Q55.

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

55a. Comprehensiveness

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SCORE: 0/100

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55b. Training

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No evidence was found indicating that there are guidelines or staff training on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations; also see the country’s last assessment (1). The website of the Defence Ministry does not provide any information in this regard (2). Also, the Anti-Corruption Law (3) and the Statute of Military Personnel (4) do not mention any guidelines on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst deployed on operations. A review of the laws and decrees issued since 2016 did not provide any evidence that such a policy has been introduced (5).

No evidence was found that there is training provided on corruption risks in procurement or any general corruption risks in the defence institution and with regards to deployed operations or peacekeeping missions. The ONPLC has reportedly provided training for public officials exposed to fraud risks in the public procurement process during the last few years (1), (2) but no information could be found whether this also included officials involved in defence procurements.

There is no evidence that such guidelines exist (1), (2), (3).

There have been no reports of specific anti-corruption training being provided to Angolan Armed Forces personnel either before or during operational deployments.
Angola’s armed forces intervened in the Republic of the Congo in 1997 and in the DRC in 1998, and have reportedly never left and are still training Congolese soldiers and police. Troops were also deployed for security sector reform in Guiné-Bissau (MISSANG 2010-11) From 2010, Angola has deployed contingents to the SADC Brigade and Standby Force as well as ECCAS brigades, participating in joint exercises. However preventive anti-corruption training does not appear to be a priority within these regional military engagements. The 2001 SADC Protocol that entered into force in 2003 hasn’t yet been operationalized (in September 2017, a draft five-year SADC strategic & action plan was submitted to the member states for approval) (1), (2), (3).

Most of the guidelines available for mission staff members are not relevant to corruption risks in procurement and contracting. According to TI-DS (2016) “at the mission level Conduct and Discipline Teams have developed training and raised awareness of the issues, and OIOS has been responsible for investigating serious allegations that represent a major risk to a mission, which include corruption” (1). The available code of conduct addresses issues broadly, it has very limited insights on corruption risks and contracting. This makes it difficult for the mission staff members to deeply comprehend the issue of corruption. The lack of appropriate information at the mission level inevitably nurtures corruption risks and can fuel war (LeBillon 2003) (2), (3), (4).

Usually, UN Peacekeeping Mission’s staff members do not attend training specifically on corruption risks in procurement and contracting (1). According to Transparency International training and awareness-raising materials have been developed at the mission level, to help with investigating potential risks that could undermine the mission, including corruption (2), (3). Furthermore, the military involved in peacekeeping missions may register to get the Peacebuilding Operations Training Institute (POTI)’s online materials on a variety of subjects, including corruption. However, the guidelines available at the mission level, as well as on the POTI’s website remain incomplete and are not well-documented to successfully address corruption (3).

The 2017 US State Department Human Rights Report states: “In the context of the fight against Boko Haram, local sources indicated that corruption-related inefficiencies and diversion of resources from their intended purposes continued to represent a fundamental national security vulnerability” [1].

No evidence has been found to suggest guidelines or training specific to corruption risk in contracting during operations / peacekeeping missions.

The 2017 US State Department Human Rights Report states: “In the context of the fight against Boko Haram, local sources indicated that corruption-related inefficiencies and diversion of resources from their intended purposes continued to represent a fundamental national security vulnerability” [1].

No evidence has been found to suggest guidelines or training specific to corruption risk in contracting during operations / peacekeeping missions.

There is no evidence of specific guidelines for corruption risk in the contracting procedures for deployed operations or peacekeeping missions. The Public Procurement Code (Decree No. 2009-259 of August 6, 2009) regulates all public procurement, including defence institutions. However, because it is not specific to defence contracting, it can only serve as a general policy for contracting public services. The Code covers corrupt acts by public officials (agents publics) and bidders (soummissionnaires) in Title 10 (Sanction des violations de la réglementation des marchés publics), Articles 184-187. There is no material in these articles that can be construed as serving as a guideline to address corruption risk in field contracting (1). Likewise, there is no information in Order No. 202/MEF/DGBF/DMP (Portant conditions et modalités de résiliation des marchés publics) of April 21, 2010, suggesting that there are specific guidelines to address corruption risk in field contracting involving asset disposals, local power brokers, contract delivery monitoring or security of equipment and personnel (2). The Public Procurement Code and other legislation cannot be used as evidence since they serve only as general policy codes for public procurement.

There is no evidence in open sources indicating that staff are trained on corruption risk during contracting that takes place when troops are deployed or on a peacekeeping mission. As in 55A, the Code des Marchés Publics (Decree No. 2009-259 of 6 August 2009) serves a public procurement policy for state procurement, and defence institutions fall within its scope of application. However, because the code is not specific to the MoD operations, none of its articles refers to the types of corruption risk that deployed troops or peacekeeping missions may face. No article in the Public Procurement Code relates to this type of corruption training, and the code is a general policy not specific to the defence industry.

Normally the defence sector is subject to the same rules of procurement and contracts as applies to the general government. The defence sector though enjoys considerable exceptions as stipulated in Article 77 of Law no. 182 (2018) which allows the MoD and the MMP to grant contracts by direct order. There is also no evidence in the relevant laws, by-laws and media platforms of the existence of guidelines that are specific to corruption risks in contracts while the armed forces are deployed on operations (1), (2).

According to our interviews, the Egyptian army does not train its personnel who will be sent to missions abroad on corruption and corruption risks. Corruption is not considered a strategic issue in the Egyptian army’s operations (1), (2), (3). Egypt has 3000 personnel deployed around the world in peacekeeping forces which means it has the 7th largest peacekeeping operation in the world (4). It is understood that the UN Peacekeeping forces receive some training on corruption risks in general, but it is not clear whether there is specific training for corruption risks in contracts (5). However, after having surveyed and reviewed relevant laws and media platforms, namely that of the Training Authority of the Armed Forces (6), there is no evidence that there is staff training on corruption risks in contracting while on deployed operations.

During peacekeeping missions, GAF personnel adhere to the Command Policy Guidelines issued by the commanding officer and the UN Code of Conduct (1). However, the guidelines are not made publicly available by the MOD or the GAF, and therefore it is impossible to assess whether or not these address corruption risks in contracting specifically. Recruits being deployed on peacekeeping missions are sent for basic training, but no evidence confirms specific training on corruption risks.

Recruits deploying to peacekeeping missions go for general training. However, there is no systematic training for anti-corruption awareness for either civilians or military representatives in operations. The Kofi Anna International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) provides training to military and police personnel before deployment. However, the training does not specifically address corruption risks (1).

There are internal guidelines within the units, brigades, and the offices of the armed forces on how to deal with and report corruption cases. However, these guidelines are not complete, and they are ineffective [1,2]. In addition to that, Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces specifically prohibits the involvement of armed forces personnel in commercial or trade activities that affect their official duty, however, it allows purchasing and owning shares in private companies [3]. Despite the existence of some articles relevant to prohibitions around defence contracting, the law does not even provide any contracting-specific guidelines, let alone a specific one for deployment [4].There is no evidence to support that there are relevant guidelines for corruption risks in contracting.

There are many training sessions provided for the military personnel who work in the offices, especially the financial and procurement units. However, corruption is a small part of such training and is not provided always. It is externally enforced by NGOs or when foreign donor requires such training to be included in the programmes. In fact, evidence points out that collaboration between the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission and the general security department is recent and that a training engagement had not been in place before [1]. In addition to that, trainings provided by foreign embassies or organisations are usually irregular in nature and do not provide any transferrable skills to address corruption in general, let alone specifically in contracting and procurement [2,3,4].

There are no guidelines for corruption risks for operations, an activist close to the Government and an Interior Ministry official said said (1 and 2).

The heads of departments and other senior officials do receive training but it is not while they are deployed on any kind of mission, the activist and officials said (1, 2, 3 and 4). This training is superficial and mostly consists of reiterations that integrity is important.

No corruption guidelines in contracting adopted at the LAF level (risks in contracting in operations of asset disposals, local power brokers, contract delivery monitoring, and security of equipment and personnel) were found (1). However, as indicated Q48, international military education programs conducted with partner nations tied to financial management, procurement, and acquisition all emphasize anti-corruption best practices- such as the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and other similar bilateral training engagements (2), (3). Procurement contracting is conducted under Decree No. 11574 (4) while the delivering country often monitors asset disposal (5). For example, the US’s End-Use Monitoring (EUM) that varifies the end-use transfer of equipment and its compliance with the agreements signed (5). According to the US, the LAF has had an excellent track record with EUM (6).

The LAF indicated that it does not conduct specific training concerning corruption risks in contracting while deployed on operations (1). Furthermore, the LAF does not participate in peacekeeping missions (2).

There is no indication that any guidelines exist or that any training has been provided that specifically addresses corruption risks in contracting when deployed to the field.
Some general guidance on contracting does exist, but this is not even sector-specific, let alone tailored to military operations. The Penal Code which applies to all Malian personnel outlaws the solicitation or accepting of gifts or presents during contracting (article 129).⁵ The Alioune Blondin Beye school of peacekeeping in Bamako offers a wide range of training programmes, including an ethics course that includes guidelines on “integrity and not soliciting or accepting material reward, honour or gifts”, and which is specific to officers on peace-keeping missions.² The school’s basic programmes are based on United Nations Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs), which also address corruption risks in peacekeeping operations. The school also offers a course on UN policing that similarly deals with corruption risks.² These materials are used by MINUSMA to train its peacekeepers before deployment.
The Alioune Blondin Beye school trains about 1,000 individuals from all over Africa each year, with the majority of trainees coming from ECOWAS countries.² This means that the number of Malian soldiers, gendarmes and police officers receiving training at the school is under 1,000 – a mere fraction of the Malian security forces, which comfortably exceed 10,000 individuals.
Moreover, as TI has previously found, training efforts in Mali up until now have paid insufficient attention to corruption-specific matters.³ The police, gendarmerie and national guard are receiving regular anticorruption training from the EU’s EUCAP Sahel Training Mission.⁴ Reforms are designed to create a more effective and transparent human resources system. Training is designed to install a citizen’s ethic into the police to discourage them from preying on the population and demanding bribes.⁴ However, a security expert in Bamako confirmed that the EU’s military training mission (EUTM) – the largest and most important training programme currently operating in Mali – focuses overwhelmingly on military tactics and contains no anticorruption component.1,⁶ Indeed, the EUTM is operating in Mali at the request of the Malian government. Therefore, it does not have an executive or mentoring mandate. It can only deliver what the Malian authorities want.⁶

The Alioune Blondin Beye school of peacekeeping in Bamako offers a wide range of training programmes, including an ethics course that includes teaching on “integrity and not soliciting or accepting material reward, honour or gifts”, and which is specific to officers on peace-keeping missions.² The school’s basic programmes are based on United Nations Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs), which also address corruption risks in peacekeeping operations. The school also offers a course on UN policing that similarly deals with corruption risks.² These materials are used by MINUSMA to train its peacekeepers before deployment. The Alioune Blondin Beye school trains about 1,000 individuals from all over Africa each year, with the majority of trainees coming from ECOWAS countries.² This means that the number of Malian soldiers, gendarmes and police officers receiving training at the school is under 1,000 – a mere fraction of the Malian security forces, which comfortably exceed 10,000 individuals.
Moreover, as TI has previously found, training efforts in Mali up until now have paid insufficient attention to corruption-specific matters.³ The police, gendarmerie and national guard are receiving regular anti-corruption training from the EU’s EUCAP Sahel Training Mission.⁴ Reforms are designed to create a more effective and transparent human resources system.1 Training is designed to install a citizen’s ethic into the police to discourage them from preying on the population and demanding bribes.⁴
However, a security expert in Bamako confirmed that the EU’s military training mission (EUTM) focuses overwhelmingly on military tactics and contains no anticorruption component.⁵ Indeed, the EUTM is operating in Mali at the request of the Malian government. Therefore, it does not have an executive or mentoring mandate. It can only deliver what the Malian authorities want.⁵

The assessor found no evidence of guidelines on how to address corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions (1). The lack of readily available information is also noteworthy in terms of transparency and oversight.

The assessor found no evidence of staff training on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions (1).

There is no evidence of corruption risk guidelines during contracting. The guidelines which exist are of general application. Although the general guidelines which exist may touch on corruption, it is not sufficiently detailed to say that corruption risks in contracting are a key aspect of the guidelines. Peacekeeping Support Operations doctrine has existed since 2007. Guidelines issued by the army state that military personnel on peacekeeping missions are governed by Nigerian law. While on peacekeeping missions they will be expected to adhere to the conduct rules of the army and national laws regarding corruption. The ambiguity as to whether the PPA 2007 applies to military acquisition and procurement processes also arises in this context (1).

There is no evidence of corruption risk training on contracting or procurement while troops are on deployment. However, there is credible evidence of corruption training in more general terms. “Another major problem identified is that of training and doctrine associated with PSOs.” (1) The quality and availability of training for personnel on PSO missions have been identified as a considerable problem which undermines the effectiveness of such missions. This has led to a downgrade of Nigeria’s contribution to peacekeeping missions. “Sources told The Authority newspapers that in February 2017, the MOD awarded a contract for the refurbishing and relocation, but this time, to a contractor who had no prior experience in installation of Level 2 Hospital and didn’t pass through the initial procurement process of the Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP) (2). This contract was awarded after the MOD had gotten a Presidential approval for the contract in the name of another contractor. The side-lined contractor was said to have handled the 2008 installation of Nigeria’s Level 2 hospital currently in operation under the UNAMID operation in UNAMID, Sudan” (3). The various cases reported demonstrate that it is not solely the absence of training or the content of the training which contributes to the high levels of corruption reported but also collusion between public officials and contractors and failure to implement or apply procedures and policies stated in the law.

There is a guideline relevant to corruption risks in contracting; however, it is general and does not define corruption or bribery and lacks specific provisions for contracting while deployed or on peace-keeping missions. The Oman Authority of Partnership for Development established by RD 9/2014 and affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was set up to ensure offset obligations applied to civilian and military procurement contracts (1). However, no legislative guidelines exist addressing corruption when deployed or on peacekeeping missions (2), (3), (4). The MoD’s secretary-general has its own Secretariat Tender. However, no information regarding corruption risks is made available; similarly, the state tender board does not address corruption or bribery within Tender Law (the primary procurement law) (5), (6).

No anti-corruption training was found. The State Audit Institute has held anti-corruption training within other ministries, according to its website, there is no information on training in the Ministry of Defence, including the Royal Armed Forces (1). There is no information regarding training, including procurement corruption risk, on the Royal Armed Forces or MoD websites (2), (3). As outlined in the above sub-indicators, the Omani Royal Armed Forces are not currently deployed in operations or peacekeeping missions. According to our sources, even military personnel who are high ranking and whose units are at a higher level of corruption risk are not trained (4).

There are no guidelines. Armed and security forces can not contract other private companies that provide security services. It has never happened (1). Furthermore, the PA has not ratified the Montreaux Document as it is under an external power and has no sovereignty to contract or even exercise its sovereignty over its area. However, there can be some contracts for local companies to build, provide food, and other needs. There are no specific guidelines other than the procurement guidelines of the Ministry of Finance.

In general, no training is provided. However, in 2017 there was training for senior officers on corruption, transparency and accountability issues (1), (2). Usually, local NGO (Aman) provides training, but no reports in the media or public mentioned that. In the PACC 2017 and 2016 reports (3), they mentioned that many workshops, training and meetings were organized on different themes related to anti-corruption efforts (4), (3), (2). From 2016 to 2017, there was only one training course on anti-corruption that included the armed forces; in 2018, there was one organized by Aman (4).

There are no relevant guidelines for corruption risks in contracting or while on deployment. Research has revealed that the defence sector and the armed forces do not fall under the parameters of Law No. 26 (2005) Central Tender Committee Law, which states ‘The Armed Forces and the Police, in respect of procurement of materials and contracts deemed to be of a confidential nature, for their identification and regulations of conditions of tenders and contracts thereof a decision from the Emir.’ [2] This means that almost all matters related to the armed forces, including contracting, fall directly under the authority of the Emir. In accordance with Article 65 of the Constitutions, the Emir is considered the chief commander of the armed forces. [1] Moreover, our sources on the ground confirm that such guidelines do not exist. [3,4]

There is no training provided on corruption risks for personnel who are part of operations. Such training is not provided for peace operation missions as there are none currently. [1,2]

According to our sources, there are no such guidelines in deployment. As one source confirmed, “During our mission in Yemen, we never had such guidelines or knew of such guidelines even inside KSA” (1). Guidelines training are implemented to address corruption risks in contracting while on deployed operations does not exist (2). Saudi Arabia rarely takes part in peacekeeping missions, with the one instance of its participation in a peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1993 (3).

According to our sources, there is no training provided on corruption risks in procurement for personnel on missions (1). However, the source confirmed that some personnel, especially in financing and procurement receive general training at the main headquarters (1), (2).

According to our sources, there are no guidelines that cover corruption risks in contracting (in all operations, units and procurement practices)(1,2). The Ministry of Defence did not communicate on this issue and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide evidence of the existence of relevant specific guidelines for corruption risks in contracting whilst deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions (3,4).

According to our sources, there is no training provided on corruption risks in procurement or any general corruption risks specifically for contracting. The only training provided is in cooperation with DCAF it is general training, as mentioned above(1,2).

Despite the fact that the UAE has engaged in operations in Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan and Syria (1), and in addition to its involvement in peacekeeping missions, there is no evidence of guidelines addressing corruption risks in contracting on deployment. There are very few regulations that address the conduct of military personnel in general, let alone during deployment. Regulations related to contracting within Federal Laws No. 6 and 7 of 2004 address general military conduct with some articles specifically addressing corruption, but none of these articles are related to corruption while in deployment (2), (3), (4).

There are general anti-corruption training courses for particular departments within the armed forces, such as procurement and the financial department. However, these training courses are not only on corruption, but are general training courses on accounting, and advocacy, but they include a module or two on corruption/anti-corruption. As a source pointed out, “We are invited to participate in an entire training course. But in reality we participate only superficially; we attend in order to get out of work. The trainers don’t require full participation.” (1), (2).

Country Sort by Country 55a. Comprehensiveness Sort By Subindicator 55b. Training Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 0 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 0 / 100 0 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kuwait 0 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 50 / 100
Morocco
Niger 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 50 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 0 / 100 0 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 0 / 100 0 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 50 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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