Q24.

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

24a. Controls

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24b. Transparency of disposal process

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24c. Transparency of financial results of disposals

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No information could be found (1) on whether the Ministry of Defence has formalized an internal process of overseeing and advising on asset disposals. There are some regulations in place as presented in the following that might also apply to the Defence Ministry.

A law on privatization generally allows the government to undertake privatization. Here, the respective ministers are in charge (Art. 8). According to Art. 18, the details of the privatization, the call for tenders and the closing date have to be published twice in at least two newspapers. Under Title VI, modes of controls are codified. According to Art. 38, there is a control commission, which should supervise the privatization process. Its members are mostly composed by members of the Cabinet, i.e. the Minister of Finance and Minister of Justice (2).

Moreover, Executive Decree No. 12-427 of December 16, 2012 (an amendment to Law No. 90-30) sets the terms and conditions of administration and management of public domain and private domain of the state and also regulates disposals of state property assets. Under Title II, Chapter I, Section 2, it states that sales by public auction are carried out by an ad hoc committee whose composition is fixed by an order of the respective governorate (wali). The decree might also apply to the defence sector since it only states that it does not apply to affairs regarding natural resources (Art. 2) (3), (4). In light of the powerful position of the armed forces, as outlined under previous questions, it seems unlikely that civilian authorities have the final say over assets managed under the Defence Ministry.

No information on asset disposals with regards to the defence sector could be found. There has likely been no asset disposal from the Defence Ministry in the last years (see answer 24C), which is why no information was found (1).

Generally, Executive Decree No. 12-427 of December 16, 2012, says that tenders are prepared by a Domain Department. Tenders are announced through posters and press releases at least twenty days before the date of the auction. The decree gives some indications with regards to transparency in the defence sector and suggests that asset disposals are not transparent. Art. 89 states that orders on the assignment and disuse of real estate of the private domain of the state should be issued by the Minister of Finance and published in the Official Gazette unless their provision concerns the national defence (2).

No reports could be found on the website (1) or in the media indicating that the Ministry of Defence has disposed of any assets in the last years. Thus, no information on financial results could be found either.

In recent months, newspapers reported that the Algerian government would sell state companies. No details on the companies could be found, and whether companies owned by the armed forces were included. According to newspaper reports, all important sectors, such as oil, gas, telecommunications, would not be included (2), (3). Since the Ministry of Defence has recently stated that the military industry should contribute to national economic development (4), it seems likely that the military industry is not included in the privatization considerations of the government.

There is a formalized process for public asset disposals, but it is not clear and has exemptions for defence and security assets. The inventory and disposal of public assets are regulated by the 2010 Law on Public Assets (Law 18/10 of August 6) (1). Asset disposals supposedly fall under the same legal procedures as their acquisition – the public procurement law (2). However, while military naval vessels, combat vehicles and other equipment of similar durability are considered public assets (Law 18/10, Art. 12) (1), other assets of military defence and intelligence services are excluded from the inventory of public assets “for national security reasons” and are subject to a specific inventory set up by the armed forces and intelligence services (Law 18/10, Art. 84) (1).

There is no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal.

There is little to no knowledge about the financial results of asset disposals.

Every year the Parliament adopts the national budget including that of the defence sector. As per the provision of Article 84 of the Constitution, the Parliament passes laws, approves taxes and monitors government activity, including asset disposal (1). However, according to the UNODC (2015), and the United States Department of State (2017), access to government information is difficult (2), (3). Thus, the independence of the Parliament’s Defence and Security Committee in performing scrutiny over asset disposal is not evident, even if a member of the Defence and Security Committee (anonymous source) claims that the “government never influences the work of the committee” (4). Although the law gives power to the Parliament to control asset disposal, there is no evidence that it does it practically, as there is no report available on the scrutiny of asset disposal in the defence sector.

There is no information on asset disposal within the defence and security sector available (1), (2), (3).

The financial results of asset disposals of the defence and security sectors are not made available (1), (2).

The Ministry of State Property and Land Tenure is in charge of managing State property in Cameroon [1] [2]. But no evidence suggests controls over defence asset disposals [2] [3].

Although the Cameroon military has recently received logistics support and assistance from the Russian, Chinese and US governments in the form of “sophisticated military equipment, the latest version of heavy artillery, including missiles, aerial protection equipment, anti-aircraft missile systems, cannons, armoured vehicles, and several other types of military equipment and armaments” [1] [2] to combat Boko Haram, no evidence suggests that asset disposals, plans for asset disposals, nor their financial results, are ever published.

There is some internal knowledge within the Ministry about the disposal of assets, but there is no knowledge about the financial results of such disposals [1]. There is no information on the official website of the military or of the Ministry of State Property and Land Tenure indicating such disposals and purchases [2] [3].

There is no formalized procedure for disposing of state-controlled stockpiles of arms in Côte d’Ivoire, although the country has signed and ratified the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms (Convention de la CEDEAO sur les armes légeres et de petit calibre, leurs munitions et autres matériels connexes).

According to Article 17 of the ECOWAS Convention (Collection and Destruction):
Member States undertake to collect and/or destroy (1):
(a) weapons which constitute a surplus of national requirements or become obsolete;
(b) weapons seized;
(c) unmarked weapons;
(d) illegally held weapons;
(e) weapons collected as part of the implementation of a peace program or a voluntary weapons surrender program (1).

The Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la Prolifération et la Circulation Illicite des Armes Légeres et de Petit Calibre (ComNat-ALPC), a coordinating body that is part of the Ministry of the Interior, is tasked with the disposal of arms and ammunition (cession d’armes et de munition).

Decree No. 99-183 (February 24, 1999), which regulates the circulation of arms and ammunition in Côte d’Ivoire, explicitly excludes assets from the police and other government armed forces from its scope of application:

Art. 3 – Weapons ammunition, arms components and ammunition elements for use by the Army, the Police or any other public force, are not subject to the provisions of this decree (2).

The decommissioning, collecting and destruction of state-controlled stockpiles are in the hands of the ComNat-ALPC, which is financed by the government of Japan and works together with the ECOWAS Small Arms Project since 2015-2016. ComNat-ALPC is allocated resources from the Budget Law on an annual basis.
[The ComNat-ALPC website is hacked as of October 2018 and no information can be sourced directly from the Commission.] The goal of the ComNat-ALPC is to collect and dispose of light arms through institutional capacity building and the setting up of committees tasked with asset disposals throughout Côte d’Ivoire. The cooperation with ECOWAS is serving to harmonize legislation among the 15 Member States and to implement joint action plans given the sub-regional dimension of the arms problem. ComNat-ALPC holds regular events in which it publicly disposes of state-controlled arms, as it did with obsolete rifles in the district of Yopougon (Abidjan) on 28 January 2015. It is mainly involved in the disposal of diverted arms and ammunition by former rebel groups (3).

According to a June 2014 report by the Small Arms Survey (SAS), the government of Côte d’Ivoire needs to improve its monitoring of state-controlled arms and ammunition because the amount of illicit arms caches suggests that old and newly purchased stocks are easily diverted through loss, theft or corruption. And the scale of the diversion goes largely undetected (4).

For example, there have been several cases of the discovery of arms caches dating to the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011 that have escaped ComNat-ALPC controls. On October 18, 2017, Jeune Afrique reported on a hidden cache of arms and ammunition found on September 27, 2017, in a district of Abidjan called Attécoubé. The Armed Forces retrieved AK-47 assault rifles, machine guns, grenades, rocket launchers, shells, false license plates, explosives and a military vehicle. The cache was traced to a guerrilla movement known as the Mouvement Guerrier pour la Dignité et la Justice en Côte d’Ivoire, a group led by Traoree Zanga and allied with the (pro-Outtara) Forces Nouvelles (FN) during the 2010-2011 civil conflict (5).

Another case widely reported by Ivorian media is the May 15, 2017, discovery of 15 tons of factory-packaged AK-47s and rocket launchers, along with ammunition in the basement of a villa owned by the Director of Protocol of NA President Guillaume Soro, a man named Soul to Soul. The incident proved some stocks are unaccounted for, thus casting doubt on the effectiveness of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process that expired on June 30, 2015. At that point, the Autorité de Démobilisation, de Désarmement et de Réinsertion (ADDR) had announced it had collected a total of 42,000 arms. The real number of decommissioned arms due to the DDR process is now estimated at below 20,000 arms (5).

The decommissioning and destruction of state-controlled stockpiles is nominally the task of the Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la Prolifération et la Circulation Illicite des Armes Légeres et de Petit Calibre (ComNat-ALPC). The activities of ComNat-ALPC, particularly the capacity-building workshops and the cooperation with the ECOWAS Small Arms Project, are widely publicized in Côte d’Ivoire. However, the details of the disposal of arms and ammunition are available only in highly abbreviated form. The agency, part of the Ministry of the Interior, also reports regularly about the seizure or destruction of arms and ammunition caches to the ECOWAS Small Arms Project, an EU-financed project which is being implemented by UNDP since 2015-2016 (1). ComNat-ALPC holds public events in which it disposes of state-controlled arms, as it did with obsolete rifles in the district of Yopougon (Abidjan) on January 28, 2015 (2).

There is no evidence that the disposal of arms and ammunition by ComNat-ALPC includes the disclosure of financial results. There is no evidence that either the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of the Interior provides this type of information.

According to our sources, there are no formal policies or procedures for asset disposal. Indeed, each branch of the armed forces manages the disposal of their assets alone, which in most cases results in corruption cases for issues like the disposal of assets for personal use (1), (2), (3). Moreover, all laws related to the defence sector were surveyed, and no evidence was found for the existence of provisions regulating asset disposal (4), (5), (6).

Law no. 14 (1967) prohibits the publishing or broadcasting of any information or news about the armed forces: its formations, movements, armaments and personnel, and everything related to the military and strategic aspects unless written approval from the director of the military intelligence department has been attained (1). Therefore, even if a process of asset disposal exists, the law prohibits the publishing of any related information except that which is approved by the director of military intelligence.

No information is published about asset disposal. It is not required by the law (1), (2), (3). The publishing of any information or news pertaining to formations, movements, armaments and personnel as well as anything else that is related to the military and strategic issues is prohibited except after obtaining written approval from the director of military intelligence (4). Therefore, there is almost no knowledge in the public domain about the financial results of asset disposals. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the military budget is only available as a topline figure, so this information can be found nowhere in the national budget either (5).

The policies and procedures for the disposal of assets are outlined in section 6 of the Guidelines for Disposal of Goods and Equipment governed by the Public Procurement Act (2003). Tenders are opened by the Tender Evaluation Committee and advertised in the national dailies and other newspapers and publications. Proceeds from the assets are dealt with per the Financial Administration Act (2003), Internal Audit Agency Act (2003) and other relevant regulatory requirements. A committee consisting of three people: The head of the entity, a representative of the user-department and a senior public servant from outside the entity shall be responsible for the procedure from tender to the recording of results. According to the PPA, the authority to dispose of assets lies with the head of procurement entity (clearly defined in the act), who shall convene a Board of Survey (also defined in the act).

According to the Guidelines for Disposal of Goods and Equipment (GDGE) governed by Public Procurement Act (2003), the planned disposal of assets are advertised in the national dailies and other newspapers and publications (1), but they are not regularly published on the Ministry of Defence website. The Ghanaian government has explicitly laid out the tender process for asset disposal which is found in the GDGE, but no mention is made of specifically publishing it on the website of the said ministry. Rather, the level and importance of the asset being disposed of determines the level of publishing online or in print, which is judged by the disposal chief (1), (2).

According to the Guidelines for Disposal of Goods and Equipment (GDGE), the proceeds from sales shall be handled per the Financial Administration Act (2003), and the Internal Audit Agency Act (2003). The revenue from disposals are comprehensively recorded within the ministry, but they are not regularly released to the public (1), (2).

In relation to defence assets disposal, there seems to be no clear formalised process in Jordan. In sectors other than defence, there seems to be little oversight and control by the legislative authority in the country, particularly in relation to assets in transport, communications, tourism, water, aviation, electricity, mining and phosphates [1]. However, the defence budget does not include anything related to the disposal of defence assets [2]. Research into parliamentary news and news of parliamentary committees, as well as other oversight entities, shows that there is no evidence of any information related to defence assets, whether in relation to acquisition or disposal [3, 4, 5]. There is no evidence of the existence of a formalised clear policy for defence assets disposal [6,7].

Information about assets disposal within the civil ministries as well as the military are published online on the websites and in newspapers. However, it is hard to get information about who assets were sold to and how much they were sold for. As explained in the previous sub-indicator, there is no clear process for the disposal of assets within the defence sector, and publicly available defence budgets do not include anything related to asset disposal [1]. There might be some information available through the media on the actual sale or disposal of some defence assets, yet this coverage does not include any information about the actual process itself or about how sale deals were concluded [2, 3, 4]. There is no formalised clear process for asset disposal and, moreover, there is also no information publicly available about the process itself [5,6].

There is very little information available about the financial results of defence asset disposals, other than those available through the media [1, 2, 3]. Media reporting sometimes provides details about the financial results of sales of old military equipment or lightweight military equipment sold to other governments. However, the annual financial report issued by the Ministry of Finance, includes nothing on governmental income achieved through the Ministry of Defence [4]. The 2017 final accounts, released in March 2018, do not include any mention of income through the defence sector. In fact, there is a line within the accounts that specifies general Government income through the sale of services and goods, but none of the breakdowns for this is related to defence. There is little knowledge about the disposal of assets within the defence sector in general, let alone information about financial results of asset disposals.

The financial departments inside security agencies are in charge of asset disposals and these activities are internally and externally audited, but there is reason to think that these audits are insufficient, and they are not properly publicised, officials said (1, 2 and 3). The policy is not clear or publicised.

Moreover, the financial departments in the security agencies follow the instructions of the ministers, who are given complete control over their organisations’ funds, and this undermines their independence, according to article 24 of the police law (4) and 27 of the military law (5) Auditors from both the SAB and the ACA said they do not trust or take their reports seriously (1 and 2).

That being said, these reports are sent to the Finance Ministry monthly, which then publishes an aggregate figure for asset disposal for each month (and a total figure at the end of each year). This figure is never broken down, so it is virtually impossible for the public, civil society or the media to track an asset disposal deal without informal help from inside these ministries.

The security agencies, Finance Ministry and auditing agencies do not publish any information about individual asset disposal deals. The Finance Ministry is the only body that speaks about the matter and it does so by publishing an aggregate figure for the asset disposals once a month, and it provides a yearly total as well, but without any elaboration.(1)

These deals are never made public before they go into effect.

This is a problem that plagues other sectors of the Kuwaiti Government as well.

The ministries in question do not release any information about these deals. The Finance Ministry does publish an aggregate figure for the deals done in each ministry, but it does not provide further information and state agencies do not respond to citizen, journalist or civil society requests for more details (1 and 2).

No formalized regulatory process responsible for overseeing asset disposal, issuing internal audits, and responsible for aggregating disposal database reports was found (1). For example, in February 2019, Switzerland halted a weapons transfer to Lebanon because it could not identify arms purchased by former Minister Hussein Zeaiter in 2016 under the government of Lebanon’s name (2). Initially, the Swiss government halted the weapons transfer to Lebanon and the Lebanese Army after the government failed to commit to its obligations with regards to identify the transferred arms it has purchased. However, the minister of defence denied the purchase of the arms to the military (3). Zeaiter was identified hours after the news broke out (2). Although there is an absence of a clear policy for controls over assets disposal (1), it is important to note the existence of practical actions and safeguards to track weapons and systems in LAF holdings (2). LAF Logistics Brigade and the Logistics Directorate (J4) are among the most sensitive to the improper allocation, use, or accounting of these systems (2).

The asset disposal process is not formalised and there is little information publically available. (1), (2).

Lebanon lacks a formalized asset disposal process thus knowledge about their financial results is not achievable (1),(2).

The assessor did not find evidence of any formal procedures for disposing of assets with regard to the defence and security sector in any of the sources listed or beyond. The Malian defence sector has for many years suffered from an acute lack of assets: vehicles, communications devices, weapons, etc.[2] The government is much more focused on acquiring assets rather than disposing of older ones, which are more likely to be used until they stop functioning.
The World Bank’s 2012 report on financial management in Mali’s defence and police forces found that these forces were significantly underequipped, but noted that they were undergoing a massive programme of re-equipment.[4] In 2012 alone, the Malian armed forces acquired approximately 160 troop-carrying vehicles, five tank carriers, two reservoirs for the air force, five power generators, communications equipment, light and heavy weapons, and some T-55 tanks.[4,5] In total, the Ministry of Defence’s budget request estimated that, based on assessed requirements, 300 billion CFA francs (CFAF) was needed to rebuild the army alone.[4,5]
The current government’s major reform programme for the armed forces (LOPM), which was adopted by the National Assembly in May 2015, does not contain any mention of formal systems for asset disposals, underlining the lack of attention paid to the subject. [7] The LOPM provides for USD2.3 billion of investment for the armed forces and is set to recruit an additional 10,000 personnel between 2015 and 2019.[7]

A senior security governance professional working with the Malian authorities told the assessor that they were not aware of there being any system for disposing of assets. “It’s much more likely old equipment is used until it is run into the ground”.[8] Meanwhile, “obtaining an inventory of spare parts is difficult and often impossible. Record-keeping, accountability – none of that is done”.[8]

A French military trainer noted that the Malian army ordered 800 pick-ups in 2006, but that by 2013 there were almost none left.[1] This is unlikely to indicate disposals, it is more likely that they were stolen or destroyed in the course of the 2012-2013 conflict in which armed anti-state actors targeted military vehicles. Hundreds of soldiers also deserted their posts leaving their equipment behind them.[3]

A defence attaché working in Bamako recounted a more recent example highlighting the lack of controls in place.[9] The source noted that in 2012, France sold the Malian government a number of mine detectors. But within months, this equipment ended up in the hands of armed groups in the north that were fighting against the FAMa.[6]

The assessor did not find any evidence about the process of asset disposals with regard to the defence and security sector. Recent reports by the IMF and by the World Bank make no mention of asset disposals in the context of the Malian military.3,4,5,11,12 Similarly, previous analyses of the Malian defence sector by Transparency International, RAND and SIPRI do not contain any information concerning the disposal of defence assets.6,7,10 The websites of the Malian armed forces, the Malian government and the BVG do not contain any information about asset disposal in the defence sector.1,8,9
A senior security governance professional working with the Malian authorities told the assessor that they were not aware of there being any system for disposing of assets. “It’s much more likely old equipment is used until it is run into the ground”.²¹ Meanwhile, “obtaining an inventory of spare parts is difficult and often impossible. Record-keeping, accountability – none of that is done”.14 “There is, however, leakage of small arms, petrol and uniforms from the armed forces into the black market”.14
A defence attaché working at a foreign embassy in Bamako highlighted that, in 2015, the Malian government was unofficially supplying arms to GATIA, a pro-government militia operating in the north of the country.15 The government never provided any details about the arms transfers, indicating the absence of transparency. The transfers subsequently diminished following international pressure.
A French military trainer noted that the Malian army ordered 800 pick-ups in 2006, but that by 2013 there were almost none left. This is unlikely to indicate disposals, it is more likely that they were stolen or destroyed in the course of the 2012-2013 conflict in which armed anti-state actors targeted military vehicles. Hundreds of soldiers also deserted their posts leaving their equipment behind them.2
The loss of equipment continues today. In 2016, two senior military commanders were suspended and six soldiers arrested following the loss of 26 sub-machine guns from an unspecified base in Bamako.13,14 A Kalashnikov sub-machine gun can fetch between 300,000 and 350,000 CFA on the black market.14

The assessor did not find any evidence about the financial results of asset disposals with regard to the defence and security sector. Recent reports by the IMF and by the World Bank make no mention of asset disposals in the context of the Malian military.3,4,5,10,12 Similarly, previous analyses of the Malian defence sector by Transparency International, RAND and SIPRI no do contain any information concerning the disposal of defence assets.6,7 The websites of the Malian armed forces, the Malian government and the BVG do not contain any information about asset disposal in the defence sector.8,9
Moreover, the current government’s major reform programme for the armed forces (LOPM), which was adopted by the National Assembly in May 2015, does not contain any mention of formal systems for asset disposals, underlining the lack of attention paid to the subject.11
A senior security governance professional working with the Malian authorities told the assessor that they were not aware of there being any system for disposing of assets. “It’s much more likely old equipment is used until it is run into the ground”.²¹ Meanwhile, “obtaining an inventory of spare parts is difficult and often impossible. Record-keeping, accountability – none of that is done”.13 “There is, however, leakage of small arms, petrol and uniforms from the armed forces into the black market”.13
A French military trainer noted that the Malian army ordered 800 pick-ups in 2006, but that by 2013 there were almost none left.¹ This is unlikely to indicate disposals, it is more likely that they were stolen or destroyed in the course of the 2012-2013 conflict in which armed anti-state actors targeted military vehicles. Hundreds of soldiers also deserted their posts leaving their equipment behind them.2

There is no formalised, clear process for asset disposal.

No evidence was found supporting the existence of procedures of asset disposals or the controls that might be in place (1). This lack of evidence indicates a lack of transparency. It must also be noted that the King is the Head of the Moroccan armed forces and that top military and intelligence positions are filled directly by him by close and loyal members of his first circle.

Interviewees noted that corruption in asset disposals exist within some units of the Moroccan armed forces, although they were unable to disclose full details (2)(3). There is a lack of information regarding formal procedures of control and assets disposal, even though there is a clear statement by Morocco’s anti-corruption legislation that requires the compulsory disclosure of assets.

There is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal.

Recent official and press statements on anti-corruption fail to mention the process of asset disposal within the Moroccan armed forces, or the armed forces in general (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6).

This process was also left unaddressed by official public bodies that might be in charge of asset disposal processes, such as the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office or the Royal Treasury (7)(8).

Interviewees argue that this lack of evidence indicates a lack of transparency, which in turn could imply risks of corruption (9)(10).

Almost no information is available about the clear process of asset disposal. In Morocco’s anti-corruption legislation or other related articles, there is no clear statement on how to dispose of assets within the Moroccan army. The absence of independent scrutiny could also be explained by the fact that the King is the head of the military, and that the defence administration (lead by a Minister in charge of defence, but not a dedicated Defence Minister) remains strongly controlled by the Palace.

There is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal.

Recent official and press statements on anti-corruption fail to mention the process of asset disposal within the Moroccan armed forces, or the armed forces in general (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6).

This process was also left unaddressed by official public bodies that might be in charge of asset disposal processes, such as the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office or the Royal Treasury (7)(8).

Interviewees argue that this lack of evidence indicates a lack of transparency, which in turn could imply risks of corruption (9)(10).

Almost no information is available about the clear process of asset disposal. In Morocco’s anti-corruption legislation or other related articles, there is no clear statement on how to dispose of assets within the Moroccan army. The absence of independent scrutiny could also be explained by the fact that the King is the head of the military, and that the defence administration (lead by a Minister in charge of defence, but not a dedicated Defence Minister) remains strongly controlled by the Palace.

The assessor found no public evidence to suggest that Niger has a policy for the disposal of defence and security assets. The ECOWAS Commission on illegal arms is tasked at a sub-regional level with the decommission, collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons in Niger. The country continues to face an increasing threat of insurgency from non-state armed groups. Given the growing insecurity, Niger’s defence and security budget increased by 17.56 % in 2018. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of defence and security have also been expanded in the last five years. Besides, the country is serving as a transit route for weapons circulating principally from Libya, Mali, and Nigeria. Thus, control and circulation of weapons is one of the main challenges for the government.
The Small Arms Survey report by Savannah de Tessieres (2) clarifies that defence assets are seized (weapons and ammunition) mainly by the Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN), the Gendarmerie, National Guard, local police and customs. Records are kept, but a “national database of seizure-related information is crucially lacking”. Records of different security services include information on the type of arms, the serial number or parts of the serial number, and the date of the seizure; but, there is no national register of seized weapons and no centralisation of either the weapons or the data about such weapons (2). Moreover, weapons are often stored without any details regarding their seizure and are frequently misidentified (2). Weapons are neither destroyed nor stored according to accepted stockpile management standards. Due to their lack of equipment, many Nigerien security services take seized weapons for their own arsenals. This is in breach of Article 17 of the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of which Niger is a signatory. Some services record these transfers, while others do not. Moreover, seized weapons may change custody several times, resulting in the duplication of records (2).
In addition, Decree No 2014-737/PRN of 3 December 3, 2014 (1), set up the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission nationale pour la collecte et le contrôle des armes illicites, CNCCAI), a unit that acts as an advisory body to the president (Article 2) that supports them in the identification, creation and implementation of strategies to fight against the proliferation and circulation of illicit weapons. Part of its mandate is to advise and strategise over the flow of illegal small arms. The CNCCAI can collect defence assets (arms, ammunition) that are voluntarily handed over by owners. It can also set up programs with the State and local authorities to collect and destroy such assets. As per Articles 11–13, a technical committee composed of officials from different ministries (Comité technique ministeriel) assists the CNCCAI in strategy implementation. However, evidence shows that CNCCAI deals with voluntary handovers, not decommissioning.

There is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal. According to the Small Arms Survey by Savannah de Tessieres (1), there is an absence of comprehensive data on arms seizures in Niger: “…weapons are often stored without any details regarding the seizure and are frequently misidentified. And while these various bodies record seizures and voluntary submissions, there is no national register of seized weapons and no centralisation of either the weapons or the data about such weapons.” Thus, there is no transparency about the issue due to the lack of publicly available information.
It should also be noted that Niger currently has limited capacity and resources to assist with international tracing requests. Nigerien authorities have not sent out any tracing requests to other national authorities. The lack of a central registry of lost or stolen weapons makes domestic tracing difficult (1) and may increase the risk of diversions.

There is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal. According to the Small Arms Survey by Savannah de Tessieres (1), there is an absence of comprehensive data on arms seizures in Niger: “…weapons are often stored without any details regarding the seizure and are frequently misidentified. And while these various bodies record seizures and voluntary submissions, there is no national register of seized weapons and no centralization of either the weapons or the data about such weapons.” Thus, there is no transparency about the issue due to the lack of publicly available information.

There is a formal procedure for the disposal of public assets. According to the Public Procurement Act of 2007 (PPA), every procuring entity in Nigeria is also a disposing entity (Section 55.2 of PPA 2007) (1), (2). However, section 15 (2) of the act explicitly excludes national defence or national security acquisitions from its provisions of this act unless the president approved of such procurement (1).

The provisions of the PPA (2007), are generally applicable to civil disposal of public assets but the PPA does not include procurement of special goods and services involving national defence or national security, except when the president’s approval is obtained (1). Although there is a Freedom of Information Act available through which the public can seek information; government agencies, including the MOD, rarely comply with such requests. Moreover, revenue generated from the defence procurement is not reported in the public account (2).

Disposal of assets involving defence and security are excluded from the provisions of the PPA; therefore, the information is not available to the public (1), (2).

There are internal regulations and policies concerning asset disposal, but these policies and regulations are not published. The financial and procurement unit is responsible for asset disposal (1). The Ministry of Defence Office of the Secretary-General has its own Secretariat Tender; however, no information is published beyond the title on the website (2). The State Tender Board has detailed procedures on tender compliance in Royal Decree 29/2010; however, there are no details concerning asset disposal within any sector, let alone the defence (3).

No information is publicly available on asset disposals or the processes in place. Neither the Ministry of Defence general website nor does the secretary-general website contain a reference to the process of asset disposal (1), (2), (3). No references were found in media outlets (4), (5). Neither was any reference found in Omani law or accountancy firms discussing the state’s attempts to legislate against corruption (6).

The lack of transparency on asset disposal in the ministry across the board means no knowledge can be ascertained about the financial consequences of asset disposals. According to our sources, there are rare cases when asset disposal is conducted, but the financial resources go to the MoD (1). Like the above indicator, neither the website of the Ministry of Defence or the MoD’s secretary-general refer to the financial results of asset disposal (2), (3). As determined in sub-indicator 4A-C, 15C and the above sub-indicator, the lack of publicly available information paired with the restraints on civil society leave little accountability vis-à-vis transparency of financial results of asset disposal in the MoD.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

There is a unit that advises and oversees the process of asset disposal. This unit is linked to “The Military Financial department”. However, it is not completely separate from the MoF (1). The main unit supervising the process is part of the MoF, the General Supplies Department. The department must advertise the assets to the public, and follow a clear process in the whole process managed by the law of the MOF (2), (3). The usual process is an advertisement in local newspapers and bids. Afterwards, both units select the winner of the contract. The money goes directly to the MoF. However, in numerous cases, the assets went to people linked to the security personnel. So although the procedures and units are there, personal connections continue to be part of the operational landscape (1).

Planned disposals are known in advance and are published on the ministry’s website, and in newspapers (1), (2) before a buyer has been identified (bidding). However, some information may be incomplete in the advertisements. Information like the state of the assets, how old they are, the requirements and conditions of the intended buyers are not published for the public (1), (2).

Although asset disposal is publicly advertised, the financial results and buyers’ names are not advertised (2). Moreover, in the majority of cases, the buyer is known, and the advertisement is just a bureaucratic process to formalize it. In the advertisements, there is a written paragraph saying that the MOF is not obliged to publish the price (1).

Qatar is a major arms importer. There are no controls over the disposal of defence assets, and there is no information on these disposals. In fact, asset disposals are rare in the armed forces, which means there is not a formalised process for disposals. [1,2]

There is no formal process of asset disposal within the defence sector. The Ministry of Defence does not have a website, and the Ministry of Finance’s official website does not include any information about asset disposal processes. Qatar’s budget, available on the Ministry of Finance website, does not include any information about the MoD’s budget, expenditures or assets. [1] There is no information around disposal processes within governmental departments [2]. The Qatari government maintains that information related to defence is highly confidential. Our sources confirm that there is a lack of transparency (3,4).

The Qatari government does not release any information about defence budget, revenues, and/or assets to the public. Even ministries are denied access to information about defence (1). It has become clear that the government does not share the budget with the Advisory Council. The Emir’s announcement contains very little information about defence budgets. There is a lack of transparency in relation to all matter related to defence, including asset disposal [2,3]. If asset disposal takes place, the public are unaware of it, and of the subsequent financial results.

According to our resources, the MoD has a formalized process of asset disposal; hower, this process lack clarity, and consistency (1), (2). There is no internal auditing unit that oversees and advises on asset disposal (3). Currently, Saudi Arabia does not have an established weapons manufacturing or export industry. Therefore it is unlikely that asset disposal generates any significant income for the defence industry, which is funded by the central government.

There is no transparency in the asset disposal process in Saudi Arabia as the government does not publish any relevant information on this process. It is unclear what is done with decommissioned weapons or how these are disposed of (1), (2).

According to our sources, the financial outcomes of the disposal process are not made public, but certain sections of the financial unit are aware of the figures. The researcher found no information on the financial results of any asset disposals if and when they occur in Saudi Arabia.

According to our sources, there is a legal mechanism that clearly defines the mechanism of asset disposal of the MoD. However, there is no internal unit that monitors and reports the asset disposal as this is the responsibility of a joint committee with the Ministry of State’s Properties and Land Affairs (1,2). The disposal of state assets is the remit of the Ministry of State’s Properties and Land Affairs (Article 1 of decree n°999-1990, dated 11 June 1990, on Prerogatives of the Ministry of State’s Properties) (3). In addition to the concerned department at the Ministry of Defence, specialised departments of the Ministry of State’s Properties and Land Affairs are responsible for the asset disposal in terms of monitoring, following-up and keeping statistics of these properties, as well as selling them when they become unusable. The Public Services General Control (under the authority of the President of the Government) and the Court of Audit can also intervene in the scrutiny of such matters, but an oversight by these bodies is limited (decree no 88-36) (4). There are no available sources detailing the disposal of assets within the Ministry of Defence.

The destination of obsolete and unusable defence items like weapons systems and armored vehicles depends on the authorisation from the origin country (according to the stipulations of the end-user certificate) (5).

According to our sources, there is no mechanism to make asset disposal publicly available through any kind of channel. However, occasionally the Ministry of State’s properties and Lands Affairs open competitions of assets’ disposal (1,2,3).

According to our sources, there is no public information, or any information in the budget of the MoD, concerning the asset disposal. The revenue of the assets goes to the general budget as income(1,2).

There are clear regulations and processes within the armed forces that administer the disposal of assets. Federal Decree No. 12 of 1986 regulating Tenders & Auctions in the Armed Forces (amended by Resolution No. 32 of 1995), as part of business law in the UAE (1), is supposed to in part regulate asset disposals within the Armed Forces. There is a unit that oversees these processes. The assets can be sent as gifts to other armies(e. g Libya and Yemen) or sold in case they can be used by civilians (2,3).

The information available to the public about defence expenditure and budgets generally does not include any information related to asset disposal. Media reports, sometimes reveal information on actual sales and/or disposal of some defence assets; however, there are no official communications around asset disposal on behalf of the government. In general, information about asset disposal is scarce and not available outside the Ministry of Defence and the army in case the assets are military equipment; however, the MoF can be involved when the assets include equipment or vehicles that can be used by civilians (1), (2).

The UAE government does not reveal any information about its defence budget, revenues, and or assets to the public. As cases of asset disposal with revenues are rare, there is no information available on this matter (1), (2).

Country Sort by Country 24a. Controls Sort By Subindicator 24b. Transparency of disposal process Sort By Subindicator 24c. Transparency of financial results of disposals Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 100 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kuwait 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Lebanon 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 75 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine NEI 75 / 100 0 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
United Arab Emirates 75 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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