Civil servants and military officers who play a role in the design of the tender specifications or in the decisions of the tender committee are subject to compliance with the Public Procurement Code, which prevents conflicts of interest. They are also bound by professional incompatibilities [1]. For example, there may be no economic, legal, professional or family relations between the candidate or tenderer and an agent of the Contracting Authority [2]. Nor can procurement officials (who would be civil servants and military officer) have interests in companies, i.e. be shareholders, board members, advisers [3]. There is no mandatory annual training provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest [3].

The tender commissions are subject to an external audit, done with the aim of identifying or not the inadequacies in the decisions taken by these bodies. this is the case of the audit of public contracts of the High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication. The audit covers the procedures for awarding and controlling public contracts and delegations of public services awarded. The people and structures involved in the bidding process are listed in the minutes. The minutes of the deliberations thus serve as audit trails for the inspectors and the Court of Auditors. However, the minutes do not indicate whether politicians or other officials were unduly involved [1] [2].

Regulations and codes of conduct of tender commissions are fully transparent [1] [2]. The Code of Ethics and Deontology for Public Procurement clearly sets out the rules of transparency to be observed by agents involved in the public procurement chain. The code also devotes a special session to conflicts of interest, and prohibits all such cases [3].

The National Directorate for the Control of Public Procurement, Tthe Public Procurement Regulatory Authority are the external bodies which verify that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate [1] [2] [3]. But as we mentioned, information on tender specifications and procurement decisions often remains confidential, limiting the possibility of external, independent verification. The purchase of weapons or certain equipment useful for territorialdefence cannot be entrusted to external auditors. One of the options available to the State in these acquisitions is that the acquisition is entrusted to countries or producing structures whose reputation is known for the type of purchase to be made. This reduces the transparency and accountability of procurement processes in this area.

Article 355 of the Public Procurement Code regulates aspects relating to conflicts of interest. In particular, it prohibits civil servants involved in the public procurement circuit in various sectors, including the army, from being involved in the award of a contract in which they have any interest [1] [2]. However, there is no training planned for these civil servants [2] [3].

There is no audit trail that would allow the control agencies to know the details of the people involved in designing invitations to tender, specifying contracts, choosing suppliers and awarding tenders [1] [2]. All this remains at the discretion of certain political figures and senior army officers [2].

The Public Procurement code which provide some regulations and code of conduct is publicly available online. [1] However, there is no transparency in the rest of the procedures regarding tender committees in the defence sector as these committees are set up at the discretion of senior army officers. [2] [3] As a result, they put individuals on these committees who can be easily manipulated to suit their interests. [3] [4]

There is no external verification of the particular specifications of calls for tender. The bodies that do try to look into this matter come up against the pretext of defence secrecy [1] [2].

A conflict of interest occurs when the holder of a contract could gain direct or indirect profits from a contract concluded by the project owner or the delegated project owner, due to personal or financial interests that could compromise their impartiality or negatively influence their judgement. To prevent such conflict, the Presidents, members, secretaries and experts of public procurement commissions, analysis subcommittees, and officials responsible for public procurement are bound by confidentiality. Moreover, they must avoid any actions that could undermine their objectivity and, must not have any financial, personal, or other interests linked to the contract under review. These provisions govern the public procurement code in Cameroon, including matters related to conflicts of interest. Although special procurements (such as defence procurements) are not directly governed by the public procurement code, the ethical principles, including those concerning conflicts of interest apply to defence procurements as well. To avoid conflicts of interest, annual training organised jointly by MINDEF and MINMAP is provided to responsible purchasing managers. However, there is no specific public code of conduct dedicated to preventing conflicts of interest in defence procurement. Conflicts of interest are mentionned within the procurement code itself.[1][2]

The lack of transparency and access to information weakens oversight of the defence sector. Firstly, the tender board officials do not keep a satisfactory record of the tender process. The reason is that, in most cases, there is no tender process for purchases related to the defence sector. They are negotiated over the counter, which sometimes involves political interference and the participation of various Cameroonian and non-Cameroonian individuals who may have an interest in the business. Secondly, there is no audit trail accessible to oversight agencies because they unable to carry out their functions within MINDEF. Audits within MINDEF can only be conducted by internal bodies, such as the “Control général des armés”. Whether these internal bodies maintain thorough records of their audits or not, such records will not be available to oversight agencies outside the Ministry. The only oversight entities, outside the Ministry that could potentially access records of the sector’s purchases are the military Court and the Special Criminal Court. They can access these records if there is a judicial case against, for example, a former Minister of Defence or a senior officer, involve in embezzlement during a military equipment purchase. This happened in March 2019 when the former Minister of Defence, Edgard Alain MEBE NGOH, was arrested and sentenced for embezzlement. In summary, the absence of proper oversight leads to an increased risk of corruption across all levels of the sector, from operations to financial management, personnel, and public procurement.[1][2]

The Code of Public Procurement which provides some regulation, is publicly available. However, the rest of the procedures regarding the tender board are not transparent.[1][2]

Control bodies (Parliament and the Supreme Court Audit Office) exist in Cameroon, but they face significant challenges. Parliamentary control over the sector is enshrined in the Constitution; however, its real powers are severely limited by several factors, including a lack of technical expertise among parliamentarians, limited access to information, and excessive influence by the executive. The Audit Office, responsible for external audits, is of highly questionable effectiveness. It has never published a general report on the defence sector since its creation. regarding the role of civil society, its interactions with institutions are often neither institutionalised nor regular, which hampers its capacity for action. In summary there is no external verification of the specifications of the tender.[1][2]

There is some external verification of the adequacy of the specific specifications of the tender, but it is not comprehensive and it is not certain that all categories of defence are covered [1, 2, 3].

In theory, personnel involved in the tendering process are subject to restrictions on professional activity [1]. Personnel involved in public procurement must also comply with the Code of Conduct for Public Procurement Personnel, which mentions the need to avoid conflicts of interest [2]. However, verification mechanisms are weak. Staff are increasingly being trained in procurement rules, but not on a regular basis [3].

In the area of public procurement, there is ex post control of the regularity of calls for tenders and the award of contracts, which means that decisions taken can be annulled. There is also a partial audit trail to identify the officials who participated in the selection of suppliers and the drafting of the specifications. This can be done using meeting minutes (which are not always accessible to the public) or the organisational chart of the ministry, the staff and the National Security Council.

Articles 55 to 61 of the Public Procurement Code govern tendering and are publicly available [1]. A guide explaining some of the tendering procedures is also available online [2]. However, it is unclear whether these procedures apply to the defence sector due to the culture of secrecy surrounding military procurement. There is also a regulatory mechanism for arms purchases that goes from the commands to the National Security Council, but it is very poorly evaluated and there is little visible financial evidence of military purchases [3].

The Public Procurement Authority has issued a final manual for the implementation of the Act (2016) Act 663. (1) This manual offers clear guidelines on persons involved in procurement including as regards conflict of Interest. Section 2.3.1 of the manual on Approval of Contract Awards by the Head of Entity for instance notes that “ Where the Head of Entity has a conflict of interest in any submission, he shall declare his interest in the submission and refer it to the officer to whom authority has been delegated for a decision.” This is to prevent issues of conflict of interest. Trainings are provided in accordance with the Public Procurement Act, 2003, Act 663 as amended, this trainings are generally organised to build the capacity of public officers involved in the procurement and tendering departments of the various Ministries, Agencies and Department of the government. This eneral training offered not necessarily address conflict of interest. This is evidenced from the training calendar of the Public Procurement Authority 2025 training calendar. (2)

There are no audit trails related to military procurement processes. Despite the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament’s oversight role and its power to summon service chiefs to question them about procurement processes and procedures, the committee has never summoned the defence outfit to answer questions related to procurement issues (1) (2).

There are regulations for the Tender Committees as stated in Section 20 of the Public Procurement Act 2016 as amended indicating the composition, functions and the various standards required for the operation of the tender committee. The Tender Committees are further subjected to codes of conduct under Section 86 of the Act by the Procurement Board with the approval of the Minister. (1) These provisions are publicly available as part of the Act, meaning the formal regulations and codes of conduct are accessible.
However, some members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI) argue that the armed forces lack transparency in their tender procedures, as they do not consistently follow the procurement guidelines outlined in the Public Procurement (Amendment) Act (2016). (2) (3) This suggests that while the regulations themselves are public, their application within the defence sector is only partially transparent.

Despite the existence of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI) (1), the classified nature of defence procurement makes it difficult to verify the procedures and determine whether the procurement process and specifications of the tender are subject to external verification processes (2) (3) (4).

Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest. The law requires that the tender opening committee should not have the same members as the evaluation committee. Members must sign a non-disclosure form. The confidentiality declaration form in the regulation instructs members not to disclose information about procurement. It also minimises unnecessary discussions between bidders and the committee and addresses conflicts of interest. PPRA and KISM train them quarterly on ethical practices, teaming up with EACC, KISM, OAG, and DCI. KISM convenes trainings for heads of procurement across the government. The training ensures teams share their challenges and maintain standards [1]. Section 78, 67, and 66 provide for guidance on standard tender documents, confidentiality and corruption, coercive, obstructive, collusive or fraudulent practice, and conflicts of interest respectively [2].
The last training on procurement was held week of 25 September 2025 and is reported on the Ministry of Defence website. The Kenya Defence Forces conducted an intensive two-week training program on procurement compliance and best practices. The training targeted procurement officers and clerks from various Defence Headquarters departments across the Army, Air Force, and Navy. It focused on adherence to the Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2015 and its 2020 regulations, including issues of conflict of interest. The program went beyond mere compliance to foster a culture of ethical decision-making and operational excellence. The comprehensive curriculum covered critical areas: advanced procurement methodologies, ethical considerations in tender processes, technical document preparation, systematic evaluation frameworks, strategic contract management, and guidance on preparing submissions for the Procurement Advisory Board (PAB). This multifaceted approach aimed to build both technical competency and professional integrity [3].

A comprehensive audit trail and procurement records must be maintained for at least six years for every transaction. Section 68 of the PPADA mandates the accounting officer of a procuring entity to keep records for each procurement for at least six years after the resulting contract has been completed or, if no contract resulted, after the procurement proceedings were terminated. Section 78 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA) stipulates that an accounting officer of a procuring entity shall appoint a tender opening committee for each procurement. This committee must have at least three members, with at least one member not directly involved in processing or evaluating tenders [1].
In practice, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) conducts performance audits that may verify these records. However, in the case of the Ministry of Defence, there is limited publicly available information confirming whether such audit trails include all officials involved, including senior policymakers or politicians [2, 3]. While there are some procurement records regarding tenders on the open procurement portal, this information only focuses on general description [2]. Additionally, a general search in the portal only showed one tender in defence. Secrecy provisions in Kenya’s defence-related laws — such as the Official Secrets Act and security exemptions in the PPADA — may restrict public or external access to detailed audit trails in defence procurement. External audit do not mention audit trails in their reports [4].

Since 2015, Kenya abolished permanent tender boards in public institutions. Instead, the procurement function now reports directly to the accounting officer, with temporary committees formed for tender opening and evaluation. These ad hoc committees are governed by Section 181 of the PPADA, which empowers the PPRA to develop and enforce a Code of Ethics for procurement officials [1].

The Code of Ethics for public officers, as issued by PPRA, outlines prohibited conduct including bribery, conflict of interest, non-disclosure of confidential information, and bid-rigging [2]. While there is a published Supplier Code of Ethics, no public version of a detailed tender board-specific or MoD-specific code was found. Therefore, while general ethics frameworks exist, clarity is lacking around defence sector adherence or internal enforcement, especially due to restricted access to defence procurement documents.

PPRA scrutinises and undertakes pre-bidding analysis of tender notices, reviewing the extent to which specifications are objective. There is a team that examines tender documents and writes to institutions to institute corrective action [1]. In FY 2023/2024, the MOD is alleged to have “wilfully failed to cooperate with the Authority in the exercise of its mandate to inspect, assess, review or audit [their] procurement records by failing to provide procurement records/information requested by the Authority for Assessments and by extension hindered the Authority’s staff from conducting procurement and asset disposal assessment/audit [2].

Officials involved in tender specification and tender board decisions are governed by formal regulations and codes designed to prevent conflicts of interest:
– Under Section 131(1)(c) of the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (PPCA, 2010), any public officer involved in procurement must “avoid conflict of interest,” and any inconsistency renders the offending action void.
– The National Code of Conduct for Public Officials (2014) mandates that all officials engaged in procurement-related decisions must submit asset declarations before assuming office and repeat these upon promotion or exit, providing a formal mechanism to detect potential conflicts.

In terms of implementation, the PPCC offers training initiatives, such as the Intensive Procurement Training Program (IPTP) [1], which includes procedural modules for procurement practitioners, although training focused specifically on ethics or conflict-of-interest prevention remains infrequent [2][3][4][5][6].

Under the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (2010) and the Public Financial Management Act (2009), procuring entities must maintain records documenting the full procurement process, from needs assessments through supplier selection, contract award, and implementation.[1][2]
To some extent, there have been some audit trails involving officials in the selection of suppliers and the design of tender specifications.[3][4] For instance, GAC compliance audits show that auditors review documentation on procurement decisions, including whether contract awards followed established procedures. GAC 2017-2021 compliance audit to the MoD acknowledges that the “procurement activities at the MoD were associated with various irregularities, such as no-submission of periodic (quarterly and annual) procurement activities reports to PPCC.[5] GAC reports highlight recurrent weaknesses in record-keeping, and incomplete documentation of supplier evaluations suggests that while audit trails exist, they are often inconsistent or incomplete.

The Public Procurement and Concessions Act (2010) establishes the Procurement Committee/Tender Boards within procuring entities. Members are bound by the Act itself, which requires impartiality, disclosure of interest, and adherence to the Code of Conduct for Public Officials (2014).[1]
The PPCC website provides a “Guidelines & Manuals” section, listing tender board procedures and related documentation, suggesting transparency in principle.[2]
Liberia’s e‑Procurement platform (e‑GP) publishes procurement plans, “No Objections,” and bidding details, even if not all categories, like tender board deliberations, are fully visible.[3]
Tender board regulations and codes of conduct in Liberia are partially transparent, the legal framework is public, and some oversight reports are published, but the actual enforcement, decision-making processes, and conflict-of-interest checks within defence procurement are not fully disclosed.

There are external means of verifying tenders, and this is done through appropriate committees set up by the PPCC.[1] The first committee is the Procurement Committee, comprising the head of the procuring entity. The second committee is the Complaints Committee or panel mandated to review wrongdoing reported. The third is the appeal panel mandated to review reports submitted by the complaints panel or committee.
However, while these mechanisms exist in law, evidence suggests they are not robustly enforced.
GAC audit reports highlight procurement weaknesses, such as the lack of utilisation of procurement methods, procurement committees, and annual procurement plans.[2] However, these audits are delayed in their findings and not very regular. This suggests that there is some external verification that the particular specifications of the tender are or are not appropriate, but it is not regular.

The Law on the Public Procurement Code includes articles on the ethics that civil servants who participate in defining the specifications of calls for tenders and in the decisions of the awarding commissions must have. Article 89 of the Code establishes a Public Procurement Ethics Committee. It is responsible in particular for pronouncing administrative sanctions against all public procurement bodies or any other persons or organizations involved in the preparation, award or execution of public contracts, having infringed the regulation of public contracts. [1].
Article 9 of Decree No. 2006-343 establishing the Code of Ethics for Public Procurement stipulates, moreover, “that it is prohibited to hold direct or indirect interests in a company bidding or holding a contract or carry out any activity likely to place them in a situation of real, potential or apparent conflict, of a pecuniary or moral nature, between their personal interests and the public interest, in the service of which they exercise their functions.” The same article specifies that “Appended to the individual commitment to respect the Code of Ethics is a declaration on honor disclosing all the interests that he has directly or indirectly in companies likely to be candidates for public procurement [2]. And finally to combat acts of corruption, annual training is provided to officials in charge of public procurement [3]. All these provisions apply to the defence sector.

A full audit trail exists to determine which officials were involved in the selection of suppliers, the design of specifications and the decisions to award contracts [1]. Therefore, a verification system makes it possible to know which officials are involved in the decisions to award contracts. It is up to the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, which enjoys administrative and financial autonomy, to carry out this audit [2].

The legal framework for public procurement is clear and applies to all stages leading to the award of public contracts. Transparency concerns tender committees (their members, the entire process), so that contract awards are as transparent as possible. [1][2]

The ARPM always carries out checks between the drafting of the specific specifications of calls for tender. Audit missions are thus carried out. It verifies compliance of procedures with the general principles of economy, efficiency, fairness and transparency. It also provides an opinion on the quality of contracts, including technical and economic aspects[1]. Sometimes, an external firm helps the ARPM in its audits [2]. The ARPM may controlled the defence sector.

Military and civilian procurement officers are all subject to restrictions on professional activity under the law. This is a general ban imposed on these officers to prevent conflicts of interest, risks of corruption and others. In fact, civil servants who participate in defining the specifications of calls for tenders or in the decisions of the award committees are, in fact, subject to regulations and codes of conduct aimed at avoiding conflicts of interest. This is the case for Article 22 et seq. of the Public Procurement and Service Delegation Code,[1] which deals with conflicts of interest. The same is true for Article 29 et seq. of the same code, which deals with corruption. Even if defence sector contracts are of a particular nature and are excluded from the scope of the Public Procurement Code, the provisions relating to conflicts of interest and corruption remain general. Furthermore, the law establishing the code of ethics and professional conduct for public administration employees requires civil servants who participate in defining the specifications of calls for tenders or in the decisions of the award committees to behave in an exemplary manner.[2] Seminars or capacity building sessions are often organised for staff in charge of conducting contracts; these sessions or seminars focus on the effective, efficient and transparent management of procedures.[3][4]

The legislation requires the documentation of the supplier selection procedure and the definition of specifications for calls for tender.[1][2] This documentation process provides information on the profile of the officials who participated in the section and the definition of specifications. This information is not made public in the defence and security sector.There is very little information on the practice but the procedure is followed to a minimum, because with each change of regime there have been audits and people have been worried for non-compliance with the procedure or misappropriation of public funds (sources have been cited in this sense above).[3][4]

The legislation requires tendering commissions to be fully transparent in the conduct of the process.[1] The lack of visibility on the process in the defence and security sector does not confirm the transparency and sincerity of the procedure.[2] Indeed, the code of conduct and transparency requires transparency in the operation of tender commissions, otherwise they will be subject to criminal law. In fact, it has happened that commissions have been criticised for lack of transparency. The commissions set up for the purchase of military equipment and the presidential plane have been accused of lacking transparency. Some members of the commissions have been brought to justice and some have recently been sentenced to prison terms, while others have been acquitted due to insufficient evidence against them.[3]

No control or audit report has been made public for the period 2020-2024, and the annual reports or mission reports of the various audit or control bodies do not mention any mission, evaluation or control in the defence and security sector.[1]

The officials involved in drafting tender specifications or making decisions by the tender board are subject to regulations or codes of conduct designed to prevent conflicts of interest, such as the Public Probation Law [1], the Corruption Prevention Law [2], the Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption [3], the Statute of the Military of the Armed Forces of Defence of Mozambique [4], and the Military Discipline Regulations in Mozambique [5]. The Centre for Public Integrity, a CSO that works in the areas of transparency, anti-corruption, integrity and good governance points out that there are many conflicts of interest (access to the salaries of ghost soldiers, facilities in contracts for non-operational goods and services such as food and uniforms, contracts with PSCs and PMCs involved in combating terrorism) in the awarding of public works contracts, supply of goods and provision of services to the State [6]. There is no evidence of annual trial of the acquisition staff, but the annual meeting of the army, navy, and air force serves as a platform to review and assess procurement activities [7].

The National Defence Inspectorate follows an audit trail to track employees involved in the selection of suppliers and bidding specifications [1]. This process has led to cases where employees were arrested for bypassing established procurement procedures, particularly when acquiring goods and services without signing contracts, citing military contingency and urgency as justification [2]. However, the State Secrets Law imposes restrictions on access to defence sector information, which hinders effective scrutiny and limits public oversight [3, 4].
An example is the case of five senior officials from the Ministry of Defence, who were accused of embezzling more than 50 million meticais. They allegedly authorised fund transfers to companies supposedly contracted for public works and procurement, without issuing tenders or signing contracts, again using military contingency and urgency as justification [2]. However politicians’ roles are untraceable due to secrecy laws, such as the Military Secrets Act.

The regulations and codes of conduct of the tendering committees are only partially transparent for defence products and services related to operational matters because they are protected by the legislation on military secrets and state secrets [1, 2]. Section 4.2.1. of article 4 of Decree No. 79/2022, of December 30, which approves the Regulation for the Contracting of Public Works Contracts, Supply of Goods and Provision of Services to the State, stipulates that the Tender Committee is required to observe the principles of independence,
impartiality and exemption from any potential conflict of interest in respect of the bids [3, 4]. However, in the case of the defence sector, the State Secrecy Law may apply.
Furthermore, implementation of contracts demonstrate the existence of opacity, as was the case with PSCs and PMCs operating in Cabo Delgado [5].

There is almost no external verification of specifications regarding the suitability of tenders for the processes and procedures that regulate the contracting of public works contracts, acquisition of goods and provision of services to the state [1]. External scrutiny is challenging because legislation on military secrets and state secrets [2, 3] and the culture of secrecy established in Defence and Security institutions restriction information access. In the case of “Hidden Debts”, the Parliamentary Committee for Defence, Security and Public Order and the CSOs had enormous difficulties in carrying out external scrutiny of the process, due to restrictions on access to information considered strategic by the Defence and Security Sector [4]. In the Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to Investigate the Situation of Public Debt, in 2016, it was clear that the bidding councils operated outside the regulations and codes of conduct that regulate the contracting of Public Works Contracts, Supply of Goods and Provision of Services to the State and the regulations that guide the acquisition of defence and security products [5].

Niger’s 2013 decree on defence procurement established formal regulations and codes of conduct for tender boards, with measures to prevent conflicts of interest. Articles 28-29 of the decree outline the composition of tender boards, specifying that they must consist of three to five experts chosen based on their expertise, with one representative from the beneficiary service [1]. The decree explicitly prohibits conflicts of interest, requiring that any board member with a conflict of interest be immediately replaced; failure to do so results in the cancellation of the tender board [1]. Additionally, Article 30 mandates that tender board members sign a certificate of commitment to follow the regulations outlined in the Code of Ethics, which includes confidentiality and anti-corruption obligations that persist even after the end of the contract [2]. However, the February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) significantly weakened these safeguards by exempting defence and security-related expenditures from public procurement laws and financial oversight [3]. This effectively eliminated the role of tender boards in military procurement, as contracts can now be awarded at the discretion of military authorities, bypassing competitive bidding and regulatory scrutiny. This legal shift renders previous anti-corruption and conflict of interest provisions largely irrelevant in practice. Before February 2024, tender board members were formally subject to regulations and codes of conduct designed to prevent conflicts of interest. However, the recent ordinance has effectively dismantled procurement oversight mechanisms in the defense sector, making these regulations obsolete in practice.

Niger’s 2013 decree on defence procurement formally established a posteriori control mechanisms for contracts awarded through direct negotiation, as outlined in Article 35. This provision states that such contracts are subject to ex-post oversight, in accordance with Articles 77 and 78 [1]. However, these articles do not provide any specifications on how such oversight should be conducted, leaving the implementation of these controls ambiguous and unenforceable in practice. Although the procurement oversight mechanism is formally structured, its effectiveness is questionable. Article 71 of the 2013 decree states that the Inspector General of the Army (IGA) or equivalent bodies conduct biannual inspections of military contracts, with confidential reports submitted to the President and Prime Minister [1]. Additionally, the Court of Accounts theoretically had the authority to investigate procurement irregularities. However, there is no evidence that any of these bodies maintain an accessible audit trail detailing individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection, or tender awards. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) further dismantled existing procurement controls, effectively exempting defense and security-related expenditures from public procurement laws [2]. This removed the requirement for competitive bidding, eliminated oversight mechanisms, and granted authorities unrestricted discretion to award contracts. The lack of procedural clarity in the 2013 decree, coupled with the elimination of procurement controls under Ordinance No. 2024-05, ensures that no meaningful audit trail exists to scrutinizse defence procurement processes.

Tender board procedures in Niger lack full transparency, particularly in the defence and security sector, where procurement decisions remain highly classified. While the 2013 decree on defence procurement formally established a tender board for negotiations, the acquisition plan is classified as “top secret”, and there is no publicly available information on how procurement decisions are made [1]. Tender board regulations and codes of conduct are accessible, as the code of ethics is available on the website of the Regulatory Agency on Public Procurements, and board regulations are covered under Chapter V (Articles 20-34) of the 2013 decree [1]. However, Article 30 of Decree No. 2013/570/PRN/PM requires tender board members to maintain strict confidentiality over procurement decisions, even after the conclusion or cancellation of contracts [1]. This confidentiality clause acts as a significant barrier to transparency, preventing public scrutiny of supplier selection, contract allocation, and procurement justifications. Furthermore, the February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) exacerbated the opacity in procurement processes, as it exempted defence-related acquisitions from public procurement laws [2]. This effectively removed the requirement for competitive bidding and independent oversight, further limiting transparency. Although tender board regulations and codes of conduct are formally accessible, the confidentiality clauses embedded in the procurement framework significantly hinder transparency. Additionally, the complete exemption of defense contracts from public oversight under Ordinance No. 2024-05 further weakens transparency.

In Niger, there is no external verification of tender specifications in the defence and security sector. While the 2013 decree on defense procurement provides a formal framework for procurement oversight, there is no evidence that an autonomous body, such as Parliament or the Court of Accounts, systematically verifies whether tender specifications are appropriate [1]. Article 71 of the decree assigns a posteriori control to the Inspector General of the Army (IGA), who submits confidential reports to the President and Prime Minister, but this does not constitute independent external oversight [1]. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) further weakened any remaining procurement scrutiny by removing defense contracts from public procurement laws and allowing authorities to award contracts without competition or external oversight [2]. This legal change completely excludes external institutions from reviewing procurement specifications, eliminating any independent verification mechanisms. Moreover, Parliament’s role in defence oversight was entirely suspended following the military coup on July 26, 2023, and there is no indication that the Court of Accounts or other audit institutions have reviewed defense tenders since the transition to military rule. Given this lack of external verification and independent scrutiny, tender specifications remain unchecked, creating a high risk of mismanagement, inefficiency, and corruption in defence procurement.

The MOD’s Tenders Board is under the Procurement Department. Although officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest, many defence contracts are classified as sensitive, limiting the ability of independent auditors to fully scrutinize the processes. Trainings are sometimes organised for procurement officers in the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) [1]. These training programmes organised by the Bureau of Public Procurement on a yearly basis to ensure that the public procurement system fulfills its purpose in a way that the federal government ensures the right allocation or use of resources [1]. However, the claim of national security is often used to bypass the usual procurement regulations which entrenches excessive secrecy that enables conflict of interests to thrive or outright diversion of money from the defence budget for personal benefit or political patronage [2]. In January 2024, CISLAC lauded the judgment of the Royal Court in Jersey that ordered the seizure of $8.9million that was siphoned off by corrupt Nigerian officials from funds meant to be used to equip the country’s military in its fight against terrorism. TI-DS, also applauded the Royal Court’s decision, noting that “this case underscores the pervasive risks of corruption in the defence sector, where the secrecy and complexity inherent in international arms deals, coupled with the large amounts of money at stake, create an environment ripe for abuse of office” [3].

While regulatory frameworks do exist, including the Public Procurement Act (2007), its application within the defence sector is inconsistent. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) does not typically disclose its spending breakdown, which frustrates efforts by civil society and oversight institutions to assess procurement decisions and monitor the flow of defence funds [1]. The Office of the Auditor-General for the Federation (OAuGF) performs regularity audits covering most MDAs, including defence. However, reports indicate that MDAs do not consistently prepare standalone financial statements [3], which hampers the creation of reliable audit trails.
Moreover, although Auditor General’s reports are constitutionally required and occasionally submitted, they are often delayed, not integrated into legislative defence reviews, and rarely acted upon by the executive [2].
While public procurement regulations suggest that these boards should maintain records and conduct processes transparently, defence procurement is frequently exempted under the “national security” clause, making meaningful audits difficult.

Tender boards in Nigeria’s defence sector are formally guided by the Public Procurement Act (2007), which mandates the establishment of Ministerial Tenders Boards (MTBs) and procurement planning committees in all federal ministries, including the Ministry of Defence. These boards are required to operate under established procurement procedures, including competitive bidding, transparency of evaluation criteria, and adherence to codes of conduct [1]. There is also a Code of Conduct which applies to all public officers involved with public procurement [2].
However, in practice, the defence sector frequently invokes national security exemptions, which results in opaque processes, limited competition, and a lack of public visibility on awarded contracts. Many tenders are categorized as “classified,” and therefore fall outside the scrutiny of the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) and external audit bodies.
This selective transparency has fueled a perception that the defence procurement system operates above regulatory frameworks. Regulations are often circumvented in the awarding of defence contracts, contributing to a culture of impunity and perceived untouchability of the military establishment [3][4].
While tender board regulations and codes of conduct technically exist, and there is some evidence of partial transparency, they are rarely enforced rigorously in defence-related procurements.

The NASS has the authority to supervise defence procurement and spending, especially through the Public Accounts Committees [1]. However, due to political constraints, the complexity of defence procurement, and limited access to comprehensive information, sustained scrutiny is infrequent and ineffective in practice. As the most notable arms procurement scandal shows, Nigeria’s political elites or politicians are not only often involved in corrupt deals, they promote them [2, 3]. In fact, politicians have a number of ways to systematically interfere with the procurement process and guarantee their own participation in corrupt arrangements [4]. In this way, they can even frustrate efforts at thorough scrutiny. Even the report of the Auditor General’s Office that should serve as a veritable working tool for the NASS in its oversight responsibility is hardly available in a timely manner to encourage proper oversight of the relevance and specifications of the tender. Between 2020 and 2023, for instance, the NASS Committees on Public Accounts did not receive an Auditor-General’s report due to the absence of a substantive Auditor General for the Federation (AuGF) [5]. Without a substantive AuGF, it is possible that many agencies will be spending money without control and not reporting their finances.

Procurement unit staff are recruited through a competitive and transparent procedure from among staff in the A hierarchy or of equivalent status. Before being recruited, they are subject to a character test and must take an oath before the regional court following their appointment. [1] In the procedure manual, there are rules or codes of conduct concerning conflicts of interest. Officials responsible for drawing up the specifications or members of the tendering committee are supposed to know this because the manual is made available to them. All committee members must sign the declaration of non-conflict of interest. Members of technical committees for the study and evaluation of bids, as well as experts, are bound by the same obligations of declaration of conflict of interest and secrecy as members of procurement committees. They must sign a declaration of awareness of the Charter of Ethics and Responsible Public Procurement, which will be appended to each evaluation report they produce. [3]
The contracting authorities shall ensure the regular operation of internal control services and shall take all necessary steps to bring about the intervention, where appropriate, of external control bodies, whether administrative or judicial, while taking care to preserve the balance between the need for control and the need for efficiency. Sanctions provided for in the regulations must be applied to those responsible for misconduct in the awarding or execution of public contracts.[2] The control is robust even if we can mention few limits. The public procurement code prohibits collusion between civil servants and biddersconflict of interest. [3]
The ARMP (Public Procurement Regulatory Authority) of Senegal offers training courses for its staff and for external stakeholders involved in public procurement. These courses aim to strengthen the skills and knowledge of ARMP staff and other relevant stakeholders, particularly in the areas of regulation, investigations and public procurement. [4]

Control of public procurement in Senegal is carried out by public procurement bodies within the contracting authority. There are also various forms of control by the commissions responsible for awarding contracts.[1] There are a number of criteria that suppliers must meet in order to apply for a public tender, and the purchasing staff responsible for selecting suppliers and drawing up tender specifications take the trouble to carry out an investigation to ensure that the chosen supplier meets all the pre-established conditions.[2] ARCOP (ex-ARMP)’s mission is to regulate the system for awarding public contracts and public service delegation agreements. The purpose of this regulatory mission is to issue opinions, proposals or recommendations as part of the definition of policies and assistance with the drafting of regulations relating to public contracts and public service delegations, to contribute to the provision of information, to the training of all those involved in public procurement, to the development of the professional framework and to the evaluation of the performance of those involved in the procurement system, execution and control of public contracts and public service delegations, to carry out investigations, to implement independent audit procedures, to sanction irregularities found, to proceed with the non-judicial settlement of disputes arising from the award of public contracts and public service delegations, or to issue opinions as part of the amicable settlement of disputes arising from their execution. [3]

The Public Procurement code and others documents which provide some regulations are publicly available online. [1] [2] However, there is no transparency on all the procedures particularly regarding defence procurement.

ARCOP (ex-ARMP) publishes annual reports, audit findings, and decisions, which include reviews of procurement processes—even in defence, though details may be limited for security reasons. ARCOP (ex-ARMP) is an independent administrative authority with financial and management autonomy. As such, it can initiate any investigation into irregularities or breaches of regulations made by some officials, in the field of public procurement and public service delegations, and refer any infringements to the relevant authorities. [1] A unit was created by Decree 2009-510 of 29 May 2009, which sets out the recruitment procedures, status and powers of ARCOP (ex-ARMP) staff responsible for investigating the regularity of procedures for awarding and executing public contracts, public service delegations and partnership contracts. The said decree lays down the conditions of appointment and obligations of the members of the unit, as well as its composition and powers, and also describes the conduct of the investigators’ missions. The ARCOP (ex-ARMP) is keen to equip and train those involved in public procurement with the knowledge and technical skills they need to guarantee sincerity, transparency and efficiency in public spending. It has created a multi-disciplinary Master’s degree in Management and Regulation of Public Procurement, with the aim of training enrolled professionals to enhance their skills in: Identifying and planning the different stages of a public contract; Analyzing the principles of public contract regulation; Mastering the rules of transparency and efficiency in the award and execution of public contracts; Using the standards of good governance. [2] There are external verification mechanisms to ensure the relevance of tender specifications.[3][4] The Central Public Procurement Directorate (DCMP) is responsible for conducting a priori checks on public procurement procedures, including the compliance of consultation documents, which includes specifications. [5]

Officials in sensitive positions such a procurement are required to submit financial disclosures to a central system [1] and all state employees are prohibited from engaging in business with the state which prohibits procurement officials from contracting with the state [2]. Likewise bidders are required to disclosure conflict of interests as part of their bids. In practice, however, the Auditor-General has found non-compliance with bidders failing to provide disclosure forms, and procurement officials failing to submit financial disclosures [3]. It is unclear how regularly training is provided on managing conflicts of interest, but the lack of compliance with existing provisions may be an indication that training is either ineffective or not conducted regularly.

In the Auditor-General’s latest report for the Department of Defence it was indicated that the Auditor-General ” was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that all contracts were awarded in accordance with the legislative requirements as department did not have proper record keeping in place. Similar limitations were also reported in the prior year” [1]. This is despite National Treasury requirements to maintain appropriate records for auditing. [2]

Regulations for supply chain management processes are publicly available [1]. The main document is the 2003 National Treasury Regulations for Supply Chain Management, issued under the PFMA. [1] These regulations explicitly apply to national departments, including Defence, and lay out:
– The composition and functioning of Bid Adjudication Committees and Tender Boards
– Roles of supply chain management officials
– Requirements for competitive bidding, declaration of interests, and conflict-of-interest management
– Mechanisms to review, cancel, or adjust tenders

Additionally, the Public Service Regulations of 2016 (updated as of Nov 2023) set out a mandatory Code of Conduct for all public service employees.[2] This code addresses ethical behavior, accountability, and restrictions on accepting gifts or acting under conflicts of interest.

The Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) conducts routine audits of the Department of Defence (DoD), including reviewing procurement processes, tender specifications, and contract awards to ensure alignment with legal requirements. [1] The Auditor-General is comprehensive and well-regarded for the quality of its auditing and independence. [2]
According to the 2022/23 DoD Annual Report, the AG’s audit process included a review of procurement transactions to assess compliance with the PFMA, Treasury Regulations, and SCM prescripts. Deviations from competitive processes were evaluated for justification and correctness. In multiple cases, poor specification design and lack of competitive processes were noted as material irregularities [1].

Section 18 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018 addresses the issue of conflict of interest in public procurement with clear directives. Section 36 of the Act is clear that defence and security institutions are also guided by the same Act. Section 18(1) mandates that any member of the Board who holds a direct or indirect interest in a matter under consideration by the Board must disclose the nature of this interest [1]. This disclosure is required to be formally recorded in the minutes of the Board. Furthermore, the member in question is prohibited from participating in any discussions or decisions related to the matter in which they have an interest. The act provides that any board member who fails to disclose their conflict of interest will be removed from the board. Similarly, Section 18(2) reinforces this requirement, emphasizing that any Board member with a vested interest must disclose it, ensuring transparency and impartiality in the Board’s proceedings [1]. On the issue of training, there is no information of the defence ministry website indicating training on conflict of interest has been conducted to tender boards [2].

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2018 has important provisions that can provide some audit trail for officials involved in the selection of suppliers. Section 57, (5), Section 71 (c) (5) and Section 78, (1) (2) (3) provides for a code of conduct, how bids are to be opened and how solicitation in request of quotations are to be managed respectively [1]. These provisions if followed to the letter should provide a trail of which officials are involved in the process of selecting suppliers. In addition, the South Sudan Audit Chamber Act, 2011 section 12 (4) (c) gives the Auditor General powers to call any public officer to explain and answer questions related to audit. Such a process is likely to give the auditor the ability to examine the role of the officer in the audit process [2]. While the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDAA) is mandated to oversee classified procurements (Sect 8 of the PPDA Act 2018) [2], in practice procurement at Ministry of Defence & Veterans Affairs remains opaque, with officials frequently bypassing formal oversight and leaving no traceable record of participation in key procurement decision leaving oversight agencies a challenging access to audit trails. [3]

With the existing Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act (2018) [1] and the South Sudan Audit Chamber Act, 2011 [2] tender boards are required to be transparent in their conduct and processes. These regulations require members of tender boards to declare any conflict of interest, to publish tenders and for the tendering process to be subjected to audit. However, an examination of local, regional and international media did not reveal any documents that suggest tender boards that have violated this requirement have been investigated or tried. This is particularly true for the defence and security apparatus which have been accused of acquiring new equipment without being transparent with their process [3]. Therefore, regulations exist and are publicly accessible as they contain provisions for transparency and ethics, but lack of enforcement and poor implementation limits full transparency.

In theory, there are multiple layers of scrutinising tender process in South Sudan according to the existing laws. For example, the South Sudan Audit Chamber gives the Auditor General robust powers to scrutinise and audit activities that involve public finance. Section 12 (3) allows for the Auditor General to receive requests for audit from the Government of Southern Sudan Public Accounts Committee, the Southern Sudan States Public Accounts Committees, the Local Government Authorities Accounts Committees and any other Committee of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly [1]. The existing institutions would be appropriate for scrutinising tenders, however most of these audit institutions in South Sudan have continued to face challenges such as financial and human resources [2]. Although the Ministry of Finance’s Procurement Policy Unit is legally tasked with overseeing procurement processes, its authority over defence-related contracts is extremely limited [3]. Furthermore, there are no publicly available records—such as evaluations or review reports—that document external verification that specifications of the tender are appropriate [4].

Section 37 (6) of the PPDA Act, mandates the Evaluation Committee members to sign a Code of Ethics and declare the absence of conflicts of interest. This establishes a foundational principle of integrity within public procurement. The presumption that public officers are individuals of integrity, coupled with the requirement to declare sources of income/wealth, further reinforces this ethical framework. Periodic training for appointed officials and specific regulations or codes of conduct for those involved in tender specifications and board decisions are intended to prevent conflicts of interest. Additionally, procurement officials are subject to restrictions on professional activities, including limitations on involvement with contracting firms and post-employment restrictions, and are required to file financial disclosure reports [1].
While the PPDA Code of Ethics mandates such declarations and ethical conduct, there is no statutory requirement in the PPDA Act for annual training on conflict of interest. PPDA has confirmed in public resources and capacity-building reports that it conducts periodic workshops and targeted training sessions for procurement entities, including MoDVA officers, but these are not necessarily annual or universal [1].
However, the effectiveness of these measures hinges on their rigorous implementation and enforcement. While the legal framework and training programmes are in place, the reality is that conflicts of interest can be difficult to detect, especially in environments where transparency is limited. The reliance on self-declaration and financial disclosure reports assumes a high degree of honesty, which may not always be present. The lack of public access to these disclosures and the confidentiality surrounding evaluation processes can hinder external oversight and create opportunities for abuse. Furthermore, the effectiveness of annual training programmes depends on their quality and the extent to which they are reinforced by a culture of ethical conduct within the procurement system. Therefore, while the legal and procedural safeguards are in place, continuous vigilance, robust enforcement, and a commitment to transparency are essential to ensure that conflicts of interest are effectively prevented and addressed [2].

The PPDA Act and Regulations require procuring entities to maintain a complete audit trail documenting all stages of the procurement process — from needs assessment and specifications through supplier selection, award, and contract management. The PPDA Regulations (Reg. 24 & 25) require these records to be retained for at least five years and made available to oversight bodies, including the Auditor General, Inspectorate of Government, and Parliamentary committees [1].
However, due to the classified nature of military purchases, certain transactions are exempt from standard documentation and reporting requirements. These exemptions create gaps in the audit process, limiting full transparency and independent oversight [2][3]. Audit reports have access to some defence procurement information as outlined in the 2024 report, but does provide specifications to access to audit trails [4].
As a result, while the UPDF has made efforts to professionalise its procurement processes and maintain records, the audit trail remains incomplete and subject to restrictions. A fully transparent and independently verifiable audit trail is essential to ensure that defence procurements are conducted fairly, accountably, and efficiently.

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) requires all public procurement entities, including the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA), to operate under the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct for Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets. This code is publicly available on the PPDA website and contains explicit ethics provisions for tender boards and evaluation committees [1].
However, while the PPDA Code applies to all government tender boards, there is no evidence that the UPDF/MoDVA publishes a standalone tender board regulation or internal code of conduct specific to defence procurement [1]. In practice, MoDVA tender board members operate under the PPDA Code and relevant sections of the PPDA Act [2], but internal implementation guidelines are not publicly available.

The involvement of the Auditor General’s office and the PPDA in auditing and reviewing UPDF procurement processes provides a layer of robust external verification. The Auditor General’s annual audits of financial statements and procurement processes, culminating in comprehensive reports with findings and recommendations, offer a vital check on the financial management of the UPDF [1]. Similarly, the review by the PPDA and verification of the UPDF tender specifications, aimed at ensuring compliance with national procurement regulations.[2].
These mechanisms provide robust external verification of procedural compliance and financial accountability, but their ability to assess the appropriateness of specific technical specifications is constrained by:
– Classified procurement rules, which limit disclosure and sometimes restrict full access to operational justifications.
– Technical complexity of military acquisitions, which may require specialist military expertise not always available in audit teams. [3][4].
The fact that oversight often focuses on process (This is particularly true in the context of classified military procurements, where the Auditor General and PPDA may face limitations in accessing sensitive information. Therefore, while the external verification processes are robust in ensuring procedural compliance and financial accountability, the assessment of the appropriateness of specific tender specifications may be constrained by the inherent secrecy surrounding defence procurements and the technical complexity of military equipment [3].

The Defence Procurement Act [Chapter 11:03] established the Defence Procurement Fund which is responsible for the purchase and sale of equipment [1]. The Defence Procurement board works with the Minister of Defence and the Commander, and the Director of procurement usually rank of a Brigadier General [2]. This is the top step involved in the procurement process. However, at the bottom there are officers trained in procurement, and they belong to the Directorate of Procurement through they are posted to different units [2]. Although there is the defence procurement board working with the commanders, junior soldiers do not have a decision of their own because the military and the defence forces works on orders, and senior officers order junior soldiers on what to do even on procurement [3]. Thus, even though the Public Procurement and Disposal Act and the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act, guides the procurement process on good governance [4], the military does not have a code of conduct in the procurement process.

Section 69 (1) (2a-g) provides that procuring entity shall keep a separate record for each procurement, the “procurement record”, which shall be marked with a reference number for easy identification. The procurement record shall contain accurate copies of all documents and communications related to the procurement concerned and shall include at least the following- (a) a description of the procurement requirement; and (b) a list of the participating bidders and their qualifications; and (c) any requests for clarifications and any responses thereto; and (d) where applicable, a statement of the reason for choosing a procurement method other than competitive bidding or request for proposals; and (e) the bid prices; and (f) a summary of the evaluation of bids; and (g) a summary of any review proceedings, and the resulting decisions [1]. The decision made on their submission, and reasons for such decisions should be made available to the bidders, including the losing bidder [1]. This information is not only for the bidders but to the auditors as well [2]. However, such a trail of records and information is not made available to the auditors and the Auditor General’ office. It is not available to the Parliament either, specifically the parliamentary portfolio of the Committee on Defence, Security and Home Affairs [2].

Under the PPDPA, public entities, ncluding those in the defence sector, are legally required to maintain transparent tender processes. Section 66 mandates that procurement documents must be retained, and procurement decisions—, including details on successful and unsuccessful bidders and the rationale for selection—, should be recorded. The Act also outlines the establishment of Procurement Management Units (PMUs) and Special Procurement Oversight Committees (SPOCs) to bolster transparency and accountability in larger or sensitive procurements [1][2].
Furthermore, the PPDPA and related Procurement Regulations specify clear tender board procedures:
a) tender board must be constituted within each procuring entity, comprising suitably senior members and excluding key operational staff like accounting officers and heads of procurement.
b) tender boards are responsible for evaluating bids, including the right to require modifications, minority votes, and providing justifications for award decisions.

The public procurement authority (PRAZ) is empowered to access these tender records and compel compliance, including through publication of award notices and validation of bidding processes [1].
Despite these legal frameworks, in practice the defence sector does not publish defence-specific procurement plans or tender board regulations. Defence procurement documents such as evaluation reports, minority opinions, or unsuccessful bids are not publicly accessible. Formal requests for defence procurement records are typically denied, with minimal transparency about tender board deliberations [2].

Section 69 (2) of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act provides that the tender process documents must be accessible to external verification and review [1]. The scrutiny includes responding to question parliament (Committee on Defence, Security and Home Affairs) might have over the procurement process and documentation therein as provided by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [1]. This is also in line with section 26 of Public Entities Corporate Governance Act [Chapter 10:31], which states that all board of public entities should ensure good governance on procurement process [2]. However, the defence forces tender process documents are difficult to access, and they are not made easily available for external audit and assessment [3].