Taking corruption into account as a strategic issue in operational planning implies identifying corruption as a factor that can cause the operation to fail. Seen in this light, corruption is not identified as a central factor in operational planning [1]. However, the military is aware that corruption is one of the risks; and the fight against corruption is a cross-cutting factor that applies to all public sectors, including the military [2].

Benin is part of countries that are contributing for the effectiveness of peace operations worldwide [1]. In Benin, there is no evidence of the effect of corruption in the planning of military operations but with regard to the award of contracts linked to security operations corruption is taken into account due to the existence a legislative framework that regulates corruption for specific cases. Even if for specific questions the evidence is weak. Furthermore, taking into account the risks of corruption during training for staff, since entry into the armed force and the various promotion and anti-corruption units are guarantors of respect for these notions in specific operations of security. The personnel deployed on mission are trained on corruption risks [2].

Corruption is taken into account as a strategic issue in some operations, such as peacekeeping operations in which Burundian soldiers participate abroad. Burundian soldiers going to Somalia receive instructions on how to fight corruption. These instructions are designed to raise awareness among soldiers going on peacekeeping missions in Somalia of the importance of values such as integrity in the accomplishment of their mission, and especially of the fact that they must not accept bribes during their mission. [1] [2] Anti-corruption training is mostly aimed at soldiers deployed for overseas operations, justified by certain sensitive reasons, such as higher salaries at stake or the possibility of trafficking in minerals and arms [3].

Corruption is taken into account in the planning of few missions, such as peacekeeping missions abroad, but there is no consistent approach to checking the extent to which it is effectively combated during deployments [1] [2].

Corruption issues are not considered in forward planning of operations.[1] However, several soldiers or high-ranking officers informally or formally consider the possibility of betrayal by their men or comrades due to corruption when deploying units. Some senior officers stated that they are aware it is not excluded that, after accepting corruption money, some soldiers might leak operational data to separatist fighters in the Anglophone region. They also believe civilians are sometimes corrupted by armed separatists to provide information on patrols and military movements.[2][3] This is why some high-ranking officers organise a surveillance of their own soldiers and local population.[4] Although there are few documented cases of corruption among soldiers and officers in the army, suspicions of corruption persist among troops deployed in the field, especially in the Far North region against Boko Haram fighters and notably in the English-speaking regions. For instance, a study focusing on the types of weapons possessed Ambazonian fighters (Anglophone separatist fighters), raises suspicions of arms trafficking between the army and separatists. The separatists possess various types of weapons: AKM (Russian-made), PKM (Russian-made), Galil (Israeli-made), Beretta (Italian-made), FAL (Belgian-made), RPG-7 (Russian-made) and its Chinese and Romanian variants, Zastava M21 (Serbian-made) and VHS-H2 (Croatian-made).[5]

Cameroon annually deploys a contingent of Blue Helmets, soldiers, and gendarmes as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA). During each deployment, 1,070 peacekeepers, including 750 soldiers from the Infantry, Air Force, Navy and 320 gendarmes, are sent on this peacekeeping mission. To prevent abuses related to violations of military ethics and professional conduct, notably the fight against corruption, the High Command of the defence forces mandates a high level of professionalism, discipline, and strict adherence to the rules of engagement established by the United Nations.[1][2] The observation was made during the traditional flag hand over ceremony of the flag to the 9th contingent led by Colonel Clément GARANSOU. In his speech, the Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Defence (MINDEF), Joseph BETI ASSOMO, emphasised that the hierarchy will not ignore cases of misconduct, as strict measures are awaiting offenders. MINDEF also conveyed warm congratulations to all members of the 8th contingent for preserving and even strengthening the honour and reputation of the Cameroonian flag. MINDEF noted an overall improvement in the disciplinary record of the 8th contingent and commended the unit and training commanders for fulfiling their mandate in Central African Republic fulfilled without errors. However, despite the High Command’s efforts to improve the working conditions and ethics within the defence forces, MINDEF also highlighted receiving some complaints from the UN regarding misconduct by certain soldiers within the 8th contingent. He further stated that disciplinary actions had been initiated against these soldiers by the competent MINDEF authorities.[3]

Corruption is integrated into the planning process as an operational obstacle. Whenever an operation is being planned (and this is done on the basis of threats), corruption issues are considered. The nature of the threats facing Côte d’Ivoire has required the defence and security forces to actively seek the support, cooperation and trust of the population in order to effectively prevent terrorist acts and reduce them where necessary. Consideration of corruption is done to foster this trust. [1, 2].

Corruption is taken into account during planning. Aware of the population’s support in the fight against terrorism in particular, soldiers are oriented about the risks. Checks are carried out during operations, but the mechanisms used are not always effective, as complaints from the population are sometimes received [1, 2].

The GAF has several training institutions and programs, including the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC), Military Academy and Training Schools (MATS), Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC), the University of Ghana, and other external support trainings. Usually, these programs focus on building the capacity of personnel in Peace Support Operations (PSOs), peacekeeping, and election monitoring and observations, among other areas. However, they do not solely address corruption as a forward-planning operation. (1) (2) (3)

Operations may incorporate corruption into their forward planning if external bodies require it. The Office of the Inspector General of the GAF may also initiate such anticorruption safeguards. As part of the standards for the deployment and execution of some peacekeeping missions and operations require the adherence to some anticorruption measures, which compels the GAF to implement, however, its consistency cannot be affirmed. (1) (2)

There is limited information available to ascertain to what extent corruption is considered a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations. A recent study on Women Participation in Peace Support Operations of Kenya’s contingent in African Mission in Somalia 2011-2020 established that corruption was identified as a key challenge in nominating and selecting women for peace support operations. The study found that women’s participation in the African Mission in Somalia enhanced skill sets, increased host country acceptance, and reduced gender-based violence. It identified lack of transparency in personnel selection (44.8% disagreement), corruption in nomination and selection (35.6%), and limited experience (40.2%) as barriers to women’s participation in AMISOM operations [1].

There is no evidence that corruption is considered as a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations by the Kenyan Ministry of Defence or the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF). Available documentation and open sources do not reference specific guidance, training, or directives that require commanders to assess or mitigate corruption risks as part of operational planning. The AMISOM example shows that corruption—among other factors—has been a barrier to women’s effective participation in Peace Support Operations, but does not indicate that anti-corruption measures were planned or implemented strategically in the mission itself [2].
Therefore, there is an absence of formal integration or application of corruption risk considerations during operational planning.

After the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia post-civil war (2003–2009), with strong U.S. support, SOPs were developed to ensure respect for human rights, rule of law, and anti-corruption practices.[1] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in the AFL are considered during operational and deployment planning. Post-reform military doctrine integrates key issues such as human rights protections, into forward planning processes, especially for large deployments and the accounting of public funds.[2][3]. For example, the AFL’s participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was governed by these SOPs, ensuring compliance with both national policies and UN standards.[4] SOPs serve as tools to hold personnel accountable to civilians and reinforce professional military conduct. This integration is a direct outcome of the reforms initiated by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and by Liberia’s 2008 National Defense Act.

The vision to democratise the Armed forces of Liberia and the systematic use of SOP is intended to create a new vision. The AFL for example has been deployed to Mali in Peacekeeping Operations. This research found that the men and women in arms are governed by rigorous use of the SOP to mitigate corruption risk. There has been no report of corruption involving personnel of the Armed Force of Liberia from the Peacekeeping operations in Mali.[1][2] However, there is no precision regarding mitigation approaches and their consistent implementation during deployments.

Corruption is not a strategic issue taken into account in the prospective planning of operations. Only a few Malagasy officers participate in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of African organizations such as the African Union or the United Nations. For national operations, there is also nothing to indicate that corruption is taken into account in any prospective planning to the extent that training in the fight against corruption is mainly aimed at command officers and not at all security forces [1] [2].

In operations, corruption is not always considered a priority issue. However, certain elements of the defense forces are accused of acts of corruption in the accomplishment of their missions [1][2].

While the fight against corruption is a major issue in public policies and strategy as a whole, it is not necessarily addressed in a singular way in the defence and security sector.[1] Based on this and on the general framework that applies to defence, this sector, like others, is required to strategically take corruption into account in forward-looking planning. Furthermore, the Justice Sector Orientation and Programming Law (LOPJ) 2020-2024 and its action plan make strengthening the fight against corruption, financial delinquency, terrorism, drugs and cross-border crime a priority.[2] Moreover, for several years, Mali has been conducting military operations on its territory as part of the fight against corruption, rebellion, armed banditry and the fight against cross-border crime.[3] These operations, until recently, were partly conducted with international partners through the European Union missions, the United Nations and France.[4] These missions required taking corruption into account in strategic planning. The country contributes funds to the United Nations, which means that planning within the framework of its operations takes corruption into account.

As mentioned the collaboration of Mali with international partners as part of the fight against corruption, rebellion, armed banditry and fight against cross-border crime required taking corruption into account in the strategic planning of these operations. The country is also contributes funds to the United Nations, which means that operational takes corruption into account. These operations were part of projects and laws that made transparency and the fight against corruption essential aspects of the projects and laws related to the operations at the time. MINUSMA, which operates under UN policies;[1] Barkhane within the framework of French policies;[2] EUCAP Sahel and EUTM, which intervened within the framework of European Union policies; and FAMAs, which intervened within the framework of the military orientation and programming law. All these operations had a dimension of combating corruption and promoting transparency in the use of the various funds. However, there are no evidence of mitigation approaches being implemented consistently during deployments.

Corruption issues such as bribes, illicit payments, diversion and appropriation of funds allocated to the defence sector, fraud in bidding and acquisitions of defence products, overpricing of products and specifications, influence peddling in military contracts, among other passive and active corruption practices established in Articles 8 and 9 of the Anti-Corruption Law [1] are not taken into account at all in forward planning [2]. Corruption issues are only addressed in general documents that can be applied to the Armed Forces, such as Law on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption or the Strategy for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption in Public Administration – EPCCAP (2023-2032) [3] and legislation on military crimes (Law No. 17/87, of December 21, approves the Military Crimes Law. Maputo: National Press) [4].

Apart from old posters posted at the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of National Defence and the Provincial Recruitment and Mobilisation Centres and announcements about lectures on the International Day for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption [1, 2] , no evidence was found that commanders at all levels of the Armed Forces apply anti-corruption knowledge or operationalise the Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption in the Mozambican Public Administration Sector.
However, HRW reports Mozambican state security forces engaged in arbitrary arrests, torture, and excessive force, indicative of weak discipline and oversight in deployment [3]. Additionally, U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Reports continue to log serious abuses by security forces and limited accountability, consistent with corruption/ethics risks not being effectively internalised in command practice [4].

There is no evidence that corruption is systematically considered in the forward planning of military operations in Niger. There are no known frameworks, policies, or doctrines within Niger’s military that mandate the inclusion of corruption issues in operational planning [1][2]. Additionally, there is no evidence that military commanders are trained or required to apply anti-corruption considerations in the field.

Despite Niger’s involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, there is no evidence to suggest that corruption is strategically considered in the forward planning of operations. While the country contributes over 1,000 uniformed personnel to UN missions in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, and Mali, there is no indication that commanders receive training on corruption risks in operational environments or that corruption considerations influence mission planning [1]. Niger has leveraged peacekeeping for funding, military professionalization, and diplomatic legitimacy. However, financial incentives tied to UN missions have encouraged participation without necessarily fostering governance or anti-corruption reforms. The military leadership, now in power after the July 26, 2023, coup, shows no indication of integrating corruption concerns into operational planning. Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani, Niger’s de facto leader, previously served in multiple UN peacekeeping missions, but his trajectory follows a broader trend where officers with extensive international experience later consolidate power through coups. This suggests that exposure to peacekeeping has reinforced military autonomy rather than adherence to transparency and governance principles [2]. There is no evidence that corruption risks—such as illicit financial flows, procurement fraud, or bribery—are systematically addressed in Niger’s military planning. The military junta’s growing control over state institutions has further weakened transparency and civilian oversight. Additionally, reports of financial opacity and procurement fraud within the defense sector indicate that corruption remains an entrenched issue rather than a strategic consideration in operations.

There is ample evidence that corruption has remained a significant issue in Nigeria’s operations, and it does impact defence and military forward planning [1, 2, 3]. The Nigerian military and defence sector have both historically and recently been affected by corruption at various levels, which undermines operational effectiveness, procurement processes, and overall strategic planning [4]. For instance, corruption have always affected troop morale and soldiers most times do not receive adequate supplies or salaries, and in some cases, money meant for operations are embezzled. This undermines confidence in leadership and reduces the overall effectiveness of military operations [5]. However, there is no evidence on whether corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account in forward planning or operations or not taken into account at all in forward planning.

In Nigeria, corruption is a significant issue that affects the planning and execution of military operations. While corruption risks are often acknowledged during the planning stages, the implementation of mitigation strategies during deployments is inconsistent. This inconsistency undermines the effectiveness of military missions, perpetuates insecurity, and causes widespread societal harm [1]. Transparency International’s Defence & Security program highlights that corruption in military operations can take various forms, including the diversion of resources, bribery, and abuse of civilians. These corrupt practices not only damage the mission’s reputation but also waste resources and exacerbate the levels of corruption in the operational areas [2].

As part of the forward planning of operational missions, soldiers about to be deployed are trained in all aspects, including corruption but corruption issues are not comprehensively taken into account in the strategy and rely mainly on external partners’s requirements [1] . In the gendarmerie, there is regular capacity-building training for personnel, including in corruption issues, however when it comes to taking into account the issue of corruption in the strategic plan of field operations, other issues are given more importance, even when it is considered. [2]

Corruption is taken into account in the planning and execution of some operations. In some international deployments (e.g., peacekeeping), corruption considerations are addressed due to external partner requirements, but domestic operations rarely incorporate these measures . Senegalese soldiers are known for their discipline during peace operations, including those of the United Nations, and they are not involved in corruption, it’s all thanks to this training before their deployment. [1] This training is essential and is not limited to corruption-related issues, but also covers other issues such as gender. This is to ensure the discipline of the sordats who represent our country in foreign missions. [2]

Contemporary operations undertaken by the South African National Defence Force are primarily in support of regional peace-keeping missions under United Nations or Southern African Development Community leadership.
There is no public documentation indicating that anti-corruption considerations are systematically integrated into operational planning or deployment strategies.

While parliamentary hearings have cited equipment shortages, underfunding, and poor logistical planning that indirectly heighten corruption risk [1], none have connected this to strategy setting. Indeed, a DA parliamentary statement explicitly criticised the deterioration of SANDF’s capabilities as aggravated by “mismanagement compounded by corruption,” [2] but did not indicate pre-deployment risk mapping. A recent event where 14 SANDF members were returned home after they were killed in the eastern DRC conflict shows “the challenge of designing policy frameworks and resourcing an appropriately designed SANDF and meeting its operational requirements (training, equipment, deployment mandates) needs to be addressed by multidisciplinary teams of experts”. [3] [4]

There is no public evidence that corruption issues are formally addressed during planning of deployment. Although missions like Democractic Republic of Congo deployments have revealed serious resource constraints and lack of air support, factors that increase corruption vulnerability [1], there’s no indication that corruption is taken into account in planning for operations. However, South African defence analysts had already started warning that the SANDF could not support deployments and that the lack of training, preparedness and equipment was putting South African soldiers in harm’s way [2] [3].

Relevant documents such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act 2009 do not provide any explicit mention of corruption as a strategic issue. Given that the South Sudanese Army is still being developed slowly with recent inclusion of opposition fighters into the army,[2] it will perhaps take a while before the military can focus on adopting measures such as anticorruption given that it is also currently dealing with challenges of integrating opposition fighters into the military [1]. Given the political nature of this process, corruption and integrity may be overlooked. The challenges of including training on corruption as a strategic issue during the forward planning can be seen as rather intentional than an oversight. For example, according to a report by Enough, ‘The lack of financial oversight for and within the SPLA constitutes a major organizational weakness and creates opportunities for corruption. This deficiency does not stem primarily from a poor legal framework, underdeveloped institutional capacity, or lack of knowledge about international best practice in financial oversight. The deficiency stems from wilful, systematic obstruction of financial oversight.’ [3] This shows a lack of leadership will to curb corruption and with it the lack of transparency on its inclusion in forward planning operations. Furthermore, However, since the details of the SDSR Board strategic security policy documents, including threat assessment are scanty there is a possibility that it could include corruption as a security threat.

The only mention of corruption in the defence documents is in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act of 2009 which does not address specific forward planning issues [1]. The revelation by a report published by the US State Department shows that “Corruption was endemic in all branches of government. The UN Panel of Experts reported government security forces, including the Internal Security Bureau, gained control of public and natural resources to generate off-budget sources of revenue” [2]. This means that despite the lack of information about training on anti-corruption within the military, the application is wanting. The naming of military officers in corruption activities shows that corruption is not formally taken as a strategic issue or if it is taken into account, it is not applied during planning and operations by commanders at all levels. Furthermore, the revelation in a report by Enough Group of how top security officers are intertwined with the executive casts doubt over the application of anticorruption policies. According to the report, ‘There are many political appointees, or employees who are personally selected by the executive leadership of government, in South Sudan, and a large number of political appointments are made by the president himself. As in many contexts where top leadership is a source of competition and contest, there is evidence that personal loyalties and battlefield alliances in South Sudan, affect the choices for individual political appointments at the national and local level.’ [3]

The incident in Somalia, where soldiers were reportedly recruited through bribery, underscored the damaging impact of corruption on military operations, prompting the UPDF to take measures to address the issue. Recognising that corruption undermines operational effectiveness, erodes morale, and damages public trust, the UPDF has taken steps to caution officers against corrupt practices.[1] However, there is no publicly available evidence of a formal anti-corruption strategy, or a structured, forward-looking plan specifically designed to counter corruption risks.
While anti-corruption efforts are acknowledged within the force, these appear to be more ad-hoc than strategic. Instances such as cautionary statements to logistics officers against corruption and calls for unity in fighting corruption indicate a reactive rather than a proactive approach [2][3]. Moreover, concerns have been raised that corruption itself may influence mission planning, with reports of inflated budgets due to exaggerated threats, as seen in past procurement scandals, such as the ‘junk helicopters’ case [4].

Under the UPDF Act (2005) the code of conduct in section 117 subsection 5(f) warns against any form of corruption by the army at any point in time. For example, logistics officers of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) were urged to avoid corrupt practices and mismanagement of logistics while performing their duties. This caution was issued after a three-day retreat for logisticians at the College of Logistics and Engineering in Magamaga. Lt Gen Otema asked the officers that effective planning and management of logistics are crucial for the seamless execution of all UPDF operations [1, 2].

There is no consideration for any forward planning in the military or the defence forces for commanders when they are to be deployed [1]. On being deployed commanders do not consider corruption as an issue of priority [2].

Corruption is not considered a strategic issue in military deployment and or operations [1]. For example, in internal deployments or operations, since 2003, the Zimbabwean military has been involved in an operation called ‘Operation Maguta’, where soldiers were deployed to assist agricultural extension officers in distributing farming inputs such as fertilizers, maize seeds, and groundnut seeds. However, soldiers have been reported to steal and sell these agricultural supplies [2]. Similarly, in the ‘Command Agriculture’ operation, intended to support farmers with agricultural methods, soldiers were again involved in stealing and selling the inputs. Furthermore, unit commanders have been known to sell army rations, including fuel and agricultural inputs, that were meant for distribution to farmers [1].