There has been a public debate on defence issues since the rise of the terrorist threat and violent extremism. This debate is mainly taking place between citizens on the social network platforms WhatsApp and Facebook [1]. It is also done between academics and researchers in colloquia organized by universities or think tanks [2]. Intellectual productions of think tanks also participate in this debate. Journalists also organize radio and television debates that address defence issues [3]. Violent extremism and terrorism are used as a pretext for organizing this type of debate. In more professional circles such as universities or think tanks, the debate addresses priority questions of national defence [1]. But in the media and social networks, it’s much more a question of debates that arise on the occasion of terrorist attacks and that don’t pose the problems in depth [1]. For CSOs it can be risky to raise these issues in public, in the media, without being called to stop. For instance, in 2025, HAAC suspended Le Patriote newspaper for criticising military command[4].

The government participates in debates with universities, opinion makers and CSOs on defence issues. Very often, it is a reaction of the government spokesman to an ongoing controversy on a defence or security issue [1]. The government, through the military command or the spokesman of the Beninese armed forces, also participates in conferences organized by universities or think tanks on the fight against violent extremism and terrorism [2]. The army also organized a symposium on this subject and brought together academics, researchers and experts on the subject [3]. In addition to the government, the National Assembly also takes part into the debate by organizing a talk with students and academics at the University of Parakou on the government’s counter-terrorism policy [4].

Some local media occasionally organise debates on defence issues .These debates bring together civil society activists, political opponents and academics, but they remain superficial. It’s tricky to go into depth on this kind of subject [1] [2]. So, for example, when the newspaper IWACU tries to tackle the issue of the presence of Burundian soldiers in the DRC, it only mentions the circumstances of their deployment but does not substantially address the losses suffered by the Burundian army in the DRC or the question of the sums of money paid by the DRC government to the Burundian government by way of compensation [3].

In recent times, we have seen officials make statements on defence issues, but these have been limited, and when they have been made, they have not given rise to debate or questions from other players. In recent months, the President of the Republic and the Secretary General of the ruling party have twice spoken on regional defence and security issues, but these speeches have not been debated. Even when journalists ask questions, they don’t get answers.There is total reserve on the part of the authorities [1] [2].

There is no public debate on defence issues.[1] When the Cameroonian army was established between 1959 and 1964, it was built on the myth of the “Great Mute”. However, with institutional civil-military reforms, the communication division has made a digital switch to position itself on social networks. The first Facebook page for the Cameroonian army was launched on 13 June 2016. [2] MINDEF’s Communication Division has kept up with developments in NITICs by opening official pages on social networks. It’s Facebook page has almost 75,000 followers.[3] The www.mindef.gov.cm website, on which MINDEF’s activities are hosted, allows researchers and journalists to access certain information. Despite all these efforts, communication remains mostly vertical and reactive. This is due to the opaque nature of the Ministry. Members of the academy, civil society, and the media hold formal debates during television programmes or colloquia. However, these debates do not appear to influence the country’s major security decisions. Among the information not made public are the overall casualaties of armed forces in the Anglophone regions and the Far North, the financial cost of those wars, and the size of Cameroon’s military personnel or the Presidential Guard. MINDEF is also much less open to the media, which is often highly critical of the Government’s actions, such as Equinoxe TV.

The Ministry of Defence’s communication with the public is not interactive. The debate on defence and security is limited as most security and defence issues are regarded as state secret. The Ministry even considers basic information to be secret. This strategy, which in fact stems from a desire to hide a structural weakness, exposes the strong influence of presidentialism in Cameroon’s defence sector.[1] Furthermore, the irregular holding of the Council of Ministers in Cameroon renders the government somewhat impenetrable. Indeed, the last ministerial council took place on 16 January 2019,[2] a year after the re-election of the President of the Republic. The secretive nature of the MINDEF was somewhat alleviated by the reform of the armed forces in 2001. This reform, aimed at modernising the army, was driven by the Head of State’s ambition to strengthen the army’s capabilities, improve its operational equipment, and reorganise its territory. The government, through the Ministry of Defence, has had opportunities to engage with the academic community at the 2nd Colloquium of Military History held from 11 to 13 November 2021 in Douala, under the theme: ‘Cameroonian Army: 60 years of dedication to the service of the nation, national unity and the defence of Cameroon’s integrity.[3]

In addition to the government initiative, a debate on security issues has been ongoing for several years between civil society and the government, as well as between CSOs and academics [1] [2]. Furthermore, a European NGO specialising in security organises annual meetings between members of the armed forces, parliamentarians who are members of security and defence committees, and civilian and military experts. The most recent topic discussed, for example, was “What framework for collaboration between the army and parliament in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in Côte d’Ivoire?” [3]. However, the debate is not sufficiently in-depth to allow for a truly critical assessment of security measures. Most of the debates are organised and funded by international NGOs.

For a long time, defence issues were considered too sensitive to be debated “in public”, and any initiative of this kind was perceived as inherently ill-intentioned. This explains why Ivorian civil society is not very involved in internal security issues. Debate on security issues outside the government framework is most often initiated by international NGOs, which have financial leverage and useful contacts. These international NGOs, which are less “vulnerable” due to the supposed diplomatic protection of their countries of origin, are the ones that can launch such debates. [2] The terrorist threat near the capital and on the country’s northern borders makes it necessary to collaborate with citizens, who are the beneficiaries of this security.[1] In addition, the Ministry of Defence has a relatively active website with a news section and regularly updates its social media pages. [3] [4]. There is also a debate involving academics and the military, initiated by the government, which focuses mainly on strategic issues. [5]

Outside government, there has been occasional debates about defence issues and aspects of the country’s national security strategy. Civil Society Organisations like the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and academia have spearheaded some of these conversations. In July 2022, for instance, the Political Science Students Association at the University of Ghana organised a public lecture on “violent extremism, terrorism and the Youth”. (1) The Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) have also facilitated occasional public engagements on defence and security issues. In December 2023, experts attending a meeting on developments in African-led Peace Support Operations also reflected on the impact of African-led agency on current conflicts and their ability to deal with insecurity. (2) The 2024 KAIPTC Peace and Security (KAPS) Forum on the theme Migration and Societal Resilience in a Multipolar World Order: Addressing Conflicts and Building Peace in Africa” offered several opportunities for public discussions on security and defence matters for West African Countries.(3) Joy FM, one of the leading media organisations in the country, has also run documentaries followed by Phone-in discussion programmes on defence and security issues in Ghana. A recent documentary focused on the nature of the terrorist threat from Burkina Faso and how alleged terrorists from Burkina Faso cross into Northern Ghana to use hospital facilities. (4)

The government engages in regular debate with academia, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues in collaborative ways. (1) The Counterterrorism Fusion Centre under the Ministry of National Security has actively engaged a number of stakeholders on issues regarding the country’s preparedness against the threat of terrorism from the Sahel. (2) Also, the National Peace Council, through its public engagement processes, has focused on issues of violent extremism with a variety of stakeholders, including chiefs, the clergy, and academics across the country. (3)

Outside government, there is a regular public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues [1, 2, 3]. These debates usually revolve around operations, accountability, and Kenya’s stabilisation efforts. For instance, Kituo Cha Sheria called for the recall of KDF deployment in June 2024. Members of Parliament approved the deployment of the KDF within the country to restore order following the gazettement of the deployment by Defence Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale [1].
In June 2024, the KDF was deployed following protests against the Financial Bill 2024 by Gen-Z. The Defence CS issued a gazette notice on June 25, citing Article 241(3, b) of the constitution as justification for deploying the military to support the National Police. This act triggered public discussions and debates on whether it was justifiable [2].
A legal challenge was filed, and the courts upheld the deployment, with conditions. The Government was given two days to state the scope, duration, and areas of intervention by the KDF [3].

Parliament facilitates most discussions with the public about defence issues through open forums and media briefings [2]. However, this does not happen regularly or may exclude very important issues that the government chooses to avoid. KDF maintains an active website and X page where updates of their engagements are communicated to the public. The public can follow discussions through these platforms [1].

There is evidence of regular ongoing public debate on issues of defence.[1] The civil society Security Sector Working Group is one of the many outlets championing public debates on the sector. However, though there’s ongoing public debate in academia and civil society, this discourse appears to be happening in silos as the legislature rarely calls for expert intervention. There is also little evidence to suggest that their engagement in closed-door meetings considers some of the issues raised in academic and civil society public engagement.[2] The absence of a committee to engage the public on such matters of national security raises further questions about oversight, public debate on the issue of defence.[3] This debate has focused on reflective and in-depth issues such as developments in the core issue areas of the National Security Strategy, rebuilding of the armed forces, security sector legislation, civilian-security actor relations, state of reform, and progress and limits thereof.[4]

The government engagement happens often behind the scenes than in the open and in the public space.[1] The Senate and Lower House Committees are committed to private, closed-door sessions rather than a public interaction with the press and civil society.[2] For example, after the traditional Armed Forces Day Parade was disrupted by wives of the AFL soldiers, the Senate held a closed-door meeting with the wives of the AFL, with the aim of resolving the matter. The government, especially the defence institution, does not engage in open forums or press briefings where questions from the public are systematically addressed.[3]

Madagascar is often subject to political crises during which the military is involved. And this gives rise to debates around the roles played by the forces, including defense policy. Academics debate it, but among themselves [1][3]. Publications on the armed forces are, moreover, weak. [2] [4]

Most of the time, defense officials communicate through press briefings or press conferences when an event relating to the defense forces occurs. With each change in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the new minister gives some details on his future actions and his policy. The defense forces believe, moreover, that the question of defense is rather reserved for the military. In this case, civilians are not always invited [1]. This is the case during the ministerial reshuffle of January 2024 [2].

Previously, CSOs, the media, academics, and activists regularly led and guided debates on issues related to defence arising from current events and their centres of interest. This trend is confirmed by radio and television broadcasts, conferences and workshops, press articles, scientific articles, studies and analytical documents. However, we can observe that recently, there has been self-censorship on certain aspects of discussions, which stems from restrictions on public freedoms and arrests against the background of damage to the credit of the State.[1][2] Opinion leaders have been arrested and imprisoned for expressing opinions on the state of the nation and the conduct of the country.

The government engages in discussions with the public at different levels, although not regularly. Over the past two years, it has involved all ministers, including those of defence and veterans, in an annual television programme on the public TV channel ORTM. The journalist invites various government ministers to present their annual reports to enlighten citizens about issues relevant to their departments.[1] The programme is now in its 2nd edition. Furthermore, the public relations department of the Ministry of Defence and Veterans (DIRPA) also communicates proactively about the actions and specific operations of the Malian armed forces.[2] The DIRPA is directly attached to the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs. It provides information and public relations for the defence sector. It has priority over press releases, which are then disseminated by local and international media. Additionally, the government has been engaging in discussions with civil society organisations and security experts since December 2024 on the validation of the new national security policy and strategy.[3] Finally, at the local level, there are some Comités Consultatifs de sécurité (CCS), created in 2020, which serves as spaces for debate at regional and local levels between the defence forces and civil society organisations.[4] At this level, policies can be contested.

In Mozambique, public debate among academics, journalists, opinion makers and CSOs on matters of defence and national security is occasional. This debate is conducted by a restricted group of academics from the Joaquim Chissano University (School of International Relations and its Centre for Strategic Studies) and academics from educational institutions in the defence and security sector (Military Academy, Academy of Police Sciences and Higher Institute of Defence Studies). Some books and journals have been published by educational institutions in the defence and security sector [1]. The issue of Cabo Delgado may have changed things a little, as the subject of the war there is debated extensively beyond the state and the Joaquim Chissano university. However, overall, civil society, journalists and the public rarely debate defence issues. Defence and security issues are not yet openly discussed, because a culture of secrecy still prevails [2].

Traditionally, the government has been relatively uninvolved in public discussions on defence and security. However, with the emergence of the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, this stance has been changing. The Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Forces engage in discussions with the public on defence issues through open forums, and there is an active website and Facebook Page of the Ministry of National Defence [3], where press releases and media briefings are posted [4]. There is also the “Hora do Soldado” [Soldier Time], program on the public radio station and “Antena do Soldado” [Soldier Antenna], on the public television station, where the achievements of the Armed Forces are presented. This only highlights achievements, but does not discuss other relevant and critical issues [5]. Nevertheless, these engagements do not happen regularly or may exclude very important issues such as structural sector reforms and the introduction of more open policies and practices [1, 2].

From 2018 to July 2023, public debate on defense issues in Niger occurred intermittently, often triggered by high-priority events. The Islamic State-led attacks in Inatès and Chinagodrar (December 2019–January 2020), which killed over 100 soldiers [1], sparked discussions about transparency in defense spending and the role of international forces. However, protests demanding accountability in January 2020 were prohibited [2]. In February 2020, an audit exposing corruption in the Ministry of Defense [3] further fueled debate, although civil society activists raising concerns faced arrests [5]. The September 2020 CNDH report on military abuses in Tillabéry [6] prompted significant public discourse, despite the government dismissing its findings [8]. Occasional debates also arose over decisions like the April 2022 parliamentary approval of foreign military redeployments [9]. The coup marked a sharp decline in public discourse. While authorities communicated through media briefings, misinformation and censorship became prevalent. Criticism of military actions or demands for accountability led to systematic repression of civil society actors [10]. While government figures—including military officials—issue statements or participate in televised briefings, these communications are unidirectional, not dialogical, and serve as propaganda tools rather than platforms for debate or contestation. The minimal or symbolic discussions that may occur—such as tightly framed academic events or government-led forums—do not offset the broader erosion of civic space and do not represent the kind of pluralistic debate expected in a functioning democracy. However, since the coup Niger’s Transparency International chapter (ANLC) has maintained activies on defense governance and engagement with the FDS and almost all senior officers have participated in one way or another in the project’s activities [11].

From 2018 until July 26, 2023, the government of Niger maintained intermittent engagement in public discussions on defense issues, although the depth, consistency, and openness of this engagement varied. Public debates often emerged in reaction to major security incidents or political developments. For example, Islamic State-led attacks in Inatès and Chinagodrar (December 2019–January 2020), resulting in the deaths of over 100 soldiers [1], sparked significant public concern about the management of defense resources and the role of international forces. In January 2020, civil society actors organized demonstrations demanding transparency and accountability in defense spending, though these protests were ultimately prohibited by authorities [2]. In February 2020, political pressures led President Mamadou Issoufou to order an audit of the Ministry of Defense, revealing widespread corruption [3]. Although partially motivated by internal political dynamics [4], the audit occurred within an environment where some degree of public debate was still possible. Nevertheless, boundaries to openness remained evident; civil society activists criticizing defense-sector corruption were arrested in March 2020 [5], even if they were later released. Further, the September 2020 report by the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) documenting military abuses in Tillabéry [6] triggered additional public debate [7], despite the government’s swift dismissal of the findings in favor of prioritizing military morale [8].
Between 2020 and July 2023, the government occasionally facilitated discussions, such as the parliamentary debates surrounding the redeployment of Barkhane and Takuba forces in April 2022 [9].
The military coup of July 26, 2023, marked a profound deterioration in the quality and nature of government engagement. While military authorities continued to issue biweekly newsletters and conduct media briefings, these communications fundamentally shifted from information-sharing to propaganda. Official information lacks credibility, Government bulletins systematically underreport military casualties, omit civilian deaths caused by insurgent attacks (JNIM and Islamic State), and obscure evidence of abuses by security forces. Independent sources, such as ACLED, provide more reliable data, consistently contradicting the sanitized official reports. There is no space for genuine public debate: civil society organizations, journalists, and independent analysts have been intimidated, arrested, or silenced, preventing open discussions on defense and security policy. Finally, state messaging is one-way and controlled: While some communications exist (e.g., public addresses by General Tiani), they are unidirectional and offer no opportunities for dialogue, public questions, or scrutiny [10]. There are no open forums, no genuine media engagement, and no response to public concerns.
Thus, although formal communications continue, they contain no meaningful or reliable information and are not intended to foster public debate.

The outbreak and persistence of violent security threats that endanger Nigeria’s defence and security and the nature of responses by the Nigerian state have underpinned regular public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues outside government [1]. These pressing defence and security issues include Boko Haram terrorism in the North East, banditry in the North West, herdsmen-farmer conflict in the North Central, Separatist agitation in the South East, sea robbery and piracy in the South, and ritual killings in the South West [2]. The surge in kidnapping for ransom, among other crimes, has equally been a topical issue of public debate. Successive Nigerian governments have increasingly deployed the military to contain elevated security threats, with over 40 different military operations and exercises launched between 2015 and June 2020 [3]. Accordingly, regular debates have focused on these issues. However, they are often addressed superficially rather than persisting through in-depth and regular discussion. A notable reason for this is the speed and scale with which violent crimes evolve in Nigeria, and the attempt to politicise it rather than address the structural factors that enable the persistence of these threats [4]. In addition, organisations such as CISLAC/TI-Nigeria have led several public dialogues among CSOs and the media on transparency and accountability in the Defence and Security sectors [5][6][7].

The government engages in discussion with the public about defence issues through open forums, an active website, or at media briefings, although these engagements do not happen regularly, and in most cases, government officials take defensive opposition or only organise such engagements as mere press releases. Relevant defence institutions such as the Ministry of Defence, Defence Headquarters, the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Air Force, and Nigerian Navy are increasingly becoming active in the use of social media handles, particularly Facebook and Twitter, to engage with the public [1]. However, critical documents that are of interest to academics, journalists, and CSOs, such as the National Defence Policy and the Gender Policy of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, are unavailable for access or download. They have equally organised press briefings, summits and seminars with the participation of journalists, CSOs, and professional associations. In May 2024, Operation Safe Haven (OPSH), the military outfit in charge of security in Plateau and parts of Kaduna State, organised a peace summit for farmers and herdsmen at Gwantu, Kaduna State, as part of its engagement with stakeholders in finding lasting solution to the myriads of security challenges in the area. The military uses social media platforms for a variety of purposes, such as perception management, building counter-narratives, advocacy, and strategic communication. The Nigerian Army has equally trained some of its personnel on how professionally executed strategic communication can help the army overcome public condemnation and reputational crises arising from ignorant use of social media [2][3].
In this regard, organisations such as CISLAC/TI-Nigeria enjoys some level of partnership and consultation with the Defence sector. In the last 2 years, this organisation has been invited twice by the Defence Headquarters to make a presentation or serve as a Guest Speaker at the Defence National Summits. Also, Defence and Security agencies actively participate atin various Dialogues and Capacity Workshops organised by CISLAC/TI-Nigeria [4].

Outside government, there is regular and in depth debate on security issues. There are debates where CSO actors, academics, journalists, researchers and scholars are invited to exchange on the defenceissue, even on national TV, and radio station journals. [1] [2] [3] [4] However, the Minister of the Armed Forces, Sidiki Kaba, and Colonel Moussa Koulibaly, Director of Information and Public Relations for the Armed Forces, have issued a note asking the opposition and civil society to not discuss or debate any subjects linked to the army. [5]
However, FDS are not host any public radio or TV programs dealing with security, except on the occasion of major events, when they intervene alone. Their emphasis is on road safety and the security of people and property, with collaboration between the FDS and the population. [2]

The government engages in discussion with the public about defence issues regularly but it does not discuss all issues such as questions related to the governance of the sector for instance or corruption. Indeed, the Armed Forces have an active news section on their website and the DIRPA (the Armed Forces Information and Public Relations Directorate) acts as the main interface between the Armed Forces and the general public through the public and private media. It designs, plans and implements communications initiatives on behalf of the command, both in normal circumstances and in times of crisis. [2] Members of the DIRPA take part in debates on Senegalese television and sometimes with civilians, and they had active social media accounts particularly X until the summer 2024. DIRPA’s communications role includes developing the Armed Forces’ communications policy and safeguarding their corporate image; researching and collecting all press information of interest to the Armed Forces; designing, coordinating and implementing all public relations activities in conjunction with the Armed Forces General Staff and the National Gendarmerie High Command; informing the public by producing and distributing written and audio-visual documents and media concerning the Armed Forces; contributing to knowledge of the Armed Forces, maintaining their morale and safeguarding their traditions. [2] Moreover,the MoD, through its Centre for Advanced Studies in Defence and Security (CHEDS) , collaborates a lot with civil society organisations and accademies on issues related to peace and security. However, corruption is not part of the issues they work on. [3] Every year, they organise a conference where all civilians and military experts are invited and share the same panels of debates

South Africa has a well-developed media landscape, and CSOs, academics, and think tanks are known to debate high-level defence policy issues. [1] This includes strategic considerations such as military operations and deployments, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo [2], issues around funding and the military budget [3], and internal policy and defence planning [4]. These debates are, however, sporadic, with greater focus on competing priorities such as issues of crime and police reform.

The Department of Defence (DoD) actively engages with the public through media briefings and regular press releases on current operations, policy updates, and high-profile incidents [1] [3]. It has demonstrated a degree of openness, such as during the Defence Review process, where consultations were held with academics, think tanks, and civil society stakeholders [2].
However, these engagements are not part of a systematic framework for regular civil-military dialogue. Collaboration with CSOs or independent think tanks occurs, but mostly on an ad-hoc basis rather than through institutionalised platforms [2]. There is no evidence that such collaboration happens regularly or cover a wide range of sensitive defence topics [4].

Public participation in debates related to the defence and security sector in South Sudan is notably limited, though there have been instances where CSOs have played a role in shaping defence policies and laws. For example, there was a national security sector reform conference, Dec 5-7, 2024, attended by stakeholders from various institutions, including CSOs that debated and validated the security policy framework, the revised defence policy, and the white paper on defence and security. [1] Despite the narrow space for public participation, the CSOs are continuing to claim their spaces and take advantage of the available platforms to make their voices heard. E.g., through RJMEC monthly plenaries, UNMISS platforms on constitution-making and elections, peace agreement implementing institutions and mechanisms, print and electronic media and social media platforms, etc. However, there are concerns, such as those raised by Ter Manyang Gatwech, the executive director of the Center for Peace and Advocacy in South Sudan, who spoke strongly against the National Security bill emphasizing that the bill could be perceived as targeting civil society, ordinary citizens, and human rights defenders. He called on the president to return the bill to parliament for further revision, reflecting the concerns of various stakeholders in the country [2]. Despite these instances of engagement, such participation remains sporadic, with limited opportunities for broader public involvement in the formulation and discussion of defence-related legislation. This situation underscores the need for more inclusive and transparent processes to ensure that diverse voices, including those from civil society, are heard in debates on national security and defence issues.

There are instances where the government has been involved in public discourse. For example, public participation in debates related to the defence and security sector in South Sudan is notably limited, though there have been instances where CSOs have played a role in shaping defence policies and laws. For example, there was a national security sector reform conference, Dec 5-7, 2024, attended by stakeholders from various institutions, including CSOs, that debated and validated the security policy framework, the revised defence policy, and the white paper on defence and security. [1] The TNL has also been a forum for engagement on defence and security issues. For example, in July 2024, Lawmaker Orester Simion made a request that “this house to summon the Minister of Wildlife and Conservation, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Minister of Defence, and the Governor of Eastern Equatoria State to come and explain to this august house what measures have been taken and what can be done so that our people do not continue to die at the hands of foreigners in this country [2]. However, the government is responding very slowly to public discourse, and when it does, they are often very limited to responses to issues raised by the ongoing peace agreement oversight, monitoring and verification institutions, media spaces, and workshops with the security mechanisms under the R-ARCSS.

The Ugandan landscape of defence and security discourse is characterised by sporadic bursts of public engagement, primarily triggered by incidents of crime and rebel activity. While television and radio platforms facilitate discussions involving civil society organisations (CSOs), media, academics, opposition leaders, and some government military officials, these debates lack regularity and sustained momentum [1]. This episodic nature of public dialogue limits the development of a consistent and informed understanding of defence and security issues.
However, a more consistent and robust scrutiny of the government, including its defence and security apparatus, is evident across various sectors. Academics, journalists, CSOs, and political actors, including former security officers, engage in ongoing analysis and critique. The recent surge in anti-corruption activism, exemplified by the youth-led march to Parliament and the #UgandaParliamentExhibition on X, demonstrates a growing public demand for accountability[2] [3]. These actions reflect a deep-seated frustration with alleged corruption and maladministration, particularly within the 11th Parliament. The accusations by Mr. Julius Mukunda and the support from Dr. Kizza Besigye underscore the perception that the government actively shields corruption, hindering citizen participation and protest. This intense scrutiny, while focused on broader governance issues, indirectly impacts the defence sector by highlighting the need for transparency and accountability in all government operations [4].
It is important to acknowledge that while these public displays of discontent and scrutiny are significant, they do not necessarily translate into direct, sustained dialogue on specific defence and security policies. The focus of these protests and debates is often on broader issues of corruption and governance, with defence and security concerns being addressed indirectly. Therefore, while there is a clear trend of increased public scrutiny of government actions, the regularity and depth of focused discussions on defence and security remain limited.

The government engages regularly in public discussions about defence issues on both public and private media platforms, with government officials participating in panel discussions, interviews, and talk shows. Official statements and speeches, particularly by President Museveni, frequently frame defence as crucial to national stability. The Uganda Media Centre serves as an official channel for disseminating government policies, including defence matters, ensuring that key messages reach the public.[1]
However, while the government actively communicates its defence priorities, it also controls narratives and limits open and diverse engagement. While there is public discourse, it is often shaped to align with the government’s perspective. The selective nature of these engagements restricts broader debates on defence and security policies, potentially limiting public scrutiny and accountability [4].
Additionally, the government uses platforms like the 12th CPA Economic Forum to address broader governance issues, including corruption. For example, the Inspector General of Government (IGG) has publicly discussed financial mismanagement and procurement fraud, highlighting systemic inefficiencies that affect national security and resource allocation. While these discussions demonstrate a degree of transparency, they do not necessarily translate into inclusive public engagement on defence policy formulation.[2][3]

There are some academic debates on the Zimbabwe on issues that involve the defence and security [1]. Defence debates are dominant during the peak of the election times in academic spaces or platforms such as the Southern Africa Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust [2]. However, beyond the academic debate, there is minimal public debate [3].

Defence sector engagement with the public is very uncommon [1]. When such engagement does occur, it often involves threats and intimidation by the defence and security sector [2]. The public generally avoids speaking out against the military due to the potential negative consequences such as armed violence against the public, in particular civilians [2].