There are formal policies and procedures that outline how to monitor, assess and report upon a supplier’s service and or delivery obligations. Any disputes or differences arising in connection with the performance of the contract shall be settled in accordance with the contractual provisions. If the parties fail to do so, such disputes shall be settled in accordance with ordinary law [1]. The parties may choose between three methods of dispute settlement: amicable settlement, arbitration, or the competent administrative courts [2]. In the case of amicable settlement, the regulatory authority may hear the parties and work with them to find an amicable solution to the dispute [2]. In all other cases, the arbitrator or judge directs the proceedings and imposes sanctions in accordance with the law. The law also lays down a procedure for controlling and monitoring the performance of public contracts. The contracting authorities’ Public Procurement Control Unit (Cellule de contrôle des marchés publics) is responsible for a priori control of the award procedure and for monitoring the performance of contracts awarded using the request for information and price procedure. To this end, it: 1) assists with the opening of bids received in connection with requests for information and prices; 2) validates the bid analysis report prior to the final award of requests for information and prices; 3) monitors the performance of requests for information and prices contracts; 4) participates in the acceptance of services resulting from requests for information and prices procedures. The contracting authorities’ Public Procurement Control Unit carries out a posteriori control of public procurement contracts awarded through the request for quotation procedure [3].

Only public procurement for works, supplies and services for the day-to-day operation of the defence and security administration are not covered by secrecy [1]. All contracts related to those purpuses are open to public and published on a website dedicated to Public Procurement Purchases [2]. On this website, the full versions of the contracts are not published, but for each public contract, the amount, type of contract, award method, contract reference, performance period, source of funding, date of contract notification, date of authorisation to launch the tender documents, date of publication of the notice by PRMP and amendments are indicated. [2]. Overall, all public procurement for works, supplies and intellectual services that have defence and security objectives are covered by secrecy [3] and are not accessible to public [2], but the oversight agencies receives some information that would enable its to scrutinise quality of service delivery [4].

The person responsible for public procurement (PRMP) keeps statistics and performance indicators, and for draws up reports on the award and execution of contracts as required by the law. [1][2]. The PRMP reports are sent to the supervisory authority and the regulatory authority . [1] [2] These sanctions can go as far as the termination of the contract. Penalties and sanctions provided for by the Public Procurement Code are applied when the contract is not properly executed.[2][3]

Most of contract violations are dealt with adequately and in accordance with the provisions of the Public Procurement Code. Problems, when they are minor, are dealt with internally. When they go beyond the internal level, they are referred to the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority. In some cases, an amicable settlement, mediation or legal action is used .[1][2][3][4]

The Public Procurement Law mentions in its articles 256 to 259 the conditions for good execution and delivery. Articles 270 and 272 discuss sanctions in case of delay or bad execution. However, there are no policies or procedures for assessing the extent to which the supplier has fulfilled its obligations. The civil servants responsible for the acceptance process do this according to their own common sense. [1] [2] [3]

In the absence of well-established policies or procedures in this area, reporting on contractors’ compliance with their obligations is not transparent [1] [2]. It is often the subject of compromises between government managers and suppliers [2].

Reports on the monitoring and completion of contracts are regularly produced and submitted to line managers, but they do not give rise to legal action because they are generally positive. This is because they are discussed in advance between the government executives who produce them and the bidders. There are always pre-arrangements that precede the production of this kind of report [1] [2].

It is not at all clear that the various breaches of contract are followed by appropriate action. The secrecy surrounding the whole process makes it impossible to comment on this [1] [2]. In particular, there have been shortcomings in the services provided by certain suppliers [2].

There are no formal policies or procedures that outline how to monitor, assess, and report a supplier’s service and delivery obligations. There is no official document related to this. The lack of formal and standard reporting policies and procedures hinders the assessment and identiffication of corruption risks and complicates monitoring efforts.[1][2]

Public procurement is opaque and underscores the lack of transparency in the procurement process. The sector is mostly exempt from the disclosure rules that govern the procurement process in other institutions, shrouding this process in secrecy.[1][2]

Oversight mechanisms are essentials to the effectiveness of the defence sector and constitute a fundamental pillar of security. At MINDEF, these mechanisms operate internally and do not admit the presence of other bodies. This situation does not contribute to making the procedure for executing public contracts clear. In general procurement officials produce contract monitoring and completion reports, but not on a regular basis.[1][2]

There is insufficient information to determine if breaches of contract exist and whether they are acted upon.[1][2]

Public procurement regulations provide for control and evaluation mechanisms . Article 43 of the Public Procurement Code deals with subcontracting. These mechanisms are accompanied by monitoring of suppliers. They also apply to the armed forces. The armed forces inspectorate should, in theory, be able to carry out monitoring. However, public access to reports is made more difficult on the grounds of defence secrecy [1, 2].

Changes to contracts are not made public and there is no transparency regarding reporting and the fulfilment of obligations by contractors, suppliers or subcontractors [1, 2, 3].

In accordance with public procurement regulations, the defence and security forces inspection services produce reports and monitor suppliers and sometimes subcontractors, although it is regrettable that this monitoring is not carried out regularly. The same applies to reports, which are not made public [1, 2].

Any shortcomings are reported to the hierarchy of the armed forces and ministries. They are dealt with internally. External actors such as the Court of Auditors take very little action [1, 2].

The Public Procurement (Amendment) Act Section 22(A) (1 & 2) provides a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework that assesses and reports on the service delivered by the suppliers. It requires entities to monitor and report on supplier performance, and to define grounds for contract termination due to poor performance or fraud.
The PPA’s Contract Administration Manuals (e.g., Manuals 1 for Goods, 2 for Works) provide detailed procedures for post-award contract management:
Monitoring: regular inspection and verification of goods, works, or services against agreed deliverables;
Assessment: formal performance evaluation forms at key milestones;
Reporting: submission of contract management reports to the Head of Entity and PPA;
Resolution/Sanction: application of penalties, liquidated damages, or contract termination for incomplete or inadequate delivery.
In addition, the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584) empowers the Auditor-General to review contract execution and report irregularities to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) for follow-up action, which may include sanctions under the Criminal and Other Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) in cases involving fraud or corruption (3).

There is no publicly available register or report that systematically discloses post-award contract modifications for Ministry of Defence (MoD) procurements in Ghana (3)(4). While the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) and its amendments require procurement records to be kept, Section 32A allows exemptions from disclosure where publication is deemed to compromise national security (1).
In practice, this means that information on defence contract modifications is withheld from public view. Neither the MoD Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) nor the reports of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCDI) provide contract-level detail on post-award changes. When procurement irregularities are reported by the Auditor-General, they typically cover contract award and implementation issues in aggregate form and without specifying modification details.
in July 2024 the Auditor-General published a report on procurement breaches at the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) [4], demonstrating the possibility of reporting such data in other sectors, but no equivalent transparency exists for MoD contract modifications. (2) The mechanisms for procurement by the MOD are restricted to some extent, making it difficult for oversight bodies to be able to conduct a thorough scrutiny.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) are legally bound under the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended, to monitor contract execution to ensure suppliers deliver according to agreed specifications, timelines, and quality standards (3).
However, in practice there is limited public information on how the MoD or GAF conducts contract monitoring post-award. (1) (2) Internal contract management processes within the MoD are not transparent, and available evidence suggests that oversight of contract implementation relies heavily on ex-post audits by the Auditor-General and scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee. the procurement procedures of GAF have rarely been referred by the Public Procurement Agency. (1) (2)

There is no evidence to suggest that sanctions for laid-down procurement breaches have been enforced on defence procurement. (1) (2) The report of the Audit Service of the MOD in 2024 suggests some procurement breaches including the procurement of items to a tune of GH¢105,577.86 without alternative quotations, the Audit Service therefore made recommendations for sanction against officers who were in charge but this did not directly apply to breaches of contract. (3)

Kenya’s procurement framework includes clear mechanisms to ensure contractors meet their delivery and reporting obligations. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA), 2015, mandates that signed contracts include deliverables and timelines. Section 151 requires that for complex or high-value procurements, the Accounting Officer must establish a contract implementation team [1].
Their core role includes monitoring contract performance, issuing performance reports, and certifying satisfactory delivery before payments are processed.

Section 48 of the Act also mandates the establishment of an Inspection and Acceptance Committee to verify that delivered goods or services meet the contract terms before acceptance. This ensures direct performance monitoring and ties compliance to payment.
In terms of oversight, section 38 of the Public Audit Act empowers the Auditor-General to examine procurement processes to assess legality, efficiency, and effectiveness [2]. Additionally, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) conducts periodic procurement performance audits under section 9(1)(e) of the PPADA. PPADA includes provisions for suspension and debarment (Section 41–44).

Executive Order No. 2 of 2018 requires all public entities, including the Ministry of Defence to publish contract award data, including amendments and sub-contractor details, on the Public Procurement Information Portal (PPIP). This promotes transparency and allows external scrutiny. The law applies to all non-classified procurements [1].

However, in practice, the MoD has not complied with this requirement. As of August 2024, there were no defence procurement contracts listed on the Public Procurement Information Portal [2]. The MoD website only provides historical tender advertisements and no award or implementation data [3].

Although oversight bodies such as the Auditor-General and PPRA are expected to receive information on procurement delivery performance, there is no confirmation that these agencies consistently receive full contract implementation data for defence-related procurements.

In past audits, the Auditor-General has flagged issues regarding the MoD’s procurement performance (e.g., unexplained asset acquisitions, incomplete records), suggesting at least partial access to information [4]. However, the lack of publication and limited clarity on the level of detail shared with oversight bodies indicate a transparency gap.

Section 152 of the PPADA mandates monthly progress reports on contract implementation to be submitted by the procurement head to the Accounting Officer [1]. In addition, section 290 of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Act requires the Defence Council to submit an annual report to Parliament and the President within three months of the financial year’s end [2]. These requirements establish a structure for internal monitoring and strategic accountability.

However, the actual implementation in defence procurement is unclear. While the legal provisions are robust, there is limited publicly available information confirming that the Ministry of Defence follows these practices in a consistent and transparent manner. Reports from the Auditor-General have highlighted procurement irregularities, indicating that some level of monitoring occurs, but they do not provide evidence that internal monitoring mechanisms are fully operational or effective [3].

There is limited information to assess the extent to which contract breaches are acted upon. However, available evidence demonstrates that Office of the Auditor General (OAG) scrutiny has been effective in highlighting breaches. Special audits are usually initiated by Parliament, such as the Parliamentary Accounts Committee, to further scrutinise wastage, serious allegations of fraud, corruption, misappropriation of funds, and mismanagement of public resources. For instance, Parliament authorised such an audit to examine the Ministry of Defence’s food contracts for the period 2014- 2015 and 2017–2018; the report was tabled in 2022 [1].
More recently, a March 2025 OAG report revealed that the Ministry of Defence lost KSh 3.16 billion in stalled military projects, with auditors concluding there had been “no value for money” in the expenditures. The findings detailed widespread failures in contract implementation and poor oversight in project execution, suggesting that while breaches are detected, there are persistent weaknesses in contract management and enforcement [2].

There are formal reporting requirements outlined in the PPCC law.[1] For example, the PPCC is required to report on non-performance of contractual obligations under a contract deemed serious enough to warrant debarment. Likewise, it also requires to report on bidders’ non-settlement of tax obligations in the same way that it is required to monitor.[2][3] Section 41 also mentions contract administration regulation. For instance, the contract administration functions shall include at least the following a) ensuring that the contractor complies with the specifications and terms of the contract; (b) ensuring that the contract is being performed on schedule; (c) ensuring that payments made to the contractor are in accordance with the terms of the contract, and (d) determining when a contract has been successfully performed which will entitle the contractor to final payment. The sanctions established if providers do not comply are limited to debarment.

Information regarding contracts and post-award by the procurement authority is rarely released to the public. While the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission has launched an Electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) system to enhance transparency and accountability, access requires registration with a valid Tax Identification Number, and is restricted to bidders (individual or organisational).[1] As a result, citizens cannot scrutinise contract modifications or failures [2].
The PPCC website is accessible but not regularly updated with procurement-related information. Moreover, defence contracts are not available.[3]
Oversight bodies such as the General Auditing Commission (GAC) and the Internal Audit Agency (IAA) do have access to procurement and contract data through the PPCC reporting system, but this access is limited and inconsistent, particularly for security-related contracts under subsection 3(c) of the PPCA.[4]
Audit reports often highlight weaknesses in compliance monitoring and incomplete reporting of contract execution and quality controls. This demonstrates that while oversight agencies receive some information, they do not consistently receive complete data on contract performance and modifications [5].

Procurement officials are formally required to monitor contract implementation through Contract Monitoring Units (CMUs) established within procuring entities, under the oversight of the PPCC.[1]
In practice, however, these monitoring mechanisms are weak and inconsistently applied.[2]
For example, General Auditing Commission (GAC) audits from 2021–2023 repeatedly highlight incomplete monitoring records, poor contract supervision, and weak enforcement of penalties for non-performance.[3]
Similarly, civil society has raised concerns that non-performing contracts—such as major infrastructure projects—often stall without transparent updates to the public.[4] In the defence sector, there is no publicly available evidence that CMUs consistently scrutinise military contracts or that they disclose monitoring outcomes.

Liberia’s Public Procurement and Concessions Act (PPCA, 2010) allows sanctions for contract breaches, including debarment for serious non-performance. It empowers the Public Procurement & Concessions Commission (PPCC) to investigate and debar firms.[1] The Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) and the General Auditing Commission (GAC) also collaborate with the PPCC, providing referrals and oversight that can lead to investigations and prosecutions.
The PPCC is also mandated to maintain and publish a debarment list, and its regulations require procuring entities to consult that list before awards; bidding documents typically require firms to certify they are not debarred.[2]
However, for post-award breaches, public evidence of sanctions is scarce. Despite the legal requirement to publish a debarment list, there is no readily accessible, regularly updated list on the PPCC website, and we found no published PPCC debarment decisions for non-performance, including none specific to the defence sector. The PPCC does publish quarterly/annual compliance reports and a ledger of No Objections, but these mainly track planning/approvals rather than penalties for breach.[3]
This supports an assessment of inconsistent enforcement: mechanisms exist, but application, especially after contracts are signed, lacks consistent, transparent follow-through.

ARMP agents carry out an unannounced inspection in accordance with official procedures. They may request the necessary documents to determine whether contractors have complied with the procedures and their service obligations. They also check the quality of service of suppliers. These inspections are the subject of a report in which it can be noted whether a supplier has complied with its performance obligations or not [1]. Moreover, the contract execution period is also checked and in the event of non-compliance, sanctions may be applied [2].

One of the ARMP’s missions is to promote transparency in the public procurement system by publishing all information relating to public procurement in the specializsed public procurement journal, including general notices and calls for tender., and award notices. Article 53 of the Public Procurement Code law stipulates that the Person Responsible for Public Procurement sends, for publication within thirty days of notification of the contract, an award notice. The information appearing in this notice is specified by an order of the Minister responsible for Finance and Budget. Award notices are published under the same conditions as advertising notices [1].
This information can be consulted online on the ARMP website [2]. However, post-award tenders are not published.

One of the missions of the ARMP is to promote transparency in the public procurement system by publishing all information relating to public procurement in the specialised journal of public procurement, in particular general notices, calls for competition and award notices. Article 53 of the law on the Public Procurement Code stipulates that the Person Responsible for Public Procurement shall send, for publication within thirty days of notification of the contract, a notice of award. The information contained in this notice is specified by an order of the Minister responsible for Finance and the Budget. Award notices are published under the same conditions as advertising notices [1]. This information can be viewed online on the ARMP website [2] .This makes it possible to know what the initial contract was and therefore allows for control and supervision of the changes. The ARPM control reports provide information on the quality of the products and services provided [3]. Evidence thus shows some de facto reporting but mo sistematic action on breaches of contract.

In the event of non-performance of contracts, appropriate measures are taken. Bidders can always make a request for review of a decision or an act taken by the authorities in charge of public procurement. Article 84 of Law No. 2016-055 on the Public Procurement Code states that “the holder of a public contract may refer the Person Responsible for Public Procurement to a free appeal by sending him a complaint statement following of a dispute arising during the execution of the contract The brief must be sent to the Person Responsible for Public Procurement within thirty days from the day on which the dispute arose” [1]. Amicable settlements, mediations or even arbitrations are provided for by law in the event of a dispute including contractual non-performance. And if no solution is found, it is the administrative jurisdiction with territorial jurisdiction which settles the disputes [1]. But consulting the appeals on the ARMP website allows us to argue that contractual non-performance leading to the adoption of appropriate measures remains rare [2]. Indeed, the number of disputes is rather low compared to the overall volume of calls for tender. Sources at the ARMP allow us to affirm this [3].

The Public Procurement Code constitutes the reference document and clearly indicates the procedures to be followed in the context of the evaluation and drafting of reports concerning the service provided by a supplier or the latter’s compliance with its performance obligations.[1] The Public Procurement and Service Delegation Code also provides for the procedures to be followed in the event of incomplete or inappropriate provision,[2] in this case, the resolution mechanisms and possible sanctions.[3] In the event of failure to comply with the obligations related to their responsibilities, they incur criminal penalties.

Audit and control missions, through the publication of their reports, make public cases of contractual failures and changes after the award of contracts that they have been able to observe.[1] This statement should be qualified with regard to the defence sector because from 2020 to the present, no audit or control mission, nor any audit or control mission report has been made public. This could imply that there was no control during this period.[2] The context and the 2023 decree, which excludes from the scope of public procurement contracts works, supplies, and works in the defence sector seem to explain the situation.[3]

According to the legislation, civil servants are required to regularly carry out contractual monitoring and write reports.[1] This qualitative monitoring is carried out by several bodies.[2] In practice, this is not always the case due to the existence of a certain maintained and desired passivity and due to the risks of collision and concussion.[3] A performance audit of the markets is carried out punctually, and this audit looks at the performance of suppliers and subcontractors, where appropriate, drawing conclusions and giving directives.[4]

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. Because the procedure in the defence sector are not necessarily made public, and detailed information beyond general aspects is difficult to obtain, it is challenging to assess the award procedures, especially in cases of contractual breaches.[1] In the current state there is not enough information to score this indicator.

There is legislation that regulates the contracting of public works, acquisition of goods and provision of services to the state, approved by Decree No. 79/2022, of December 30 [1], but it opens space for direct awarding for certain products and services: confidential military works, uniforms and their accessories, acquisition, repair and maintenance of military equipment and equipment for the exclusive use of the Armed Forces and Police [2]. The monitoring of the obligations of the contractor, supplier or companies is carried out at all stages of the contract, from the launch of the procurement tender to the delivery of the good or service, when they deliver a service [3]. The monitoring and evaluation mechanisms provided for assessing the performance of the supplier and the quality of the goods and services involve the supervision, coordination, control and evaluation carried out by the Procurement Management Units, the Procurement Supervision Functional Unit and the Contract Manager, to ensure the quality of the good and service [4, 5, 6]. If the goods and services do not comply with the provisions of the contract or have deficiencies, they may be rejected and cancelled [7]. However, products and services related to classified military works, uniforms and their accessories, acquisition, repair and maintenance of military equipment and equipment for exclusive use by the Armed Forces and Police do not undergo these procedures [2].

Information about contract failures and modifications is rarely disclosed after the contract has been awarded. Internal oversight agencies (National Defence Inspectorate) [1] receive full information, which is not shared with the public, while external oversight agencies (Parliamentary Committee [2] on Defence, Order and Security, SCO and academics) receive limited or no information at all because it is classified under military secrets and state secrets legislation [3,4].

The officials regularly produce reports on the monitoring and completion of contracts, which are subject to scrutiny and evaluation by the National Defence Inspectorate [1], including performance assessments of suppliers and subcontractors, as well as other aspects established by the legislation regulating the contracting of public works, acquisition of goods and provision of services to the state [2, 3]. If the contract has not been sufficiently completed, the Procurement Supervision Functional Unit takes one of the following actions for breach of contract: “payment of a fine; prohibition from contracting with the State for a period of one year; and in the event of recurrence, prohibition from contracting with the State for a period of five years” [4]. These actions are executed taking into account “the seriousness of the infringement in relation to the subject of the contract; the economic and financial situation of the competitor, in particular its capacity to generate revenue; the degree of involvement of the competitor in the consummation of the unlawful act; the benefit obtained by the competitor; the value of the administrative expenses caused by the invalidation of the unlawful act; and the recidivism” [5]. In the case of hidden debts, the Mozambican State brought a case against Privinvest, a UAE-Lebanese shipbuilder, for breach of contract and the trial focused on agreements signed by state-owned companies with Privinvest for loans and bonds from banks, including Credit Suisse, in 2013 and 2014, for the acquisition of fishing boats and maritime security [6].

Most breaches of contract are dealt with in accordance with the legislation governing the contracting of public works, the acquisition of goods and the provision of services to the State [1], the anti-corruption law [2] and the law on public probity [3]. Initially, the problems are dealt internally, and then they are taken to the National Defence Inspectorate or to the courts for criminal liability [4]. For instance, contracts that fall under the regime of Contracting for Public Works Contracts, Supply of Goods and Provision of Services to the State (Decree No. 79/2022, of December 30) are available in the Official Gazzette [7]. In terms of practical examples, the Hidden Debts scandal continues to be an exceptional and particular example of domestic accountability, by the Maputo Judicial Court [5], and international accountability, by the London and Washington Courts, of a company for breaching contracts with the Mozambican Defence and Security sector [6].

Niger’s 2013 decree on defence procurement includes formal provisions for assessing suppliers’ capacity to fulfill service and delivery obligations. Article 10 explicitly outlines these requirements, while Articles 35 and 36 establish a “caution on performance”, which allows the tender board to require guarantees during contract negotiations to ensure suppliers meet their contractual obligations [1]. Additionally, Article 35 provides for a posteriori control of contracts awarded through direct negotiations. However, Articles 77 and 78, which are supposed to detail how this control is implemented, lack clear procedural guidelines [1]. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) drastically altered the procurement landscape, removing defence procurement from public procurement regulations [2]. This undermined the role of regulatory agencies in enforcing reporting and delivery requirements, as contracts can now be awarded without competition or structured oversight. While formal policies and procedures exist to monitor supplier reporting and delivery, they lack detailed implementation mechanisms, and recent legal changes have further weakened oversight in defence procurement.

There is no transparency regarding the reporting and delivery obligations of contractors in Niger’s defence sector. While the 2013 decree on defence procurement includes provisions for monitoring supplier performance, these mechanisms operate in secrecy, and there is no public disclosure of supplier compliance, contract execution, or delivery status [1]. Articles 35 and 36 of the decree mention a posteriori control mechanisms, but the lack of clear specifications in Articles 77 and 78 means that any enforcement remains opaque [2]. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) further eroded transparency by exempting defense contracts from public procurement regulations [2]. This eliminated competitive bidding and independent oversight, making it impossible for external actors, including civil society and media, to verify contract fulfillment . Additionally, there is no publicly accessible information on which companies fail to meet contractual obligations, contract modifications or whether any sanctions are enforced.

In Niger, there is no evidence that procurement offices actively monitor reporting and delivery obligations for defence contracts. While the 2013 decree on defence procurement (Articles 10, 35, and 36) provides a formal framework for assessing suppliers’ compliance, there are no clear procedures to ensure that these obligations are enforced [1]. Articles 77 and 78, which were supposed to define the implementation of a posteriori control, lack specific guidelines, leaving oversight mechanisms vague and ineffective [1]. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) completely removed defence procurement from public procurement laws, allowing contracts to be awarded without competition or independent oversight [2]. As a result, any remaining monitoring mechanisms were effectively dismantled, meaning that procurement offices no longer have a structured process for tracking contractor performance, reporting, or delivery obligations. Additionally, there are no publicly available reports or evidence indicating that procurement offices conduct audits or follow-up evaluations to ensure suppliers fulfill their contractual obligations. Given Niger’s history of procurement scandals, including the 2020 defence corruption case, the lack of monitoring further exacerbates the risk of contract fraud, undelivered equipment, and inflated costs [3].

There is no clear evidence that breaches of contract in defence procurement are systematically acted upon in Niger. While the 2013 decree on defense procurement includes provisions for monitoring supplier obligations (Articles 10, 35, and 36), there are no clear mechanisms detailing how breaches of contract are addressed [1]. The decree mentions a posteriori control, but Articles 77 and 78, which should define enforcement procedures, provide no specific guidance [1].
The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) further weakened enforcement by removing defense procurement from standard public procurement laws. This change eliminated competitive bidding requirements and independent oversight, allowing contracts to be awarded without accountability [2]. Without transparency or structured monitoring, it is unclear whether suppliers who fail to meet contract obligations face penalties or if breaches are investigated at all.
Past procurement scandals, such as the 2020 defence corruption indicate a pattern of impunity. Despite evidence of fraudulent tenders, inflated costs, and undelivered military equipment, there were no meaningful prosecutions, and many implicated officials remained in power [3]. This precedent suggests breaches of contract are either ignored or resolved through informal settlements rather than legal or financial consequences.

Contractors are required to comply with the guidelines set out by the BPP, which include provisions for contract performance and reporting as dictated by the provisions of the PPA. The BPP also has the authority to monitor and enforce compliance with these guidelines. Contractors are typically required to submit regular progress reports, detailing the status of the project, any challenges faced, and updates on timelines [1]. These reports are used by the contracting authority to assess whether the contractor is on track to meet their obligations. Apart from the PPA, there are no specific laws in Nigeria governing defence sector procurement. And even then, national security related procurements are granted special exceptions or waivers in the law, with audit of procurement of “Special Purpose Goods” such as armaments, ammunition, mechanical, electrical equipment or other things for the use of the Armed Forces, being subjected to the President’s discretion [2]. Thus, it is unclear what precise reporting policies and procedures exist in the defence sector.

Information on contract failures and modifications post award is rarely released. Such information only becomes public when anti-corruption agencies or other institutions of the government such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), Code of Conduct Bureau, the Nigeria Police Force and other regulatory bodies commence investigation into procurement fraud [1]. In addition, oversight agencies such as the NASS receive limited information to enable diligent scrutiny. For instance, the NASS Committees on Public Accounts did not receive an Auditor-General’s report between 2020 and 2023 [2]. Dearth of Auditor-General’s report hampers NASS’s ability to deal with the Achilles’ heel of contract awarding process which is the public procurement process.

Given the huge inflow of public funds to the defence sector, it is only reasonable that the processes through which these funds are expended are open to stringent monitoring and public scrutiny [1]. The 2021 Ethics and Integrity Compliance Scorecard compiled by the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission had revealed that 187 MDAs did not conduct monitoring and evaluation of their projects in six months before the deployment and assessment exercise [2]. The assessment further discovered that 174 MDAs did not comply with the Public Procurement Act (PPA) 2007. The same defect was noticed in 88 MDAs where tender board composition was in contravention of the PPA 2007, thereby promoting procurement and due process abuse and fraud [3]. Reports of corruption cases in the defence sector repeatedly confirm that there are no quality monitoring procedures in place or the procedures in place do not function optimally [4].

Nigeria has mechanisms and procedures in place to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery [1]. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms often depends on the capacity and integrity of the institutions involved in the procurement and monitoring processes. Defence contracts are often classified, which imposes a constraint on the effective enforcement or sanctioning of contract breaches. In addition, delayed or failed transmission of annual reports of the AuGF on the accounts of MDAs to the NASS compounds the challenge of discovering breaches of contract award and execution. As of September 2023, for example, the Audit Reports of 2020, 2021 and 2022 were yet to be transmitted to the NASS in accordance with section 85 (2) of the 1999 Constitution [2]. While reacting to this development, the chairman, Senate Committee on Public Accounts, Senator Ahmed Wadada Aliyu, emphasised that it is “impeding the necessary checks and balances integral to the functions of the National Assembly committees responsible for Public Accounts”.

ARCOP (ex-ARMP) requires reporting on procurement procedures [2] , but defence procurement reports are often limited or redacted . The Portail des Marchés Publics does not consistently publish defence procurement reports. Transparency requirements are waived frequently for national security reasons. In the event of violations of public procurement rules committed by candidates and holders of contracts, sanctions may be pronounced by the Dispute Resolution Committee of the body responsible for regulating public procurement, sitting in disciplinary formation, against the perpetrators of such violations. [1] There is a system for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the public contract, and if there is a problem, the commissionaire is called upon to resolve it. If this exceeds the authorised limits, penalties are provided for depending on the seriousness of the fault committed. ARCOP (ex-ARMP)’s mission is to regulate the public procurement system and evaluate the performance of those involved in the system for awarding, executing and monitoring public procurement contracts and public service delegations, to carry out investigations, to implement independent audit procedures, sanctioning irregularities, settling disputes arising from the award of public contracts and public service delegations, or issuing opinions as part of the amicable settlement of disputes arising from their execution. [2] .

Defence contracts often invoke confidentiality clauses under national security exemptions, reducing transparency. Despite these exemptions, ARCOP (ex-ARMP) still provides general oversight and publishes some summaries, although lacking in detail for sensitive defence contracts. General contracts are accessible to the public, except for contracts relating to national defence and security needs requiring secrecy or for which the protection of the essential interests of the State is incompatible with publicity measures [1] . All changes in the contract during the implementation exist in redacted format and the oversight agencies receive limited information that would enable them to scrutinise quality of product and service delivery. In accordance with article 23 of the Public Procurement Code, modifications to the initial conditions of the contract after its approval must be the subject of a written amendment, signed by the authorizsed representatives of the contracting authority and the contract holder. Where the proposed modification involves quantities of work, supplies or services greater than those set out in the previous paragraph of this article, a new contract must be drawn up. However, information relating to modifications or amendments to contracts which do not require a new contract is not published on the Senegalese public procurement portal [2] .

All documents relating to the stages already completed in the procurement procedure, including the evaluation report and the recommendation for awarding the contract, will be submitted to the body responsible for monitoring public procurement for prior review and opinion before the contract is awarded. [1] Civil servants regularly produce monitoring and evaluation reports on the performance of suppliers and subcontractors, which are audited separately. In the event of breaches of their contractual obligations, holders of public contracts are liable to the financial, coercive or reso- lutory penalties provided for in articles 84 et seq. of the Code des obligations de l’administration, in this decree and in the specifications. The contracting authority may also order the postponement of the performance of public contracts or public service delegation agreements. [3] The Procurement Unit is responsible for ensuring the quality of procurement files and the proper functioning of the Procurement Commission, and for preparing quarterly reports on procurement and contract execution for the relevant authorities, for transmission to the Central Procurement Directorate and the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics). [2] In Senegal, there is monitoring and evaluation of contract performance in public procurement. If the contract has not been sufficiently performed, measures are taken for breach of contract.[4]

When violations are established after a contract has been awarded, including in the defence sector, the sanction may be accompanied by termination of the current contract or substitution by another company, at the risk and peril of the sanctioned offender. The offender may appeal to the courts of administrative jurisdiction against the decisions of the Dispute Resolution Committee. This appeal does not have suspensive effect [1] . The settlement of disputes relating to the award of PPP contracts is governed by articles 50 and 51 of Law 2021-08-02 of March 2, 2021, and by articles 123 to 125 of the implementing decree. It should be noted that the Senegalese legislator has included in these articles all the provisions of the Code des Marchés Publics (Public Procurement Code) relating to the settlement of disputes in public procurement contracts in the procedural phase relating to ex gratia and contentious appeals, which enables us to retain the unification of the legal regime for appeals relating to MPs and PPPs, albeit on a separate legal basis. [2]

Disputes or disagreements in the contract, even if rare, are settled internally and if this is impossible, they are settled by a higher authority [3] such as the Dispute Resolution Committee (Comité de Règlement des Différends – CRD) which is a Dispute Resolution Committee set up by ARCOP (ex-ARMP), which sits either as a Disputes Committee or in a disciplinary capacity, depending on the facts of the case. This committee has issued several opinions, including Opinion No. 002/2022/ARMP/CRD of 15 June 2022 of the Dispute Resolution Committee on the risk of conflict of interest relating to the recruitment of the Consultant selected for the accounting and financial audit of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project, for the financial years ending 31 December 2021, 2022 and 2023 on the referral from the Coordinator of the Procurement Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Budget and Opinion No. 001/2022/ARCOP (ex-ARMP)/CRD of 18 May 2022 of the Dispute Resolution Committee ruling in the Disputes Commission on the referral from the Director of the Thiès Regional Development Agency (ARD) requesting an opinion on the meaning and scope of the requests for additional documents made pursuant to the provisions of Article 44 of the Public Procurement Code. [4]

National Treasury’s Contract Management Guide includes guidance on monitoring and reporting on the delivery of service providers as well as on sanctioning procedures. [1] The guide outlines detailed procedures for monitoring supplier performance. It stipulates that departments must establish contract management plans that define key performance indicators, and delivery milestones. Contract managers are required to hold regular performance review meetings with suppliers and maintain records of delivery against agreed timelines.
The guide also provides for resolution mechanisms, including issuing warning letters, applying penalties, and blacklisting suppliers in case of non-performance or repeated breach. Sanctions are coordinated with the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer and may result in restriction from future contracts [1]

Procurement and contracting data for the defence sector is limited. The Department of Defence contract information is not available on the departmental website nor on the government’s eTenders website [1]. Armscor procurement data while published online is severally restricted in the data provided [2]. Data on contract modifications is not available. While the Auditor-General has access to almost all procurement information, this is with the caveat that the Auditor-General has noted deficiencies in record keeping, inhibiting effect audits [3].

The Department of Defence uses legacy, non-integrated and stand-alone logistics and supply chain management information systems undermining the department’s ability to effectively monitor contract implementation and maintain records. [1] Contract monitoring does occur, but is not systematic and effectively monitored at a high level.
Additionally, the Department of Defence Annual Report 2022/2023 notes shortcomings in information management due to poor data capture and weak monitoring [1]. A 2023 report by the Public Service Commission found that defence procurement lacks standardised monitoring templates and often fails to escalate performance issues for resolution [2].

Effective contract management is severely undermined by a lack of capacity. The Department of Defence has revealed that a single project manager on average oversees 21 projects, undermining their ability to effectively monitor contract implementation and sanction breaches of contract [1]. While the Department can impose financial penalties for breaches of contract or delays, this does not seem to occur at any significant level despite delays in project implementation.

Section 31 (c) of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 [1] gives the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets unit the power to ensure compliance with the act, best practices and that regulations made under the act are followed. This provides the basis for formal procedures that contractors need to meet. However, the Act does not clearly state how the suppliers will be monitored, assessed and reported should they provide inadequate or incomplete services.

According to Section 51 (1) of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, once a contract has come into force, the procuring entity is obligated to publish the award details to the public [1]. The notice ought to include specifying the name(s) of the Provider(s) or Contractor(s) to which the Contract was awarded and, in the case of Contracts, the Contract price. While some contracts are exempted from this requirement, mostly based on cost consideration, the assessor was unable to trace any public notice of award in line with this section from local, regional and international media [2]. The respondent reached out to were also unable to trace similar notices from the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs [3].

Monitoring regarding contractors meeting their contractual obligations in South Sudan is challenging due to several factors. Although the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act mandates the monitoring of tenders, the ongoing conflict significantly hampers the effectiveness of audit and oversight units [1]. This challenge is particularly pronounced within security sector agencies, which may operate under emergency conditions, making it difficult to capture and monitor expenditures accurately. Additionally, the conflict and resulting displacements undermine citizen participation, further complicating efforts by the public and civil society organizations to monitor government activities and expenditure [2].

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 outlines mechanisms and procedures that are intended to ensure contractors meet their obligations [1]. However, the enforcement of these mechanisms and procedures are not publicly available. Furthermore, the Enforcement of mechanisms and procedures that ensure contractors meet their obligations has been undermined by a combination of different factors. For examples, the office of the Auditor General has for years been unable to exercise its mandate effectively due to interference by a board that had been appointed by the president but also due insufficient personnel and resources. The challenges facing independent institutions in South Sudan can best be captured in a letter from the Auditor General to the speaker during the debate on the controversial introduction of chapter XA to the Audit Chamber Act 2011 (Amendment [2].

Section 93(2) of the PPDA Act, states that all providers of works, services, or supplies shall be required to sign a declaration of compliance with those codes of conduct determined by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority from time to time [1]. There are regular audits and monitoring of performance to ensure compliance of contractors. Section 94 outlines that providers can be suspended if, after investigations by the Auditor General or an independent body appointed by the Auditor General, they are found to have a record of unsatisfactory performance [2][3].

The maintenance of records by the PPDA that includes UPDF contracts is a step towards transparency. However, UPDF contracts often involve sensitive information related to military equipment, technology, and operational capabilities. Disclosing detailed contract information online could potentially compromise national security by revealing strategic assets, procurement strategies, or vulnerabilities. The argument that UPDF contracts relate to national security and are classified is the primary justification for restricting public access. Secondly, many UPDF contracts contain confidentiality clauses that explicitly restrict the disclosure of contract details.[1][2]
The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) maintains a national contract register; however, defence contracts awarded by the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) are not listed in publicly accessible formats due to national security exemptions under the PPDA Act [3]. For classified procurements, post-award transparency is particularly restricted. OAG’s public reports confirm that contract monitoring and performance verification take place internally, but they do not disclose supplier identities, contract values, or modifications for these procurements [4]. Similarly, PPDA’s compliance audits reference MoDVA procurement performance but without itemised or contract-specific disclosure.

The absence of an online register raises concerns about transparency and accountability. Information on contract failures or modifications after award is rarely made public.

The PPDA conducts periodic procurement and contract audits, including in the MoDVA, to assess compliance with contractual terms and value for money. Its 2023 and 2024 procurement audit summaries note that for classified procurements, performance verification is handled internally by MoDVA technical officers, with PPDA oversight limited to process compliance due to security restrictions [1].
The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) audits MoDVA annually, reviewing contract files, delivery notes, and payment records for both classified and non-classified procurements. While the OAG has full legal access to classified procurement documentation under the National Audit Act, the public versions of audit reports summarise these findings in aggregated form, meaning the depth of monitoring in specific cases cannot be externally verified [2].
The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) plays a pivotal role in auditing public sector entities, including the UPDF. The OAG conducts annual audits and submits reports to Parliament, which encompass findings and recommendations on various government operations. Nevertheless, the depth and scope of these audits concerning UPDF procurement activities are not extensively detailed in publicly available summaries, making it challenging to assess the effectiveness of external oversight in this area [3].
In summary, monitoring procedures exist in law and are applied internally, but for classified defence contracts, verification by external bodies is restricted and public reporting is minimal [4]. This limits independent assurance that contractors meet their obligations on delivery and reporting.

Under Uganda’s PPDA framework, breaches of contract (non-delivery, substandard performance, misrepresentation) are first handled by the procuring entity through its internal structures (Contracts Committee, PDU, appointed Contract Managers) using remedies in the PPDA Act and Contracts Regulations 2023 (performance security, variations/change orders, penalties, and termination) [1]. Where providers breach obligations, PPDA can suspend/debar them and maintains a public Suspended Providers register [4]. Unresolved or systemic issues are subject to PPDA procurement audits/investigations and the Auditor General’s external audit [5].

In practice, MoDVA shows both strengths and gaps. PPDA’s FY 2023/24 audit rates MoDVA’s system “satisfactory” but still records contract-implementation delays, inconsistencies between bidding terms and signed contracts, and incomplete implementation of prior recommendations, issues that point to uneven enforcement and follow-through at contract-management stage. PPDA again directed MoDVA to align contract terms and apply change orders/variations properly (Reg. 52(3)(b)) and to implement outstanding recommendations under Section 10(1)(a) of the PPDA Act [2]

Furthermore, Uganda’s MAPS assessment reports inadequate enforcement of contract provisions, frequent time overruns, and weak record-keeping, [3] while PPDA’s own performance notes resource constraints affecting field work.
Uganda’s MoDVA has clear legal mechanisms for contract enforcement, and breaches are addressed internally or through PPDA sanctions. However, audit reports reveal inconsistent implementation of recommendations, repeated contract-management failures, and limited transparency in defence procurement.

Section 78(2)(a-m) of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act provides that procuring entity shall ensure that every procurement contract it enters into, (a)sets out the complete names and addresses of the parties to the contract; and (b)lists the contract documents by order of priority; and (c) states the specifications of the procurement requirement; and (d) states the quantity of the procurement requirement; and (e) states the price of the procurement requirement or how the price will be determined; and (f) states when the price will be paid and the method of payment; and (g) provides for the procuring entity’s right to inspect the procurement requirement in order to ensure proper performance of the contract by the contractor; and (h) specifies the place and time of delivery or completion of the procurement requirement and any conditions relating to its delivery or completion; and (i) provides for delivery of the procurement requirement, including, where appropriate, transfer of title, risk of loss, insurance and the completion of import and export formalities, which provisions shall conform to international commercial terms published by bodies such as the International Chamber of Commerce; and (j) where applicable, provides for the nature and amount of securities to be provided by the parties; and (k) provides for the remedies of either of the parties in the event of breach by the other; and (l) provides for the responsibilities of the parties in the event of delay in performance, supervening impossibility of performance or other event affecting performance; and (m) provides for termination of the contract [1]. Parliament was also reported to have cancelled tenders for being overpriced [2]. In other reports, the government refused to pay inflated tenders at a government hospital and cancelled the tender [3].

Section 69(3) of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act states that the procuring entity shall, on request made at any time after a bid has been accepted in the procurement proceedings concerned, permit any person to inspect the procurement record and to make copies of any documents in the record provided that such disclosure shall be made in such a way as to preserve the confidentiality of proprietary commercial information. Section 69(4) provides that the procuring entity shall preserve the procurement record for at least six years following completion or termination of the procurement contract or cancellation of the procurement proceedings. Any contract variation is reduced to a contractual agreement without changing the material content of the original contract while giving the public access to any variations made to the contract [1]. However, the military does not give the public access to the defence procurement documentation, including any variations thereof [2]. This is against the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act which calls for o transparency in handling public affairs and good governance [3].

Section 78 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act mandates procuring authorities to monitor contract implementation, including timing and quality of services delivered, and to allow for condonation of delays up to six months [1]. In other sectors, the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) monitors implementation and can intervene if contracts are mismanaged.

However, within the defence sector, no contract performance monitoring reports are shared publicly, nor are they systematically submitted to PRAZ. The Ministry of Defence does not publish performance data such as delivery timelines, quality assessments, or remedial actions when contracts breach terms. Requests for performance documents are routinely declined, and there is little evidence of post-contract oversight in defence procurement [2].

Section 78 and 87(d) of the Public Procurement Act establish that procuring entities may terminate contracts if performance obligations are not met and must seek compensation from defaulting parties, such as contract forfeiture or replacement performance at the vendor’s expense [1]. These remedies are legally mandated under the Act.

However, there is minimal evidence of such enforcement within the defence sector. Although constitutional and statutory remedies exist, they are rarely utilised for defence contracts, even where delays or poor quality have occurred. No documented cases were shared publicly in which the defence ministry exercised legal remedies or terminated contracts under these provisions [2].