The tasks of the Military Police and the Defence Intelligence and Security Agency (DISA) include the conduct of their activity in support of operations and missions abroad also [1, 2]. Depending on the size of the contingent (usually for a contingent that is larger than a platoon), Military Police and DISA elements are attached to the contingents sent on operations abroad. As part of their mandate, both the Military Police and DISA are responsible for the monitoring corruption; however, there is no practice of producing reports on corruption [3].

There is no guidance on monitoring and evaluation of corruption risks in operations [1]. Given the (small) size of the Albanian Armed Forces, there are no dedicated and trained anti-corruption officials to monitor corruption risks in operations [2]. However, these functions are covered by the partner countries to which the Albanian forces have been attached to in missions abroad [2].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. No reports on corruption risks are provided to the oversight bodies (parliament), nor has the parliament proactively requested information of that type [1].

No evidence suggests that any trained professionals have been deployed to monitor corruption risks in the field. No information was found in the military magazine (1), on the website of the Ministry of Defence (2), or during a review of the local and international press. As outlined before, seminars conducted by the anti-corruption agency ONPLC have been targeted at civilian bureaucrats that work in at-risk areas in the public administration but not in the defence sector (3).

No evidence suggests that any trained professionals have been deployed to monitor corruption risks in the field, nothing was found in either the military magazine (1) or on the website of the Ministry of Defence (2); see the answer to question 54A.

This question has been scored Not Applicable because no evidence would suggest that any trained professionals have been deployed to monitor corruption risks in the field, for example, nothing was found in either the military magazine (1) or, on the website of the Ministry of Defence (2); see the answer to question 54A.

It is unclear whether trained professionals are deployed to monitor corruption risk in operations. The Ministry of Defence has an Inspector-General of National Defence who is tasked with the monitoring of human, material and financial resources, and can conduct probes, audits and inquiries, though there is no explicit mandate to assess corruption risks (1), (2).

There is no evidence that operational M&E guidelines exist and are being implemented. Angola has been engaged in the SADC Defence Inspector’s Working Group that has been developing guidelines and conducted field visits, though technical training has been conducted for senior defence and police personnel in South Africa. Since 2007, senior staff of the Ministry of Defence and armed forces, at times including Interior Ministry and National Police officials, participated in internal audit training in South Africa, conducted by South African lecturers within the bilateral defence cooperation framework (1), (2), (3).

The inspector general’s reports on the armed forces and national defence are not made public (1), (2), (3).

Argentina is currently participating in 7 United Nations missions (Cyprus, Colombia, Haiti, South Sudan, Western Sahara, Middle East, and Central African Republic) with a total of 281 people deployed, where the largest contingent is in UNFICYP (Cyprus) with 233 people from the Armed Forces and 10 members of Staff. [1] On the other hand, military personnel are deployed at the country’s borders in compliance with national regulations and by Resolution of the Ministry of Defence (860/2018). There is no evidence that there are professional staff capable of monitoring corruption in either the missions outside the country nor in those that have been established for border control. Regarding operations in the Argentine territory, the personnel deployed in Operations must strictly comply with the National Laws, the “Code of Discipline of the Armed Forces,” and the current Military Regulations. In this regard, Mejías notes the need for education and training in aspects of corruption risks for the armed forces, especially if the nature of the new missions, such as those to combat drug trafficking, is taken into account. [2] [3] [4] [5]

The guidelines correspond to the Operational Command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is no evidence either in academia or in the press regarding monitoring and evaluation guidelines for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks. There are general evaluations and follow-up of missions in their different aspects, but they are not published. [1] [2]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. There is no evidence of personnel deployed for corruption monitoring. Further, there is no public access on the websites of each of the Forces or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reports on the missions carried out. Personnel specially trained in corruption issues are not mobilised. [1,2,3,4]

There has been no evidence publicly available that expert personnel capable of monitoring corruption are regularly deployed and report on the status of corruption within missions [1, 2, 3].

There is no evidence that M&E guidance for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks is publicly available [1, 2, 3].

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. There is no publicly available evidence that expert personnel, capable of monitoring corruption, are regularly deployed and report on the status of corruption within missions [1, 2, 3].

Monitoring and evaluation in the field is carried out by evaluators in a variety of different forms and approaches [1], but investigating corruption and ethical issues do not seem to feature in monitoring and evaluation. Throughout the 114-page Department of Defence (DoD) policy document on Operation Evaluation, ethics are only mentioned in one paragraph, and corruption is not mentioned at all. The purpose of the paragraph mentioning ethics is to justify DoD’s removal of propriety/ethics as a standard to which evaluations are carried out by DoD [1, ch. 3, p1]. Propriety/ethics standards are typically applied to evaluations in civilian contexts, though these apply to the carrying out of the evaluation itself, rather than being the subject of the evaluation [2]. High-level operational evaluation is also carried out by the Defence Science and Technology group, but this focuses exclusively on effectiveness and war planning, seemingly discounting corruption issues [3]. A 2011 Australian National Audit Office performance audit also does not mention corruption or ethics as a feature (or issue) of evaluation and monitoring within defence [4]. The Fraud Control and Investigations Branch, a part of the Defence Audit and Fraud Control Division, does investigate fraud, which often overlaps with issues of corruption [5]; while the Australian Federal Police-hosted Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre coordinates law enforcement efforts combatting corruption, including in DoD [6]. However, there is no indication that officials from these institutions are actively monitoring corruption during operations. Superior officers of soldiers deployed on operations would be expected to monitor compliance with behavioural guidelines and policies, including those relevant to anti-corruption. But with seemingly limited training on corruption issues and a multitude of other foci and areas of responsibility on the battlefield, these officers cannot be considered professional corruption monitors.

Defence monitoring and evaluation guidance that is publicly available does not specifically mention corruption or ethical risk [1]. Multiple attempts by the Country Assessor to reach out to Defence officials and the media team to get a better understanding of how Defence evaluators or other ‘monitors’ treat corruption issues during operations went unanswered.

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as evaluators do not seem to monitor corruption risk in the field according to publicly available policy documents.

There is no professional staff to monitor corruption risks within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and other military structures. The MoD has several departments, but the ministry does not provide information on their anti-corruption inspections. For example, in the Military Police, there is no official information about the activities of this institute.
The Defence Ministry’s Legal Department Chief Rauf Kishiyev said in 2015 that the powers of the Military Police Institute will be determined by legislation (1). Within the investigation units within the MoD, there is no information about the activities of these investigative bodies within MoD for the last four years. Alakbar Mammadov believes, the organization of these bodies is only formal (2). Years ago, the MoD’s Military Inspection was supposed to be the organization would research the military units. Currently, no information is available on the activities of the organization. Expert personnel capable of monitoring corruption are regularly deployed for peacekeeping operations in which Azerbaijan is involved (Kosovo (until 2008), Iraq), but this was a requirement from NATO/US. Sometimes corruption monitoring is done by those institutions, not by Azerbaijan itself.

There is no Monitoring and Evaluation process for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks. There is no strategic document on the fight against corruption in the MoD and other military structures. From this point on, strong monitoring and evaluation are not possible (1).
There is a procedural basis for personnel to monitor corruption which applied to peacekeeping operations. “Azerbaijan’s full realization of monitoring peacekeeping operations is a prestige issue; if bribery and corruption happen this can halt the mission and damage its reputation. They (MoD) is not sensitive at home, but in overseas operation, they pay special attention” (2). According to the expert, Azerbaijan can use NATO’s support in this regard. To do this, Azerbaijan must join the Building Integrity program. But at present, officially, Baku has not taken any steps.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. Any reports about the monitoring of the peacekeeping forces or other operational forces are not open to the public. There is no public control over this process. The Ministry of Defence does not report to the parliament on the issue (1, 2).

Although Bahrain is not engaged in any operations abroad at the time of writing, there are not any trained personnel on corruption issues deployed in the country. Corruption is not seen as a strategic issue [1, 2]. Bahrain was only engaged for a short period in the Yemen war, 15 jets were engaged and flew dozens of troops [3]. However, there was no corruption monitoring during that mission. Following a search of several websites and after being confirmed through interviews, there is no information on this topic publicly available.

Following a search of several websites and after being confirmed through interviews, no information on this topic publicly available. There is no monitoring and evaluation guidance, but there are some documents that have some elements to counter nepotism and misconduct, but they are not called corruption [1, 2].

As Bahrain does not deploy any personnel for corruption monitoring and has no M & E guidance on assessing corruption risk, this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2].

The UN Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) is mandated to provide oversight critical for increasing UN resilience against corruption risks in missions. In the absence of any official or public records, it is unclear whether Bangladesh deploys trained professionals to monitor corruption risks in peacekeeping missions. Established in 1999, the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training provides training on peacekeeping in UN missions for Bangladesh military and police personnel. Among the 21 courses offered, the topic of anti-corruption is not included [1].

There are no official records available to suggest that Bangladesh has any formal M&E guidelines for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as Bangladesh does not deploy any personnel for corruption monitoring.

The corruption risks of each country are regularly assessed by the intelligence services and briefed to commanders and key personnel before the mission [1]. Most deployed detachments are accompanied by a legal advisor from the legal department of the Belgian Defence. Classified reports are drawn up.

There is Not Eenough Information to score this indicator. M&E guidance for missions clearly specify how to monitor corruption risk, and establishes the procedural basis for personnel to monitor corruption [1]. However, further detailed information on this guidance is not publicly available [2].

These reports are usually classified in their entirety and are not available to the public [1]. However, they are made available to a Special Commission of the House of Representatives dealing with foreign missions [2].

According to the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) written contribution, inspectors from the General Inspectorate of the MoD represent professional military staff which could be sent to the field of operation to investigate any kind of irregularities [1], but there are no sources to confirm that this happens, as there are for visits of commanders [2].

According to the government reviewer, the Instruction Manual of the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Defense and the Inspector General in the Armed Forces of BiH, as a key strategic document governing the work of the MoD and AFBiH inspectors’ systems, enables the deployment of inspectors in the field of operations. This is governed by Chapter VIII – Role of Inspectors in Military Operations (He cited this chapter in 51A). So far, there has been no need to send inspectors because Bosnia and Herzegovina participate mainly with smaller contingents in peacekeeping operations abroad and is logistically reliant on contingents of other more numerous countries, so the possibility of corruption in Procurement that is performed on missions is minimal and mainly related to communication and internet services. However, the Inspectorate General monitors personnel on a mission by using online applications to report irregularities. There have been instances of reporting irregularities in the mission where the inspector has been in communication with the whistleblowers through the Ethics Line online application [3] and My Inspector [4]. In these cases, the inspector successfully responded in collaboration with the chain of command authorities to investigate and stop the irregularity.

Additionally, the BiH Armed Forces for Mission and Abroad (IR Afghanistan) deploy other investigative bodies, such as authorized military police officials engaged in military police operations in the mission. In the case of an increase of the BiH contingent in peace support operations abroad, there is a legal and by-law regulation for sending inspectors within the BiH contingent to monitor and prosecute cases of corruption and other irregularities during the mission abroad. In conclusion, the MoD and AFBiH have clear doctrinal and implementing acts, and the organization and staff through the chain of command and the system of inspectors implement measures on prevention and protection against corruption in the MoD and AF of BiH both in operations in BiH and outside BiH in OPM. All of the above is a result of continuous and continuous training, which was rated highly by the partner with which the MoD GI cooperates.

According to the MoD’s written contribution, inspectors from the General Inspectorate of the MoD represent professional military staff which could be sent to the field of operation to investigate any kind of irregularities [1]. The AFBiH are currently engaged in UN and NATO-led peace support missions abroad. For each overseas mission that the AFBiH is involved in, the Presidency of BiH appoints the head of the contingent or commander of the unit being sent on a mission [2]. The head of the contingent or commander of the unit, depending on the type of mission, is responsible for ensuring proper execution of the mission and supervising the work of every individual in the mission, and is obliged to regularly report to the AFBiH’s Operational Command on all important aspects of the execution of the mission, including the legality of work of each individual [2, 3]. The risk of corruption in the AFBiH’s missions currently conducted abroad is not high, seeing that these are small contingents or individual missions of UN military observers and there is no need for any major procurement or contracting in these missions [3]. Overall, there is no publicly available evidence on monitoring, which perhaps is due to the small number of personnel deployed who are under partner command.

As noted above, there is no publicly available evidence on monitoring, which perhaps is due to the small number of personnel deployed who are under partner command. 

When deploying military personnel on the field, the country does not deploy trained personnel for corruption [1]. As noted in other questions, the BDF is not currently involved in any military operations. The mandate to monitor corruption remains the prerogative of DCEC. The DCEC’s aims included:
-Promoting ethical behaviour in government and public organisations.
-Establishing codes of conduct Maintaining good governance, transparency and the rule of law [2].
-Taking part in corruption prevention interventions.

The DCEC was given wide-ranging powers and operational independence, which was modelled on the Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), with a “three-pronged strategy” of investigation, prevention and public education. It had robust investigative powers, such as the power to arrest, trace and freeze assets, to search and seize, to confiscate travel documents, and to extradite suspects. It could also recommend prosecutions to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The DPP in turn had control over all prosecutions [2].

There is no evidence that trained corruption professionals are deployed to monitor corruption risk on the field, and there is no evidence of M&E guidance for missions on how to monitor corruption. The BDF is not currently involved in any military operations nor has Botswana adopted a written national anti-corruption strategy. At the public sector level, a Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (2010) exists, which was developed by DPSM in collaboration with DCEC. Furthermore, public institutions have policy statements on anti-corruption [1]. At the national level, a draft National Anti-Corruption Policy for the country has been prepared (December 2015) under the leadership of DCEC through consultations with stakeholders, including the private sector and civil society [1]. In the context of coordination, the draft proposes to establish a new National Anti-Corruption Commission, among other critical objectives, with monitoring and evaluation of the policy to be done by the Government through DCEC [2]. It is expected once this Strategy is in place it will address the M&E aspects.

As no trained corruption professionals are deployed to monitor corruption risk on the field, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’. It remains the prerogative of DCEC to fighting corruption with its trained officials [1]. The stories of corruption coming out of Botswana, however, do not point to lower levels of corruption as much as the inability of the Botswana Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) to deal with elite corruption, including in the Botswana Defence Forces. DCEC has not conducted any publicised corruption training for those BDF Officers that have been deployed to peacekeeping missions [2].

According to one of the reviewers, there are regular inspections in missions, both in peacekeeping missions or in internal deployments of the military. Each one of the three branches of Brazil’s Armed Forces has departments to oversee and monitoring missions. Inspections are in the yearly calendar of all military units, either in Brazil or deployed abroad. There is a branch in the forces (Intendência), whose task is, among others, monitoring and reporting irregularities. In the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), where Brazilian troops were deployed for 13 years, every six months, teams of experts were monitoring and reporting to the minister of defence. All military units report to the Centro de Controle Interno do Exército, that analyses the risks of corruption. The Air Force also has its Centro de Controle Interno. Inspections are conducted, in the case of the Army, by the Inspectorates of Economy and Finances – (ICFEx). There are 12 in the country, under the control of the Directorate of Economy and Finances of the Army [1]. Each ICFEx has an annual calendar for inspections and they are followed rigorously [2]. According to the experience of the assessor regarding the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro’s Public Security, led by the Army, a member of the Federal General Comptroller (CGU) was seconded to work within the Intervention Cabinet, making a direct link with the day-to-day work of the intervention with the CGU. However, the CGU’s member was not in charge of corruption investigations, nor had a report as his final assignment. The CGU’s presence in the Intervention Cabinet served mainly to suggest the implementation of a knowledge management processes within the operation [3].

The assessor found no evidence of an M&E policy for corruption in operations but, according to a military interviewee, internal control partially fulfils this role, and information regarding operations are sent to the internal control system at least once a year [1]. The absence of an M&E plan dedicated solely to corruption might be due to the very recent launching of the Integrity Plans, a concept which is not present in the military daily activities. The first steps towards a systematic corruption risks assessment were just taken in 2019, and after the release of the plans, no public follow up was made [2]. It is important to note that despite not explicitly mentioning the term corruption, guidelines for monitoring are explicit in the manual for inspections carried out by the Inspectorates of Accountably and Finances, and by the Secretary of Economy and Finances by the Army, for instance. The other Armed Forces have a similar structure. It may fail in establish procedural for personnel to monitory corruption, but they are in place [3, 4].

The Ministry of Defence’s Management and Financial Reports [1] report internal comptroller actions and external control requirements that were accomplished or not. There is no specific M&E policy dealing with corruption, internal control mechanisms search for irregularities and inconsistencies in a broad way [2]. Reports are sent to external control agencies, but they are not easily accessible to the general public.

According to TI-DS (2016) “TCCs, including Burkina Faso, have no anti-corruption training for troops and commanders before they deploy on operations” (1). Over the years, Burkina Faso has deployed its military in many countries including the CAR, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, DRC and North Suda, for peacekeeping purposes. As of today, Burkina Faso’s military is in Mali, the DRC, and Sudan. However, there is no evidence that the country deploys corruption monitoring staff or informal corruption monitors. Transparency International’s Defence and Security Program (TI-DS) has raised that issue, stating that, “troop-contributing countries (TCCs) do not take steps to control corruption in operational environments, including UN peace operations.” “Trained corruption monitors are not deployed to the field,” TI-DS said. The United Nations deploys many types of experts in its field missions; but rarely have they thought about deploying corruption monitors in these missions (TI- DS 2016) (1). At the domestic level, the government of Burkina Faso has deployed troops in the strategic zone of the Sahel region, which has continuously been the target of terrorist groups, including Ansaroul Islam, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and its affiliates, like the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (2). Again, there is no evidence of corruption monitors deployed with the military in these remote areas of the Sahel. Given the fact that corruption is widespread in all economic sectors, including the armed forces (3), and the low interest of the military in applying anti-corruption measures (4), the deployment of corruption monitors in peacekeeping operations is unlikely.

There is no evidence that corruption monitoring is conducted in operations. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no evidence that corruption monitoring is conducted in operations. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Although ethics in peacekeeping is taught in some institutions such as the International School Forces and forms part of the deployment training material that is mandated by all UN Peacekeeping missions, for some of which Cameroon have sent contingents to the Central African Republic [1], there is no evidence that Cameroon regularly deploys professionals to monitor corruption risks in the field. The lack of oversight mechanisms to monitor corruption risks within the country and the endemic corruption found within the ranks of the defence and security institutions in Cameroon [2] strongly suggest that such monitors are not sent when peacekeepers are deployed to the field. Research does not indicate any monitoring of corruption in peacekeeping missions [3].

The 2017 US State Department Human Rights Report states, “In the context of the fight against Boko Haram, local sources indicated that corruption-related inefficiencies and diversion of resources from their intended purposes continued to represent a fundamental national security vulnerability” [4].

Research does not indicate any monitoring of corruption in peacekeeping missions [1].

Research does not indicate any monitoring of corruption in peacekeeping missions [1]. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There are no trained professionals deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field. [1] One of the few explicit references to corruption in training/deployment is in a 2016 report form the Canadian Senate, which cites a witness referencing a Transparency International / Human Rights Watch study on peacekeeping. The witness notes that the “30 countries, almost all developing nations, which provide the most soldiers and police officers to UN peacekeeping operations. They observe that these militaries are among those most susceptible to corruption and guilty of abuse and crimes against those they are sent to protect. In short, they need better training in operations and in the field. Canada can help, drawing on our acknowledged expertise in successful pluralism and good governance.” [2] In this context, it appears as though the emphasis and focus (at least politically) on troop deployment is their potential to reduce the potential for corruption of their partners.

There is no M&E guidance for missions on how to monitor corruption risks. Canada’s defence policy specifically references Monitoring and Evaluation to incorporate gender-based analysis and perspectives into the analysis, planning and evaluation of all CAF operations which build upon UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent resolutions. [1] However, there is no clear public-facing M&E policy specifically pertaining to corruption.

There are no trained professionals deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field. [1] As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.

There is no evidence that trained professionals are regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field, nor reports on the status of corruption within missions abroad. There might be audit capacity in the institutions of the armed forces, but there is no evidence of their application and deployment in operations or peacekeeping missions. As mentioned above, troops participating in peacekeeping operations in foreign countries must comply with specialised training in the Centre of Training for Peacekeeping Operations (Cecopac) [1], which includes materials related to the values and competencies, and conduct and discipline. However, there is no documentation of risk assessment studies of operations and missions, nor mitigation measures being employed. Although initially there was a good evaluation of peacekeeping operations abroad, there have been revelations of possible fraud and embezzlement, currently under investigation [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].

There is no information available of specific guidance for monitoring corruption risks during operations or peacekeeping missions. Other than the United Nations’ principles and guidelines in peacekeeping operations, public documents and reports contain only general information regarding missions, resources involved, and personnel mobilised. It is assumed that monitoring and evaluation policy complies with standards of conduct publicised by United Nations’ missions, particularly with acting with impartiality, integrity, and awareness. However, in national reports, corruption is rarely mention, and it is primarily considered a contextual factor or a matter of “cross-cultural awareness” or ethic in the fields of deployment [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].

Chile does not deploy trained professionals to monitor corruption risk in the field, as outlined in 57A. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. No information could be found to establish the existence of anticorruption monitoring professionals in the PLA’s deployments abroad. It can be assumed that Political Work officers are present and, as in normal units, in charge of supervising the moral conduct of soldiers, however there is a lot of secrecy around this matter. Regarding peacekeeping operations (PKOs), in 2017 China created a standby peacekeeping force, which means that there will be more regular training on PKO deployment. [1] The PLA also announced in 2019 that it will create more comprehensive strategic planning and improve the domestic legal system for PKOs. [2]

There is not enough information to score this indicator. No evidence to suggest that M&E guidance exists beyond that which is outlined in 54A, could be found

There is not enough information to score this indicator. This is due to the lack of evidence to establish if such monitoring takes place.

The Army has an Inspector General that issues reports on corruption. [1, 2] According to interviews, the Directorate for the Application of Transparency Standards of the National Army (DANTE) also carries out some monitoring, at the unit, brigade, and directorate level by embedding a DANTE official within each. [3, 4] However, the Regulation addressing inspections does not have any specific mention regarding the inclusion of anti-corruption professionals to monitor corruption in instances where forces are deployed for combat. Monitors can certainly be deployed in the field, but there is no information on whether they do so in practice.

The manuals of doctrine and ethics generally present guidelines on transparency and integrity. [1] The exercise guidelines for monitoring and evaluation procedures are developed in the General Regulations on Inspections of the Army and in the Procedure and Inspection Manual. [2, 3] These documents define the technical and thematic elements to be taken into account when identifying corruption events within the Military Forces. [4] Monitoring and evaluation tools such as an inspection programme, annual action plan, steps for proper pre- and during inspection action, results communication, and improvement and monitoring approach are outlined. Likewise, the website of the National Army shows the different forms inspectors will be required to fill during monitoring, in addition to an evaluation guide by area. [5] It is important to emphasize that these documents do not identify the risks of corruption. The document that more clearly identifies acts of corruption within military operations is the Risk Map contained in the Anti-Corruption and Citizen Care Plan, which identifies 40 types of risks, with some related to operations. [6]

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Colombia does not deploy expert personnel for corruption monitoring. With regard to the publication of reports relating to monitoring and evaluation, according to the General Inspection Regulations these are handled in accordance with the classification and safety criteria established for their protection and custody. [1, 2] Some of these reports, at the discretion of the Inspector General, are kept in special reserve, granting them a higher secrecy classification. For this reason, they are not published on the Armed Forces website. With regard to the delivery of these documents to the supervisory authorities (the Attorney’s Office, Comptroller’s Office, and the Prosecutor’s Office), Interviewee 2 and 3 noted that the offices should send such reports to the supervisory authorities, and working together with these entities if they require additional information. [3, 4] However, the content of such documents is not evidenced with documentary support.

There is no evidence that Côte d’Ivoire’s military deploys trained professionals to monitor corruption in the field. There is also no evidence of informal MoD monitoring of corruption with non-experts. No references can be found in open sources that attest to regular corruption monitoring in the field (surveillance de corruption sur le terrain), though this does not mean that MoD does not use internal or informal means of its own to monitor integrity issues during operations.

For example, in a July 2018 monitoring report by the Brussels-based GRIP research centre, Côte d’Ivoire was said to be pursuing its reforms of the armed forces with the retirement of 2,168 military personnel by May 2018. Côte d’Ivoire was also reported to want to increase its contingent of MINUSMA in Mali from the current 150 soldiers to 600 soldiers, a request that the UN Security Council would need to approve. But there was no mention of field monitoring of corruption risk by trained professionals (1). In its previous monitoring report from 9 April 2018, GRIP carried no updates on the progress in the reforms of the armed forces. There was also no coverage of corruption issues in the defence sector (2). In its report from January 11, 2018, GRIP informed, among others, about the discovery of the arms cache found at the home of Souleymane Kamagate (Soul-to-Soul) in Bouaké in May 2017. It also informed about the continued reforms of the armed forces. There was no reference to corruption monitoring in the armed forces (3).

There is no evidence that there is any type of M&E guidance in the field (1).

As shown by 54A and 54B, there is no evidence of any corruption monitoring or of monitoring and evaluation while the armed forces are deployed or on peacekeeping missions (1). Therefore, there is no reporting that can be made available to oversight bodies, and this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Research indicates that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs monitors corruption concerning civilian activities and aids [1, 2, 3]. However, this is only relevant as far as it pertains to a “comprehensive approach” mission concept. Concerning the military side specifically, there is not much publicly available information to indicate that corruption monitoring of the Danish effort is taking place [4]. Research only found that the Ministry of Defence Accounting Agency “supports international operations by sending out accountant’s staff to Danish camps where the Accounting Agency handles the money supply and cash. The Accounting Agency is responsible for the accounting education of the employees sent out as well as of the authorities’ cash handling employees/the accountants” [5]. No further information on this was available.

As research could not identify montoring practices, research was also unable to identify M&E guidance. No further information on the Ministry of Defence Accounting Agency’s activities in relation to deployment of agents could be found, thus no information on its mission guidance could be found [1].

There is no evidence that corruption monitoring reports are made public. No further information on the Ministry of Defence Accounting Agency’s activities in relation to deployment of agents could be found, thus no information on its reporting activities could be found [1].

According to our sources, there are no trained and specialized professionals in the armed forces that are capable of monitoring corruption activities. Therefore, there is no deployment of professionals who could monitor corruption risks and activities in any operations (1), (2), (3), (4).

According to our sources, there is no M&E guidance for any committee or personnel who are specialized in monitoring corruption risks. (1), (2), (3).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence that any form of corruption monitoring takes place in the field.

There is no evidence of expert personnel monitoring corruption within deployed missions and there is no indication of this being planned for the future either. [1] Estonia’s Anti-Corruption Strategy by the Ministry of Justice does not include tackling corruption in the defence sector or investing in expert personnel for monitoring corruption within missions. [2] It is not deemed as a priority. [3] However, the Headquarters of the Defence Forces prioritises gathering know-how and information about experiences in foreign operations. The experiences are analysed and evaluated after the operation. These evaluations could include corruption, but it is not part of the procedure. The unit deployed on a mission will be accompanied by communications, logistical and medical support, and an information officer. [4] The latter informs the public in case of crisis. There is no mention of an expert monitoring corruption being involved. Between 2005 and 2006, Estonia sent a Military Observation Team to Afghanistan. [5] One of their tasks was to gather information. Whether information about corruption was included is not specified. [6]

There is no evidence of monitoring and evaluation guidance for the missions by the Defence Forces.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. There is no evidence that Defence Forces write or publish reports on corruption risks during operations or peacekeeping missions.

There is no evidence that the country deploys trained personnel for corruption monitoring during operations. The Headquarters of the Defence Forces also did not address the question in its written response.

There is no evidence of any M&E guidance for military missions on how to monitor corruption risk. The Headquarters of the Defence Forces also did not address the question in its written response.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Finland does not deploy expert personnel for corruption monitoring.

As mentioned, there is no reference to corruption specifically in the context of « operational preparation » for the deployment of the armed forces [1] – hence it is unlikely that corruption monitors exist. It might be possible that the « Army Inspectors » [2] who visit field bases, Direction of Defence Intelligence and Security (DRSD) or gendarmes who are present on external operations (Opex) have a role in this regard, [2] but it is not a stated corruption-monitoring one.

At the time of the assessment, there was no M&E guidance for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks.
It is, however, worth noting that the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MOAF) is currently doing a “corruption-risk mapping” (with a broader definition of corruption than defined the Penal Code, encompassing embezzlement and misappropriation of funds), [1] in the form of two separate questionnaires: one sent to over 60 departments at risk of corruption-exposure (procurement, subcontracting, exports, subsidies, HR, etc. [2] [2bis]) within the Ministry, and a second one, anonymous, sent to operators working with the Ministry. The “contrôleur général des armées” and “ethics chief” of the MOAF, Jean Tenneroni, indicated that this risk mapping would feed into the development and subsequent publication of the new Code of Conduct published in December 2020.

This indicator is scored Not Applicable. The Sapin 2 law [1] empowered the Military Ethics Committee, appointing an “ethics chief”(2) in charge of monitoring and raising awareness of corruption risks in February 2018.
The MOAF is currently doing a “corruption-risk mapping” (with a broader definition of corruption than defined the Penal Code, encompassing embezzlement and misappropriation of funds), [2] in the form of two separate questionnaires: one sent to over 60 departments at risk of corruption-exposure (procurement, subcontracting, exports, subsidies, HR, etc. [3] [3bis]) within the Ministry, and a second one, anonymous, sent to operators working with the Ministry. The “contrôleur général des armées” and “ethics chief” of the MOAF, Jean Tenneroni, announced that this risks-mapping will be done and will result in an anti-corruption Code of Conduct before the end of 2020. [2]

According to Central Service Regulation A-2100/1, which regulates the implementation of the ‘Federal Government Directive Concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration’ [1], commanders are in charge of corruption prevention during missions, taking into account potential corruption indicators. Commanders are supported by dedicated corruption prevention staff (APK). If an incident of corruption occurs, commanders and APK staff can reach back to the Central Operational Command (EinsFüKdoBw). There is no further monitoring mechanism. There is no indication that monitoring reports are produced, nor any mention to that effect [2]. Some form of monitoring takes place, although it appears to be unsystematic and the degree of expert involvement beyond support upon request is unclear.

The ‘Federal Government Directive Concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration’ (‘Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung’) applies during mission [1]. The applicable Central Service Regulation A-2100/1 provides guidance on monitoring corruption risks [2]. Commanders are required to monitor corruption risks. There are no independent monitoring mechanisms, as illustrated in the case of Afghanistan.

No publicly available reports on corruption during missions were found. According to the Federal Ministry of Defence, classified reports would be provided to oversight institutions or parliamentarians [1]. Since documents are not automatically made public and no evidence of published reports could be found, it appears as though transparency is very limited.

The country deploys no trained personnel for corruption monitoring. A range of public financial management regulations including PPA apply in the field, but there are no specifically trained professionals deployed to deal with and evaluate corruption risk (1), (2), (3), (4).

IIn 2018, the MOD’s budget allocated 335,441 GH Cedi for policy planning, and a monitoring and evaluation sub-programme (1). However, no operation was planned that included M&E activities in 2018 on corruption risks for missions (2). If M&E guidance is in place the documentation for peacekeeping operations is not published. There is no evidence that there is M&E guidance for missions on how to monitor corruption risks.

There is no evidence this monitoring is occuring, so this indicator is scored Not applicable.

The country deploys no trained personnel for corruption monitoring, or informally monitors corruption using non-expert personnel [1, 2].

The Greek Armed Forces rarely participate in peacekeeping operations [1, 2].

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’. The Greek Armed Forces rarely participate in peacekeeping operations [1, 2].

Hungary takes part in international military operations (NATO, EU, UN, international coalitions) and does not engage in singular military operations. Hungary does not have experts trained specifically for corruption monitoring in international missions. Operatives of the National Security Service regularly get deployed to international crisis management missions, together with the actual contingent, and their tasks formally include also protecting the personnel from corruption risks [1, 2]; however, they are not specialized in this area.

The Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) have no general regulations or guidance on how to monitor and evaluate corruption risks during international missions. According to source 4, this is also connected to the fact that HDF is participating in most missions with such a small amount of forces that it makes even not much sense to prepare a general M&E policy for all missions [2]. Monitoring corruption-related risks in missions is the purview of the National Security Service [1] and they conduct hundreds of audits and personal checks; however, it is not public knowledge how many of these checks are related to field missions.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. Hungary does not have experts trained specifically for corruption monitoring in international missions. Operatives of the National Security Service regularly get deployed to international crisis management missions, together with the actual contingent, and their tasks formally include also protecting the personnel from corruption risks [1, 2], the relevant reports are not available to the public.

It is unclear if trained professionals are regularly deployed at present to monitor corruption risk in the field of operations. However, as of March 2019, the Defence Ministry has approved a new branch for vigilance in the Indian Army. The new vigilance unit is to monitor corruption cases handled by field commands (1).

All UN peacekeeping operations troop contributing nations such as India, deploy trained professionals to monitor corruption including risk assessment for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) in the field of peacekeeping operations. However a few countries are more consistent than others and have more rigorous training [1]. According to Transparency International, none of the top 25 TCCs follow best practice and deploy anti-corruption monitors to missions [2].

As previously stated, it is unclear if trained professionals are currently deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field of operations. However, as of March 2019, the Defence Ministry has approved a new branch for vigilance in the Indian Army. In peacekeeping operations, it is possible that there is monitoring and evaluation but the frequency and extent are not easy to ascertain [1][2].

It is unclear if trained professionals are regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field of operations. However, as of March 2019, the Defence Ministry has approved a new branch for vigilance in the Indian Army. The new vigilance unit is to monitor corruption cases handled by field commands (4). It is possible that the reports would be made available to oversight bodies with some information given publicly.

In peacekeeping operations, it is possible that there is monitoring and evaluation with reports available to oversight bodies but the frequency and extent are not easy to ascertain [1][2]. India has held training courses for DPO trainers [3.

When it comes to daily operations within the country, monitoring is carried out by the Inspectorate General of the TNI at the level of the TNI Headquarters, through supervision and inspection activities (pengawasan dan pemeriksaan, or wasrik). Wasrik focuses on the implementation of duties and functions, resources and all elements of management relating to the level of obedience, order, effectiveness, efficiency and economy [1]. While wasrik itself does not explicitly monitor corruption risks, its objectives includes the early detection of weakness in internal control mechanisms and the realisation of clean and corruption-free working environments [1]. With regard to peace operations, supervision is carried out by the Joint Headquarters of the TNI verification team, which is deployed annually during the operation period [2]. The supervisory team consists of personnel from the TNI Headquarters and forces headquarters. It was not possibly to verify whether they receive any anti-corruption training prior to deployment.

There is insufficient public evidence to score this indicator; as such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. According to an interviewee, there are no known specific guidelines for monitoring corruption risk during military operations and peacekeeping mission [1].

Reports of the monitoring of internal operations and peacekeeping operations are neither submitted to parliament nor are they open to the public. DPR’s Commission I conduct oversight by visiting the battalions deployed on peacekeeping missions abroad, but there is no indication of specific anti-corruption monitoring [1].

No evidence was found to indicate that the country deploys trained personnel for corruption monitoring. The only monitoring spoken of is in relation to surveillance activities [1]. Interviewee 1 said Iran probably has some mechanisms in place to keep tabs on their soldiers’ behaviour and actions, but beyond minders, they had not heard of any specific positions or roles [2].

No M&E guidance for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks was found [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as the country does not deploy trained personnel for corruption monitoring [1].

A total of $450bn (1) has vanished in the form of public funds; this suggests monitoring of corruption is afforded little attention. High-risk areas include borders and ports, where little monitoring takes place. International investors and allies continue to write invaluable reports (2) that underscore much of what is known, that corruption is endemic and that public funds should not be entrusted to Islamist parties and armed forces. In 2018, the COI was said to have referred 11 ministers (3), accused of embezzlement, to the judiciary. It is unclear against whom meaningful charges were brought.

There are no signs of existing guidelines that address or assess corruption risks in the context of military operations, as confirmed by two interviewed sources (1), (2).

Reports into corruption risks are formulated by Iraq’s leading official anti-corruption body but concerning others realms of risk; political, judicial, administrative, but not risks that are present within the field of operations.

There is no evidence that Israel deploys trained personnel for corruption monitoring. The soldiers have no specific anti-coruption trainings but before every single mission they receive anti-coruption instructions as part of the general instructions for the soldiers(1). Aside from this though, there is no formalised process for corruption monitoring as part of military operations.

There is no evidence of any M&E guidance for military missions on how to monitor corruption risk, aside from generalised oral instructions. (1) (2).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Israel does not deploy expert personnel for corruption monitoring.

In the various crisis situations in operations abroad, there is no deployment of expert personnel capable of monitoring Italy’s corruption risks in operations abroad. [1]

In the various crisis situations in operations abroad, no specific duties on the monitoring of corruption risk are foreseen [1], therefore one could assume that there is no specific guidelines for M&E activities.

Since there is no deployment of trained professionals to monitor Italy’s corruption risk in operation, it is not possible to assess the transparency of dedicated reporting duties. This indicator is therefore marked ‘Not Applicable’.

A retired higher Marine Self-Defence Force (MSDF) officer, who commanded an MSDF regional headquarters, said at interview that when the scale of deployment is above a certain level in number of troops, size of budget and length of time, it is generally the case that specialist personnel are deployed for the purpose of monitoring. One of the aims of the laws and regulations that apply to contracting and are listed in the Compliance Guidance, whether the contracts are for work in Japan or operations abroad, [1] is to prevent corruption. [2] Furthermore, a recent research paper from the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center at the Joint Staff College gives a detailed overview of civil-military relations in international emergency relief operations in which Japan participates. The paper describes several expert groups that are dispatched from Japan during such operations. However, experts on anti-corruption are not mentioned explicitly. [3] The Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance (IGO), for its part, can select for inspection aspects of foreign operations that it is aware may need improvement. However, only one foreign operation was mentioned in its annual inspection reports from the timeframe of this research. That was Japan’s participation in a UN peacekeeping operation in South Sudan. This operation was inspected for the handling of documents (in this case daily logs) and Freedom of Information requests, not corruption. [4] The Board of Audit did not report any inspection of foreign operations in its recent annual reports. [5] Based on these sources, it is fair to conclude that Japan probably conducts some informal monitoring of corruption with non-expert personnel.

A search of the webpages of the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center of the Joint Staff College [1] and the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit of the GSDF [2] and of the Japan Ministry of Defence [3] found no evidence that there is M&E guidance for the missions that refers to monitoring corruption risks. However, a retired former higher MSDF officer said that it is generally the case that such risks are monitored for large operations (see Q54A). [4] It is possible that such guidance exists but is confidential.

A retired higher MSDF officer, when asked about monitoring of corruption, stated that it is generally the case that specialist personnel monitor large foreign operations by the SDF (see Q54A). [1] However, no mention of reports of corruption monitoring was found on the webpages of the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center of the Joint Staff College [2] or the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit of the GSDF [3] or of the Ministry of Defence. [4] Thus, no confirmation has been found that Japan deploys personnel who are explicitly assigned the task of corruption monitoring. This indicator is therefore marked Not Applicable.

There are very few corruption monitoring personnel who work under the head of the armed forces. They conduct few monitoring and checking missions inside Jordan, and rarely any outside Jordan. They are not well-trained, but they have financial auditing and political capacities. There is no evidence to support that Jordan deploys any trained personnel for corruption monitoring, or that it informally monitors corruption with non-expert personnel [1]. Information available on the UN’s website only includes information about the number of deployed personnel from Jordan and the band they fall under. The Jordanians on missions are either used as contingent troops, police, experts on missions or staff officers. It is important to note that Jordan only has 15 personnel deployed as experts on missions, 33 as staff officers, 747 as police, and 53 as contingent troops [2]. Other than peacekeeping, Jordan does not have major operations that require troops to be stationed. For example, Jordan’s involvement in Syria consisted of aerial bombardment rather than field troops deployment [3].

On missions, there is no such guidance. According to an officer who was deployed in a UN mission, they never received training about M&E or on corruption. Information about defence operations in Jordan is scarce. On Jordan’s peacekeeping missions, information only consists of number of deployed personnel and no further information is provided [1]. In addition to that, corruption is not treated as a strategic issue within defence, and thus it is safe to assume that no M&E guidance for missions on how to monitor corruption exists. There is no military doctrine on corruption, and the only law that exists about corruption and which applies to the armed forces, is Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces, issued in accordance with Article 126 of the Jordanian Constitution [2]. There is no evidence to support that M&E guidance exists. It is important to reiterate here, that information about defence operations is scarce as the majority of defence matters are considered state secrets and are classified under Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. 50 [3], and thus access to this information might be hindered due to the lack of transparency in relation to the operations of the armed forces.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as with the lack of an M&E policy and the lack of information about deployed personnel to monitor corruption, it is not relevant within this context to assess transparency in relation to M&E reporting.

There is limited information of oversight institutions monitoring defence-related corruption issues in KDF field related activities. [1, 2] The exception here is with the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and Parliament who have the mandate to and capacity to monitor security related operations and processes. KNCHR, for instance, has the legal mandate to monitor, investigate and report on security related operations of all national security organs, including KDF, under the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act. [3] However, the KNCHR monitoring scope has mainly been restricted to human rights and less on corrupt related issues. [4] Moreover, their mandate is only restricted within the republic and not outside the country. Parliament’s Defence and Foreign Relations Committee has also in the past monitored corruption risks of KDF related operations. [5] Nevertheless, there is still limited evidence to suggest that trained anti-corruption professionals can be deployed or have the capacity to monitor corruption risks in KDF operations internally, or during external missions.

Currently there is no monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework to ensure that anti-corruption programme, policies and preventative measures are being implemented. However, in 2018 the The office of the Attorney General and Department of Justice published a sessional paper that set out the a traget for Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission to establish a robust M&E system within two years. [1] The system, according to the framework will be automated and will aim to enhance compliance of public bodies including defence and security organisation with EACC recomendations on corruption prevention.

The sub-indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because Kenya does not deploy any personnel for corruption monitoring within missions.

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. According to the government reviewer, the Ministry of Defense and the KSF have trained personnel to monitor corruption in matters related to peacekeeping operations and missions [1]. It has sanctioned the issue of integrity and counter-corruption measures by its bylaws [2] and other domestic policies [3]. However, analysis of the evidence provided by the reviewer does not explicitly state whether there are currently formal mechanisms for personnel to be deployed for corruption monitoring. Nonetheless, based on the the Integrity Plan 2019-2022, several trainings on corruption monitoring have been conducted. [3]

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator.

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator.

SAB officials and lawmakers scrutinise military missions and these are included in the SAB’s annual report, officials say. Auditors are, however, not deployed with the mission (1, 2 and 3). But Kuwait’s army is small and it is largely inactive, so officials say there is not much need to deploy anyone to monitor the few, small operations they are running.

There are currently no guidelines on corruption risks for missions (1, 2 and 3). The very idea is new as a concept to the SAB in general and they talked in their 2017 report about how they will try to focus on monitoring corruption risks starting in 2018, but so far there is no information available on the subject (4).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because auditing bodies and Parliament don’t have a policy of making mission reports available to the public. In fact these reports are made available to the SAB and Parliament (as well as the ACA if there is an investigation) but they, like other reports from the security agencies, tend to be in summary form and missing key information, state auditors said (1, 2 and 3)

It is important to take into account Latvia’s specific situation – deployment usually is very small in numbers and part of international forces. Therefore, to deploy professionals to monitor corruption risks for 3 to 15 soldiers is not efficient. In international missions, Latvia relies on the lead nation’s guidelines. [1]

Since trained professionals are not deployed to missions in order to monitor corruption risk due to the small size of Latvia’s contingent, the M&E policy depends on the lead nation’s policy. [1]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as it is not Latvia that drafts the reports.

The LAF does not deploy trained personnel for corruption monitoring. It informally monitors corruption through the Military Police that controls and monitors violations committed by military personnel (1). A source (2) and the LAF Directorate of Orientation also confirmed the role of the Military Police (3).

The LAF does not have M&E guidelines that specify how to monitor corruption (1). According to the LAF, the military operates under the laws related to it and internal rules to ensure discipline and order of military personnel (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there are no corruption monitoring reports; the LAF does not have personnel specifically focused on M&E (1).

Lithuanian troops join partners’ units because Lithuania sends only a few troops on missions so sending trained professionals to monitor corruption risk would not be cost effective. For example, Lithuania has up to fifty people in Afghanistan, five in Kosovo, and up to forty in Mali [1]. As they join forces with other partner countries, the need to train personnel for monitoring tasks is done by the partner whose team Lithuanian officers join. However, if the unit deployed is of a certain size (25-60 people), one person should be made responsible for corruption issues as per point 2.5 of the Action Plan of Anti-Corruption programme [2].Apart from the requirement of the Action Plan, there is no publicly available evidence provided that Lithuania performs corruption monitoring in international operations under NATO, UN, EU. Lithuania also sent 60 people to Ukraine to conduct military training, yet there is no mentioning of anti-corruption issues covered there [1] [3].

The Assessor found no evidence of monitoring and evaluation guidance for missions regarding corruption risk monitoring. The interviewees note that Lithuanian troops join partners’ units because Lithuania sends only a few troops on missions [1]. As they join forces with other partner countries, Lithuania does not see, according to the interviewees, the necessity to train personnel for monitoring tasks. This is done by the partner whose team Lithuanian officers join. However, if the unit deployed is of a certain size (25-60 people), one person should be made responsible for corruption issues as per point 2.5 of the Action Plan of Anti-Corruption programme [2].

According to the government reviewer, the liability for corruption-related offences is provided for in the job descriptions of the commanders of military units participating in multinational operations (National Support Element and Special Operations Squadron). Lectures on corruption prevention are included into the preparation for multinational operations [3].

The Assessor found no evidence of monitoring and evaluation guidance for missions regarding corruption risk monitoring. The interviewees note that Lithuanian troops join partners’ units because Lithuania sends only a few staff to missions. The interviewees note that Lithuanian troops join partners’ units because Lithuania sends only a few troops on missions. For example, Lithuania has up to fifty people in Afghanistan, five in Kosovo, and up to forty in Mali [1]. As they join forces with other partner countries, Lithuania does not see, according to the interviewees, the necessity to train personnel for monitoring tasks. This is done by the partner whose team Lithuanian officers join. Given that there is no evidence that trained personnel are deployed for corruption monitoring purposes, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

The first mission in which trained anti-corruption personnel were deployed was the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOMM) mission in 2014. Since then, trained Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) officers have been regularly deployed to ESSCOMM to aid in anti-corruption investigations. [1] [2] [3] However, there has been no other evidence of such cooperation between MACC and the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) in other missions, suggesting that deployment of anti-corruption experts on missions is irregular and on an ad-hoc basis. The Integrity Unit does not deploy its officials to oversee any missions. [4]

No information could be obtained regarding the M&E guidance for ESSCOMM in particular. As such, this indicator is not scored and is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

Anti-corruption experts deployed on missions report directly to the MACC. The MACC reports that there are no recent reports of defence officials involved in corruption in ESSCOMM. The results of the recent MACC-ESSCOMM manhunt for ‘moles’ is yet to be seen. Nevertheless, reports of operations are generally not made public but are provided to the legislature, including the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Auditor General.

The assessor found no evidence that that corruption monitors are deployed in the field. A NOREF report notes that the Malian army lacks “a unified national moral compass to underwrite its military operations”.⁹ The military code of conduct does not reference corruption and there is a lack of corruption-focused training and strategic planning within the armed forces (see Q51, Q52, Q53). A defence attaché based in Bamako said that he was not aware of any elements within the FAMa working to monitor corruptions risks.¹²
There is overwhelming evidence that corruption has been endemic and widespread in the Malian army, gendarmerie and police for at least the last decade.¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ This strongly indicates that there are either no such trained professionals deployed to monitor corruption in the field or that any such experts are ineffective and lack any meaningful oversight.

The assessor found no evidence that that the government has produced any M&E guidance for the Malian armed forces. A NOREF report notes that the Malian army lacks “a unified national moral compass to underwrite its military operations”.1 The military code of conduct does not reference corruption and there is a lack of corruption-focused training and strategic planning within the armed forces (see Q51, Q52, Q53).

Because no personnel are deployed for corruption monitoring, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There are certainly no reports published by the armed forces regarding corruption risks in military operations. The only public bodies to have produced reports examining corruption in the security forces are the BVG and the Supreme Court (see Q16C) and that was only at the behest of the IMF, which was withholding aid until an investigation was conducted. The BVG’s investigation into the acquisition of the presidential jet remains an exceptional case of any public oversight body daring to hold the armed forces accountable with regard to corruption.¹,²

Mexico has little experience in mobilising peacekeeping missions, deploying 83 members of the military and police personnel (May 2015 to May 2019) in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The main tasks carried out are military observation, as officers of the General Staff, planning, communication-informatics, and operational work in the headquarters. [1]
There is no evidence of Mexican personnel being trained and deployed to supervise corruption risks on operations [2] [3] [4]

There is no evidence of M&E guidance for missions on how to monitor corruption and no evidence of professionals being deployed to monitor associated risks. No further information could be found on this subject.

Mexico has little experience in mobilising peacekeeping missions, deploying 83 members of the military and police personnel (May 2015 to May 2019) in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The main tasks carried out are military observation, as officers of the General Staff, planning, communication-informatics, and operational work in the headquarters. [1]

There is no information on Mexican personnel trained to supervise corruption risks in foreign countries. [2] [3] [4]

There is only one person in military who is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Integrity Plan, but that person does not monitor corruption risks. [1][2]

There is no M&E guidance for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks. [1][2]

Only reports on the implementation of the Integrity Plan exist, but these are not related to monitoring corruption risk in the field. [1] The country does not deploy any trained personnel for corruption monitoring and, as such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

No evidence was found that the country deploys trained personnel for corruption monitoring, and/or informally monitors corruption with non-expert personnel (1)(2)(3).

No evidence was found of M&E guidance for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks, whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions. Morocco is the 13th largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping operations (1)(2).

Such lack of evidence might indicate a lack of transparency which itself could imply corruption risks.

This sub indicator is marked as non applicable because Morocco does not deploy any personnel for monitoring.

The Tatmadaw’s doctrines on the planning of operations are not publicly available. The assessors do not have access to any information indicating whether the Tatmadaw addresses corruption as a strategic issue during its military operations against ethnic insurgency. There are provisions on extortion and insider trading in the Defence Services Act (1959) [1]. It is not possible to take action against military personnel under the Anti-Corruption Law because of the provisions of the 2008 Constitution [2]. Although there are no professionals delpoyed, there are scrutiny officers posted at the headquarters tribunal [3].

Although there are no professionals delpoyed, there are scrutiny officers posted at the headquarters tribunal [1]. However, there is no evidence of M&E guidance for missions on how to monitor corruption risk.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Myanmar does not deploy any expert personnel for corruption monitoring.

The deployment of trained personnel for the purpose of corruption monitoring depends on the specific mission. For example, during the Dutch involvement in Afghanistan, civil-military advisors were tasked with corruption monitoring [1]. However, there is no policy on this matter, nor any attempt to institutionalise such positions or the reporting on corruption. Aside from ad hoc advisors, legal professionals, who are part of the Ministry of Defence’s Legal Services Centre (DC JDV), are deployed on missions to advise on the Rules of Engagement [2]. They are responsible for guiding troops and commanders on the legality of activities and actions which could implicitly involve corruption [2]. However, no trained personnel are regularly deployed for the explicit purpose of corruption monitoring.

Rules and policy, including the Rules of Engagement, are different for each mission and different guidelines apply to missions compared to general military service at home [1]. However, the Rules of Engagement and other guidance documents do not consistently or explicitly specify how to monitor or manage corruption risks [1,2].

Reports that have been written on corruption monitoring (for example, those written by advisors in Afghanistan) have been classified [1].

At the unit level, a Unit Security Officer is the person designated to identify, process, and report breaches which may include corruption [1]. While deployed, situational reports are regularly sent through to the NZDF Lessons Learned database, managed by Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand. In previous years, HQJFNZ routinely deployed auditors, assessors, and legal advisors into operational areas to monitor inventory and financial practices within operational theatres. For larger missions such as Timor and Afghanistan the Defence Force deployed a specialist Finance Officer to mitigate the likelihood of these sorts of practises from occurring.

The wider risk of corrupt practices is managed through contract management training, pre-deployment training and New Zealand-based monitoring and reporting (see answers to Q53 and Q55) [2]. It is debatable whether the Unit Security Officers could be deemed “experts” as much depends upon the quality of the personnel appointed. Moreover, these officers are usually only deployed on larger missions. However, when operational deployments require Finance Officers, all evidence indicates that their reports are of a suitable level to meet statuary obligations.

There is no evidence of any M&E policy or guidance for monitoring corruption risks during military operations.

The reports from NZDF deployments are official documents and may be requested pursuant to the provisions of the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act). They are not published online or made readily available to the public. Media have reported difficulty with gaining access to operational documents, however content may only be withheld in accordance with relevant clauses of the Act [1, 2]. Moreover, operational documents often remain classified due to the potential OpSec threat, and therefore redactions could be more prevalent. Nonetheless, these reports may not be withheld from the Auditor-General or the designated audit body [3, 4].

There are regular joint missions conducted with RECAP-GIZ and IGSS to monitor corruption risks (1). Niger is a major contributor of troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations, in particular in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire. These officers are trained by the ICRC to observe international humanitarian law. The Military Code of 2003 (2), includes Articles 47 and 48 that allow the military police to follow up on all types of criminal behaviour (including corruption, which is described in Art. 228) in the field. However, the assessor found no information on corruption training prior to deployment (3).

The assessor found no evidence that there is M&E guidance for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks.

No evidence has been found for such reports to be public should they exist.

There is no evidence of active corruption risk monitoring during operations. The course content for the training provided by the Nigerian Army Defence Centre appears not to cover corruption monitoring. An examination of the content of the training provided did not identify corruption monitoring as a subject in the course. Discussions with a source also confirmed this (1).

There is no evidence of active corruption risk monitoring during operations. The Military Resource Centre recently held a series of training sessions on project management for defence personnel. The topics covered by the course included Introduction to project management (1).

Project planning:
– Work breakdown structure
– Project schedule development
– Critical path analysis
– Project monitoring and control
– Maximizing resources in project execution
– Critical success factors for projects
– Introduction to Microsoft Project 2007.

The course outline fails to cover the procedural basis for personnel to monitor corruption.

There is no evidence of active corruption risk monitoring during operations. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

No anti-corruption experts are explicitly deployed during international missions. This is partly due to the fact that the missions are small in scope. Still, military police officers involved in a mission are charged with monitoring corruption monitoring and are allowed to act in case of a corrupt behaviour amongst members on the mission [1]. Since 2002, units and individual soldiers are subjected to a coalition/partner structure in missions. So far, there has been no evidence of corruption in the missions that are publicly known.
The MoD considers that due to small scope of mission, the preset arrangement with partner countries on logistic support and the very low risk of corruption, the deployment of trained corruption specialist in this case does not seem applicable [2]

There is no monitoring and evaluation guidance for anti-corruption during the missions abroad [1].

Thi indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as North Macedonia does not deploy any personnel for corruption monitoring. Mission reports which outline daily activities of the mission are produced weekly and monthly. The final 6-month report of the mission also addresses corruption issues, if any have occurred. The weekly reports are classified. The final 6 – Month report is unclassified and is distributed to the President, CDS, and the Minister of Defence. The reports are not published on the website of the MoD or the Army. The final 6-month report is also presented to overseeing bodies such as Parliament and the Committee for Defence and Security [1]. Minutes from the Committee for Defence and Security over the past two years do not show these issues debated in any such report [2].

Norway does not deploy trained personnel for corruption monitoring [1].

The Norwegian Armed Forces do not have specific M&E guidance for missions on how to monitor corruption risks, but pay attention to ensuring that deployed personnel are aware of the risk and if necessary work out action plans for high risk areas [1]. The anti-corruption policy for missions is the same as the long-term anti-corruption policy for the whole defence sector as outlined in the Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership for the Defence Sector [2].

The sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable because Norway does not deploy any personnel for corruption monitoring within missions [1].

There is no evidence of the deployment of trained personnel for corruption monitoring in the field. As outlined above there is no anti-corruption training or provisions in place to monitor corruption in military operations (1), (2). There have been no recent deployments of Oman’s Royal Armed Forces in military operations, or peacekeeping missions, it is thus difficult to discern if there is any, even informal non-expert corruption monitoring (3), (4). There is no mention of corruption, including professionally trained corruption personnel on either the Royal Armed Forces or Ministry of Defence websites (2), (3). According to our sources, there are no trained officials who have received training on corruption risks that are deployed to monitor activities within the armed forces inside Oman or outside Oman (5), (6).

There is no evidence of any monitoring and evaluation guidance available for missions on how to monitor corruption risks (1), (2). As stated above there is no evidence of any corruption monitoring in the field (1), (3), (4), (5). There is no indication of trained professionals being deployed to carry out monitoring and evaluation in the field (6). Corruption is not explicitly mentioned in any documentation on the MoD or Royal Armed Forces websites (4), (5).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence that monitoring and evaluation of corruption risks takes place.

Reports concerning the military or army never make their way outside offices and closed rooms. “These are confidential information that nobody in the public had to have them” (1).

There is no mechanism for corruption monitoring, particularly for the armed and security forces (1). The only agency for auditing and controlling is the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau, which mainly focuses on local bodies and ministries, including the MoI which governs the civil police, but not the military. Therefore, M&E does not exist within the armed forces (2).

There is no M&E mechanism within the armed forces. Annual reports are submitted to the head of the agency office, the prime minister’s office or the president’s office, but not as part of any system. According to two officers, the routine reports are never read by senior officers (1), (2). In many cases, these reports include numerical data about bureaucratic issues. In some cases, when there is public pressure about incidents that include the armed forces, an investigation occurs by special committees set up by the president or the prime minister (3). In general, there is no M&E guidance on how to monitor corruption risks; however, the Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission is responsible for following up on the M&E related to corruption found in any ministry, including the MoI (2). The Palestinian government does not have a specific M&E procedure manual, and there are no specific policies in this area. The Security Sector Strategic Plan 2017-2022 indicates weaknesses in this area in general (3).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no M&E mechanism within the Armed Forces (1), (2). Other than a few statements (on social media by senior officers) that respond to allegations, no reports are public.

Informal monitoring of general corruption-related issues does occur in line with the broader coverage mentioned previously, but there is no evidence of trained personnel deployment specifically for corruption monitoring during regular operations, nor during times of crisis [1, 2, 3].

The conduct of monitoring and review is one of the key steps in the Philippine Army’s Risk Management framework [1]. M&E guidance stipulated in the framework does not specifically refer to corruption risks alone but to risks, in general, citing corruption as one probable risk [1].

Given that the Philippines does not deploy any personnel for corruption monitoring, this indicator is marked as ‘Not Applicable’.

Polish military contingents takes part in various international operations, training and peace keeping missions of NATO, EU, UN and international coalitions. [1, 2] There are no evidences of anti-corruption monitoring deployed by the institutions itself.
The anti-corruption program in the Ministry of National Defence for 2016-2019 identifies corruption risks in operations as a threat [3].
Both military police and counterintelligence officers are deployed in the missions. One of their tasks is monitoring, preventing and combating crimes, including corruption. [4, 5].
Reports on corruption as a separate document are not prepared. However, these issues should be part of the periodic reports by Military Police officers. The guidelines regarding minimizing the risk of corruption on military missions states:
“12. Soldiers and employees should be required to report to their superiors about attempts to provide financial or personal benefits.
13. The fact of corrupt situation should be noted in the periodic report of the Polish Military Contingent.” [6].
Since 2015 level of corruption risk in operations is generally law, as Polish contingents spent relatively small amount of money locally. They are mainly supplied directly from Poland and do not implement local CIVIC or international assistance projects. Corruption threats are monitoring by Military Police and Military Counterintelligence Service personnel deployed in operations. There is no need of other anti-corruption experts to be deployed as the risk level is generally low. [7]

Polish military contingents takes part in various international operations, training and peace keeping missions of NATO, EU, UN and international coalitions. [1,2] Commands of NATO and EU operations perform M&E procedures, where corruption is one of the issues (marginally) tackled. Polish contingents provide input for mission M&E data. On national level M&E procedures are poorly developed. [3].
The guidelines regarding minimizing the risk of corruption on military missions states:
“12. Soldiers and employees should be required to report to their superiors about attempts to provide financial or personal benefits.
13. The fact of corrupt situation should be noted in the periodic report of the Polish Military Contingent.” [4].

No evidence has been found on the deployment of anti-corruption specialists (other than Military Police and Military Counterintelligence Service officers) or publicly available reports. Also, there is no evidence that this information is made available to relevant oversight bodies.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and branches were contacted to provide information concerning monitoring and evaluation in corruption issues but were not forthcoming. There is evidence that monitoring occurs in deployment, but existing information is strictly related to UN monitoring activities [1, 2] and there is no evidence that MoD or armed forces activities include corruption risks and mitigation.

The MoD and other branches were contacted in order to provide information concerning training in corruption issues but were not forthcoming. There is evidence that some monitoring and evaluation (M&E) occurs [1], as well as learning [2], but none of these activities involves structured M&E, nor do they pertain to corruption.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Portugal does not deploy expert personnel for corruption monitoring. The MoD and the military branches were contacted in order to provide information regarding monitoring and evaluation in corruption issues, but they were not forthcoming.

On the basis of existing information (as per Q54B), monitoring does not encompass corruption, and as such no reports are submitted or made publicly available.

Qatar has very few defence operations (Eritrea, Yemen), but withdrew from both in 2017. However, there has not been any deployment of trained personnel to monitor corruption activities. [1,2]

There is no M&E guidance for missions on how to monitor corruption risks. [1,2] It has become clear that Qatar is not involved in any major fields to prompt the need for such mission-specific guidance, and that the defence sector is not subject to any form of scrutiny or monitoring. [3] These factors point to the fact that there is no M&E guidance for missions.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no monitoring of corruption (see Q54A).

Qatar does not publish any reports on corruption and transparency as there are no such reports in the armed forces. There have not been any reports on corruption activities for the last four years. [1,2] Therefore, we assume that even if there are internal reports, they are not made public.

When deploying Russian troops to foreign missions, the Russian military command does not seem to provide any specific anti-corruption training. There is no publicly available evidence that there were any personnel trained in corruption monitoring deployed with the Russian troops on the Russian mission in Syria [1]. Equally, there were no reports that the Russian military observers and officers deployed for the UN peacekeeping operations were trained specifically in anti-corruption monitoring [2,3].

As for creating anti-corruption mechanisms within the foreign armed forces, it was only in 2019 that Russia initiated the formation of an anti-corruption committee in the Syrian regular army [4]. There are no details as to how the committee will be formed or what kind of Russian specialists are involved in the project [4].

There is no evidence there is any M&E guidance specifically for the operations or peacekeeping missions. Also, the instructional guidelines for implementing anti-corruption requirements in the army do not provide any guidance related to the deployment of troops in foreign countries or under foreign command [1].

This indicator is Not Applicable because there is no evidence that the Russian military command deploys trained experts in corruption monitoring either with the Russian mission in Syria [1] or for UN peacekeeping operations [2].

According to our sources, there are not trained personnel for corruption monitoring in the field (1), (2). Corruption has not been prioritized or even publicly mentioned by the government, until very recently when the crown prince and de facto ruler identified tackling corruption as one of the “pillars” of his national reform program (3). According to an expert on Gulf affairs, “the Saudi government has not to date deployed professionals to monitor corruption risk in the field” (4).

As there are no trained personnel on anti-corruption deployed in the field, M&E guidance for missions on how to monitor corruption risks does not exist (1), (2).

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable. As there are no trained personnel on anti-corruption deployed in the field, reports from missions on how to monitor corruption risks do not exist (1), (2).

Oversight and monitoring of corruption risks within the multinational operations is conducted by the responsible person in each mission, such as the contingent commander or a senior national representative. There is no record of specialist training provided for the persons in charge of monitoring corruption risks. Reports on the engagement in multinational operations are provided weekly; the report also contains records on corruption if necessary [1].

Guidelines for monitoring corruption risks are set by an internal order from the Peacekeeping Operations Center of the SAF General Staff [1].

Reports on corruption risks in multinational operations stay within the defence system. The reports or the activities of the personnel designated for evaluating corruption risks are not subject to external oversight. They are not submitted to the relevant parliamentary committees or made publicly available. Integrity plans or reports on their realisation do not contain any data on risk assessments in multinational operations [1].

IAD deploys professional auditors overseas to conduct audits periodically for overseas deployments. Indications of potential corruption are reported to superiors for follow-up action.
While MINDEF does not deploy officers in the field specifically to monitor for corruption, security spot checks are periodically conducted on units to detect security breaches. MINDEF also conducts investigations on complaints of security breaches and other SAF offences. In the course of these checks or investigations, evidences of corruption are reported to superiors for follow-up action. [1].

There is no evidence of specific guidance provided to deployed units to monitor corruption risks, other than the existing general orders and overarching regulations and policy on corruption [1].

Cases of suspected corruption uncovered during checks and investigations are generally not made public due to their classified nature. However, should subsequent investigations by CPIB substantiate a case of corruption for criminal prosecution, the facts of case will be accessible to the public as deemed appropriate by the Court.

Interviewee 4 confirmed that every deployment he was involved in had dedicated personnel monitoring corruption risks. He further added that Defence Intelligence members were deployed alongside the forces in the field and conducted monitoring efforts to identify any irregularities. He was unable to comment on the frequency of the checks or point to the specific doctrine under which they occurred [1].

Following from 54A, Defence Intelligence members actively report irregularities and matters are investigated “immediately” by relevant units (MPs, Commanders, etc) [1]. A public document on the procedural aspects is not available.

Instances of fraud and corruption are regularly published and disclosed through the DoD’s Annual Report which is presented both to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans and is made public [1], as well as via its Corporate Communications Department [2]. The media can query investigations and inquire as to the progress of cases overseen by the Directorate Anti-Corruption and Anti-Fraud (DACAF) [3]. There are no reports from corruption monitors in the field that are made public.

The Ministry of National Defence (MND)’s Directive on self-audit and inspection outlines measures that can be implemented to monitor corruption risks in the field. However, the deployment of corruption monitors and the active publication of audit reports remain unclear. Although a field audit should be conducted in theory, a paper-based audit is possible if necessary, according to Article 7 of the Directive. [1] In addition, one research on the self-audit system in the defence sector argues that it is difficult to conduct the field audit to counter corruption in operations regularly in terms of the MND, due to the shortage of auditing personnel. Instead, each armed force or army unit conducts a self-audit, risking the independence and expertise of the audit process. [2]

No specific M&E guidance has been found in the Directive of the Self-audit and Inspection of the Ministry of National Defence on how to monitor corruption risks in the field. [1]

In September 2018, South Korea’s military launched a new security command, the Defence Security Support Command (DSSC) [군사안보지원사령부] to replace the Defence Security Command [기무사령부]. The DSSC’s activities include investigating potential corruption of military personnel and soldiers in field units. [1] [2] Although no report has been published publicly after its establishment, the DSSC is required to submit reports at the request of the National Assembly. [3]

No publicly available data exists to score this indicator; as such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. Sources contacted were not knowledgeable about it. Military operations are classified activities and it is highly unlikely that information such as that stated in this indicator would get out. South Sudan is not involved in any peace-keeping mission.

No publicly available data exists to score this indicator; as such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. Sources contacted were not knowledgeable about it. In any case, regarding military operations, such information is likely not to filter out due to the fact that these operations are usually be classified.

In more than ten years of analysing South Sudan issues, the assessor has never come across any instance of reports from field operations being made available to the public. There is no literature to cite on this. This is a fact based on observation and supported by a scrutiny of online news reports, which also revealed nothing. Given this lack of evidence that such corruption monitoring occurs, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.

Corruption is observed as a concern in the countries where Spanish soldiers are deployed, and measures are taken in this regard. But corruption is not considered an internal issue, and no measures to counter it in this regard are known. In each unit there is a detachment of Military Police and military legal officers who, among other, may work on corruption issues [1]. But their specific role regarding monitoring of corruption is unclear. There is no evidence of expert personnel capable of monitoring corruption regularly deployed for such aim, and there is no evidence that any report on the status of corruption within a mission is produced [2]. However, the possibility of members of the CNI (National Centre for Intelligence) or the CIFAS (Armed Forces Intelligence Centre) deployed whose tasks may include corruption monitoring cannot be ruled out [2].

No evidence has been found on the existence of M&E guidance for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks [1, 2, 3].

There is no evidence that any report on the status of corruption within missions is produced [1, 2]. Even if these reports do exist, they are probably not available to the public [1]. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

No evidence could be found suggesting that Sudan’s civilian government or military has deployed any trained professionals to monitor corruption, either formally or informally. Human Rights Watch’s 2016 report on Sudan notes that the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has been denied access to areas affected by conflict [1]; other international organisations that could monitor corruption face the same restrictions and the Government of Sudan does not arrange for informal monitoring of any kind.

No evidence could be found suggesting that Sudan has produced and/or directed the use of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) guidance to monitor corruption risks in its defence sector. No ministry website included any reference to such a document. Sudan’s Procurement Act of 2010, which covers general procurement for all elements of Sudan’s government, only mentions the monitoring of contracts very briefly and makes no specific mention of a requirement to train professionals to be deployed for the purpose of monitoring corruption risk during field operations [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Sudan does not deploy any expert personnel for corruption monitoring. No reports resulting from corruption monitoring missions are made available because no such reports are produced by Sudan’s government.

An individual serving as legal advisor and judge advocate is present within most missions abroad, and the advisors’ tasks include reporting on corruption risks [1] [2]. It is unclear, however, to what extent advisors have actually conducted corruption assessments as part of their reporting, as no documents were found that indicate that this has taken place during the studied time period.

The Swedish Armed Force’s (SAF) ‘Code of conduct’ [1] states generically that they disassociate themself from ‘all forms of discrimination, harassment, and crime such as corruption, trafficking, and abuse’. However, no clear guidance for how corruption risks are to be monitored and evaluated in practice exists.

Reports produced by legal advisors could be requested according to the Principle of Public Access to Official Documents [1], however, no reports have been made available to the public or oversight bodies in any form.

No evidence was found that expert personnel are deployed to monitor and report on corruption. However, finances, expenses, procurement of the deployed contingents are subject to the same rules and standards as for other troops in the swiss military. They might be subject to an audit by the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) [1], and regular reports including on finances are submitted to the Parliament [2]. Operations abroad for the Swiss military are politically a very sensitive matter and therefore subject to a lot of public scrutiny.

No M&E guidance or specific mention of monitoring corruption risks could be found. The standard rules and procedures for the rest of the Swiss Armed Forces apply.

The sub-indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence that Switzerland deploys any personnel for corruption monitoring within missions.

Within the military hierarchy, Political Warfare Officers are responsible for monitoring and evaluating corruption, ethics, and integrity in Taiwan’s armed forces, and they play a key role in Taiwan’s military operations during both peacetime and wartime [1].

The Company Political Warfare Officer is the first check valve for corruption M&E at operational level on a daily basis. Battalion Security Officers are the first frontline for the task of anti-corruption, ethics, and integrity. Political Officers make their “Daily Digests of Political Warfare Operation” (政戰工作日誌) reports, which include risks for corruption, on daily basis in phases of trainings, deployments, & operations [1].

Anti-corruption measures are compiled into the “Daily Digest of Political Warfare Operations” at the company and battalion levels on a daily basis and that they are based on the military doctrine of the ‘Political Warfare Outlines” [1]. The website address “https://webpac.ndu.edu.tw/bookDetail.do?id=496296” indicates that this is military doctrine of the “Political Warfare Outlines” is archived in the central library of the National Defence University of Taiwan [1].

M&E guidance is under the authority of the Battalion Security Officer, who serves as a general monitoring mechanism for corruption risks; however, a procedural basis for personnel to monitor corruption is yet to be developed [1].

Reports issued by Company or Battalion Security Officers are not accessible to the general public [1].

A review of open source online documentation revealed no evidence of the consideration of corruption risk in the planning or execution of operations. This included material from the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, and Tanzania People’s Defence Force, as well as Google searches of relevant terms in English and Swahili. No evidence could be found of corruption-monitoring in operations in these sources.

The Tanzania government indicated that personnel are regularly deployed to monitor and report on the status of corruption within missions, [1] however this information could not be verified in the public domain.

There is no evidence of any systematic monitoring of corruption risks, or Monitoring and Evaluations policy, based on a review of Tanzania state and United Nations materials.

The Tanzania government indicated that personnel are regularly deployed to monitor and report on the status of corruption within missions, [1] however this information could not be verified in the public domain.

There is no evidence of any systematic monitoring of corruption risks, or Monitoring and Evaluations policy, based on a review of Tanzania state and United Nations materials. If such reports do exist, they have not been made public.

The Tanzania government indicated that personnel are regularly deployed to monitor and report on the status of corruption within missions, [1] however this information could not be verified in the public domain.

The Office of the Inspector General is a special unit under the Office of Internal Audit, which is responsible for monitoring corruption issues with the MoD [1]. The Office of Internal Audit, Ministry of Defence, generally performs duties concerning the analysis of corruption risks and conflicts of interest and provides annual reports on the matter to the State Audit Office [2]. Every year, the officers in the Office of Internal Audit attend the anti-corruption training organised by the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters [3]. According to the Regulations of Ministry of Defence on Internal Audit 2010, internal audit officers must have knowledge and expertise in the field of corruption monitoring or possess qualifications specified by the Cabinet or Ministry of Finance [4].

According to the Guidelines for Internal Control and Evaluation for the Office of Internal Audit, personnel who are capable of monitoring corruption are regularly deployed and provide annual reports on the status of corruption within the missions. The guidelines also mention support for transporting the audit officers to the mission sites; however, it is unclear whether they are regularly deployed during military operations/peacekeeping missions with the mandate of corruption monitoring overseas. Moreover, the guidelines do not require audit personnel to report the effects of corruption on the goals of the mission or the mitigation measures being employed [5].

The Guidelines for Internal Control and Evaluation, implemented by the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, are available online [1]. Moreover, the National Defence Studies Institute also published the Guidelines for Internal Audit for the Office of Internal Audit, Ministry of Defence in 2019 [2]. These guidelines provide personnel with the procedural basis for monitoring corruption. However, they do not include any statements specifically addressing M&E for deployment or military operations/peacekeeping missions.

In the Guidelines for Internal Control and Evaluation for the Office of Internal Audit, implemented by the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, the processes and procedures for corruption M&E reporting and report publication are explained in Chapter 3. According to the guidelines, the Office of Internal Audit is required to submit the reports solely to the State Audit Office, meaning that its annual reports are not necessarily available to the public [1].

There are also the reports on the annual internal audit of the military, which are published by the Office of Internal Audit. The reports for the fiscal years 2017, 2018 and 2019 are available at the moment. The issues monitored and evaluated in the reports are divided into the following areas: Financial Auditing, Compliance Auditing, Operational Auditing, Performance Auditing, Information Technology Auditing, Management Auditing and others [2,3,4]. However, the analysis reports of internal audits and conflict of interest risks for the fiscal year, conducted by the Office of Internal Audit, Ministry of Defence, are available online in summary form; for instance, in the analysis report of the internal audit and conflict of interest risks for the fiscal year 2019, there is a table that superficially summarises the results of the corruption risk inspection for the Darfur and South Sudan peacekeeping missions in one or two sentences [5].

According to our resources, the country does not deploy any trained officers for corruption monitoring in the field. The issue of corruption is not considered a strategic matter or even a matter of operational interest and therefore, there are not officers trained on the issue (1,2,3).

According to our sources, there are no M and E guidelines related to corruption monitoring in the units or on missions abroad (1,2,3).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because the country does not deploy trained officers to monitor corruption, nor is there an M&E policy. No publicly available reports concerning this issue could be found, and none could be obtained as there is no policy on this (1,2).

Turkey has no tradition of deploying trained personnel for corruption monitoring or informally monitoring corruption with non-expert personnel. No information on this subject could be identified.

As explained by Interviewee 6, there are some executive orders that include sections about codes of conduct, anti-corruption, proper behaviour when dealing with local people and financial management, which are directly issued by the Chief of General Staff and force commands in order to regulate the behaviour of military and civilian personnel in the field [1]. However, according to him, these executive orders are not issued periodically, do not reflect the existence of awareness of anti-corruption and integrity at a strategic level and therefore cannot be defined as a reflection/outcome of a proper and decisive anti-corruption and integrity policy [1]. As explained before, the top anti-corruption and integrity-related document for all military and civilian personnel working in the sector as civil servants is the Civil Servants Code of Conduct (2005) [2]. All military personnel serving abroad are legally and administratively obliged to adhere to this framework document.

Interviewee 6 suggested that, during service abroad, there are no specific Measuring & Evalulation (M&E) practices for corruption risks and that corruption and integrity-related issues are not part of the general risk assessments in the field [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Turkey does not deploy expert personnel for corruption monitoring.

Research found no evidence that the country deploys trained personnel for corruption monitoring during operations. Given the secrecy surrounding military operations, the absence of anti-corruption frameworks for operations, lack of a doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue and weak anti-corruption training programmes – may all indicate that such monitoring does not take place either.

There is no evidence of any M&E guidance for military missions on how to monitor corruption risk.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Uganda does not deploy expert personnel for corruption monitoring.

The MoD does not deploy any trained personnel for corruption monitoring [1]. However, there is the MoD Main Inspection which is empowered to carry out inspections of compliance and carries them out should a situation occur [1]. Each military unit has counterintelligence officers who are responsible for eliminating corruption which might become an issue during deployment [2]. If a situation like that happens, there are grounds to believe that it would be also an issue for the Military Prosecutor’s Office and the Military Law-Enforcement Service [2].

The MoD does not deploy any trained personnel for corruption monitoring [1] and there is no M&E guidance in place [1].

The MoD does not deploy any trained personnel for corruption monitoring, and there are no reports on corruption risks related to particular deployments [1], as such this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

However, should something occur and should the MoD Main Inspection conduct an inspection, MPs can receive relevant reports based on existing procedures specified in the Law On State Secret which grants them access to classified information [2].

The UAE deploys no trained personnel for corruption monitoring at any level during missions (1), (2). Research revealed that the majority of operations carried out by the UAE’s armed forces are peacekeeping missions (3), (4). The UAE’s history in peacekeeping started with their involvement in the 1976 Lebanese Civil War, as Emirati troops were deployed to Lebanon to bring peace to different areas affected by the war. In 2015, the UAE was also brought as part of the Saudi-led military intervention ‘Operation Restoring Hope’ in Yemen. Additionally, the UAE has also participated in peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Afghanistan, Jordan, as well as other missions.

Corruption is not considered a strategic issue in operations, there is no evidence to support that it is, and there is also no evidence of anti-corruption training taking place within the defence sector at all. There is no evidence of the existence of M&E guidance in any of the operations of the armed forces, in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Egypt, or in other peacekeeping missions (1), (2).

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable, due to the lack of information on trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field. There are no accessible reports. However, there are internal communications at senior levels that discuss and examine these issues (1), (2).

The Joint Doctrine Publication 05, ‘Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution’, outlines some measures that can be taken to counter corruption in the field [1]. However, the extent to which these measures are effectively deployed remains unknown. There is no indication to suggest that corruption monitors are regularly deployed in the field.

As part of the previous assessment, the Transparency International UK Chapter reviewer stated that some international efforts to monitor corruption risk in the field in Afghanistan included the UK [2]. The chapter reviewer stated: ‘while questions can be raised about its effectiveness, in Afghanistan the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) was established to monitor corruption risks from a perspective of funding the insurgency. CJIATF would have included UK representation. Its stated mission was to synchronise and focus strategic Counter Corruption, Counter Narcotics, Counter Threat Finance, and ‘No Contracting with the Enemy’ activities, in order to deny resources to the nefarious actors, and enhance transparency and accountability within the government of Afghanistan. However, this appears to focus on the threat to ISAF posed by the corruption of Afghan actors, rather than the threat posed by corruption or corrupt payments by ISAF personnel’ [2].

Whilst no formal regular reporting on the monitoring of corruption is in place on all operations, Defence Human Security Advisors are usually deployed with formation Headquartes at all levels (and if not, they are available at reach). Civilian secretaires are deployed forwards to offer J8 governance at the theatre level, with a remit that covers corruption issues, as J8 is a division of Permanent Joint HQ, with responsibilities for Finance and Human Resources [3].

Building Integrity/Integrity & Anti-Corruption is a key theme within Human Security. Reporting would be on a needs basis [4]. Moreover, as outlined in the UK StratCom counter-fraud and corruption policy, a register is held for any corruption risks identified in the sector, including on operations. These risks are recorded and evaluated by the chain of command for further action [5].

Whilst there is no unified M&E policy for corruption risk on operations, there is evidence of guidance on monitoring. For instance, as outlined in the UK StratCom counter-fraud and corruption policy, a register is held for any corruption risks identified in the sector, including on operations. These risks are recorded and evaluated by the chain of command for further action [1].

Moreover, on Operation HERRICK, the UK was part of/contributed to Task Force 2010 and Shafafyat which draw up a ‘safe’ list of contractors, so the international community had a better understanding of which contractors were safe to use. This was mainly based around intelligence that they did not have links to insurgent groups, and did not look extensively into corruption [2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, since it does not appear that the country deploys personnel with the specific aim of monitoring corruption risk in the field.

The Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations requires the Lead IG to submit quarterly reports to Congress on each active operation. The Lead IG investigates fraud and corruption and produces various reports on particular issues. Each operation has a ‘fraud and corruption investigative working group’, which consists of representatives from the DCIS, USAID OIG, US Army Criminal Investigation Command and other similar bodies. From the Lead IG quarterly reports, it appears that at least some of the working group representatives actually conduct their investigations on the ground, but this is not explicitly confirmed [1,2]. According to the legislation, if a military overseas contingency operation exceeds 60 days, a lead Inspector General should be designated [3,4]. There is also an overall ‘Comprehensive Oversight Plan’ for overseas contingency operations (OCOs), which is produced annually. The report includes details of criminal investigations, under which corruption falls, as well as the counter-corruption measures implemented in Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan [5].

Congress created the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to detect and prevent fraud, waste and abuse in Afghanistan. SIGAR has a head office in Kabul and various field offices around the country [6]. The Lead IG reports do not provide information on the most significant corruption risks or mitigation efforts, instead focussing on investigations that have taken place in the last quarter [1,2]. Conversely, SIGAR reports do focus more on the corruption risks and occasionally make recommendations to Congress [7].

Although a commitment to corruption investigations was identified, as outlined in 54A, no M&E guidance on monitoring corruption risks was found on publicly available sources.

The quarterly Lead IG reports are all published by the DoD OIG and can be accessed publicly through the website [1,2]. Similarly, SIGAR publishes quarterly reports to Congress, in addition to specific audits and investigations, all of which are publicly available on the SIGAR website [3]. In 2017, however, the Trump administration moved to classify and restrict information available to Congress and the public on metrics relating to the work of SIGAR, which led to the introduction of the ‘Afghanistan Security and Reconstruction Transparency Act’ in May 2020 [4]. Although it does not seem that specific information relating to corruption monitoring was restricted, this does fit into a wider trend of overclassification during the Trump administration [5].

Given that no specific trainings for monitoring corruption risks are listed within the framework of internal operations mobilisations, and that there is a lack of oversight of these operations, there is no evidence that trained personnel are mobilised to monitor corruption. The trainings that do handle defence sector oversight, for which there is little information, discuss the administration and management of the sector in general without specifically addressing scenarios in which the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) are mobilised [1].

The National Security Law and the Organic Law on the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (LOFANB) do not include regulations on corruption regarding the mobilisation of units of the FANB [2, 3]. Nor are there any specific requirements for the monitoring of operations carried out by military forces and security bodies by internal and external control bodies. Likewise, the Defence Sector Procurement Committee (CCSD) has not made any information public regarding the existence of specific regulations for the oversight of procurement and acquisitions carried before or during mobilisation operations [4].

This lack of monitoring has been particularly aggravated by an increase in “civic-military exercises”, in which the regime orders the deployment of militias, the National Guard (GN), and the army and other FANB units to monitor public infrastructure and the border with Colombia in the face of what it considers external threats. [5, 6] For these movements, there is no available documentation recording the number of officers involved, resources invested, and assigned tasks. In recent years, within the context of the country’s political crisis, the government has mobilised security forces in operations for the maintenance of internal order, which have been monitored by international and civil society organisations. These organisations have also mobilised personnel on the ground, who focus on monitoring the use of force against civilians and cases of human rights violations, but who have also reported irregularities associated with the corruption of police and military officials [7, 8]. However, this kind of monitoring is not coordinated with the government, so the information they handle and their capacity for action are limited.

The Organic Law of National Security does not establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for FANB mobilisations. The National Defence Council, formed of representatives of the various state powers, has no control function over actions involving military mobilisation; it is only attributed functions of assistance, advice, and the formulation of security policy [1]. Following the recent activation of the Zamora Plan, criticism centres on the fact that even the National Defence Council does not discuss the approval, planning or execution of the plan, and experts say that there is no democratic mechanism for monitoring this operation [2].

In recent cases of internal operations, no organised, systematic results have been published on oversight and monitoring of implementation [3] or the number of units and resources mobilised [4]. There have only been announcements from the president or military officials, presenting results in terms of arrests or assassinations of members of criminal organisations and of political opposition groups accused of destabilisation or attempted coups [5].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Regarding operations for the maintenance of internal order, approval documents, strategic plans, and performance reports have not officially been made public [1]. Regardless, Venezuela does not deploy trained professionals to monitor corruption risks in the field.

According to operatives in both the Zimbabwe National Army and the Central Intelligence Organisation, there is no monitoring and evaluation mechanism to deal with corruption risks. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces rely on internal whistleblowers to report corruption in the field, there is little action taken at most times [1, 2]. At the end of the day, even observations by soldiers and intelligence operatives in the field on corruption risks and corrupt activities are not reported as they are usually ignored or not taken seriously by commanders [1, 2].

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is usually restricted to key strategic results of the operation [1, 2]. The M&E procedures in both the army and intelligence service are specific to the mission of operations. In peacekeeping missions, there have been allegations of corruption during the selection of people seconded for peacekeeping missions [1]. There are allegations that the people are selected based on nepotism, favouritism and sometimes bribery. Hence the second officers will not likely monitor corrupt activities during deployments since they sometimes represent the interests of the deploying authorities [1].

This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” since the country does not deploy any personnel for corruption monitoring [1, 2].