minister of defence and several high-level military officials during 2013-2014, and the referral to the Prosecution by the State Supreme Audit Institution (SSAI) of nine officials have been broadly covered by the media and as a result, the public was kept informed about the proceedings of those cases.

Charges are usually made public by the prosecution in response to media attention and often by the defendants, but there is no policy for the proactive release of details on the charges or the hearings conducted by the prosecutors. Details may be made public during trials when prosecutions result in lawsuits [1].

Cases are investigated, but they mainly are a result of political incentives rather than from thorough investigations [1, 2]. Often cases are referred to the prosecution without proper investigation, leading to the cases either being dismissed or ruled in favour of the defendants in the courts [3, 4]. In 2015 the SSAI referred to the prosecution of 12 MoD officials for improper budgeting, procurements, and mismanagement in the implementation of contracts [5]. The MoD rejected the report on claims that it was a political fabrication influenced by the opposition [6].
This fits with the overall trend in corruption investigations, prosecution and trials. In 2015 there were 1492 cases registered from the prosecutor’s office for criminal offences in the field of corruption and 440 persons were indicted, while 212 cases (about 13.9%) were sent to trial. In 2016 there were 1526 cases registered, and 386 people were indicted, while 192 cases were sent for trial [7].

No evidence could be found that there is a formal policy to make public outcomes of prosecutions of defence services personnel available; see the country’s last assessment (1). Rules coded in the Code of Military Justice do not suggest that there is such a policy. According to Art. 41, the procedures and the investigations are secret. Moreover, all persons who are involved in the procedures are bound by professional secrecy (2). In Art. 135, the court can forbid reporting on the proceedings of the cases. Violations of rules can be subject to prosecution (3). There are reports in the media about corruption cases in the military last year, but no information was given if the armed forces proved the information (4), (5).

The outcomes of the prosecution of defence service personnel for corruption activities are generally not made public. A recent report from the US Department of State noted that the Algerian “government did not always provide information on disciplinary or legal action against the police, military, or other security personnel” (1, p. 4). No information was provided on the website of the Defence Ministry (4). No website for the Military Judiciary or evidence of other official communication procedures were found. However, there are reports on the current corruption cases involving five high-ranking military officers in the media (2), (3).

There is no evidence that prosecutions of corruption cases in the defence sectors have been effective. If there have been any effective prosecutions, they have not been made known to the public; see the country’s last assessment (1). The corruption cases of the five high-ranking military members of October 2018 have yet concluded and no assessment of the effectiveness can be made yet (see the answer to question 35). In 2018, there have been discussions that the trials were connected to the scheduled presidential elections in 2019 and possible power struggles (2). In 2019, there was a report that one of the accused was on the run. (3) Arrest warrants against two others were also issued in spring 2019 (4). No other examples of military personnel being prosecuted for bribery or corruption have been found since 2016. Newspaper articles reporting on the five generals compared the case to the trial of General Beloucif who embezzled money from the Department of National Defence’s coffers in the 1990s (5).

Further assessments on the Algerian judiciary suggest that civil trials are not without undue political influence. For example, one observer stated that the intelligence service (DRS) interferes with the work of the judiciary (6). Freedom House noted that the judiciary is vulnerable to government pressure since the president appoints all judges and prosecutors. Additionally, the High Judicial Council is led by the president, who also selects its judges (7).

One prominent civil case provides evidence that obvious cases are not prosecuted. The case of the former Minister of Energy, Chekib Kheli, who was close to former President Bouteflika, was also mentioned in the country’s last assessment. Khelil was accused of being involved in a complex international money-laundering system. In a court case in Italy, it was exposed that he had received bribes of nearly 200 million euros. To the surprise of many, the Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia announced in November of 2017 that the case would be closed (8).

There is no stated policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defense personnel. Prosecution cases and their outcomes have been disclosed mainly by the media.

Court documents such as indictments and sentencing are considered public documents; however, in practice access to court hearings and documents is often restricted for the media, even more so for the military courts (1).

Cases are investigated but are not often prosecuted. There are indications for clear undue influence in the decision-making process in recent years; for example, President Dos Santos’ decisions to grant a broad amnesty in 2016 and to shelve more than four years of inspection investigations in 2017 (1). The inspector general of the Angolan Armed Forces (IGFAA), apparently later merged with the inspector general of National Defence, has conducted investigations into corruption-related activities within the defence sector. However, although senior officials were investigated, no prosecutions followed.

Based on the broad amnesty issued by Dos Santos in 2016, several corruption-related investigations based on complaints presented by Rafael Marques and several lawyers were shelved. Furthermore, in September 2017, the inspector general of the state administration, a direct subordinate of the president, shelved all ongoing investigations opened between January 1, 2013, and August 30, 2017 (2).

In 2010, an IGFAA inspection ordered by the president led to the dismissal of Francisco Pereira Furtado the then General Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, for alleged involvement in corruption. However, Furtado was not prosecuted, and in 2014 his alleged co-conspirator, Furtado’s arms and logistics director, General Fernando Vasquez Araújo, was later appointed to another top post in the same area of work (3).

In 2011, Rafael Marques filed a criminal complaint at the attorney general’s office against nine powerful generals on allegations of corruption and torture, which included the then inspector-general of the Joint Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (it’s unclear whether that post still exists), Carlos Alberto Hendrick da Silva. The complaint was never investigated. Subsequently, the powerful general who retired as an inspector in 2017, was among the plaintiffs in a defamation lawsuit against the journalist (4), (5).

In 2018, President Lourenço ordered an investigation on corrupt practices of the military intelligence chief, General Zé Maria. He has since retired but hasn’t been prosecuted (6).

There is no evidence of the existence of a specific policy that aims to make public the results of prosecution procedures due to corruption of personnel belonging to the defence jurisdiction.

Military personnel who are prosecuted are removed from the Institution, in accordance with article 20, subsection 6 of the Military Personnel Law. [1] The Judicial Information Centre allows access to the causes of corruption entered and in force with the pertinent constitutional limitations. [2]

In 2008, Argentina repealed its military justice code through Law 26.394 so all members of the Armed Forces can be tried in Federal Jurisdiction. The Centre for Judicial Information of the Argentinean State provides information on judgements carried out at the Federal Level, [1] which can also be found on the Supreme Court website, in accordance with Law 26.856. [2] [3] However, defence institutions do not regularly publish information on accusations or ongoing trials with sufficient regularity. [4] As such, prosecutions of civilian personnel would be made public however, prosecutions of defence personnel would not.

There are cases of corruption within the defence jurisdiction that the Anti-Corruption Office has reported to the courts (eg: alleged illicit enrichment in the Argentine Army; alleged request for bribes from civilian personnel; etc). [5] However, the institutions with jurisdiction over these cases do not follow-up or not publish further details. Only in very specific cases does the media publish aspects of these prosecutions. [6] [7]

There is Not Enough Information to score this indicator. Under law, cases involving the military should be investigated and prosecuted through a formal process, but it is not clear just how much undue influence is exercised over them.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) provides a comprehensive Concept on Public Awareness stressing the importance and outlining the scope of public consultations. The main purpose of the document is to define the ways and means of creating a public awareness strategy on the activities of the MoD and the General Staff of the Armed Forces and to increase the level of public awareness on the programs and reforms which are designed to improve and modernize the defence sector. The concept focuses on the importance of public awareness and consultations, specifically in promoting reforms aiming at the transparent and accountable interaction with partners and stakeholders both publicly and institutionally [1]. However, there is no policy specifically designated for making public outcomes of the prosecution of defence service personnel for corrupt activities.

The whole prosecution process is made public, regardless of the position and the rank the person has. Media outlets are very active in providing information on the prosecution process. After a case arrives at the court and the decision is made, it can be obtained at datalex.am website, provided the name of the prosecuted person is available [1].

Cases of prosecution of defence service personnel are widely discussed in the media outlets. As Mediamax reported in February 2018, 1207 criminal cases were revealed in the armed forces in 2017. Corruption cases totalled to 116 in 2017, thirty-six criminal cases that involved seventy-two individuals were sent to court [1].
The PanArmenian news agency also addressed the increase in corruption cases in 2017 [2]. More investigative cases were reported in mediaю [3, 4]. Some extra-parliamentary opposition representatives after the Velvet Revolution have argued that some prosecutions are still politically motivated [5].

The Judge Advocate General of the Australian Defence Force has a detailed and publicly available policy obliging the public release of outcomes of completed court martial and Defence Force Magistrate cases and details of upcoming court martial and case proceedings [1]. These outcomes and details of upcoming proceedings are published on the Office of the Judge Advocate General website [2] “as soon as possible” after outcomes are determined or the details of the proceedings confirmed [1, p1-2]. There are several possible grounds for non-publication, including national security, due process, and public morals [1, p3]. This policy was put into place in March 2019; before this date, only aggregated prosecution statistics and selected and anonymised case summaries appear to be publicly available in Director of Military Prosecutions Annual Reports [3]. In the civilian criminal system, where more serious cases that fall outside the scope of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 are often referred, the principle of open justice is confirmed by legislation and policy. Under the Federal Court Rules 2011, a person is entitled to inspect a broad range of court documents as soon as they become available [4], and the details of this access is elaborated in Federal Court policy [5]. Case information is posted in an online database [6], and judgements are available in a separate online database [7].

The detailed and publicly available policy of the Judge Advocate General of the Australian Defence Force relating to the publication of court martial and Defence Force Magistrate case details requires that a case summary be made publicly available if a defence service personnel is convicted [1]. The case summary is detailed, including the charges, details of any hearings and trial, facts of the case, and the findings and sentence [1, Enclosure 3]. The case summary may be redacted before publication “where the case summary in combination with other factors would not comply with other legislative requirements” [1, p3]. Even when defence personnel are acquitted, details on the charges and pleas/findings, among other information, is provided in a database of outcomes [1, Enclosure 2]. For civilian prosecutions, as well as many case documents and nearly all judgments being readily available (see Q49A), significant cases are summarised on in case reports [2], and detailed prosecution statistics are publicly available [3].

The military justice system works alongside the civilian criminal justice system to handle cases of members of the Australian Defence Force [1], and both are generally considered effective and without undue influence. A 2005 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference Committee report into military justice highlighted serious shortcomings in the processes and fairness of the system, though formal processes did exist and there were no accusations of undue influence [2]. By 2008, a progress report highlighted that, “Defence has implemented significant reforms that, without doubt, have improved the system,” though the Committee remained concerned with keeping momentum behind reform [3]. The military justice system is independent, overseen by the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, who performs audits, addresses grievances, and promotes fair processes, among other duties [4]. The civilian criminal justice system is highly formalised in Australia [5]. For its 2019 Rule of Law Index, the World Justice Project gave Australia a score of 0.91 for “No improper government influence” in the criminal justice system and 0.68 for “Effective investigations”, both well above the regional ranking. Overall, Australia was ranked 12 of 126 countries for the quality of its criminal justice system [6]. There are no contemporary media reports that civilian or military courts have been credibly accused of undue political influence [7].

There is an informal policy in the defence institution to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available. Corruption-related court processes related to defence services personnel are not always open. In most cases, it is closed and no public information is provided. In some cases, they are associated with “state secrets” (1). Only in exceptional situations are certain parts of the outcomes of prosecution made publicly available, it is done when it is favourable to one of the interest groups in the government, or to punish several individuals from the army (2, 3).
Statistics on prosecutions (number of people and case investigated) are published annually by the military prosecutor, but details of court cases are not available (4).

Only in exceptional situations are certain parts of the outcomes of prosecutions (charges and results of prosecutions) made publicly available, but it is done when it is favourable to one of the interest groups in the government, or to punish several individuals from the army. For example, the charges and results of prosecutions against former Deputy Defence Minister Mehman Salimov and the Commander of the Navy Shahin Sultanov can be an example. The former commander of the Defence Naval Forces, vice-admiral Shahin Sultanov was arrested in 2014. According to the information provided by the Baku Military Court, Sultanov was detained on suspicion of committing fraud and large-scale embezzlement as a detainee (1). Shortly afterwards his arrest was changed to house arrest (2).
In 2016, Baku Court of Grave Crimes completed the trial over the case of Mehman Salimov, former deputy defence minister of Azerbaijan, who is charged with embezzlement and abuse of power. Under the court verdict, Salimov was sentenced to 8 years in prison (3).
In some cases, general information is provided: According to Khanlar Veliyev, military prosecutor, in 2017, 123 criminal cases of corruption and bribery about 146 persons were completed and sent to relevant military courts (4). Nearly twenty former senior officers of the former National Security Ministry have been involved in the investigation. All of them are charged with the creation of a criminal gang, robbery, kidnapping and corruption. Former National Security Minister Eldar Mahmudov led the criminal grouping (5).
But in most cases, the charges and results are closed and no public information is provided. For example, by the order of Zakir Hasanov, the Ministry’s Housing and Utility Department was abolished. In some companies (they have carried out relevant construction work in the ministry), violations of law were discovered and a criminal case was filed against them. The press reports that they are accused of artificial exaggeration of prices and corruption crimes (6). However, the names of those companies were not disclosed.
In the summer of 2015, three senior officials of the Defence Ministry’s Main Military Inspection were arrested. They were charged with corruption. The ministry did not disclose the names and duties of those persons. On the basis of the collected materials, a criminal case has been launched and an investigation has been launched by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office for Combating Corruption under the Prosecutor General’s Office (7). Although three years have elapsed, the public has not been informed about the results of this culpability. Likewise, in exceptional circumstances, the results of trials against military services personnel are made publicly available for the abovementioned reasons (8).

Observations show that corruption-related incidents mostly are not seriously investigated, and the public is not informed about the trial results (1). In some cases, the leadership of the Defence Ministry, the president’s administration and other government agencies interfere in the investigation process, and the criminal case is postponed. Even though some criminal cases are pursued against some officials and the cases that are brought before the courts, the results are not proportionate. For instance, while there were allegations of extortion and blackmail against the former Ministry of State Security Eldar Mahmudov, he was never convicted and has denied wrongdoing (2). Shahin Sultanov case is another instance. The prosecutor asked the court to sentence him to 13 years in prison. However, he was released on probation (3).

There is no legal framework or policy that requires judicial institutions to make the outcomes of prosecutions public. There has not been any public outcome of a military prosecution in the last five years [1, 2, 3].

There is no public information available on the outcomes of prosecutions, especially military personnel prosecutions, as they are considered highly confidential [1, 2, 3].

In many cases, there is evidence of corruption or misconduct, but the military fails to investigate or even conduct a trial at any level. This indicates a complete failure in the effectivity of investigations and prosecutions [1, 2, 3].

The Bangladesh military does not have a formal policy to inform the public about outcomes of prosecutions [1].

No information on prosecutions is made publicly available [1,2].

There is no public information to suggest that cases have been efficiently investigated or that due process has been followed to impose punishments [1].

Prosecution thus happens either as internal disciplinary or via the judicial system. Defence institutions do not have an internal formal policy to make outcomes of prosecution formally available [1, 2]. Rather, prosecution for corrupt activities goes through the civilian judicial system [2]. Citizens may request information on the results of prosecution and the charges through the Law on Freedom of Information [3].

Court martials have been abolished in peace time [1]. Prosecution thus happens either as internal disciplinary or via the judicial system. In the latter case, hearings are public but the sentencing is not automatically disclosed. Due to GDPR guidelines, charges and results of prosecutions are rarely publicly available, and only partly. There is, however, legislation being written on this topic right now [2]. Moreover, citizens may request information on the results of prosecution and the charges through the Law on Freedom of Information [3].

There is Not Enough Information to score this indicator. Within the timeframe 2016-2020, the only case of potential corruption from a senior governmental suspected of corruption during a visit in Africa and an alleged illegal acquisition of mansions; however, the investigation was very short and the senior official was released quickly. The absence of information relating to prosecutions means it is not possible to score this indicator [2].

Corruption is a criminal offence under the criminal codes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and perpetrators of such offences are prosecuted by the judicial authorities in BiH, i.e. outside the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH). Disclosure of information on the outcomes of prosecution of offences is the responsibility of the judicial authorities that prosecute them.
The MoD and AFBiH have internal regulations compelling them to inform the public of all important issues in the field of defence, including cases of corruption in the MoD and AFBiH. Internal regulations governing the public relations in the MoD and AFBiH are:
– Public Relations Policy, No. 14-03-3-844/10 dated 10 February 2010, and
– Guidelines for the implementation of PR activities in MoD and AFBiH, No. 14-35-2-815/11 dated 17 February 2011 [1, 2].
The MoD’s General Inspectorate organizes regular annual conferences involving the key staff of the MoD and AFBiH and present the work of inspectors during the year. The conference presents indicators and data on the violation of regulations in general, including the fight against corruption. Representatives of the Defence and Security Commission of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, the parliamentary military commissioner, representative of the Agency for Coordination of the Fight against Corruption, representatives of the BiH Agency for Investigation and Protection, representative of the BiH Office of the Auditing of Institutions, commander of NATO Staff in Sarajevo and Commander of EUFOR attend. According to the government reviewer, the prosecution of perpetrators of irregularities, which are regulated by the BiH Criminal Code as well as other regulations in BiH are applied in the MoD and AFBiH. The MoD informs the public about activities through a range of content, through regular press conferences, announcements and regular events [3,4].

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. The MoD informs the public about its activities and irregularties (involving personnel) through a range of content such as regular press conferences, announcements and regular events [1,2]. However, it cannot be estblished whether all other related facts about prosecutions are not made public by the ministry.

Following a poll conducted as part of the USAID’s Justice Project, Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens were not convinced of the honesty in this country’s judiciary. 84.2% of respondents disagree with the assertion that judges and prosecutors are not subject to corruption [1].

The OSCE “Trial Monitoring of Corruption Cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Second Assessment” mentions 189 ongoing corruption cases. The same report analyzed the conviction rate of 111 finished cases in 2017-2018, where data shows that there was 33% conviction rate in the three high corruption cases (two convictions of imprisonment which were converted into fine), as well as 74% and 61% conviction rate for medium and low corruption cases. In the summaries of the finalized cases analysed there are no mentions of personnel from the MoD or AFBiH [2].

There is no defence policy to make the outcomes of defence prosecution public [1,2].

There is no policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities and is no there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years. Generally, prosecutions in Botswana are by law public, and this should include defence prosecutions unless there is an application to have in-camera court proceedings. The highest case involves Isaac Kgosi, who was head of the Directorate of Intelligence Services and was arrested on the allegations of corruption that he committed during his time in office.[1,2,3]

In the absence of such policy as highlighted in 49A and 49B, and the absence of further information relating to prosecutions, it is not possible to score this indicator. As such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

There is no clear policy to make prosecutions for corrupt behaviour public, and only general procedures for transparency [1].

The transparency mechanisms available are in the list of servants provided by the Transparency Portal, but this list does not offer details of why the public servant was expelled [1]. The other mechanism mentioned by the Transparency Report of the Ministry of Defence [2] is the Military Superior Court website. The search in the website is intended for those familiar with the law, a search in the jurisprudence section shows many decisions and appeals regarding processes on corruption and fraud. However, it does not offer simple information to citizens less aware of the judicial system [3].

There are exonerated public servants [1]. However, the assessor found no evidence of if proper investigations or prosecutions occur or not [2]. However, according to one of the interviewees, many instances of misconduct are ‘resolved’ internally, with no formal process [3]. One of the interviewees that served the armed forces as a conscripted soldier asserted that, when military intelligence found out about the robbery of items of a military museum, the responsible party or parties suffered informal disciplinary sanctions [4].

The existing defence policy of 2004 does not cover issues such as corruption (1). There is no evidence on the existence of an anti-corruption policy that specifically applies to the military. However, the current REN-LAC’s the Open Government Partnership (OGP) against the corruption of the Ministry of Civil Service, Employment and Social Welfare (MCSESW) (2), applies to the defence ministry, as many government institutions have subscribed to it (3). However, there is no evidence, which proves that the OGP applies to the military.

According to the United States Department of State, the gendarmerie is responsible for investigating and prosecuting both the personnel of gendarmerie and the police, but investigation and prosecution reports have never been made public (1). Also, there is no evidence that both the Parliament and the Court of Account, respectively manded by Article 84 and Article 127 of the Constitution (2), as oversight of the defence sector, have already published a report on the management of the military. The ASCE-LC, which has just been provided with constitutional power to investigate and prosecute, is still finding its way in the system. There is no transparency in the processes of such kinds in the defence sector (3). Terrorism has increased the lack of transparency within the military, as they tend to make every issue a defence secret (3).

The internal body in charge of investigating corruption within the security sector is the gendarmerie, according to the United States Department of State. However, none of its reports are published for public access (1), (2). The opacity of the defence sector makes it difficult (if not impossible) to conduct any scrutiny work by recognized public institutions (3). The Supreme Audit Institution, the Parliament and the ASCE-LC, each mandated by the Constitution, to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption, have failed to scrutinize the defence sector through the publishing of a single investigation report. The lack of a real separation of powers (2), the weakness of law enforcement and the poor access to information make the fight against corruption so difficult (4).

There are several legal documents that guide the behaviour of these personnel with respect to corruption. They include:
– Article 134 of the Penal Code, and
– Article 66 of the Constitution (Declaration of Assets by political appointees) [1].

Corruption is criminalised within the penal code of Cameroon (Law No. 67-LF-1 of 12 June 1967). The penal code effectively penalises:
– Offering and receiving bribes (Art. 134),
– Granting of undue exceptions or benefits by a public official (Art. 137),
– Extortion and collusion with public employees (Art. 142 and 160),
– Intent of extortion, collusion or bribery (Art. 161 and 312) and
– Embezzlement (Art. 184) [2] [3].

However, there is no formal policy to make outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel public. Civilians who are victims of police or gendarmerie offences sometimes do not know the outcomes of disciplinary measures taken against their violators or offenders [4].

There is no official policy on the publication of names of security personnel involved in corrupt practices. However, from time to time the names of junior officers found guilty of corrupt practices are broadcast on the radio and television [1]. As an example, Africa News reported in July 2018 that “The Cameroonian army has been indicted in extrajudicial executions of two women and two young children” [2].

Although the law makes provision for criminal penalties for defence and military personnel, these are hardly enforced, especially when high-profile personalities are involved [1]. Some junior and middle-management officers are sometimes prosecuted for corruption but top-ranking military officers seem to benefit from the impunity related to corruption in the country [2]. It is alleged that Edgard Mebe Ngo’o, the former Minister of Defence, and Colonel Mboutou were involved in a corruption scandal where “Robert Franchitti paid Colonel Mboutou and Maxime Mbangue huge amounts of money in exchange for lucrative Cameroon military contracts” [3] [4], but there is no evidence that they were ever prosecuted. A US State Department Human Rights report observed that the Delegate General of National Security (DGSN) investigated alleged abuses and cases were sent to court. Although the DGSN, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice reported that members of defence and security were sanctioned in 2017, there is no evidence that these sanctions ever took place [1].

According to the US State Department, “The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, although these were seldom enforced…The government did not always effectively address high-profile cases, and officials continued to engage in corrupt practices with impunity. The judiciary was not always free to independently investigate and prosecute corruption cases…Some officers convicted of corruption were relieved of their duties but continued to be paid due to weak oversight, accountability, and enforcement mechanisms for internal disciplining…Civilian authorities maintained some control over the police and gendarmerie, and the government had some mechanisms in place to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. The DGSN and gendarmerie investigated reports of abuse and forwarded cases to the courts. Lesser sanctions were handled internally. The DGSN, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Justice claimed members of security forces were sanctioned during the year for committing abuses, but few details were known about investigations or any subsequent accountability” [1].

Cameroon media continue to relate details of an investigation in France concerning suspicions of corruption / bribery between the former defence minister Edgard Mebe Ngo’o and MagForce for defence contracts. The ex-minister and his wife have been arrested and held in Yaounde on charges of corruption [5] [6].

Information on all courts martial is made available to the public, and updated on a regular basis. The findings and decisions of all proceedings are also published. [1] [2] The results of all cases can be found in CanLII in cooperation the Law Societies of each Canadian Province and Territory. [3]

There is clear evidence posted online of recent procecutions of courts martial regarding instances of corruption and breach of trust. For example, one such case is R. v. Edmunds, 2017 CM3012. [1] While this resulted in a ‘not guilty’ verdict, the composite legal documentation of this case and others like it are readily available to the public and do make their way through the official legal channels. [2] This includes rank, details of charge, date, and location of hearing.

Cases make their way through official legal channels without undue political interference. The National Defence Act requires regular independent reviews of key components, including the Code of Service Discipline. In the past, these have been conducted by former members of the Supreme Court of Canada or a Provincial Superior Court. [1] [2] [3]

Available evidence of recent corruption scandals points to specific cases in which outcomes of prosecution were made public, but the information was communicated only in general terms, and it has not constituted a formal policy within the armed forces. After cases of fraud in the armed forces in 2014 and investigations conducted by the press and two special parliamentary commissions, some institutions opened up to review procedures and other measures [1, 2]. However, at the same time, persecutors complained of attempts to delay investigations by hiding information or delaying its submission through various means [3, 4]. From this point of view, responses can be framed as media responses or a communications strategy. On the other hand, the armed forces do not influence the publicity of judicial outcomes, to the extent that this is an exclusive attribution of the respective courts. Once judicial sentences have been handed down, isolated efforts to publicise results by the armed forces have functioned more as a communicative effect than as an institutionalised policy.

In Chile, judicial processes are secret during the investigation until the judicial sentence, and there is a reserve obligation of administrative processes until the respective disciplinary act. After resolutions have been made, charges and results of prosecutions are publicly available through online platforms. For the Judicial Branch, sentences can be found through the unified system of court cases (Consulta Unificada de Causas). Cases can be accessed by their name, date, internal ID number (RIT), and unique ID number (RUC) [1]. In the case of court-martials, cases can be accessed by indicating the court, ID number, and date of resolution [2].

In general, cases have been investigated and prosecuted through formal processes, and there is no evidence of an institutional policy to derail prosecutions. After several cases of fraud and embezzlement were uncovered in the army in 2014, there have been consistent efforts to investigate and prosecute misdeeds. Prosecutors have been able to process senior generals for fraud [1], including a former commander in chief of the army [2]. There have been some judicial strategies to delay judicial processes; however, it cannot be said that there has been a policy to influence judicial decisions politically. Some of these cases have involved the hiding of relevant information or the delaying of its submission [3, 4, 5]. There have also been complaints of wiretapping of media journalists by military intelligence agencies. All in all, the evidence does not suggest clear undue influence in the judicial decision-making process nor an institutional policy to derail prosecutions.

There is an informal policy, as evidenced by the many cases of prosecution that have been made publicly available. The CCP and the CMC occasionally report numbers of minor cases of corruption, as well as audited personnel, prosecutions and outcomes. [1] Major cases receive more publicity and are reported in detail by all state-controlled media. [2,3,4,5] The regime publicises these cases to demonstrate its commitment to anticorruption and not due to transparency obligations. The CCP has unchecked power to reveal cases selectively.

For major cases involving high ranking officers, the government usually releases all information on charges and outcomes. [1,2,3,4] However, as noted above, the government and courts are not bound by law to be transparent, which means that the regime may hide information if it chooses to do so.

Anticorruption in China is heavily politicised. This is achieved through the CCP’s organisational control over the Discipline Inspection Commissions [1] and the political control of the judiciary. [2,3] A very different understanding of effectiveness of prosecutions must be applied, that includes political influence as a regular part of the process of investigation, persecution and trial. Indeed, there is no case of a military officer being prosecuted and found innocent, which shows that if an individual is charged with corruption crimes, the outcome is predetermined.

The Attorney General’s Office, who is responsible for investigating criminal acts of the military and The Prosecutor’s Office, report very general cases related to criminal acts or cases of great national impact, but there is no concrete evidence about the proceedings or the results of the prosecutions. In May 2019, the Prosecutor’s Office published information on 3,000 cases of corruption, of which Military Forces and Police represented 8%. [1] This highlights the difficulty in accessing detailed and accurate information. The Special Justice for Peace (JEP) publishes judicial proceedings related to the Military and Police in the context of the armed conflict, as a part of the Integral System of Truth, Justice and Reparation and Non-Repetition. [2] In 2018 the JEP reported 1,914 cases of military personnel brought to justice, including 5 Generals and 20 Colonels, in cases mostly related to ‘false positives’ or extrajudicial executions in the context of the armed conflict. [3, 4] Related to criminal acts of military personnel, the Attorney General’s Office has 135 cases in trial, 22 cases that have been sentenced, and 88 dismissals, all of which relate to extrajudicial executions. [5]

There is insufficient evidence to state that all results of military procedures of military personnel under trial for corruption are in the websites of the Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, Police, Prosecutor’s Offices, and Attorney General’s Office. There is widespread publication of results in corruption scandals by the media, but these do not represent the entirety of judicial actions. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace publishes resolutions and hearings undertaken in the context of trials of military personnel which are easy to download and include the date, place, and detail of accusations, as well as information on the hearing and summons of the procedure. The information is filtered by title or subject matter, name of case file, claimant, case, remitant, and defendant in each of the courts.

According to the criminal prosecution system in Colombia, corruption cases are investigated and put to trial by the Attorney General’s Office. The Office has a criminal proceeding divided into three phases: inquiry in which the prosecutor and the judicial police obtain evidence and physical evidence of the crime that occurred and the prosecution is made before a judge of guarantees; research phase where a formulation hearing is held and research is open; and trial phase where indictment, preparatory, oral trial, and judgment hearings are held before a judge of knowledge. [1] For Interviewee 6, during this judicial process there may be attempts to influence in the application of justice. [2] There are media influences that accelerate or delay the capture of those involved and statements from the Ministry of Defence. As for the effectiveness of sanctions, military members involved in corruption processes are released on some occasions, arguing that no arraingment is necessary.

There is no formal policy to publicize the outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel for corruption. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence showing that cases involving police rackets are effectively prosecuted by military prosecutors for charges of corruption. In July 2018, Le Débat Ivoirien reported that 21 gendarmes had been arrested and been temporarily incarcerated at a military prison in Abidjan to await trial on racketeering charges. The arrests took place as part of the anti-racketeering efforts within the armed forces. The public P
prosecutor, in this case, Ange Kessi, stated that this type of corruption tarnished the public image of the armed forces and would not be tolerated. A military court in Abidjan (MAMA) was scheduled to try them and another 33 accused of corruption in October 2018 (1), (2).

Previously, in May 2018, the General Directorate of Public Administration (Direction Générale de l’Administration) had organized capacity-building workshops to help local anti-racketeering groups to publicly denounce this type of corruption cases. During these workshops, the inspector general of police services and former ministry of national security, Joseph Djable, sent a strong message to racketeers within the Gendarmerie that corrupt practices would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. The efforts to end racketeering by military and civilian police are often backed (financially) by multilateral organizations and by the executive due to the negative impact they have had on the national economy. The inspector general said that “all civil servants in the police services who are condemned to 6 months of prison will be banned from the police force” (3).

The policy of permanent removal of prosecuted officials from the police force (radiation des effectifs) was confirmed in November 2018 (4).
There is strong evidence that there is an informal policy at defence institutions to make the outcomes of prosecution publicly available, particularly for anti-racketeering efforts.

The reality is that both the process and the results of the prosecution are made publicly available with access to information on the charges and hearings. However, the information released to the public is not exhaustive, as per the criteria for a score of 4.

As shown in 49A, Joseph Djable, sent a strong message to racketeers within the Gendarmerie in May 2018 that corrupt practices would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. The inspector general said that “all civil servants in the police services who are condemned to 6 months of prison will be deleted from the police force” (1). The accusation, arrest, temporary incarceration and outcome of the anti-racketeering trials by military prosecutors have been made widely available in 2018, perhaps as a sign that the executive is unwilling to tolerate this type of petty corruption (2), (3).

There is evidence that military and civilian police personnel have been investigated and prosecuted on racketeering charges to the full extent of the law in 2018. However, the high level of effectiveness may be attributed to the executive’s strong political will to end such practices. In November 2018, the Military Court of Abidjan (Tribunal Militaire d’Abidjan, TMA), by way of military prosecutor Ange Kessi, ordered the dismantling of 33 illegal roadblocks in rural districts operated by corrupt members of the police forces. Some brigade commanders were involved in these rackets. The dismantling of the roadblocks took place after NGOs and the Transportation Fluidity Office (Office de la Fluidité des Transports) had brought the existence of 33 roadblocks to the attention of the military prosecutor (1).

A biographical article about Ange Kessi in Jeune Afrique (May 2016) explains how he has brought about several changes in terms of prosecuting corruption cases. Kessi has become an iconic figure in Côte d’Ivoire’s judiciary because of his prosecution of crimes committed by defence personnel, including highly sensitive cases of former military commanders such as Wattao and Chérif Ousmane, both of whom supported President Ouattara during the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. The article characterizes Kessi as an activist prosecutor (2):

“From his offices in Tower A of Plateau Administrative City in Abidjan, Colonel Kessi goes through his files every day. They include cases involving the abuse of power, racketeering, murders … On his table he has piled up the proceedings against soldiers, gendarmes, policemen. During trial proceedings and in the field, he has relentlessly tracked the evidence and inconsistencies” (2).

There are cases of effective dismantlement of roadblocks in 2018; the military prosecutors such as Ange Kessi are allowed to investigate politically sensitive cases of corruption that could compromise President Ouattara.

The annual reports of the Ministy of Defence Military Prosecution Service contain information on case-work and statistics pertaining to military criminal proceedings [1, 2]. As a public institution, the MDMPS is obliged to deliver annual reports, but research did not identify a specific (publicly available) formal policy that governs the publication of prosecution outcomes [3].

The annual reports of the Ministry of Defence Military Prosecution Service contain complete information on the number of cases etc., but not all cases are described individually and in full [1]. Although in the form of press releases, there is evidence that the MDMPS releases information on corruption cases as a matter of course, recently illustrated by the MDMPS prosecution of the former former Army Staff Chief (case to be tried in May 2020). The information includes details of the charge and disclose and the court in which the case will be handled in [2, 3].

Cases are prosecuted according to the regulations set forth in the civil and military Administration of Justice Acts [1, 2]. The military justice system is governed by the Military Penal Code and the Military Disciplinary Act, while employees within the Defence are also subject to stipulation in civil law, e.g. the Penal Code and the Public Administration Act [3, 4, 5]. Cases involving civilian employees are investigated by the Police and prosecuted by the civilian prosecuting authority [6]. The Ministry of Defence Military Prosecution Service investigates and prosecutes cases involving military personnel. Thus cases are prosecuted through formal processes, making undue political influence next to impossible. The annual reports contain evidence of a highly effective prosecution service [7]. In line with the civil court system, some cases are open to the public, but under special circumstances doors can be closed to the public/press.[9] There is no evidence of undue political influence [8].

All information regarding the investigation and prosecution of defence personnel for all crimes, especially corruption, is secrets since military courts have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by defence personnel (1). Making the information available to the public is punishable by the Military Provisions Law no. 25 (1966) (2). Article 31 of the law stipulate that “the investigation procedures and its results are considered secrets. Members of the prosecution, members of judicial control and their assistants, and all others who are linked to the investigation or attend it because of their job must not disclose any information about it or otherwise, they will be subject to the penalties set out in the law.” On the other hand, Article 71 of the same law stipulates that court session are public, but it gives the court wide discretionary power in giving “exceptions” to make the session secret for reasons of protecting military secrets, public order or for reasons related to moral decency. The court has the right to declare part or all of the session secret, prevent certain individuals from attending the sessions or imposing a media ban. In all cases, there is no public or easily accessible database (e.g. online) for accessing court document especially those on sensitive issues involving, for example, a senior military official in corrupt activities.

No information on prosecutions or outcomes is made publicly available, and the little information available in the public domain is usually through the testimonies of defence lawyers in cases where civilians are involved (1),but this limited level of access is usually unattainable for cases where defence personnel are involved as it will more likely to be deemed by the court as a “military or defence secret”.

According to our sources, there is a complete failure to investigate any corruption activities, even when there is clear evidence. Usually, those who commit these activities are at a high level, and they have the power to bypass any investigations (1), (2), (3), (4).

Court decisions, with restrictions arising from law, have to be made public. [1]

Court judgments and court rulings which have entered into force are to be published on an online platform accessible to everyone.

A published decision discloses the name and personal identification code or date of birth of the accused, except in the case of a minor, whose name is replaced by initials (unless it’s the third criminal offence for the minor). [2]

The orders and demands issued by investigative bodies and Prosecutors’ Offices in the criminal proceedings conducted are binding on everyone and shall be complied with throughout the territory of the Republic of Estonia. [3]

There is a public database anyone can access. [4] Both position and the full name of a criminal offender are published until the punishment is served. After that, the name of the person in official documents is replaced with initials or characters. However, the latter does not always happen and the names are not always deleted, as an Estonian daily, Eesti Päevaleht, shows in an article. [5]

Information concerning punished persons and their sanctions is made public in the criminal records database, a state information system. [1] The court, the extra-judicial body which took the decision, or the Office of the President submits the data to the authorised processor of the database within five working days as of the entry into force of the decision, judgment or ruling. [2] There are no known exceptions for military personnel. The date, location and information on the hearing is published in the database of the Court Hearings. [3] The only exception concerning defence is that defence institutions can have a wider access to different types of personal data when hiring new personnel. The media regularly covers prominent hearings and results of prosecutions involving defence personnel.

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence. There is no evidence of cases being influenced externally. Based on a new study, it can be inferred that the court system is objective and fair in Estonia. [1] At the beginning of this year, lawyers and prosecutors evaluated the trustworthiness of Estonia’s court system. 97% of prosecutors, 88% of lawyers and 80% of individuals who have turned to or been to court deemed Estonia’s court system trustworthy. There has been a discussion about whether there should be a separate court to deal with offences related to the military. At the moment, Estonia does not have specialised courts, the only exception being the Administrative Court. More specialised cases will be allocated to judges with special training in the sector. [2]

In times of peace, there are no separate military courts but prosecution of defence services personnel takes place in the normal court system (only the composition of jury involves military members differing betweed the courts [Regional Court, Court of Appeal or Surpreme Court] and only if the defendant is prosecuted for a military crime. [1] If he or she is accused of a crime in private capacity, the composition of the jury is normal). [2] All court rulings in Finland are made public.[3]

Thus, the outcome of the prosecution (as well as the trial itself) is public unless otherwise decided by the court. In case of military crimes, the defence institutions may or may not issue a press statement, but the documents are available e.g. through the website of the court and upon request (or at least there is a possibility to familiarise oneself with the documentation in the court). Usually, these kinds of cases (at least high-profile ones) receive plenty of media attention as well.

As noted in 49A, every single Finish court ruling is automatically made public and this includes the details of those related to military and defence personnel. The published court papers and case descriptions include rank, dates, locations, details of the charges, and the results of the case. All court cases and details can be found online [1].

Military crime cases are considered as urgent and treated accordingly by the prosecutor and by the court. [1] There have been cases of suspected nepotism in the intake of the Airforces flight school that led to pre-trial investigation and prosecution; the misuse of financial resources in a military exercise that led to three pre-trial investigations and two prosecutions and consequently to two convictions, as well as a conviction of nepotism in recruitment processes in the Navy [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Research has not identified any cases of undue influence.

Outcomes of prosecutions are publicly available, as they are decided by civilian justice and therefore open to public scrutiny as any non-defence related case. [1] [2] There is no need for the defence institution to make them available.

Both the charges and results of prosecutions are made publicly available, from the moment they cease to be covered by the secrecy of prosecution. There is no military justice in France, so all information on the date, location and details of the charge, and information on the hearing are available to the public, the press, CSOs, like for any case of any citizen in front of the law, as show the recent examples of the publicity of the ICS case (currently being prosecuted) [1] and 2015 Balard case. [2]

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence.
Examples of recent prosecutions include the Balard scandal: [1] an investigation of corruption charges in the context of the construction of the new Ministry of Defence HQ. Three people were indicted: one military officer working at the Ministry of Defence, a manager of the Bouygues construction company and a Franco-tunisian serving as an middleman in the favouritism corruption scheme. Another example is the ICS case [2], in which the National Financial Prosecutor (PNF) is currently investigating a case in which high-ranking commanding officers in charge of logistics for the French army are suspected of influence peddling, corrupted by an aerial transport subcontracting company (ICS) that was over-charging for its services to the Ministry of Defence. This investigation didn’t start off from an internal assessment or audit, but from an anonymous denunciation. Letters were sent to the press, the Ministry of Defence and to competitors, which ended up on the PNF judge’s desk.

According to the ‘Federal Government Directive Concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration’, suspected corruption cases must be shared with prosecutors and reported annually by the BMVg [1].

These cases of corruption in federal institutions are published on an annual basis by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) in its report ‘Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung’ (‘Corruption Prevention in the Federal Administration’). This includes corruption cases in the BMVg as well as measures taken in response to these cases [2]. Furthermore, the Federal Criminal Police Office publishes an annual assessment of corruption incidents in the country as a whole [3]. The BMI report provides specific information on identified corruption cases and the measures taken in response. The Federal Criminal Police Office report provides information on corruption offences/allegations, damages and prosecutions but does not provide a breakdown by institution.

Regarding non-corruption-related criminal proceedings, statistics appear to be available on request. More prominent cases, especially those related to political extremism, are discussed widely in the media as well as in the annual report of the Armed Forces Ombudsman (‘Parliamentary Commissioner for the Bundeswehr’) [4].

The report ‘Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung’ (‘Corruption Prevention in the Federal Administration’) provides some details of the context of allegations and the subsequent proceedings. It breaks down corruption incidents by federal institution [1]. However, full details are not always available since the date, location and details of the hearing are not published in the report and the information is generalised [1]. The report issued by the Federal Criminal Police Office provides information on corruption offences/allegations, damages and prosecutions but does not provide a breakdown by institution. Fully detailed information on the Ministry of Defence or Armed Forces therefore cannot be obtained [2]. Besides that, only high-level corruption cases are covered more broadly in the media.

Suspected acts of corruption are generally investigated and prosecuted through formal processes without undue political influence. However, in the case of the recent consultant scandal (‘Berateraffäre’), certain irregularities, such as the deletion of data relevant for the investigation of the case, have been described as a hindrance to investigation [1].

The military justice system is based upon the Armed Forces Act (1962), Act 105. The act does not provide a publication of the outcomes of prosecution for the public. The same goes for the Armed Forces Regulations, which regulates the procedures used by the tribunals, and does not provide publication of the outcomes of prosecution (1). Military personnel are tried before the military court for the most important breaches of the code of conduct, and before civilian tribunals for the most common prosecutions.

Information on prosecutions is not made publicly available. Neither the MOD or the GAF publish the outcomes of prosecution, the media occasionally cover the most salient cases (1), (2). Ghanaian tribunals do not have a publicly available database of their trials.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

According to the most recent Afrobarometer survey, the judiciary is perceived as the second most corrupt institution after the police (1). In 2015, an investigation led by the prominent Ghanaian journalist, Anas, exposed broad corruption practices in the judiciary system (2); the scandal prompted the Judicial Council to suspend more than 20 court judges and magistrates (3).

The defence institution does not have a policy according to which outcomes of prosecution are made publicly available [1, 2].

No information on prosecutions of military personnel is publicly available [1].

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, but there may be cases where undue political influence is attempted [1]. In 2014, for example, the former Shadow Minister of Defence Theodoros Dritsas claimed that certain political parties have attempted to prevent effective prosecutions [2].

There is no clear policy on making the outcomes of prosecutions available [1]. However, the Ministry used to provide information in high-profile cases if that had a political relevance. As the military prosecution office was integrated into the general prosecution system, outcomes should be published both on the website of the ministry and the website of the prosecutor general [1]. Beyond prosecution phase, in high-level cases, both the regional court of appeal [2] or in case of an appeal in the second level the Budapest Regional Court of Appeal can issue press releases [3]. Unfortunately, there is no single page both in case of prosecution office nor in case of the courts of appeal where anybody can browse military-related cases in any format (that can be browsed or researched).
The most visible case recently was the “General case,” a major military corruption case linked to the socialist government between 2002-2010. The case was closed in January 2019, finding thirteen high-level officials including several generals guilty. However, the then state secretary was found innocent and was not convicted [4].

Very limited information is available on the results of military prosecutions. Annual reports consist of some data [1]. However, it is only aggregate information; the online portal of the prosecutor general also publishes the results of high-profile cases [2].

The Institution of the Prosecutor General is highly politicized and subject of criticism in every report on the rule of law and state of democracy in Hungary [1]. The fact a military prosecutor office was integrated limited the institutional independence as well as the transparency. The Venice Commission identified several shortcomings in its Opinion on Act CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution Service and Act CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecutor General, Prosecutors and other Prosecution Employees and the Prosecution Career of Hungary, adopted on 19 June 2012. In its report, adopted on 27 March 2015, GRECO urged the Hungarian authorities to take additional steps to prevent abuse and increase the independence of the prosecution service by, inter alia, removing the possibility for the prosecutor general to be re-elected. Additionally, GRECO called for disciplinary proceedings against ordinary prosecutors to be made more transparent and for decisions to move cases from one prosecutor to another to be guided by strict legal criteria and justifications. According to the Hungarian Government, the 2017 GRECO Compliance Report acknowledged the progress made by Hungary concerning prosecutors (publication is not yet authorised by the Hungarian authorities, despite calls by GRECO Plenary Meetings) [2]. The Second Compliance Report is pending [1].

There is some evidence of policies in existence that require the outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel to be made public. The Defence Services Regulations for the Air Force, 2000 states:

“Fullest possible publicity through air force orders in the case of air force personnel will be given in all cases of bribery, corruption, fraud, misappropriation and other malpractices in which there has been a conviction either by a civil court or a court martial. In cases of investigation by Special Police Establishment two copies of the air force orders will be sent to the Inspector General, Special Police Establishment, Ministry of Home Affairs” [1].

There are cases where crimes and prosecution outcomes are made public and are published by the media [2][3][4].

There is material on charges and results of prosecutions publicly available. Cases include both lower and higher ranking officers and officials. Information is available through CBI press releases and media reports [1][2][3]. In-depth information about the hearing is not usually available. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) publishes annual reports with a section on the activities of vigilance units. Here, details on the number of complaints against staff, sanctions and penalties imposed on those convicted, finalisations of disciplinary hearings, exonerations, recordable warnings and appeals are given [4][5].

Cases of corruption are investigated and prosecuted [1][2]. Concerns lay with the duration of the judicial process, with convictions taking multiple years in some cases [3]. There is no clear evidence of undue influence being attempted.

Sessions and decisions of the Military Courts are open in principle, except for a number of circumstances under which trials are closed to the public, as decided by the Chief Judge, namely [1]:
• if the case breaches court decency,
• if the case involves military secrets and/or state secrets and
• if the Panel of Judges assesses that the dispute being heard concerns military interests in the context of supporting the interests of defence, security and/or public order or state safety.

The results of the Military Court’s ruling can be accessed through the directory of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia [2], except those that are closed to the public. When it was last accessed, the directory of decisions of the Military Courts contained 18,920 decisions out of a total of 20,381 decisions originating from 25 Military Courts. In other words, 1,461 decisions, equivalent to 7% of the total number of decisions, were not made public. The information published is quite complete, including the decision number, the level of the process, the date and year of the register, sub-classification (what action is being tried), classification (criminal/general/special), institution, type of judicial institution, party, year, name of the judge chairman, member judge and clerk, as well as the legal force of the decision [3].

The Explanation Section in the Military Justice Rules [1] explains that the judicial power within the military court environment is carried out by:
a. Courts in the Military Courts, consisting of:
1) Military Court, which is the first court of law for a criminal case in which the defendant is ranked Captain or below;
2) Military Court, which is the first court of law for a criminal case in which the defendant is ranked Captain or below; the High Military Court is also the first court of law for: i – Criminal cases in which the defendant or one of the defendants holds the rank of Major or above; and ii – lawsuits for Armed Forces administrative disputes;
3) Main Military Court, which is an appeal court for criminal cases and Armed Forces administrative disputes, which are decided at the first level by the High Military Court;

b. Combat Military Court, which is the first and last level of court for prosecuting criminal cases conducted by soldiers in the combat area, which is the specialty of the court in a military court environment. This court is a new organisational framework that functions when needed and is accompanied by appointment of officials.

The judicial bodies referred to under letters a and b all culminate in the Supreme Court. According to the Directory of Supreme Court Decisions [2], the published decisions are the decisions of the Training Court, Main Court and High Court. Published court verdicts include the date, location and details of the charge, as well as information on the hearing.

In the implementation of military court, both the charges and results of prosecutions are made publicly available. However, seems like charges are only made public during the court, for example in the case of First Admiral Bambang who was charged with corruption in the procurement of satellite for the Indonesian Coast Guard (Bakamla) [3]. The military court can be attended by journalist, who then make the report of charges details.

An investigation can end up in military court or general court, or it can be spared from court (prosecution) and resolved as a disciplinary action or even closed down in the interest of the law or in the interest of the public/military [1]. The effectiveness of defence prosecution is demonstrated by the results of the Military Court’s rulings, which are accessible through the directory of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia [2]. Between 2016 and 2018, there were approximately 6,000 cases processed in the Military Courts. The number of cases demonstrates that prosecution is still effective. Though there is no known evidence of undue influence in the court decision making process, it cannot be excluded especially when cases are dealt with solely within military structures.

There is not a policy of defence institutions to make outcomes of prosecutions publicly available. Article 633 of the Law on the Code of Criminal Procedure for the Armed Forces and for Electronic Proceedings states that it is prohibited to publish information relevant to the military courts [1].

The results of one prosecution were found publicly available through the media. There is little to no access to information on the charges or the hearing, or other key details [1].

There is evidence to indicate that prosecutions of armed forces personnel, and potentially extending beyond the police force [1] are now beginning to affect the military generals, or at least former military officers, and those at the top of the system. There seem to be formal processes in place. However, at present, there may be evidence of undue political influence in the decision-making process [2, 3, 4]. For example, the former mayor of Tehran City Council Mohammad Ali Najafi had accused his predecessor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf (who was a former general) of a list of “violations” during his tenure. The prosecutor general called on Najafi to deliver the evidence. Najafi never delivered and was ultimately forced to resign under heavy pressure from political opponents [4].

Subsequently, the supreme leader gave his go-ahead for legal action. Tehran’s Prosecutor-General, Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi says the legal cases against several suspects charged with financial corruption in the capital’s municipality have been delivered to the Military Prosecutor’s Office. The five suspects in the case were not named, but, Radio Farda reports that all of them have a military background [4].

A judicial source confirmed in an interview with TI (1) that military courts, rulings and off-stage hearings favour a policy of non-disclosure, as the publication of such sensitive information could compromise national security. A detailed review of Iraq’s Military Criminal Procedures Law (2) further confirms that no formal policy of the disclosure of the outcome of military prosecutions ought to be made public (3).

In an interview with TI, one source (1) identified what he describes as a “rising trend in which investigations are promised, but results a[re] rarely disclosed”.

A report published by HRW (July 2018) underscores the failure of Iraq’s judicial institutions to “investigate [and] punish Security Forces implicated in abuse” of civilians in formerly ISG-occupied territories, lamenting the inaction of judges for having ignored allegations of torture and issuing convictions based on coerced/false confessions (1). News of investigations often slips off of the front pages of Iraqi press after it’s an announcement, with verdicts and prosecutions rarely reached. Iraqi PM Abadi announced in early September his decision to demote Basra’s Operations Commander Jamil Al Shammari, following a parliamentary vote, against the backdrop of civil unrest in Iraq’s oil-rich province of Basra (2), following calls from a handful of parliamentarians. Abadi sought the latter option, opting not to launch a judicial investigation capable of producing clear evidence and a verdict determined by the rule of law.

The outcomes of prosecutions for corruption cases involving defence personnel are made publicly available, even though research could not find an explciti policy stipulating this. Regarding publicizing the outcomes of prosecution of defense services – decisions of the military courts are published on its website and include, as relevant, details regarding the charges, the dates and the result of the proceedings, and the sanctions imposed (1). The decisions of the court are also broken down by offence with “Integrity” offences grouped together and including corruption-related crimes. In parallel, the Supreme Court publishes its decisions on its website (2) and other courts’ decisions can be found on the judicial website. (3) Conditional Arrangements (a form of Non Prosecution Agreements) are posted on the relevant websites (4). Furthermore, some cases that are not published initially due to reasons of national security, are published later on when the circumstances change. For example, a case from 2017 in which two companies – Giltech and Uricoms – along with ten other people, were suspected of fraud: receiving more than a hundred million shekels from the MOD for jobs that they did not perform, after having bribed the inspectors in charge of inspecting their performance and forging hundreds of IDF documents (5).

Both the charges and results of prosecutions are made publicly available. There are several cases illustrating the effectiveness of prosecutions (1) (2) (3) (4). The Military Courts website contains detailed information on the outcomes of individual prosecutions including the date, location, details about the charge and information about the hearing (5). A review of the court’s decisions on the website provide evidence of prosecutions againts high-ranking officers (6).

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and it seems without undue political influence (1) (2) (3) (4).

Outcomes of prosecutions are made publicly available through the annual report of the Anticorruption Supervisor. Section 12 of the said report identifies number and entity of sanctions and punishments occurred during the year [1].

The report specifies the charges and the articles of the national civil and penal code that apply in order to sanction the illegal activities of personnel, but there is no specific indication of the amount of sanctions or of imprisonment measures imposed [1]. However, for serious crimes, it is possible to access information on date, location and details of the charge through the public media. In this regard, in February 2020, 12 people were convicted of corruption, among which were 2 officials of the Marines and 2 civil servants of the Ministry of Defence for 16 bid rigging and corruption in Taranto in 2019 [2]. The Military (Marines) has been subject to a further corruption case in 2016 that led to the imprisonment of several people [3].

There is no evidence on the media of formal processes delayed due to political influence. Moreover, the independence of the judiciary is ensured by art. 104 of the Constitution [1] A recent example is provided by the imprisonment for 10 years of a captain involved in corruption activities. Alongside this sentence, other colleagues of the captain have been imprisoned for the same crime, but for a shorter amount of time given their different involvement in the case [2].

The website of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) revealed no formal policy on making the outcomes of prosecution of defence services personnel public. [1] The ministry has a page on its website that explains in detail the criteria on which freedom of information requests are handled. Based on Article 5 item 1 of the Freedom of Information Law, [2] in principle, information that can identify a specific individual should not be declassified. A consequence is that a written notice of disciplinary punishment should not be made public. [3] No announcements by the MOD of the result of prosecutions of defence services personnel for corruption related charges were found. However, a list of disciplinary punishments by the MOD of specific MOD officials for breaches related to obstruction of auctions was found. [4] This document was on a webpage that said that several of the individuals were prosecuted by the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor. However, the names of the officials who were prosecuted and the outcome of the trials were not available on the webpage (see Q10A for further information on this case). [5] The case of former Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence Takemasa Moriya, who was sentenced to prison and to a fine for receiving bribes and breaking the Diet Testimony Law, was written in an MP’s Question to the Minister, which was posted on the ministry website. [6] A search of the mainstream media between 2015 and 2019 turned up only one case of the prosecution of a MOD or SDF staff member for a corruption related matter. By the end of 2019, this person had been prosecuted by the Yokohama District Public Prosecutor. [7]

There are no courts martial in Japan, because the Constitution states that “[n]o extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial power.” [1] Members of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) who break the law are tried in ordinary courts. Former Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence Moriya was sentenced for corruption related charges in an ordinary court in 2008. [2] A question asked to the minister in the House of Representatives in 2008 that cited the crimes for which he was sentenced and the sentence he was given could be accessed on the homepages of the House of Representatives. [2] With a few exceptions such as trials of juvenile defendants, judicial proceedings in criminal cases are held in open court in Japan. [3] The extent of information from a trial provided in the media depends on what the media finds interesting to report. For example, one newspaper article from 2008 about the above-mentioned Moriya case that could be accessed online in 2019 reported details of the charges and sentence. [4] A search of mainstream media found only one case of the prosecution of a Japanese SDF official on a corruption related charge from the timeframe of this research, which was for accepting a bribe. (see Q49A) [5] This case was not found mentioned on the homepages of the Ministry of Defence. [6] The Ministry of Defence provides annual statistics on the number of, respectively, SDF officials and administrative officials who have been punished under the SDF’s internal disciplinary system. In 2018, 99 SDF and 3 administrative officials were dismissed, 370 SDF and 17 administrative officials given a suspension of duty, 232 SDF and 8 administrative officials subjected to a salary reduction, and 153 SDF and 9 administrative officials given a warning. The most common categories of breaches were absence from work without valid reason, illegal handling of goods, vigilantism, driving violations and harassment. The names of the persons prosecuted and information on the charges and hearings are not made public on the MOD homepages. [7] However, personnel who have committed obscene acts are sometimes named on the ministry’s homepages. [8] In addition, the names of personnel who had been subjected to disciplinary measures by the MOD for corruption related breaches were posted on the MOD website in 2006. On that occasion, the names and positions of 82 employees of the MOD or SDF and information about what rules they had broken and which internal disciplinary measures they had been subjected to were publicised, but not information about prosecution in the courts. [9] The public prosecutor determines whether an SDF employee who has received disciplinary punishment should be prosecuted in the courts as well, and a decision on this is often reported in the press. [10]

The public prosecutor has a legally guaranteed, independent position in the Japanese judicial system. Investigation and prosecution follow formal processes. [1] A search of the mainstream newspapers, Asahi Shimbun [2] and Yomiuri Shimbun [3], returned no allegations of undue political influence on the investigation and prosecution of MOD or SDF personnel for crimes.

There is no evidence to suggest that Jordan has a policy to make the outcomes of prosecutions for corrupt activities of defence personnel available to the public. In fact, policy restricts access to information related to defence in general. Information about the defence sector is generally considered classified under Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. 50 [1]. As there is no legal framework to guarantee public access to defence information, there are also no policies to guarantee access to the outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activity. Most matters related to defence are considered classified. There has been in the past, cases of corruption within the intelligence services, where outcomes of prosecution were made public. There were several incidents when defence institutions were accused of corruption including the general intelligence services [2]. There were also a few instances of officials within the defence and security sector, such as the head of intelligence services, being put forward for trials and sentencing, which can be perceived as a way to increase the public’s trust in the willingness of the defence sector to counter corruption [3]. However, there is not a clear policy that guarantees public access to outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel. The incidents where the public were given access to the outcomes of the prosecutions date before the armed forces prohibited the publications of news about them [4].

As previously established, there is generally no transparency in relation to defence matters, and for this reason it is safe to assume that there is no transparency regarding information on prosecutions. Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. 50, considers all matters related to defence as classified [1]. The armed forces prohibited the publication of its news in 2016 [2], immediately off the back of corruption accusations by the public about the chief of the army [3]. These claims were over the Chief attaining a publicly owned piece of land to build a private home. Beyond the accusations, the army chief was not prosecuted, and no investigation took place in relation to these accusations. There is not only no transparency in relation to making the outcomes of prosecutions available, there is a general lack of information around the defence sector in general, stipulated through policies that restrict access to such information and do not allow for defence scrutiny.

There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence, especially when it comes to the armed forces. Over the past few years, whenever accusations of corruption in the armed forces surface, these accusations are either responded to through armed forces statements or through silencing such accusations. Accusations levelled against the chief of the army were neither investigated nor prosecuted [1]. The corruption accusations against the armed forces, brought forward by the association of retired military personnel, which concerned the distribution of food parcels for retired military personnel, [2] were not investigated or prosecuted. Instead the armed forces issued a response statement, which indirectly meant that they had the final say over the matter. In addition to that, there is evidence of journalists and the public being prosecuted for defamation when they speak about Governmental corruption [3]. Therefore, there are many reasons and examples that make it safe to assume that cases of corruption are rarely prosecuted and that the defence sector is immune from such accusations by law, as explained in the above sub-indicators.

According to section 124 (1) of The Kenya Defence Forces Act No.25 of 2012 corruption-related offences are convicted in accordance with Anti-Corruption and Economic Act, No. 3 of 2003. [1] Such cases under investigation and outcomes are required by the same Act to be to be published in the Kenya Gazette. However, there is no known case involving MOD personnel to have been published by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.

Prosecution of military officers is conducted in court martial except for offences triable in civil courts. The processes of court martial are guided by the Kenya Defence Forces Act, which states in section 169 that the court martial may decide in its discretion to sit in closed court and thus excluding the public from part, or all, of the proceedings. [1]

Furthermore, section 185 of the Act states that custody of court martial records of proceedings remains with the Defence Court-martial Administrator, and shall be availed to the accused by application. Some prosecution cases of corrupt officers have been published in local media, and in instances when they have been published, they are often within the Civilian Court. [2]

However, comprehensive details of proceedings are not provided by the Ministry of Defence or Kenya Defence Forces. Moreover, an audit of the Court Martial conducted by the National Council for Administrative Justice noted some cases before the Court Martial that do not require closed proceedings are conducted at night violating the right to public hearing. [3]

Cases of corruption by military personnel are often prosecuted. However, the fairness of the investigation and prosecution processes is in question. An audit report by the National Council for Administrative of Justice (NCAJ) noted that the court, as currently structured, lacks independence and impartiality as required in terms of fair trial rights largely because it is only the Judge Advocate who decides matters of Law. [1]

Furthermore, the NCAJ audit found out that, during Court Martial trials, the accused persons are detained beyond constitutionally mandated times. In addition, prosecutors rarely present evidence in court, and lawyers of accused officers tend to be intimidated and unable to represent their clients adequately. Moreeover, in these trials there is no option of cash bond/bail and convictions are generally without an option of a fine. Lawyers representing clients claim that there is clear undue influence in the process where accused officers are often subjected to pre-determined convictions. [2] It has been reported that members of Court Martials are often under pressure to make convictions.

No policy document stipulates that prosecution outcomes should be made public.

The courts in Kosovo notify the public through announcements on their websites of upcoming hearing sessions, and provide information with regard to the charges being prosecuted [1]. However, some information is not made public, such as the results of prosecutions. The Prosecution Court releases some superficial information through a press release on its webpage, but information is minimal [2]. Nonetheless, in a move towards transparency, at least the courts are publishing these judgements [3]. All cases are conducted by the existing civil courts in Kosovo [4]. According to the government reviewer, KPC has regulated the policy on personnel corruption activities within the Regulation No. 04-2016 on Institutional Cooperation where it the procedure is regulated in detail.

Apart from the acting Minister of Defence and the former Deputy Minister of Defence who were charged in the famous case of the “Veterans” [1]; and the case of the two Kosovo Security Forces members were indicted for corruption offences [2], there is no other evidence that other defence services personnel of the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces have been subject of investigation or prosecution [3].

The military have the formal power to make the outcomes of prosecutions public, according to article 24 of the military trials’ law (1). However, the problem is that most prosecutions are never completed, and so they almost never have anything to announce. Auditors did not know if there is a written policy about this matter. It is not present in their publicly available laws but it may be present in their internal rules handbook.

The investigations into corruption are drawn out and they almost never result in successful prosecution for the security agencies to make public, officials and activists said (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). The security agencies are also tight-lipped about these investigations, and they did not officially tell the public who is being investigated and what charges they are facing. Any information about the individuals involved and their charges, as well as other details of the case, are the byproducts of speculation or informal conversations between activists and journalists with security or auditing officials.

The agencies are only willing to tell the public that they are investigating an issue or a trend, but sometimes lawmakers reveal details of the case.

There is a complete failure to prosecute but they do conduct investigations because of undue political influence, officials said (1, 2, 3 and 4). These investigations appear to be just for show, and they are often drawn out and the security agencies generally do not cooperate with the investigators. Sometimes auditors are explicitly told to kill cases by high-ranking auditing officials close to the Emir or by the security services, to whom fighting corruption is not a priority, officials said. (The officials behind the corrupt practices are often from powerful Kuwaiti tribes, whose happiness and silence the Emir is interested in buying while he tries to keep the instability of the region from affecting Kuwait, the officials said.)

There is no formal policy of the defense institution with regards to publishing outcomes of prosecution of personnel for corrupt activities. [1]

According to the government reviewer, however, Latvia has clearly set policy to make publicly available outcomes of the prosecution for corrupt activities, including in the military. KNAB and State Revenue Service are responsible for investigation and publication of all decisions regarding corruption and conflicts of interest prosecutions, including military, according to Article 31 of the Law on prevention of conflict of interests in the activities of public officials (Par interešu konflikta novēršanu valsts amatpersonu darbībā) [2].

All relevant information is public and available on the KNAB webpage either as press release (in criminal cases) or as a list of adopted decisions of penalties (administrative cases). MOD informs KNAB on all findings of possible corruption and conflicts of interest cases. Information on all KNAB administrative decisions, including military, is publicly available [1].

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. However, according to the government reviewer, KNAB has effectively investigated and prosecuted respective cases involving the military and the related information is publicly available. Still there is not enough information to establish whether cases are investigated and prosecuted through formal processes without undue political influence.

Defence service personnel are prosecuted by a military court. According to Article 55 of the Code of Military Justice, the outcomes of the prosecutions are publically released. However, the court may prohibit the publication of the proceedings or summary of the prosecution if it deems it necessary (1).

The Military Court prosecution outcomes are published by local media outlets. The prosecutions announcements usually include information about the indicted persons, the trial process and the outcomes (fines, prison sentence, etc.). For example, a summary of the list of results may include the names, initials, or the number of persons tried in front of the court (1). The published results also include the main issues under which indicted personnel were charged such as terrorist activities (2). Some announcements might also be more specific to one prosecution case were they narrate and describe what went on during the hearing (3). Nevertheless, the proceedings are not open to the public, a key feature that human rights organisations such as HRW have called for an increase in the court’s transparency (4).

Cases of corrupt activities are investigated and prosecuted. For example, in July 2018, the Military Court sentenced 14 people involved in bribes acceptance to recruit civilians in the LAF (1). In 2017 the Military Court indicted 7 persons including civilians and former military personnel for being involved in a corruption case linked to the military academy (2). According to journalist Johnny Mounayar during a morning political talk show on a local TV station, he indicated that the 17 officers were prosecuted for corruption and dismissed from the army. The case was not publicized and the LAF blocked any political interference (3). Nevertheless, in 2016, the ALEF, a human rights organization, indicated that the Military Court had been a political tool to suppress individuals (4). HRW has reaffirmed this point in its 2017 report by describing the court as a tool for intimidation (5).

One of the main tasks declared in the anti-corruption defence program is to inform society about the activities of the Ministry of Defence, engage society in anticorruption efforts, make decisions in the defence sector more transparent, and publish more information about breaches of conduct [1,2]. The General Inspector is responsible for investigating possible violations and sending them to law enforcement institutions if necessary [3]. All national court judgements are public and can be found in the Lithuanian court information system [4]. However, the Ministry of Defence does not publish the outcomes of a prosecution, and does not disclose information about potential other criminal cases initiated in the sector. There is no official policy within the Ministry of Defence to specify prosecution outcomes being publicised. According to the government reviewer, the publicly available information about corruption related activities, investigations and prosecutions can be found on the following websites [5,6].

One of the main tasks declared in the anti-corruption defence program is to inform society about the activities of the Ministry of Defence, engage society in anticorruption efforts, make decisions in the defence sector more transparent, and publish more information about breaches of conduct [1,2]. The General Inspector is responsible for investigating possible violations and sending them to law enforcement institutions if necessary [3]. However, the General Inspector does not publish the outcomes of investigations online.
According to the government reviewer, the publicly available information about corruption related activities, investigations and prosecutions can be found on the website of the Lithuanian MoD [5,6].

Corruption cases that occur in any public sector are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, and regulated by the Law of Criminal Process [1]. The Assessor found no information publicly available about cases of corruption investigated in the defence sector, but there are grounds to believe that were such cases to occur, these would be effectively prosecuted. Consequently, there is not enough evidence to support a score and this indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

The Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) established a ‘name and shame’ corruption offender list on the agency’s official website which provides pictures and names as well as case numbers of prosecuted corruption offenders. [1] Prosecuted defence services personnel are not exempt from this name and shame policy. [2]

Reports and information on prosecutions of defence services personnel for corrupt activities can be obtained through mainstream media. Expansive details of the investigations and charges are included in the reports, including person(s) involved, the charges brought, and details of court hearings. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Reflective of the new government’s vow to eradicate corruption, numerous efforts to investigate suspicious activities can be noted. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Investigations of new cases such as the land swap deals are relentlessly pursued, and old cases that allegedly were politically influenced have also been reopened for investigation. For example, there have been calls for the Scorpene case to be reopened. [6]

Prosecutions of defence officials for corruption are exceedingly rare. Thus, it is difficult to judge what the policy of the Ministry of Defence is, in practice, towards the disclosure of prosecutions for corruption. In the statute book at least, there is no reference to a policy of disclosure with regard to prosecutions. Although the general statutes for the police and the armed forces stipulate disciplinary procedures and sanctions, there is no mention of whether such cases are automatically made public or not.¹ ²
However, the attitude of the government and the Ministry of Defence towards allegations of corruption can reliably be gauged from how they have reacted to corruption-related scandals in recent years. For instance, in November 2017, it was reported that officials within the Ministry of Defence were on the brink of revealing the identities of several senior security figures implicated in the embezzlement of military food allowances and the drawing of salaries from up to 13,000 ghost employees.³ Rather than have the Ministry of Defence suppress the report, the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General instructed the Prosecutor General to open an investigation into the allegations.³
Similarly, in February 2016, the identities of four senior military leaders arrested for embezzlement were publicly revealed. Among more than the 20 arrested individuals were:
– Colonel Major Mary Diaar, from MDAC’s finance and equipment division
– Colonel Cheick Hamalla Traoré, from the budget and finance division
– Colonel Satao, from the general staff of the armed forces
– Captain Achofikoi Maïga, from the IT division.³
Meanwhile, in November 2016, the daughter of a military general, who worked as a cook at a police training school, was condemned to five years in prison and ordered to repay 75 million CFA (USD 140,500) to 95 victims.⁴ Sergeant Aminata Kané was found guilty of having solicited bribers to facilitate successful applications for posts in the customs authority, the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard.⁴ Applicants had been “encouraged” to pay between 100,000 CFA and 5 million CFA to secure jobs within the security forces.⁴ This rare prosecution and the details provided, along with previous arrests and investigations, indicate that while the security forces do not have formal policies relating to the disclosure of prosecutions and investigations, the details of such cases are frequently revealed.

Prosecutions of defence officials for corruption are exceedingly rare, despite some legislation in place.1,2 Thus, it is difficult to judge how transparent the Ministry of Defence is, in practice, in the disclosure of prosecutions for corruption. However, the attitude of the government and the Ministry of Defence towards allegations of corruption can reliably be gauged from how they have reacted to corruption-related scandals in recent years. The assessor has found evidence showing that the disclosure of details in relation to corruption investigations and prosecutions is sometimes comprehensive, but at other times is inconsistent and patchy, in keeping with an informal policy.
For instance, in 2011, an army colonel was arrested for allegedly embezzling approximately EUR 457,000 of military funds.⁵ He was detained and suspended from undertaking his military activities, but his identity was not revealed.⁵ By contrast, in February 2016, the identities of four senior military leaders arrested for embezzlement were publicly revealed. Among more than the 20 arrested individuals were:
– Colonel Major Mary Diaar, from MDAC’s finance and equipment division
– Colonel Cheick Hamalla Traoré, from the budget and finance division
– Colonel Satao, from the general staff of the armed forces
– Captain Achofikoi Maïga, from the IT division.³
Meanwhile, in November 2016, the daughter of a military general, who worked as a cook at a police training school, was condemned to five years in prison and ordered to repay 75 million CFA (USD 140,500) to 95 victims.⁴ Sergeant Aminata Kané was found guilty of having solicited bribers to facilitate successful applications for posts in the customs authority, the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard.⁴ Applicants had been “encouraged” to pay between 100,000 CFA and 5 million CFA to secure jobs within the security forces.⁴
Finally, in November 2017, it was reported that officials within the Ministry of Defence were on the brink of revealing the identities of several senior security figures implicated in the embezzlement of military food allowances and the drawing of salaries from up to 13,000 ghost employees.³ Rather have the Ministry of Defence suppress the report, the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General instructed the Prosecutor General to open an investigation into the allegations.³

Prosecutions of defence officials for corruption are exceedingly rare, despite some legislation in place.1,2 Allegations of corruption within the defence sector are often investigated, although offenders are rarely held accountable. This is frequently due to political considerations and executive interference in the justice system.
The judicial system in Mali is unable to efficiently deliver prosecutions as a result of internal corruption. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption.⁶ The same month, four judges and a court clerk were arrested on suspicion of corruption.⁷ A US State Department report also noted that “corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts … There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time”.⁷ For instance, in 2011, an army colonel was arrested for allegedly embezzling approximately EUR 457,000 of military funds.⁵ He was detained and suspended from undertaking his military activities, but there is no evidence he was subsequently prosecuted.⁵ In February 2016, the identities of four senior military leaders arrested for embezzlement were publicly revealed. Among more than the 20 arrested individuals were:
– Colonel Major Mary Diaar, from MDAC’s finance and equipment division
– Colonel Cheick Hamalla Traoré, from the budget and finance division
– Colonel Satao, from the general staff of the armed forces
– Captain Achofikoi Maïga, from the IT division.³
However, as of April 2018, there have been no reported charges brought against them.
In 2014, defence contracts signed under Defence Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (Sep 2013 – May 2014) were found to be irregular – according to Malian media, one contract with a Chinese supplier involved supplies invoiced at CFA 600million but budgeted at CFA 3 billion.⁸ ⁹ As a result, the Ministry of Defence cancelled 10 defence contracts, in which several private companies agreed to provide the Malian state with military equipment, and the central court arrested Maïga – it is unclear whether he was tried, charged or fined. But in December 2017, he returned to government to serve as IBK’s Prime Minister, suggesting that the clear failure of oversight and the subsequent arrest had a limited impact on the standing of the president’s ally.
Similarly, there have still been no charges brought against anyone in connection with the controversial off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet for USD35-40 million without parliamentary approval in 2014. Although the scandal caused the IMF to suspend its aid programme and prompted the BVG to conduct an exceptional audit into the purchase, no further action has been taken despite IBK’s promise earlier that year to prioritise fighting corruption.¹⁰ ¹¹
During this exceptional audit, the BVG determined the cost to be CFA 19 billion (around USD40 million), of which CFA 1.4 billion were commissions and fees paid to a broker linked to the president’s friend, Michel Tomi.¹⁰ ¹¹ Moreover, the BVG never received access to the plane’s operating contract, highlighting the limited ability of independent and external audit bodies to perform their functions in the face of opposition from the executive.¹⁰ ¹¹
The one rare case of a prosecution came in November 2016, when the daughter of a military general, who worked as a cook at a police training school, was condemned to five years in prison and ordered to repay 75 million CFA (USD 140,500) to 95 victims.⁴ Sergeant Aminata Kané was found guilty of having solicited bribes to facilitate successful applications for posts in the customs authority, the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard.⁴ Applicants had been “encouraged” to pay between CFA 100,000 and CFA 5 million to secure jobs within the security forces.⁴ However, the isolated prosecution of a lowly sergeant for a case involving USD 140,500 cannot make up for the lack of judicial action in relation to the off-budget purchase of a presidential jet for USD 35-40 million.

There is no formal policy on the part of SEDENA to make the results of the prosecutions public, [1] even though the decisions of the military court judges must be made known in the same hearings, which are open to the public. [2]

The LFTAIP also indicates that the armed forces must make statistics on the following publicly available: pardons, pending trials, enforceable resolutions for crime, by degree of those convicted, by year and sentences completed, and update them. [3] [4] [5] [6]

Information on indictments or hearings is of open access as per the Military Code of Criminal Procedure. It states the principle of publicity will be followed in criminal trials, including the presence of the media. However, the Code also states that proceedings can be reserved whenever, inter alia, public safety, national security, or military operations can be seriously hampered by their publicity. [1] Information not released through the principle of publicity can technically be requested through access to information legislation but, according to media reports and sampled responses to information requests by SEDENA show that the information they release is, at best, very generic. In other cases, it simply refuses to provide an answer. [2] [3] [4] [5]

There is no concrete information on relevant investigations and prosecutions. This information is not easily made accessible, but can be locally requested. As such, this indicator is marked Not Enough Information.

There is no formal policy of the Ministry or the army to make the outcomes of the prosecution publicly available. [1][2]

According to the MoD reviewer, Montenegrin legislation (Criminal Law, Law on Protection of Corruption, etc.) contains penal provisions and measures in this regard. The Law on Prevention of Corruption prescribes measures for prevention of conflict of public and private interest and shall regulate restrictions in the exercise of public functions, submission of reports on assets and income by public officials, protection of persons reporting threats to the public interest that indicate the existence of corruption, as well as other issues of importance to the prevention and suppression of corruption. (Article 1) Section VI (articles 102-105) regulates penal provisions for breachment of the Law.

The Criminal Code of Montenegro treats the following criminal offenses as criminal offenses against official duty in Section XXIII: 1) money laundering, Art. 268 of the Criminal Code; 2) violation of equality in performing economic activity, Art. 269; 3) causing bankruptcy, Art. 273 ;4) causing false bankruptcy, Art. 274) abuse of authority in the economy, Art. 276; 6) false balance, art. 278; 7) abuse of assessment, Art. 279; 8) disclosure of a trade secret, Art. 280; 9) disclosure and use of the stock exchange secret, Art. 281; 10) abuse of official position, Art. 416; 11) unscrupulous work in the service, Art. 417; 12) illegal mediation, Art. 422; 13) accepting bribes, Art. 423; 14) giving bribes, Art. 424; 15) disclosure of an official secret, Art. 425; 16) abuse of monopolistic position, Art. 270; 17) abuse of position in business operations, Art. 272; 18) fraud in the service, Article 419 of the Criminal Code.

No information is available on prosecutions of personnel in defence in official publications of the Ministry available on its website, [1] or on the website of the Army of Montenegro. [2]

According to the MoD reviewer, so far there have been no effective prosecutions and convictions for corrupt actions in practice, but if that happens it will be publicly available. This information could not be verified.

Corruption in defence is rarely reported due to the fear of reprisal. [1] Even when it is reported, the prosecution does not investigate such cases. [2][3]
So far, there have been no effective prosecutions and convictions for corrupt practices in practice. If that happens it will be publicly available, according to the MoD reviewer. This information could not be verified.

No evidence of a policy to publicise the outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities was found. The only example of a public outcome of the prosecution of defence services personnel is the Adib case, which dates back to the late 1990s / early 2000s (1)(2). But in that case the outcome of the prosecution made available concerned Captain Adib, a whistleblower, and not the officers he accused of partaking in corruption activities.

As of October 2018 no legal public action was taken against the suspects. The main suspect, General Bennani (a close relation of the King and former general in charge of the Western Sahara region) passed away in 2015 of unrelated causes without having been prosecuted.

The only example of a public outcome of the prosecution of defence services personnel is the Adib case, which dates back to the late 1990s / early 2000s (1)(2).But in that case the outcome of the prosecution made available concerned Captain Adib, a whistleblower, and not the officers he accused of partaking in corruption activities.

As of October 2018 no legal public action was taken against the suspects. The main suspect, General Bennani (a close relation of the King and former general in charge of the Western Sahara region) passed away in 2015 of unrelated causes without having been prosecuted.

The only example of a public outcome of the prosecution of defence services personnel is the Adib case, which dates back to the late 1990s / early 2000s (1)(2). But in that case the outcome of the prosecution made available concerned Captain Adib, a whistleblower, and not the officers he accused of partaking in corruption activities.

As of October 2018 no legal public action was taken against the suspects. The main suspect, General Bennani (a close relation of the King and former general in charge of the Western Sahara region) passed away in 2015 of unrelated causes without having been prosecuted. The Adib case shows that corruption cases within the military are superficially investigated, or receive “show” hearings in which defendants are not punished.

There is no formal policy for releasing information on the outcome of prosecutions [1]. However, there is some evidence that the military releases information on prosecution outcomes when it is under international pressure to do so, as in the case of the Inn Din massacre [2].

Information about prosecutions is not made public. According to Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun, the Tatmadaw has taken action against corrupt officials, including high-ranking officials, but the Tatmadaw does not release information about prosecutions [1].

The military handles corruption internally but, as General Zaw Min Tun stated at a press conference in response to a question about military prosecutions, ‘we don’t release information about those prosecutions. And don’t ask me [about that]. I won’t answer. The fact is that we have taken action’ [1]. In 2018, two high-ranking members of personnel were prosecuted and sentenced for bribery [1]. According to the activist group Justice for Myanmar, the fact that the Tatmadaw’s Director of Procurement and Quartermaster General are also members of the Board of Directors of MEC is clearly a conflict of interest that could potentially lead to corrupt activity [2]. Due to a lack of access to information, it is not possible to evaluate effectiveness.

While there is no formal policy described in the ‘Designation on Investigating and Handling Military Cases’ that mandates the Military Chamber or Civil Courts to publish the outcomes of prosecutions, the Courts state that ‘cases that attract publicity and/or are legally interesting will be published online as soon as possible’ [1, 2]. This amounts to an informal policy that is reflected in practice (see Q49B).

Since cases that involve the armed forces and the military are of high public interest, many such cases and their accompanying summary reports are published online [1,2,3,4,5,6]. These reports contain information including (but not limited to) charges, date of the (alleged) offence(s), location and extensive information on the judgement delivered by the court [7].

In 1991, the Netherlands abolished the court-martial and the Military Chamber was merged into the rest of the criminal justice system and reformed to include a multi-judge panel [1]. Members of the Judiciary in the Netherlands are independent pursuant to the Constitution and cannot be subject to undue political influence [2]. Cases are investigated and prosecuted through formal processes. The multi-judge panel structure reinforces this independence. The judiciary web service contains news on convictions in defence related fraud and corruption cases [3,4,5].

In the strictest of interpretations, the MoD does not have a formal policy to make available outcomes of prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. However, prosecutions are a matter of public record and are therefore subject to the Official Information Act 1982, which means there is a right to access information though some details, especially of private individuals, may be withheld [1]. This is articulated in Defence Force Orders for Official Information DFO 70, Chapter 3, Section 2 of which establishes the grounds for withholding official information [2]. The NZDF provides media access to Court Martials concerning serious offences (according to the NZDF this is a matter of open justice). While there have been no recent examples of corruption, public reporting on trials at Courts Martial illustrate that Defence takes these issues seriously and releases information as a matter of course. Generally, media are invited to attend Court Martials during the trial. Details will only be withheld on the direction of a relevant New Zealand Court [3]. An explanation for the NZDF not having a formal policy to make available outcomes of prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, can be gained by the fact that the Serious Fraud Office is the lead agency for the investigation and prosecution of bribery and corruption, including of Defence personnel in New Zealand [4]. All information passing through the SFO is observed in the strictest secrecy, however the Director may disclose information to the public pursuant to any act, for the purposes of the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990 and the exercise of powers resulting therein, prosecution purposes, or any person who the Director is satisfied has a proper interest in receiving such information [5]. As a matter of course, the Director regards any relevant information which may have a public interest [6].
Moreover, in November 2020, the Armed Force Discipline Committee, chaired by the Chief of Defence Force, directed the publishing within NZDF of the outcomes from summary trials to ensure that commanders are aware of discipline trends and outcomes and to achieve a deterrent effect [7].

The MoD revealed that no ministry staff have been prosecuted for corruption and or had links to organised crime in the last five years [1]. Similarly, the NZDF confirmed that no personnel or employees have been investigated or prosecuted for corruption. There have been several cases of dishonesty, fraud and misappropriation investigated and in most cases referred to the Police or the SFO for further investigation and/or prosecution [2]. Charges and results of prosecution are made publicly available, as are the New Zealand Courts Martial Appeal Reviews. Examination of a recent case by the Serious Fraud Office showed a suitable level of transparency, by providing background information as well as the specific crimes with which the suspect was charged [3, 4]. Media statements about a recent Court Martial of a senior officer included rank, details of charges (none of which related to corruption), location, and hearing information [5].

Though there are extremely low numbers of NZDF personnel and employees and MoD staff prosecuted for corruption, one case of fraud conducted by the Serious Fraud Office in 2020 of a former Defence employee shows an effective prosecution of cases [1, 2]. Nonetheless, one media report, citing anonymous sources, claimed that some information of a suspect (a senior officer) in a Court Martial relating to bullying was not brought to the Court’s attention, with the article directly implying a cover-up [3]. The absence of information relating to prosecutions means it is not possible to score this indicator. As such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’

No evidence was found of a formal policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities (1, 2). For example, there is no provision in the Military Code of 2003 (3), Chapter 1 (The Military Judicial Police), Articles 46–49, or Chapter III (Prosecution and Criminal Proceedings) about making public the outcome of prosecutions against an officer accused of corruption. This policy probably does not exist.

The results of prosecution are rarely made publicly available, and usually, there is no detailed public information on the charges or the hearing (1,2) .

There is very little public information regarding cases of security and defence personnel’s involvement in cases of corruption. Investigations regarding policemen or military officers are rare (1,2) .

There is no formal policy that the MOD or anti-corruption agencies have to make prosecution outcomes public information. There is an informal practice that does so, but no formal requirement. The recommendations of a presidential probe into military procurement between 2007-2015 was well-publicized. The policy is not clear, but sometimes with particularly egregious offences, there is more publicity. Cases with significant public interest such as the dismissal and or forced retirement of senior officials received a great deal of information available regarding their dismissal and subsequent prosecution (1).

There is no formal policy to make the outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel public. Although there have been some high-profile prosecutions of defence personnel, the outcomes have not been made public as the trials are ongoing. The recommendations of the Presidential Probe into military procurement between 2007-2015 were well-publicized. This is a recent example which can be seen to demonstrate the degree commitment of the Buhari administration to tackle corruption (1).

Further, although there have been several prosecutions of defence personnel this has not been sustained. A part of the FGN commitment during the Open Government Partnership (OGP) process is to improve dialogue and communication with the public. Some other OGP commitments include: Develop a Permanent Dialogue Mechanism on transparency, accountability and good governance between citizens and government to facilitate a culture of openness, Government-Civil Society to jointly review existing legislation on transparency and accountability issues and make recommendations to the National Assembly; adopt a technology-based citizens’ feedback on projects and programs across transparency and accountability. Sometimes when information regarding prosecutions is made public, significant or critical details may be missing (2).

The mentioned cases were high-profile and unusual. There is no evidence of the same information being provided for all prosecutions.

Currently, several prosecutions are ongoing. The political pressure has been focused on getting convictions, rather than derailing the investigations or the prosecution of top military officials (1).

Formally, there is no specific policy regarding the publication of corrupt activities. However, over the past few years, the Ministry of Defence has openly revealed and strongly condemned several high corruption cases [1]. In line with this approach, it is possible that the adoption of official documents and by-laws within the Ministry of Defence to regulate this approach and publicise criminal prosecutions in order to better inform employees and the general public of these issue may be considered [2].

According the Law on Criminal Procedure [1], all outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities are archived on the Criminal Court website, including details on hearings. As such, the public can follow the processes and Court decisions.
In addition, the results of criminal prosecution procedures for corrupt activities of defence personnel are often reported by the media. High-level corruption cases attracted high-level media coverage and public interest [2]. The verdict for Prime Minister Buckovski was published in numerous media, for example [3].

The case of the former Prime Minister and Defence Minister Vlado Buckovski was lengthy and complex, and saw a delayed prosecution. Buckovski was originally charged in 2007, yet 12 years later, the case was closed because of a 10 year statute of limitations [1].

Recently, there have not been any reports of high-level corruption cases in the area of defence and security [2].

Neither the Armed Forces nor other defence institutions are obligated to make prosecution outcomes publicly available. However, the charges and results of prosecutions involving military personnel are made public through the civil judiciary system [1]. This has to be seen in the light of the Norwegian judiciary system. The Norwegian Armed Forces have military prosecuting authority, but this only applies to breaches of the Military Penal Code, whereas corruption offences are defined by the civil Penal Code. In other respects, there is no difference between civil and military court hearings. There are no court martials in Norway [2]. A main rule for the administration of justice in Norway is that the public and the press have free admission to court hearings. The right of admission to any member of the public to a court session can be set aside out of a concern for national security reasons. However, it would concern only extreme cases and serious grounds must be shown for a court to decide to hear a case behind closed doors [3].

Information about scheduled court hearings is available online [1]. Online access to court decisions is accessible to everyone free of charge for one year through Lovdata.no [2]. The full text of all court decisions, included those on corruption, can later be accessed by subscribers through Lovdata.no. Additionally, TI Norway also publishes a collection of important corruption cases, which it updates on an annual basis [3]. The breaches of the Military Penal Code apply to offences by military personnel in wartime and to certain offences, primarily disciplinary cases, in peacetime [4]. Court decisions concerning breaches of the Military Penal Code are also available to the public through Lovdata.no [5].

According to Section 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act, prosecution authorities shall act objectively in all of their actions, including the investigation phase, when a decision to prosecute is made and a case is tried [1]. The law is aimed at forestalling undue political influence. In October 2018, a former commander of the Royal Norwegian Navy was convicted of aggravated corruption and embezzlement in his capacity as a public officer in the Procurement Division of the Armed Forces’ Logistics Organisation [2]. The case was investigated by the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM), a unit responsible for investigating and prosecuting economic crime, including issues in the defence sector. The former commander was paid bribes to help secure the sale of 7 decommissioned naval vessels to CAS-Global Ltd., a UK based company. He was also convicted of contravention of the Export Control Act for misleading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the end user of the vessels was CAS-Global Ltd., despite it being a Nigerian company. The former commander was sentenced to 4 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.

There is no policy in the defence institutions to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available. According to Article 62 in the Basic Statute (1), corruption and bribery within the military and security services fall under the military judiciary exclusively. There is no policy regarding transparency of military courts, nor is there any stipulation on transparency within the Basic Statute (1), (2). According to our sources, there is no policy and no practice of making such information internally available within the different units of the army (3), (4).

No information on prosecutions in military courts is made publicly available. Publishing information on the prosecutions can be criminalized (1), (2). No media reports were found relating to corruption prosecution cases involving defence personnel (3), (4), (5). The open access to the information document on the eGovernment website, Omanuna, states clearly that issues regarding national security remain data protected (6). The military judiciary has no website, and no information or reference is made to the military judiciary activities on the Ministry of Defence website (1).

There is no information on the prosecution of defence services personnel for corruption activities available to the public (1), (2). The effectiveness of the military judiciary is weak. Most cases are superficially investigated without any serious consequences. There are rarely hearings of any kind.

Court proceedings and referrals to military prosecutions are not made public because there are no government procedures or legal provisions to support the publication of the information (1). Outcomes of prosecution are rarely publicly available if the cases are about corruption. Major incidents outside of corruption may result in a public outcome or prosecution (2), (3).

Court proceedings and referrals to the military prosecution are not made public because there are no government procedures or legal provisions to support the publication of such information (1). Prosecution of military personnel for other crimes is usually not publicly available (such as killings, shooting of civilians and attacks against civilians in demonstrations) (2).

Investigations or prosecutions are rare and usually superficial, even in the face of clear evidence (1), (2). There have been many cases of corruption where evidence was publicly available, but the PA has not prosecuted these cases. For instance, the ACC report mentions dozens of corruption cases and hundreds of missing financial records from senior officials (3). None of these issues has been investigated and prosecuted as per the report.
There are several cases of punishment policy towards corrupted security members: For example, the number of punished soldiers was: in 2009, (711), in 2010 (47), in 2011 (87), in 2012 (19), Aman Annual Corruption Report 2012 (p. 29), and in 2014, two members of the Public Prosecution were accused of corruption crimes, and they were referred to the Corruption Crimes Court; one of them holds the position of chief prosecutor and the second was a deputy prosecutor (4).

Rule XIV of the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the SB stipulates the publication of prosecution outcomes on its website as well as in the government’s Official Gazette [1]. The SB is a special court that has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officer and employees, including in the defence institution. For example, the SB’s decision to convict the former military comptroller, retired Lieutenant General Jacinto Ligot, is publicly available on its website [2]. In addition to the court’s decision, both charges and evidences presented by the prosecution are made public. The media has closely followed the development of this high-profile case since 2011 [3, 4, 5]. However, some cases that are not brought to trial by the Office of the Ombudsman (for example those tried under the military justice system) and details rendered by the court martial are not publicly available [6].

Both charges and results of the prosecution filed by the SB are publicly available [1] but those for cases tried under the military justice system, and details rendered by the court martial, are not [2]. For example, the dismissal of 20 top military personnel by the President was prompted by a report submitted by the Armed Forces chief after a “discreet investigation” on anomalous transactions [3].

Corruption cases are investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman but, as the Ombudsman and his/her Deputies are appointed by the President, there has been evidence of undue political influence from the Executive. There have been cases where the Executive has promoted the military personnel in question whilst investigations are ongoing [3, 4].

There is no evidence that there is a policy to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available in this context.

Information about investigations, detention of suspects and indictments filed with the court, related to the defence sector, are published by the news services of the military police [1], the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau [2] and the Prosecutor’s General Office [3]. Some of them are disseminated by the media. Courts do not publish news on sentences and punishments, nor do law enforcement agencies. Some news is published by media; however, due to the lengthy times of trials in Poland, these matters are not followed systematically [4].

In 2015 / 2016 / 2017 The Military Police started 27 / 32 / 49 new and continued 19 / 29 / 27 criminal investigations in corruption cases against military and civilian personnel. 5 / 5 / 14 indictments were filed with the court [1,2,3]. A growing trend may be observed.
In 2016 / 2017 Central Anti-Corruption Bureau started 4 / 5 criminal investigations in corruption cases in defence and security sector [4,5]. The report do not provide sector specific data how many indictments were filed with the court.
Also official statistics on convictions in corruption cases do not provide sector specific data. Some convictions has been reported by media. [6] Study of military courts judgments for the years 2010 – 2015 indicates that 66% (208 out of 297) of defendants in corruption cases were convicted. However, only 2 (1%) of them were sentenced on determinate prison period, the others got suspended prison sentence or non-prison sentence, as fine. [7] In all types of courts the level of determined prison sentences in case of corruption convictions is c. 9% in 2016-2017 [3].
In some high profile cases (as corruption charges against assistant of a former defence minister) media speculates that his arrest was possible only after his political protector was dismissed. (There are no traces of involvement of the former minister in corrupt activities of his assistant) [8]

There are no specific military courts in Portugal, according to the Military Justice Code [1]. If the country has declared war, ordinary military courts are provided for in law [1] Instead all military justice matters are required to run through civil courts where military judges are required to participate in rulings [1]. Final court sentencing, including that involving strictly military justice issues, is published in the Official Gazette [2].

Prosecutions of defence personnel in civil courts are made public as a matter of law [3], subject to judicial secrecy [4], and defence institutions are not required to have specific policy on disclosure.

Civil courts are required to be open and transparent to the public with limits established by law [3].

Corruption-related prosecutions are not processed by military courts [1]. The Penal Process Code requires publicity under penalty of mistrial [2], but judicial secrecy applies [3]. Charges and court rulings are publicly available [4, 5]. These include the date, location and a summary of the charge; hearing dates are accessible online [6].

The Tancos affair involves allegations of undue influence [1], but plaintiffs are now in court [2]. A recent court decision on corruption in the Portuguese Air Force [3] suggests undue influence is neither systematic nor effective.

There is no policy obliging defence institutions to make the outcomes of prosecutions publicly available. Prosecution of military personnel is confidential and almost all data related to the military, including its judicial system and internal processes, are confidential. [1,2]

There is no transparency in relation to the prosecution of defence personnel for corrupt activities. Information about the defence and security sectors are treated as confidential state secrets. There is no information available about prosecutions on any of the governmental websites. [1,2,3]

According to sources within the MoD, cases are investigated but superficially. Internally, the investigation also is superficial, and the hearings of defendants are simply to comply with procedure. [1,2,3]

The 2018-2020 MoD anti-corruption plan can be considered a formal policy to make the outcomes of prosecution cases available to the public. Clause 24 of the plan requires ‘information about the processing of incoming reports of corruption to be published on the official MoD website’ [1]. The plan also demands that ‘those who violate legislation (related to conflicts of interest) are held to account’ (see Clause 2) and that ‘punishment be made absolutely unavoidable for those who break anti-corruption law’ (see Clause 8) [1]. It also requires the MoD website to publish ‘updated information about anti-corruption activities’ (see Clause 22) and to ‘provide the public with the means to report cases of corruption within the MoD’ (see Clause 23) [1].

First of all, there is a separate report on the prosecution of civillian personnel for failing to declare potential conflicts of interest [1]. It is not conducted regularly, however – the most recent is dated February 2016 [1].

Second of all, in compliance with the anti-corruption plan, there is a report on the processing of incoming reports of corruption in the MoD. The most recent one states that there were 191 reports about potential corruption cases, the main areas of which included abuse of office, informal fees, blackmail and embezzlement [2]. As a result, according to the report, there were two criminal investigations, two employees were fired and disciplinary action was taken against five employees. There are no details on the grounds for firing employees, hearings or the prosecution of criminal cases.

With regard to public reports submitted to the MoD concerning corruption within the MoD, the statistics suggest that only two criminal cases were launched after receiving 191 corruption reports in the fourth quarter of 2018 [1].

As for publicly announced corruption cases, there were constant reports of corruption investigations in the MoD after the 2012 scandal involving the former Minister of Defence, the head of Property Department and MoD sub-contractor Oboronservice. Most investigations result in prosecution and sentencing decisions [2,3]. Some criminal prosecutions give rise to additional investigations following the initial indictment [4].

Some investigations take a lot of time – the case investigating the record-breaking bribe of 648 million rubles was launched in October 2017 and was only finished in March 2019 [5,6,7]. Overall, it seems that the 2012 case prompted investigative and prosecution officials to keep a close eye on corruption in the MoD. Comment: according to Interviewee 2, during the last few years, there has been an order from the top to punish anyone, regardless of their position, for bribery or corruption-related crimes. That has resulted in the practice of judges being afraid to even commute a sentence in corruption cases because the FSB or other monitoring agencies might suspect the judges of being bribed. This could also be considered to be undue political influence [8].

The Saudi Anti-Corruption Law of 2007 states, authorities are obliged to publish the results of corruption cases “upon the request of the general prosecutor and the approval of the authority considering the case” (1). According to our sources, the legal framework indicates that corruption persecution of officials must be published to the public (2), (3), (4).

According to our sources, the government publishes information about cases, but they do not provide detailed information about the outcome of the prosecution process itself. According to our sources, there is a lack of transparency and enforcement (1), (2), (3).
The Saudi government typically does not release details of investigations or prosecutions relating to public officials, and such cases are primarily covered by the international press rather than local media outlets. The anti-corruption drive led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in November 2017 did release some details relating to the individuals arrested and the charges against them, including senior military personnel such as then head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard Miteb bin Abdullah, who was accused of embezzlement and conflict of interest. Nonetheless, the government does not widely circulate or publish these details, and the abovementioned charges against Miteb bin Abdullah were again primarily published by international press sources including Reuters based on private discussions with Saudi government officials (4).

According to our sources, there is a lack of effectiveness in the prosecution of corruption cases. The recent crackdown on corruption is politically motivated that aims at strengthening MBS’ position in the royal family as the most powerful person. Cases are superficially investigated (1), (2), (3). The aforementioned anti-corruption campaign led by Mohammed bin Salman has targeted members of the Saudi military and defence establishment. However, this drive has attracted substantial criticism from international rights groups and observers, who have claimed that the detentions and investigations are an attempt by the crown prince to consolidate power, remove potential rivals and seize funds from the detainees to advance his reform programs (4). There is little information published regarding the status of many of the detainees or the penalties against them, and the trials, if there are any, are not public.

Policy for making outcomes of prosecutions public does not exist within the current legislative framework, which regulates the defence system [1, 2].

Information on prosecution outcomes is rarely made public. The archive on the MoD website does not contain any announcements containing information about the outcomes of the prosecution of MoD and SAF personnel or imposed sanctions [1]. Most media reports also stop with news of arrests and the disclosure of corrupt cases.

Since information on the outcomes of trials is not made public, it is difficult to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of prosecuting corrupt cases of defence personnel. Evidence of undue political influence can be seen in certain high-profile cases, such as a famous one involving the current defence minister and the shady origin of the money invested in real estate several years ago. Three prosecutor’s offices declared incompetence over the case; the investigation was stopped and the case closed [1].

Outcomes of formal proceedings are made available to the public. Article 103 of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Act stipulates that: (1) Subject to any other provisions of this Act, a subordinate military court shall sit in open court in the presence of the parties and, to the extent that accommodation permits, the public shall be admitted to the trial; (2) Every judgement or finding of a subordinate military court shall be pronounced in open court [1]. There is no evidence of attempts to suppress information regarding the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities.

Relevant information on cases that attract media attention has been widely covered [1]. For example, a senior military official was convicted of crimes including prostitution and sentenced to jail, discharged from service and lost his commission [2, 3]. Other offences have also demonstrated the efficiency of the military justice system and the openness in which such events are disseminated to the public, likely to enhance deterrence [4]. However, detailed information on court-martials is not publicly released by the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF).

There is a robust process for the formal investigation and prosecution of corruption-related cases for military personnel, which is clearly defined and free from political influence [1]. Suspects are brought before either a Judge Court Martial or depending on the offence. Civil offences such as theft and drug consumption are presided over by a district judge from the State Courts, while military offences such as going absent without leave (AWOL) and desertion are dealt with by a Panel Court Martial. An appeal is possible via the Military Court of Appeal, or a petition the Reviewing Authority of the Armed Forces Council, comprising of the chief of the defence force, a service chief, and MINDEF’s permanent secretary for defence development. The Reviewing Authority can overturn a court-martial sentence or reduce it [2]. The overall process leaves very little room for external influence.

There does not appear to be a policy related to the publication of defence service personnel prosecution outcomes.

There does not appear to be a policy related to the publication of defence service personnel prosecution outcomes. There is information available in the public sphere on some prosecutions; but this does not relate to the DoD themselves releasing prosecution outcomes, let alone as a matter of policy. Modest media coverage of occasional, high profile cases is not sufficient evidence of a generalised policy of transparency [1, 2, 3, 4].

Unknown due to lack of transparency.

The DoD 2017/18 Annual Report records prosecutions, as a performance indicator cryptically labelled: “The degree to which military prosecution services are provided to the SANDF”, which achieves a 100% target achievement rate, without any further information provided [1].

Unknown due to lack of transparency.

The DoD 2017/18 Annual Report records prosecutions, as a performance indicator cryptically labelled “The degree to which military prosecution services are provided to the SANDF”, which achieves a 100% target achievement rate, without any further information provided [1].

The Department of Defence Annual Report includes information of corruption investigations:
“During the period under review, 43 whistleblowing reports were detected for investigation, of which Directorate Anti-Corruption and Anti-Fraud completed 27 investigations. Of the 27 investigations conducted, eight were handed over to the Military Police Division, three were referred to the Defence Legal Services Division, three were referred to Services/Divisions and 13 were closed, due to no corruption/fraud detected” [2]. 

However, media coverage of (albeit a small number) of cases suggests at least some level of transparency and effectiveness [3, 4, 5, 6].

Prosecution outcomes are not made public in South Korea. [1] Although there is legislation that requires disclosure of all information, including public officers’ prosecution results, except for confidential information, many central government agencies do not disclose prosecution outcomes. [2] Article 9 of the Official Information Disclosure Act states that all information kept and managed by public institutions is subject to disclosure to the public through the “Information Disclosure [정보공개]”, a website run by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety. [3] However, a media report reveals that the Ministry of National Defence (MND) has not publicised sensitive information, such as prosecution outcomes of defence personnel, on the website. [4]

As stated above, there is no comprehensive policy that requires defence institutions to disclose prosecution outcomes. Instead, the media actively reports criminal cases regarding the military and defence personnel. The only possible way to access the information for the general public is through the media. [1] [2] Since conscription exists for all male citizens in South Korea, most Korean citizens have some degree of involvement in the military, and society is likely to expect a high standard of morality from defence and military personnel. Therefore, the media has focused on covering stories on the prosecution outcomes of defence personnel. [1] According to one media report, the total number of personnel in defence procurement prosecuted for bribery charges in the past 10 years was 33, as of 2018. [3]

Once corrupt activities of defence personnel are detected, all the cases are forwarded to prosecution institutions and are prosecuted through formal processes under the terms of relevant laws, such as the Public Service Ethics Act, the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act and the Criminal Procedure Act. [1] [2] [3] However, there is evidence that prosecution institutions are not independent from political influence. [4] When the former Park Geun-hye administration prioritised policy on the integrity of the defence sector, prosecutors excessively concentrated their investigative power on defence corruption. This resulted in wrongly accusing high-ranking military personnel, who were eventually found not guilty (See Q8). [5]

The Procurement Act, which applies to defence services personnel, lists heavy fines for corrupt activities by contractors. [1].But it does not talk explicitly of penalties for civil servants in the Ministry. Neither does it state that corrupt activities by Ministry staff will be made public. [1]

Despite senior officers being fingered for corruption and investigation committees being set up (eg the current Chief of Defence Staff’s example in 2015), the outcome of the process is not revealed to the public. [1] In the case of Gen. JJ Okot, he was suspended from his command but resurfaced as Chief of Defence Staff without the public knowing the details of the investigation on him, or whether he was absolved or found guilty.

There is insufficient information in the public domain to ascertain a case in which an official engaged in corrupt actions with clear evidence that resulted in a prosecution. Hence this indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

No explicit policy regarding the publication of prosecutions of corrupt activities in the defence sector is known. However, court resolutions are made public in Spain and this includes defence personnel. However, there are limits in access to information when national security interests are applicable. Statistics of the military judicial processes consider the offences listed in Article 6, 7, and 8 of Organic Law 8/2014 (of the Disciplinary Regime of the Armed Forces [1]), Art. 7, 8, and 17 of Organic Law 8/1998 (also on the Disciplinary Regime of the Armed Forces) and Art. 7, 8, and 9 of Organic Law 12/2007 (for the Civil Guard) [2]. None of the offences listed as soft, severe, and very severe refer to corruption, bribery, fraud, or anything deemed similar [2]. Thus, there is no express mention of these types of offences in the statistic yearbook on military jurisdiction. Overall, no policy on making outcomes of the trials of defence services personnel for corrupt activities was found, and experts consulted are not aware of the existence of such a policy [3].

Article 105b of the Spanish Constitution recognises the right to access administrative files and registers, “except in what affects the security and defense of the state, the investigation of crimes and the privacy of people” [1]. As stated by the Judicial Power in Spain, “those who have been a party to the military judicial procedure in question or are holders of a legitimate interest may access the military judicial files”, whilst restrictions still apply in these cases and the processing of the petition does not seem easy [1]. Court resolutions, including those in the military’s jurisdiction, can be accessed in the Judicial Documentation Centre (Centro de Documentación Judicial) (CENDOJ), and a search engine facilitates the work [2, 3]. In the cases where results of prosecution are made publicly available (even if not always easily accessible), information includes both the charges and results of prosecutions; the date, location and details of the charge; and information on the hearing.

In Spain, there is evidence of effective investigation and prosecution relating to corruption crimes for defence personnel, and certain cases can be found at the CENDOJ [1]. However, cases of corruption, sexual abuse, or theft in a military facility are not judged in civilian courts, as is the case for other Spanish citizens, but in a military court. This is a vestige from the past that was not eliminated during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. This situation “goes against the very spirit of the bodies of Justice and it is not entirely clear the crime that corresponds strictly to the military sphere” [2]. Military members have accused military courts of being non-impartial and non-independent, pointing out that hierarchy and discipline may hamper decisions (e.g. when a military judge has to decide the fate of an accused officer of a higher rank). Endogamy, comradeship, promotion opportunities, self-protection, accusations of breach of honour and discipline, among others, are factors that hamper impartiality and independence in military courts [2]. In military courts, an argument with a higher ranking officer may be sentenced to nine months of imprisonment, and there is evidence of military judges arguing that the word of a higher ranking officer is more valid just because it comes from a higher ranking officer, or they have justified abuses arguing “bad luck” [3, 4]. This context has forced complainants in Spain, from personnel in the Guardia Civil or in the armed forces, to resort to European court jurisdiction or human rights courts [2].

No evidence could be found that the Bashir regime or its Ministry of Defence had a written policy to make information about defence-related and security-related prosecutions publicly available. A 2020 report by Bertelsmann Stiftung summarised that, although the regime publicly declared a ‘war on corruption’ in 2018, this was executed by the National Intelligence and Security Services as an public relations exercise to pin responsibility for the dismal economy on a group of businessmen and bankers [1].

Information on prosecutions is not made publicly available as a matter of routine, but rather selectively, when the release of such information is intended to bolster the support or tolerance of the population that supported the overthrow of Bashir. For example, the government very publicly announced the prosecution of former President Bashir for domestic corruption charges brought in Sudanese courts, as well as the fact that former President Bashir, former Minister of Defence Abdel Raheem Hussein and former Minister of Interior Official Ahmad Harun were in custody and would go to the International Criminal Court for trial [1]. A vast number of defence and security personnel are themselves party to the Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption and Funds Recovery Committee itself; state-level committees include representatives of the Ministries of Interior, the SAF, the General Intelligence Service, the Rapid Support Forces, the Central Bank and the Ministries of Finance and Justice [2]. As was the case under the Bashir regime, they only support and publicise prosecutions that will satisfy the public’s desire for accountability without sacrificing themselves (the military leadership of the transitional government).

A 2020 report by Bertelsmann Stiftung summarised that ‘accusations of corruption are used as a political instrument to arrest and prosecute persons who have lost the favor of the [ruling regime]’ and that, although the regime declared a ‘war on corruption’ in 2018, this was executed by the National Intelligence and Security Services as a public relations exercise to pin responsibility for the dismal economy on a group of businessmen and bankers [1]. In other words, rather than civilian institutions holding the President, military leaders and defence sector cronies accountable for pocketing revenues that should have served citizens’ interests, the security institutions were themselves in charge of finding scapegoats.

Similarly, the transitional government appears to pursue and publicise the prosecutions of individuals selectively (rather than routinely) for political purposes – in this case, to demonstrate to the public and the international community that they are cracking down on corruption by former regime members who did not make it into the current government. A vast number of defence and security personnel remain uninvestigated and are even party to the Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption and Funds Recovery Committee itself; state-level committees include representatives of the Ministries of Interior, the SAF, the General Intelligence Service, the Rapid Support Forces, the Central Bank and the Ministries of Finance and Justice [2]. In other words, rather than defence and security personnel being vulnerable to prosecution or at least investigation, they are themselves in charge of the investigations that lead to prosecutions of high political and/or resource value for the new government. Meanwhile, as observed by an expert on Sudan’s defence sector, who was interviewed for this report, no effort is made to investigate or prosecute cases that might/would implicate sitting defence and security officials in the transitional government [3].

There is no formal policy to publish or to make publicly available the outcomes of the prosecution processes involving defence institutions. However, documentation related to court rulings in Sweden can be requested by anyone according to the Public Access Law [1], and the involved legal bodies (e.g. the National Agency against Corruption (RMK) [2], Armed Forces Personnel Administration (FPAN) [3], State Disciplinary Board (SA) [4], and The Chancellor of Justice (JK) [5]) tend to make at least case outcomes publicly available, either online or in their annual reports.

The results of prosecutions are made publicly available, but usually there is little to no information included concerning the details of the hearings. However, again, according to the Public Access Law [1] as well as the Law on Freedom of the Press [2], information regarding the prosecution processes –  including date, location and details of the charge, and information on the hearing – are defined as public documents and can be requested by the public at any time.

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, and no evidence of undue political influence could be found from the studied time period [1] [2] [3].

Article 48 of the Swiss Military Penal Trial Procedures (Militärstrafprozess) (MStP) defines all procedures, but not the deliberation and votes as public (Article 48.1). In cases where the court sees a risk to national interests or public order, the public can be excluded. The same applies when it is in the interests of the victim (Article 48.2). The judgement is announced publicly (Article 48.3) [1]. If the penal procedure is based on documents being classified as “secret” or “confidential”, the entire ruling has to be classified as such. Exceptionally such documents can be removed from the dossier and stored separately. The main dossier must not contain references to the content of the classified documents (Ordinance on Military Criminal Justice, Militärstrafrechtspflege, Article 58) (MStV) [2].

Article 48 of the Swiss Military Penal Trial Procedures (Militärstrafprozess) (MStP) defines all procedures, but not the deliberation and votes as public (Article 48.1). In cases where the court sees a risk to national interests or public order, the public can be excluded. The same applies when it is in the interests of the victim. (Article 48.2). The judgement is announced publicly (Article 48.3) [1]. Hearings are public and announced in advance on the website of the Office of the Armed Forces Attorney General [2]. If the penal procedure is based on documents classified as “secret” or “confidential”, the entire ruling is classified. In Exceptional circumstances, documents can be removed from the dossier and stored separately. The main dossier must not contain references to the content of the classified documents (Ordinance on Military Criminal Justice, Militärstrafrechtspflege, Article 58) (MStV) [3]. Rulings by the Military Court of Cassation are publicly accessible on a dedicated website. They contain the relevant information to the case, including details, dates, charges and justifications [4].

Article 1 of the MStP guarantees the independence of the military justice system [1]. Article 204 of the MStG regulates the independence of disciplinary procedures [2]. There are no reports of undue political influence on prosecutions or military criminal trials. However, the independence of a separate military judicial system per se has been regularly disputed and is increasingly less common in neighbouring European states [3].

Laws and regulations are well organised for anti-corruption from the perspectives of investigation, allegation, and prosecution for both civilian and military personels of the Ministry of National Defence independently and publicly by the Criminal Code of the Republic of China, the Anti-Corruption Act, and the Armed Forces Punishment Act [1, 2, 3]. Legal cases of corruption and bribery, including personnel in the Ministry of National Defence and Taiwan’s Armed Forces, are summarised and disclosed by the Ministry of Justice to the public on a monthly basis [5]. During peacetime, both civilian and military personnel are under the same jurisdiction which make public outcomes of the prosecution [4]. Military justice is only applied to the military personnel in Taiwan’s armed forces during wartime [5, 6].

During peacetime, both civilian and military personnel are under civilian jurisdiction which is transparent and open to the public [1]. The charges and results of prosecutions are made publicly available [2]. For court martials for all ranks, information is released to the public as a matter of course and includes the date, location and details of the charge and information on the prosecution [3, 4].

Taken together, the Criminal Code of the Republic of China, Anti-Corruption Act, and Armed Forces Punishment Act provide effective measures for anti-corruption in Taiwan’s military [1, 2, 3]. This being said, some experts have still questioned Taiwan’s judicial independence. [4]. Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence [5, 6, 7, 8].

There is no evidence of such policy. No evidence could be found on the websites of the Ministry of Defence, or the Tanzania People’s Defence Force. [1] [2] While occasionally the prosecution of individual soldiers for corruption is reported by the Preventing and Combating of Corruption Bureau, no such announcements have been seen from the ministry or the military, or any similar formal policy document.

Such information is rarely provided to the public. [1] [2]

Cases are investigated and prosecuted through formal processes and normally the Public Court is used to investigate and prosecute the cases. For example, on October 23, 2019, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau arrested four personnel including one Millitary Personnel member in Kagera Region, for allegedly receiving bribery worth 3 Million Tanzania shillings and sent them to court. That said, certain cases are suspicious in that senior officials are acquitted under strange circumstances. For instance, in the case of Abdallah Zombe and other top police officers, a former Dar Es Salaam Regional Crime Office Assistant Commissioner of Police was acquitted in a murder case. He was accused of leaving his co-accused and junior officer Senior Superrintended of Police Christopher Bageni to be sentenced to death. Such cases are rare though.

During the NCPO’s regime, led by Prayut Chan Chan-o-cha since the 2014 coup, NCPO Order No. 69/2257 was issued to broadly define the prosecution procedures for corruption cases. According to this order, the head of each governmental agency is responsible for delivering prosecution and specifying penalties. This whole process should be considered non-transparent [1]. Nonetheless, according to the National Strategy on Corruption Prevention and Suppression, issued in 2018 and which is still in effect, the fourth strategy emphasises that the prosecution of corruption offences must be conducted in a timely, strict and transparent manner [2, 3]. The sentences of offenders must be publicly announced and every armed forces unit must submit an annual report on its anti-corruption performance to its Commander-in-Chief every October [4]. In other words, between 2014-2019, the prosecution of the military personnel in corruption cases was not required to be publicly available, but the National Strategy on Corruption Prevention and Suppression requires the sentences of offenders to be publicly announced and reported to the Commander-in-Chief on an annual basis.

During the six-year rule of the NCPO’s regime led by Gen Prayut, NCPO Order NO. 69/2257 was issued to broadly define the prosecution procedures for corruption cases. According to this order, the head of each governmental agency is responsible for delivering prosecution and specifying penalties. This whole process should be considered non-transparent [1]. However, under the NCPO, even though the government had employed Article 44 to prosecute more than 300 civil servants for corruption offences, this never happened to military officers, raising questions about its double standards. More importantly, the details on prosecutions were rarely made available [2]. Later on, according to the National Strategy on Corruption Prevention and Suppression, issued in 2018, the fourth strategy emphasises that the prosecution of corruption offences must be conducted in a timely, strict and transparent manner [3]. Nevertheless, information on prosecutions is rarely or inconsistently made available since military courts prohibit observers from recording court proceedings and do not allow the publication of witness testimonies or court dockets in general [4].

In 2014, the Committee for Anti-Corruption was established but it was entirely made up of military generals. Two years later, there was a law amendment that only allowed military attorneys to prosecute military officials, making it more difficult to investigate or prosecute military personnel [1]. Despite the existence of the National Strategy on Corruption Prevention and Suppression, newly issued in 2018, these NCPO legacies continue to be in effect to this day, rendering the national strategy barely effective. An example of the failure to investigate corruption activities in the defence sector is the case of ‘Prawit’s Watchgate’. Even though members of the cabinet are obliged to file asset declarations before accepting their positions, Prawit never declared the watches he was photographed with to the commission. However, the NACC claimed that it found no evidence that Prawit owns a large collection of luxurious watches despite the clear images of him wearing them [2].

Article 108 of the constitution provides that all prosecutions should be publicly available (1). The code of military justice in article 40 grants this same principle, otherwise the results of these prosecutions should be considered null and void. However, the court may order that the debates be held on camera in accordance with the law or whenever it believes that advertising can undermine the army. In all cases judgements must be pronounced publicly (2).

According to our sources, the outcomes of prosecutions are usually made public, but they often lack detail and hearings and charges are not published, which leave a room for speculations and rumours which in turn affect trust in the military judicial system (1,2). The Ministry of Defence does not publish statements and does not communicate about this issue on its website or in the media (3).

According to our sources, some cases have been investigated and prosecuted, but not all of the cases are prosecuted, and many are superficially investigated (1,2). The Anti-Corruption Authority (INLUCC) annual report for the year 2017 mentions that 7 cases of corruption have been transmitted to justice by the Ministry of Defence (3).

Interviewees 2 and 3 both suggested that, before the presidential system, corruption and anti-bribery investigations and legal trials had been made public more frequently, but for almost two years, due to the extreme pressure of the government on independent media, the number of news reports on corruption and anti-bribery investigations published by media outlets has dramatically decreased [1,2]. Open-source research confirms this suggestion because almost all corruption and anti-bribery investigations and legal cases found are from before summer 2018. Therefore, there is not currently any policy of defence institutions making the outcomes of prosecutions available to the public.

Open-source research confirms the above assertion because the overwhelming majority of reports on corrupt activities in the defence/security sector are from before summer 2018, which marks the beginning of the presidential system. Only two reports from the past two years could be found through open-source research [3,4].

During their open-source research, the assessor could not find even a single report or article about a prosecution within the defence sector relating to corruption or bribery since before summer 2018, which marks the beginning of the executive presidency.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’ as the absence of information relating to prosecutions means it is not possible to score this indicator. The assessor’s open-source research, which aimed to examine reports published by both national and local media outlets on corrupt activities involving defence/security personnel, shows that there are only three reports: one about a case of bribery at the Van border gate [1], one about fuel smuggling [2] and one about soldiers getting arrested for bribery [3]. These reports suggest that all military and civilian personnel involved in the investigations were detained, but there are no other details provided about further legal processes, such as whether or not they were arrested by the prosecutor or whether or not they were convicted by the courts and dishonorably discharged.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Deo Akiiki [1], and the chief legal officer of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) [2], the UPDF has an open door policy of prosecutions which is open to the public from the trials through sentencing. Any member of the public is allowed to attend to the proceedings. According to The Independent [3], a UPDF captain was arrested over alleged extortion. However, there is no official policy.

The Independent [1] reported that two UPDF soldiers were charged before the General Court Martial in Makindye for fraud-related offences. Major Kapalaga Lubega, attached to Uganda People’s Defence Air forces (UPDAF) and Caroline Kyakabale, a former human resource manager in charge of civilian personnel, appeared before Chairman Lieutenant General Andrew Gutti and denied the allegations. However, as one of the peer reviewer has noted, not all cases of corruption and their proceedings are made public. For example, the investigations into the ghost soldiers scandal were never publicised. Some of the proceedings in a court-martial are conducted on camera if there are sensitive and damning details involved high profile people in the ministry or government.

Some MPs [1] observed that the effectiveness of these cases depends on whether the accused people are considered to be anti or pro-establishment. In many cases, those who are related to the powers that be either through marriage connections or tribal lines tend to walk scot-free, while those who do not have relations with high-ranking officials face the brutal side of the law.

According to Ukrainian legislation, the NAPC must publish, annually, a National Report on the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Policy Principles which inter alia includes statistics on corruption cases [1]. It also informs the public about the measures taken to prevent corruption [2]. However, public authorities are not obliged to publish the results of anti-corruption prosecutions [4]. There is no formal policy to publish outcomes of prosecutions, although individuals are entitled [3] to receive information on anti-corruption activities upon filing information requests. There is, however, an informal policy of MoD to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available [5]. In practice, the Corruption detection and prevention unit (department) in MoD is leading/supervising the Working group #5 devoted to anticorruption activities in the framework of Reforms Committee under the supervision of MoD togather with foreign advisers and experts and civil society. The meetings of Working group #5 used to be organized once in a month. Foreign experts and civil society were invited on them. During such meetings the Corruption detection and prevention unit openly reported their activity in MoD Central Staff and situation in regions. They directly described the detected corruption cases in the defence system of Ukraine and their prosecution. Last such meeting was in the end of 2019. Meetings were fully open to public. However, in the majority corruption cases the final punishment was a fine, not a prison sentence. But in general, the number of cases for prosecution the corruption crimes had positive dynamic in Ukraine, at least up to 2018 [5].

Some of the charges and results of prosecution are made publicly available [1, 2, 3], although it is difficult to say what share of the actual charges and results of prosecution are published. On a separate website, information on the court hearings can be found (including date, location and brief information on the charge) [4]. As of April 2018, Ukraine does not have court-martials although there have been attempts to set them up [5].

There are several public institutions responsible for the investigation and prosecution of offences including corruption offences by defence personnel. SAPO prosecutes top-level corruption offences (including defence and security top-level officials) following NABU’s investigation. All other cases are currently prosecuted by the General Prosecutor’s Office (Military Prosecutor’s Office), following investigations conducted by either the SSU or the National Police depending on particular infringement type. The NABU can be seen to be one of the effective and independent institutions tasked to combat corruption and corruption amongst defence personnel as well; it is also one of the first public institutions to investigate high-level corruption cases with active MoD officials involved [1, 2, 3]. There are reasons to doubt SAPO’s independence and effectiveness since its Head was recently accused of corruption [4]. Equally doubtful is the effectiveness of the Military Prosecutor’s Office and Security Service of Ukraine since there is evidence that they subjected to undue political influence [5, 6].

There is no evidence to suggest that there is a policy within the defence institutions to make the outcomes of prosecutions publicly available. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any public information available about the prosecution of cases of corruption within the defence institutions themselves. As previously explained, several laws apply to defence sector personnel concerning corruption and bribes. These include the armed forces-specific Federal Laws No. 6 and 7 of 2004, the UAE Federal Law No. 3 of 1987 (as amended) (the “Penal Code”); the UAE Federal Law No. 21 of 2001 concerning Civil Service; the Dubai Government Human Resources Management Law No. 27 of 2006; and the Abu Dhabi Law No. 1 of 2006 concerning Civil Service in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (1), (2). Cases of corruption within the army (if they exist) are handled secretly and never made public (4), (5).

There is a total lack of transparency about making the outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel available to the public. Researchers could not identify a single case of defence corruption made publicly available whether officially by prosecutors or through the media. The websites of the UAE’s official government portal, the Ministry of Defence and official media outlets do not mention a single case of corruption within the defence forces (1), (2), (3). Some information is shared on the government’s website about Public Prosecution, but this information only includes procedures followed, rather than cases or outcomes (4), (5).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no defence institution policy to make the outcomes of prosecutions publicly available, as set out in 49A, it is irrelevant within this context to assess the policy’s effectiveness as it is non-existent (1), (2).

There is a policy to make outcomes of all prosecutions publicly available. The Military Court Service publishes court martial results from the military court centres on an annual basis [1, 2].

Both the charges and results of prosecutions are made publicly available [1]. For court martials, information is released to public as matter of course. This includes the date, location and names of the charge. Details of the charge and the outcome (guilty/not guilty) is included in the data [1].

There is no evidence to incidate that there is any undue political influence when cases are investigated [1]. Cases are investigated through formal processes.

During the research period of 2015-2020, there was no policy which mandated the various military justice systems to publish details on the prosecution of defence services personnel. Each military branch publishes some information on court-martials and hearings, to varying degrees. The Navy, for example, publicly publishes the results of every special and general court-martial convened [1], whereas the Army publishes the time, location and name of past and upcoming trials [2].

The 2017 National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) introduced Article 140a to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which prescribes best practice for data collection and transparency in the military justice system [3,4]. Article 140a came into effect in January 2021 (after the period of this study) and time charge sheets, court filings and other documents will be made public on a new website. According to an FOIA specialist at the US Army Court of Criminal Appeals, however, records of trials will not be included in this new system [5]. Article 140a states that the military justice system should facilitate public access to docket information, filings and records unless classified. Records of trials are not included in this provision and require an FOIA request [4].

As noted above, each of the branches of the military makes details relating to courts-martial of their own service members public independently. It appears that for all five branches, details are made public for all personnel regardless of rank.

The Marine Corps publishes monthly Court Martial reports, in which the results of prosecutions are made public. This includes the name of the offending Marine, their unit, the offence, sentence and the date and location of the hearing [1]. The Navy also publishes monthly reports on the results on every court-martial convened, which includes the same information [2]. The Air Force and the Coast Guard publish trial results on a rolling basis, which include the date, location and details of the offences [3,4]. The Army’s archive is published on a rolling basis with details of the date and location of the charge, but no information on the actual offence [5]. There is no information about the judicial system in the US Space Force on its website [6].

Given the lengthy dockets and reports published by each of the armed services, as outlined above, it seems that prosecutions are frequent. With regard to undue influence, there is no evidence of systemic undue political influence but it could be possible that influence is imposed on the court-martial process. President Trump, however, did involve himself in certain cases of military justice, including pardoning a Navy SEAL who was demoted for war crimes in Iraq. Trump reversed the demotion and prevented the Navy from expelling the officer from the SEALs in a move that was seen to be undermining the process of military justice [1].

Although information from the judicial branch is public according to constitutional law and the Anti-corruption Law [1, 2], there is no policy requiring or promoting the publication of investigations, prosecutions, and trials of defence sector staff who commit corruption malpractice.

The military justice system is tasked with prosecuting military personnel who commit offences against the military administration, but secrecy and a lack of control over justice reflect a lack of policies to make prosecution outcomes publicly available [3]. With regard to civilian justice, the lack of action from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR), which is blocked from exercising control over the defence sector [4], also contributes to a failure to publish information on prosecutions, as well as to the absence of judicial action in the face of evidence of corruption involving military officials.

There is no policy requiring the publication of information on judicial proceedings against state officials, civil or military, in either the military or civilian justice sectors. Therefore, justice is totally opaque in these and other cases, given the obstruction of the independence of the judiciary, strongly influenced by the interests of the executive. As such, there is no interest in maintaining an openness of information or in external controls that may demand information [1, 2].

Although information on investigations of military personnel accused of corruption was published by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in previous years [3], no official or unofficial information was made public to show the progress of judicial proceedings. Academics and military experts have criticised the failure to comply with military justice procedures, currently evidenced by the arrests of military personnel for political reasons, carried out without open investigations or judicial orders [4, 5].

Corruption cases in the defence sector are not investigated and recent years have seen a sharp deterioration in military justice, which has ceased to comply with due judicial processes and has become heavily politicised.

Within the framework of announcing anti-corruption plans, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has made announcements about investigations of military personnel. However, recent years have seen no action from this body or military justice, even in the face of denouncements against and information on the involvement of the military in cases of corruption [1]. The management of military companies is one of the main cases for which social organisations and academic analyses have reported irregularities from which military officials benefit. Both the military and civilian Venezuelan justice systems have been inactive in light of this [2].

Despite inaction on corruption matters, various sectors have condemned the biased use of justice for the persecution of military officials for political reasons. In these cases, it has been clear that the executive has directly targeted military personnel that it consider traitors to the regime. Their arrests violate due process, since no evidence is presented to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and no warrants of arrest are issued by the judges [3]. These irregularities affect civilians, who are being tried by military justice [4].

There is no policy to make public information relating to the prosecution of army personnel on corruption-related matters [1]. The public primarily gets information from media reports on prosecutions taking place in the general justice delivery system, in a few cases court-martials [2]. The policy only relates to broadcasting the information internally to either the administration, department or the military unit in which someone belongs for actionable points in one’s file; otherwise, there is no policy to make results of prosecution public [3].

Information of prosecution is only available internally, within the brigade or unit. It is not shared with everyone but only those involved; for example, either unit members or those from the processing departments who should take action when the judgement is handed down [1]. There is a file called the “First Sight,” which must include information relating to prosecutions done on the day or when the outcomes are released [1, 2]. This information must be shared with everyone in a battalion; it is shared regularly [1, 2]. The information is not shared outside the battalion or with the public [2].

Cases of corruption are sometimes reported, and evidence is provided. For instance, when an officer receives travel allowances for a trip they did not take, while soldiers who are travelling are not paid their allowance. These incidences are superficially investigated by senior officers, who are then given bribes from the allowances [1]. There are also issues of favouritism and nepotism which hinder proper investigations even where there is evidence of corruption [2].

Country Sort by Country 49a. Policy Sort By Subindicator 49b. Transparency Sort By Subindicator 49c. Effectiveness Sort By Subindicator
Albania 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Algeria 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Argentina 0 / 100 50 / 100 NEI
Armenia 0 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Australia 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Azerbaijan 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Bahrain 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Bangladesh 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Belgium 50 / 100 50 / 100 NEI
Bosnia and Herzegovina 75 / 100 NEI 50 / 100
Botswana 0 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Brazil 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Canada 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Chile 50 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
China 50 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Colombia 0 / 100 25 / 100 75 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Denmark 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Finland 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
France 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Germany 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Ghana 0 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Greece 0 / 100 0 / 100 75 / 100
Hungary 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
India 50 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Indonesia 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Iran 0 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Israel 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Italy 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100
Japan 0 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kenya 75 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Kosovo 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Kuwait 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Latvia 100 / 100 75 / 100 NEI
Lebanon 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Lithuania 50 / 100 50 / 100 NEI
Malaysia 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Mexico 50 / 100 50 / 100 NEI
Montenegro 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Myanmar 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Netherlands 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
New Zealand 50 / 100 100 / 100 NEI
Niger 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
North Macedonia 50 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Norway 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Philippines 75 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Poland 0 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Portugal 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Russia 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Saudi Arabia 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Serbia 0 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Singapore 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100
South Africa 0 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
South Korea 0 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
South Sudan 0 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Spain 50 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Sudan 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Sweden 50 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100
Switzerland 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Taiwan 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Tanzania 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Thailand 75 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Turkey 0 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Uganda 50 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Ukraine 50 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
United Kingdom 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
United States 25 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Venezuela 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Zimbabwe 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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