There is no formal defence strategy. Purchases are therefore planned on the basis of the strategic needs identified to effectively face the country’s defence challenges. Once the needs have been identified, planning is done through the State budgets [1]. Connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit [1]. Very often, planning is done on a three-year basis [2]. The National Directorate for Public Procurement Control (DNCMP) is the main institution responsible for monitoring and regulating public acquisitions, including calls for tenders and the allocation of contracts. Except acquisitions that can not be managed by the Procurement Directorate, for security reason.

The multi-year programming document (over three years) is proactively published on the website of the Budget Directorate-General. It includes the justification for purchases, chains of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms and results [1]. However, no details are given about the military equipment that the government plans to acquire. In general, the document speaks of the acquisition of military equipment. Detailed information related to defence procurement is not made public [1]. According to people interviewed, defence and security equipment are classified secret and can not be disclosed to the public. For security reasons, they think that publishing this kind of information could help the enemies to plan attacks against them. [2][3]

The National Assembly has the power to control government action, including with regard to defence issues,[1]. However,but there is no evidence that the National Assembly has exercised such control in recent years . [1][2].

The budget law indicates each year the amount allocated to acquisitions in the defense sector but it never goes into detail to allow the separation of the different headings and to establish the link between purchases and the requirements of the defense strategy [1].It will thus be up to the logistics department of the Army General Staff to go into detail to break down the budget allocated to acquisitions. [1] [2] Except for that there is no military programming law or other policies that would guide the process and the link between purchases and the requirements of the defence strategy is not publicly made .

The process related to the acquisition plan within the Defence sector is opaque . The public has no access to it [1] [2]. Even the elected representatives of the people have no access to it.

In reality, acquisition plans in the Defence sector should be evaluated by external bodies such as the Court of Auditors or the Defence and Security Committees of Parliament but in practice these bodies do not have access to them. [1] [2]

The country has a procurement planning process, even though it is not designed for the long term. This is due to the budgetary mechanisms of the State of Cameroon, which are based on programme budgets lasting only one year. Similarly, the budgetary, commercial and financial functions are separate because of the overlapping of committees on these issues within the National Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly has the Defence Committee responsible for all security sector matters, including missions, organisation, research and development, intelligence, financing of the army and procurement. The foreign affairs committee of the National Assembly independently decides on participation in international and regional peace missions, treaties and agreements; the budget or finance committee of the National Assembly makes final decisions on all security structures, and even the public accounts committee, which reviews audit reports on the entire national budget, including defence budget.[1] However, explicit links between procurement and defence strategy are rare due to sector opacity, corruption and, especially, the lack of expertise among parliamentarians, who could have sought clear explanations of these links.[2] Since 2018, many innovations have emerged in the preparation of the budget and the budget programming stage, notably the institution of the budget debate and the three phases of developing the medium-term expenditure framework, namely the initial, adjusted and final versions. The medium-term expenditure framework is a document that details expenditure profiles and budgetary controls at the Ministry of Defence.[3]

The public has access to certain information relating to the process itself, but some details may be withheld from publication for reasons of defence secrecy and sensitivity. The acquisition planning process within the Cameroonian army operates under a shroud of confidentiality. Discussions concerning this process are limited, even among internal personnel.[5] Decision-making is mainly restricted to the minister of defence, the Directorate of Joint Equipment, a select group of the minister’s associates, and various intermediaries.[4][6] The defence and security sector is indeed characterised by a level of confidentiality that is often excessively high. This confidentiality is often exploited to compensate for a relatively low level of oversight or a lack of adherence to internationally recognised public expenditure management standards. It should also be noted that the issue of defence secrecy has often been exploited by the military either to conceal their shortcomings in this area or to secure significant benefits from their work.[1]. In this way, they manage, through a careful balancing act, to extend the scope of defence secrecy to other subjects, particularly those related to the purchase of military equipment or arms imports. In the case of Cameroon, it can therefore be said that defence secrecy as it is presently applied in the country contributes more to maintaining this opacity due to the suppression of information that military officials are supposed to communicate to the public.[2] Another point is that the budgets of some elite units of the army (Rapid Intervention Battalion and the Presidential Guard) are not included in the Defence Ministry’s budget and are therefore entirely outside the scrutiny of CONAC, the National Assembly and internal bodies within the Defence Ministry (General Controller of the Armed Forces). Credible sources indicate that the budgets for these two elite forces amount to nearly half the Ministry of Defence’s and the regular army’s budget, roughly 200 millions euros per year.[3]

The parliament is involved on the oversight of the security sector in Cameroon through oral questions froms MPs to the Minister of Defence. The existence of several committees within the parliament reflects this desire to monitor the defence and security forces.[1] However, as noted above, this oversight remains superficial. Parliamentarians assess what is presented to them during th public speech of the Defence Minister at the National Assembly and generally do not question the efficiency of pruchases or the plans and strategic decisions related to security issues, partly due to their lack of knowledge in this area (interview with a senior officer in the Cameroon army) and because of they largely belong to the ruling party and are unlikely to challenge their executive. In Cameroon, it is worth highlighting the inequality in terms of the competence of personnel in the executive and military powers compared with legislative authorities. The executive and military branches are more experienced and better equipped intellectually, and clearly ahead of the legislative branch in terms of expertise (analysis of security issues, development of security policies and doctrines, etc). Materially, the executive relies on a wide range of personnel from different administrations; the military relies on its senior officers, while the legislature relies on a handful of experts. Furthermore, when information relating to defence and security is provided to parliament by the executive and the military authorities, the effectiveness of scrutiny becomes hypothetical, given the secretive nature of the issues addressed, or even the deliberate attempt by the executive to distort figures related to assessing the forces’ needs.[2] Historically, parliamentarians have not addressed the numerous scandals connected to the procurement of arms and equipment by the Cameroonian military.

Public procurement in the defence and security sector is excluded from Public Procurement Law 2019-679 of 24 July 2019 on the Public Procurement Code. The process for acquiring defence equipment is therefore opaque and not governed by clear rules. There was a military programming law (2016-2020), but it has not been renewed [1]. Since then, the public procurement process has been unclear. Notwithstanding acquisitions related to the military strategy of a country engaged in the fight against terrorism, the issue of acquisitions is managed in a praetorian manner by the Ministry of Defence. The only traceability is indicated in the budget [2]. The Ministry of Defence’s budget is divided into four sections: 1. Personnel; 2. Goods and services; 3. Transfers; and [4]. Investments. The authorities justify the budget increase by the desire to modernise the defence system [3] [4].

There is no clear process for planning acquisitions in Côte d’Ivoire, as most public procurement is controlled by the Ministry of Defence. Some information on purchases or deliveries of equipment is sometimes published online. [1] [2] [3] [4]

Strictly speaking, there is no independent and systematic external oversight mechanism for the defence procurement planning process in Côte d’Ivoire. No audit court, civil society organisation or independent body is officially or regularly involved in the military procurement planning and oversight process. Military procurement is primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, in particular through the Directorate of Financial Affairs and the Directorate of Equipment, and the authority of the National Security Council (CNS) and the Council of Ministers for major approvals. [1] [2]

Ghana has made substantial progress in enhancing the transparency and supervision of its acquisition planning procedures, particularly in relation to defence procurement. The Public Procurement Act of 2003 (Act 663), later amended in 2016 (Act 914), provides a well-defined structure for public procurement, encompassing defence acquisitions. This framework requires that all procurement actions be carried out in a just, open, and competitive way. (1) The process entails multiple stages, first with the Ministry of Defence identifying needs, and preparing a procurement plan. Subsequently, the Public Procurement Authority (PPA), an autonomous entity responsible for assuring adherence to procurement laws and regulations, examines and grants permission to this proposal after careful examination. The monitoring provided by the PPA guarantees that procurement processes are carried out with transparency and accountability at every stage. (2) The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) of the MOD 2024 details the acquisition planning regime of the MOD from 2024 to 2027. This provides a separate internal planning function, including budgeting, finance and the long-term rationale behind such forward planning structures. Inclusively, the MTEF demonstrates an explicit relation between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements as the various projections of procurement are made in the budget sub-program results statement indicating procurment projections from 2024 and 2027. The document shows the estimated increase in procurement of vehicles (combat and admin vehicles, motor cycles) to account for 10% of the total budget. The same procurement plan purchase were made for other equipments including parachutes, other GControl stores, ICT networking among several others. Moreover, there are provisions for the acquisition of movable and immovable assets by the end of 2024, which includes the procurement of shipping spare parts, harbour equipments ships and personnel protection equipment and facilitate rehabilitation. (3)

Although the general structure and principles of defence procurement are publicly accessible, precise details of acquisition plans are frequently classified for reasons of national security. This restricts the degree to which the public can obtain comprehensive information regarding defence procurement procedures. (1) However, the presence of a well-defined oversight mechanism via the PPA ensures a certain degree of responsibility and transparency within the constraints of national security. (2)

The external oversight bodies of the expenditure of the MOD include the Public Procurement Authority, as established under the Public Procurement Act of 2003 (Act 663), later amended in 2016 (Act 914). Additionally, the Audit Service and the Special Budget Committee maintain oversight responsibility for public expenditures by any government agency, department, and ministry.(1) In terms of long-term acquisition plans, the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior ensures that procurement plans align with the country’s medium-term developmental plans, specifically referring to the Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF) for the MOD.(2) The Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior, in accordance with Orders 140(4) and 158 of the Standing Orders of Parliament, maintains an oversight role over the acquisition and planning of the GAF. (3)

There is a clear process for the entire acquisition planning cycle in place, with formally separate internal acquisition planning functions, e.g., budget, commercial, and finance. Connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit, with the exception of what is deemed classified. Kenya’s budgeting is annual, and procurement plans are done annually. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 33 of 2015 was amended in 2022. The revisions now require public entities to make their procurement plans public under Procurement 53(12) [1]. However, the MoD has not published its plans in its website. Neither has treasury published its plans. Defence budget does not make distinction between what is confidential and what is not [2].

There is limited information available about entire acquisition planning cycle in place and connections between specific purchases and defence strategy. The only information available is inquiries undertaken by the Defence Committee or Auditor General Reports [3]. This is despite recent amendment of The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 33 of 2015 requiring Public entities, including MoD, to make their procurement plans public under section 53(12) [1, 2].

There is strong external oversight in land acquisition matters within the defence sector, primarily because land issues are highly public and sensitive. However, there is limited evidence of similar oversight in other aspects of defence acquisition planning. This gap was highlighted by remarks from the Cabinet Secretary for Transport, Kipchumba Murkomen, who stated that no external entity has the mandate to oversee KDF aircraft acquisitions [1].

Following a major chopper crash in April 2024, which resulted in the deaths of Kenya’s CDF and nine others, the Defence Council, led by the Defence Cabinet Secretary, convened to review both short- and long-term operational strategies of the KDF [2]. The Council, as part of its oversight role, is responsible for setting policies, controlling, and supervising the KDF. However, while the Council plays a crucial internal oversight function, there remains a lack of independent external oversight in broader defence procurement and acquisition processes.

The process of acquisition planning formally begins with the Ministry of National Defense submitting its budget requests to the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. Before the budget is submitted to the Legislature, the Ministry submits a budget to the ministry, which describes its activity for the forthcoming budget year. This process entails a certain level of back-and-forth between the MFDP and Defence, through which questions are addressed and more information provided where clarification is required. The link, however, between requisition and purchase is rather weak.[1[2][3][4]
By law, acquisition functions are supposed to be separated; the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (PPCA) requires ministries, including the MoD, to operate dedicated procurement units, distinct from their finance and planning divisions.[5]

Liberia’s defence and security legal framework, including the National Defense Act of 2008 and the National Security Agency (NSA) Act, outlines procedures for acquisition planning. However, the practical implementation of these procedures lacks transparency, with limited publicly available information on how internal processes function.[1][2]
Civil society organisations and security sector stakeholders have consistently called for greater transparency in defence acquisition planning.[3] Reports have pointed out that the NSA has operated with significant financial autonomy, spending substantial amounts over the years without adequate oversight, leading to calls for forensic audits to ensure accountability.[4]

Liberia’s external oversight of defence acquisition planning involves three primary institutions:
1. General Auditing Commission (GAC): As Liberia’s supreme audit institution, the GAC conducts audits across government ministries, including the Ministry of National Defense.[1]
2. Public Accounts Committee (PAC): This joint committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate reviews audit reports submitted by the GAC. While the PAC has initiated public hearings based on these reports, such actions are often reactive, occurring after audit findings rather than proactively overseeing defence acquisition processes.[2][3]
3. Statutory Committees on Defence and Security: These committees within both legislative chambers are tasked with oversight of defence and security matters, including acquisition planning. However, their engagement tends to be sporadic and more responsive to emerging issues rather than part of a continuous oversight strategy.[4][5]

However, none of these institutions consistently assess the long-term outcomes or the legitimacy of acquisition plans. For instance, the GAC conducts financial and performance audits across government ministries, including the Ministry of National Defense. Reports typically focus on whether expenditures followed regulations, not whether acquisitions were strategically justified. The Legislature reviews GAC findings and can host public hearings to question officials based on audit reports, rather than proactive reviews of future acquisition plans.[6]
Despite these structures, the overall effectiveness of external oversight in Liberia’s defence acquisition planning is limited. The Open Budget Survey 2023 rated Liberia’s legislative oversight during the budget process as weak, scoring 22 out of 100.[7] This indicates a need for more proactive and structured engagement by oversight bodies to ensure transparency and accountability in defence acquisitions.

There is a process for planning acquisitions. Planning is established annually and future acquisitions are included in the budget of the armed forces; therefore in the general state budget adopted by Parliament [1]. Generally, acquisitions are scheduled one year in advance. This does not necessarily mean that the purchases are made in the same year. Sometimes planned acquisitions only take place several years even if they appear in the planning [1]. These are the services of the ministry which prepare all aspects of the acquisition including the commercial and financial aspects. The acquisition market, for the most part, is carried out within the framework of bilateral cooperation with the supplier countries; thus, allowing the State to have cheaper prices [1]. The State always tries to justify the planned purchases so that they fit into the defense strategy set by the executive [2]. Specific purchases are not always linked to the requirements of the defence strategy. This is seen through the acquisition of equipment not adapted to the needs of the military, such as surveillance equipment that is not deployed in regions where its use would have been beneficial.

Generally, the public only has access to information provided by the communications services of the Ministry of Defense or by the Presidency of the Republic [1]. Even journalists don’t always have the details of acquisitions in advance. The only information they have is that of the budget allocated to equipment purchases and sometimes also their details. They can then relay this information to the public even if the acquisitions of the Ministry of National Defense are covered by journalists very rarely [2].

There is no external oversight regarding the acquisition planning process. Planning is always a matter discussed within the military [1]. The only civilian political figures who intervene are those of the Presidency of the Republic. Parliament almost never intervenes directly. With regard to the budget, the Court of Auditors, Financial Control as well as the General State Inspectorate can carry out an a posteriori control [2].

It appears that the Ministry of Defence plans its needs, which includes planning acquisitions. However, the planning process is neither inclusive nor accessible. These needs may be partially reflected in the consolidated procurement plan[1] or may be addressed within a strictly confidential framework.[2] Information about defence procurement in the consolidated plans is limited to office supplies, vehicle repairs or medical supplies. Until 2019, the military orientation and programming law (LOPM) provided detailed information on some expenses related to the defence sector, including acquisitions, but since then, no further information has been published.[3]

Despite having a comprehensive legal framework,[1] there is a lack of transparency in the acquisition planning process since it is not made public,[2][3] and there has been almost no external monitoring of the process in recent years[4][5].

Despite having a comprehensive legal framework,[1] there is a lack of transparency in the acquisition planning process since it is not made public,[2][3] and there has been almost no external monitoring of the process in recent years.[4][5]

There is a clear process for the entire production cycle, acquisition planning, export and import of defence products [1]; the Defence Budget is made available by the General State Budget [2]; the connections between specific purchases and requirements depend on Military Planning, Defence Policy and Strategic Concept of Defence and National Security [3]; The processes for production, acquisition planning cycle, export and import of defence products, in force in Mozambique, are all provided for by military legislation and are guided by the Military Programming [4], which results from the Government’s Five-Year Plan [5].

The expenditure on the production, acquisition planning, and export of defence products is presented in the General State Budget and in the Economic and Social Plan [1]. The report on the production, acquisition, export and shipment of defence products is prepared by the Ministry of Defence and sent to the United Nations under the ATT Convention, A/RES/67/234B, of April 2, 2013 [2]. However, the actual acquisitions, imports and inspections of defence products are classified under the State Secrets Act [3].

The inspection, supervision, and monitoring units operate within a legal framework, which includes: 1) Parliamentary Regulations, granting oversight powers and responsibilities to the Defence, Order, and Public Security Committee [1, 2], the Organic Statute of the General Defence Inspectorate, which authorises inspections, audits, inquiries, investigations, administrative and operational assessments, and oversight of defence acquisitions [2, 3], and the Internal Regulations of the Ministry of National Defence, which outline the oversight and internal scrutiny powers of the National Defence Inspectorate [3].
However, several challenges undermine the effective assessment of long-term defence acquisitions. These include limited technical expertise, insufficient financial resources, lack of specialised knowledge, and restricted access to technology—all of which affect the ability to evaluate the relevance, legitimacy, and effectiveness of defence acquisition plans [4, 5]. It remains unclear whether Parliament still holds oversight and scrutiny powers, as its involvement is typically limited to approving legislative changes rather than actively overseeing defence acquisitions.

The government has a process for acquisition planning as a result of the programming act of the Ministry of Defense. According to art. 20 of the 2013 decree on defense and security procurement, there is an annual acquisition. It is drawn from the needs identified by relevant technical departments of the Ministry of Defense. The plan must be drawn up no later than the end of January of the current budget year, but it is flexible and regularly updated. [1][2]. It is not available to public and is classified as “top secret”. [1][2] From data that could be sourced, this is not particularly clear if internal functions are separated by budget, commercial and finance.

According to art. 20 of the 2013 decree on defense and security procurement the acquisition plan is not subject to publication and is classified as “top secret”. All correspondence regarding the plan is to be carried out exclusively by “confidential mail” [1]. Similarly, Article 7 of the 2016 Niger Code for Public Procurements excluded goods, equipment, supplies, and services related to defense and security from the scope of the code. This exclusion further entrenched opacity in procurement processes, as these transactions were not subject to the regulatory safeguards applied to other public procurements [2].
However, the adoption of Decree No. 2022-743/PRN/PM on September 29, 2022 marked a significant departure from this approach. The new decree repealed and replaced Decree No. 2016-641, reintroducing defense and security procurement into the scope of public procurement regulations. [3]. Unlike the earlier “exclusion” terminology, which implied complete exemption from public procurement rules, this new derogatory regime establishes specific, tailored provisions for these acquisitions while maintaining necessary confidentiality for national security purposes. The revised code also integrates the procurement needs of diplomatic missions and the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) under the derogatory regime to account for their unique operational requirements. While this framework allows for flexibility and confidentiality, it represents a move toward incorporating defense and security procurement into a broader regulatory framework, promoting some degree of accountability and oversight. The adoption of Ordinance 2024-05 on February 23, 2024, reversed some of these transparency improvements. This ordinance grants authorities broad discretionary powers to award public contracts without competitive bidding or prior oversight. It further allows exemptions from taxes, duties, and fees for certain well-connected operators and excludes specific public expenditures from scrutiny by oversight bodies or citizens. The ordinance is considered a significant setback for good governance in the security sector. It eliminates both prior controls, which are intended to prevent irregularities, and post-controls, which sanction them. Moreover, according to civil society organizations, it contravenes Decree No. 2022-743/PRN/PM, particularly provisions in Chapters V and sections such as Articles 54–57 and Articles 66–67, which outline specific procurement rules for the defense and security forces [4]. This shift has undermined accountability and increased the risk of financial mismanagement in defense spending, further eroding public trust in the sector.

Given the confidentiality of the procurement procedures [1] it is unlikely that the acquisition plan is subject to any oversight. Given that the National Assembly was dissolved, there is no other legislative organ that could ensure the external oversight. [2].

Nigeria has a process for acquisition planning, which is basically governed by the Public Procurement Act (PPA) of 2007 [1]. The PPA 2007 aims to ensure transparency, accountability, and value for money in public procurement. The process of acquisition plaining in the Armed Forces of Nigeria originates from each of the Services – Army, Navy, Airforce – but overall integrated under the budget of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD’s major function is the formulation and execution of the national defence policy and the planning of military expenditure. The MoD is striving to ensure synergy in the procurement process by the Tri-Services to enhance efficiency and sufficiency [2]. Nonetheless, external scrutiny over the defence procurement remains extremely limited, even though the Service Chiefs are invited to the National Assembly to defend their budgets. Some military expenditures have been excluded from the appropriations law on the grounds of national security. Nearly all defence contracts and budgets and considers any broadly defined security-related matter ‘secret’ by definition [3].
Moreover, in practice, explicit documented links between specific procurement decisions and the national defence strategy are not publicly made available. Much of the defence procurement process remains classified, which limits transparency on whether acquisitions are aligned with stated defence objectives [3].

Regarding acquisition planning, the Nigerian public has very limited access to information about the process itself, because a great deal of information is excluded from publication, or not provided upon request. In Nigeria, national security related procurements are granted special exceptions or waivers in the law, with audit of procurement of “Special Purpose Goods” such as armaments, ammunition, mechanical, electrical equipment or other things for the use of the Armed Forces, being subjected to the President’s discretion [1] [2]. Much of what the public get to know about defence acquisition is during the appearance of the Service Chiefs to defend their budgets before the National Assembly. At other times, details emerge when the media report such acquisition. the Ministry of Defence (MOD) ranks among the agencies least compliant with the 2011 Freedom of Information (FOI) Act [3].

The Parliament through its Senate and House of Representatives’ Committees on Defence undertake oversight of the activities of the Ministry, Departments and Agencies within its remit such as; the committee Ministry of Defence (MOD), Defence Headquarters (DHQ), Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Research and Development Bureau (DRDB), Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC), National Defence College (NDC), Defence Space Agency (DSA), etc. They exercise such oversight functions through conduct of public hearings, oversight visits to locations and facilities of interests, meetings with heads of the agencies and budget hearing sessions [2]. These oversight functions assess basic performance, but fail to assess long-term outcomes or the legitimacy of plans. In June 2024, for instance, the Senate Committee on Defence visited the Defence Headquarters so that they will “be adequately briefed on the implementation of the 2022 and 2023 Appropriations, including the supplementary budget passed and approved by the National Assembly, respectively, for Defence” [2].

The Senegal Public Procurement Code governs public tenders, budgeting, and contract awards but defence and security contracts are specifically exempt from competitive bidding and scrutiny processes, permitting direct awards for sensitive requirements. This weakens the planning cycle integrity—since defence purchases may bypass standard public procurement processes. [1] Moreover, a Multi Year Programme for Army Expenditure for the 2020-2022 period exist which mentions general planned procurement and some link to strategic requirement. However, no document was published since 2022 which shows tat defence acquisitionsdo not seem systematically derived from strategic planning documents. [2] The MOD has a standard administration, but there’s no publicly available organisational chart showing separate, permanent budget, procurement, and finance directorates aligned under a unified acquisition strategy. [3]

Most defence procurement are exempt from rules of the public procurement code which restricts the transparency of the procurement processes. [1] Some information is included in the Multi Year Programme for Army Expenditure for the 2020-2022 but the document is outdated . [2]

Senegal has formal external oversight mechanisms over defence acquisition—including parliamentary review through committees (especially the the Finance Committee) and ARCOP audits (ARCOP replaces ARMP in 2023). Parliamentary control is technically authorised but rarely exercised. Committees’s activity is infrequent as defence ministry approval is needed for official witnesses to appear. Moreover, audits cover only a subset of procurement, not the entire acquisition cycle. ARCOP produces findings and recommendations, although it does not challenge the strategic merit of contracts, only their administrative correctness. [2] Finally, defence and security purchases frequently escape full scrutiny, as procurement regulations allow exemptions for national security or intelligence-related contracts . [3]

South Africa’s armaments acquisition process is managed by Armscor on behalf of the Department of Defence as guided by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act, 2003. [1] The Act requires the establishment of a system for evaluating acquisitions which is transparent and fair. This is operationalised through a number of policies including the Policy on the Acquisition of Armaments in the Department of Defence, and Armscor-specific supply-chain management policies. [2] Acquisitions are financed from the Special Defence Account, established by the Special Defence Account Act, which is used to purchase armaments separate from the General Defence Account used for the purchase of commercially available goods and services. [3] Acquisition planning and budgeting is informed by the Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan as informed by force requirements drawing from the Defence Review setting out the military’s high-level strategic planning. This comprehensive acquisition system establishes a clear cycle for planning, budgeting and purchases which links acquisitions to defence strategy.

Acquisitions processes are not published in the public domain by the Department of Defence, but information on the broad acquisition processes is available from various sources in civil society and academic publishing. Neither Armscor nor the Department of Defence published acquisition details such as the justification of purchases. Likewise, budget allocations to the Special Defence Account are not itemised, meaning that only high-level budget allocations are publicly provided. [1] [2].

Oversight of acquisitions is performed by a range of bodies including Defence Secretariat, and various parliamentary committees including the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, and the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans. The Auditor-General of South Africa likewise has a mandate which includes external audit of Department of Defence accounts. [1] The Public Protector, an independent ombuds with the power to investigate any allegations of impropriety in government, has similarly investigated armaments acquisitions. Parliamentary oversight generally focuses on assessing performance and regulatory compliance, and engagement around the legitimacy and value of acquisitions is more limited. [2]

At the national level, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018 outlines the process of acquisition planning. For example, Section 24(1) states that “A Procuring Entity shall be responsible for the management of all Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets activities within its approved budget” [1]. In addition, Section 24 [2] adds that “Notwithstanding the provision of sub-section one (1) above, the Authority shall have power to transfer the procuring responsibility of a procuring entity to another procuring entity or procuring agent in the event of delay or in such other instances as may be prescribed.” [2]. At the ministry level, the SPLA White Paper on Defence of 2008 give ministries the mandate to establish a Logistics Policy Guideline internally to deal with acquisition. Despite the legislation in place, the process of acquisition is not clear particularly the planning process. This can be attributed to the challenges of sanctions that the country is currently facing from the Security Council. The level of oversight especially during the planning stage is not available publicly [3]. It is worth noting that under chapter 4 of the R-ARCSS, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act (PPDAA) 2018 has been amended under the R-ARCSS to conform to its provision as well as regional and international best practices.

Section 36 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018 speaks specifically on the procurement undertaken by defence and security departments. It acknowledges the unique nature of defence and security procurement but outlines measures aimed at promoting procurement. Section 36 (5) states that “Any document, notification, decision or any other information generated in the course of a Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Process and communicated as required by this Act, including in connection with challenge and appeal proceedings under this Act or in the course of a meeting, or forming part of the record of Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Processes under this Act, shall be in a form that provides a record of the content of the information and that is accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference” [1]. However, due to the UN sanctions imposed on South Sudan on arms procurement, the process has remained opaque and not transparent [2].

The National Legislative committee on Defence and Veteran Affairs is established to provide external oversight. However, the extent to which it examines acquisition beyond evaluating the budget is not clear. [1] There is also no relevant information from the media indicating that the committee conducted a detailed oversight on the Ministry [2]. Similarly, a look at the annual comprehensive report of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly for 2021-2022 and 2022 to 2023 which gives a detailed summary of the activities of specialised committees does not show any audit or oversight activities on the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs.

Uganda has a formal acquisition planning framework for defence, with defined roles for budget, procurement, and finance functions. Official defence policy documents and ministerial policy statements articulate the broad alignment of budget allocations with defence strategy objectives, such as force modernization and capacity-building [1]. There are also distinct department to aid internal procurement and scrutiny within the ministry. For example, the Department of Logistics and Procurement handles the procurement of military equipment and supplies, while the Department of Finance and Administration provides oversight to ensure that procurement processes adhere to the necessary regulations and transparency standards [2].
The main limitation of these systems is that there is no data on the specific links between individual procurement decisions and strategic goals (e.g., the selection of equipment tied to specific defence scenarios) are not explicitly disclosed.

The public has access to some information about the process of acquisition planning. For example, the UPDF has published the pre-qualification of providers for supplies, services, and works for two financial years—2024-25 and 2025-26—under MD/SUPLS/WKS/SVCS/00210. [1] [2] However, the details of these publications are only shared with selected bidders, limiting broader public access to procurement information. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) presents annual budgets and ministerial policy statements to Parliament, which are publicly accessible [3]. These documents provide an overview of defence spending and policy priorities, including budget allocations and planned activities. While this contributes to a degree of transparency, these documents often lack detailed insights into specific procurement processes and acquisition planning within the defence sector.
Furthermore, defence procurements are frequently classified due to national security considerations, restricting transparency. This classification creates gaps in public oversight, as critical information about procurement processes, supplier selection, and contract execution remains inaccessible to the general public.
Thus, while there are some publicly available procurement-related documents, significant gaps in transparency persist, particularly concerning classified defence procurements and the limited scope of publicly accessible details on acquisition planning.

While Uganda’s oversight mechanisms for defence procurement are formally well-structured, their effectiveness in practice is significantly constrained. The Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs is mandated to scrutinize and approve the annual budgets of the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA). In theory, this includes the power to examine procurement plans and assess whether acquisitions align with national defence priorities and fiscal responsibility [1]. However, the actual depth of this oversight is often limited. Much of the defence budget is classified, which restricts parliamentary access to critical information necessary for thorough scrutiny. As a result, oversight tends to focus more on headline figures than on detailed assessments of procurement necessity or cost-effectiveness.
Similarly, the Auditor General’s Office is responsible for auditing the financial transactions and plans of the MoDVA. Although its mandate includes ensuring legality, efficiency, and alignment with broader frameworks, the jurisdiction of the Auditor General is also limited when it comes to classified defence procurement. While some Auditor General reports have noted irregularities in defence spending, they seldom address the long-term legitimacy or strategic feasibility of acquisition plans, largely due to these limitations [2][3].

There is an existing act which provides with what needs to be done on public procurement; it is highlighted in the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, Chapter 22:23, section 1-5 [1]. Section 31(1) of the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act [Chapter 10:31] emphasise that all public entities have to comply with good governance on the acquisition planning process and the acquisition planning process is not separated from the budget [2]. However, the Ministry of Defence does not publish strategic defence reviews or white papers; the defence strategy is treated as confidential [3], which makes challenging to assess whether purchases respond to specific strategic needs. This implies that public, explicit links between specific acquisitions and defence strategy are rare or absent.

While there is a clear laid out procedure on what must be done on acquisition, it is not clear how the defence sector acquires the equipment from countries such as China [1]. It is not clear how they do their acquisition process because the process is hidden from public accounts scrutiny [1] [2]. Acquisition is clear but is not transparent on the security sector institutions. In most cases, the public only finds out about acquisition when the things would have been bought; for example, cars for the officers [3]. The acquisition planning is not available on the Ministry of Defence website.

There is external oversight of military plans done by the National Security Council (NSC) comprised of the president, vice president and select ministers, as well as service chiefs as ex-officio members [1]. Since the NSC comprises the Minister of Finance, it has an external oversight of basic performance matters such as budgetary approval and defence equipment purchases, but does not assess long-term outcomes or the legitimacy of acquisition plans [2].
In addition, the National Defence Council, established under Section 209 of the Constitution, brings together the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services, and the Central Intelligence Organisation to advise the President on defence policy [2]. Parliament is not involved in oversight of acquisition planning, as there is no evidence that the Defence, Home Affairs and Security Services Portfolio Committee review or approve acquisition plans or major procurement decisions [3].