In 2024, the press announced the receipt by the Beninese army of new drones to be used in the fight against terrorism in the north of the country. This is an operation financed by the European Union and costs €11.7 million [1]. It is therefore not a question of equipment acquired from the national budget. In 2023, the press also announced the receipt of three French-made helicopters. The amount of the operation has not been specified nor the source of financing [2]. In general, the government rarely publishes information on the purchase of equipment for the army. When it does so, it is essentially for the purpose of political communication to show citizens that the government is fighting terrorism [3].

Data on currentdefence purchases is generally not publicly accessible due to the sensitive and classified nature of defense-related procurement.This information is often kept confidential to protect national security and operational effectiveness. As it is already mentionned, except the programming document on defence, there is no much details on procurement of military equipment or other related expenditures. The idea behind is that disclosing detailed information about defence purchases could reveal military capabilities, vulnerabilities, or strategic priorities, which could be exploited by adversaries. And looking at the security fragilities in Benin, those information are really kept secret [1][2].

Defence purchases are rarely published. Occasionally, there are documents about food purchases in military camps. The total amount may be announced but there is no certainty about the accuracy of this amount. Defence secrecy is invoked at random, even when there is no justification for it. [1] [2]

Data is rarely published, and on the rare occasions that it is, it is aggregate information that is not easy to read [1] [2]. The website of the Defence forces and the army do not provide any information and budget sections [3].

Defence purchases are not usually disclosed publicly due to the high strategic confidentiality clause in public procurements. However, there is partial justification for this; indeed, the commission responsible for executing the public contract must produce a report upon receipt of the material.[1][2][3]

Data is sometimes published but not in an accessible format, such as reports provided when making a purchase or providing a service. Also, there are foreign defence media and wesbites, such as Janes Defence, which often reveal some purchases made by Cameroon’s defence sector. This is often based on undercover sources investigations.[1][2][3]

Very little communication occurs on equipment purchases. In some cases, their inauguration is shown (particularly patrol boats), but no information is provided on costs. For example, on 18 October 2024, the Ivorian navy received a patrol boat but the acquisition cost remains unknown [1, 2].

Data on acquisitions is not easily accessible [1, 2].

Security concerns play a major role in the secrecy surrounding military purchases. This is evidenced in the debate on the floor of the House of Parliament between the minority and majority in August 2020 over undertaking the discussion over the approval of USD 86 million for the purchase of armoured vehicles for GAF. (1) Generally, after the government receives the products, it informs the public about military expenditures without providing specific details, thereby undermining the purpose of maintaining secrecy during the budgetary approval stage. The military largely keeps its purchases secret. (2)

The MTEF of the MOD makes available various expenditures made by the MOD, but does not provide comprehensive details about actual purchases, considering the fact that it may contain the procurement processes to detail the number of tenderers and the particular tender who was given the contract acting in pursuant to Section 32(A) of the PPA, which may prohibit the disclosure of such information due to national security concerns. (1) The PPA website also advertises some defence sector procurements; however, it is limited to nonessential items needed by the MOD, which may not include military hardware and equipment.(2) There is, however, data on the year-by-year total purchases of the various priority areas on the MOD, as indicated in the MTEF, outlining expenditure trends for 2022 to 2024. (3)

Some defence purchases are not made public. Security or confidentiality is often given as a reason for such secrecy; this is partly, but not fully justified. Executive 2 of 2018 and the provisions of Section 138 of PPADA 2015 and 131 of PPADA regulations provide for the publication of information, including Beneficial Ownership for all contracts. However, the extent to which Defence publishes cannot be ascertained [1].
Separately, the CS Defence declined to reveal to parliament how KES 135 billion was spent. The Defence committee had raised queries concerning the 2022/23 Annual Performance Report submitted by his ministry. In defence, the CS noted that “Revealing such details in public, was a risk to the national security.” He added that he could only share such information to the National Security Council under the tutelage of the Commander-In-Chief [2]. During the Special Audit ordered by Parliament, the OAG experienced a number of challenges, while the Ministry of Defence’s management allowed the special audit team to review original documents on-site, copies were not given owing to confidentiality. Foodstuff contract agreements between the Ministry and suppliers only specified the market price per unit, omitting quantities. As a result, the special audit couldn’t determine the total value of claims made [3].

For some of the purchases and tenders available, there is a portal recently launched, the Public Procurement Information Portal. Very few defence purchases can be found mostly regarding public works [4].

PPRA’s Public Procurement Information Portal (PPIP) publishes data in accessible formats. They use the Open Contracting Data Standard, allowing interested parties to download data as Excel or JSON files. This enables the use of web scraping tools and supports various data formats [1]. It also disaggregates data showing how many tenders and contracts were undertaken by women, youth, and people with disabilities in accordance to the Kenyan law.
In August 2024, the PPRA launched an upgraded PPIP portal that is fully automated. The portal has approximately 800 active procurement entities out of 34,000 entities. The new site includes data visualisation tools allowing for data analysis [2].
However, regarding defence purchases, there is not much information available online. The tenders available correspond to public works.

The Ministry of National Defense and all other government agencies are required by the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (2010) to submit annual procurement plans to the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC). The Compliance summary can be found in the publicly available PPCC Annual Reports. The PPCC website offers general procurement information, including thresholds and authorised bidders, but sensitive defence material is limited due to national security concerns. Therefore, information on planning, suppliers selection and contract award, specifically in defence, is not available to the public.[1] Due to these exemptions, information regarding potential defence purchases is not systematically disclosed to the public. For instance, on the PPCC website, there is some information regarding BIDS, but not much information on defence procurement.[2]
While the PPCA requires procuring entities to prepare annual procurement plans, there is no obligation for these plans, especially those concerning defence procurement to be made publicly available. For instance, one of the quarterly reports from March 2022 outlines that the Ministry of National Defense (page 10) is non-compliant with quarterly reports.[3]

Moreover, the Liberian government has initiated the implementation of an Electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) System. This system aims to digitalise procurement processes, making information more accessible to the public. However, the initial rollout of the e-GP system focuses on select ministries and agencies, and it remains unclear when or if it will encompass defence-related procurements.[4]

Data on the procurement process is not released in a timely fashion. However, when data is released, it is not accessible, as the information available is dated to awards going back several years. Moreover, the available information is generally scanned documents, which limits the accessibility of data. Information on current awards is not available. Also, the website is difficult to navigate, unlike other institutional websites such as the National Election Commission website, which always involves updated information concerning elections.[1][2][3]

The introduction of the Electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) system has been piloted recently aiming to enhanc real-time data access and digitalising procurement processes. However, this is yet a system’s pilot programme including six public-sector organisations, the MoD is not part of it yet [4].

The ARMP always details the purchases of the various ministries including the Ministry of Defense. It makes public, in the reports it draws up, the calls for tenders as well as the suppliers who obtained the contract. There is a detailed description of the items purchased, the beneficial owners, the amounts [1]. For calls for tenders involving a large amount, the Ministry of Defense makes them public and calls on suppliers to acquire the relevant specifications allowing them to have details [2]. But certain purchases are not always known, especially if they are the subject of an international call for tenders or within the framework of bilateral cooperation agreements even if no security proof requires it [3].

The data is distributed in PDF format and comparisons are always possible, including the number of calls for tenders won by a company or the amounts of contracts that a company has won [1]. But certain purchases concluded within the framework of bilateral cooperation are not always known [2].

For confidentiality reasons, contracts for works, equipment and services are excluded from the scope of the public procurement code and are subject to a special framework.[1] The Ministry of Defence does not publish the list of actual defence purchases at the end of the year.

Data is rarely disclosed due to the exclusion of almost all defence markets from the public procurement code and transparency requirements.[1] However, some information on actual purchases is sometimes disclosed to the press.[2][3]

Defence purchases are rarely made public, even though aggregate total expenditures may be disclosed [1, 2]. The Sectoral Matrix of the Economic and Social Plan of the Ministry of Defence presents general and non-strategic aspects such as targets of a legal nature, civic service, and development of human resources, maintenance of military infrastructure, opening of military research centres, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian missions [3].

The general data are released in an accessible format: Government Five-Year Plan [1], General State Budget [2] and Economic and Social Plan [3], which are published in the Republic’s bulletins, the official publication of the Republic of Mozambique and available on the website of the Ministry of Economy and Finance [4]. These documents are in PDF format and with aggregated and systematised data manner.

In Niger, information on defence purchases is selectively disclosed. While many acquisitions are not systematically reported, some significant purchases are publicly announced [1][2][3]. For example, the arrival of Russian military instructors and equipment in April 2024 was officially reported by government sources and covered by national and international media [1]. However many defence purchases remain undisclosed, particularly those involving internal procurement or minor acquisitions and there is no consistent public disclosure policy. No formal security justification is usually provided for withholding information about non-disclosed purchases.

Data on military purchases in Niger is rarely, if ever, released in an accessible format, making public scrutiny nearly impossible. While the 2013 decree on defence and security procurement establishes an annual acquisition plan, Article 20 explicitly classifies it as “top secret,” preventing any form of public access [1]. Additionally, there are no public records, reports, or official databases detailing military acquisitions, contract values, or suppliers.The adoption of Ordinance No. 2024-05 on February 23, 2024, further entrenched opacity in military procurement by exempting defence-related purchases from standard procurement laws and financial oversight mechanisms [2]. This decree eliminates any remaining legal requirements for transparency in military spending, ensuring that details of arms acquisitions, defence contracts, and supplier agreements remain undisclosed.

Occasionally, some defence purchases in Nigeria are not made public. The details of what has been purchased, from whom, and for how much are usually kept confidential due to national security concerns [1]. Consequently, civil society organizations and international watchdogs have repeatedly called for greater transparency in Nigeria’s defence sector to mitigate against shady procurement processes, excessive secrecy, and inflated contracts [2]. Notwithstanding, military authorities sometimes have either inform the public of plans to acquire some defence platforms and weapons or declare same during induction of newly acquired hardware or assets [3]. In June 2024, the Nigerian air force stated that it will acquire 50 new aircraft to strengthen its capabilities against armed gangs and terrorists in Nigeria. The air platforms, expected to be receive in 2025 include 12 AH-1 attack helicopters, 24 M-346 combat planes, 12 AW109 multipurpose helicopters and a pair of Casa 295 transport aircraft [4].

Although the budget allocation of the MOD is usually accessible in the consolidate annual budget of Nigeria, specifics of defence spending is rarely in the public domain. Subjects such as technical specifications and price issues are largely undisclosed; neither is any information about the role and or payment to any intermediaries involved in transactions. Beneficial ownership information of companies involved in arms purchases is also not disclosed. Much of what is released by the military or available in the media is usually the company or corporation that produced the defence or security equipment, platform or hardware acquired. For instance, the Nigerian Army disclosed in 2021 that it has received 60 newly acquired Tracked Armoured Personnel Carriers, APC, manufactured in China by NORINCO to be deployed to theatre of operations [1]. Nigeria Imports from Brazil of arms and ammunition, parts and accessories were US$8.62 Thousand during 2023, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade [2].

In accordance with the provisions of Decree 2020-876 of March 25, 2020 supplementing Article 3 of Decree 2014 -1212 of September 22, 2014 on the Public Procurement Code, amended by Decree 2022-22 of January 7, 2020 which excludes from the scope of the Public Procurement Code certain works, supplies, provision of services and equipment carried out for the defence and security of Senegal. These are classified as “Secret Defense” which are incompatible with the advertising measures required by the Public Procurement Code. [1] Not all information relating to this schedule is made public, as it is sometimes classified as a defence secret. Only information deemed accessible, such as the purchase of vehicles, is made available to the public on the calls for tender website. But when it comes to armaments, the information is not available. the term ‘defence secrecy’, which is a multi-layered legal protection that restricts access to certain information of interest to the company to those authorised to know it [2] . Several influential businessmen involved in the sale of military equipment are busy finalizing contracts. The sine die postponement of the presidential elections should give them a reprieve [3] .

On the platform ”Portaille des Marché Publics du Sénégal”, you can consult Senegal’s Public Procurement Portal. Consult the Senegal Public Procurement Portal. Type of services. Balance – Retirement & Pensions. It is a central platform for suppliers and all other players interested in public procurement by the various ministries. [1] . However this platform publishes does not give details of the data of the actual defence purchases in some issues. The platform, Senegal Markets, helps public sector leaders modernise existing applications and working practices, accelerate digital service delivery, make smarter decisions based on real data, and improve technology skills within teams. Calls are also published there [2] .

Awarded tenders are published on Armscor’s website with restrictions on requirement specifications and at times without publishing the details of the awarded bidder or the bid amount often without justification. [1]

Procurement data lacks significant data and the format is largely inaccessible. [1]

There is no comprehensive detail of actual defence purchases. Despite the ongoing internal conflicts where presence of new weapons is being exhibited, there is no record of data on the procurement of defence equipment. However, the year -on -year expenditure on defence is available. For example, in 2023, South Sudan spent $1.1 billion which was a 78% increase from 2022 when the country increased its defence spending by 108% [1].

Despite the availability of data on the defence expenditure, there is rarely data released to the public and which is accessible on the actual purchases. While the government could conceal such information due to national security reasons, it does not instil much confidence to the public especially when senior military officers are implicated in corruption. For example, Shannon Mizzi, who works for The Sentry stated that “Many of South Sudan’s senior military leaders have amassed enormous wealth. Their posts provided easy access to government funds that appear to have financed luxurious lifestyles for relatives overseas in some instances.” [1]. One of the respondents also confirmed that accessing actual defence purchases is very difficult due to lack of publication of such data on mainstream media or the defence ministry’s website [2].

Defence purchases are not made public because most of the time these purchases fall under classified budget/expenditure. MoDVA does not publish aggregated figures for defence procurement each year for security reasons [1][2]. However, there are some bids and tenders available online in the MoD website, but information is not often released [3].

The absence of disaggregated information on UPDF expenditure, particularly concerning military purchases, is a significant obstacle to transparency and public accountability. The classification of military purchases, while justified on grounds of national security, effectively shields these expenditures from public scrutiny [1]. The argument that military purchases are classified due to national security concerns is understandable, but it should not preclude the provision of aggregated, anonymised, or otherwise redacted expenditure data. For instance, broad categories of spending, or percentages allocated to different areas, could be disclosed without compromising sensitive information. The lack of any disaggregated information fosters an environment where potential misuse of funds is difficult to detect and address. While classified information is necessary, a balance between security and transparency is essential for maintaining public trust and ensuring responsible use of public resources [2][3].

Defence actual purchases are not made public because they are part of classified information for security reasons [1]. Not only does the information about defence actual purchases not shared with the public but even soldiers within the barracks. The information about defence purchases is only privy to the Directorate of procurement [1]. Units in the military do not make requisitions, but they are made at Brigade level, but the brigade will not even know whether what they requested for will be purchased because purchasing such equipment and other expendables is at the discretion of the Defence procurement board and the Minister working with the commander defence forces [1]. Even parliament is not given information on the actual items to be purchased. Parliament is only given the total spending on defence equipment [2].

It is difficult for the public to access data on defence purchases from the defence forces, in particular from the military even though it is a requirement by law [1]. Thus while the Public Procurement Act and Disposal of Public Assets Act reveals that on request by parliament through the parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Home Affairs such information can be made public [2].