Contract violations are dealt with adequately and in accordance with the provisions of the Public Procurement Code. Problems, when they are minor, are dealt with internally [1]. When they go beyond the internal level, they are referred to the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority [2]. In some cases, an amicable settlement, mediation or legal action is used [2]. There are mechanisms allowing companies to complain about practices perceived as unfair or irregular in public procurement. These mechanisms are governed by the Public Procurement Code and supervised by institutions such as the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP). In fact, the 2020 law provides for three types of recourse for the resolution of disputes: a) amicable settlement; Amicable settlement is encouraged in public procurement to resolve disputes before considering more formal solutions. It consists of direct negotiations between the company and the contracting authority to find a solution satisfactory to both parties, without resorting to legal proceedings; b) arbitrations; If amicable settlement fails, the parties can resort to arbitration, which is a more formal procedure but which takes place outside traditional jurisdictions. In Benin, arbitration is regulated by the provisions of the Public Procurement Code and other national laws relating to arbitration. It involves one or more arbitrators chosen by the parties, and the decisions rendered are binding. Arbitration is often preferred for its speed and confidentiality; c) competent administrative courts. When attempts at amicable settlement and arbitration fail, disputes may be brought before the competent administrative courts. Companies can also lodge an appealbefore the person responsible for public procurement or his line manager during procurement procedures markets against the acts and decisions of the latter creating harm to them [3].

There are no specific costs associated with complaint mechanisms [1]. Companies consider them to be effective and make regular use of them. In 2023, ARMP issued 364 decisions/opinions and processed 27 requests for conciliation. The decisions/opinions issued break down as follows: 120 decisions on appeals; 52 decisions on self-referrals; 13 decisions on arbitration between various bodies responsible for awarding, monitoring and approving public contracts; 179 opinions [2]. There are, for example, decisions relating to the exclusion of companies from a public procurement order, or the restoration of a company’s rights, rejection of company files for fraud, etc…in the the majority are decisions made by the regulatory council of the public procurement regulatory authority. Cases relating to thedefence sector are not published there [3].

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. We were unable to note any formal complaints made by companies against defence and security institutions during the period under review [1]. On the Autorité de régulation des marchés publics (Public procurement regulatory authority) website, the latest decision on a complaint concerning thedefence sector dates back to March 1, 2016 [2]. No complaints found does not mean that there are no fear of being discriminated. Im the current states there is not enough information to score this indicator.

The Public Procurement Code provides for recourse mechanisms that individuals and legal entities can use to lodge complaints against poor procurement practices. These include internal administrative appeal mechanisms as well as the possibility of going to court [1] [2].

Public procurement review mechanisms are ineffective and rarely used in the defence sector. The secrecy and intimidation which characterizse this sector are among the reasons for this state of affairs [1] [2]. Cases of dissatisfaction are often reported to the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Defence, but every time the Inspectorate General tries to look into a case, the complainants themselves come and ask for the procedure to be stopped, because of the intimidation they are subjected to. [3]

Legal entities and individuals bidding for public contracts are afraid to file complaints in the defence sector, because they are convinced that they will never be able to sue the State, but also because they fear being blacklisted . The proof is that the businessmen concerned refuse even to address the issue of lack of transparency when it comes to the defence and security sector. Public opinion is convinced of the lack of transparency in this area [1] [2].Moreover, whistleblowers, including those related to the security sector, have been intimidated and even killed in the past [3].

There is no formal complaints mechanism, as the defence procurements are not governed by the public procurement code.[1] In practice, companies can attempt to meet with investigators from the internal oversight bodies of the MINDEF to raise concerns. They can also use their various networks within the Presidency, the MINDEF, and parliament to complain when their complaints have not been resolved or they have been poorly treated. In the worst case, they can involve media to exert pressure to the MINDEF.[2]

As stated above, the country has no formal complaints mechanism for defence procurement, so this indicator is marked Not applicable.[1][2]

As stated above, the country lacks a formal complaints mechanism for defence procurement, so this indicator is marked Not applicable.[1][2]

Article 144 of Order No. 2019-679 of 24 July 2019 on the Public Procurement Code states that “Candidates and tenderers who can demonstrate a legitimate interest or who consider themselves to have been unjustly harmed by procedures subject to the provisions of this code may lodge a formal appeal against decisions taken, acts performed or facts causing them harm with the authority that issued the contested decision” [1]. There are also appeal mechanisms before commercial courts and military courts. The National Public Procurement Regulatory Agency (ANRMP) is also responsible for settling disputes relating to the award of public contracts and public-private partnership contracts, conducting conciliation proceedings where necessary and imposing sanctions on private actors in the public procurement process who have committed infringements of public procurement regulations [2]. However, no information demonstrates these mechanisms can be used in the case of defence contracts.
Alongside these official mechanisms, there are informal channels, which are often preferred to the official channels and are unfortunately prone to corruption [3, 4].

Mechanisms exist and are inexpensive, although they are rarely used. This is primarily because there are few complaints and, in such cases, those involved prefer informal channels, which they consider more effective. They prefer to deal directly with the officials responsible for these purchases [1, 2].

Formal complaints are rare because companies prefer parallel and informal channels rather than official referrals, which risk reducing their chances of winning future contracts, as companies believe that if they complain, they will be unfairly disadvantaged or excluded from future public contracts [1, 2].

There are formal processes in place for companies to be able to lay formal complaints over procurement breaches. Section 79 of the Public Procurement (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 914) makes provisions for this effect. Upon notice of such breaches by the complainant, the head of the procuring entity shall receive the complaints within 20 days. The procurement board may therefore make a determination within 21 days upon receiving such complaints. Furthermore, the complainant has the option to apply to the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) for a review of the board’s decision. The decision of the PPA is subject to review by a court of competent jurisdiction may review the PPA’s decision (1) (2).

Procurement complaints are highly obscured from the public despite the fact that there are complaints that are laid by companies that, in some cases, notice breaches within the processes of awarding procurement contracts (1). There are further legal challenges with the applications for legal complaints and probe into issues of contracting breaches as may have been applicable to Section 79 of the Public Procurement (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 914). The exemptions made by the Local Governance Act 2016 (Act 936) exempt decentralised departments and agencies from further review by the Public Procurement Authority (2)(3).

Businesses and organizations operating in the procurement sector hold the belief that those who file formal complaints with the board and pursue legal action face a targeted approach. This is usually political (partisan politics), which may lead to several barriers to access to further contracts by the same government (1) (2) (3).

Formal mechanisms exist for companies to report perceived procurement malpractice. The Review Board and PPRA offer facilities for filing complaints, both officially and anonymously to Public Procurement Administrative Review Board [1] or EACC respectively [2]. These complaints can be about government or fellow bidders [1]. Section 167 of the PPADA outlines the review process for bidders: Candidates or tenderers who believe they have suffered or risk suffering loss due to a procuring entity’s breach of duty may request an administrative review within 14 days of award notification or alleged breach. This applies to any stage of the procurement or disposal process. Review requests require a refundable deposit of at least 10% of the contract cost, except for tenders reserved for disadvantaged groups. Reviews are conducted openly unless national security is at risk [2]. However, there is no publicly available test case on the MoD.

Section 167 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act requires companies submitting a review request to provide a refundable deposit of at least 10% of the contract cost. However, this requirement does not apply to tenders reserved for disadvantaged groups, including women, youth, and persons with disabilities (PWDs) [1].
The complaints mechanisms available to companies are efficient, reasonably priced, and frequently used. The Public Procurement Administrative Review Board (PPARB) charges review fees ranging from KES 20,000 (minimum) to KES 250,000 (maximum) [2]. However, youth, women, and PWDs are exempt from these refundable costs. Additionally, reviews are conducted openly to ensure transparency, except in cases where national security is at risk.

There is a significant number of companies that seek services of the review boards, and their continued use of the service suggests confidence in the process [1]. Also, many companies have proceeded to the courts to challenge outcomes of the review board. Given the established checks and balances, the number of those seeking redress and filing complaints reasonably suggests that their cases would receive a fair hearing. However, the Ministry of Defence does not have any cases that have recently been filed at the Review board or judicial review [2].

Under the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (PPCA), companies can initially file complaints directly with the procuring entity responsible for the procurement process. Upon receiving a complaint, the entity is required to investigate and respond in writing within 14 days, stating the reasons for its decision and any corrective measures to be taken, if applicable. This process is outlined in Section 125 (4) and (5) of the PPCA.​[1]
The PPCC has established a Complaints, Appeals, and Review Panel (CARP), which consists of five members, including qualified lawyers and professionals with experience in procurement or concessions. CARP is mandated to decide on complaints and appeals, advise the Commission on regulations and procedures, and conduct hearings in debarment cases.[2]
Beyond the administrative processes, companies also have the option to seek judicial review through the courts if they believe that procurement decisions have violated legal provisions. This provides an additional layer of oversight and ensures that procurement practices adhere to the rule of law.[3]

The PPCA establishes the Complaints, Appeals, and Review Panel (CARP)—its composition, presidential appointment, procedures, powers, confidentiality, and remedy provisions are detailed in the Act. The Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC) has a fully operational Complaints, Appeals, and Dispute Resolution Mechanism (CADRM), as mandated by law.[1]
On the PPCC website, under the section labelled complaints, FY’2023, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019, there is a folder that should contain complaints, but these files are not accessible. While the PPCC site hosts this section for complaints for FY2019–2023, they are not accessible, potentially due to technical migration to the e‑GP system, the lack of online availability indicates transparency issues.[2]
There is little knowledge on how many people report malpractices in procurement and how many of these malpractices get to be investigated.[3][4].A full record on on the nature of this complaints remain unavailable in the discussion of procurement involving the defence sector.
Liberia has a functioning complaints mechanism, although accessibility for the public is limited and defence-related complaints remain classified. There is no clear evidence of companies facing discrimination for filing complaints.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Liberia’s PPCA establishes a formal complaints route via the PPCC’s Complaints, Appeals and Review Panel (CARP), and decisions are to be issued within set timelines and published (per procedures and publication requirements).[1]
Companies may use this mechanism, for example, a local firm (SATZ Group) publicly challenged procurement irregularities at the LTA.[2] According to the MoD, the e-GP provides access to complaint records. To improve enforcement and risk, the PPCC also keeps and disseminates a debarment list in the PPCC Annual Compliance Report, PPCA (Amended 2023), Sections 55–58, e-GP Portal (https://egp.procurement.gov), Ministry of Public Works Infrastructure Bulletin, GAC Report on Infrastructure Project, and PPCC Debarment Registry (Published Quarterly).[3]

However, there is no Liberia-specific, firm-level survey data showing that companies fear being blacklisted or otherwise disadvantaged for filing complaints.[4][5]
There is no record available to the public on how complaints are addressed and sanctions imposed. Without such public information, it is then difficult to assess how specifically companies perceive risks, such as being blacklisted or disadvantaged.

Article 78 of the Law establishing the Public Procurement Code stipulates that “any person having an interest in bidding or concluding the contract and likely to be harmed by the failure to comply with the advertising and competitive bidding obligations is entitled to seize the Territorially competent administrative jurisdiction “[1]. The Guide for the Prevention of Corruption in the Public Procurement Process recommends as an integrity measure that whistleblowers and whistleblowers be protected [2]. Thus, companies can refer the matter to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (BIANCO) or the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (PAC) if they believe they have been harmed in a call for tenders. Under the anti-corruption law, BIANCO and PAC are considered the competent jurisdiction and they have regional sections scattered throughout the national territory. Moreover any grievances can also be lodged on BIANCO’s i-toroka platform [3],

Despite the existence of mechanisms allowing companies to denounce wrongdoing, cases of denunciation remain rare [1]. Therefore, the available mechanisms such as online reporting, although costly, are not always effective. However, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority has made available an anonymous online denunciation mechanism [2]. According to sources, companies avoid using it for fear of being “discriminated against” in future tenders [3].

In general, it is rare for a company to complain when it is the victim of embezzlement [1]. Companies are always afraid of being excluded from future calls for tenders [2]. At the level of the Ministry of Defense, almost no denunciations have been made to the extent that the military hierarchy exercises strict control [3].

The legislation provides companies with the possibility of complaining about perceived malpractices in procurement at several levels. In the case of the defence sector, companies can refer the matter to the inspectorate or to the minister himself, they can also refer the matter to the regulatory authority for public procurement and service delegations and finally they can refer the matter to the courts. Indeed, Article 119 [1] of the Public Procurement Code provides that disputes or litigation or any claim made by one party against another, arising from the interpretation of the texts governing public procurement and public service delegations, from the award, execution, interpretation or termination of public procurement and public service delegations are settled in the following ways:
– an informal appeal;
– non-jurisdictional settlement;
– a judicial appeal;
– arbitration.

The complaints mechanisms available to businesses are occasionally used, although they can be slow for informal recourse or non-jurisdictional settlement[1] and costly for judicial recourse and arbitration.[2] On the efficiency of the mechanisms, both the supervisory authorities for the appeal and the courts are bound by a deadline to render their decision.

Companies are mostly trying to make a good impression and rarely complain unless they are blatantly excluded from the process for reasons that go against procedure. Most, even when they have been wronged, avoid complaining out of fear of being excluded from future procurement cycles. Some are also suspected of maintaining a collusion network.[1] The low number of complaints at the level of the public procurement department or the public procurement regulatory authority illustrates this reality.[2][3]

For cases of non-operational and strategic products and services, there are formal mechanisms to allow companies to complain about perceived malicious practices in acquisitions, which is the legislation that regulates the contracting of public works contracts, acquisition of goods and provision of services to the State [1, 2]. These include both legal proceedings and an internal complaints mechanism. In terms of internal complaints mechanisms, the complaints must be submitted in writing within five business days from the date of notification, without payment of any fee [3]. During the consent period, competitors may freely consult the administrative procedure of the competition [3]. The Jury is responsible for sending the permission as well as its opinion on the Complaint to the Contracting Authority within a maximum period of five business days from receipt of the consultation [3]. The Contracting Authority shall decide on consent within ten business days from the date of receipt [3]. The request has suspensive effects on the progress of the competition. In the case of competitions by lots, the suspension only applies to the lot that is the subject of consent. Complaints are subject to appeal to higher hierarchical levels, namely: Functional Unit for Supervision of Acquisitions, Minister and Courts, and there is a fee to be paid for the hierarchical appeal [4].

Policies and procedures are in place for companies to complain about procurement malpractice. However, these mechanisms are often inefficient in practice and not widely used, partly because procurement agencies lack sufficient capacity to handle complaints properly [3].
Furthermore, there have been almost no cases of complaints from companies in bidding processes for products and services that are made public [1, 2].

Normally, companies that are contracted to provide services and supply goods to the Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Forces are trustworthy companies for the sector [1], considering the sensitivity of Defence and Security issues. Thus, the possibility of complaints is quite small. No information on this subject was found in the box and in the complaint book available at the Ministry of National Defence [2]. There is a tacit trust between companies that compete for tenders from the Ministry of National Defense and the Armed Forces. Therefore, this fact makes companies rarely complain because they believe that they will be discriminated against in future procurement cycles.

Niger’s 2013 decree on defence and security procurement provides only a limited and restrictive process for companies to file complaints regarding perceived malpractice. Article 70 of the decree states that a candidate who believes they have been unfairly disadvantaged during the procurement process may submit a complaint directly to the person responsible for the specific procurement procedure [1]. However, this mechanism lacks impartiality, as it does not provide an independent review process or an external appeals body, leaving decision-making power in the hands of the same authorities overseeing the procurement process. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) further eroded procurement oversight, making it even more difficult for companies to challenge malpractice. With defence procurement now exempt from public procurement laws, competitive bidding has been largely removed, eliminating the need for formal complaint mechanisms [2]. This change effectively shuts down any avenue for companies to contest unfair treatment, as contracts can now be awarded through direct negotiation without external scrutiny. Additionally, there is no evidence that companies are protected from retaliation if they attempt to challenge procurement decisions, further discouraging complaints. Given past procurement scandals involving collusion and favoritism, companies that raise concerns risk being excluded from future contracts or facing administrative barriers [3].

The existing complaint mechanisms for companies in defence procurement are neither effective nor accessible. Under Article 70 of the 2013 decree, companies that feel unfairly disadvantaged during the procurement process may file a complaint only with the person responsible for the procurement procedure [1]. However, this internal process lacks independence, as it does not allow for external oversight, making it highly unlikely that complaints will be addressed fairly. Moreover, there is no evidence that this mechanism is frequently used, as companies risk retaliation if they challenge procurement decisions, particularly given Niger’s history of favoritism and corruption in defence contracts [2]. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) further weakened accountability by exempting defense procurement from public procurement laws, effectively eliminating any formal oversight or structured appeal mechanisms [3]. Additionally, there are no provisions ensuring that companies can file complaints without excessive bureaucratic or financial burdens, and there is no transparency regarding the handling of complaints. Given the lack of independent oversight, protections against retaliation, and a clear appeals process, companies are unlikely to use the available mechanisms, as they are costly, inefficient, and ineffective.

There is a documented history of favoritism and corruption in Niger’s defence procurement, including the 2020 military procurement scandal, where suppliers engaged in fraudulent deals but continued receiving contracts despite evidence of misconduct [1]. This reinforces the perception that procurement decisions are politically driven, and that complaining could result in economic or political repercussions rather than corrective action. The February 23, 2024 Ordinance (No. 2024-05) further exacerbated these risks by removing defense procurement from public procurement regulations, allowing contracts to be awarded without competitive bidding or transparency [2]. With no independent oversight or appeal mechanisms, companies that raise concerns risk being blacklisted, informally excluded, or subject to administrative barriers that prevent them from securing future contracts.

The Public Procurement Act (2007) grants companies the right to request an administrative review if they believe there has been a violation of procurement rules. This includes issues related to collusion, favouritism, or other forms of malpractice.
Formal mechanisms include: a) Filing a Letter of Intent within 14 days of award notice; b) escalation to the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) within 21 days if not resolved; c) referral to the Federal High Court within 45 days, with provision for interim injunctive relief to prevent contract implementation before resolution [1] [2].

These mechanisms establish a clear, tiered complaint process that suppliers can pursue. However, actual usage is limited within the defence sector due to fears of retaliation, delay, or perception of political interference. Civil society actors report that some suppliers hesitate to file complaints because of risk of procurement marginalization in future contracts or protracted legal proceedings [3].

Given that the complaints mechanism under the PPA 2007 does not apply to the defence sector it would appear that there is no clear legal mechanism for contractors to make a complaint if there is any irregularity in the procurement process. To be sure, the effectiveness of whatever complaint mechanisms regarding procurement process and contract award system in the defence sector is likely to be undermined by corruption and political influence, which may discourage companies from filing complaints or result in inadequate responses to legitimate grievances[1]. Worst still, Nigeria’s judiciary is largely corrupt, very inefficient, and slow in dispensing justice [2]. Nigeria’s constitution establishes an independent judiciary, but other branches of government frequently interfere with it. Thus, it has been noted that companies face a high risk of corruption when interacting with Nigeria’s judiciary [1].

Despite the legal frameworks in place, companies may still fear retaliation or being discriminated against in future contracts, especially in the defence sector where contracts are often classified and highly competitive. Businesses do not report sufficient trust in the efficiency of the legal framework to settle disputes or allow them to challenge regulations [1]. This political interference, threat of blacklisting, and absence of an effective whistleblower protection mechanism could further discourage the companies from reporting these crimes. Improvement in the protection given to the whistleblowers, more transparency in the resolution of complaints, and reduction of political manipulation will contribute to making the defence procurement process more transparent and accountable [2].

Legislation gives companies the right to lodge complaints with public authorities for failure to comply with contractual agreements, without the risk of being discriminated against in future procurements. Where violations are established after a contract has been awarded, the offender may appeal to the courts with administrative jurisdiction against the decisions of the Dispute Settlement Committee. This appeal does not have suspensive effect [1] . Article 21 of the Public Procurement Code provides that the Disputes Committee shall hear appeals relating to the award procedure, as referred to in the second paragraph of Article 20 of this Decree, within the time limit laid down by the provisions of Section 4 of Chapter 7 of Title III of the Public Contracts Code, and which are intended to contest:
– decisions to award or not to award the contract or the delegation agreement;
– the conditions under which notices are published;
– the rules relating to the participation of candidates and the capacities and guarantees required;
– the award method and selection procedure used;
– the compliance of the tender documents with the regulations;
– the technical specifications used; – the evaluation criteria.
The Commission’s decisions are enforceable and binding on the parties; they are final, except in the event of an appeal to an administrative or judicial court, such appeal not having suspensory effect; the Chairman of the Regulatory Board may also refer a matter to the Commission for a ruling on any procedural irregularity referred to the ARCOP (ex-ARCOP (ex-ARMP)). [4] The State of Senegal has chosen to specify dispute resolution mechanisms directly in its PPP legislation, by instituting a conciliation procedure with the Public Procurement Regulator. From this rule, we can deduce that the contractual stipulations in PPP contracts must necessarily cover the methods for resolving disputes between the parties, as stipulated in article 30 of the implementing decree of the 2021 PPP law, which lists as minimum clauses in a PPP contract the methods for preventing and settling disputes, and the conditions under which arbitration or other alternative methods of dispute resolution may be used, where appropriate. [2] If certain rules are not respected, whether in the implementation or in the awarding of the contract, the service providers can lodge a complaint to demand justice.

Recourse to the state judicial system is also possible, in which case PPP contractual disputes are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, as are PPP contracts in principle. However, PPP parties often consider that the judicial system is not sufficiently equipped to resolve such disputes, due to the slowness of the procedure or the judges’ lack of technical expertise. As a result, PPP dispute resolution mechanisms avoid recourse to the judicial system wherever possible. [1] Because of these reasons, the complaint mechanisms for companies are not considered as efficient and reasonably priced, even if they are regularly used.
The instruments used to collect data are mainly literature reviews, analysis and interviews, yet the adoption of this new legal framework should enable administrations to make more intensive and rigorous use of the PPP tool, on the basis of sound planning. [2] On the basis of articles 13 and 90 of the Organic Law on the Supreme Court, the judge ruled on the CRD’s withdrawal. Order No. 5 of 23 April 2020, Société Étude-Coordination-Travaux, known as ECOTRA SA v ARCOP (ex-ARMP) ‘Considering that, by letter received on 4 February 2019 at the clerk’s office, Société Étude-Coordination-Travaux, known as ECOTRA SA declared that it was withdrawing its action for annulment of Decision No. 173/19/ARCOP (ex-ARMP)/CRD/DEF of 30 November 2019 of the Dispute Resolution Committee (CRD) of the Autorité de Régulation de Marchés Publics (ARCOP (ex-ARMP)) ; Considering that no legitimate interest is prejudiced by this withdrawal, it is appropriate to acknowledge it; [3] All decisons are of the Dispute Resolution Committee are available online on the ARCOP webite but decsions involving contrats with the Minsitry of Defence has been found. All companies and bidders for public contracts have had different experiences with the ARCOP (ex-ARMP), but in general, the CRD is effective because they even happen to have jurisdiction over certain disputes. It should be noted, however, that there are delays in the execution of their work. [4]

ARCOP (ex-ARMP)’s dispute management committee is an effective commission, even if some bidders think that the committee favours those who offer public contracts. They have also launched an online evaluation via a questionnaire to improve their service and be as neutral as possible. [1]
The Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) is considered neutral. It is responsible for handling disputes related to public procurement and public-private partnership contracts, and its decisions are considered quasi-judicial without any form of discrimination against any party. It is part of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARCOP), an independent institution attached to the presidency, but without any hierarchical link to avoid any form of influence.[2]

South Africa has several anti-corruption hotlines to which the public can submit complaints regarding procurement irregularities and procurement disputes can be taken up through legal channels. [1] The country, however, lacks a central procurement dispute resolution mechanism, making formal processes cumbersome.

South Africa does not have a formal procurement dispute resolution mechanism and as a result, affected parties are forced to make use of protracted legal processes through ordinary courts and civil litigation [1]. The formal regime for remedies is consequently weak, protracted and costly [2].

While it is difficult to determine whether companies avoid submitting complaints related to procurement for fear of retribution, there is significant evidence that whistleblowing is discouraged by the inadequacies of formal protection and out of fear of retaliation [1] [2].
Investigations and civil society reports suggest that actors are generally reluctant to raise concerns about procurement irregularities due to fears of reputational harm, exclusion from future contracts, or administrative delays [1][2] [3]. Furthermore, the 2023 Discussion Document on Whistleblower Protection confirms that companies are not explicitly protected under the Protected Disclosures Act, and the absence of anonymous or independent channels to file procurement grievances contributes to a discouraging effect [2].

Section 22 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2018 gives companies an avenue to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. Section 22(1) specifically states that “the Authority shall establish a Complaints Review Committee for the purpose of conducting independent administrative review of complaints and challenges to procurement decisions in accordance with Act” [1]. Also, the R-ARCSS provides for forum where such issues are raised, and decision taken. One of such for a is the RJMEC monthly plenaries where several issues related to the implementation of the R-ARCSS are tabled, debated and resolutions passed for remedial measures. Subsequently, the RJMEC formally forwards the resolution to the concerned parties for appropriate action, as deemed necessary.

The effectiveness and accessibility of complaints mechanism that companies can use to complain about malpractice in public procurement is not evident in South Sudan. An analysis of local, regional and international media houses does not reveal any reports of complaints raised by companies over public procurement malpractice in the last five years [1]. In addition, a US State department on South Sudan published in 2023 states that “there were no significant anti-corruption cases investigated or prosecuted in 2021 or 2022. Anti-corruption officials allege intentional underfunding of their activities to protect Politically Exposed Persons” [2].

An analysis of local, regional and international media between 2000 and 2024 did not reveal any public information regarding a company that faced retaliation after giving information regarding malpractice in procurement [1]. One of the respondents mentioned that companies seeking to do business with government agencies including the defence and national security ministries try to avoid any confrontation with the government and as such will avoid complaining since that will put them in a disadvantaged position. [2]

The PPDA Act provides a structured administrative review process for bidders who believe that a procuring and disposing entity (PDE) has breached procurement laws, regulations, or guidelines. Section 89 grants bidders the right to seek administrative review for any omissions or violations in procurement procedures, ensuring that best practices are upheld.

Under Section 90, an aggrieved bidder may first submit a complaint to the Accounting Officer of the PDE for redress. If the response is unsatisfactory, Section 91 allows for escalation to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA), which can suspend procurement activities, annul unlawful decisions, or take corrective action. In cases where the matter remains unresolved, Section 91M enables companies to appeal to the High Court within 30 days of a Tribunal decision.

Additionally, The PPDA Regulations, 2006, particularly Regulations 123–125, provide specific procedural guidelines, including:

Regulation 123: Outlines the format, content, and time frame for submitting complaints to the PDE.

Regulation 124: Requires the PDE to respond to a bidder’s complaint within 10 working days.

Regulation 125: Details the process for escalating unresolved complaints to the PPDA Authority, including required documentation and timelines.

Beyond the PPDA framework, additional legislation strengthens procurement accountability:

The Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2010 provides a mechanism for individuals to report corruption or malpractice in procurement while ensuring anonymity and protection from retaliation.

The Public Finance Management Act, 2015 (as amended) reinforces transparency and accountability in public financial management, supporting complaints mechanisms in public procurement processes.

These legal provisions collectively create a multi-layered complaints and review system, ensuring bidders have avenues to seek redress while promoting integrity and transparency in Uganda’s procurement processes. However, the practical effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on enforcement and accessibility, particularly in the defence sector, where classified procurements may limit transparency.

The PPDA complaints handling mechanism provides companies with an avenue to raise concerns about procurement processes, while the Inspectorate of Government’s whistleblower protection mechanism allows for the reporting of corruption and other forms of malpractice. Recent amendments to the PPDA Act and Regulations have aimed at enhancing the efficiency of these processes by reducing lead times and streamlining complaint reviews [1] Specifically, adjustments have been made to expedite resolutions and improve accessibility for businesses navigating the procurement system.

However, despite these legal provisions, concerns remain about the practical efficiency of the complaint’s mechanisms. Reports indicate that delays in decision-making and procedural complexities may discourage companies from pursuing formal complaints [2]. Additionally, the 4th Procurement Integrity Survey 2020 outlines that suppliers do not report because 62% do not have cases to report, 59% are afraid of retribution, 94% think that it is costly, and 92% perceive that if they report, there will not be consequences, or nothing will be done. This suggests that these mechanisms are rarely used.
Cases of malpractice persist within the UPDF procurement process, underscoring the limitations of enforcement mechanisms. For instance, two soldiers serving on an internal administrative review committee investigating a Shs76 billion procurement scandal—involving J2E Investment Corporation and Roester Construction Corporation in alleged collusion with Ministry of Defence and UPDF officials—highlight the risks of internal influence and procurement fraud [3]. While legal frameworks exist to enhance oversight and complaints resolution, their success ultimately depends on effective enforcement, independent review mechanisms, and greater transparency in defence procurement.

Retaliation against companies that file complaints or report malpractices in procurement, including UPDF procurement, can take various forms, such as blacklisting, debarment from future tenders, or contract termination [1]. In practice, the PPDA has investigated and sanctioned companies for breaching the Code of Ethics of Providers. Under Section 8(1)(f) and Section 94 of the PPDA Act (2003), the Board of Directors has suspended certain providers, including those servicing the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) [2,3].

However, while legal provisions exist, fear of retaliation remains a significant deterrent to filing complaints. A PPDA survey (2020) revealed that 60% of suppliers refrained from reporting issues due to concerns about retribution, such as exclusion from future procurement opportunities. Research also indicates that companies perceive Uganda’s public procurement system as corrupt, which further discourages participation or raising concerns about irregularities [4][5].

This environment of hesitancy and perceived risks suggests that, beyond enforcement actions, strengthening whistleblower protections and ensuring fair treatment of complainants is essential to fostering greater trust and transparency in the procurement system.

Section 73 (2-5) of the Public Procurement Act provides a mechanism to complain where a potential or actual bidder in procurement proceedings who claims to have struggled, or to be likely to struggle, loss or injury due to a breach of a duty imposed on a procuring entity by or under this Act, may challenge the procurement proceedings by lodging a written notice with the procuring entity in accordance with this section.
Where notice of the award of a contract has not yet been issued, a challenge may be lodged at any stage of the procurement proceedings up to the date on which such notice is issued [1]. Provided that, where the grounds of a challenge concern alleged improprieties in the invitations to bid or to pre-qualify which have become apparent before bids were opened, the challenge shall be lodged prior to bid opening. Review panels shall be appointed from one or more lists of panellists prepared by the Authority in terms of this section. The Authority shall select persons for inclusion on a list of panellists by-
(a) requesting- (i) the Law Society of Zimbabwe; and (ii) the Civil Service Commission; and (iii) organisations representing professional associations or bodies or commercial and industrial entities; and (iv) other organisations which, in the opinion of the Board, have or represent persons with expertise in relation to the field of procurement [1]. Section 68 of the constitution of Zimbabwe provides for review of administrative conduct [2].

The mechanism allows companies to complain about procurement malpractices including unfairness in any procurement processes since the panels are constituted by representatives from the Law Society of Zimbabwe and professional bodies familiar with the field in which the procurement is drawn [1]. The mechanism for review is also accessible provided that the complaint satisfies the board and review panel [3]. Because a certain amount of money has to be deposited, it ensures that the process of review is not left for abuse by bidders [1,][2,][3].

While the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that an aggrieved person on issues related to administrative conduct should approach the courts for administrative justice, there are practical challenges involved as this may bring tension between the companies and the government especially for future bidding [1]. Procuring entities can take the government to court to ensure administrative justice [2]. However, there is no case in which companies have taken the government to court, including the defence forces.