A National Intelligence Control Commission is established to review the policies, administration and budget of the intelligence service. [1] It is an independent administrative authority composed of five members: two MPs from the majority and the minority; two judges of the Supreme Court, a high-ranking officer. But the National Intelligence Control Commission, in 2024, is still not installed. In addition to day-to-day operations, the intelligence services’ budget comes under secret funds and is handled according to the secret fund management procedure, which further impedes transparency and oversight of the intelligent functions. [2]
Based on the law, the members of the committee are authorized in their capacity to have access to information or elements of assessment that are protected but useful for the exercise of their functions. The agents of the commission are authorized or a national defence secret for the purpose of accessing the information and documents necessary for the performance of their missions. The members and agents of the commission shall be bound or shall respect the protected secrets for the facts, acts and information of which they may become aware in the exercise of their duties [1]. The National Commission for the Control of Information shall produce an annual report. This report is presented to the National Assembly Committee on Defence and Security [2]. The work of the committee is covered by national defence secrecy [3]. There are therefore no published conclusions. The commission meets at least once monthly [4].

In practice, the National Intelligence Control Commission, in 2024, is still not installed so there is no effective control of intelligence services and this indicators is marked Not Applicable. [1][2]

There is no form of oversight over the intelligence service has no form of control. [1]. Moreover, information from the interviews suggests that it is common to say that the Head of the National Intelligence Service manages the so called ‘slush fund’, i.e. the reserve of money used for illicit purposes. Unlike the army where we find ant least admittedly superficial breakdown of the Defence budget. At, the budget level of the national intelligence services, the budget appears in the finance law without any form of precision [1] [2]. This means that the amount of the budget allocated to the defence and security forces is never detailed. It is indicated in aggregate terms [3].

According to the Commission of Inquiry, among others, the National Intelligence Service is under the direct authority of the President and operates with impunity [1]. Thus, there is no independent oversight of the intelligence service’s policies, administration, and budgets, and this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The issue of controlling the policies, administration, and budgets of Cameroon’s intelligence services is very complex. These services exist, and in this respect, we can mention: the Territorial Surveillance Department, which is attached to the DGSN; the Directorate General of External Research (DGRE) the former SEDOC; the Directorate of Presidential Safety (DSP) and the intelligence service attached to the SED.[1] All these intelligence services depend on the budget of the President of the Republic for their operations and are also partly funded by SNH company. This is because they are located in institutions directly under the Presidency of the Republic. From that point onwards, since there is no control over the expenditure of this institution, there is consequently no control over these intelligence bodies. This lack of control can sometimes lead to opacity and settling of personal scores,[2] as we saw with the murder of journalist Martinez Mbani Zogo in January 2023 by DGRE.[3] In the end, there has been no parliamentary committee to investigate. In brief, the findings suggest that there is no independent body responsible for monitoring the spending of these intelligence services.

In Cameroon, there is no independent oversight of the intelligence service’s policies, administration, and budgets, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable.[1][2]

In Côte d’Ivoire, there is no institution responsible for overseeing the policies, administration and budgets of the intelligence services. Intelligence functions are attached to the military cabinet of the presidency. No part of Parliament or any committee has been tasked with evaluating and monitoring the appropriations allocated to the intelligence services [1][2].

There is no known institution that oversees the policies, administration and budgets of the intelligence services. No part of Parliament or any committee has been tasked with overseeing the intelligence services. This indicator is marked as not applicable. [1] [2]

The mandate of the Defence and Interior Committee of Parliament also includes considering the policies administration and budgets of the intelligence services. (1) (2) Following a review of its Standing Orders, Parliament of Ghana has created new committees including a Committee on Security and Intelligence. (3) This committee is vested with the powers to subject the intelligence services to independent and effective oversight. Section 258 (1) of the new standing orders dated 27 June 2023 states that “The Committee on Security and Intelligence shall have referred to it matters that relate to national security and intelligence and (b) has jurisdiction to investigate and enquire into the activities and administration of the ministries, departments and agencies under the mandate of the committee that may extend to the making of proposals for legislation. The Committee is also expected to examine the budget estimates of the National Security National Investigations Bureau, Research Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and any other agency dealing with national security and intelligence. (4) However, while the law grants these committees the authority to conduct oversight, beyond legal provisions, what is often lacking is the ability and attitude of members to fully exercise their mandated authority in practice (5).

The Defence and Interior Committee does not have real time regular access to all classified information owing to national security concerns.(1) This creates a gap in parliamentary oversight hence the creation of the new security and intelligence committee. The new Committee is however yet to be formed. (2) (3) (4)

The National Assembly Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations is designated to scrutinise the intelligence service’s policies, administration, and budgets. It functions without undue influence from the executive or the military. Its mandate is matched by the body’s powers and resources [1]. The Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations is established under the National Standing Orders No. 216.The mandate of the committee includes oversight, scrutiny of budgets, studying and reviewing legislation, investigating, inquiring into, and reporting on all matters relating to the mandate, management, activities, administration, operations, and estimates of the assigned ministries and departments. The Defence and Public Accounts Committee can also summon witnesses [2].
In practice, the Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations has demonstrated its independence. Thus, there is no likelihood of undue influence, as this committee summons senior officials and presses for accountability on sensitive issues [3, 4].

The National Assembly Departmental Committee on Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations exercises statutory oversight of the National Intelligence Service [1]. When handling sensitive matters, it may sit in camera under the Standing Orders/committee rules, and it reviews annual budget estimates that include NIS votes as part of the national budget cycle; in practice, detailed NIS briefings are taken behind closed doors, with public summary reports later tabled on the committee’s site [2].
Kenya operates an annual budget cycle, thus reason why parliament meets annually to review its expenditures, personnel issues and expenditures. While the Committee issues public reports on its work, such as Budget Implementation Oversight Reports and reviews of defence cooperation agreements, findings on intelligence oversight are rarely published and are generally limited to high-level summaries.

According to Chapter 5, Article 29, of the legislature, the Senate and House of Representatives have the power to enact laws, review and appeal them. The Liberian Legislature holds constitutional authority to oversee the country’s security and intelligence services. Article 34 of the Liberian Constitution grants the Legislature extensive powers to oversee security matters, including the ability to enact laws, approve budgets, and conduct oversight of the executive +L80+K82

While Liberia’s Constitution and legislative framework grant the Legislature oversight authority over security matters, in practice, access to classified information remains restricted. The National Security Agency (NSA) Act exempts the agency from disclosing financial operations, placing it beyond public scrutiny and limiting legislative oversight. This legal barrier hinders the Legislature’s ability to perform comprehensive oversight of intelligence activities.[1][2] The Legislature’s oversight of intelligence services is often reactive rather than proactive. Oversight activities are typically initiated in response to public outcry or specific incidents, rather than through systematic review processes. For instance, in November 2024, the Senate Committee on Defence, Intelligence, Security, and Veterans Affairs launched an investigation into the leakage of confidential Armed Forces of Liberia documents after they appeared on social media. Such instances highlight the ad hoc nature of legislative oversight.[3][4] These factors justify the assessment that the oversight function does not have regular access to classified information and may meet less frequently than every six months.

Theoretically the National Defense Committee of Parliament has the power to control the policies, administration and budgets of the intelligence service. [1][4] Since Parliamentarians are affiliated with political groups, the executive influences their interventions. Moreover, the military can also put pressure on politicians. [2][3]

Intelligence is always a matter for the military and is generally classified as “defense secret”[1]. As such, the Parliamentary Commission only has access to information declassified by the armed forces and Parliamentarians have minimal influence on the intelligence services [2]. In this case, it is difficult for Parliament to exercise oversight of the policies, administration and budgets of international services.

The Defence Committee is not able to supervise the activities, operations and functioning of the National State Security Agency (ANSE) – the country’s main intelligence service.[1] In fact, the Defence, Security and Civil Protection Commission of the National Transitional Council is theoretically responsible for monitoring the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services. In practice, however, it is clear that this committee has very little information about the administration and use of the intelligence services’ budget. While it is aware of the overall budget allocated to these services, details such as allocations, acts of disposal, and operations are known only through the national agency for state security. Consequently, the Committee is faced with serious restrictions in this area. Since the previous GDI, the situation has not changed; the control exercised by the National Assembly [2] still does not extend to the intelligence services, whose spending programmes are entirely obscure, creating blatant opportunities for corruption. The budget for the security and armed forces does not include the Directorate General of State Security (formerly DGSE and now ANSE). It is also still unclear whether the budget for the Military Security Directorate (DSM), the army’s intelligence service, is included within the overall defence budget. In any case, there has been no explicit mention of intelligence spending in recent defence budgets. Furthermore, Article 10 of the decree creating the National State Security Agency[3] states that the agency has financial autonomy and that the budget allocated to the National State Security Agency is included in the overall budget, although the constitution and internal regulations of the CNT allow the CNT, through the Defence and Security Commission, to review the policies, administration, and budgets of all structures related to defence and national security.

There is no independent oversight of the intelligence service’s policies, administration and budgets in Mali, so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. Indeed, in practice and depending on the context, the Defence, Security and Civil Protection Committee (CDSP) of the National Transitional Council cannot fully perform their oversight roles, either due to ignorance, influence, self-censorship, or simply imposition. The commission does not receive the details of the reports from the national state security agency and does not, in fact, have the powers to force it to do so.[1][2]

The Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Public Order has specific competence over the State’s Intelligence and Security Policies (SISE) [1]. This includes reviewing national and international security developments; measures taken by SISE in response; the general administrative and financial situation of SISE, and SISE’s needs in fulfilling its mission [1].
The Intelligence Service may provide information to the Assembly of the Republic before the Committee for Defence and Security Affairs on the general national and international situation and measures taken; phenomena of particular importance or other incidents; the general administrative and financial situation of SISE; and the general needs for carrying out its mission and duties [2]. The Intelligence Service shall not provide operational information on the protection of sources, means and methods of action; protection of third-party privacy rights; or information provided by foreign intelligence services [3]. However, the public documentation lacks clarity on how frequently these briefings or reports take place. It is established that SISE must provide details on general administration and finances, but there is no available record detailing the timing or regularity of such submissions to Parliament. SISE’s budget is openly published in the State Budget [7]. However, there’s no evidence of in-depth parliamentary scrutiny of that budget, suggesting oversight may be formal but limited.

The position of the MDM Party (i.e., Democratic Movement of Mozambique) regarding the Final Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to investigate the Situation of Public Debt, known as “Hidden Debts”, demonstrates that the Parliamentary Commission for Defence, Order and Public Security likely struggles with undue influence from the Executive in the discharge of its mandate. This commission is formed mainly by deputies of the governing party, which receives instructions from the executive to make viable or unviable processes in said commission [4, 5]. This influence was also confirmed in the interview with the deputy who was a member of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence, Security and Public Order, in the Mozambican Parliament [6].

The parliamentary oversight function has little or no influence over the Intelligence Services, because the legislation on Protection of State Secrets and Right to Information prohibits access to confidential information [1]. Although the committee has authority to review SISE’s budget (as part of the wider State Budget review), there is no public evidence of substantive debate, amendment, or reallocation. Budget reductions or changes, such as the cut in SISE’s 2025 budget from 3.5 billion to 459 million meticais, are recorded in official documents but appear to result from executive proposals rather than parliamentary initiative [4].
Furthermore, civil society and journalists do not have solid tools to scrutinise the Intelligence Services [2]. There is always a risk that Intelligence Sector personnel will resort to the legal principle of protecting State secrets to use privileged and sensitive information for personal purposes or those of specific interest groups [3].

Prior to the coup, the Security and Defence Committee (Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité) of the National Assembly served as an oversight body with a mandate to oversee security and defence policy [1]. Additionally, the General Inspection of Security Services (IGSS) and the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA) may also play oversight roles (2, 3,4). However, there is no evidence to suggest that these bodies have exercised oversight over Niger’s intelligence services. The military takeover on July 26, 2023, further constrained oversight capabilities, as it led to the dissolution of the National Assembly.

The effectiveness of oversight over Niger’s intelligence services is severely limited. While the Security and Defense Committee of the National Assembly was formally mandated to oversee security and defense policies, there is no evidence that it exercised oversight over intelligence services. The Inspectorate General of Security Services (IGSS) and the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA) may have a role in oversight, but there is no documented indication of their involvement in monitoring intelligence operations [1][2]. The dissolution of the National Assembly following the military coup on July 26, 2023, has further weakened any potential for independent scrutiny, effectively placing intelligence services under unregulated executive control.

The intelligence services are subject to effective oversight through the Senate and House Committees on National Security and Intelligence [1]. They are mandated to oversee public security, security and intelligence matters generally, matters relating to any organization or agency established by law for ensuring the security of the Federation and offices of the National Security Adviser (NSA), State Security Services (SSS) and National Intelligence Agency (NIA).
However, oversight remains largely ineffective in practice. Research finds that committee members seldom receive or act upon forensic reports, recommendations are frequently ignored, and hearings often fail to translate into accountability action or reform [1][2]. Despite repeated budget allocations and high-profile violations, legislative pressures fail to catalyse institutional change, suggesting unwillingness or incapacity to enforce oversight measures [1]. Reports also highlight political entanglement among executive and legislative elites that further erodes oversight capacity [3][4].

Intelligence agencies by design are secretive in nature and tasked with gathering information to bolster national security. Given this, their operations are including resources are usually not made public except budgetary allocations [1]. Apart from oversight of the budget of the intelligence agencies during budget defence, there is no available public report or evidence suggesting that the oversight function include having regular access to classified information. However, the legislators do summon the head of the military, intelligence and other security agencies over issues of national importance such as the deterioration of security in any part of the country [2.3].

Evidnece suggest that there is no system of scrutiny at the level of parliament which has considerable and regular influence in scrutinising the policies, administration and budgets of the intelligence service. The intelligence services do top secret work that is not known to everyone.[1] The Military Intelligence Chain (MIC) is responsible for centralising, exploiting, analysing and transmitting intelligence of military interest. The information they process is therefore highly sensitive, which is why there is no civilian oversight body for the intelligence services. [2]

Due to the lack of independent oversight of the intelligence service’s, this indicator is marked Non-Applicable. [1][2]

The Intelligence Services Oversight Act provides for the establishment of the Inspector-General of Intelligence as well as the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence which spans both houses of Parliament. [1] Findings emerging from the Commission of Enquiry into State Capture as well as a High-Level Review Panel Report on the State Security Agency, however, show significant levels of malfeasance and undue political influence in numerous sectors of the intelligence services. The Panel found that the Joint Standing Committee provided no effective oversight of intelligence services due to committee members’ inability to rise above party politics. [2] Findings from the State Capture Commission revealed that the State Security Agency had been heavily politicised and likewise irregularly interfered in factional party politics. [3] These reports as well as a a failure by the intelligence community in the build up to a major civil unrest event in July 2021, have brought the oversight of intelligence services into question. [4]

As documented in the High-Level Review Panel Report on the State Security Agency, oversight of intelligence services is ineffective despite the establishment of various oversight bodies. [1] Meetings of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence are closed and so little is known of their internal functioning. However, it is apparent that the committee convened significantly less frequently than most parliamentary committees during the height of state capture illustrating an unwillingness to provide oversight of intelligence services in part due to the politicisation of intelligence services and committee members protecting the party. [2] In recent years, Joint Standing Committee has become more active again. The Joint Standing Committee’s most recent annual report submitted to Parliament on its activities documents a range of challenges in effective oversight including the Auditor-General’s recurrent findings of irregularities combined with an inability to access all available documentation. Similarly, the report notes challenges with the Inspector-General of Intelligence carrying out their oversight function as well as slow implementation of recommendations stemming from the High-Level Panel as well as the State Capture Commission. [3]

The National Security Service is South Sudan’s intelligence service and falls under the oversight of the National Security and Public Order committee in the Transitional National Legislative Assembly. This committee is currently chaired by Simon Kun Puoch a member of the SPLM, and a majority of the committee members are drawn from the ruling party SPLM. [1] Article 72 of the South Sudan Constitution establishes specialised committees which are expected to independently provide oversight to public institutions including defence and security entities.[2] Therefore, legally, the oversight institutions that check the National Security Services ought to be independent. However, given the political nature of the legislative committee, which are dominated by members of the ruling party, there could be an undue influence especially if the issue touches on the executive.

Despite the existing laws, the effectiveness of the National Security and Public Order committee in the Transitional National Legislative Assembly to oversight the intelligence service is questionable. First it is the same Transitional Legislative Assembly that passed a controversial National Security Service Amendment Bill [1] which was seen by many observers as an attempt to broaden the powers of this agency despite allegations of abuse [2]. Equally important, a review of local and regional media publications between 2020 and 2024 did not indicate any form of investigation or scrutiny of the National Security Services by the oversight bodies [3]. Yet there are reports that the policies and administration of the National Security Services are questionable [4].

The Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs considers policies and budgets of the defence sector, including the intelligence services. The committee also approves the proposed budgets for classified expenditures. The committee is responsible for recommending that the Parliament approve the budget of the MoDVA, which incorporates the other intelligence services as well [1]. While there are some oversight mechanisms in place, the policies, administration, and budgets for intelligence services in Uganda are not subject to effective and independent oversight. Parliament’s scrutiny of intelligence service budgets is minimal and mostly occurs behind closed doors, with little public disclosure or analysis [2].
Moreover, the intelligence services in Uganda are heavily influenced by the executive branch. The intelligence sub-sector in Uganda still lags behind as far as adhering to democratic governance norms is concerned [3].Therefore the lack of independent oversight allows for potential abuses of power and mismanagement of resources.

The oversight of intelligence services presents a complex picture, balancing the need for security with the imperative of accountability. While formal mechanisms for oversight exist, their effectiveness is often questioned due to the inherent secrecy surrounding intelligence operations. The fact that the oversight function has access to classified information and convenes regularly to review budgets, expenditures, personnel, and policies indicates a formal commitment to scrutiny. However, the limited public dissemination of findings raises concerns about the transparency and efficacy of this oversight[1].
Classified information is restricted to a few members in the legislature and classified findings though published, are not accessible for public consumption. Much of the equipment used in military and intelligence operations is procured using classified expenditure budgets. These budgets are audited by the Auditor General and reviewed by the Parliamentary Defence and Internal Affairs Committee, though members told Privacy International that they have never seen a detailed report on how the classified expenditures are spent.[2]

The country’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) is under the office of the president and its budget is under the president office. Its establishment is in line with the constitution [1,2,3]. Under section 224 (2) of the Constitution, an intelligence service is established to serve the interests of the country [1]. In addition to the CIO, section 224 (1) allows an establishment of other intelligence units within the army, air force, the police and prisons.
However, in practice, the CIO does not function independently from the ruling political party. Sources indicate that the CIO reports not only to the government but also directly to ZANU-PF officials, thereby blurring the lines between state security functions and partisan interests [3][4][5]. Furthermore, there are no effective or independent oversight mechanisms over the CIO or other intelligence services. Their operations, budgetary allocations, and internal policies are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament or any independent watchdog institutions. Given its structural placement under the President’s Office and political entanglements, CIO’s mandate is highly vulnerable to undue influence [2].

Intelligence services’ operations, budgetary allocations, and internal policies are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament or any independent watchdog institutions [1][2][3]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.