Benin had an anti-corruption policy based around Law No. 2011-20 on the fight against corruption and other related offenses in the Republic of Benin. This text defined the offenses linked to corruption, the applicable sanctions and the preventive measures [1].Defence and security institutions are therefore aligned with the government’s general initiatives to fight corruption [2]. However, Law 2011-20 on the fight against corruption no longer exists in Benin, as it was repealed in 2020 and no reasons was given by the government. [3] The political discourse and texts against corruption exist, but there is no national policy developed, or even a national anti-corruption strategy. The Ministries of Defence and Security also have, like all the others, a Ministerial Committee for Risk Management (CMMR). The CMMRs are installed in all ministries and are responsible for promoting integrity and reducing corruption within the public administration [4].

There is no action plan at the ministerial level that reflects institutional weaknesses in the fight against corruption [1]. However, from 2024 to 2026, the multiannual budget programming provides for the strengthening of the control services, namely the CMMR and the CMAI [2] [3]. As regards the timeframe for implementation and monitoring, few indicators are available. The absence of an action plan is a lack of a comprehensive and coordinated strategic framework to guide efforts and resources. This implies that weaknesses or limits in the process, both at the institutional level and in substance, will not always be taken into account.

In 2020, the outgoing president signed a national anti-corruption strategy but since the start of this legislature (2020-2027), no one has been able to provide this document [1]. Moreover, this document concerns the operation of Burundi’s state services in general and not the defence sector in particular [1][2]. It should be mentioned that, a retreat with all stakeholders (CSO included) has been organised from 21st to 22nd February on elaborating a national strategy for anticorruption under patronage of President of Republic [3].

Evidence show that Burundi does not have an anti-corruption policy that also applies to the defence sector so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. [1][2].

Cameroon has a comprehensive anti-corruption policy in line with international conventions. The current anti-corruption strartegy was released in December 2021 for the 2022-2026 period,(and it applies to the defence sector.[1] Cameroon is a signatory to the Merida Convention, the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption. According to Article 38 of the Convention, States Parties must take the necessary measures to encourage cooperation between national authorities in accordance with domestic law.[2] With this in mind, Cameroon established a national anti-corruption mechanism by Decree No. 2006/088 of 11 March 2006 [3]. The National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) has three main objectives: prevention and communication, studies and cooperation, and investigations [4]. The body is responsible for implementing the government’s anti-corruption plan. This reflects the fact that all ministerial departments are involved. Since the principle of good management of public affairs and public property is essential, Cameroon has undertaken to put in place all the formal and legal measures necessary for the body to function properly.

Regarding the effective implementation of the anti-corruption policy in Cameroon, it appears that the anti-corruption system suffers from significant institutional weaknesses. In the public sector, Cameroon’s corruption perception index was 73 points in 2021. The scale ranges from 0 to 100, indicating that Cameroon has a high level of perceived corruption. As a result, Cameroon is ranked at the 143rd globally. This position is considerably below the average for other countries. It is worth noting that corruption is often high in low-income coutries. [1] This situation complicates the implementation of anti-corruption strategies within ministries such as the Ministry of Defence, the General Delegation for National Security, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Territorial Administration. These ministries, especially the Ministry of Defence, are not yet fully engaged in the anti-corruption efforts.[2] For example, MINDEF’s public procurement process remains vague and depends entirely controlled by the Presidency of the Republic. The procurement of ammunition and military equipment occurs secretly, based on a purely internal strategy. This significantly resuces transparency.[3]
Furthermore, there is a toll-free number to report acts of corruption to the police and the national gendarmerie. However, the defence and security sector in Cameroon remains a significant area of concern regarding petty corruption. In addition to the extortion practices commonly known as “kapsaillement,” members of the military express dissatisfaction with corrupt practices related to career management, including assignments, internships, and participation in peacekeeping missions.[4]

The HACG has developed a national strategic plan to fight corruption for 2021-2023 [1]. This plan mentions the security services and the gendarmerie as partners, but makes no direct reference to the Ministry of Defence or the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FACI). In addition, on 12 June 2024, the Ivorian government adopted its first national anti-corruption strategy (SNLC) for the period 2024-2028 [2]. Its implementation programme is currently being developed [3].

There is a ministerial-level action plan that addresses the institutional weaknesses of the system, but no steps have been taken to implement it [1]. The implementation programme for the new anti-corruption strategy 2024-2028 is currently being developed [2].

Ghana has signed and ratified a number of regional and global anti-corruption conventions, including the UNCAC and the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption. Domestically it has created the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to address this gap. Established in 2018, it is largely considered an independent anti-corruption institution in Ghana. Its mandate empowers it to prosecute cases related to the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) and the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). This clearly does not immunise the defence sector against prosecution by the OSP. (1) Its recent investigation and report on the Airbus Scandal also point to its ability to conduct investigations relating to defence establishments. (2) (3)
Furthermore, Ghana also operates under the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) 2015–2024, which provides the overarching strategic framework for preventing and combating corruption across all public institutions, including the Ministry of Defence (MoD).(4) The NACAP period has now ended, and a new NACAP (2025–2034) is expected to be launched in September 2025 (5).

The OSP’s harmonised duties and responsibilities enjoin it to prosecute offences under the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) and the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). It operates at the national level and is not housed within the Ministry of Defence (MoD), but its jurisdiction extends to all public institutions, including the MoD, under Section 3 of the Act.(1)
From 2015 to 2024, the OSP worked within the framework of a National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) 2015–2024, which is Ghana’s overarching strategic document for preventing and combating corruption. (3)
The OSP has prosecuted matters related to the MOD, which demonstrates a given level of effectiveness of the office in its anti-corruption policy; this includes procurement-related matters under the Public Procurement Act. For example, the OSP’s involvement in the Airbus bribery case, which had links to Ghana’s military procurement (2). However, there is an absence of MoD-targeted objectives in NACAP or the OSP’s operational planning limits the specificity of implementation in the defence context. (3) There are no specific timelines for the implementation of the mandate of the OSP on corruption-related cases.
While the NACAP outlines broad objectives for combating corruption and the OSP has jurisdiction over the MoD, there are no defence-specific targets, timelines, or activities in the plan, and no evidence of a MoD-led action plan addressing institutional weaknesses within the ministry.

There is no anti-corruption policy that applies directly to the defence sector. However, guiding principles under the Kenya Defence Forces Act requires the Defence Forces to prevent corruption and promote and practice transparency and accountability. It outlines that anyone who engages in corruption, malpractices, or any act or omission while in the course of duty for selfish purposes or gains, or causes loss by their dereliction of duty, commits an offence and shall, upon conviction, be punished, as the circumstances may require, in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code (Cap. 63), the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Cap. 65), the law relating to public procurement and disposal of public property, or any other written law [1].

The Government’s official policy is the Sessional Paper number 2 of 2018 on National Ethics and Anti-corruption policy. The policy is a comprehensive framework for the design and development of an effective legal and institutional framework for tackling corruption and promoting ethics and integrity in Kenya. However, this policy is silent on defence security [1]. The Ministry of Defence website does not have a specific document that reflects a ministry-level action plan on institutional weaknesses in the system and implementation progress according to the estimated timeline. Available data on the ministry level annual performance does suggest that the ministry considers Anti-Corruption in its reflections, such as instituting court martials to address unethical behaviour and corruption [2].

According to the Act establishing the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC), the Commission is mandated to investigate all acts of corruption across the public, private, and civil society sectors of Liberia.[1] This mandate applies broadly to all ministries, agencies, and commissions, including the Ministry of National Defense and the Armed Forces of Liberia.[2] In efforts to combat corruption, the LACC operates alongside the Public Financial Management Law, both of which set accountability standards for the public sector, including the defence and security sectors.[2] Additionally, the Public Procurement and Concessions Act applies across all public institutions, including the defence sector.[3]

The National Defense Act 2008, Chapter 8, Code of Conduct, states that all personnel of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) shall adhere to democratic values, and human rights and shall be non-partisan. Chapter 9 indicates that a credible system of auditing and accountability for all public property, including real property and funds in the charge of the AFL, is required.[1] The Defense National Defense Act is further supplemented by the PFM Law,[2] as well as the Internal Audit Agency and General Auditing Commission. The Internal Audit Agency (IAA) is an autonomous integrity institution established by an Act of Legislature with the mandate to establish, direct and control internal audit functions across all branches of government, including the Executive, Legislative & Judiciary. The PFM law is an Act that governs all matters related to the management of the public finances of the Republic of Liberia.[3][4] In consultation with these integrity institutions, the Inspector General as specified in the NSA Act, among other things, to lead financial audits of activities and report findings to the President or the Minister of Finance.
While the National Defense Act and related statutes emphasise accountability, they also reference national security and confidentiality, implying that the financial conduct authority is under an obligation to grant a certain waiver or compensation in matters concerning defence and security. Beyond these laws, these words have been put into action and these actions have somewhat tuned into precedence.

There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy that applies to the defence sector. Under the anti-corruption unit of the Ministry of Defence, the ministry adopted an Internal Anti-Corruption Policy of the Ministry of National Defense in May 2022 [1]. In 2023, the Ministry of Defense organized a workshop on combating corruption. The objective of this meeting was to change people’s perception of the prejudices according to which the Malagasy armed forces are among the most corrupt sectors in the country [2]. Admission exams to the various military schools – and in particular the Antsirabe Military Academy – are generally considered opaque and are subject to widespread corruption. The organization of this workshop was part of the anti-corruption policy defined by the Ministry of National Defense.

Measures have been taken such as corruptive practices as well as directives[1]. Thus, the “Internal Anti-Corruption Policy (PILCC)” Plan was widely communicated among the staff of the Ministry of Defense. It was the subject of a verbal communication in the Government Council and the minister was personally committed to its implementation[2]. In order to eradicate corruption, the Ministry of Defense wanted to mobilize enormous resources, both financial and human, as well as material resources. He also called for the mobilization of all its structures[3]. Among the measures announced are the establishment of a corruption prevention mechanism in the context of direct recruitment and administrative competitions. Thus, the competitions at the Antsirabe Military Academy are now organized under the supervision of Bianco. But this does not always prevent competition scandals during these same competitions [3].

In December 2023, the government adopted the national anti-corruption strategy (Strategie Nationale de Lutte contre la Corruption or SNLCC), accompanied by an action plan for the period 2023-202. However, it is unclear whether the policy applies to the defence sector, as there is no mention of the armed forces or related ministry in the document.[1]

There is no specific action plan for the defence sector regarding to the fight against corruption, nor has any initiative been launched to develop such a plan. The existing action plans are general and are applicable to all sectors [1][2].

In Mozambique, there is a general legal and institutional framework for combating corruption. There is no specific anti-corruption legislation for the Defence Sector [1]. The Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption in Public Administration – EPCCAP (2023-2032), approved by Resolution No. 46/2022, of December 1, was created due to the need to establish a new approach to preventing and combating corruption that includes genetic aspects of civil society involvement, widespread use of information and communication technologies, and professionalisation of state employees and agents. The Central Monitoring and Evaluation Commission for this strategy is the committee of personnel from the public order, security and tranquillity sector (Police Forces) [2]. In Mozambique, all public employees, including those in the Armed Forces and Police Forces who hold management and leadership positions, must declare their assets upon taking office, according to the Public Probity Act. The Intelligence Service staff are exempt from this procedure [3].

In recent years, Mozambique’s leadership has repeatedly emphasised the need to combat corruption within the defence sector. In 2021, during the opening of the Thirty-First (XXXI) Coordinating Council of the Ministry of the Interior (Police Forces), the President of the Republic stressed the government’s commitment to preventing and fighting terrorism, organised crime, and corruption [1]. In 2023, during his speech marking the 59th anniversary of the Armed Forces of Mozambique, the President expressed concerns about the lack of transparency in procurement processes, acknowledging that this opacity could facilitate corruption within the Armed Forces [2]. Similarly, on World Anti-Corruption Day in 2023, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence emphasised the need for strict adherence to legal norms to prevent corruption in the defence sector. He called for ending impunity by rigorously applying existing laws, investigating and prosecuting corrupt officials, and strengthening enforcement of disciplinary and criminal measures [3].
The Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption in Public Administration (EPCCAP) 2023-2032 applies to all public institutions, including the Armed Forces, which are overseen by the Ministry of National Defence. The ministry’s action plan reflects broader institutional weaknesses, yet official reports indicate that the implementation of anti-corruption measures is progressing according to schedule. Anti-corruption messaging is visible in the Ministry of Defence and General Staff offices, where posters denounce corruption, and on the Ministry of Defence’s Facebook page, where records of various anti-corruption activities are documented. [4] However, while the government’s anti-corruption rhetoric is strong, its effectiveness remains questionable. Corruption and impunity have significantly worsened over the past decade, raising concerns that the official discourse may serve as a cover for ongoing corrupt practices rather than a genuine effort to tackle the issue. For instance, within the defence sector, five national defense officers were accused by their involvement in corruption; they were accused of making transfers to companies, supposedly contracted, for public works and the acquisition of goods for the state, without following the call for tenders and without concluding a contract, under the pretext of contingency and military urgency [5].
The gap between stated commitments and actual enforcement suggests that while anti-corruption policies exist, their impact remains limited.

Niger’s anti-corruption initiatives reflect a gradual evolution of institutional frameworks. In 2011, the government established HALCIA, the High Authority to Combat Corruption and Related Infractions, through a decree. Its mandate was significantly enhanced in 2016, when the decree was replaced by Law No. 2016-044 that expanded HALCIA’s investigative powers. This law empowered HALCIA to directly refer corruption cases to the Public Prosecutor and independently initiate investigations. Additionally, it introduced protective mechanisms for witnesses, informants, and experts involved in corruption cases [1]. In January 2018, the National Strategy to Fight Corruption and its Action Plan (SNLC) was adopted through Decree No. 2018-007/PRN. This strategy aimed to institutionalize anti-corruption measures across various sectors, further supporting HALCIA’s preventive and enforcement missions. It emphasized transparency, accountability, and effective governance as key objectives. The strategy is structured around three key pillars: enhancing corruption prevention mechanisms, strengthening anti-corruption systems, and fostering national and international partnerships to combat corruption and related offenses. However, it does not specifically address issues related to the security and defense sectors [2]. In August 2019, Order No. 0108/PM was issued to define the roles and responsibilities of the Council for the Orientation and Oversight of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (COPIL-SNLC). This body was tasked with monitoring the implementation of the strategy, assessing its effectiveness, and proposing improvements based on lessons learned. The Second COPIL-SNLC Meeting was hoeld in 2023,.iIt focused on reviewing the outcomes of the first session, monitoring the strategy’s implementation, and considering adjustments to the action plan. The meeting highlighted the critical role of anti-corruption efforts in fostering development, peace, and good governance. The Prime Minister emphasized the need for transparent and effective public service delivery and accountability mechanisms [3].
Despite the formal meetings, there was no real evaluation of the implementation of the SNLC [4]. Furthermore, as noted previously, the SNLC did not provide for specific provisions or sections on defense and security sectors.
Following the military coup in July 26, 2023, the Niger authorities dissolved HALCIA and created in September 13, 2023, the Economic, Financial, and Tax Crime Fighting Commission (CoLDEFF) as the primary institution in the combat against corruption. According to the ordoninance, the COLDEF’s primary mission includes investigating economic, financial, and fiscal crimes, recovering illegally acquired public assets, and ensuring adherence to the country’s legal framework. [5]. The ordinance establishing CoLDEF notably omits specific provisions for addressing corruption in the security and defense sectors. While positioned as an independent body, CoLDEF’s close alignment with the transitional military leadership raises concerns about its impartiality. COLDEF members are nominated by CNSP,.tThey include judges, soldiers, police officers, and civil society members. According to prominent civil society member, the CoLDEFF focuses primarily on fiscal and non-fiscal recoveries rather than directly combating corruption. Based on inspection or investigation reports, CoLDEFF summons the individuals involved and grants them a deadline to make payments. Instead of referring cases to the judiciary, CoLDEFF prioritizes reaching agreements to ensure payment is made [6].

The National Strategy to Fight Corruption, adopted in 2018, included an action plan aimed at combating corruption across various sectors. However, no specific actions were applied to the defense and security sector. Despite corruption scandals, particularly in military procurement revealed in 2020, the strategy remained largely generic and ineffective in addressing corruption risks within defense institutions. The establishment of the Commission de Lutte contre la Délinquance Économique, Financière et Fiscale (CoLDEFF) in September 2023 further illustrates the lack of targeted action toward the defense and security sector. According to the founding ordinance [2], CoLDEFF’s focus is narrowly limited to economic and financial delinquency without mention of military oversight or defense-sector reforms. CoLDEFF’s operational approach—prioritizing fiscal recovery through negotiated settlements rather than judicial accountability—has transformed it into a political tool rather than a systemic anti-corruption mechanism [1] [3].. This perspective aligns with broader critiques of military-led governance, where anti-corruption campaigns are often instrumentalized to consolidate power rather than to establish lasting institutional reforms.

Nigeria has a revised National Anti-Corruption Strategy – NACS (2022-2026). The NACS established a committee comprising all ACAs, relevant MDAs, government and private sector entities, faith-based organisations, as well as the civil society and Nigeria Labour Congress, as the Implementation committee of the strategy, with the Federal Ministry of Justice (FMOJ) as the key regulator in the anti-corruption sector, to lead the implementation of the Strategy [1]. The strategy identifies who is responsible for dealing with anti-corruption within government ministries and states what types of actions should be taken to address corruption, including the monitoring and evaluation of the success or failure of such policies. It also emphasizes the need for mainstream ethical considerations within government processes and the importance of sensitization and training concerning corruption issues. The Strategy is not available on either the websites of the Federal Ministry of Justice or the Independent Corrupt Practices & Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). The implementation of the revised NACS is still being discussed [2]. It is unclear how the Strategy relates to the defence sector, as there is no specific reference to the defence sector in the previous NACS [3]. Similarly, the Open Government Partnership (OGP) Nigeria National Action Plan (2023-2025) does not specifically capture the defence sector [4].

Nigeria National Anti-Corruption Strategy – NACS (2022-2026) provides a government-wide anti-corruption posture that should apply to Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs). The NACS established a committee comprising all anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), relevant MDAs, and government and private sector entities, among others, as the Implementation committee of the strategy [1]. The Strategy mandates individual units to develop an action plan to implement the Strategy within individual units of the MDAs. There is no evidence to the degree of the existence of action plan in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to implement the strategic objectives identified in the NACS. Also, there exists no action plans/implementation strategy specifically that has been developed or published for the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN). However, efforts to tackle corruption at the MOD is spearheaded by the Ministry’s Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit (ACTU) [2].

Senegal has several anti-corruption mechanisms, including : Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, National Financial Information Processing Unit, Court for the Repression of Illicit Enrichment replaced by the new financial judicial pool, State General Inspectorate, General Inspectorate of Finance, National Office for the Fight against Fraud and Corruption. [1] There is also a national strategy to fight corruption (2020 – 2024). Since the eradication of corruption in Senegal for sustainable and inclusive development, this strategy applies to all sectors, including the defence and security sector. There is the Gendarmerie’s “Brigade Prévôtale” and the National Police’s “Brigade Prévôtale”, which can be reinforced with human and logistical resources and work efficiently under the authority of their hierarchy. [2] The National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020 – 2024 of the National Office for Combating Fraud and Corruption applies to all sectors of the Republic, including the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and is accessible to all citizens to ensure its full application by the Senegalese people. [3]

There is an anticorruption national strategy in Senegal (2021 – 2024), but there is no action plan to implement the strategy at the level of the Ministry of Defence. [1] [2]

South Africa has a National Anti-Corruption Strategy, which was adopted in 2021 to guide the country’s overall response to anti-corruption. This includes Pillar 6, which is related to protecting vulnerable sectors, with the defence/armaments sector identified as one of the vulnerable sectors. [1] Issues related to the country’s anti-corruption response are likewise reflected in the National Development Plan, and all government entities are required to align their planning with this high-level strategy. [2] At the departmental level, the Department of Defence has a Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan first adopted in 2012 and updated in 2022. [3]

The Department of Defence’s Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan is implemented as part of the Department’s Annual Performance Plan and tracked using various metrics including the number of investigations, the results of investigations, and whistle-blowing incidents. [1] The Department likewise regularly reports to relevant parliamentary committees on audit findings and the implementation of its Audit Action Plan. [2] However, on-going challenges with adverse audit outcomes and deficiencies in the control environment illustrate shortcoming in the implementation of the Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan including the implementation of actions to strengthen financial management systems as documented in the Auditor-General’s report in the Department’s Annual Report. [1]

South Sudan does not have a defence-specific anti-corruption policy. However, there are legislations in place intended to fight corruption from different dimensions. For example, procurement in defence and security sector is covered by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 [1], the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011 [2]., South Sudan Penal Code Act, 2008 [3] and the Audit Chamber Act, 201 1 [4]. Other laws that prescribe anti -corruption practices include the SPLA White Paper on Defence [5] and the Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Act 2009 [6], both of which prescribe practices intended to curb corruption in all government departments, including defence. There are reforms underway to align with anti-corruption laws, with the provisions of the 2018 R-ARCSS, as well as international best practices.

According to a U.S State department report of 2023, South Sudan has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, but there is a near total lack of enforcement, and considerable gaps exist in legislation [1]. The implementation of anti -corruption policies has been merged by lack of ratification of regional anti-corruption conventions [2], delayed establishment of bodies tasked with implementing anti -corruption policies [3] political interference [4] among other factors. The effectiveness of key anti- corruption institutions such as the National Audit Chamber (Article 186), Anti-Corruption Commission (Article 143 of the constitution) and other independent institutions such as the Human Rights Commission (Article 145) have from time to time been questioned [4]. For example, H.E. AMB. MAJ GEN (rtd) Charles Tai Gituai, during a RJMEC meeting held on November 9, 2023, observed that “in terms of resource, economic and financial management, while some progress has been made with regards to the passage of legislation for reforms to increase transparency and accountability in the economic sector, much more is needed. It is important to finalise and operationalise the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 (Amendment) Bill 2023, passed last month by the reconstituted TNLA. Furthermore, I urge the passage of the National Audit Chamber Act (Amendment) Bill, as it complements the process of achieving the transparency and accountability aspired to in the R-ARCSS” [5].

Uganda has several anti-corruption laws and policies designed to combat corruption across various sectors, including defence. These legal frameworks aim to enhance transparency, accountability, and integrity in public administration. Key legislative and policy measures include:

– The Anti-Corruption Act (2009): This law provides the legal foundation for prosecuting corruption-related offenses in Uganda. It establishes the Anti-Corruption Court and empowers the Inspectorate of Government (IGG) to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption, embezzlement, and abuse of office. The Act also includes provisions for asset recovery and sanctions for individuals found guilty of corrupt practices [1].

– The Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) Anti-Corruption Policy (2019): This sector-specific policy aims to curb corruption within the defence sector by promoting integrity, transparency, and accountability. Key provisions include whistleblower protection mechanisms to encourage the reporting of corruption cases without fear of retaliation, as well as mandatory asset declaration requirements for officials within the ministry and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). [2]

– The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (2014): This law regulates procurement and asset disposal processes to prevent corruption and mismanagement of public funds. It establishes guidelines for competitive bidding, contract awarding, and monitoring of procurement activities across government institutions, including the defence sector.[3]

– The Uganda National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS): This comprehensive strategy provides a framework for coordinating anti-corruption efforts across government institutions, civil society, and the private sector. It outlines key priority areas such as strengthening institutional capacity to fight corruption, promoting transparency in public service delivery, and fostering public awareness and participation in anti-corruption initiatives. NACS serves as a roadmap for implementing anti-corruption measures at both national and sectoral levels, including within the security and defence sectors [4].

These legal and policy frameworks demonstrate Uganda’s commitment to fighting corruption. However, enforcement remains a critical challenge, as instances of corruption continue to be reported within the public sector, including defence institutions.

Although Uganda has a comprehensive anti-corruption legal framework, it lacks the political will to combat corruption. For example, in an interview, the executive director of the Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda (ACCU), warned that without political will, it will take decades to eradicate corruption. If the leaders go after small corruption cases and leave the high-profile political cases, corruption will not end. The former Ethics Minister accused President Museveni of shielding corrupt officials. She also criticised the President for duplicating duties, questioning why he hires ministers to advise him while also employing RDCs and presidential advisors, who consume government funds that could be used to create more jobs for youths [1].
The Chairperson of the House Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament, emphasised that only exemplary leadership, particularly from President Museveni, can effectively combat corruption. He criticised the President for appointing ministers such as Amos Lugoloobi, who have been charged with corruption, suggesting that such individuals should step aside. Mr Kivumbi also highlighted the contradiction in arresting those who demonstrate against corruption instead of engaging with them. Mr Kivumbi pointed out the issue of classified budgets, where large sums of money are hidden, as a significant barrier to eradicating corruption. He questioned the president’s lack of trust in existing institutions like the IG, evidenced by the creation of an anti-corruption unit within the State House [2].
Uganda’s anti-corruption policy in the defence sector is not considered effectively implemented, with several issues, including the fact that the Uganda People’s Defence Force Act of 2005 does not specify what counts as corruption. There is an action plan at the ministry level, but it is general and covers all government agencies. It is not specific to the defence sector. There are statements made by the president against financial misappropriation by the UPDF [3].
The Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs is tasked with oversight of issues about the defence sector, including corruption, but the heavy executive influence undermines this department’s effectiveness.
Politically connected defence personnel grab land and evict residents with impunity, thereby disenfranchising local people. As well, the UPDF has a non-transparent recruitment process for the intelligence agencies [4].

There is a National Anti-Corruption Strategy [NACS] (2020-2024), which was adopted in 2020 to 2024 [1]. The functions are as follows:
◆ To investigate and expose cases of corruption in the public and private sectors,
◆ To combat corruption, theft, misappropriation, abuse of power, and other improper conduct in the public and private sectors,
◆ To promote honesty, financial discipline and transparency in the public and private sectors,
◆ To receive and consider complaints from the public and to take such action in regard to the complaints as it considers appropriate,
◆ To direct Commissioner General of Police to investigate cases of suspected corruption and to report to the Commission on the results of the investigations,
◆ To refer matters to the National Prosecution Authority for prosecution
◆ To require assistance form members of the Police Service and other investigative agencies of the State [1]. Section 255 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe established the Anti-corruption commission [2].
The NACS is a broad, whole-of-government framework, aiming to fight corruption across the public and private sectors; this technically includes the defence ministry under its umbrella mandate.

While anti-corruption efforts and policy exist in Zimbabwe [1], there are significant challenges. There is a perceived lack of implementation of anti-corruption policy. Ministers and other politicians are alleged to be involved in corruption and there are complaints that they are acquitted by courts, despite evidence to the contrary [2][3]. Furthermore, the anti-corruption strategy is considered to have not been enforced within senior elements of the defence forces, leading to increased risks of corrupt activity [4][5].