Officers known as provosts are deployed in all missions to monitor corruption and report on the state of corruption within the mission. These provost are permanently deployed within the missions [1]. Their reports contain assessments of the most significant corruption risks, how corruption may affect the objectives of the mission, and the effectiveness of the mitigation measures employed [2]. Monitoring corruption is a significant component of maintaining operational integrity. This is conducted through the presence of provost officers who are deployed on a permanent basis within these missions. These officers are tasked with monitoring the state of corruption and ensuring compliance with anti-corruption measures during operations. Corrupt practices are identified and addressed promptly, mitigating their potential impact on the mission’s objectives. Just like how we have gender monitoring during peace operations, the reports are sent to the Ministry of Defense, particularly to the General Staff. Though it is difficult to elaborate on the frequency of the report.

The mission’s M&E guidelines do not clearly specify how corruption risks are to be monitored. They are sometimes oral guidelines, accompanied by data collection tools such as questionnaires. This fails to establish a procedural basis for the staff responsible for monitoring corruption. [1][2][3]The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) guidelines, often aligned with broader national defense strategies and policies. These guidelines typically focus on assessing the effectiveness of military operations, training programs, and resource management.

The reports are not made public. However, they are addressed to the Ministerial Committee for Risk Management and accessible to the administrative and judicial authorities responsible for imposing penalties in the event of infringement [1]. Reports on corruption within peace operations missions in Benin, although not made public, are crucial for transparency and accountability within the armed forces. These reports are supervised by the Ministerial Risk Management Committee. But also the anti-corruption and respect for integrity unit also within the Ministry of Defense is in charge of supervision [2].

There are no experts capable of monitoring and evaluating corruption deployed on the ground. This is not envisaged by the Burundian army [1] [2]. It may be done by experts from the African Union or the United Nations [2].

Burundi’s national defence force has no M&E guidance on how to monitor corruption risks [1] [2].

No reports are made available to the public or oversight bodies in any form [1] [2].

Apart from UN peace missions, the Cameroon Defence Forces also operate in active conflict within Cameroonian territory: the “Anglophone” conflict, the war against Boko Haram in the Far North and the fight against Central African insurgents along the eastern border. In all these operations, the risk of corruption on the ground is significant. In a context of war and instability, the potential for individuals to nurture or benefit from illicit activities and the economy is increased. In a closed and opaque environment like that of the army, the work of observers is doomed to fail from the outset. In brief, the country deploys no trained personnel for corruption monitoring,[1] but some units such as the BIR (Rapid Intervention Battalion) informally monitors corruption with non-expert personnel. They occasionally produce reports after those monitoring activities, but they are not disclosed. Also, even this informal monitoring is neither regular; nor systematic.[2][3][4]

In Cameroon, MINDEF is classified among Ministries of sovereignty with others ministries, alongside others such as Justice, External Relations, Territorial Administration, and the General Delegation to National Security (essentially the police). Briefly, there is no M&E guidance for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks within MINDEF.[1][2]

The 2020 CONAC Report indicates that five administrations submitted their activity reports, as was the case the previous year. Among these administrations was MINDEF. The report highlights the anti-corruption activities undertaken by MINDEF in 2020 and is organised around four strategic axes: prevention, education, conditions and sanctions. Concerning the axes on prevention and education, the report states that in 2020, despite the Covid-19, MINDEF organised training sessions on corruption for some of its directorates, training centres and decentralised services. However, the report makes is no mention of training for professionals to monitor corruption risks in the field, since corruption is not considered as a strategic issue within the defence sector institutions.[1] Furthermore, trained professionals are not deployed in Cameroon to monitor corruption risks in operational fields or peacekeeping missions. Because they are not deployed, they are unable to produce reports.[2][3]

Inspections of the army and gendarmerie are deployed in the field in cases of suspected or even proven corruption linked to operations. However, limited resources, the wide scope of the inspections and the lack of specialised personnel are important obstacles. [1, 2].

Inspections, or even monitoring missions on the issue of corruption, are not really structured. The programme for the year, for example, is not known and reports are not made public [1, 2].

The Ivorian army and gendarmerie remain silent on this issue. Inspection reports are not made public and inspections themselves are rare [1, 2].

Corruption monitoring is not regularly deployed during missions unless it is a requirement as part of the deployment. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) may also instruct the Office of the Inspector General’s office deploy personnel during a mission in which the CDS believes requires corruption risk assessment. (1) (2) (3)

There is no M&E guidance with specific reference to monitoring corruption-related issues during missions; however, there are some cases of M&E deployed for some projects within the forces but not targeted at corruption. (1) (2)

There are no reports of M&E cases because there is no guidance with specific reference to monitoring corruption-related issues during missions. (1) (2)

In June 2021, the UN General Assembly adopted a political declaration at its first special session against corruption. Subsequently, in 2022, the Department of Peace Operations’ (DPO) Justice and Corrections Service (JCS) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s Corruption (UNODC) and Economic Crime Branch developed a knowledge product titled “Achieving Peace Through Integrity: Anti-corruption Efforts in Post-conflict Environments.” This practitioner’s guide aims to provide guidance to UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions in their efforts to address corruption in conflict settings. The DPO-UNODC have been collaborating to develop expertise in implementing key anti-corruption tools outlined in the practitioner’s guide. This joint effort recognises the gaps in expertise and inclusion of corruption, ethics, integrity and accountability in mission mandates [1, 2].
According to the MoD’s Annual Report 2022/23, Kenya deployed military observers and staff officers to various countries, including Somalia, DR Congo, South Sudan, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Yemen, Uganda, Djibouti, and Central African Republic, for peacekeeping and monitoring missions. This deployment included trainers sent to DR Congo to instruct their military personnel. However, it remains unclear whether those deployed had the capability to monitor corruption. There is a scarcity of information and reports assessing significant corruption risks, their potential impact on mission goals, and the effectiveness of mitigation measures employed [3].

The available evidence fails to show how monitoring and evaluation (M&E) guidance clearly defines corruption risk monitoring procedures or establishes protocols for personnel to track corruption.
The State Department for Planning at the National Treasury has developed Evaluation Guidelines to institutionalise, systematise, and structure M&E in the public sector, including Defence. These guidelines aim to harness evidence for policy-making and promote a culture of M&E practice within the public sector. They also include guidance for emergencies, with accountability and transparency principles integrated into the M&E methodology for emergency and humanitarian contexts [1]. The Constitution of Kenya 2010 provides the basis for monitoring and evaluation as an important aspect of operationalising government functions, emphasising the principles of transparency, integrity, access to information, and accountability, which state offices are required to adhere to. These principles are provided under Articles 10, 35, 56, 132, 174, 185, 201, 203, 225, 226, 227 and 232. The principles implicitly suggest the need for a structured way for monitoring programmes/projects/policies [2].

While the Ministry of Defence submits various reports to Parliament (including annual performance reports and deployment authorisation summaries) [1, 2], there is no evidence of mission-specific reports or corruption monitoring being published for individual operations or peacekeeping missions [3]. The available reports are general, at the national level, and do not detail operational conduct, risks encountered, or corruption-specific monitoring in the field.

From the inception of the AFL rebuilding programme, senior officers were trained in anti-corruption matters with the view of initiating training of trainers (ToT) programme.[1] Based on these trainings, senior officers of the AFL normally take on the role of monitoring personnel during operations, whether domestic or international. Much of this training focus on basic operations of the military. For example, military personnel are trained in warehouse management, inventory and stock taking. Commanders who passed these training normally undertake spot checks to monitoring the corruption practices.
However, while senior officers play a role in monitoring for corruption, there is no evidence of the deployment of specialised anti-corruption personnel within AFL operations. Monitoring efforts are primarily conducted through the existing chain of command, without dedicated experts focused solely on anti-corruption oversight.[2]

Monitoring and evaluating systems are in place. However, internal systems on corruption are normally kept internal, and not shared with the public.[1] For example, full knowledge of what the inspector general does at the NSA is largely unknown. His role within the internal structure on anti-corruption only came up when the President authorised the GAC to commence audit preparation for NSA.[2] On the other hand, the public’s insight into the Ministry of National Defense’s financial dealings was made public due to audit reports which exposed the lack of transparency at the minister. New measures, such as monitoring and evaluation, have been introduced to assess standards, measure risk, and investigate how personnel are being trained to mitigate them.[3]

Reports on anti-corruption are not made public. The only anti-corruption report that is shared with the public is the GAC’s audit report. With such a dearth of information on anti-corruption reporting, it is difficult to assess fully the level of transparency.[1] This view is similarly expressed by other units of the security sector, including the NSA, LNP and other units of Liberia’s security architecture.[2]

The sources contacted and online documentation do not allow us to confirm that controls are carried out to combat corruption during operations deployed by defence force elements or within the framework of peacekeeping missions [1][2]. A few rare cases of operational corruption are known following denunciations by victims [3].

The sources contacted and online documentation do not allow us to confirm that controls are carried out to combat corruption during operations deployed by defense force elements or within the framework of peacekeeping missions [1][2]. A few rare cases of operational corruption are known following denunciations by victims [3]. Thus, no monitoring and evaluation guidance for the mission exists.

The sources contacted and online documentation do not allow us to confirm that controls are carried out to combat corruption during operations deployed by defence force elements or within the framework of peacekeeping missions [1][2]. A few rare cases of operational corruption are known following denunciations by victims [3]. No report is thus made public.

Corruption controllers from services outside the defence and security sector, like the Auditor General, as well as from the General Inspectorate, may be deployed to conduct checks.[1][2] Some visits have been reported by the General Inspectorate but no mention of corruption was made.[3] The control and audit structures have the possibility, according to the legislation, to control a posteriori the operations carried out within the framework of military operations and possibly detect cases of corruption, but as explained, since 2021, no control or audit structures have made any mention of any control or audit of the defence and security sector.

The guidance on how to monitor corruption risks is general and is now governed by a national anti-corruption policy that takes into account the current legislation.[1] The legal framework for monitoring and evaluation in the defence and security sector, as in other sectors, clearly indicates how to monitor corruption risks, as well as outlines the basic procedure to be followed by staff responsible for monitoring corruption. The national strategy for the fight against corruption and its action plan,[2] the public procurement code and the decree which derogates from it for the defence and security sector on certain aspects[3], the penal code and the criminal procedure code,[4] apply to all sectors, including the defence and security sector. However, the guidance is general and does not specifically tackle corruption risks in peacekeeping missions, nor does it explain a procedural basis for personnel to monitor corruption.

The reports are neither made public nor communicated to the relevant supervisory bodies in any form.[1]

In accordance with the mandate of the National Defence Inspectorate, in cases of suspicion and risk of corruption, Inspectors of National Defence Inspectorate are deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field, headed by a Brigadier General [1, 2]. However, the reports are classified under the State Secrets Act [3] and it is not known whether they contain assessments of the most significant corruption risks. Mozambique does not have much experience of participating in United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations [4] (Burundi, Comoros, DRC, and Timor) and there is no evidence of this type of activity.

The Ministerial Diploma No. 89/2006, of May 10 [1], that approves the Internal Regulations of the General Inspectorate of Defence or the Procedure Guide of the General Staff of the Armed Forces for inspection in the areas of resource administration [2] does not provide clear and objective guidance on M&E of corruption risks in the Armed Forces.

The reports produced by the Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique are protected by the State Secrets Act [1] by military legislation, with emphasis on the Military Crimes Law [2] and Right to Information Law [3]. Thus, these reports are not in the public domain. For instance, the report on the corruption cases in the recruitment of young men that led the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Mozambique to cancel the 2022 course was not public [4].

There is no evidence that Niger deploys trained professionals to monitor corruption risks in the field, whether in domestic military operations or peacekeeping missions. There are no specializsed anti-corruption units within the Nigerien armed forces dedicated to identifying and addressing corruption-related issues during deployments .[1][2]

No monitoring and evaluation (M&E) guidance for the mission on how to assess or manage corruption risks was found in the sources consulted [1][2]. In the absence of any documented framework or operational directive addressing corruption risk monitoring within mission structures, this indicates that no such guidance is in place. Therefore, the country scores 0 on this sub-indicator.

No evidence has been found that the country deploys personnel specifically tasked with corruption monitoring during missions. Consequently, whether such reports exist or are made public cannot be assessed. In line with the scoring criteria, this sub-indicator is therefore marked Not Applicable (NA).[1][2]

Corruption monitors in the Nigerian Defence sector are irregularly deployed. Often, these monitors lack the necessary expertise for effectively addressing corruption issues, resulting in weak reports or complete failure to report.Efforts to implement anti-corruption measures have been inconsistent, and there is a notable lack of transparency and accountability within the sector [1] [2]. This situation has allowed corruption to flourish, further exacerbating insecurity and inefficiency in military operations​

The federal government has a general Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) policy and anti-corruption policies in place to track institutional performance [1]. However, their application within the defence sector is inconsistent and lacks comprehensive procedural and focused guidance. Nigeria’s defence sector does not have specific M&E guidance explicitly designed to monitor corruption risks during missions. However, in the latest assessment of MDAs M&E performance, the Ministry of Defence is one of the eight MDAs that their M&E Units are becoming stronger, developing M&E knowledge, and producing learning products [2]. But a lack of focused application of M&E policies or the risk of corruption undermines efforts to address corruption effectively, indicating a need for more specialized and enforced guidelines in the Nigerian defence sector.

The M&E report made available to the public is generic and does not give a detailed breakdown of the thematic issues or metrics used in the evaluation. Nigeria’s defence sector does not have specific M&E guidance explicitly designed to monitor corruption risks during missions.
However, the MOD is among the MDAs rated as being “in the growing Stage”, in terms of its M&E Compliance and Mandate [1].

Experts are deployed and report to the mission at least once a year. However, the reports do not only assess the facts relating to corruption, but take into account all the shortcomings identified during the mission, including the risks of corruption and the mitigation measures implemented. [1] For external missions, after training before deployment, once on the ground it is the organisation responsible for the mission that takes over. All control missions are carried out by this body, which may be the United Nations, ECOWAS or the African Union. [2]

The monitoring and evaluation guidance for the engagement refers to the monitoring of all engagement risks generally, including corruption risks. [1] Since their control is not limited to corruption, they do not establish the procedural basis for staff to monitor corruption alone [2] .

The reports are made available to the competent supervisory bodies at least in summary form in some cases, without compromising information. They are sometimes not made available to the public, and this exclusion is justified by the sensitivity of the information they contain. [2] . For the sake of transparency, any content not disclosed is legitimately justified as sometimes involving a certain sensitivity. However, if allegations are proven and the person is found guilty, spontaneous sanctions are applied. [1]

South African deployments do not include embedded corruption-monitoring experts or advisors in command staff [3]. Pre-deployment briefings focus on operational rules of engagement and conduct (e.g., UN zero-tolerance for sexual exploitation training before MONUSCO deployments), but these target general ethical conduct, not financial or corruption risk [1]. Additionally, peacekeeping operations face ongoing challenges, including funding, mandates, and the complex realities of conflict zones [2].
No reporting suggests that SANDF engages specialised corruption monitors to patrol supply chains, asset use, or local contracts in deployed settings. A recent report by Open Secrets exposes allegations of criminal activities within the South African National Defence Force [3].

There is no documented mission-level corruption risk guidance or post-deployment audit protocols focused on detecting corrupt practices in the field [3]. Evaluations and oversight are typically logistical or disciplinary, and internal audits focus on domestic procurement. Parliamentary coverage of corruption tends to occur after significant controversies [1] [2], rather than as part of mission-based M&E.

Parliamentary oversight bodies such as the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans receive summary updates from the Department of Defence regarding corruption and financial misconduct investigations, including instances linked to peacekeeping deployments like the SADC Mission in the DRC. [1][2] However, the recent deployment on DRC has also triggered public concern over possible mismanagement, particularly surrounding allegations of under‑equipped troops and tenders related to peacekeeping logistics. A prominent case involves former Defence Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa‑Nqakula, who has been accused of accepting bribes connected to procurement contracts tied to deployment support (e.g., equipment transport for SANDF contingents). [3]

Despite these developments, no formal reports have clearly documented corruption within deployed operations or specialist logistics channels. Parliamentary briefings and DoD statements focus on procurement failures or administrative misconduct, but they do not identify specific corruption cases tied directly to recet deployed operations [4].

There is no information either on the media [1] or the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs [2] that can confirm the presence of corruption monitoring in military operations. Similarly, South Sudan military is yet to be deployed of peacekeeping missions. However, one of the respondents mentioned that the ministry had not employed corruption monitors to specifically operate at the ministry. [3]

There is no information either on the media [1] or the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs [2] that could confirm the presence of M&E guidelines in military operations. Similarly, South Sudan military is yet to be deployed of peacekeeping missions. However, one of the respondents mentioned that the ministry was yet to develop and implement M&E guidelines. [3]

There is no information either on the media [1] or the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs [2] There is also a lack of academic literature citing such reports. Similarly, South Sudan military is yet to be deployed of peacekeeping missions. However, one of the respondents mentioned that the ministry does not make public any reports related to oversight during operations. [3]

The deployment of trained UPDF professionals to monitor corruption risks in the field, particularly during operations and peacekeeping missions in Somalia, the DRC, and Karamoja, signifies a proactive approach to mitigating corruption. This initiative, coupled with training programmes like the “Building Integrity for Senior Leaders,” demonstrates a commitment to fostering a culture of integrity within the forces.[1] The conclusion of a four-day training for senior leaders from the Ministry of Defence and UPDF further emphasises the importance placed on preventative measures. The regular deployment of expert personnel capable of monitoring corruption, and the expectation of annual reports on the status of corruption within missions, establishes a framework for ongoing assessment.[2][3]
However, a significant weakness lies in the lack of reports to assess corruption risks and the effectiveness of mitigation measures. While the deployment of trained monitors and the production of reports are positive steps, the failure to adequately analyse and document corruption risks diminishes the value of these efforts. This suggests a potential gap in the training provided to monitoring personnel, or a lack of standardised reporting protocols that allow for comprehensive risk assessment. Without thorough risk assessments and evaluations of mitigation measures, the ability of the UPDF to effectively combat corruption in the field is compromised. The reports should not only document incidents of corruption but also provide detailed analyses of the underlying causes, vulnerabilities, and the impact of mitigation strategies. Strengthening the reporting process, providing more specialised training to monitoring personnel, and ensuring that reports are used to inform strategic decision-making is crucial for improving the anti-corruption efforts in mission areas.[4]

The UPDF, like other government institutions in Uganda, operates within a framework designed to monitor and address corruption. The Internal Security Organisation (ISO) plays a crucial role in investigating internal threats, which include corrupt practices within the military. This internal oversight is complemented by Uganda’s broader legal framework for combating corruption, characterised by comprehensive legislative measures and enforcement mechanisms.[1] The Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA) has established a mechanism for domestic coordination of all entities involved in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, which indirectly impacts corruption investigations by tracing illicit financial flows.
However, while these mechanisms exist, their effectiveness in eradicating corruption within the UPDF remains a challenge. The effectiveness of ISO depends on its independence, resources, and the willingness of personnel to report corruption without fear of reprisal. The secrecy surrounding its operations makes external evaluation difficult. Secondly, the legal framework, while comprehensive on paper, faces challenges in enforcement due to factors like limited resources, bureaucratic hurdles, and potential political interference. The coordination of the FIA efforts is crucial, but their impact is limited by the cooperation and efficiency of the entities involved.
Corruption often thrives in environments where accountability is weak and transparency is lacking. Regular audits, whistleblower protection, and public disclosure of corruption cases are essential for effective evaluation. The absence of readily available public data on corruption investigations and prosecutions within the UPDF hinders thorough evaluation.[4] While the existence of mechanisms is a positive step, their true effectiveness can only be determined by their consistent and impartial application, and by the demonstrable reduction of corruption within the UPDF [2,3].

The lack of UPDF corruption reports in the public domain, even to oversight bodies, is a significant impediment to transparency and accountability within the military. While national security concerns may justify the classification of certain information, the complete absence of any form of public reporting raises concerns about potential impunity and the misuse of public funds [1] [2].
The argument that all corruption reports are classified is not tenable, as aggregated, anonymised, or redacted versions could be made available without compromising sensitive operational details. This would allow for a degree of public oversight while still protecting national security [1][2].

Trained professionals are not deployed in the field of operation to monitor any form of corruption therein [1]. The field of operation by military personnel is considered a securitised area, and no one except those deployed to fight, and or execute the task should be found within the deployment zone [2]. The idea of forbidding the professionals to monitor corruption in a military field of deployment allows commanders to loot any products meant for the operation itself without any accountability [1] [2].

No Monitoring and Evaluation policy exist to monitor corruption risk in the field of operation [1] [2]. This is despite the fact that every morning in the deployment, a signal is drafted and signed by the commander of the deployed troops [2]. The signal will be about the Situational Report, popularly known as the ‘SITREP’, meant to give the highlights of and about the deployment, including the moral of troops [2].

There is no transparency since reports are not available to the public and or on the Minisitry of defence website [1] [2].