There is an Armed Forces Police Service within the national police force. This unit ensures compliance with laws and regulations within the Defense and Security Forces. It records offences committed by its personnel. It is responsible for policing Beninese contingents engaged in overseas operations [1] [2]. This unit has the jurisdiction to police corruption cases and /or organised crime within the defence and security sector, but there is no public information about its activities [2].

These police functions are independent of the bodies they investigate [1]. As a police unit, it does not report hierarchically to the military high command. The decree on the Police force’s organization placed this unit under the direction of the Judicial Police [2]. Its budget is incorporated into the general police budget. Military officers therefore have no direct influence over it [1].

Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and there is no evidence of undue political influence. For example, in 2024, 14 servicemen, all from the navy, were tried by the Cour de Répression des Infractions Économiques et du Terrorisme (CRIET) for abuse of office, handling stolen goods and money laundering [1]. Another trial concerns 5 military personnel prosecuted before the CRIET for “abuse of office and theft of equipment” [2]. There is no evidence of political or other influence on these proceedings [1].

There is an anti-corruption brigade created to fight corruption within state institutions, including the army and the police. In addition, a unit called Military Police exists within the army and its mission is to fight corruption and organizsed crime within the army. [1] [2] [3] [4]

An interview revealed that these policing institutions are often exposed to interference from the authorities they are supposed to control. The Anti-Corruption Brigade is heavily dependent on the executive, which can have a direct impact on its work [1] [2] [3]. As for the military police unit, it is incorporated into the army and is under the command of officers who are potentially likely to be the subject of its work [2][3].

Testimonies from the Anti-Corruption Brigade attest that there are cases that are the subject of serious investigations, but most of the time, they do not givle risead to prosecutions[1]. This leaves a serious gap in policing effectiveness of corruption and organised crime within the defence and security sector. Moreover, some cases are untouchable because of the importance of the personalities and interests involved [2].

At the national level, the department responsible for investigating corruption and organised crime is the Ppolice. [1] In this context, we have the Judicial Police Directorate based at DGSN. This department of the DGSN deals with organised criminal activities, corruption and related offences, such as embezzlement, taking interests and money laundering. There is also the National Central Bureau of Interpol, which is attached to the cabinet of the DGSN. DGSN does not conduct investigations into cases of corruption within the defence institution [2]. That said, it should be noted that the judicial police cannot investigate corruption issues or organised crime within the defence services unless they are exceptionally authorised by the Presidency. When such cases occur, the investigation could be carried out by the military police (which is part of the MINDEF) or the National Gendarmerie (also part of MINDEF). In this case, the prosecution is conducted by the military tribunal or the Special Criminal Court, not the civilian court.

The services responsible for fighting organised crime and corruption are not fully independent. At national level, the Judicial Police Directorate, the National Central Bureau of Interpol and the Border Police all operate under the DGSN, and their budgets depend on their hierarchy.[1] In terms of activities, these services primarily handle complaints, denunciations, and arrests under the authority of the public prosecutor. In addition, the fact that the departments responsible for combating organised crime and corruption are attached to the DGSN, a department that reports directly to the Presidency, means that there is interference from the executive, specifically the Presidency of the Republic.[2] Cases of corruption within the defence services are dealt with by the military police, the national gendarmerie, and units responsible for Integrity within the MINDEF.

In general, the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases within defence institutions are not regular. Many high-ranking officials are involved in embezzlement or corruption practices and have never faced prosecution. However, the former Minister of Defence, Egard Alain Mebe Ngoh, was investigated by several units, including some wihtin the national police. In January 2023, he was jailed and sentenced to 30 years by the Special Criminal Court for “detention for misappropriation of public funds, corruption, taking interests, and money laundering”. The amount of funds he is accused of embezzling is 23 billion XAF (30 million UK pounds). Nonetheless, corruption investigations and prosecution within defence institutions remain inconsistent. Some evidences also suggests that political considerations influenced the prosecution of the former Minister of Defence.[1][2]

The Anti-Corruption Brigade (BLC), which reports to the Ministry of Justice, is responsible for investigating corruption at the national level, including in public institutions. It can therefore, in theory, conduct investigations involving defence force personnel, but there is no information to confirm this [1]. In addition, the National Gendarmerie (including the Provost Brigade, the military police component) is empowered to investigate offences committed by military personnel, including corruption offences within the armed forces [2].

The BLC’s budget, staffing and tasks are approved by the Ministry of Justice and, ultimately, through the government budget process, over which the executive authorities can exert considerable influence. [1] Furthermore, the Preventive Brigade, as a military institution, does not enjoy formal independence and is subject to the direction, funding decisions and personnel control of the Ministry of Defence and the President. [2]

There is very little evidence of cases that have been investigated and/or prosecuted by these units. Two gendarmes were prosecuted for corruption by the military court in 2021, but no mention of these two units appears in the press article [1].

The Military Police (MP) of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) is a specialised branch within the military that is responsible for maintaining discipline, law, and order among military personnel. Their functions also include conducting investigations into criminal activities involving military personnel. This can include crimes such as theft, assault, smuggling, and other offences that violate military law. The MP may also work in conjunction with civilian law enforcement agencies when military personnel are involved in crimes outside military jurisdiction. The Inspector General of the Ghana Armed Forces is also empowered to investigate corruption and organised crime within the Ghana Armed Forces. The Department has established working relations with state bodies like The Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO)(1) and the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)(2).

The Military Police (MP) of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) is not entirely independent in the performance of its functions as it operates within the established military chain of command. This means that its actions and decisions are subject to approval and oversight by higher-ranking officers. The necessity to ‘follow orders from the top’ can influence the scope and direction of its activities (1). The Inspector General of the Ghana Armed Forces (IGAF) is also expected to act with a degree of independence in carrying out inspections and investigations. (3) However, they operate within the established chain of command, which means they are subordinate to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and ultimately to the Minister of Defence and the President of Ghana, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This structure limits the IGAF’s independence as they must report to and take directives from their superiors. Their actions are also subject to review and oversight by higher military authorities, particularly the CDS. This internal oversight can influence the IGAF’s decisions and actions, potentially limiting their autonomy (2).

Cases are investigated and prosecuted through formal channels, and while the possibility of undue political influence, especially by the President who is also the Commander-in-Chief, is recognised as possible, there has not been any report or evidence of the exercise of such undue influence over investigative processes. (1) (2) (3).

Kenya Defence Forces maintain a specialised policing unit—the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Military Police Directorate—tasked with enforcing discipline and investigating internal misconduct, including corruption and organised crime. Sections 137,138,139 of the KDF Act provide the powers to arrest offenders, search by other persons upon arrest and conditions for arrests. Section 3 of KDF Act also provides the guiding principles for the defence forces, among these are principles on preventing corruption and promoting and practising transparency and accountability. Section 124 speaks to corruption and economic crimes[1], stipulating that ‘ (1) A person subject to this Act who— (a) engages in corruption, malpractices, or any act or omission while in the course of duty for selfish purposes or gains; or (b) causes loss by their dereliction of duty, commits an offence and shall, upon conviction, be punished, as the circumstances may require, in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code (Cap. 63) [2], the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 (No. 3 of 2003) the law relating to public procurement and disposal of public property, or any other written law. (2) The offence under subsection (1) shall be triable in the civil courts’ [3].
Clarification:
The Military Police Directorate serves as the internal enforcement arm, with legal authority to investigate wrongdoing within KDF ranks. Although “organized crime” is not explicitly defined in the KDF Act, the powers granted in these sections extend to addressing complex internal misconduct [1].

The Kenya Defence Force has an independent Director of Military Prosecution (DMP) established under section 213 of the Kenya Defence Force Act. The DMP is appointed by the Defence Council, and can direct military police to investigate and prosecute criminal conduct independently [1]. The DMP’s budget falls under the broader military budget managed by the Ministry of Defence and National Treasury. While the DMP proposes its budget requirements, final allocations require approval from both the Ministry of Defence and National Assembly [2]. This process maintains financial oversight while preserving the DMP’s prosecutorial independence under the Kenya Defence Forces Act [1].
Furthermore, there is low likelihood that interference from military commanders or politicians has occurred in the DMP’s prosecutorial decisions [3].

The Kenya Defence Forces have acknowledged incidents of bribery within their ranks, particularly in relation to recruitment. Officers have been investigated and prosecuted by courts-martial for such offences [1, 2, 3].
However, there is no evidence that allegations involving organised crime or resource-related profiteering have led to prosecutions within the defence services [4]. This suggests investigations focus mainly on low-level offences rather than systemic or organised criminal activity.
Organized Crime Index (2023) underscores Kenya’s high level of organised crime, particularly in financial, cyber, and arms-trafficking sectors, indicating a pervasive, organised criminal ecosystem.
However, there is no indication that defence institutions are being actively policed or prosecuted for involvement in those systemic criminal activities [5].

No policing function is exercised over the defence sector to investigate corruption or organised crime. Rather, the police have a unit called the Professional Standard Division (PSD) that investigates the professional conduct of police officers who breach the SOP. Sometimes, the PSD is called to intervene in other paramilitary, cases such as the Arms Commission, elsewhere, but not the Armed Forces of Liberia[1][2].

No policing function is exercised over the defence sector to investigate corruption or organised crime.[1][2] Therefore, this indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

No policing function is exercised over the defence sector to investigate corruption or organised crime.[1][2] Therefore, this indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

The unit in charge of organised crime and corruption is the Anti-Corruption Unit of the Ministry of National Defence [1]. According to the Ministry’s “Internal Anti-Corruption Policy” Plan, it is up to this unit to monitor the treatment and development, at the judicial, disciplinary and statutory level, of cases of corruption identified at the Ministry and at the Army [2]. It is then up to the Unit to seize the institutions of the anti-corruption system. The national police cannot investigate directly when the accused is a soldier. He must have a prosecution order from the military hierarchy. And in this case, it is a mixed investigation made up of police, gendarmes and soldiers. And usually, the investigation is entrusted to the gendarmes [3].

In cases of proven corruption (that is to say when the evidence is sufficient following scandals for example), it is up to the Anti-Corruption Unit within the armed forces to file a complaint with the Anti-Corruption Office (BIANCO) and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (PAC). These two entities operate completely independently because they are not part of the Ministry of Defense. They have their own surveys and their own budgets [1]. However, the Anti-Corruption Unit may be subject to strong influence from high-ranking military officers or the executive branch because it works under the supervision of the ministry hierarchy [2].

There are cases of prosecutions of members of the armed forces for corruption, but these are generally rare [1] [2]. They are mainly high-profile cases, giving the impression that only cases revealed by the press are concerned. Cases handled internally are not made public and do not always seem to be prosecuted. Generally, due influence exists in the decision-making process and sometimes hinders certain investigations.

In Mali, there is no public evidence of the existence of an officially designated unit within the national police specifically responsible for combating organised crime and corruption within the defence services, or of an equivalent unit attached to the military police.
Some units exist but have a general reach, such as the police inspectorate, which is responsible for investigating organised delinquency and corruption. Since the militarisation of the police in 2022, it may now operate in the defence sector, but no clear evidence of this exists. [1][2] Moreover, criminal matters and offences committed by the military are handled by the gendarmerie and military police, which report to the military prosecutor. The military court has jurisdiction over cases involving them. In this regard, the body responsible for conducting investigations into crimes involving military personnel remains the National Gendarmerie.[3]

Since no evidence of an effective policing function being exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime has been found, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.[1][2][3][4]

There are some cases of corruption being investigated in the defence sector, but no mention of a spefic policy function that investigate the defence services, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable.
While there is a general trend towards internal management of cases involving breaches by the defence and security forces, there are times when, given the complexity or scope of the case, it is prosecuted and brought to public attention. Occasionally, cases of theft, embezzlement of public funds, kidnapping, and disappearance are brought before the courts. For example, on Tuesday 17 May 2022, the Supreme Court of Mali issued a committal order against three generals of the Armed Forces for Defence and Security in connection with the military equipment affair.[1][2][3][4]

The General Inspectorate of Defence is a body of the Ministry of National Defence responsible for supervising and controlling the correct administration of human, material and financial resources. It has the power to investigate the Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Forces, and other bodies or services integrated into the Ministry of National Defence, including bodies under the supervision of the Minister of National Defence. The Inspectorate can investigate organised crime and corruption in both institutions [1, 2, 3]. It carries out administrative and operational inspection of human Resources, material resources; financial resources, and operational inspection [4]. The Inspectorate-General for National Defence (IGND), through inspections, audits, inquiries, investigations and expert assessments, can detect cases of corruption or organised crime in the institution. It also can execute the initial investigation to institute disciplinary administrative proceedings internally. Where there is a need for criminal proceedings, it refers the case to the Attorney General’s Office and the Central Office for Combating Corruption for criminal liability. However, the Inspectorate does not have policing functions, but it can refer cases to the Attorney General’s office [1, 2, 3]. For instance, in November 2023, the Inspectors of the Army, Air Force and Navy Branches of Mozambique met at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Mozambique to evaluate and ensure the exercise of the mission of inspection, control and evaluation of the performance of military units, bodies and military education establishments of the Armed Forces of Mozambique [5].

The independence of the General Inspectorate of Defence is established in formal terms, but the appointment of the Inspector General depends on the Minister of National Defence [1, 2], while the operating budget is provided by the Ministry of Defence. These interdependencties can reduce its efficiency and independence, especially when it comes to inspecting the institution’s superstructure. The Inspectorate of the Armed Forces is part of the Organic structure of the Ministry of Defence meaning that it does not fully operate as an independent body as it lacks a separate budget [3].

The Inspectorate-General of Defence is legally independent and autonomous [1]. However, in practice, it is politically influenced, as the Minister of National Defence appoints the Inspector [2]. Additionally, it lacks a separate budget, relying on funds allocated to the Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Forces, which limits its ability to carry out inspections effectively [3]. Despite these constraints, in 2024, its investigations led to the arrest of three Armed Forces administration officials and four civilians from the construction sector for the misappropriation of over 40 million meticals, as part of an operation by the Central Office for Combating Corruption [4].

Internal oversight bodies within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior play critical roles in auditing and ensuring accountability within Niger’s security and defense forces. The Ministry of Defense’s internal oversight body, the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA/Inspection Générale des Armées), is responsible for ensuring that administrative, financial, and budgetary rules are properly applied and respected. Its mandate also includes promoting the transparent, efficient, and cost-effective management of public resources [1]. Similarly, the Ministry of Interior oversees the General Inspection of Security Services (IGSS), tasked with controlling the operations of the National Police, National Guard, and Civil Protection. Its mission includes not only administrative oversight but also enhancing professional skills and enforcing ethical conduct within the security services [2]. The IGSS’s responsibilities extend beyond basic administrative control, highlighting its broader role in ensuring compliance and integrity across these institutions [2]. The 2003 Military Penal Code [3] addresses corruption in article 228, which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary military police that report to Ministry of Defence (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (article 48) [3]. Nigerien authorities have strengthened existing institutions to combat organized crime and terrorism. These include the High Authority for the Fight against Corruption and Assimilated Offences (HALCIA), the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT), the National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF) [5], the National Commission on the Fight against Human Trafficking (CNCLTP) [4], and the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI). Notably, the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT) serves as Niger’s primary counterterrorism investigative entity [6]. However, it remains unclear whether these institutions, based on their mandates, possess the authority to conduct investigations directly within the security and defense institutions.

Evaluating the extent to which the policing functions of the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT) and the National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF) are subject to undue influence from top military officials or the executive remains challenging. The SCLCT reports to the General Director of the National Police (Directeur général de la Police Nationale) [1], while CENTIF is structured as an Independent Administrative Authority under the Minister of Finance, with financial autonomy and the ability to make autonomous decisions on matters within its competence [2]. These structural differences suggest that CENTIF operates with a higher degree of independence compared to SCLCT. However, since the military coup of July 26, 2023, the landscape of institutional autonomy has changed dramatically. The military regime’s consolidation of executive and administrative power introduces direct risks of undue influence on oversight bodies. The potential for interference is particularly acute for SCLCT, which is directly embedded in security governance and now operates within an increasingly authoritarian framework.
A particularly concerning development is the instrumentalization of the SCLCT to suppress political dissent, which diverts its focus from genuine oversight—particularly in relation to investigating corruption within the defence sector. A clear example of this is the arrest of Moussa Tchangari on December 3, 2024. Tchangari, a well-known human rights advocate and Secretary-General of the civil society organization Alternatives Espaces Citoyens (AEC), was abducted from his home by men in plain clothes identifying as police officers. He was incommunicado for nearly 48 hours before being found held by the SCLCT in Niamey, a body ostensibly designed to fight terrorism and organized crime [3]

Historical patterns of corruption and lack of accountability exist in Niger. The 2020 audit by the Inspector General of the Armed Forces exposed €116 million (76 billion CFA francs) in embezzled defense funds between 2014 and 2019, including cases of overbilling, fraudulent contracts, and non-delivered military equipment [1]. Despite the government’s initial response, which included a formal commitment to recover the stolen funds, no significant prosecutions or convictions were carried out, and the scandal gradually faded from public discourse [2] Organized crime networks generate significant revenue from drug, gold, and human trafficking, often collaborating with corrupt officials within the security sector. The UNODC report emphasizes that corruption within state institutions, including the security forces, has allowed organized crime to flourish [3]. In border areas such as Agadez, Nigerien authorities have historically opted for conflict management strategies rather than direct enforcement, indicating a lack of genuine policing of criminal networks. Following the July 26, 2023, military coup, the Nigerien government classified defense expenditures, removing them from public procurement laws and financial oversight [4]. This decision eliminates legal requirements for transparency and accountability in defense spending, making investigations into financial misconduct even less likely. Moreover since July 2023, Niger’s security situation has significantly deteriorated, reflecting possible the growing penetration of organized crime within state institutions, including the defense sector [5].
The provided examples demonstrate that there is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute corruption and organised crime within the defence service, even in the face of clear evidence.

There are systems and structures in place to deal with the infiltration of organised crime and corruption within the defence and security sector. Within the Armed Forces of Nigeria, the Military Police investigate crimes committed by military officers. For example, the Nigerian Army has a unit known as the Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) which collaborates with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in investigating and monitoring cases of corruption in the security sector [1]. However, the primary responsibility for investigating organised crimes and corruption rests outside the police force. It resides with the EFCC and the Independent and Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). Both the EFCC and the ICPC have in the past separately or jointly conducted investigation over allegations of corruption and organised crimes in the defence sector. As an example, the ICPC in September 2022 disclosed that some former military and security personnel are being investigated for embezzlement of funds allocated to security [2].

These policing functions are subject to considerable and regular undue influence from top military officials or the executive. In August 2019. Mr Hamisu Bala, a notorious billionaire kidnap kingpin, also known as Wadume, confessed that men of the Nigeria Army helped him escape on August 6 after he was arrested by the police [1]. There were several allegations that the Attorney-General of the Federation, Abubakar Malami and military authorities were shielding the soldiers by not court-martialling them. The Police was left with no option but drag the military to court to compel it to produce the army officers who aided the escape of Wadume [2]. Some soldiers led by Captain Tijjani Balarabe were named in the charges before the court [3].

In some instances, cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes. However, undue political influence is attempted which sometimes could prove effective at derailing prosecutions. For instance, a federal high court in Abuja in March 2020 ordered the production of the army officers who allegedly facilitated the escape of a suspected kidnap kingpin Mr Hamisu Bala, better known as Wadume [1]. The judge gave the order following an application filed by the police prosecution counsel, that the Nigerian Army had refused to release the suspected officers for prosecution despite a request by the police who is prosecuting them [2]. In May 2020, the Attorney-General of the Federation, came under serious under attack for allegedly shielding from trial about 10 soldiers named as accomplices in the kidnapping charges involving the kidnapping kingpin, Bala Hamisu [3]. In 2022, the military promoted Capt. Tijjani Balarabe, who was indicted by the police for involvement in the escape of a kidnap kingpin. The Executive Director, Centre for Anti-corruption and Open Leadership, Debo Adeniran, criticised the actions of the military authority, noting that “Balarabe and other soldiers indicted in the case did not deserve to be in service, let alone enjoy promotion” [4].

Within Senegal’s police, there’s a National Economic and Financial Crime Squad (BNLCEF). Its primary mandate is fighting economic crime and financial corruption involving public officials, including defence and security forces if necessary. [1] Moreover, the Provost brigade is a specialised unit within the Gendarmerie Nationale tasked with military policing functions over military personnel, It is responsible for conducting investigations, gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses. This brigade also investigates defence services, the army etc . The Brigade prevotal (Provost Brigade) exists and operates as the internal military police, tasked with law enforcement and discipline. [2]

The brigade prevotal is a National Gendarmerie unit made up of departmental gendarmes from traditional units, whose main mission is to provide military judicial police services to Senegalese armed forces stationed inside or outside the country. It also carries out general police, force support and intelligence missions. [1] The brigade prevotal is an internal unit of the defence and security forces of Senegal.The Direction Générale de la Police Nationale has an internal control brigade that monitors the behaviour of uniformed police officers on the public highway. [2] The Provost brigade is a unit that enforces discipline and rules in the performance of police and gendarmerie duties, including corruption. It is responsible for conducting investigations, gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses. This brigade also investigates defence services and the armed forces. [3] Although the military police brigade has specific missions in the military field, it does not operate independently. It is integrated into the gendarmerie hierarchy and is subjected to its directives.

Corruption cases are investigated and prosecuted but convinctions are rare. Evidence show occasional influence which prevent some people of being prosecuted. [1] However, there are examples of investigations being conducted. For instance, the Commander of the Territorial Gendarmerie issued an internal memo condemning the existence of funds opened in the name of the unit of the armed forces without any legal basis. Investigations were underway by the board of enquiry within the national gendarmerie, which would decide whether or not to dismiss the officers in question [2] . Moreover, a captain was arrested the day after an interview published in the Dakar Times in which he explained the reasons for his resignation and announced that he would be entering politic, threatening to expose the Army. He was arrested just as he was about to give an interview to Dakaractu. [3]

The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (the Hawks) functions as an independent directorate within the South African Police Service with a mandate to investigate organised crime, corruption and other serious offences. The organisation has previously investigated a range of corruption cases within the South African military including most recently allegations of kickbacks in relation to the procurement of personal protective equipment. [1] Issues of corruption and organised crime within the defence sector are likewise investigated by the military police established in terms of chapter 5 of the Defence Act and will refer serious corruption cases to the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation. [2]

In terms of the South African Police Service Act as amended in 2012, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation is independent, but it remains housed within the South African Police Service and reports to the Minister of Police. [1] The South African military police likewise remain a division within the broader reporting structure. Particularly in the case of the military police which forms the primary investigatory body for the defence sector, severe budget deficiencies undermine its effectiveness. In the 2022/2023 financial year, the military police division investigated 1,214 criminal cases from a backlog of 3,358 criminal cases, citing budgetary and capacity deficiencies as constraints. [2]

The severe lack of capacity within the military police to manage its case load illustrates the division’s lack of effectiveness in investigating cases. A limited number of ongoing corruption investigations within the Department of Defence are publicly disclosed and little is known about undue political influence in relation to these cases, but the department’s treatment of a case related to the former minister of defence is revealing of the relationship between the department and politicians. In the case of corruption charges brought against the former minister of defence accused of soliciting bribes in exchange for government contracts, the head of the Department of Defence’s legal division irregularly approved a request for state funding for the former minister’s legal defence. [1] Likewise, in the Commission of Enquiry into Allegations of State Capture found significant undue political interference in intelligence services with complicit individuals both engaging in corrupt activities while simultaneously undermining investigations into corrupt relationships. [2] No prosecutions have been achieved in this regard and there are limited cases of charges being brought against the perpetrators.

The South Sudan Police Act, 2009 does not give any mention of the role of the police in investigating corruption and organised crime withing the defence services. [1] There are other laws that could fill this gap such as the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Act, 2012 [2], The Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission Act, [3] and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018. However, none of these frameworks focus specifically on corruption in the defence and security sector. An analysis of local and regional media did not show any attempt to implement these laws against corrupt officers in the security sector [4].

There is no anti-corruption or anti-organised policing framework dedicated to the defence and security sector as stated in the previous sub-indicator (including in the South Sudan Police Act, 2009). Therefore, this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

There is no policing function as established in section 20 (A) and (B) [1][2][3][4]. It is difficult to measure the level of effectiveness if there is no clear policing on corruption and organised crime in the security sector. Therefore, this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

The Police Professional Standards Unit (PSU) investigates cases of crime including corruption among the police officers. The PSU is a police unit that investigates disciplinary cases committed by police officers and forwards the cases to different government institutions for action [1]. There are policing mechanisms in place to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services in Uganda. Some of the key bodies involved in investigating corruption and organised crime in the defence sector include the Uganda Police Force (UPF) which has a specialised unit, the Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID). This unit investigates corruption and organised crime cases, including those involving military personnel. Additionally, the Anti-Corruption division under CID is tasked with investigating corruption in various sectors, including government institutions like the military, although its scope may be limited due to resources and capacity [2].

Uganda’s policing mechanisms, designed to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services, face a significant challenge. The ability of top military figures to influence investigations, either directly or indirectly, poses a serious threat to the integrity of these processes. This interference can manifest in various ways, including the selective allocation of resources, the obstruction of investigations, or the manipulation of evidence [1][2].
Furthermore, the budgetary autonomy of these policing units can be compromised. If the executive or high-ranking military officials control or heavily influence the allocation of funds, they can effectively stifle investigations by limiting the resources available for them. This can involve cutting budgets, delaying disbursements, or diverting funds to other areas [3]. This financial leverage creates a situation where policing units may be hesitant to pursue investigations that could potentially implicate powerful figures within the defence establishment [4]. The fear of reprisal, whether through budget cuts or other forms of interference, can lead to self-censorship and a reluctance to challenge the status quo. Therefore, while formal structures may exist, the reality of potential interference in both their work and budgets casts a shadow over the true effectiveness of policing corruption within the defence services.

The Police Professional Standards Unit (PSU) only investigates cases of crime including corruption among the police officers. However, the police have been perceived as a corrupt institution [1][2].
The Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID) as a specialised unit within the Uganda Police Force responsible for investigating serious offenses, including corruption, organised crime and financial crimes, works closely with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) to deliver criminal justice outcomes [3]. In 2024, Uganda’s CID was ranked third most effective investigative agency in Africa, outperforming those in Ethiopia, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South Africa [4]. The ranking applauded CID’s ability to tackle organized crime and terrorism using intelligence networks and modern tools. Despite this recognition, Uganda continues to struggle with pervasive organized crime, such as cross-border human trafficking, arms smuggling, and illegal logging, driven in part by institutional weaknesses [5].
The ability of top military figures to influence investigations, either directly or indirectly, poses a serious threat to the integrity of these processes. This interference can manifest in various ways, including the selective allocation of resources, the obstruction of investigations, or the manipulation of evidence [2].

Within the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, the Military Police is mandated to arrest and investigate soldiers involved in various forms of misconduct and criminal activity within military installations, including cybercrime, white-collar crimes, and petty offences [1][2]. While these may overlap with corruption, not all are classified as such. For example, white-collar crimes may include document falsification or fraud, but explicit corruption cases may be handled differently depending on severity and chain of command. The Military Police includes a Special Investigations Branch (SIB), which has a primary focus on conducting investigations into complex or serious infractions [2].
At the battalion level, Regimental Police units operate with similar disciplinary functions but are restricted to their specific units [2]. Additional policing branches include the Air Force Police and the Prison Police, who serve the Air Force of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Prison Service respectively. Officers from these units receive training provided by the military in areas of policing and investigation, including training related to organised crime [2]. However, it remains unclear whether this training explicitly includes investigative techniques for internal corruption cases or whether jurisdiction over such cases is limited by command structures.

It is important to note that military police, and the special investigation branch exist in the military [1]. However, the challenge with military policing is that these units are controlled by the same senior officers who are sometimes implicated in criminal activities [2]. This creates a significant obstacle, as junior officers are reluctant to investigate their commanders, to whom they directly report, out of fear of retaliation or victimisation [1].
Undue influence in the defence sector is not made public and this practice happens in the military barracks and the execise of power and acceptance of the excesive of power by junior officers is perceived as discipline. None compliance to military orders, from senior officers, is viewed as indiscipline is punishable offence within the military.

The Military Police and the Special Investigations Branch (SIB) both operate under the Directorate of Military Police, which is responsible for overseeing military discipline and internal investigations across the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) [1][2]. The reporting procedure flows hierarchically: individual Military Police officers report to their Officer Commanding, who in turn reports to the Director of Military Police. This Director reports to the Army General in charge of Staffing, who then reports to the Army Commander, and ultimately to the Commander of the Defence Forces [1].

While this chain of command is formally established, its effectiveness is limited, particularly when it comes to investigating senior officers. Investigations can be compromised when high-ranking individuals have visible political affiliations [1][2]. The activities and findings of the SIB are not published publicly, making it difficult to verify concrete examples of their involvement in investigating or prosecuting corruption or organised crime cases within the military [1]. This lack of transparency further challenges efforts to assess the unit’s operational effectiveness.