Benin has no written military doctrine. The recently established Joint Centre for Study, Doctrine and Method is working on the design of this doctrine [1] [2].

Benin has no written military doctrine so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. The recently established Joint Centre for Study, Doctrine and Method is working on the design of this doctrine [1] [2].

Since 2006, corruption has been identified as one of the challenges facing Burundian society . The Law on the Prevention and Punishment of Corruption and Related Offences was voted in 2006 to this effect. However, this law generally concerns Burundi’s public services, including the army, but has no specific provisions on military operations [1] [3]. To date, there is no specific text identifying corruption as a strategic problem within the Defence corps. The 2017 law on Burundi’s national Defence force speaks of military doctrine, but there is no text containing this military doctrine.[1][2]

The country has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations so this indicator is marked Not Applicable.[1][2][3]

The Cameroonian Defence Forces do not have a military doctrine that addresses corruption issues in peace and conflict operations. Neither do they consider those issues as strategic.[1][2] However, the Ministry of Defence is aware of corruption issues within the defence forces, including during operations. Corruption is even mentioned in some presidential decrees and is condemned by the Code of militatary justice. That means the country and the Ministry of Defence consider corruption as an issue, but not as a strategic one. There is no military doctrine which considers corruption as a strategic issue for the country. For example, Cameroon’s Code of military justice mentions corruption among the misbehaviours of soldiers that can be sanctioned, although superficially.[3] However, sanctions are by no means systematic. Likewise, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) has organised awareness seminars against corruption for all ministerial departments, including the Ministry of Defence [4]. Nevertheless, there appears to be no specific training for soldiers on corruption before deployment. For instance, Cameroonian officers have mentionned that during their 2-year ordinary curriculum training programme at EMIA (before graduating as a lieutenant of the Defence forces), corruption and human rights violations are discussed during lessons on ethics, morals and deontology.

The Cameroonian Defence Forces lack a military doctrine that addresses corruption issues in peace and conflict operations. Neither do they regard these issues as strategic.[1][2] However, the Ministry of Defence is aware of corruption issues within the Defence Forces.

The military doctrine is still being validated and cannot therefore be assessed. However, there is evidence of awareness of the dangers of corruption, including military court communications, awareness campaigns, training in schools and speeches by leaders. Leaders emphasise that security threats, particularly terrorist threats, require the support and trust of the population to be contained. Corruption and racketeering are therefore perceived and presented as obstacles to the operational management of the response [1, 2].

Côte d’Ivoire developed a Doctrine for the Use of Armed Forces in 1978. Since the end of the 2010s, this has been considered obsolete and inadequate. The new doctrine has not yet been published and cannot therefore be analysed so this indictor is marked Not Applicable. [1, 2].

The GAF has several doctrines and has a dedicated unit known as the Military Training and Doctrines Command (TRADOC) that trains and imbibes the doctrines of the military in officers of the force. However, these doctrines do not specifically address the issue of corruption within the military. (1) (2) (3)

The current doctrines of the Ghana Armed Forces do not explicitly address corruption. (1) (2) (3)

The Kenya Defence White Paper acknowledges corruption and resource mismanagement as domestic threats the country faces: “There have been wars and insurrections as well as deteriorating economic conditions fuelled mostly by corruption and mismanagement of public resources that have aggravated the situation in the national security environment” [1]. However, the White Paper does not delve into corruption risks and mitigation, as corruption is only mentioned in a general way, and there is no detailed information on addressing it as a strategic issue on operations.

The Kenya Defence White Paper does not address corrruption risks and mitigationc[1, 2]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

While there is no publicly available information indicating that the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) have a specific military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations, it is worth noting that the AFL has undergone significant reforms since the end of Liberia’s civil wars, focusing on professionalisation and adherence to democratic principles.[1]
Elements of good conduct, financial probity, human rights are among some of the critical values and principles outlined in the National Defense Act 2008. Chapter 9 of the National Defense Act underscores the need for proper accounting and audit to ensure public funds are accounted for, as well as to mitigate the risk of corruption.[2][3] This standard require that every operation adopt a Standard Operating Procedure for personnel (SOP) to adhere to.
However, these frameworks remain financial and institutional controls rather than an operational doctrine treating corruption as a strategic issue during military operations. The 2014 National Defense Strategy provides high-level direction, not tactical doctrine.[4]
However, detailed aspects of their internal doctrines, particularly concerning anti-corruption measures within military operations, have not been documented in public sources. There is no explicit doctrine treating corruption as a strategic issue.

Not all aspects of Liberia’s military doctrine or defence policy are made publicly available. A review of the Ministry of National Defense’s (MoD) official policy repository shows that there are no dedicated public documents outlining the Ministry’s internal policies, anti-corruption strategies, or detailed military doctrines. For instance, the Ministry of National Defense’s website does not contain a publicly accessible strategic plan for the MoD itself. However, the site provides access to several broader national strategic documents, including the National Agenda for Transformation 2030 [1], the National Security Strategy of Liberia, and the National Defence Strategy 2014.
The National Agenda for Transformation (NAT) 2030, particularly Chapter 11, addresses corruption in general terms but does not specifically focus on military corruption or provide a detailed anti-corruption strategy within the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). It focuses mainly on governance reforms without tailoring its discussion to military peace and conflict operations.[2] The National Security Strategy of Liberia (specifically Section 9.8) mentions the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission. However, it does not outline an anti-corruption strategy specifically for the Ministry of National Defense or military operations.[3] The National Defence Strategy 2014 outlines broader defence objectives but lacks specific mention of internal corruption mitigation strategies for military operations or peacekeeping missions.[4]
Since there is a lack of a publicly accessible, dedicated MoD anti-corruption policy or military-specific doctrine addressing corruption in operations, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The Ministry of Defense’s Internal Anti-Corruption Policy Plan does not include any military doctrine relating to issues relating to corruption in the context of peacekeeping operations and conflicts [1].Thus, a priori, the country does not consider corruption as a strategic issue during operations. There is no mention of the risks of corruption from international actors nor any guidelines for mitigating these risks [2].

This indicator is not applicable as no military doctrine considers corruption as a strategic subject. No indication on this matter appears in the Internal Anti-Corruption Policy of the Ministry of Defense [1].

There is no military doctrine in Mali that addresses corruption in the defence and security sector.[1][2] There is also no military doctrine in general, such as national security strategy or similar documents.

The country does not have a specific military doctrine that considers corruption as a strategic issue during operations so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. Corruption is considered a strategic issue at the national level and is not deployed specifically to a specific component.[1][2]

The Mozambican Armed Forces have a comprehensive Military Doctrine [1] [2], but it does not address corruption issues as a strategic issue in operations. The corruption aspects appear in other documents such as the Law on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption [3] or the Strategy for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption in Public Administration – EPCCAP (2023-2032) [4] and legislation on military crimes [5].

In Mozambique, doctrinal issues of the Armed Forces are classified as State secrets by the Military Secrets and State Secrets Legislation. Furthermore, the country has no military doctrine that considers corruption. This indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

Corruption in the defence sector is not systematically or comprehensively addressed; instead, it is tackled through ad hoc or punctual measures. The 2003 Military Penal Code addresses corruption in Article 228, which stipulates that officers found guilty of corruption, theft, or general criminal offenses can face dismissal, demotion, or imprisonment. The Code also establishes a judiciary military police under the Ministry of Defense’s authority (Article 46), tasked with identifying and investigating legal violations (Article 47) across all levels of the armed forces (Article 48) [1]. However, there is no national defense strategy, doctrine, or operational planning that identifies corruption as a factor degrading mission effectiveness.

There is no explicit military doctrine that would address corruption as a strategic issue on operations. The sub-section is left as non-applicable [1][2].

Corruption has been recognised as a critical issue affecting operations and effectiveness within the Nigerian military, as noted in various strategic documents such as the national defence strategy. However, despite this recognition and the acknowledgment of corruption’s detrimental effects, there is a noted absence of explicit doctrine or formal guidelines specifically addressing corruption within the military’s operational framework. This poses a challenge in effectively combating corruption and maintaining high standards of integrity and efficiency within the armed forces [1].

The military doctrine of the Nigerian Armed Forces, including its stance on corruption as a strategic issue, is not widely made public. Military doctrines are typically classified documents that outline the fundamental principles, strategies, and guidelines for military operations, and they often contain sensitive information that is not openly shared with the public. However, there have been public statements and reports indicating that the Nigerian military is aware of the impact of corruption on its operations and has made efforts to address it. For instance, the Nigerian Armed Forces have reportedly undertaken internal reforms aimed at reducing corruption, particularly in procurement processes and the management of resources. These reforms are part of broader anti-corruption efforts within the Nigerian government [1]. Similarly, military leaders have occasionally acknowledged the challenges posed by corruption and have emphasized the need for transparency and accountability within the ranks. These acknowledgments are sometimes made during public addresses or interviews, but detailed operational doctrines addressing corruption are not typically disclosed [2].

Senegal’s military doctrine includes operational guidelines but lacks explicit measures for managing corruption risks during operations. No open-source documents or references highlight a specific focus on corruption in operational settings. This doctrine does not apply to international peace and conflict operations, where the policies of the UN or the body responsible for the mission (ECOWAS and AU) are applied [1] The Institut de Défense du Sénégal (IDS) was inaugurated on Thursday 02 December 2021 by His Excellency Mr Macky SALL, President of the Republic of Senegal. It comprises a staff college, a war college and a centre for military doctrine. [2]

The country has a military doctrine but it is not made available to the public and does not apply to international peace and conflict operations, where the policies of the UN or the body responsible for the mission (ECOWAS and AU) are applied [1] . In a speech to mark the New Year, the Senegalese President announced that he had instructed the Minister for the Armed Forces to propose a new doctrine for cooperation in defence and security. [2]

South African military doctrine is derived from the National Defence White Paper [1] and the Defence Review. [2] The White Paper does not mention corruption as an operational or strategic issue, and the Defence Review only mentions corruption in passing in relation to organised crime and intra-state conflict, but does not consider corruption risks in terms of national defence and operations.

Key military strategies such as the National Defence White Paper and Defence Review are publicly available. [1] [2] However, these documents do not mention corruption as an operational or strategic issue. As the country has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operation, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There is no explicit defence doctrine on corruption publicly available, however the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act of 2009 Article 73 (amended to SSPDF Act 2022) touches on corrupt offences that are punishable [1]. Nonetheless these cases are largely targeting low level corruption at the individual level and not elaborate macro corruption that involves bureaucratic corruption, embezzlement, political corruption and patronage. A Freedom House report indicated that “Military commanders have gained enormous wealth through corrupt procurement deals. The executive has facilitated corruption by appointing officials who were previously accused of embezzlement” [2]. Nonetheless there are efforts underway to develop the military doctrine for the SSPDF by the Center for Doctrine Synthesisation and Development at the MoD [3]. However, these documents/website do not mention corruption a strategic issue for operations.

While there is a Centre for Doctrine Synthesisation and Development, based at army headquarters in Juba, there is no formal Defence doctrine document that is available publicly that can be used to examine the level of commitment to transparency and anti-corruption during operations. There is no mention of corruption as a strategic issue in operations apart from Article 73 of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act of 2009 which by now is not only dated but also does not exhaust the issue of corruption [1].

The 2008 UPDF doctrine outlines the core principles and beliefs of the military. In 2012, the doctrine was reviewed and updated to reflect experiences from operations in Somalia (AMISOM). In 2018, a comprehensive review incorporated lessons from the UPDF operations and security challenges [1] [2]. The doctrine provides the strategic conceptual framework for making strategic military decision [3]. However, the Uganda Military Doctrine, as outlined by the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs, does not explicitly address corruption as a strategic issue within its publicly available documents.
Nonetheless, Ugandan leadership has emphasised the critical importance of integrity within the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). President Yoweri Museveni has cautioned military personnel against corrupt practices, underscoring that corruption undermines socio-economic transformation and the effectiveness of the armed forces [4].

The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) has established a military doctrine to guide its strategic and operational activities. The Centre for Doctrine Synthesization and Development (CDSD), located at the Ministry of Defence/UPDF General Headquarters is responsible for developing this doctrine.[1] The UPDF’s doctrine is structured into various levels, with the Strategic Doctrine at its apex. This level provides the strategic conceptual framework for making high-level military decisions, establishing the rationale, philosophy, and general principles that guide military activities within the UPDF [2] and ethical processes within the UPDF [3]
However, publicly available information does not explicitly indicate whether the UPDF’s doctrine considers corruption as a strategic issue impacting military operations. The available sources do not detail the inclusion of anti-corruption measures within the doctrinal framework.

In the Zimbabwe military there is no specific military doctrine to address issues of corruption [2]. As a commander’s initiative, battalion commanders and brigade commanders use parades and any other briefings in the barracks to talk to their soldiers to desist from any criminal conduct in and outside the barracks [1]. Pre-deployment orders and standing orders are also utilised to talk about soldiers to refrain from any form of criminal and corrupt activities in the barracks [1].

Zimbabwe has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations [1][2]. Therefore, this indicator is marked as Not Applicable.