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62.

What procedures and standards are companies required to have – such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes – in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

62a. Formal policies

Score

SCORE: 75/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

62b. Consistent implementation

Score

SCORE: 75/100

Assessor Explanation

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The Public Procurement Code details the conditions and documents to be provided by bidders to a public procurement. For example, candidates must provide documents justifying their material, human, technical [1] and financial [2] capacities. The code also defines and prohibits conflict of interest, and this applies to subcontractors [3]. These standards are generally included in the main contracts and subcontracts throughout the supply chain and controlled by the National Directorate for the Control of Public Procurement (DNCMP) [4].

There is evidence that the official policies and laws are implemented for defence and security public procurement contracts which are not covered by secret. Details of those contracts are published online [1]. For those contracts covered by secret, we were not able to confirm with evidence, but people involved in the public procurement chain ensure that the procedures are respected [2][3].

There are no established laws or procedures on how the government chooses its suppliers or subcontractors. Suppliers are not required to sign anti-corruption clauses in their contracts with the government [1]. Moreover, most of the Burundian army’s major suppliers are well known for their involvement in major cases of corruption and economic embezzlement [1] [2].

There are no established laws or procedures on how the government chooses its suppliers or subcontractors so this indicator is marked Not Applicable. [1][2]

In fact, the laws and procedures for awarding public contracts between the government and suppliers or subcontractors do not exist. There is a lack of impartiality in the treatment of suppliers and subcontractors. This situation is due to the fact that the government unilaterally chooses which structure the contract will be awarded to, and this does not guarantee the effectiveness of the public procurement process. Likewise, the provisions envisaged to combat corruption are non-existent between the parties (government – suppliers or subcontractors).[1][2]

There are no such policies and laws as far as my knowledge in 62A.[1][2] Therefore, this is marked as Not Applicable.

There is general legislation on public procurement [1]. Article 37 of the Public Procurement Code stipulates that the selection of candidates must include ethical standards. Article 38 deals with conflicts of interest and Article 39 stipulates that companies that have been found guilty of violating public procurement regulations cannot be selected. The law does not mention the need for a formal and public anti-corruption programme. However, as procurement related to national defence and security needs is excluded under Article 7 of the Public Procurement Code, it is difficult to determine whether these rules apply to this sector and whether they exist and are enforced [1, 2, 3].

The concept of defence secrecy, the exclusion of contracts relating to national defence and security needs from the scope of the Public Procurement Code, and the influence of bodies attached to the Presidency constitute obstacles to the full implementation of the procedures [1, 2, 3].

The Public Procurement (Amendment) Act (PPA) sets out formal criteria for procuring products and equipment for any public institution. Section 22 of the PPA outlines the various criteria for considering a tender from an entity seeking to procure products or equipment for any government agency. This includes the ability to demonstrate professional, technical, and environmental capacity, as well as the ability to resource the process with financial and managerial capacity. Section 22(1,e) explicitly stipulates that the directors or officers submitting their bids must not have received a criminal conviction. The entity initiating the tender may need to establish pre-qualification or preselection criteria for the interested parties to meet. The section clearly states that an entity submitting false or inaccurate information may face disqualification from the process to prevent corruption and other discrepancies. Beyond the clearly stated requirements, the PPA does not specify minimum standards. 22(1,ba) for instance talks about meeting “ethical and other standards applicable in this country” without any reference to minimum standards(1) (2) (3).

There is consistency in the implementation of the Public Procurement Authority’s procedures under the Public Procurement (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 914) in the procurement of equipment and products; however, this only applies to non-essential military hardware. Sensitive and essential products and equipment do not usually go through the process of the PPA but largely single sourcing (1) (2).

Standard MoD tender documents require bidders to comply with Kenya’s anti-corruption laws and prevailing sanctions policies and procedures. This includes the Competition Act 2010, which addresses collusion. Applicants found to have engaged in collusive conduct will be disqualified, and criminal and/or civil sanctions may be imposed [1].
Section 55 of the PPDA outlines eligibility criteria for bidding. Bidders must comply with tax regulations and be free from convictions related to corruption, employment rule violations, modern slavery, or conflicts of interest [2]. The Bribery Act of 2016 establishes a Code of Ethics for public officials. Additionally, the PPRA is developing a specific code of ethics for procurement professionals [3].

A recent special audit revealed inconsistent implementation of policies and laws. Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) examined procurements undertaken from 2014-2018 touching on food stuffs. The OAG noted the Defence Department engaged non-prequalified suppliers, used irregular procurement methods and paid for goods not delivered [1]. Additionally, PPRA has also raised compliance issues regarding the MOD’s need to comply with sections 43(1) and 176(1)(a) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA) [2]. The special audit by the Auditor General reviewed 226 contracts relating to supply of food stuffs at the Ministry of Defence, 97 of which were procured directly from the MOD while 129 were procured by Service Lines/Barracks. Of the 97 at the MoD, 1 was through Direct procurement, 60 open tendering and 36 restricted tendering. The OAG established 18 firms out of the 36 in restricted tendering were awarded tenders despite not being on the Prequalified List of Suppliers [3].

The PPCC and PFM Laws are the formal processes in place to ensure fair and transparent procurement processes are carried out.[1][2] The PPCA outlines general principles for procurement activities, including:​

Integrity and Fairness: Procurement should be conducted in a manner that ensures fairness, transparency, and integrity.​
Eligibility Criteria: Suppliers are required to meet certain eligibility criteria, which may include legal and financial qualifications.​
Debarment Provisions: The Act provides for the debarment of suppliers who engage in fraudulent or corrupt practices.​

While these provisions aim to promote ethical conduct, the PPCA does not specifically require suppliers to have formal anti-corruption programs or codes of conduct in place.[3]

Foreign suppliers may participate in international bids for public procurement contracts. Overall, Liberia has a robust legal framework for public procurement that complies with most of the international best practices considered relevant by both the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework and Global Integrity.
However, defence procurement exemptions under Section 3(c) of the Act allow modifications to procurement procedures on national security grounds, limiting the extent to which compliance standards are enforced in practice.
Furthermore, there is a risk of procurement rules being flouted by public officials or procuring entities.[1]
In postwar Liberia, the issuing of contracts for road projects has been one of the main outcomes of the PPCC process.[2][3][4] More recently, controversies such as the 2024 biometric ID procurement scandal—although not defence-related—illustrate the persistence of compliance gaps and political interference in Liberia’s procurement system.[5] This suggests that procedures detailing how the government discriminates in its selection of suppliers and sub-contractors on the basis of their integrity is not consistently applied.

Decree No. 2006-343 establishing the Code of Ethics for Public Procurement stipulates in its article 17 that “any candidate and any holder of public contracts expressly undertake to renounce any practice of passive or active corruption or trafficking in influence. To this end, they refrain from promising, offering or granting, directly or through an intermediary, an undue advantage of any nature whatsoever to the staff of public procurement bodies for the purposes that they carry out refrain from performing an act in violation of its obligations, as defined by this Code” [1]. However, the legislation does not require suppliers and subcontractors to have an anti-corruption program [2]. Decree No. 2006-343 applies to suppliers and subcontractors of the Ministry of Defense.

Some suppliers, including those of the Ministry of Defense, have been prosecuted for corruption. The authorities responsible for regulating public markets are aware of this [1]. However, the implementation of this policy is not efficient. The pursuit of certain suppliers is always linked to political considerations [2][3]. Thus, companies close to the regime in place are not always subject to prosecution, unlike companies belonging to opposition figures.

There are laws and procedures that specify how the government makes distinctions in its selection of suppliers and subcontractors. Anti-corruption standards are included in the main contract or within subcontracts throughout the supply chain. Indeed, standards for combating corruption and conflicts of interest are included in the standard tender documents[1] in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Public Procurement Code. For open calls for tender, the provisions relating to ethics and compliance policies are generally respected in the files because they constitute a criterion for eliminating the offer.[2] Indeed, the Public Procurement Code in its Articles 22 et seq. deals with issues of conflicts of interest, corruption and the capacities of bidders. The Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct of Civil Servants also imposes a certain number of obligations.[3]

There are policies and legislation but it seems that they do not always apply in the defence and security sector due to reasons of defence secrecy or essential state interests.
The regulatory authority for public procurement and service delegations as well as the public procurement and service delegation directorate periodically publish the list of those subject to sanctions following non-compliance with the current legislation.[1][2] However, for works, supply, and service contracts in the defence sector, the rule remains that contracts are made over-the-counter and calls for tender are restricted following a special procedure.[3] This situation is not likely to promote compliance with the rules of ethics, transparency and compliance.

There are legal procedures and standards that companies are required to follow in order to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of Mozambique. These procedures are governed by legislations such as Decree No. 79/2022, that regulates the contracting of public works contracts, the acquisition of goods and the provision of services to the State [2]. All documents that make up the administrative procedure for contracting these companies are open to public consultation, free of charge, from the publication of the Notice until sixty (60) days after its conclusion, except in cases where their disclosure may compromise the confidentiality of the process in the phases of preparation, reception and evaluation of proposals, as well as those that respect national defence and security [3]. Paragraph I of Article 115, Decree No. 79/2022, of December 30, requires the mandatory inclusion of an anti-corruption clause as an essential clause in the establishment of contracts of this nature [4] and the Paragraph A, B, C and D of Article 282 inhibits corrupt practice, fraudulent practices, collusion and cohesion, such us offering, giving, receiving or requesting something of value to influence the actions of a public official in the contracting procedure or in the execution of a Contract [5]. This legal framework opens the way for direct adjustments in the Defence and Security Sector and does not reduce cases of corruption [6].

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator.
In practice, the implementation of the procedures applied to companies contracted by the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, within the scope of the contracting of public works, acquisition of goods and provision of services to the State, established by Decree No. 79/2022, of December 30 [1], cannot be truly measured, for two main reasons. First, the contracts are classified by the State Secrets Law [2]; second, the legal framework provides for direct adjustment for “contracting of confidential military works, uniforms and their accessories, acquisition, repair and maintenance of military equipment and for the exclusive use of the Armed Forces and Police” [3, 4]. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to assess the extent of implementation consistency.

Niger has legislation detailing how the government selects suppliers and sub-contractors, including specific requirements and anti-corruption provisions within the 2013 decree on defense and security procurement. Chapter III (Articles 6-12) establishes eligibility criteria for companies seeking to work with the Ministry of Defense, including disqualifying factors outlined in Article 6 (paragraphs “a” to “i”) [1]. Additionally, companies participating in procurement processes are required to sign a “letter of engagement,” which is based on the public procurement code of ethics (“code d’éthique en matière des marchés publics et des délégations de service public”) [3][4]. This letter explicitly prohibits corrupt activities, including:
• Bribery of public officials involved in procurement
• Fraudulent maneuvers to obtain contracts
• Illegal collusion between bidders
• Unjustified cancellation of contracts
• Failure to fulfill contractual commitments
Beyond potential penal sanctions, the “letter of engagement” includes provisions for administrative sanctions in case of violations [3]. However, the military coup of July 26, 2023, significantly altered the procurement framework, removing key safeguards. Ordinance No. 2024-05, enacted on February 23, 2024, exempted defence contracts from public procurement regulations, competitive bidding, and oversight [5]. This ordinance grants broad discretionary powers to authorities, allowing them to award contracts arbitrarily, bypass supplier qualification requirements, and exempt certain contractors from taxes, duties, and fees. The elimination of procurement oversight mechanisms effectively weakens anti-corruption safeguards, making supplier compliance standards largely irrelevant in practice.
Since legislation exists outlining supplier requirements and anti-corruption obligations, Niger would not score 0 on this sub-indicator. However, due to the recent exemptions granted under Ordinance No. 2024-05, these requirements are no longer effectively enforced or applied across all defence contracts.

Despite the existence of formal policies requiring suppliers to meet eligibility criteria and sign anti-corruption agreements, there is substantial evidence that these policies are not implemented in practice. The 2020 defense procurement corruption scandal exposed systematic violations of procurement regulations, with 71.8 billion FCFA (approximately $120 million) embezzled through fraudulent contracts [1]. Investigations revealed fictitious tenders, shell companies, inflated invoices, and rigged procurement processes, demonstrating a complete disregard for existing supplier selection and anti-corruption laws. Despite overwhelming evidence of fraud and financial misconduct, many of those implicated in the scandal have not faced prosecution or legal consequences, highlighting the impunity surrounding defense procurement violations [1]. Furthermore, the military coup of July 26, 2023, and the adoption of Ordinance No. 2024-05 on February 23, 2024, eliminated competitive bidding and oversight in defense procurement, effectively rendering supplier requirements and anti-corruption clauses meaningless [2]. The new legal framework allows authorities to award contracts at their discretion, without enforcing compliance programs or ethical business conduct requirements. This shift institutionalizses procurement corruption and removes accountability measures, further ensuring that procurement policies are not implemented.

There are quite a few laws in Nigeria guiding procurement, even that of defence, though their application has usually been inconsistent at best in defence contracts. These laws are meant to foster the principles of transparency, fairness, and accountability, but the defence sector is often special in the frame of exemptions. Some of the laws are: the Procurement Act (PPA) 2007 that governs general public procurement, and establishes the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) to oversee compliance with procurement standard; the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 that promotes transparency in managing public finances, indirectly impacting procurement processes; and Defence Procurement Guidelines that provides specific frameworks for defence procurements, aligning them with broader national security needs. Given that the process is shrouded in secrecy and that the PPA 2007 does not apply, there are no laws or procedures disclosed to the public, which detail the selection criteria and requirements for anti-corruption clauses in defence contracts with the government [1]. Notwithstanding these laws and regulations, there is no publicly available information indicating that selection of contractors follows any transparent process. However, there are claims that procurement practice now is a total departure from old practice where the scope paper is filled with armament just for the sake of enriching few persons and not filled with what we really need to prosecute wars on many fronts and win [2]. This suggests that previous procurement practice may have been driven by pecuniary intentions rather than formalised procedures. In rare instances the Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP) has revealed details of project contractors awarded contracts in the MOD. For instance, a spreadsheet of the BPP indicates that Messrs Ocea SA of France was awarded a contract worth Euro 35,030,000.00 for the procurement of 3 x 32-metre Fast Patrol Boats, 6 x OCEA Special Forces Boats (SFB), 5 x Sillinger RHIBs, a 4-Year ILS package and the proposed building of 3 filtration stations to support Nigerian Navy operations [3].

In the Nigerian case, the level of compliance to the procedures and standards prescribed by relevant laws and institutional frameworks is very weak, plagued by massive insider abuse, sabotage, corruption and other sharp practices [1]. All procurement activities of the MoD is governed by the Public Procurement Act (PPA) 2007 and the Federal Government Executive Order on Transparency and Support for Local Content in public procurement, which demands meeting several minimum eligibility criteria expected to be met by all prospective bidders including a Certificate of incorporation by Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), evidence of current Tax Clearance certificate for the last three years, and unabridged Company Audited Annual report for the last three years, among others [2]. While Nigeria has established some legal and institutional frameworks for defence procurement, the consistent implementation of these procedures and standards has been hindered by issues such as corruption, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and lack of transparency. For instance, a non-governmental organisation (NGO), recently sued the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) for issuing “certificates of no objection” to the MDAs for contracts awarded between January 2020 and March 2023 that did not follow standard procedures [3].

In its procedures, the government selects suppliers and subcontractors on the basis of their integrity and credibility. A number of documents are requested as proof before contracting them. In carrying out their duties, the persons designated in Article 2 of Decree no. 2022-2295 of December 28, 2022 on the Public Procurement Code (JO 2023-7592)], obey the rules of good governance, efficiency and proper use of public funds including anti-corruption standards. They take into account the requirements and objectives of sustainable development in their social, environmental and economic dimensions [1] . Public procurement means government contracts awarded to national or foreign suppliers, businessmen and contractors according to a number of criteria which are included in the terms of the contract to encourage the contracting parties to respect a certain code of ethics in the performance of the contract. [2] In its invitations to tender, the Ministry of the Armed Forces states that the candidate must prove, with supporting documentation, that it meets the experience requirements, such as having successfully carried out at least one contract of the same nature during the last three years, by attaching certificates of services rendered or copies of the contracts carried out, with acknowledgement of receipt. [3]

These rules mentioned in the 62A are for the most part used in practice by the authorities when they choose their suppliers. However, they may not comply with the rules. Indeed, the government has reacted to revelations of an astonishing transaction involving military equipment, concluded in early 2022 by the Senegalese Ministry of the Environment. Some opponents are calling for a parliamentary inquiry. [1] Already implicated in 2020 in a fraud involving tens of millions of dollars linked to an arms contract in his native Niger, Aboubakar Hima, known as “Petit Boubé”, a sulphurous Nigerien arms dealer, signs a secret contract with Senegal. [2] .

Bidders are required to sign disclosure form detailing conflicts of interest in terms of relationships to state employees or their own employment by the state. [1] The General Conditions of Contract for government procurement include provisions for the purchaser to cancel contracts based on suspected corruption and prohibits collusion and bid rigging. [2] However, there are no known requirements for bidders to have an anti-corruption policy in place. Bids are likewise assessed in terms of criteria set by preferential procurement policies in the awarding of contracts.

The Auditor-General has previously found that the Department of Defence has awarded contracts to bidders which have not submitted the required disclosure forms [1]. This is a recurrent finding by the Auditor-General which the Department has not addressed indicating an inability or unwillingness to follow procurement procedures [2].

According to the Ministry of Defence and Veteran affairs [1], internal measures and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018 [2] provide formal policies that determine the most suitable service providers. The criteria listed requires service providers to have the following qualities.
-Certificate of Incorporation,
-Articles and Memorandum of Association,
-Particulars of Directors,
-Tax Identification Number(TIN),
-Manufacturing /Dealership/ Distributorship License or Authorizsation and or any other equivalent document that can bolster an entity’s commercial standing and competitiveness.
While these requirements show that the government has formal policies on discrimination, they do not explicitly talk about corruption or require the service providers to show any specific anticorruption compliance measures.

South Sudan’s defence procurement laws and policies are not consistently implemented, including for strategically important suppliers [1]. Despite formal procedures outlined in the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act [2] and the establishment of the PPDAA [3], procurement for the Ministry of Defence often bypasses competitive bidding and transparency requirements. Report from Sentry reveal that senior military officials frequently resort to single-source contracts, circumventing oversight from the Ministry of Finance and regulatory authorities [3]. Although the PPDAA became operational in 2023 and regulations were passed in 2024 [4], implementation remains weak and irregular, with strategic contracts often awarded through opaque processes influenced by political and military elites.

Section 70 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (PPDA) provides the basic qualifications of bidders. It states that a procuring and disposing entity shall require all bidders participating in public procurement or disposal to meet the qualification criteria set out in the bidding documents, which in all cases shall include the following basic qualifications. These are:
(a) that the bidder has the legal capacity to enter into the contract; (b) that the bidder is not— (i) insolvent; (ii) in receivership; (iii) bankrupt; or (iv) being wound up;
(c) that the bidder’s business activities have not been suspended; (d) that the bidder is not the subject of legal proceedings for any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (b); and (e) that the bidder has fulfilled his or her obligations to pay taxes and social security contributions.1 According to a UPDF Lieutenant in the UPDF Legal Department at Mbuya, the MoDVA requires companies or firms bidding for work to have compliance programmes in place especially principles that comply with international standards in particular the anti-bribery codes. They require business conduct programs which are ethically binding. Quality assurance standards with certified management systems such as ISO 9001. There is security clearance because sensitive issues have to be understood and due diligence in terms of business practices, financial statements and ownership should be very articulate. MoDVA requires anti-corruption certification and for the supply to the UN missions, the sanction compliance should be demonstrated[1][2].

The classification of military purchases often allows the UPDF to bypass standard procurement procedures, citing national security concerns. This effectively renders the PPDA guidelines irrelevant in many cases [3][4][5]. The lack of public access to procurement data, the absence of disaggregated expenditure information, and the limited availability of UPDF policies all point to a system where transparency is sacrificed for perceived security benefits. While the Procurement and Disposal Unit may exist on paper, its ability to enforce PPDA guidelines is severely limited by the prevailing culture of secrecy and the broad discretionary powers granted to senior military officials and the Commander-in-Chief. Therefore, while the UPDF may claim adherence to PPDA guidelines, the evidence on the ground suggests that these policies are frequently disregarded in favour of opaque and potentially corrupt practices [1][2]

Like any other public entity, the Defence Forces are subject to Section 28 (a-f) of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, which stipulates that bidders must be allowed to participate in procurement proceedings without discrimination based on nationality [1]. Bidders must meet the following- (a) specified ethical standards; (b) legal capacity to enter into the procurement contract; (c) (i) they are not insolvent, in liquidation or under judicial management; or (ii) their affairs are not being administered by a court or a judicial officer; or (iii) their business activities have not been suspended; and no legal proceedings are pending for any of the foregoing; (d) that they have paid all taxes, duties and rates for which they are liable in Zimbabwe, together with any contributions or payments due under the National Social Security Authority Act [Chapter 17:04]; (e) that neither they nor any of their officers have, in the five years immediately preceding the initiation of the procurement proceedings- (i) been convicted in any country of an offence related to their professional conduct or the making of false statements or misrepresentations as to their qualifications; or (ii) been censured or subjected to any penalty in any country following disciplinary proceedings arising out of any conduct involving the making of false statements or misrepresentations; (f) possess the professional and technical qualifications and competence, financial resources, equipment and other physical facilities, managerial capability, experience, business reputation and personnel, needed to perform the procurement contract [1]. Importantly, the Defence procurement board working with the Minister of Defence and the Commander, has to ensure that due compliance is done at all levels. Also, section 26 of Public Entities Corporate Governance Act [Chapter 10:31] provides that the board of public entities should ensure good governance [3]. But bidders’ contracts or any documentation related to bidders in not accessible from the Ministry of Defence [2].

Bidders’ information is not accessible in the military [2]. The military has a way of resisting with giving information, as it is easy for the military to assert that the information is classified and is guided by the Official Secrets Act [1] [2]. It is important to note that despite the existence of the law which guides the bidding, the defence forces do not easily follow such bidding process, as they invoke the Official Secrets Act [1].

Country Sort by Country 62a. Formal policies Sort By Subindicator 62b. Consistent implementation Sort By Subindicator
Benin 75 / 100 75 / 100
Burundi 0 / 100 NA
Cameroon 0 / 100 NA
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 75 / 100 50 / 100
Kenya 50 / 100 50 / 100
Liberia 50 / 100 25 / 100
Madagascar 50 / 100 25 / 100
Mali 50 / 100 25 / 100
Mozambique NEI NEI
Niger 25 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 25 / 100 25 / 100
Senegal 75 / 100 50 / 100
South Africa 50 / 100 50 / 100
South Sudan 25 / 100 0 / 100
Uganda 75 / 100 25 / 100
Zimbabwe 25 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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