The Public Procurement Code prohibits any participation in collusion practices between tenderers in order to set the prices of tenders at artificial and non-competitive levels in order to deprive the contracting authority of the advantages of free and open competition [1] [2] [3].

The Public Procurement Code clearly provides penalties against bidders and public officials, including defence and security officers, involved in fraudulent acts in the context of public procurement. Candidates, tenderers or contract recipients are liable to the following penalties, which may be imposed, as the case may be, cumulatively: confiscation of the guarantees provided by the offender in the context of the incriminated competitive tendering procedures; exclusion from competition for a period determined according to the seriousness of the misconduct committed, including in the case of collusion duly found by the regulatory body; the withdrawal of their approval and/or qualification certificate [1]. As for public officials, they are punished by a prison sentence of five to ten years, any public official who intentionally fails to comply with one or more legislative or regulatory provisions intended to guarantee freedom of access and equality of candidates in public contracts [2]. These sanctions do not prevent disciplinary sanctions, prosecution for corruption and fines depending on the nature of the offence [3]. In the specific field of defense we do not have the elements. But in other public contracts in particular, cases of conflicts of interest have led to the exclusion of bidders [4].

The cases are investigated and sanctioned by the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) [1]. The ARMP is independent and is not subject to undue influence by third parties [2]. Criminal sanctions are imposed by the courts as a result of unsuccessful legal proceedings [3]. Sometimes attempts at undue political influence can be noted when the people involved have political links in the majority parties, but there is no evidence whether these attempts condition the authority’s decisions, especially in defence and security sector [3].

There is no specific, regular and mandatory training for the Procurement officials to identify collusion patterns and report potential malpractice. This is something discussed occasionally during various training sessions given by the public Procurement Regulatory Authority. [1] [2]The legislation mentions the responsibilities of actors in respecting procedures, it is not specifically mentioned that purchasing managers must undergo mandatory training to detect collusion. In practice, there are capacity building initiatives for public officials, including purchasing managers, organized by entities such as the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP). These training courses aim to improve their skills in public procurement management, compliance with ethical standards, and fraud prevention, including collusion [2].

Article 361.1 of the Public Procurement Code prohibits collusion between bidders. It states that bidders that engage in collusion practices will incur penalties[1]. However most public contracts are actually awarded to senior government officials who are represented by private individuals who only appear in the documents, whereas the real bidder is a government official. [2] [3]

In theory, officials have the authority to pubish collusion. According to article 362 of the the Public Procurement Code , various sanctions exist to punish collusion including exclusion and fines. Officials have the authority to proceed to the ” temporary or permanent exclusion from competition depending on the seriousness of the offence committed, including in cases of collusion established by the regulatory body” and the exclusion cannot exceed 5 years, except if it is a repeated offence, then permanent exclusion can be applie However, no guidelines seems to exist. [1][2][3]

According to discussions with various people, cases of collusion certainly exist, but they are not publisicised. [1] [2] [3].

There is no specific training on collusion for officials responsible for awarding public contracts [1] [2].

There is no legislation covering defence procurement that addresses collusion, and article 71 of the “Code des marchés publics” specifies that the Code does not apply to Defence procurement. The only legislation related to collusion is at article 197 of the “Code des marchés publics”.[1][2]

There is no legislation applicable to the defence sector, so this indicator is Not Applicable.[1][2]

There is no legislation applicable to the defence sector, so this indicator is Not Applicable.[1][2]

There are risks that some bidders may refuse to abide by competition rules and may collude to influence outcomes for their own benefit. Because of its harmful effects, collusion is punishable under Cameroonian law. To avoid or reduce the risk of collusion, procurement officials within the MINDEF are occasionally trained to recognise collusion patterns and report potential malpractice.s or irregularities.[1][2]

Article 155 of the Public Procurement Code penalises collusion between bidders. However, these rules are not specific to the defence sector and are widely circumvented by civil servants [1, 2]. No evidence of training on collusion has been found.

Bidders found guilty of collusion may be excluded from public procurement by the regulatory body, either permanently or for a specified period [1]. Penalties are provided for in public procurement legislation and the military court may deal specifically with this issue for military personnel [2].

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. No verifiable and publicly available cases specifically involving collusion in defence procurement have been officially reported or prosecuted in Côte d’Ivoire since 2020 [1, 2].

Procurement officials are occasionally trained to identify collusive practices. The training covers all issues related to corruption and is provided by the Armed Forces Commission, which deals specifically with public procurement. Issues related to identifying collusion mechanisms are addressed along with most of the major themes in financial ethics, such as the fight against corruption and conflicts of interest [1, 2, 3]. This training is generally combined with the training offered by the Autorité Régulation de la Commande Publique (ARCOP, formerly ANRMP) and the Direction Générale des Marchés Publics (DGMP). Indeed, ARCOP, with the support of its partners, organises training courses for public procurement officers, including those from the Ministries of Defence and the Interior. The most recent course focused on the professionalisation of public procurement in Côte d’Ivoire [4]. However, no information has been found showing that the training covers how to report cases of malpractice.

There is adequate legislation in place to discourage collusion in procurement, and the provisions in Section 22 of the Public Procurement (Amendment) Act 2016 set out the various modalities necessary for procurement to ensure standard ethical practices in the procurement process (1). Moreover, Article 284 states, “A public officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal interest conflicts or is likely to conflict with the performance of the functions of his office.” This clearly states the legal abhorrence to collusion between all parties within a procurement process, either public officers or private individuals who may be bidders, since their actions may not have to contravene any of the meanings of corruption as stated in the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). Despite the fact that there is a legal framework regulating procurement processes in Ghana that applies to all public institutions, it is limited in the case of defence procurement, since the section provides a confidentiality clause that limits transparency within defence and security contracts.

The Public Procurement (Amendment) Act in Section 22(1) states that “A tenderer in public procurement shall: (e) have directors or officers who have not in any country been (i) convicted of any criminal offence relating to their professional conduct or to making false statements or misrepresentations to their qualifications to enter into a procurement contract, within a period of ten years preceding the commencement of the procurement proceedings.” Therefore, this legislation advocates for the disqualification of a lead tenderer in any public procurement due to a conviction, while the subsequent provisions prohibit the submission of fabricated documents during the procurement process. (2)

Despite the existence of legal processes, there are no publicly available cases of defence personnel or their assigns being prosecuted for procurement breaches. Furthermore, the court martial’s proceedings and cases remain confidential. In cases of corruption and procurement breaches, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) reserves the mandate to evoke the powers of the Inspector General Office to investigate the issue, but the outcomes have rarely been made publicly available even within the military hierarchy (1) (2) (3) (4).

There is no publicly available information to suggest that there are training programs for officers to identify collusion patterns in the GAF. There are, however, standard practices and ethical considerations in the procurement processes, but nothing points to any form of personnel training. (1) (2) (3)

Section 66 of the PPADA prohibits collusion between bidders and procuring entities [1]. The MOD tender documents explicitly forbid collusive practices. Bidders must comply with the Competition Act 2010. Violators face disqualification and potential legal sanctions. Applicants must sign a “Certificate of Independent Tender Determination” to ensure compliance [2].

The MOD bidding documents exclude debarred entities from competing during the period where PPRA determines their ineligibility periods for debarred companies [1]. The PPRA is empowered to debar companies found with malpractice. Articles 66 and 41, which are part of the regulation, require bidders to abide by the code of ethics (see the forms) in standard tender documents. The independent determination form requires bidders to declare whether they independently prepared the bid without collusion or discussion with any other parties. Disqualification and debarment extend to directors—both company and natural directors—and any other legal entities where the director is the majority shareholder [2].

There is not enough information, particularly on the investigation and prosecution of collusion cases without undue influence, to score this indicator. Entities debarred have the right to seek judicial review at the High Court under Section 42 of the PPCA [1]. While the PPRA publishes a list of debarred companies, the information does not specify the sectors where malpractice occurred, making it difficult to determine whether any cases are linked to the defence sector. No specific defence procurement cases involving bidder collusion have been publicly reported in recent years. The only collusion-like references on the MoD website relate to internal employment malpractice rather than contractor misconduct [2]. Separately, media reporting, such as a February 2022 Star Kenya article, has raised concerns about mismanagement and irregularities in KDF food contracts, but this does not specifically point to collusion between bidders [3].

Despite consulting public records, official procurement reports, and media coverage, no evidence could be found on investigation or prosecution of collusion cases in the defence sector.

PPRA and Kenya Institute of Supplies Management (KISM) conducts quarterly training on ethical practices for supply chain and procurement professionals, collaborating with EACC, OAG, and DCI. KISM coordinates heads of procurement across the government. These sessions allow teams to share challenges and maintain standards. In 2024, KISM offered a course on “Enhancing Ethics in Public Procurement: A Collaboration with Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC).” Little information is provided on the course content. Thus, it is unclear whether procurement officials are trained to identify collusion patterns and report potential malpractice. Neither is it consipicuous if training is provided but it does not cover all the issues of collusion [1].

The PPCC law forbids collusion.[1] Under this law, specific provisions are designed to prevent collusion between bidders and public officials, and to safeguard the integrity of competitive bidding. For example under the section titled “Debarment of bidders, contractors and suppliers” the law states that, a) provision of material false information supplied in the process of submitting a bid; b) collusion between the bidder and another bidder or a bidder and a public officer concerning the formulation of any part of an invitation to bid, request for quotation or request for proposal or the related bidding documents or supply of information in the bid proceedings among others.

Additionally, Liberia’s anti-corruption legal regime reinforces these procurement laws. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) also include prohibitions on corrupt conduct, such as bribery and favouritism in contract award processes. To discourage collusion, the laws propose debarment as a form of sanction.[2][3]

In Liberia, PPCC officials have the authority to punish acts of corruption or collusion in procurement processes. Under the Amended and Restated Public Procurement and Concessions Act (2010), convictions for collusion or other procurement-related offences can result in imprisonment of up to five years and/or fines up to US $100,000, and such offences may also serve as grounds for debarment from public procurement.[1]
Some of the sanction involves debarment from all competition or debarment for a period of a year and a maximum period of six (6) years. The penalty is proportionate to the breach of the PPCC law.[2][3] Further reinforcing these measures, Liberia’s 2022 Anti-Corruption Act criminalises acts of corruption—including collusion between bidders—as criminal offences, broadening the legal remit for prosecution beyond administrative sanctions.[4]

Liberia’s procurement legislation under the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (2010) and the 2022 Anti-Corruption Act provides for sanctions against collusion, including debarment, fines, and criminal penalties. In practice, however, enforcement is inconsistent and has not been systematically demonstrated in the defence sector.
Recent investigations illustrate how collusion and circumvention are addressed across the public procurement system. The investigations, though not related to the defence sector, shed much light on the nature and practices of public procurement within the PPCC[1] For example, a Senate Joint Committee report in May 2024 uncovered that the Ministries of Public Works, Justice, and Finance awarded road contracts totalling US$22.4 million without adhering to competitive bidding procedures. The Executive Director of the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC) also approved these contracts without an allocated budget, raising concerns about the integrity of the procurement process.[2][3] Additionally, the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) investigated the Planned Parenthood Association of Liberia (PPAL) and found that officials conspired to establish a security company, PEWETA Security Inc., awarding it contracts without following PPCC procedures [4]. The former public officials were convicted for economic sabotage.
While these cases highlight that enforcement sometimes results in convictions, they remain exceptions rather than the rule. A World Bank diagnostic notes that Executive follow-up on GAC audit recommendations is neither monitored nor enforced, leaving little incentive to act on findings.[5] Moreover, civil society’s UNCAC shadow report flags political interference and obstruction affecting anti-graft institutions and the implementation of recommendations—consistent with uneven sanctioning in practice [6].
High-level interference often prevents the consistent application of sanctions, and there is no clear evidence of enforcement specifically in defence procurement.

Several training sessions have been conducted. However, this training might involve foundational topics and frequently asked questions, such as: what is procurement? What type of procurement? What method of procurement? These sessions aim to bring together ministries, agencies and commissions to build an understanding of the public procurement process.[1] Officials are trained to understand procedural steps, identify malpractices, and how to avoid common pitfalls in procurement.[2]

Article 8 of Decree No. 2006-343 establishing the Code of Ethics for Public Procurement stipulates that civil servants in charge of public procurement are bound “to an obligation of confidentiality and a strict duty of reserve in the context of any activity contributing to the procurement process or amicable or contentious settlement of disputes. To this end, it is prohibited to disclose any information on a contract or proposed contract, on a candidate and that likely to undermine the guiding principles. of public procurement decreed by the Public Procurement Code [1].
Article 91 of Law No. 2016-055 on the Public Procurement Code stipulates that sanctions are provided for any collusion between bidders and officials who have used confidential information as part of the tender procedure. [2].
The Guide to Preventing Corruption in the Public Procurement Process identifies this risk. In this case, this guide’s mission is to better train civil servants against any collusion [3].

The Law on the Public Procurement Code, in Title X, provides for sanctions. Article 90 stipulates in particular “the public procurement regulatory authority establishes quarterly a list of natural and legal persons ineligible for public procurement. This list is regularly updated, transmitted to the contracting authorities and published in the Journal des Marchés Publics and in the Official Journal. Fines as well as criminal proceedings are provided for in the event of non-compliance with the Public Procurement Code [1].
Article 20 of Decree No. 2006-343 establishing the Code of Ethics for Public Procurement stipulates that “without prejudice to applicable criminal sanctions, any failure to comply with the provisions of this Code of Ethics on the part of a Candidate or “a Holder will respectively result in a temporary exclusion of five years maximum or the termination of the market for wrongs and grievances” [2].

Cases of investigations exist and prosecutions have been launched but interference, particularly political interference, is also present. The Guide for the prevention of corruption in the public procurement process has notably identified this risk according to which the award of the contract could be influenced by authorities or elected officials or hierarchical leaders [1]. The case of three former ministers close to the political regime corroborates this state of affairs [2].

The Guide for the Prevention of Corruption in the Public Procurement Process details the types of corruption, potential actors and their descriptions. It also specifies preventive anti-corruption measures [1]. Public procurement officials receive training on the subject, although it does not cover all possible aspects [2].

The penal code, which applies to everyone, even military personnel, prohibits any form of collusion.[1] Similarly, the public procurement and service delegation code prohibits collusion in all procurement processes and the defence sector is not exempt from this regulation, even though the process in the defence and security sector is subject to a restricted framework that is likely to encourage the risk of collusion. In the event of proven collusion, offenders are exposed to criminal sanctions.[2] The definition given by the law to collusion involves both aspects (between officials and bidders and between bidders).

Collusion, according to the legislation, goes in the direction of relations between bidders and civil servants. The sanctions in the event of a proven case and according to the legislation range from exclusion from the process to the payment of fines or to imprisonment. The sanctions may range, depending on the case, from disciplinary proceedings to a ban on exercising a public function or imprisonment with or without a fine.[1][2]

Suspected or proven cases of collusion in the defence sector may be prosecuted. This was the case in 2022 in the context of suspicions of embezzlement (collusion, bribery and corruption) in the management of funds allocated in the implementation of the military orientation and programming law.[1][2][3] However, cases that are brought to the attention of the public constitute an exception.

The training or professional orientation of purchasing managers, even when it comes to military personnel, in principle means that they have knowledge or are trained[1][2] in identifying collusion schemes and reporting potential bad practices. Purchasing managers, in this case, the directors of finance and equipment, are appointed on the proposal of the Minister of Economy and Finance. In the case of the defence and security sector, the practice remains the appointment of a military officer by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Minister of Economy and Finance.[3] The frhequency of the training sessions is not fixed but they still take place.[4]

The country has general legislation to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for contracts in the public sector [1], where the Armed Forces are integrated through the Ministry of National Defence, the Police through the Ministry of the Interior and the Intelligence Service through the State Information and Security Service – SISE. In addition, there is anti-corruption legislation [2, 3] and the Public Probity Law [4]. In cases of collusion between bidders, the Anti-Corruption Law [5] and the Penal Code [6] provide for penalties of imprisonment from 6 months to five years or corresponding fines, while the Military Crimes Law [7] provides for the expulsion of members of the Armed Forces involved in this type of case.
While the legislation clearly covers both collusion between bidders and collusion between bidders and public officials, there is no publicly available evidence that procurement officials in the defence sector receive specialised training to identify collusion patterns or are required to report such malpractice as part of a systematic programme. Mozambique has hosted training workshops on corruption and procurement, such as those by ICAR targeting infrastructure corruption, but these are not explicitly about collusion detection by officials in the defence sector [8].

There are clear legislation and implementation guidelines that empower procurement officials to exclude companies and senior officials from companies where there is a conviction or reasonable evidence of bribery and corruption-related offences [1]. Entities with tax problems (tax clearance) [2] are excluded from the processes. However, there are cases of procedural deviations that have resulted in arrests and convictions [3]. Article 11 of the Anti-Corruption Law establishes the following sanctions: loss of assets or values unlawfully added to their assets; full compensation for damages caused; expulsion from the profession; fines, imprisonment from six months to five years; or prohibition from contracting with the State or public companies or from receiving benefits or tax or credit incentives [4]. For instance, five senior officials from the Ministry of Defence were accused of embezzling more than 50 million meticais, for having made transfers to companies, supposedly contracted, for public contracts and acquisition of goods for the state, without complying with the launch of the tender and without signing a contract, under the pretext of military contingency and urgency [3].

With the approval of the law that regulates the contracting of public works contracts, acquisition of goods and provision of services to the State, cases of Defence Sector employees being sanctioned for illicit practices and corruption in the bidding processes for products and services gradually begin to emerge [1]. Since the law’s adoption in 2022, one notable case involves five senior officials from the Ministry of Defence who are now facing justice for allegedly embezzling more than 50 million meticais. They are accused of transferring funds to companies contracted for public works and State acquisitions without launching a formal tender and without suspending the contract, citing military urgency and contingency as justification [2]. In the “Hidden Debts” case, in 2022, officers of the Defence and Security Forces were sentenced to up to 12 years in prison for crimes of corruption and money laundering during the acquisition of defence products to ensure maritime security in Mozambique’s Exclusive Economic Zone [3]. Although the conviction occurred in a year that does not cover the period under review, it is worth mentioning the 2017 case, where officials from the Ministry of Defence and the Army Command, involved in a scheme to embezzle 36 million meticais, were sentenced to terms ranging from 10 to 16 years in prison [4], but these are still incipient cases for the magnitude of the Defence and Security Sector.

There is not much experience and training on these materials, but occasionally, procurement officers are trained to identify patterns of collusion and report potential malpractice [1]. There is little specific training provided and what occurs most frequently is discussions in lectures and seminars, which do not cover all the issues of collusion, corruption and conflicts of interest in the Defence and Security Sector [2].

Niger’s 2013 decree on defence procurement includes legal provisions that prohibit collusion among bidders. Article 74.3 explicitly forbids collusion by defining it as an agreement between bidders to artificially fix prices at non-competitive levels, depriving the contracting authority of the benefits of free and open competition [1]. This provision aims to prevent anti-competitive practices in defense procurement, ensuring that bidders do not manipulate the tendering process to inflate prices or limit competition.
However, the February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) significantly undermined these legal safeguards by removing defence procurement from public procurement laws, effectively allowing contracts to be awarded without competition, oversight, or enforcement of anti-collusion provisions [2]. With defence contracts now exempt from regulatory scrutiny, the legal framework against collusion has become largely irrelevant in practice, as authorities can now directly negotiate contracts with selected suppliers without any competitive process. While Article 74.3 of the 2013 decree provides a legal basis for prohibiting collusion among bidders, the recent ordinance effectively nullifies this protection by eliminating competitive bidding in defence procurement.

Niger’s Decree No. 2013/570/PRN/PM, Article 75, Sections 1–6, establishes six specific sanctions that can be imposed on companies found guilty of bribery or corruption in defence procurement. These sanctions include temporary or permanent exclusion from future bids, financial penalties, contract cancellations, and legal actions [1]. However, the application of these sanctions requires the consent of the Prime Minister, which introduces a layer of political discretion in their implementation.
The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) significantly altered the procurement framework, as it exempted defence-related contracts from public procurement laws, removing the requirement for competitive bidding [2]. This change raises concerns about the relevance of existing sanctions, as defence contracts can now be awarded through direct negotiation, limiting the necessity of enforcing anti-corruption provisions related to bidding processes.

Despite the existence of legal provisions for sanctioning corruption in defense procurement, there is a complete failure to effectively investigate or prosecute cases, even in the face of clear evidence. The 2020 Ministry of defence audit exposed a large-scale corruption scandal involving overpriced military contracts, fraudulent tenders, and undelivered equipment, initially amounting to 76 billion FCFA (116 million EUR), later reduced to 12.1 billion FCFA (18.5 million EUR) after investigations [1]. However, no significant prosecutions followed, and many of those implicated in the scandal faced no legal consequences. Two former defense ministers, Mahamadou Karidjo and Kalla Moutari, along with businessmen Hima Aboubacar and Aboubacar Charfo, were named in the audit, as well as the name of the General Wally Karingama. The names of the coup-leading generals did not appear in the audit, but it was the case of the number two of the military regime, General Salifou Mody, who served as Chief of Staff from 2020 until April 2023 [2]. The military junta that seized power in 2023 claimed to prioritize good governance, yet key figures in the coup were senior officials in the armed forces during the 2020 scandal, raising serious doubts about their commitment to accountability. Instead of judicial prosecutions, the case was resolved through a financial settlement, meaning individuals responsible for corruption did not face meaningful punishment [3]. Furthermore, concerns over impunity have grown with the appointment of Alio Daouda as Minister of Justice, given his past role as president of the military tribunal, which has raised fears that corruption cases will continue to be overlooked [2].

In Niger, there is not enough evidence to assess that procurement officials receive training on identifying and preventing collusion in defense and security contracts. While the 2013 decree on defence procurement (Article 74.3) explicitly prohibits collusion between bidders, it does not outline any requirement for procurement officials to undergo training on detecting or addressing anti-competitive behavior [1]. Furthermore, the February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) removed defense procurement from standard public procurement regulations, eliminating the need for competitive bidding and, by extension, the necessity for officials to monitor collusion among suppliers [2]. Without structured training programs or mechanisms to enforce anti-collusion measures, procurement officials are not equipped to identify or prevent price-fixing, bid-rigging, or fraudulent supplier agreements.

Bureau of Public Procurement conducts public reviews and auditing to verify due process and fair and open competition. Part XI of the PPA provides for an extensive process which includes a Code of Conduct (1). Section 22 PPA 2007 provides that Tender Boards should be created in each procuring entity. Section 57(2) of the PPA 2007 imposes an obligation of honesty and accountability, transparency and accountability and equity on persons involved with public procurement (3). The Bureau of Public Procurement also has residual powers to review and recommend investigation of any matters related to the conduct of procurement. A bidder may, under section 54(1) PPA 2007, seek judicial review for any omission or breach by a procuring entity or disposing entity under the provisions of the Act [1]. In addition, the Competition and Consumer Protection Act aims to promote fair competition in Nigeria, including in public procurement. The Act prohibits anti-competitive practices, such as collusion and bid-rigging. The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) is responsible for enforcing this law and can impose penalties on companies or individuals found guilty of collusion [2].

The laws and regulations governing public procurement in Nigeria such as the PPA empowers relevant authorities to exclude companies or individuals implicated in bribery or corruption-related offenses from participating in procurement processes. Regulatory provisions in the PPA 2007 include the power of the Bureau to exclude or blacklist companies which have engaged in procurement malpractice [1]. Companies can be debarred and fined under the legislation. However, given that section 15(2) excludes goods and works and services involving defence or national security it is difficult to confirm the application of sanctions to defaulting companies in the context of defence specific goods and services. Whereas several legal frameworks exist that allow procurement officials authority to exclude companies or individuals involved in corruption and bribery, the grant of authority given to procurement officials is still rather limited, and the available sanctions are mostly badly wrought and undefined. Enforcement is also weak, and the inconsistent application of these measures undercuts effectiveness in anti-corruption efforts [2]. Defence and security procurement is not immune to these lapses.

While the legal framework allows for the exclusion of corrupt entities, enforcement can be inconsistent due to factors like political interference, corruption within the procurement process itself, and weak institutional capacity. In 2020, it was reported that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was investigating a case of diversion of public funds totalling N35bn at the Ministry of Defence. The money was reportedly meant for the procurement of items and equipment for the military in peacekeeping missions. The arms’ procurement fraud occurred in 2008 and the money was released from the Debt Management Office to the Ministry of Defence [1]. It was revealed that some contractors supplied substandard materials which were accepted by the ministry but could not be utilised even up until 2020, while other contracts were terminated after full contract sums were paid to the contractors without any refunds back to the MoD. Preliminary investigation by the EFCC allegedly indicted a former minister of defence and a former Chief of Staff to ex-President Goodluck Jonathan [2]. Three years after, there is no evidence that the investigation has been logically concluded as to commence diligent trial of firms and government officials complicity in the procurement fraud.

The Public Procurement Act 2007 empowers the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) to harmonizse existing government policies and practices in setting standards and developing the legal framework and professional capacity for public procurement in Nigeria. In line with its mandate, the BPP conducts capacity-building and training programmes to enhance the knowledge, competences and skills of procurement officers working within government MDAs [1]. In 2023, for instance, the BPP organised a three-week Continuous Procurement Capacity Development Training Programme (CPCDTP) for 400 personnel of parastatals, institutions, commissions and agencies of the Federal Government [2]. The Director of Research and Training and Strategic Learning of BPP, Mr Adebowale Adedokun, posited that the “training is the first line of capacity building that enables them to see the entire procurement system cycle, how it is organised from the beginning to the end and procurement officers have a big role to play in fighting corruption” [3]. Participants of training programmes organised for procurement officers by the BPP are subject to an examination, meant to prepare them for their roles as procurement officers in achieving organisational objectives, evaluate their procurement process knowledge, and formally induct them into the procurement cadre [4].

Collusion between bidders is punished by the Sengalese Public Procurement Code [2] . Public officials of all sectors including defense, found guilty of breaching regulations or complicity will be excluded from the procedures for awarding and executing public contracts, without prejudice to the disciplinary and penal sanctions provided for by the laws and regulations in force. Theses acts can be corrupt activities with regard to public officials in charge of awarding contracts; fraudulent maneuvers to obtain a contract; illegal agreements; unjustified relinquishment of a contract; failure to honour commitments [1] . Sanctions are provided for in articles 149 and 150.

The law states that in the event of violations of public procurement rules committed by candidates and contract holders, sanctions MAYmay be imposed on the persons responsible, not sanctions WILLwill be imposed on them. This seems to be it is not compulsory [1] . Article 149 of the Public Procurement code states that ” If violations of the rules governing the award of public contracts are found to have been committed by candidates and holders of contracts, sanctions may be imposed by the Dispute Resolution Committee of the body responsible for regulating public contracts, sitting as a disciplinary panel, against those responsible for these violations”. Article 150 sets sanctions that may be imposed, cumulatively as the case maybe, which are the confiscation of the securities lodged by the offender in connection with the procurement procedures in which he participated and the exclusion from the right to compete for public contracts for a period determined according to the seriousness of the offence committed [2] .
Any candidate, tenderer or contractor who has: influenced the method of awarding the contract or the definition of services in such a way as to gain an undue advantage; deliberately provided false or misleading information or declarations in their bid that could influence the outcome of the award procedure; have been found guilty of corrupting public officials in charge of awarding the contract, of fraudulent maneuvers with a view to obtaining the contract, of illegal agreements, etc. Violations are recorded by the Dispute Settlement Committee, which carries out all necessary investigations and refers the matter to all competent authorities. [2] .
These violations take the form of opacity, lack of competition in the awarding of certain public contracts, collusion between bidders and contracting authorities, corruption and sometimes even outright fraud. [3] .

There is not enough information to score this indicator. As usual, the auditors noted quite a few cases of non-compliance in both the 2020 and 2021 reports. For the most part, these are reports that recur year after year. Here are just a few examples noted in the summary presented by the Chairman of the Regulatory Council: non-correspondence of award methods to the thresholds set by the regulations; failure to comply with the regulatory deadline between the opening of bids and the award; failure to publish provisional and final award notices; shortcomings linked to technical evaluation reports, etc. In addition to these dysfunctions, there are others which seem far more serious, and which even undermine the principle of transparency in the award of public contracts.[1] [2] On 3 March 2025, a Member of Parliament submitted a request for the creation of a parliamentary committee of enquiry to shed light on this contract worth 45 billion CFA francs, signed by Senegal with the Nigerian arms dealer. [3] Corruption cases or allegations related to public procurement are effectively investigated and prosecuted by the courts. However, third parties sometimes attempt to influence judicial decisions, which can complicate the process and undermine the fairness of justice in these cases. In spite of this, there is not sufficient evidence from the numerous sources consulted about the investigation and prosecution of cases and the extent of interference in them.

In addition to continuing training, ARCOP (ex-ARMP) has decided to organizse a diploma course. As part of this, a Master’s degree in “Management and Regulation of Public Procurement” has been set up, organizsed as a co-diploma. The Master’s degree in Management and Regulation of Public Procurement has a multi-disciplinary vocation, and aims to train registered professionals to increase their skills in Mastering the rules of transparency and efficiency in the award and execution of public contracts, and in the use of good governance standards. [1]

The activities initiated by ARCOP (ex-ARMP) fall within the general framework of the training program, the main aim of which is to contribute to the sustainable implementation of a high-performance public procurement management system. Two categories of training are proposed. Capacity-building sessions aimed at executing agents who, in the course of their duties, will have to apply the provisions of the Public Procurement Code. [2] . These capacity buildings or training sometimes cover many issues such as collusion patterns and report potential malpractice.

South Africa’s legal framework prohibits collusion among bidders through:
Section 34 of the General Conditions of Contract, which defines “prohibited practices” including bid-rigging, price-fixing, and collusion between suppliers. [1]
Section 4 of the Competition Act, which makes collusion between bidders illegal. [2]
However, these provisions do not explicitly prohibit collusion between procurement officials and suppliers. There is no unified procurement law that criminalises or defines collusion between officials and bidders in the procurement process

In addition, there is no publicly available evidence that DoD procurement officials systematically receive training specifically aimed at identifying collusion patterns. The AGSA audits mention irregularities and lack of compliance, but not the existence of a dedicated, structured training programme [3]. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy mentions capacity-building for procurement personnel across departments, but there is no evidence confirming DoD participation [4].

The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act establishes penalties for corruption related offices including criminal prosecution and fines with jail sentences varying according to transgressions. [1] The maximum sentence can include life imprisonment. Individuals or companies can likewise face debarred for engaging in restricted practices. [2]

There is evidence that cases of collusion are investigated by relevant law enforcement bodies [1]. However, there is clear evidence of undue interference in undermining investigations with documents needed for investigations disappearing and a seeming lack of political will to investigate senior officials [2].

National Treasury’s training programs for procurement officials do not include training on identifying collusion patterns [1]. Training provided to officials is primarily related to following regulating rather than a more comprehensive approach to corruption risks. [2].

In addition to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018, there are laws which in theory could act as the legal framework to prohibit collusion in the procurement process. Annex C of the bill describes collusion as taking place when ‘colluding with any government official, Supplier or potential Bidder concerning the formulation, creation of, selection or evaluation of any document or method used in a procurement proceeding.'[1] Section 82 (a), (b) (c) clearly describes the act of collusion and outlines the punishments in place. It states that anyone who ‘connives or colludes to engage in Fraudulent or Corrupt Practices and upon conviction; is liable to a fine.’ These include the Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC) Act of 2009 adopted with the goal of establishing a commission to investigate corruption, protect public property and provide evidence to the Ministry of Justice. Similarly, there is also the 2012 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Act which establishes a Financial Intelligence Unit [2] and the signing of the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2015 [3]. However, concerns have been raised over the effectiveness of these laws. For example, the commissioners in the SSACC are presidential appointees and although they need parliamentary approval, the National Legislative Assembly is dominated by pro-government supporters [4]. Also, despite signing the UN convention on corruption, the country has not ratified the law.

Sections 81 and 82 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018, outline clear legislation and guidelines that exclude individuals or companies with tainted reputation to participate in procurement processes [1]. The act imposes fines and/or jail sentences on individuals found guilty of collusion and corruption.

Despite significant legal reforms and frameworks, a search on local and regional media reports shows that the government of South Sudan did not announce or implement new enforcement reforms in 2021-2023 [1]. A report by the U.S State Department indicates that “the National legislative body does not provide effective administrative compliance oversight of government ministers nor do ministries or agencies adequately regulate one another” [2]. There were no significant corruption prosecutions between the year 2020 and 2024 despite the country being ranked among the most corrupt countries [3].

Section 8 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018, highlights the need for capacity building among officials to curb procurement challenges such as collusion. Although a search on various media sources [2], government reports did not reveal any evidence that there has been training of procurement officials to identify and report collusion, one of the respondents confirmed that such trainings have not been undertaken during his time at the Ministry [3].

Section 95, (1a) of the PPDA Act states that a person who— (d) connives or colludes to commit a fraudulent act or a corrupt act defined in section 3. Section 3 of the same Act outlines “fraudulent practice” includes a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement or disposal process or the execution of a contract to the detriment of the procuring or disposing entity, and includes collusive practices among bidders prior to or after bid submission designed to establish bid prices at artificial non-competitive levels and to deprive the procuring and disposing entity of the benefits of free and open competition. The Public Procurement and Disposal Authority (PPDA) can suspend a provider from participating in procurement and disposal processes for a set period of time. Grounds for suspension include a provider being convicted of a fraudulent or corrupt practice under the PPDA Act. [1][2] [3]
Collusion is only limited to bidders only.

Section 94 of the PPDA Act (2003) [1] provides for the suspension of providers. It states that the Authority may on the recommendation of a procuring and disposing entity or after investigations on its own initiative, suspend a provider from engaging in any public procurement or disposal process for a period determined by the Authority, where—
(a) the provider breaches the Code of Ethics of providers;
(b) the provider is debarred from the procurement processes of an international agency of which Uganda is a member.[1]

The PPDA has the mandate to regulate and enforce procurement regulations in all government entities including the UPDF. However, the extent of enforcement by the PPDA is limited because procurement related to national security can be exempt from PPDA regulations [1][2]. Also, some high-ranking military officers have been known to influence procurement decisions to benefit themselves or their preferred suppliers [3]. Cases of fraudulent bidding involving army officers and J2E Investment Corporation have been investigated in which billions of Ugandan shillings were misappropriated [4]. This example shows that in some instances the PPDA may apply to the defence procurement and investigation are conducted, although not necessarily prosecuted.

The UPDF has taken steps to improve the professionalism of its procurement staff by participating in training programs run by the PPDA and international institutions. These sessions cover procurement regulations, ethics, and risks of corruption in the security environment, helping personnel understand national procurement standards and best practices [1].

While training is an important tool for promoting fair and transparent procurement [2], its impact depends on consistent enforcement and strong oversight. Without proper internal controls, independent audits, and a culture of accountability, training alone may not be enough to prevent misconduct or ensure that procurement processes remain competitive and corruption-free.

Sectio 72(2) of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act prohibits collusion between bidders—such as bid rigging or price fixing—and mandates disqualification of bidders found guilty of corruption, dishonesty, or anti-competitive practices [1]. The Public Entities Corporate Governance Act (2018) reinforces these standards for state-run organisations [2].

Regarding the training of procurement officials: the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) conducts nationwide training programmes for procurement officers across all public entities, covering anti-collusion, procurement integrity, and ethical standards [3].
There is insufficient evidence of dedicated institutional training targeting defence-specific elites.

The sanctions involve imprisonment and fine or both and it does not specify under what circumstances is fine possible or imprisonment [1][2]. However, in cases where the accused are politicians or bidders connected to the ruling party, the case will likely end up being dismissed and the accused acquitted for lack of evidence [3].

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act provides that those implicated in acts of bribery are arraigned before the courts and prosecuted and sentenced [1]. The Act authorises the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) and related bodies to investigate and refer cases to prosecution. However, in practice, the investigations are rarely conducted as bribery may implicate army service chiefs who are connected to the ruling political party [3]. ZACC investigations were conducted, but they were perceived internally as intensely politicized and ended without visible punishment [4].
Further analysis in 2023 by ZIMCODD revealed that procurement corruption, including allegations of collusion and contract inflation, cost Zimbabwe approximately US $1.2–1.5 billion annually, and was exacerbated by inefficiencies in prosecution and punishment [5]

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act mandates that officers in procurement units are supposed to go through training to familiarise themselves with the processes of procurement as well as the required skills [1] [2]. The training does involve identification of collusion in the procurement process [3].