There is no public data on the number of defence procurements, as the law excludes certain contracts from the obligation to publish [1]. It is therefore not possible to calculate the rates for public or closed markets. Only public contracts for works, supplies and services for the day-to-day operation of the defence and security administration are not covered by secrecy [2]. Overall, all public contracts for works, supplies and intellectual services that have defence and security objectives are covered by secrecy [3]. Not all public contracts covered by secrecy are subject to an open call. They are the subject of either restricted calls through the consultation of three service providers or suppliers [4] or by mutual agreement [5].

About single source and restricted competition procedure contracts, Decree N°2020-603 of 23 December 2020 laying down the procedures and procedures for the award of public contracts relating to defence and security needs requiring secrecy does not refer to any external control body [1]. It specifies that procurement plans relating to defence and security needs are subject to validation by the Ministry of Defence’s public procurement control unit [2]. While the Public Procurement Code theoretically requires transparency and oversight of public procurement processes, defense contracts, by their nature, often fall into a gray area where these agencies have limited visibility due to issues national security. Parliamentary oversight also plays a role, but specific contracts, particularly in the defense sector, are rare and may be restricted for reasons of confidentiality. Sometimes in practice parliament intervenes in the acquisition, but in a very limited way on certain contracts, as an observer in order to be informed of the transactions, and not to supervise the purchases. The Ministry of Defense has a full role from beginning to the end in defense and security transactions.

There is no competition in Burundi’s defence procurement sector. The government works with a number of prefered suppliers. There are people who are always destined to supply what the army needs in this or that sector. These suppliers have been doing it for years, and everyone knows that when the contract comes up, they’ are the ones who win it. Since 2020, the same businessman has been alledged to be supplying the army with oil Even the invitations to tender published for the supply of foodstuffs, for example, are intended in advance for clearly identified individuals [1] [2] [3]. Moreover, civil society notes that the tenders that are public are often not processed transparently. [4] .

No supervisory body is able to monitor or question the procedures or competition process for obtaining contracts within the defence sector [1] [2].

Public defence contracts are carried out within a framework of competition restricted to local companies for their promotion. However, when a foreign company bids for a public contract, it is more often in partnership with a local company. This situation highlights the vulnerability of weak economies (like those of fragile States) whose overall capacities are very limited. Less than 30% of defence procurements are conducted as open competiton.[1] Importantly, the Law on Public Procurement (article 31) states that defence procurement is not necessarily subject to public tender.[2][3]

All defence procurement contracts, including single sourced ones, are submitted in a discretionary and unilateral manner without the intervention of any control agency that lacks the authority to oversee single source procurement. Indeed, articles 4 and 71 of the Public Procurement Code establish that procurement related to defence, security, and strategic interests are classified as “Special Contracts”, which are exempt from competitive tender procedures and are not subject to public procurement commissions.[1][2]

Some acquisitions follow the procedures laid down by law or are subject to a competitive process. For example, the acquisition of captive balloons may be subject to a competitive tender process alongside that for drones. Once the prototype has been selected, suppliers are contacted. However, a significant proportion of the market still escapes this process, particularly in cases of emergency or budgetary constraints [1, 2].

There is virtually no external oversight by Parliament. Internally, the Inspectorate or even certain departments of the armed forces exercise some control, but this results in very few contracts being challenged [1, 2].

The GAF’s procurement methods mostly do not adhere to established competition procedures on all occasions. Specialised and delicate military needs are restricted for sole sourcing while other non-technical needs are published through open bids published on the website of the Public Procurement Authority.(1) There is, therefore, sole sourcing of its technical military hardware due to the specialised needs of the force and the few companies available to facilitate such transactions (2) (3) (4). Moreover, information available on the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) website indicates that open bids and past procurement contracts were contracted largely through single sourcing, thereby leaving no room for competition among bidders for contracts. This included both highly resource-required contracts and low-resource procurement contracts. (5)
 

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament has taken on a crucial role in scrutinising sole sourcing procurement practices. However, the committee’s reports indicate that 99% of contracts executed through these processes have received approval, a surprising deviation from the Public Procurement Act. (1) The Committee on August 14, 2024, noticed some infractions with sole sourcing procurement processes when the management of the Ghana Law School appeared before the committee (2). On rare occasions, the PAC and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI) have questioned single-source military procurement (3).

It is difficult to ascertain what percentage of defence procurement are conducted as open or restricted, as there is no data provided in the Public Procurement Information portal [1]. Available data on MoD tenders page is not in accessible format, so one has to undertake a manual verification and assessment. Based on available data in the MoD website, all the 37 advertised pre-qualifications for goods, works and non-consulting services for the Financial Year 2023/2024 – 2024/2025 were open [2]. Only about 4 Contracts in 2021 were restricted. However, owing to insufficient information on tenders and contracts, it is difficult to determine accurately the proportion of restricted and open contracts/tenders [3].
The Special audit by the auditor General reviewed 226 contracts relating to supply of food stuffs at the Ministry of Defence, 97 of which were procured directly from MoD while 129 were procured by Service Lines/Barracks.Of the 97 at the MoD, 1 was through Direct procurement, 60 open tender and 36 restricted. The audit established that the practice at the Ministry of Defence is for various Services—the Kenya Army, the Kenya Air Force, and the Kenya Navy—to prepare Vendors’ Claims, which are then forwarded to the Ministry of Defence for verification and payment [4].

Section 9 of the PPADA Act confers PPRA with the mandate to monitor classified procurement information, including that of specific items of security organs and make recommendations to the Cabinet Secretary [1]. In the most recent past, PPRA noted that the MoD had not complied with the PPADA Act in relation to section sections 43(1) and 176(1)(a) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act. Section 43 provides for Authority to enter premises and 176 is on prohibitions and offences.

The Public Accounts Committee has, in the past, ordered for special audits by the OAG on the MoD [2]. Chair of the Parliamentary Accounts Committee questioned Defence Principal Secretary to explain why his Ministry engaged in “costly projects that had not been budgeted.” The Parliamentary Committee wanted to understand why the MoD had incurred expenditure of KSH 1.4 billion that had not been budgeted for [2].

The PPCA permits sole-source procurement under specific, limited circumstances, such as when only one supplier has the exclusive right to provide the required goods or services or for additional deliveries by the original supplier that are intended as replacements or extensions for existing goods or services.[1] Oversight of these procedures formally rests with the PPCC, the Procurement Review Council, and the Auditor General.
However, there was a unanimous response in key informants’ interviews.[2][3][4] There is no record of competitive bidding in the defence sector, and neither the Ministry of National Defense procurement page nor the Government e-Procurement Portal provide disaggregated data on military acquisitions.[5]
Defence procurement is particularly susceptible to single-sourcing due to the sensitive nature of military acquisitions and the invocation of national security concerns. While the PPCA allows exemptions in cases related to national defence, the lack of clear guidelines and oversight mechanisms increases the risk of abuse. Auditor General reports (2021–2023) flag repeated irregularities in procurement practices ” No evidence of application of the requisite methods (national competitive bidding, single sourcing, restrictive bidding) was applicable”.[6] Audit’s findings prove that the requisite procurement methods are not utilised. However, due to the lack of disaggregation, there is no specific percentage for single-sourcing.

Defence procurement in Liberia often relies on single- or restricted-competition procedures, justified under national security exemptions provided in the PPCA.[1] Though public records or audits providing systematic data are limited.
Oversight agencies, including the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC), the General Auditing Commission (GAC), and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), formally have the authority to question sole-sourcing decisions [4].
There is little research available to show that the Public Accounts Committees at the legislature are scrutinising procurement related transaction[2][3]. The latest Auditor General’s Report, a compliance audit to the MoD, questions the lack of utilisation of procurement methods and recommends compliance with the PPCA [5]. However, the reports are published with delays, and it does not specify whether single sourcing has been the rule in defence procurement methods. Hence, this is occasionally done.

Infrastructure construction follows the procedures detailed in the Public Procurement Code which stipulates in its article 32 paragraph 1 that the authorities in charge of calls for tender are required “to publish each year a general procurement notice listing the list of all public contracts that it plans to award by call for tenders during the budgetary year. This general award notice is established in accordance with a standard model established by regulation”. Paragraph 2 specifies that “each public contract awarded by call for tenders is preceded by a specific notice of public call for competition established in accordance with a standard model established by regulation” [1] [2]. However, the Ministry of Defense does not issue open invitations to tender for arms imports. For these, procedures are either mutual agreement by the Ministry of Defense or restricted tenders: by the State Secretariat of the Ministry of National Defense in charge of the Gendarmerie [3].

There is no clear evidence that all single-source contracts are routinely justified to an external oversight body. We only have the legal framework side, but we don’t know to what extent this occurs in practice.The Public Procurement Code stipulates in article 39 that all single source contracts are only authorised in the following cases:
1- for contracts relating to services which must be kept secret;
2- for contracts for which there is compelling urgency resulting from circumstances unforeseeable for the Contracting Authority and whose contract award conditions are not compatible with the deadlines required by the tendering procedures, and in particular when it involves carrying out services in place of a service provider
defaulting or when it is a question of dealing with imperative emergency situations arising from a natural or technological disaster.
3- for markets intended to meet needs which, for reasons relating to the holding of an exclusive right, can only be satisfied by a specific service provider, or when the additional purchases relate to standardized equipment or to spare parts compatible with the equipment already in service.
4- for services which complement those previously the subject of a first contract carried out by the same holder. The complementary market is a market distinct from the initial market but awarded to the same holder[1].
In the event of an irregularity, the same Public Procurement Code stipulates that the award of a contract, including over-the-counter contracts, may be called into question and canceled.

The decree of May 3, 2023 imposes a restrictive character to the procurement process of the defence and security sector.[1] Competition is therefore restricted and markets are essentially awarded through mutual agreement or restricted call for tender. Some tenders for the Ministry of Defence were published until 2021 but were for small pieces of equipment.[2]

The National Directorate of Public Procurement and the Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement and Service Delegations no longer appear to have full authority over procurement procedures in the defence sector due to considerations of defence secrecy and the essential interests of the State, as well as the exclusion from the Public Procurement Code of contracts for works, supplies and services intended for the defence and security sector.[1][2][3]

No evidence was found regarding the publication of notices, advertisements, tenders and contracts for the acquisition of defence and security products in newspapers, gazettes or other media. Article 35 [1] of the Regulation on the Contracting of Public Works, Supply of Goods and Provision of Services to the State guides the publication of the advertisement, but direct award, as provided for in Article 97 [2], has been the preferred contracting method for the defence and security sectors for the acquisition of goods and services, especially after the start of the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado in October 2017 [3].

Internal oversight bodies, such as the National Defence Inspectorate, have the authority to review and question certain sole-source, exclusive, or restricted competitive bidding processes. These powers are granted under the Internal Regulations of the National Defence Inspectorate [1, 2].
However, external scrutiny entities, including the Parliamentary Committee, civil society, and academics, face significant limitations due to legislation on military and state secrets [3]. As a result, external actors have little access to procurement details, making independent oversight difficult.
Despite the Inspectorate’s mandate, there are no known public cases where it has successfully challenged a procurement process. This is largely because procurement-related information remains classified. Additionally, when questioned in an interview, the Inspectorate’s representative declined to comment, repeatedly stating that such matters fall under classified information [4].

Defence procurement in Niger is predominantly conducted through restricted competition or single-sourcing, with minimal transparency or open competitive bidding. The 2013 decree on defence procurement originally provided a legal framework for competition, but the acquisition plan remains classified as “top secret”, preventing public scrutiny of procurement decisions [1]. Furthermore, Ordinance No. 2024-05, enacted on February 23, 2024, exempted defence contracts from public procurement regulations, allowing authorities to award contracts without competitive bidding or oversight [2]. This legal shift eliminated prior regulatory safeguards, making it possible for contracts to be awarded at the discretion of military authorities without public tendering processes or accountability mechanisms.
Past procurement scandals further indicate a history of single-sourcing and non-competitive practices. The 2020 corruption investigation into defense spending uncovered fraudulent contracts, fictitious tenders, and inflated prices, revealing that many suppliers were selected through direct negotiation rather than open competition [3]. Additionally, recent military acquisitions, such as the $87.5 million purchase of Turkish Karayel-SU drones, possibly, appear to have been negotiated directly with suppliers rather than through an open tender process [4]. The lack of publicly available information on other military procurements further supports the conclusion that a majority of purchases are made through non-competitive means. Given the legal exemptions from procurement oversight, past corruption scandals, and evidence of direct negotiations for major acquisitions, less than 30% of defence procurements in Niger are likely conducted as open competition.

Oversight agencies in Niger have no effective power to question single-sourcing, sole-sourcing, or restricted competition procedures in defense procurement. While the 2013 decree on defense procurement provided a legal framework for oversight, its effectiveness was already weak due to classified acquisition plans and limited transparency [1]. However, the adoption of Ordinance No. 2024-05 on February 23, 2024, effectively removed all remaining oversight mechanisms, granting military authorities broad discretion to award contracts without competitive bidding or regulatory review [2]. Prior to this, Niger had already demonstrated a pattern of non-competitive procurement practices, as evidenced by the 2020 defense procurement scandal, which revealed that fraudulent contracts were awarded without competition, using fictitious tenders and inflated pricing schemes [3]. Despite the exposure of corruption and procurement mismanagement, no systemic reforms were enacted, and those responsible largely avoided prosecution, further indicating the absence of meaningful oversight. Under the current legal framework, there is no requirement for oversight agencies to review or challenge the use of non-competitive procurement methods. No independent institution has the authority to investigate or question sole-sourced defense contracts, ensuring that military procurement decisions remain unchecked.

While there is no publicly available comprehensive data detailing the exact percentage of defence procurements conducted through open competition in Nigeria, it is generally understood to be a small portion. Reports and analyses from civil society organizations and partner organisations have consistently highlight that there is the prevalence of a culture of secrecy about defence and security budgets and procurements in Nigeria, despite the legislature’s formal authority to oversee it [1]. This points to the practice of the limited use of open competition and the preference for more opaque procurement processes. The procurement of military weapons is usually shrouded in secrecy which meant that it is extremely difficult to ascertain if defence procurement is generally conducted as open competition. The prevalence of opacity is enabled by certain provisions of the Public Procurement Act 2007 [2]. For instance, Section 15 (2) stipulates that “the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods, works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President’s express approval has been first sought and obtained”. Furthermore, Section 45 (3) provides that a procuring entity may make direct requests to a limited number of consultants, requesting proposals for the provision of a service if “(c) it is in the interest of national defence and security or similar reason of confidentiality” [3].

The prevalence of a culture of secrecy about defence and security budgets and procurements in Nigeria despite the legislature’s formal authority to oversee it is well-documented [1]. Institutions responsible for oversight, such as the National Assembly, are often constrained by the limited access to relevant information. In addition, special exceptions and waivers are sometimes granted for defence purchases [2], reducing the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms.

Depending on the type of procurement, the defence ministry may or may not open the competition. But most of the time, it is open [1]. For the sake of transparency, the Ministry specifies in its public invitations to tender that interested candidates wishing to obtain information may contact the Cellule de Passation des Marchés Publics of the Ministry of the Armed Forces in writing to consult the invitation to tender document [2] . Some contracts are exempted due to national security clauses. The Ministry of the Armed Forces invites sealed bids from eligible and suitably qualified candidates for the procurement of military vehicles. This notice of open tender comprises four lots. Candidates may bid on one or more lots [1] .

Given the current security challenges and the need for the State to provide appropriate responses, it was deemed useful to supplement Article 3 of Decree no. 2014-1212 of September 22, 2014 on the Public Procurement Code, amended by Decree no. 2020-22 of January 07, 2020 in order to exclude from the scope of the Public Procurement Code works, supplies, services and equipment carried out for the defence and security of Senegal and classified as “secret-defense” which are incompatible with the advertising measures required by the Public Procurement Code. The supervisory agencies have certain powers to call into question the competition procedure if it concerns the purchase of materials that are not classified as defence secrets.[1] They can also play a monitoring role, so if there is non-compliance with rules and procedures, they can question the practice. [2]

South African procurement rules, per National Treasury regulations, establish open and competitive tendering as the default procurement method. [1] Deviations from open competition (such as single-source or limited bidding) require prior approval and proper justification, especially for security or emergency cases.
However, the Department of Defence (DoD) has been repeatedly flagged by the Auditor-General for non-compliance with procurement rules. According to the 2022/23 Department of Defence Annual Report, the Auditor-General reported several procurement cases reviewed not complying with the requirements of competitive bidding processes [2] and irregular expenditure of R25 million constituted 23 incidents where no competitive bidding process was followed. [2].
The Auditor-General has consistently reported on irregular procurement practices within the DoD over multiple financial years, including failure to follow tender procedures, lack of bid documentation, and improper use of deviations without valid security or emergency justification.
Despite these findings, there is no publicly available breakdown of total defence procurement spending by method (e.g., open vs. restricted).
In addition, civil society monitoring tools such as “Procurement Watch” have highlighted red flags for potential irregular procurement, using data drawn from reports submitted to National Treasury by all procuring entities [3]. The 2024 Corruption Watch “Procurement Watch” report found a nationwide increase in deviations and contract expansions as reported to the National Treasury. Although this data isn’t defence-specific, it underlines that deviations and expansions are increasingly used across government [3[.

Public entities are required to request deviations from National Treasury to obtain approval for single-source procurements and in this way, National Treasury provides oversight of these procurements and have the power to reject non-competitive procedures [1]. The Auditor-General likewise audits procurement practices to ensure compliance with relevant legislation, providing oversight on non-competitive procurements [2].

For several years South Sudan has been subjected to a United Nations arms embargo, which has significantly restricted its ability to procure arms [1]. In an interview, Minister Michael Makuei opined that these sanctions have critically undermined the nation’s defence and security capabilities. He stated that, “The process of deploying the Unified Forces is ongoing, and the uniforms we received recently at the general headquarters will be used to deploy these forces. Within this month, the deployment of the trained forces will proceed, but regrettably, they will be equipped with sticks” [2]. This declaration highlights the extent to which arms procurement has been stymied, resulting in a stark inadequacy of proper equipment for national defence. Nevertheless, there have been allegations that South Sudan has breached the arms embargo by clandestinely acquiring weapons without the requisite authorization from the UN Security Council. Such claims suggest that the procurement process for these arms has been opaque, lacking transparency, and often circumventing open competition. These developments not only question the integrity of South Sudan’s compliance with international sanctions but also underscore the potential for restricted and single sourcing in the country’s military procurement practices.

Given the complex security environment in South Sudan, coupled with ongoing sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, there is limited publicly available information on the level of scrutiny within the procurement process. A report by Conflict Armament Research [1] highlights that Chinese-manufactured weapons and ammunition represent a significant portion of the arms present in South Sudan. Additionally, countries such as Israel, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are alleged to be supplying weapons to various factions involved in the South Sudanese conflict. Weapons originating from Bulgaria and other EU states, which were diverted from Uganda, have also been documented in South Sudan. However, due to the opaque nature of the procurement process for these arms, it is challenging to accurately assess and assign a score to this category. Legally, the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011 Section 24 (3) provide that The Council of Ministers shall determine whether any expenditure item within the budget of any Spending Agency referred there under the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) above shall be treated as classified, in accordance with the criteria and procedure to be set forth in the regulation under the provisions of this Act. Those procedures indicate that the audit of the classified expenditures shall be done by the Auditor-General, and the classified audit report shall be reviewed by the Chairperson of the Standing Specialized Committee on Economy, Development & Finance and approved by the Speaker of the Assembly and the President. [3] This closed circle of individuals with access to the audit report of classified purchases features close political allies making it difficult to scrutinise single/restricted competition.

Most defence procurements are often made through single sourcing, without competition. This means that contracts are awarded to a preferred supplier or contractor without opening the process to competitive bidding [2]. The prevalence of single-source procurement within the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) is a significant departure from standard public procurement practices, where open competition is typically favoured. This practice, where contracts are awarded to preferred suppliers without competitive bidding, is justified on the grounds of national security.
Although there is no a specific percentage, there is evidence on this practice of single-sourcing in the sector. In 2021, the Independent reported that presidential directives allowed the UPDF to bypass the PPDA Act to directly contract suppliers for school and health facility construction, contrary to competitive bidding rules [3]. Media investigations into the Shs76bn procurement scandal revealed collusion between UPDF officers and a preferred contractor in a non-competed deal for supplies, prompting a presidential probe [4]. This suggests that a majority of procurements are either restricted competition
The assertion that open competition is not healthy for national security is a common refrain used to justify single-source procurement. Therefore, while security considerations are paramount, a more nuanced approach is needed to balance these concerns with the principles of transparency and competition [1].

The PPDA conducts procurement and disposal audits, which extend to classified expenditure within the MoDVA is a crucial oversight mechanism. The submission of these audit reports to both the MoDVA and the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs chairperson provides a formal channel for accountability and scrutiny. This process acknowledges the need for external oversight, even in areas of sensitive expenditure. Furthermore, the stated power of oversight agencies to question the competition procedures selected, and their active exercise of this power in numerous cases, indicates a commitment to ensuring adherence to procurement regulations.
However, the effectiveness of these oversight mechanisms is contingent upon several factors. The degree to which the PPDA is granted unfettered access to classified information, and the extent to which the Parliamentary Committee can effectively scrutinise such information are critical. While the formal structure for oversight exists, the practical implementation of these mechanisms must be carefully monitored to ensure that they are not undermined by the inherent secrecy surrounding defence procurement. The fact that oversight agencies actively question competition procedures is a positive indicator, but continued vigilance and strengthening of these mechanisms are essential for promoting transparency and accountability in defence spending.

Defence procurement bidding is neither open nor advertised to the public [1]. Furthermore, the goods and equipment procured by the Defence Forces are not homogeneous but vary significantly [1]. Certain items, such as ammunition and firearms, are inherently sensitive and not suitable for public bidding processes [1]. However, even for less sensitive goods such as food, clothing, and bedding, the bidding process remains closed to the public and unadvertised [2].

Scrutiny is a public entity requirement as provided in Section 5 & 6 of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act which states that an established Procurement
Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe to ensure that public procurement is affected in a manner that is transparent, fair, honest, cost-effective, competitive and in compliance with this Act; and (b) to monitor and supervise procuring entities and the public procurement system in order to secure compliance with this Act [1]. In addition, parliament through the Committee on defence, security and Home Affairs has to ensure compliance with the Act. However, the military does not comply as no such procurement documents are submitted for scrutiny to parliament [2]. There is politicisation of the military and militarisation of politics in Zimbabwe, which makes it difficult for procurement processes in the defence forces to be in an open competition [3].