Q28.

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military and intelligence services) subject to parliamentary debate?

28a. Comprehensiveness

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

28b. Parliamentary scrutiny

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

Compare scores by country

Please view this page on a larger screen for the full stats.

Relevant comparisons

As per Art. 192 of the Algerian Constitution (2016), annual reports from the Court of Auditors are sent to the Presidents of the Council of the Nation and the APN (1). There is no evidence that the reports are provided to the whole parliament or that they are subject to debate. As has been outlined in question 17, according to media reports, the Ministry of National Defence was not very cooperative in providing information to the auditors and only provided general answers to questions (2).

Information on the security sectors appears to be classified. Uncovering secrets of the defence service is punishable by law, as outlined in Art. 63, Art. 66, and Art. 67 of the Algerian Penal Code (3), (4).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable due to the fact that a review of articles published by the APN suggests that the annual reports of the Court of Auditors are not discussed in the parliament (1), (2). As has been outlined in question 1C, the executive has close relations to the parliament, it cannot be considered independent. Critics have complained in the news that the parliament does not review the annual report (3).

No audit reports on the defence and security sector have been produced and submitted to parliament. The audit court is supposed to present annual reports on the state accounts that may be subject to an audit if requested by Parliament (Law 13/10, Art. 9-10) (1). However, the latest annual State Accounts Audit Court Report, published in 2017, is on the year 2014, only contains summary information on the defence sector (2).

Requests for audits on other sectors by opposition parties in parliament have been repeatedly rejected by the ruling party (see examples under Q1A) (2).

Since no audit reports on the defence and security sector have been submitted to Parliament, no debate has taken place. This indicator has thus been marked Not Applicable.

The Constitution allows the Supreme Audit Institution to monitor government accounts and provide recommendations for better management. It produces annual reports, which it sends to the president. However, there is no evidence that its reports contain secret defence items. Additionally, there is no evidence showing that the Supreme Audit Institution has access to these secret items. Burkina Faso Open Budget Survey 2017 elaborates on that by stating that the “legislature and supreme audit institution in Burkina Faso provide weak oversight of the budget” with a ranking of 24 out of 100 (1). As for the public availability of budget documents, the report further indicates that no audit report was produced from 2010 to 2017 in Burkina Faso (1). In any case, there is no evidence that the part of the military budget allocated to secret items is available for public access (2), (3), (4).

No evidence shows that parliament questions the military on findings, and requires documentation or testimony from the military regarding the incorporation of audit recommendations parliamentary scrutiny of defence account (1), (2), (3), (4). As such, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The Executive has the sole authority to set up commissions of inquiry to investigate and audit defence and security institutions [1] [2]. Such scrutiny can only be carried out at the discretion of the Head of State [3]. The U.S. Department of State 2018 Fiscal Transparency Report states, “Cameroon’s supreme audit institution audited the government’s accounts and made its audit reports publicly available but was vulnerable to political pressure… Information in budget documents, however, was incomplete” [4]. According to the same report, “the government maintained off-budget accounts not subject to adequate audit or oversight, and there were similar concerns regarding the budget for the security services” [4].

No other evidence could be found that secret defence programmes are subject to internal or external audit. The Constitution (Article 35) states that the government is not required to provide information or explanations to the legislature regarding national defence or the security of the state, in effect limiting the ability of Parliament to conduct effective scrutiny [1] [2] as confirmed in the State Department’s 2018 report.

Because legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Legislators are not given room to question findings because the military institutions are not audited except at the discretion of the Head of State [1] [2]. According to a U.S. Department of State report (2018), Cameroon’s government “maintained off-budget accounts not subject to adequate audit or oversight, and there were similar concerns regarding the budget for the security services” [2]. No other evidence could be found that secret defence programmes are subject to internal or external audit. The Constitution (Article 35) states that the government is not required to provide information or explanations to the legislature regarding national defence or the security of the state, in effect limiting the ability of Parliament to conduct effective scrutiny [3] [4], as confirmed in the State Department’s 2018 report.

Audit reports on the annual accounts of military intelligence are not submitted to the members of the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD) or any other members of the NA. The CSD has basic formal rights of scrutiny over the Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM), as it does, de jure, over budgetary allocations to defence and security in the annual Budget Law (Loi de Finances). But it cannot examine or issue recommendations on the accounts subordinated to the Presidency and classified as secret, such as the Coordination Nationale du Renseignement (CNR). Financial audits at the Ministry of Defence are typically carried out by the Inspection Générale des Armées (IGA), under the authority of the minister of defence. The IGA is nominally tasked with operational oversight of the armed forces, as per Decree No. 2016-257 (3 May 2016) (Portant Organisation du Ministere de la Défense), published in the Official Journal on May 23, 2016 (1).

The Comptroller General at the MoD (Contrôle Général de l’Administration et des Finances de la Défense, CGAFD) monitors the proper functioning of departments and agencies within the MoD. It is tasked with oversight of administrative, financial and technical issues, among others. This structure, like the IGA, is under the direct authority of the minister of defence (1). In addition, there is a Direction des Finances (Article 13 of Decree No. 2016-257), but it is not tasked with auditing or oversight. Instead, its mandate is to prepare and execute the defence budget, including the payment of salaries and services (1).

The mandates of IGA, CGAFD and Direction des Finances are described in Decree No. 2016-257. As per Article 3 of Decree No. 2016-257, the IGA and CGAFD are services attached directly to the cabinet of the minister of defence. There is no mention of any kind of NA oversight of the activities of these auditing mechanisms.

Art. 3 – The following are attached to the Cabinet:
– The General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces abbreviated IGA;
– The General Control of the Administration and Finance of Defence abbreviated as CGAFD (1).

Because legislators are not provided with audit report on secret items, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

According to our sources, the Parliament does not discuss defence and intelligence reports. The Parliament has no access to reports on secret items or operations in any form. The military and intelligence coordinate and work closely with the head of the state who has the power and authority to bypass the Parliament (1), (2), (3). Audit reports of annual accounts are presented to the Parliament for discussion (4). However, the section on defence in the accounts does not provide a breakdown, and therefore cannot be discussed (5). This absence of breakdown of defence expenditure is protected by law (6) and the Constitution (7).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, according to our sources, there are no audit reports provided to the Parliament; therefore, there are no debates (1), (2), (3), (4). Legislators are not allowed to access secret information, and the law does not allow them to scrutinize these secret items or programmes. When reporting of audit happens, it is usually direct to the president of the republic. For example, the GI law allows a unit from the CAA to operate from within the GI, and only allows their reports to be sent to the president (5). Needless to say, the president almost always comes from a military background.

Legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items and programmes. Audit reports are only presented by the auditor general for ‘public’ accounts. Military and intelligence services ostensibly do not fall under this definition (1), (2).

The Public Accounts Committee of Parliament (PAC) discusses findings of the Auditor General’s Report, but considering the limited nature of audit reports on the Ghanain military at all, combined with the basic, generalised budgetary approach of the military budget, there is no evidence of legislative debate on audit report contents. The auditor reports are high level and do not necessarily contain enough detail to press the military for responses (1), (2), (3).

There is no evidence of any governmental audit reports being subject to parliamentary debates. Whereas the overall forecasted budget is debated and approved by Parliament [1], the defence budget in particular does not receive much scrutiny and the 2018’s budget’s recommendations were to increase the budget for the armed forces [2]. As most of the defence institutions are not audited by the Audit Bureau [3], there is no room for debating defence budgets in Parliament. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance’s latest set of accounts for 2017 did not include defence and security sectors’ expenditures [4], and when defence and security sectors were included in the final reports of 2016 the accounts did not provide a breakdown of the expenditures of security and defence institutions [5]. Parliament received general reports about operations and some expenditure as a formality, but significant operations and procurement was never reported to Parliament [6]. The legislature neither receives audit reports on secret items, in fact, secret programmes are not audited at all.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as previously explained, Parliament does not receive audited reports of the annual accounts of the security and defence sectors [1, 2, 3], therefore parliamentary debate around security sector expenditure is non-existent. Despite the fact that the final accounts of 2016 included some information on security and defence expenditure, the accounts were not discussed in Parliament. In addition to that, as there is no information provided about defence and security income other than that coming from the central Government, the figures provided to Parliament do not give comprehensive data, which means they do not qualify for a parliamentary debate [4].

Legislators are provided with detailed audit reports that discuss the entirety of defence expenditure but that may be missing key details particularly ones about the reason for a certain purchase, for example (1, 2 and 3). The reports often include vague description lines, and it makes it very hard for a Parliament and a committee that is already submissive to the executive branch to evaluate the impact of the spending. These ministries do not provide impact studies, the officials and an analyst said (4).

In 2018 alone, lawmakers have complained about the Defence Ministry failing to present a final account for the 9.8 billion USD they received in additional funding in 2016 outside of the official budget; details on the payment and delivery timelines for the Eurofighter jets deal they signed in 2015 or proof that they have had the SAB review the contracts before signing them (5); information on a tracked armored vehicle deal they appear to have signed with the Canadian defence contractor at some point in 2013 or later (6); the ownership of one of the lands they occupy, Jeewan (6); and explanation for its desire to buy armored cars Oshkosh, an American defence contractor, in January 2018 (7). They also sometimes do not even reveal if they have used mediators in the deals that they have signed (8), flouting article 2 of Law no. 25 of 1996 for Government financial transactions, which says that every agreement, including arms procurement deals, that cost over 330, 000 USD (which naturally includes most arms deals) must state the names of mediators and any fees paid to them.

Lawmakers often question the military and other security bodies on the findings of these reports but they almost never follow up with punitive actions, an analyst and external auditors said (1, 2, 3 and 4). Legislators don’t usually comment on the quality of the auditory process, but they do ask these institutions to release the information the SAB and the ACA interested in. And these remarks do not appear to be having much effect on the security agencies because they do not respond to them, external auditors said.

Lawmakers only appear to have followed up some cases twice since they were elected in 2016. Adnan Abdel-Samad, the head of Parliament’s budgets committee, who led the charge in a press statement released in January 2017 “conflicting data,” routinely fails to respond completely to all requests for information and misappropriates funds (5).

In 2017, Gomaan al-Harbish, a lawmaker, said he was going to follow up on the investigation into the Eurofighter deal that the Defence Ministry signed in 2015 (6).

In 2016, Parliament followed up on a cargo aircraft deal the military wanted to sign back in 2011 for 450 million USD. They had been questioned about this deal in the past, and announced that the Ministry decided to not sign it, after it realised that it did not need the planes. This shows how delayed MOD responses to Parliament’s concerns are (7).

The Interior Ministry and the KNG get considerably less attention because their operations are smaller, but lawmakers tend to be more aggressive with the issues of the Interior Ministry than they are with the much more powerful Defence Ministry.

According to a former parliamentarian, the National Defence, Interior, and Municipalities Committee was not provided audit reports from the LAF on secret items (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as legislators of the parliamentary committee dealing with defence are not provided with audit reports on secret items (1).

The assessor found no evidence that there are regular audits of the annual accounts of the security sector. The Supreme Court and the BVG are the public bodies responsible for overseeing state finances. The BVG has 17 agents and publishes annual reports evaluating the government’s various spending programmes and budgets. But the BVG’s last published report came in 2015 and made no mention of defence spending.¹² The failure to publish any subsequent reports or to address the defence budget by the body supposed to monitor accountants and administrators highlights the lack of transparency relating to defence activities.
As the World Bank points out, the BVG has not specifically reviewed Ministry of Defence accounts, and only an aggregate administrative account is transmitted to the auditor when the annual budget is examined.⁹ ¹⁰
When the IMF, the World Bank and the EU suspended their aid programmes to Mali following reports of the off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet in 2014, it was the BVG that audited the account (see Q16C). Although the BVG never received access to the plane’s operating contract, it published its report concerning the purchase in October 2014, seven months after news of the scandal first broke [8]. The BVG determined that the former Minister of Defence, Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, and the Minister of the Economy incorrectly interpreted a legal clause that allows for certain acquisitions to be off-budget.⁸
In addition to the presidential jet, which grabbed all the headlines, the audit also looked at the purchasing of equipment for the armed forces. The report found that 18.59 billion CFA went towards the presidential jet, while a further 69.18 billion CFA was spent on other military equipment, primarily transport vehicles.7,8 The BVG found that the MDAC had failed to respect the 2014 Finance Law requiring it to register these contracts. Moreover, many of the contracts were found to be heavily overpriced.¹¹
– Lorries that can transport up to 5 tonnes of goods that normally cost 28.5 million CFA were priced at 78 million CFA under the contract.
– Lorries that can transport up to 10 tonnes that normally cost 34 million CFA were priced at 115 million CFA.
– Petrol-tankers that can carry up to 6 cubic metres of fuel, normally costing 29 million CFA were billed at 120 million CFA.
– And petrol-tankers that can carry up to 18 cubic metres of fuel, normally worth 38.5 million CFA were billed at 210 million CFA.¹¹
In this exceptional case, legislators were provided with a thorough and independent audit of secret defence spending. But this is far from the norm.
Indeed, the published budget of the armed and security forces does not include the intelligence service, whose annual spend is kept entirely secret and thus is not subject to auditing.¹ There have been no mentions of intelligence spending in recent annual budgets or defence plans.² ³ ⁴ Neither the BVG nor any other public body has the power to oversee DGSE operations, organisation, budget or activities.⁵
Moreover, the World Bank’s 2013 study notes that the existence of a special account for operations in the country’s “Northern Zone” is a major source of vulnerability.⁹ Parliamentary and administrative oversight of this special account is non-existent. The BVG has not audited this secret account. The account has no de facto spending ceiling, the purpose and operating conditions of the special account are not adhered to, budget charges display anomalies and lack transparency, and the controls performed on expenditures from the special account are less rigorous than the country’s normal budget procedures.⁹
Even these do not always function as they should. For instance, in 2016, Mali’s authority for regulating public sector contracts and spending (ARMDS) found that it was wholly unable to audit the Ministry of Defence’s finances for 2014 because of the lack of documents provided by the ministry.⁶

Because legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Legislative debate on the contents of audit reports may be limited or non-existent. As highlighted above, audits of defence spending are exceedingly rare. A 2014 audit report seems to be an exception. In the case of the BVG’s audit of the presidential plane and other military equipment in 2014, the vast majority of parliamentary debate came prior to the publication of the audit. There are numerous media reports that the topic was debated in the National Assembly in May, June and September of 2014, as MPs began to learn details of the scandal.¹ ² ³ ⁴ Opposition leaders pressed government ministers for answers as to how and why so much money had been spent off-budget.¹ ² ³ ⁴ The BVG’s audit was only made publicly available in October 2014, after the majority of the debates in parliament had taken place.⁵ ⁶ In October 2014, the prosecutor general announced it was opening an investigation into the affair.³ However, as of April 2018, nobody has been held accountable and Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga has since returned to government as Prime Minister, illustrating parliament’s limitations in pursuing the matter.
A member of the CDSPC told the assessor that parliament does not typically debate the audits produced by the BVG.⁷ The BVG submits its audits to respective administrative divisions and to the executive. It is then up to the executive to pass it on to public prosecutor if it thinks something is amiss and warrants a judicial investigation.⁷ However, if there is sufficient demand within the National Assembly, as there was in 2014, these audits can be debated.⁷ The assessor found no evidence for debates taking place thereafter.

In general, no evidence was found suggesting that the legislature is entitled to receive information on spending on secret items was found (1).

No evidence was found to suggest that the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Islamic Affairs and Moroccan Residents Abroad was given access to information on spending on secret items: the only case in which defence-related issues were discussed was the approval of a military cooperation agreement between Morocco and China (2)(3).

Moreover, no evidence was found that audits take place.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, overall, no evidence was found to suggest that legislators are provided with audit reports about secret items or that secret programmes are audited in any way.

No evidence was found to suggest that the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Islamic Affairs and Moroccan Residents Abroad was provided with audit reports on secret items or that secret programmes are audited in any way. The only case in which defence-related issues were discussed was the approval of a military cooperation agreement between Morocco and China. (1, 2, 3)

In the absence of audit reports, or due to the difficulty for legislators to access these audit reports, there is no legislative debate on the contents of audit reports concerning the security sector.

According to interviewees, no audit of the annual accounts of the intelligence services has been conducted during the last three years by legislators (1,2).
A score of 0 is the most relevant as there is no evidence that audits have ever been conducted.

According to interviewees, no audit of the annual accounts of the intelligence services has been conducted during last three years by parliamentarians (1,2). The reports, should they exist, are not presented to the Security and Defence Commission (Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité) nor to the National Assembly in general.

It is not clear to what extent members of the legislature are given full information about secret expenditure items. However, a special committee which was created to examine defence procurement between 2007 – 2017 has provided a report with considerable irregularities observed in defence procurement between those dates. The Committee concluded that “in continuation of its assignment, the Committee on Audit of Defence Equipment Procurement (CADEP) in the Nigerian Armed Forces, analysed procurement contracts awarded by or for the Nigerian Army between 2007 and 2015. The Committee so far noted that within the period under review, the sum of N71,775,313,451.30 and $685,349,692.49 were spent on Nigerian Army procurement by the Ministries of Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Environment. Others were NNPC, CBN and the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)” (1).

Additionally, some state governments, notably Adamawa, Kano and Yobe as well as Federal Ministries of Finance and Power funded Nigerian Army operations with the sum of N114,067,739,113.00. The contributions made by other states such as Borno, Plateau among others were not available at the time of writing this report. Therefore, the total amount spent on procurement and operations within the period under review were N185,843,052,564.30 and $685,349,692.49.” The Committee found that between 2007 and 2008, the Nigerian Army procured some equipment, arms and ammunition that were funded by the NNPC. The contracts were well documented, followed due process and satisfactorily executed. However, the Committee observed that some of the subsequent procurement undertaken by the MOD and Nigerian Army substantially breached provisions of the Public Procurement Act (PPA) 2007″ (1), (2).

There are examples of the legislature criticising the Audit Office for the paucity of its reports. The failure to submit audit reports hinders the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny (1), (2).

There are no audit reports available for the annual accounts of the security sector, including the military and intelligence services. There is also no information on the auditing of secret programmes or procurement on the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance websites (1), (2). No information is available on the State Audit Institute website on defence or security auditing (3). As discussed in sub-indicator 27, the severely limited mandate of the legislative bodies of the al-Shura and the al-Dawla equate to a lack of power and access to documents regarding national security (4). According to our resources, the consultative al-Shura has no authority to discuss any military and security issues. Therefore, information on secret spending and secret programmes are not available for institutions outside the sultan’s office (5), (6).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there are no audit reports available for the annual accounts of the security sector, including the military and intelligence services.

Debates held in the al-Shura are made publicly available through reports in state-controlled media, no debates referenced audit reports on secret items or concerning defence generally (1). Moreover, as set out in Royal Decree 86/97, the al-Shura lacks any formal powers to scrutinise or produce draft-laws (2). The lack of parliamentary scrutiny across defence and security sectors is noted in the BTI report, which highlights the al-Shura as an advisory body lacks decision making or scrutiny capacities (3). According to our resources, the consultative al-Shura council has no authority to discuss any military and security issues. Information on secret spending and secret programmes is not available for institutions outside the sultan’s office. Therefore, there is no possibility to have a debate or audit them externally or internally (4), (5).

Parliament has not met since 2007 (1). Therefore, legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items (even before 2007) and are not publicly consulted. Before 2007, the legislative branch used to receive and discuss audit reports. There were numerous meetings (committee) and hearings within the PLC before 2007.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Parliament has not met since 2007 (1). Therefore, legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items and are not publicly consulted.

The defence sector does not go through any audit, either by the State’s Audit Bureau or by the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority, as their mandates prevent them from auditing the defence sector. In addition to that, the legislature in the country does not receive audit reports from other governmental departments. Whilst in theory the Council should approve government budgets, in actuality these approvals have been done by the Emir. [1,2]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because the legislature in the country does not receive audit reports from other governmental departments (see Q28A).

There is no legislative debate on defence budgets, and the legislature does not receive an audit report. Since security and defence sectors are not obligated to be audited, there are no audit reports submitted to the Advisory Council, which is the equivalent of the parliament [1]. It is important to note that the Advisory Council’s elections have been postponed until 2019, which renders the current Council ineffective [2]. Legislative debate on the contents of audit reports is non-existent, as there are no audit reports available for defence and security [3,4].

The General Auditing Bureau (GAB) is responsible for auditing the state’s revenues, expenditures and assets, and technically has purview over all ministries and government departments. According to its charter, this includes the auditing of military sector accounts (1). A 2007 report by the Washington-based NGO the International Budget Partnership stated that the GAB has a dedicated department for military sector auditing (2). However, in practice, the GAB has virtually no leverage over security sector agencies, which are directly under the control of the Crown Prince and Minister of Defence Mohammed bin Salman (3), (4). It is highly unlikely that the body is provided with full access to military accounts, let alone military spending on secret items. The GAB does not publish its auditing reports, which it submits directly to the king and the Council of Ministers, the Saudi cabinet which is led by the king (1) and therefore, such reports are not debated. According to our resources, there has been no public or parliamentary debate on security and military reports. As they have no reports or information, they are not able to debate anything (5), (6).

This sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable because secret programmes are not audited.

The GAB submits its annual report to the king and the Council of Ministers. The report is then referred to the Consultative Council for review and discussion (1), however, it is unlikely that the council or its Committee on Security Affairs have access to any auditing reports relating to the military and security sectors, much less space to debate these accounts in a public forum (2), (3). Through searches of the Consultative Council’s website and session agendas, the researcher found no evidence that military and security sector accounts have ever been addressed. There is no indication or evidence that other government anti-corruption bodies are responsible for inspecting the accounts of the military and intelligence services.

According to our sources, the Parliament did not recieve any reports about the annual accounts and detailed expenses on the intelliegence services or on the army and thus the accounts and expenses were not debated. However, it is thought that they recieve reports from the MoD, but not the intelligence, yet these are also received without debate. (1,2)

According to our sources, the legislative discussion on auditing reports is either very limited or is non-existent. At present the military and security issues are seen as highly confidential and therefore, any debate or discussion (including access to data) is confidental and not open for debate.(1,2,3).

In the few meetings the two security and defence commissions had with the MoD, they did not ask for any audit reports and the issue of integrity or corruption in the defence sector was not discussed (4).

There is no evidence of the FNC or any other auditing or reviewing body receiving annual reports about defence expenditure no body receives audit reports on the defence and security sectors. According to a source from the UAE, there has never been a debate on the military expenditure of the country in the FNC or elsewhere (1), (2), (3).

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence of the FNC or any other auditing or reviewing body receiving annual reports about defence expenditure no body receives audit reports on the defence and security sectors. According to a source from the UAE, there has never been a debate on the military expenditure of the country in the FNC or elsewhere (1), (2), (3).

Country Sort by Country 28a. Comprehensiveness Sort By Subindicator 28b. Parliamentary scrutiny Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA
Angola 0 / 100 NA
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 NA
Cameroon 0 / 100 NA
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 NA
Egypt 0 / 100 NA
Ghana 0 / 100 NA
Jordan 0 / 100 NA
Kuwait 25 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 0 / 100 NA
Mali 0 / 100 NA
Morocco 0 / 100 NA
Niger 0 / 100 NA
Nigeria 25 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 NA
Palestine 0 / 100 NA
Qatar 0 / 100 NA
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA
Tunisia 0 / 100 NA
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

Transparency International Defence & Security is a global programme of Transparency International based within Transparency International UK.

Privacy Policy

UK Charity Number 1112842

All rights reserved Transparency International Defence & Security 2020